ML12114A002

Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Electrical Systems Branch (Eeeb) Technical Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR

ML12114A002
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	04/16/2012
From:	Franke J Progress Energy Florida
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3F0412-06, TAC ME6527
Download: ML12114A002 (34)

Text

kProgress Energy Crystal River Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 April 16, 2012 3F0412-06 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 - Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Electrical Systems Branch (EEEB) Technical Review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate LAR (TAC No. ME6527)

References:

1. CR-3 to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 - License Amendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate" (Accession No. ML112070659)

2. NRC to CR-3 letter dated March 2, 2012, "Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant - Request For Additional Information For Extended Power Uprate License Amendment Request (TAC No. ME6527)" (Accession No.

ML12052A130)

Dear Sir:

By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc., requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt (Reference 1). On March 2, 2012, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) required to support the EEEB technical review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) License Amendment Request (LAR) (Reference 2).

The attachment, "Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Electrical Systems Branch (EEEB) Technical Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR," provides the formal response to the RAI needed to support the EEEB technical review of the CR-3 EPU LAR.

In support of the EPU technical review RAI responses, two enclosures are provided. , "Station Blackout DC Loads," provides a listing of battery loads that demonstrates the DC Electrical System capability to provide four hour coping during a Station Blackout event. , "Battery Room Layout Drawing - Proposed FCS Battery Location," illustrates the proposed location and layout of the new Fast Cooldown System batteries with respect to the existing safety-related station batteries.

This correspondence contains no new regulatory commitments.

Progress Energy Florida. Inc. I-wo Crystal River Nuclear Plant 15760 W. Powerline Street Crystal River, FL 34428

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 3 3F0412-06 If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott, Superintendent, Licensing and Regulatory Programs at (352) 563-4796.

Sincerely, J A. Franke ice President Crystal River Nuclear Plant JAF/par

Attachment:

Response to Request for Additional Information to Support NRC Electrical Systems Branch (EEEB) Technical Review of the CR-3 EPU LAR

Enclosures:

1. Station Blackout DC Loads

2. Battery Room Layout Drawing - Proposed FCS Battery Location xc: NRR Project Manager Regional Administrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector State Contact

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 3 3F0412-06 STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF CITRUS Jon A. Franke states that he is the Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant for Florida Power Corporation, doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and be

/J A. Franke Vice President Crystal River Nuclear Plant The foregoing document was acknowledged before me this 6," day of

• '/ , 2012, by Jon A. Franke.

Signature of Notary Public State of Florida ..... ,... -

(Print, type, or stamp Commissioned Name of Notary Public)

Personally Produced Known -OR- Identification

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT NRC ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS BRANCH (EEEB)

TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 1 of 15 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT NRC ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS BRANCH (EEEB)

TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CR-3 EPU LAR By letter dated June 15, 2011, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), doing business as Progress Energy Florida, Inc., (PEF) requested a license amendment to increase the rated thermal power level of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) from 2609 megawatts (MWt) to 3014 MWt. On March 2, 2012, the NRC provided a request for additional information (RAI) required to support the EEEB technical review of the CR-3 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) License Amendment Request (LAR).

For tracking purposes, each item related to this RAI is uniquely identified as EEEB X-Y, with X indicating the RAI set and Y indicating the sequential item number.

1. (EEEB 1-1)

In your original LAR dated June 15, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112070659), , Section 2.3.1.2, pages 2.3.1-4 and 2.3.1-5, "Detailed EPU Impacts by Zone," the licensee provided an environmental qualification (EQ) reclassification of the plant area due to projected post-EPU environmental conditions, which impacts Zone 17 in the Intermediate Building, and Zones 18, 23, 47, 60, 62, and 78 in the Auxiliary Building.

Provide a list of the equipment/components that will be affected as a result of the new areas being designated as "harsh." Provide the post-EPU radiation levels in these reclassified zones and the radiation levels to which these equipment/components are qualified.

Response

The environmental impact to equipment and components in plant areas reclassified as HARSH EQ zones due to EPU conditions is limited to elevated radiation levels. Point specific dose calculations were performed to more accurately reflect the calculated Total Integrated Dose (TID) to individual equipment/components following a design basis accident.

Table 1, "Equipment/Component TIDs for Reclassified EQ Zones," lists the highest calculated TID for each EQ zone reclassified as a result of operation at EPU conditions. As applicable, Table 1 also lists the equipment/components in each zone affected by the increased radiation levels and includes the calculated point specific TID for each equipment/component.

Table 1 - Equipment/Component TIDs for Reclassified EQ Zones EQ Zone Equipment/Component Tag Number (rads) 17 - Intermediate Building 1.10E+05 Motor Starter - MFW Startup Block FW-33-MST 7.05E+02 Valve to OTSG B Motor Operator - EFW Block Valve to OTSG A FWV-35-MOA 3.86E+02

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 2 of 15 EQ Zone Equipment/Component Tag Number TID (rads)

Motor Starter - FWV-35 FWV-35-MST 3.66E+02 Motor Starter - FWV-36 FWV-36-MST 7.35E+02 Terminal Box - FWV-36 FW-41-TB 1.21E+03 Terminal Box - MSV-411/412-SV4 and Press Switches MS-21-TB 3.68E+02 Terminal Box - MSV-55 MS-6-TB 6.95E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, IA 3.9 1E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 1B 3.77E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, IC 3.78E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, ID 3.77E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 2A 3.54E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 2B 3.55E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 2C 3.55E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 3A 3.52E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 3BL 3.52E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 3BR 3.52E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 3C 3.52E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 4A 3.54E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 4B 3.54E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 4C 3.54E+02 480V Pressurizer Heater MCC-3B MTMC-9, 5A 3.55E+02 18 - Auxiliary Building No EX' components in this EQ 1.53E+05 zone.

23 - Auxiliary Building 1.22E+04 DC Disconnect Switch - Spare DPDP-2A-10; DIS 1.28E+03 DC Disconnect Switch - 125V Control DPDP2A 19; DIS 1.28E+03 Power to RCP-3A D_ DP-2A-19;_DIS _ 1.28E+03 DC Disconnect Switch- 125V Control DPDP-2A-2; DIS 1.28E+03 Power to RCP-3C DPDP-2A-2;_DIS _ 1.28E+03 DC Disconnect Switch - DCV- IO-SV DPDP-2A-20; DIS 1.28E+03 DC Disconnect Switch - 250V Motor DPDP-2A-3; DIS 1.28E+03 Power to RCP-3A D_ DP-2A-3;_DIS _ 1.28E+03 PC Disconnect Switch - 250V Motor DPDP-2A4; DIS 1.28E+03 Power to RCP-3C DPDP-2A-4;_DIS _ 1.28E+03 47 - Auxiliary Building No EX' components in this EQ 1.91 E+04 zone.

60 - Auxiliary Building No EX1 components in this EQ 9.38E+05 zone.

62 - Auxiliary Building 1.62E+05 EDG-3B Emergency Load Shedding -

Peat Tracing F HTCP-2 1.56E+04

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 3 of 15 Equipment/Component Tag Number TID (rads) 78 - Auxiliary Building 4.58E+04

_HD- IC Positioner AH- 196-POS I 4.22E+03 EX - CR-3 designation for electrical components important to safety which is relied upon to remain functional during and after design basis events.

2. (EEEB 1-2)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.1.2, page 2.3.1-5, "Summary of EPU Impact on Component Basis," the licensee discussed the proposed plant changes as a result of EPU, as referred to Appendix E, which add or modify equipment subject to EQ requirements. The licensee further stated, "These new components will be designed, procured, and installed in compliance with appropriate EQ requirements."

Provide a detailed list (preferably in a table) of new EQ equipment, which are referenced in the above paragraph. Provide a discussion of EQ (similar to the EQ discussion provided in Section 2.4 of Appendix E, page E-38, for atmospheric dump valves and accessories) for the following:

(i) new EQ motor operated valves (MOVs) and the new EQ transmitters for the low pressure injection cross-tie and hot leg injection design change, (ii) new EQ MOV for the feedwater booster pump modification, (iii) new EQ differential pressure indicating switches, and (iv) EQ core exit thermocouple for the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor System change.

Response

The new EQ components listed in Section 2.3.1, "Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment," of the EPU Technical Report (TR) (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7) are being evaluated in the associated CR-3 Engineering Change (EC) packages. Once it is determined that a component is located in a designated HARSH EQ Zone, an EQ Vendor Qualification Package (VQP) is created for the new component or the component is added to an existing EQ VQP, as applicable. Finalization of the EPU plant modifications is currently in progress and includes the associated EQ evaluations which will be completed once the specific location and type of component is known.

Analysis of the new components:

(i) The new EQ motor operators associated with the new low pressure injection cross-tie and hot leg injection lines are Limitorque valve operators. The same model of motor operators are currently qualified and included in the CR-3 EQ program. Also, new EQ transmitters have been identified as Rosemount transmitters. The same model of transmitters are currently qualified and included in the CR-3 EQ program. Therefore,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 4 of 15 both the new motor operators and transmitters will be included in the applicable CR-3 VQPs.

(ii) Replacement EQ motor operators associated with the main feedwater suction valves are Limitorque valve operators. The same model of motor operators are currently qualified and included in the CR-3 EQ program. Therefore, the replacement EQ motor operators will be included in the applicable CR-3 VQP.

(iii) New differential pressure switches associated with the Emergency Feedwater System recirculation valves are to be included in the CR-3 EQ Program and as such, a VQP is being finalized for these new EQ components.

(iv) Eight core exit thermocouples are being upgraded to safety-related in support of the new Inadequate Core Cooling Mitigation System. The same model of thermocouples are currently qualified and included in the CR-3 EQ program. Therefore, the upgraded thermocouples will be included in the applicable CR-3 VQP.

3. (EEEB 1-3)

In the original LAR. Attachment 5, Section 2.3.1.2, page 2.3.1-2, the licensee stated, "The environmental parameters evaluated for EPU conditions include temperature, pressure, radiation dose, submergence, chemical spray effects, and humidity, for both normal operation and post-accident conditions."

a) Confirm that the margins for the equipment qualified per guidance under Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 323-1974, "Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," are maintained under EPU conditions.

Response

For EQ equipment installed at CR-3 after February 23, 1983, including new equipment requiring environmental qualification in accordance with 10CFR50.49, FPC confirms that the associated margins specified in IEEE 323-1974 will be maintained during operation at EPU conditions.

b) Original LAR Figure 2.3.1-1 (Post-EPU LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident] versus EQ Bounding Profile Comparison, Inside Containment Temperature), appears to show that the IEEE recommended temperature margin (15 'F) is not maintained at one point (1.OOE+04 time/280 7F). Please clarify the apparent deviation.

Response

The EQ bounding profile curve indicated in Figure 2.3.1-1, "Post-EPU LOCA vs. EQ Bounding Profile Comparison (Inside Containment)," of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7) represents a bounding temperature profile of loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) at EPU conditions. EQ equipment inside the containment is qualified to temperatures at least 15'F above the highest temperature on the EQ bounding curve. Therefore, the EQ equipment inside containment continues to meet the temperature margin recommended in IEEE 323-1974.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 5 of 15 c) Provide the post-EPU pressure profile for conditions inside containment to demonstrate that the integrated pressure curve is bounded by the current EQ bounding profile.

Response

EQ components inside containment were evaluated to confirm that pressure margin is within the recommendations of IEEE 323-1974. Consistent with CR-3 Technical Specification 5.6.2.20, a peak containment internal pressure was used to determine the EQ limiting pressure; 54.2 psig x 10% = 5.42 psig. The qualified pressure of each EQ component located in the containment was compared to the EQ limiting pressure to determine the pressure margin. The results are provided in the following table; Table2, "EQ Pressure Margin by Component - Inside Containment." Table 2 shows the smallest margin is 15.22 psig, which is within the recommendations of IEEE 323-1974.

Table 2 - EQ Pressure Margin by Component - Inside Containment Tested Margin VQP ID Description Pressure (psig)

(psig)

INST-B014-04 B&W (Framatome) Incore Detector System 66 17.22 INST-C515-07 Conax RTDs 7H24-10000-01 70 21.22 Conax RTDs 7Q22 & 7Q77 INST-C515-08 Thermocouple/Resistance Temperature Device 87.6 38.82 (RTD)

INST-G030-11 Gamma Metrics Neutron Flux Monitors 70 21.22 INST-G050-13 GEMS RB Building Flood Level Transmitters 66 17.22 INST-G063-12 General Atomic RD-23 Hi Range Radiation 78 29.22 Monitors INST-R369-01 Rosemount 1153 Series B Transmitters 73 24.22 INST-R369-03 Rosemount 1154 Transmitters 110 61.22 INST-R369-04 Rosemount 1154, Series H Transmitters 85 36.22 INST-R369-05 Rosemount 177HW RTDs (Cold Leg) 129.9 81.12 INST-R369-09 Rosemount 1154 Transmitters / 1159 sensors 110 61.22 INST-T068-06 TEC Valve Monitoring System 64 15.22 INST-W108-15 Weed Instrument Co RTD (Hot Leg) 75.35 26.57 MTR-W120-02 Westinghouse Fan Motors AHF-IA, B & C 80.8 32.02 PEN-C515-03 Conax Electrical Penetration 2325-7870 74.5 25.72 PEN-C515-06 Conax ECSA conduit seal assemblies 75 26.22 TERM-E159-07 EGS Grayboots - GB-3, old style series 81 32.22 TERM-E159-12 EGS Grayboots - GB-lA & 2A series 105 56.22 TERM-K080- 10 Kerite 480V Tape termination 80 31.22 TERM-R098-04 Raychem WSCF-N Standard Splices 66 17.22 TERM-R098-09 Raychem WSCF-N(S) New Formula Splices 124 75.22 VLV-L200-07 Limitorque Class RH, AC Reliance Motors 70 21.22 VLV-T020-01 Target Rock Solenoid Valves 81VV-01, 02 & 03 69 20.22

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 6 of 15 d) Provide the post-EPU temperature profile for main steam line break environmental conditions to demonstrate that the profile is less severe than LOCA as discussed on page 2.3.1-3, under "Summary EPU Impact" in Reactor Building.

Response

A specific post-EPU temperature profile of the environmental conditions during a MSLB accident to demonstrate that the profile is less severe than a LOCA was not developed and; thus, is not provided. The LOCA environmental conditions are considered more severe than the MSLB accident environmental conditions as concluded by the NRC staff in a letter to FPC dated June 5, 1981 (Reference 2). This letter states, in part, that, "...for plants designed and equipped with an automatic containment spray system which satisfies the single-failure criterion, the main-steam-line-break (MSLB) environmental conditions are enveloped by the large-break-LOCA environmental conditions." The CR-3 Reactor Building Spray System satisfies the single-failure criterion and; therefore, the CR-3 EQ program continues to be based on the LOCA containment temperature results.

4. (EEEB 1-4)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.1.2, page 2.3.1-2, under "Description of Analyses and Evaluations," the licensee stated that "Even though the EPU design change packages are not yet issued for construction, EPU impacts on parameters important to EQ are known."

Provide clarification of this statement. Also, the NRC staff finds that in Attachment 10 of the original LAR, "List of Regulatory Commitments," the licensee states that CR-3 will implement all EPU modifications per Technical Report (TR) Attachment E. Confirm that the licensee intended to refer to Appendix E, "Major Plant Modifications," of Attachment 5 of the original LAR instead of TR Attachment E.

Response

When referring to Attachment E in Attachment 10, "List of Regulatory Commitments," of the CR-3 EPU LAR (Reference 1), FPC is referring to the modifications described in Appendix E, "Major Plant Modifications," and associated enclosures of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7).

FPC has evaluated the impact to plant parameters important to EQ at EPU conditions and provided the results of the evaluations in Section 2.3.1, "Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment," of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7). A revision to the Environmental Qualification Plant Profile Document has been prepared to reflect the plant conditions during EPU operation. Based on revised EPU environmental conditions, EQ VQPs, are being prepared to reflect EPU environmental conditions, which also include new EQ components. These documents will be finalized as part of completion of the EC packages required prior to EPU implementation.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 7 of 15

5. (EEEB 1-5)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.1.2, page 2.3.1-4, the licensee stated, "The RB

[Reactor Building] postulated maximum flood level is not impacted by the proposed EPU conditions."

Indicate the maximum postulated flood level versus the levels of the equipment to demonstrate that the associated equipment is not impacted by the EPU conditions in the RB. Similarly, address the postulated flood level conditions in the Intermediate Building.

Response

The CR-3 RB maximum expected flood elevation at EPU conditions remains unchanged at less than 102 ft. With the exception of the RB sump transmitter capillary tubes, electrical equipment important to safety is installed above this level and; therefore, is not impacted by flooding conditions during EPU operation. Additionally, new electrical equipment important to safety required for operation at EPU conditions will be installed in the RB above the maximum flood elevation of 102 ft.

The CR-3 Intermediate Building (IB) maximum flood level at the 95 ft. building elevation is 2 in. and the maximum flood level at the 119 ft. building elevation is 2 ft.-2 in. FPC evaluated these internal flooding levels and determined that they were not impacted by EPU conditions.

Electrical equipment important to safety is installed above these levels and; therefore, is not impacted by flooding conditions during EPU operation. Additionally, new electrical equipment important to safety required for operation at EPU conditions will be installed in the IB above the maximum expected flooding levels.

6. (EEEB 1-6)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Appendix E, "Major Plant Modifications," Section 1.4.1, the licensee stated, "The power and control from the existing MOVs will be re-routed into the RB through two new electrical penetrations (converted mechanical penetrations 327 and 328 from the Triangle Room)."

Confirm that the new electrical penetrations are environmentally qualified with margins for the installed life in accordance with the guidance provided in IEEE Standard-317, "Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

Response

The vendor qualification report for the new electrical penetration assemblies demonstrates that these penetration assemblies will perform their intended design function under normal and accident environmental conditions without loss of mechanical or electrical integrity over a 40 year installed life thereby assuring compliance with the requirements of IEEE 317-1983.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 8 of 15

7. (EEEB 1-7)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.2.2 under Section 2.3.2, "Offsite Power System,"

the licensee discussed the adequacy of the switchyard main generator output breaker capacity.

Also in Appendix E, the licensee stated that no changes to either switchyard (230 kV and 500 kV) are necessary to support EPU.

Provide a discussion that demonstrates that other equipment such as breakers (other than the generator main breaker), disconnects, buses, current transformers, tie-lines, etc., have adequate capacity so that the existing switchyard is capable of supporting EPU conditions (i.e., the equipment have adequate margins between the maximum worst case steady-state load and the equipment ratings).

Response

As discussed in Section 2.3.2, "Offsite Power System," of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7), the CR-3 generating unit shares the 500 kV switchyard with an adjacent large fossil generating unit and two 500 kV transmission lines. The PEF transmission division conducted a system impact study of the Crystal River Energy Complex transmission system considering the additional 180 MWe net generation and concluded that the current system configuration; including the 500 kV switchyard transmission lines, disconnects, buses, current transformers, and tie-lines; has sufficient margin between the maximum steady state load conditions and the equipment ratings.

In addition, as described in Appendix E of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7) the CR-3 main generator step-up transformers have been replaced during a previous outage. This plant modification anticipated a generation increase of 200 MWe. Also, based on a review of other supporting electrical systems, additional equipment was replaced during the main generator step-up transformer replacement; two high voltage bushing current transformers, two low voltage bushing current transformers, two low voltage external current transformers, and three lightning arrestors - one per main transformer.

The 230 kV switchyard is the preferred offsite power source for the CR-3 Class 1E AC Electrical System. Since the 500 kV and 230 kV electrical systems are not directly inter-connected at the Crystal River Energy Complex, the additional generation as a result of the CR-3 EPU does not impact the capability of the 230 kV offsite power source to CR-3. FPC has concluded that the 230 kV switchyard has the capacity to provide the additional load resulting from EPU operation and the current system configuration; including the 230 kV switchyard transmission lines, disconnects, buses, current transformers, and tie-lines; has sufficient margin between the maximum steady state load conditions and the equipment ratings.

8. (EEEB 1-8)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.3.2, page 2.3.3-3, the licensee mentioned upgrades to the isolated-phase bus duct and the pre-and post-EPU continuous current ratings.

Provide a summary of the calculation used to determine that the calculated short-circuit current available at the bus duct is within the bus short circuit capacity rating.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 9 of 15

Response

The short circuit analyses of the CR-3 Class 1E and Balance of Plant AC Electrical Distribution Systems calculate short circuit currents for evaluating the adequacy of fault current interrupting ratings and to ensure equipment momentary current ratings are not exceeded using Electrical Transient Analyzer Program (ETAP) software. These analyses included major AC electrical components added as a result of the CR-3 EPU. The short circuit analysis, based on the currently planned EPU configuration, indicates the maximum isolated-phase bus duct short circuit current is less than 250,000 amps which is less than the capacity rating of 345,000 amps.

In addition, changes that impact electrical calculations not yet included in the formal calculations are evaluated using the Electrical System Calculation Impact Assessment process to ensure the composite effect of the electrical system changes are acceptable. Electrical System Calculation Impact Assessment forms are included in individual EC packages. The composite effect of the EPU design changes is evaluated to ensure that the existing ratings are not exceeded. Additional CR-3 AC Electrical Distribution System configuration changes as a result of EPU operation are being evaluated using this process and are expected to be bounded by the equipment ratings due to margin in the electrical calculations between calculated short circuit current and the rated values.

9. (EEEB 1-9)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.3.2, page 2.3.3-3, the licensee stated that the proposed Class 1E modifications would not result in any configuration changes that would adversely impact the maximum emergency diesel generator (EDG) loading currently assumed.

Provide a discussion and a summary of the calculation that demonstrates that the EDG loading in the post-EPU state, after taking into account increased loads on the vital bus inverters and engineered safeguard bus (safety-related) instrument power systems, will remain within each EDG's capacity.

Response

Prior to issuance of revised EDG loading calculations, EDG loading logs are updated and managed using the Electrical System Calculation Impact Assessment process to ensure each EDG remains within its design capacity. Conservative electrical loading values, as a result of operation at EPU conditions and currently planned EPU-related plant modifications, are included in these EDG loading logs. The summation of the electrical loading changes identified in the EDG loading logs shows that each EDG will remain within its design capacity during post-EPU operation.

Additions and reductions in electrical loading to the Class 1E AC Electrical Distribution System, including increased loads on the vital bus inverters and the vital AC buses, have been evaluated using conservative loading values. The vital AC bus inverter loading changes as a result of current EPU design modifications are: (1) Inverter IA - 296 watt increase; (2) Inverter lB -

309.2 watt increase; (3) Inverter IC - no loading changes; and (4) Inverter 1D - 6.2 watt reduction. These changes do not exceed the conservative inverter loading values included in the EDG loading calculations and; as a result, do not adversely impact the EDG loading.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 10 of 15 In accordance with the CR-3 EC process, the EDG loading calculations will be revised to incorporate the actual electrical loading impacts from EPU operation and EPU-related modifications following finalization of the modifications to confirm each EDG remains within its design capacity.

10. (EEEB 1-10)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.3.2, page 2.3.3-4, the licensee stated, "All lower voltage buses, switchgear, and motor control centers were demonstrated to have sufficient voltages at the lowest operating voltage on the grid to assure operability of the connected equipment."

Provide a discussion and a summary of the calculation that demonstrates that the degraded voltage relay and under voltage relay settings at the 480 volt load center buses are not adversely affected by operation under EPU conditions.

Response

The CR-3 480 V load center buses do not have a degraded voltage relaying scheme; only loss of voltage relays. The 480 V fixed loss of voltage relays ensure selected 480 V loads are removed from the associated bus to prevent bus overload on re-energization and are not being altered as a result of operation at EPU conditions. The First Level Undervoltage Relays (FLURs) and Second Level Undervoltage Relays (SLURs) associated with the 4160 V ES buses provide undervoltage and degraded voltage protection for the downstream 480 V electrical distribution components.

The FLURs and SLURs dropout, pickup and time delay setpoints, and tolerances have been evaluated considering proposed changes to the Class IE AC Electrical Distribution System.

Conservative bus loading values were used to ensure the undervoltage and degraded voltage schemes are acceptable for operation at EPU conditions. A qualitative assessment of the safety-related ETAP analyses have concluded that the FLURs and SLURs settings are not adversely impacted and continue to be acceptable for operation at EPU conditions. In accordance with the CR-3 EC process, the electrical loading calculations will be revised to incorporate the actual electrical loading impacts from EPU operation and EPU-related modifications following finalization of the modifications to confirm the undervoltage and degraded voltage schemes are acceptable for operation at EPU conditions.

11. (EEEB 1-11)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.3.2, page 2.3.3-2, the licensee stated, "The impact of the electrical load increase was evaluated using load flow, short circuit, and protection-coordination studies."

Provide a summary of the evaluation/study that demonstrates that the short-circuit rating due to the increase in loads (Class 1E and Non-Class 1E switchgear buses) are not adversely impacted by the load increase.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 11 of 15

Response

The short circuit analyses of the CR-3 Class IE and Balance of Plant AC Electrical Distribution Systems calculate short circuit currents for evaluating the adequacy of fault current interrupting ratings and to ensure equipment momentary current ratings are not exceeded using ETAP software. These analyses include major AC electrical components added as a result of the CR-3 EPU.

An initial non safety-related ETAP analysis was performed considering EPU conditions and the results were provided in Section 2.3.3, "AC Onsite Power System," of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7). Subsequent to submittal of the CR-3 EPU LAR, FPC has discovered an incorrect design input in this ETAP analysis. This condition was identified in the CR-3 Corrective Action Program and the short circuit analysis has been re-performed. The revised non safety-related ETAP analysis indicates that the short circuit ratings are exceeded at EPU conditions on several non-segregated bus duct sections from the unit auxiliary transformer to the 4160 V buses. As a result, a plant modification has been added to the EPU scope of work to replace the sections of bus duct that were determined to require upgrading with higher short circuit ratings. This modification will replace five 4160 V non-segregated bus duct sections and will be completed prior to EPU operation. The short circuit analysis, based on the current planned EPU configuration, indicates the maximum short circuit current associated with the non-Class lE switchgear buses does not exceed equipment interrupting duty and momentary duty values and continues to be acceptable for operation at EPU conditions.

EPU modifications to the Class 1E AC Electrical Distribution System do not increase the available short circuit current on the Class 1E switchgear. Conservative vital bus loading values are included in the safety-related ETAP analyses; therefore, additional inverter electrical loading as a result of safety-related EPU modifications do not impact the short circuit ratings of the Class 1E switchgear. In addition, changes related to the 480V electrical loads (e.g., replacing MOVs) do not adversely impact the safety-related short circuit analyses since the changes consist of the same or reduced equipment short circuit contribution. As such, the maximum short circuit current associated with the Class lE switchgear buses does not exceed equipment interrupting duty and momentary duty current values and continues to be acceptable for operation at EPU conditions.

12. (EEEB 1-12)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.4.1, page 2.3.4-2, the licensee discussed the load impacts on the direct current (DC) power system due to the proposed EPU and stated that emergency feedwater flow increase/flow control modification has an impact on DC power but remains within the loading capabilities of the station batteries.

Provide a comparison of the existing loads and the loads added to the DC power system as a result of the EPU. Also, provide the design rating for each safety-related and nonsafety-related battery at CR-3 to show that adequate capacity exists to support EPU conditions.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 12 of 15

Response

The CR-3 Class lE 250/125 V station batteries are rated at 1708 amp-hours (A-H) for eight hours to 1.81 volts per cell (vpc). In addition, the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) diesel driven pump (EFP-3) battery is rated at 231 A-H for eight hours to 1.81 vpc.

An evaluation was performed considering EPU operating conditions to determine the impact on the CR-3 Class 1E DC Electrical Distribution and non-Class 1E DC Electrical Distribution Systems, including the impact of design modifications as a result of the CR-3 EPU. The total changes on vital bus inverter loading, changed as a result of EPU design modifications, do not exceed the conservative inverter loading values included in the DC electrical calculations and do not adversely impact the Class 1E battery loading.

The EFW System pump recirculation line modification adds less than 2 amps to the 'B-positive' 125 V Class lE battery and less than 2 amps to the diesel driven EFW pump (EFP-3) battery.

No specific loading changes are planned for the 'B-negative' 125 V Class lE battery or the 'A' 250/125 V Class lE battery. Table 3, "Pre-EPU B-positive Class lE Battery and EFP-3 Battery Loading Data," provides the current pre-EPU battery peak zero to one minute and diesel start loading profiles for the 'B-positive' 125 V Class 1E battery and the EFP-3 battery.

Table 3 - Pre-EPU B-positive Class 1E Battery and EFP-3 Battery Loading Data Diesel Start 2-hour Profile 4-hour Profile Profile Battery (amps) (amps) (amps)

B-positive Class 1E 125 V 335.7 286.1 356.4 EFP-3 NA NA 144.4 The non-Class 1E 250/125 V battery is rated at 2200 A-H for eight hours to 1.81 vpc. An electrical engineering assessment considering EPU operating conditions concluded that the non-Class 1E DC Electrical Distribution System is not adversely affected as a result of EPU operation and the non-Class 1E 250/125 V battery will continue to perform as designed.

In accordance with the CR-3 EC process, the electrical loading calculations will be revised to incorporate the actual DC electrical loading impacts from EPU operation and EPU-related modifications following finalization of the modifications to confirm the battery loading is acceptable for operation at EPU conditions.

13. (EEEB 1-13)

In the original LAR, Attachment 5, Section 2.3.5.2, the licensee addressed the systems and components necessary to cope with a station blackout (SBO).

a) Provide a summary of SBO loads for both pre-and post-EPU conditions.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 13 of 15

Response

Enclosure 1, "Station Blackout DC Loads;" contains the pre-EPU loads associated with the Class 1E station batteries and the EFP-3 battery. An evaluation was performed considering the current EPU modifications to determine the impact on the SBO loading and concluded that the SBO loading impact is limited to the EFW pump recirculation line modification. Modifications associated with inverter loading are bounded by the loading values assumed in the applicable calculations; as such, these modifications do not alter SBO coping.

The EFW pump recirculation line modification adds less than two amps to the 'B-positive' 125 V Class 1E battery and to the EFP-3 battery. There are no other changes to the Class 1E DC loads associated to EPU design changes that impact the ability to cope with an SBO at CR-3. Qualitative assessments have determined there is sufficient margin available on these battery systems to support the minor loading increase.

b) Section 14.1.2.9.5.2 of the CR-3 Final Safety Analysis Report provides an analysis (based on NUMARC 87-00) that supports a coping duration of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for an SBO event at CR-3. This section indicates that the analyses were performed based on a core power level of 2772 megawatts thermal (MWt) and that no analyses are required to support a power uprate of 2609 MWt.

Explain whether the analyses provided in the original LAR Section 2.3.5.2 were performed to support a power upgrade to an increased core power of 3014 MWt due to EPU conditions.

Response

As stated in Section 2.3.5, "Station Blackout," of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7), the core decay heat value in the SBO analyses performed for EPU operation is based on an initial core power of 3014 MWt plus 0.4% heat balance calculation uncertainty and 16.4 MWt from reactor coolant pump heat.

14. (EEEB 1-14)

On January 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120330114), the licensee submitted supplemental information in Attachment C, "Clarification Information to the CR-3 EPU Technical Report Section 2.7.3.1 Regarding the [Fast Cooldown System] FCS Batteries." Based on its review of the supplemental information, the NRC staff requests the following:

a) Discuss the impact of the EPU on battery room temperature during normal operation, design basis events, and beyond design basis events (such as an SBO).

Response

The Class 1E station battery room temperatures are maintained by the Control Complex Ventilation (AH-XK) System. As discussed in Section 2.7.3.1, "Control Room Area Ventilation System," of the EPU TR (Reference 1, Attachments 5 and 7); the normal

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 14 of 15 operational flow paths and flow rates associated with the AH-XK System do not change as a result of EPU operation; the heat load increases due to EPU operation and associated plant modifications are small; and the equipment operational thermal loads do not change following a LOCA at EPU conditions. A qualitative assessment of the EPU impact on the Control Complex heat load calculations, which include the Class 1E battery rooms, was performed and the assessment determined that the room temperatures will remain below the maximum allowable normal and post-LOCA Control Complex temperatures.

Also, the additional BTUs were compared to the existing margins in the SBO analyses and the additional heat loads as a result of EPU operation and associated modifications were qualitatively determined to have a small impact on these margins.

b) Discuss the impact of placing the FCS batteries in the battery rooms has on battery room temperature during normal operation, design basis events and beyond the design basis events (such as an SBO).

Response

The FCS batteries are much smaller than the station safety-related batteries. The Class 1E station batteries are rated for 1708 A-H for eight hours to 1.81 vpc while the proposed FCS batteries are rated for 50 A-H for eight hours to 1.75 vpc. The current SBO temperature rise calculations associated with the Class 1E station battery rooms indicate a maximum calculated temperature of approximately 107TF. A qualitative assessment of the FCS battery impact on the battery room temperature rise calculations was performed. The additional heat load from the FCS batteries was conservatively calculated using two times the full amperage from each battery bank during worst case conditions (i.e., maximum loads and minimum voltage). This conservative heat load assumption represents a very small percentage of heat, approximately 0.06%, of that produced by the Class lE station batteries and does not increase the evaluated temperatures of the battery rooms during normal operation, design basis events, or beyond design basis events including an SBO event.

c) Discuss the installation details of the FCS batteries in the battery rooms.

Response

The new FCS battery banks are to be mounted in new battery racks on the plant station battery room floors on a horizontal plane with the existing station batteries to meet plant separation criteria. Enclosure 2, "Battery Room Layout Drawing - Proposed FCS Battery Location," illustrates the proposed location and layout of the FCS batteries with respect to the existing safety-related station batteries.

The positive and negative terminal battery cables for the FCS will be installed in flex conduit and routed to disconnect switches mounted on the west wall (left wall as illustrated in Enclosure 2) of the battery rooms. The FCS batteries and racks will be installed greater than four feet horizontally from the station batteries to ensure CR-3 electrical circuit physical separation criteria are met.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 3F0412-06 Page 15 of 15 The seismically qualified racks provided by C&D Technologies will be installed and anchored in the concrete in accordance with CR-3 anchor bolt procedures and the battery manufacturer installation instructions.

d) Discuss the seismic design considerations for the FCS battery installation and the potential seismic impact on the other safety-related equipment/components in the battery rooms.

Response

The FCS batteries and associated supporting equipment have been seismically tested in accordance with IEEE 344, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Associated conduit and cable routing will be installed in accordance with applicable CR-3 installation practices to assure this equipment is seismically qualified. The FCS batteries and racks will be installed greater than four feet horizontally from the station batteries to ensure CR-3 electrical circuit physical separation criteria are met.

References

1. FPC to NRC letter dated June 15, 2011, "Crystal River Unit 3 - License Amendment Request #309, Revision 0, Extended Power Uprate." (Accession No. ML112070659)

2. NRC to FPC letter dated June 5, 1981, "Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment." (Accession No. 8107060035)

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 /LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 1 STATION BLACKOUT DC LOADS

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.2 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery A - Positive, 4 Hour Page 2 of 6 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tag Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (minL (sec) mminL.(sec)

DPDPIA 04 DUAL INPUT INVERTER 3A VBIT-1A 1.00 SS 168.000 0 0 239 59 DPDP1A 06 BATTERY CHARGER 3A DPBC-1A 1.00 SS 0.101 0 0 240 0 DPDP1A 10 BATTERY CHARGER 3E DPBC-IE(1A10 1.00 SS 0.101 0 0 240 0 DPDP1A 18 250/125-DC BATTERY 3A DPGD-1A 1.00 SS 0.001 0 0 240 0 GROUND DETECTOR DPDP5A 01 RC VENT VALVE & CONTROL 1030(5A01)

DPDP5A 03 RELAYS & IND LIGHTS FOR EX 1060(5A03) 1.00 SS 3.240 0 0 240 0 ACT A - HPI DPDP5A 04 MUP-3A CONTROL MUP-3A(5A04) 6.72 SS 0.672 0 0 30 1.00 SS 0.100 30 0 240 DPDP5A 09 480V ES SW MTSW-3F BKR MTSW-3F(5A09 186.90 IN 18.690 0 0 0 CONTROL 15.72 SS 1.572 0 3 1 15.72 SS 1.572 1 0 240 DPDP5A 15 SW VALVES & CONTROL 1038(5A15) 3.50 SS 0.350 0 0 240 DPDP5A 17 SW VALVES & CONTROL 1038(5A17) 1.50 SS 0.150 0 0 240 DPDP5A 21 SW & AH VALVES & CONTROL 1041 (5A21) 7.01 SS 0.701 0 0 240 DPDP5A 22 WS VALVES/AH CONTROL 1038(5A22) 1.00 SS 0.680 0 0 240 DPDP5A 23 MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION MUP-3A(5A23) 1.00 IN 11.570 0 0 0 PUMP MUP-1A BACKUP LOP 1.00 SS 2.314 0 3 30 DPDP5A 24 MAKEUP & PURIF PUMP MUP- MUP-5A(5A24) 1.00 IN 18.750 0 3 0 1A BACKUP GEAR OIL PUMP 1.00 SS 3.750 0 6 30 DPDP5A 26 EFV58 CONTROLLER EFV58 1.00 SS 3.000 0 0 240 DPDP5A 28 MAN TRANSFER SWITCH FOR DPXS-1 (5A28) 123.92 IN 12.392 0 0 0 POWER SELECT TO MUP-3B/5B 31.36 SS 3.136 0 3 30 2.50 SS 0.250 30 0 240 DPDP5A 29 EFV57 CONTROLLER EFV57 1.00 SS 3.000 0 0 240 DPDP6A 01 DFP-3A CONTROL/EGDG-1A DFP-3A(6A01) 0.32 SS 0.032 0 0 240 TACH DPDP6A 03 EGM-2A CONTROL EGM-2A(6A03)

DPDP6A 07 EDG DC FUEL OIL TRANSFER DFP-lC(6A07)

PUMP DFP-1C DPDP6A 08 EMERG DIESEL GEN DC FUEL DFP-3A(6A08)

OIL AUX. PUMP DFP-3A Case Code: AP4H Printed: 4/1612009 Printed: 4/1612009 Case Code: AP4H

Batte ry and Charger Sizing Calculation E 90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.2 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery A - Positive, 4 Hour Page 3 of 6 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Taa Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (mini (sec) minL_ (sec)

DPDP6A 09 EDG AIR COMPRESSOR EGM-2A(6A09)

MOTOR EGM-2A DPDP6A 12 EMERG DIESEL GEN EGDG-1A EGCP-1A(6A12 67.94 SS 6.794 0 0 240 0 CONTROL RELAYS DPDP6A 14 EDG 3A DIFF LOCKOUT & AUX. EGCP-2A(6A14 170.06 IN 17.006 0 0 1 0 RELAY CONTROL 6.66 SS 0.666 1 0 239 0 6.66 SS 0.666 239 0 239 50 170.06 IN 17.006 239 50 240 0 DPDP7A 02 EGDG-1A SYNCH CHECK EGDG-1A(7A02 1.00 SS 0.122 0 0 240 0 RELAYING DPDP7A 04 500 KV SUBST & OPT TRIP 1004(7A04) 1.00 IN 5.553 0 0 0 1 MASTER LOCKOUT RELAY 1.00 SS 0.118 0 1 240 0 DPDP7A 06 B.E.S.T. DIFFERENTIAL & SSAA-1 (7A06) 1.00 SS 0.218 0 0 240 0 LOCKOUT RELAY DPDP7A 07 PRIMARY UNIT TRIP LOCKOUT 1004(7A07) 1.00 IN 5.469 0 0 0 1 RELAY 1.00 SS 0.034 0 1 240 0 DPDP8A 01 HOTWELL ISO TO MTR DRIVEN EFV-2 MOTOR EFP - EFV-2 DPDP8A 07 SUBV - FWV-36 FWV-36(8A07)

DPDP8A 08 CONTROL POWER FOR FWV-36 FVV-36(8A08) 1.00 SS 0.050 0 0 240 0 DPDP8A 09 FEEDWATER BLOCK TO STM FWV-35(8A09)

GEN RCSG-1A - FWV-35 DPDP8A 11 MS VALVES & CONTROL 1035(8A11) 1.00 IN 5.237 0 0 1 0 1.00 SS 0.881 1 0 240 0 DPDP8A 14 WS SOLENOID VALVES & (8A14)

CONTROL DPDP8A 16 MS VALVES & CONTROL 1041(8A16) 2.00 SS 0.278 0 0 240 0 DPDP8A 17 TURBINE DRIVEN EFP INLET ASV-204 ISO VALVE - ASV-204 Case Code: AP4H Printed: 411612009 4/16/2009 Case Code: AP4H-

SProgress Energy Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Attachment 7.4 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery A - Negative, 4 Hour Page 2 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tag Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (min) (sec) (mm)j (sec)

DPDP1A 05 INVERTER 3C VBIT-1C 1.00 SS 180.000 0 0 239 59 DPDP1A 11 BATTERY CHARGER 3E DPBC-IE(1A1 1 1.00 SS 0.101 0 0 240 0 DPDP1A 12 BATTERY CHARGER 3C DPBC-1C 1.00 SS 0.101 0 0 240 0 DPDP1A 18 250/125-DC BATTERY 3A DPGD-1A 1.00 SS 0.001 0 0 240 0 GROUND DETECTOR DPDP5A 02 WS VALVES & CONTROL (5A02)

DPDP5A 06 ES A 480V UV LOCKOUT 1169(5A06) 1.00 IN 12.842 0 0 0 1 RELAYS 1.00 SS 0.203 0 1 240 0 DPDP5A 08 CRD PRIMARY TRIP BREAKER 1072(5A08) 1.00 IN 2.212 0 0 1 0 UNIT 10 1.00 SS 0.212 1 0 240 0 DPDP5A 10 4160V SWGR ES BUS 3A BKR MTSW-2C/D 312.54 IN 31.254 0 0 0 3 CONTROL 33.65 SS 3.365 0 3 1 0 33.65 SS 3.365 1 0 239 0 33.65 SS 3.365 239 0 239 50 100.65 IN 10.065 239 50 240 0 DPDP5A 14 SW VALVES & CONTROL 1038(5A14) 3.50 SS 0.350 0 0 240 0 DPDP5A 16 SW & Cl VALVES & CONTROL 1038(5A16) 3.00 SS 0.300 0 0 240 0 DPDP5A 18 MTXS-1 & CA VALVE CONTROL 1041(5A18) 1.00 SS 0.227 0 0 240 0 DPDP5A 23 MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION MUP-3A(5A23) 1.00 IN 11.570 0 0 0 3 PUMP MUP-1A BACKUP LOP 1.00 SS 2.314 0 3 30 0 DPDP5A 24 MAKEUP & PURIF PUMP MUP- MUP-5A(5A24) 1.00 IN 18.750 0 3 0 6 1A BACKUP GEAR OIL PUMP 1.00 SS 3.750 0 6 30 0 DPDP5A 25 MUP-5A CONTROL MUP-5A(5A25) 1.00 SS 0.672 0 0 30 0 0.15 SS 0.101 30 0 240 0 DPDP5A 27 CA VALVES & CONTROL 1041(5A27)

DPDP5A 28 MAN TRANSFER SWITCH FOR DPXS-1 (5A28) 123.92 IN 12.392 0 0 0 3 POWER SELECT TO MUP-3B/5B 31.36 SS 3.136 0 3 30 0 2.50 SS 0.250 30 0 240 0 DPDP5A 31 CRD DC TRIP BKR UNITS 3 & 4 1076(5A31) 1.00 IN 4.212 0 0 1 0 1.00 SS 0.212 1 0 240 0 DPDP6A 04 EDG 3A FUEL OIL TANK LEVEL EGCP-1A(6A04 2.00 SS 0.124 0 0 240 0 INSTRUMENTS DPDP6A 06 DFP-1C CONTROL DFP-lC(6A06)

Case Code: AN4H Printed: 4/16/2009 4116/2009 Case Code: AN4H-

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.4 U,

Crystal River Unit 3 Battery A - Negative, 4 Hour Page 3 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tag Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (mini (sec) (mini (sec)

DPDP6A 07 EDG DC FUEL OIL TRANSFER DFP-IC(6A07)

PUMP DFP-lC DPDP6A 08 EMERG DIESEL GEN DC FUEL DFP-3A(6A08)

OIL AUX. PUMP DFP-3A DPDP6A 09 EDG AIR COMPRESSOR EGM-2A(6A09)

MOTOR EGM-2A DPDP6A 10 EMERG DIESEL GEN EGDG-1A EGCP-1A(6A10 1.00 IN 2.208 0 0 1 0 CONT PNL ANNUN.

1.00 SS 0.667 1 0 240 0 DPDP7A 01 ES BUS DEGRADED VOLT. 1014(7A01) 1.00 SS 0.050 0 0 240 0 ALARM RELAY DPDP7A 03 GENERATOR BKR PRIMARY 1004(7A03) 8.00 SS 0.400 0 0 240 0 TRIP DPDP7A 05 SU TRANS DIFFERENTIAL & 1169(7A05) 1.00 SS 0.134 0 0 240 0 LOCKOUT RELAYS DPDP7A 10 230 KV BKR 4900 AND 4902 SSAA-6 1.00 SS 1.000 0 0 240 0 CONTROL DPDP7A 12 PLANT LINE 4 230 KV 1169(7A12) 1.00 SS 0.218 0 0 240 0 DIFFERENTIAL DPDP8A 01 HOTWELL ISO TO MTR DRIVEN EFV-2 MOTOR EFP - EFV-2 DPDP8A 02 CONTROL FOR HOTWELL ISO EFV-2 CNTRL 3.00 SS 0.150 0 0 240 0 TO MTR DRIVEN EFP - EFV-2 DPDP8A 04 HPI RECIRC TO RB SUMP SV MUV-543/544-SV VALVES & CONTROL DPDP8A 07 SUBV - FWV-36 FWV-36(8A07)

DPDP8A 09 FEEDWATER BLOCK TO STM FWV-35(8A09)

GEN RCSG-1A - FWV-35 DPDP8A 10 CONTROL POWER FOR FWV-36 FWV-35(8A10) 2.00 SS 0.100 0 0 240 0 DPDP8A 13 RCV VENT VALVES & 1030(8A1 3)

CONTROL DPDP8A 15 CONTROL POWER FOR ASV- ASV-204(8A1 5 1.00 SS 0.200 0 0 240 0 204 DPDP8A 17 TURBINE DRIVEN EFP INLET ASV-204 ISO VALVE - ASV-204 DPDP8C 01 EFP-2 ISOLATION (DC) VALVE - EFV-1 1(8C01)

EFV-11 DPDP8C 02 CONTROL POWER FOR EFV-1 1 EFV-11 (8C02) 1.00 SS 0.150 0 0 240 0 DPDP8C 03 EFP-2 ISOLATION (DC) VALVE - EFV-32(8C03)

EFV-32 I

Printed: 41/16/2009 Case Code: AN4H-

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.4 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery A - Negative, 4 Hour Page 4 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Taa Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (mLm. (sec) (mini (sec)

DPDP8C 04 CONTROL POWER FOR EFV-32 EFV-32(8C04) 1.00 SS 0.150 0 0 240 0 DPDP8C 05 CROSSTIE ISOLATION VALVE - EFV-12(8C05)

EFV-12 DPDP8C 06 CONTROL POWER FOR EFV-12 EFV-12(8C06)

Case Code: AN4H Printed: 4/1612009 Printed: 4/16/2009 Case Code: AN4H-

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 j Progress Energy Attachment 7.6 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery B - Positive, 4 Hour Page 2 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Taq Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (min) (sec) (mm) (sec)

DPDP1B 01 250/125-DC BATTERY 3B DPGD-1B 1.00 SS 0.001 0 0 240 0 GROUND DETECTOR DPDP1B 06 MISC. SW SOLENOID VALVES (1B06) 7.14 SS 0.714 0 0 240 0 DPDP1B 09 BATTERY CHARGER 3F DPBC-1 F(1 B09 1.00 SS 0.101 0 0 240 0 DPDP1B 11 BATTERY CHARGER 3D DPBC-1D 1.00 SS 0.101 0 0 240 0 DPDP1B 15 DUAL INPUT INVERTER 3B VBIT-1B 1.00 SS 148.000 0 0 239 59 DPDP5B 02 MTSX-1 CONTROL & CA 1042(5B02) 8.75 SS 0.875 0 0 240 0 VALVES & CONTROL DPDP5B 03 RELAYS & IND LIGHTS FOR ES 10611(5B03) 1.00 SS 2.564 0 0 240 0 ACT. B - HPI DPDP5B 04 MUP-3C CONTROL MUP-3C(5B04) 6.72 SS 0.672 0 30 0 1.00 SS 0.100 30 240 0 DPDP5B 06 480V ES SW B UV & LOCKOUT 1169(5B06) 1.00 IN 7.470 0 0 1 RELAYS 1.00 SS 0.265 0 240 0 DPDP5B 09 480V ES SW B BRK CONTROL MTSW-3G 185.93 IN 18.593 0 0 3 14.72 SS 1.472 0 1 0 14.72 SS 1.472 1 240 0 DPDP5B 14 SW & CA VALVES & CONTROL 1039(5B14) 11.91 SS 1.191 0 30 0 9.18 SS 0.918 30 240 0 DPDP5B 15 SWVALVES & CONTROL 1039(5B15) 9.68 SS 0.968 0 240 0 DPDP5B 16 SW & CI VALVES & CONTROL 1039(5B16) 4.50 SS 0.450 0 240 0 DPDP5B 17 SW & MU VALVES & CONTROL 1039(5B17) 7.57 SS 0.757 0 240 0 DPDP5B 18 SW VALVES & AH CONTROL 1039(5B18) 1.00 SS 0.612 0 240 0 DPDP5B 22 AH & CA VALVES & CONTROL 1039(5B22) 9.80 SS 0.980 0 30 0 7.07 SS 0.707 30 240 0 DPDP5B 23 MAKE-UP & PURIFICATION MUP-3C(5B23) 1.00 IN 11.570 0 0 3 PUMP MUP-1C BACKUP LOP 1.00 SS 2.314 0 30 0 DPDP5B 24 MAKEUP & PURIF PUMP MUP- MUP-5C(5B24) 1.00 IN 18.750 0 0 6 1C BACKUP GEAR OIL PUMP 1.00 SS 3.750 0 30 0 DPDP5B 26 EFV56 CONTROLLER EFV56 1.00 SS 3.000 0 240 0 DPDP5B 28 MAN TRANSF SW FOR MUP- DPXS-1(5B28) 123.92 IN 12.392 0 0 3 3B/5B CONTROL POWER 31.36 SS 3.136 0 30 0 2.50 SS 0.250 30 240 0 DPDP5B 29 EFV55 CONTROLLER EFV55 1.00 SS 3.000 0 240 0 Printed: 4/1612009 Case Code: BP4H

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E 90-0099, Rev. 4

.2Progress Energy Attachment 7.6 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery B - Positive, 4 Hour Page 3 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tag Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (min) (sec) 1mm) (sec)

DPDP6B 01 DFP-3B CONTROL/EGDC -11B DFP-3B(6B01) 0.32 SS 0.032 0 0 240 0 TACH DPDP6B 03 EGM-2B CONTROL EGM-2B(6B03)

DPDP6B 07 EDG DC FUEL OIL TRANSFER DFP-1D(6B07)

PUMP DFP-1D DPDP6B 08 EDG DC AUX. FUEL OIL PUMP DFP-3B(6B08)

DFP-3B DPDP6B 09 EDG 3B AIR COMPRESSOR EGM-2B(6B09)

MOTOR EGM-2B DPDP6B 10 EMERG. DIESEL GEN. EGDG- EGCP-1B(6B10 1.00 IN 2.208 0 0 1 1B CONT. PNL. ANNUN.

1.00 SS 0.667 1 0 240 DPDP6B 12 EGDG-1B CONTROL & ALARM EGCP-1B(6B12 67.94 SS 6.794 0 0 240 RELAYS.

DPDP6B 14 EGDG-1B DIFF. LOCKOUT & EGCP-2B(6B14 170.06 IN 17.006 0 0 1 AUX. RELAYS 6.66 SS 0.666 1 0 239 6.66 SS 0.666 239 0 239 170.06 IN 17.006 239 50 240 DPDP7B 03 500 KV & OPT ALT TRIP & 1004(7B03) 1.00 IN 5.553 0 0 0 RESET MASTER LOCKOUT RELAY 1.00 SS 0.118 0 1 240 DPDP7B 05 MOS CONTROL & BREAKER 1023(7B05) 1.00 SS 16.718 0 0 240 INDICATION DPDP7B 06 EGDG-1B SYNCH CHECK EGDG-1B(7B06 1.00 SS 0.122 0 0 240 RELAYING DPDP7B 08 SU XFMR PROTECTIVE 1169(7B08) 1.00 SS 0.268 0 0 240 RELAYS DPDP7B 14 PLANT LINE 4 BACKUP 1023(7B14) 1.00 SS 0.134 0 0 240 PROTECTION DPDP7B 15 230 KV BKR 4900 AND 4902 SSAA-2(7B1 5) 1.00 SS 1.000 0 0 240 CONTROL DPDP8B 01 HOTWELL ISO TO TURB EFV-1 MOTOR DRIVEN EFP EFV-1 DPDP8B 05 TURB DRIVEN EMERG ASV-5(8B05) 1.00 IN 19.600 0 0 0 FEEDPUMP INLET ISO VALVE ASV-5 1.00 SS 3.400 0 1 DPDP8B 06 CONTROL POWER FOR ASV-5 ASV-5(8B06) 1.00 IN 1.530 0 0 1.00 SS 0.441 1 0 240 Case Code: BP4H Printed:

Printed: 4116/2009 411612009 Case Code: BP4H

J Progress Energy Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Attachment 7.6 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery B - Positive, 4 Hour Page 4 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tag Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (min) (sec) (mi) (sec)

DPDP8B 09 FEEDWATER SU BLOCK FWV-33(8B09)

VALVE - FWV-33 DPDP8B 11 FEEDWATER BLOCK TO STM FWV-34(8B1 1)

GEN RCSG-1B; FWV-34 DPDP8B 12 CONTROL POWER FOR FWV-34 FWV-34(8B12) 2.00 SS 0.100 0 0 240 0 DPDP8B 13 SUPPLY BLOCK TO EFP-2 MSV-55(8B13)

VALVE MSV-55 DPDP8B 14 CONTROL POWER FOR MSV-55 MSV-55(8B14) 0.15 SS 0.150 0 0 240 0 DPDP8B 15 SUPPLY BLOCK TO EFP-2 MSV-56(8B15)

VALVE - MSV-56 DPDP8B 17 MS VALVES & CONTROL 1035(8B17) 2.00 SS 0.278 0 0 240 0 POWER DPDP8B 20 MUV-49 POWER & CONTROL 1039(8B20) 1.00 SS 0.621 0 0 240 0 Case Code: BP4H Printed: 4/16/2009 4/1612009 Case Code: BP4H

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.8 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery B - Negative, 4 Hour Page 2 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tao Number Qty Inrush (Amps) 0mm) (sec) (mmn) (sec)

DPDP1B 01 250/125-DC BATTERY 3B DPGD-1B 1.00 SS 0.001 0 0 240 0 GROUND DETECTOR DPDP1B 10 BATTERY CHARGER 3F DPBC-1F(1B10 1.00 SS 0.101 0 240 DPDP1B 16 DUAL INPUT INVERTER 3D VBIT-1D 1.00 SS 124.000 0 239 DPDP1B 17 BATTERY CHARGER 3B DPBC-1B 1.00 SS 0.101 0 240 DPDP5B 01 RCV VENT VALVES & 1032(5B01)

CONTROL DPDP5B 08 CA VALVES & CONTROL 1042(51B08)

DPDP5B 10 4160 V SWGR ES BUS 3B BKR MTSW-2E/F 391.99 IN 39.199 0 0 CONTROL 34.14 SS 3.414 0 1 34.14 SS 3.414 1 239 34.14 SS 3.414 239 239 101.14 IN 10.114 239 240 DPDP5B 21 SW & AH VALVES & CONTROL, 1042(5B21) 7.01 SS 0.701 0 240 MU INDICATION DPDP5B 23 MAKE-UP & PURIFICATION MUP-3C(5B23) 1.00 IN 11.570 0 0 PUMP MUP-lC BACKUP LOP 1.00 SS 2.314 0 30 DPDP5B 24 MAKEUP & PURIF PUMP MUP-MUP-5C(5B24) 1.00 IN 18.750 0 0 lC BACKUP GEAR OIL PUMP 1.00 SS 3.750 0 30 DPDP5B 25 MUP-5C CONTROL MUP-5C(5B25) 1.00 SS 0.672 0 30 0.15 SS 0.101 30 240 DPDP5B 27 WS SOLENOID VALVES & (5B27)

CONTROL DPDP5B 28 MAN TRANSF SW FOR MUP- DPXS-1(5B28) 123.92 IN 12.392 0 0 0 3 3B/5B CONTROL POWER 31.36 SS 3.136 0 3 30 0 2.50 SS 0.250 30 0 240 0 DPDP5B 30 CRD PRI TRIP BREAKER UNIT 1073(5B30) 1.00 IN 2.212 0 0 1 0 11, SHUNT TRIP PWR 1.00 SS 0.212 1 0 240 0 DPDP5B 31 CRD PRI TRIP BKR CONTROL 1076(5B31) 1.00 IN 4.212 0 0 1 0 1.00 SS 0.212 1 0 240 0 DPDP6B 04 EDG 3B FUEL OIL TANK LEVEL EGCP-1B(6B04 2.00 SS 0.268 0 0 240 0 RELAYS DPDP6B 06 DFP-1 D CONTROL DFP-1D(6B06)

DPDP6B 07 EDG DC FUEL OIL TRANSFER DFP-1D(6B07)

PUMP DFP-1D Case Code: BN4H Printed:

Printed: 4/16/2009 4/1612009 Case Code: BN4H

Batteiry and Charger Sizing Calculation E 90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.8 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery B - Negative, 4 Hour Page 3 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tag Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (mini (sec) Imini (sec)

DPDP6B 08 EDG DC AUX. FUEL OIL PUMP DFP-3B(6B08)

DFP-3B DPDP6B 09 EDG 3B AIR COMPRESSOR EGM-2B(6B09)

MOTOR EGM-2B DPDP7B 01 ES B BUSSES DEGRADED 1014(7B01) 1.00 SS 0.050 240 VOLTAGE ALARM RELAY DPDP7B 04 GENERATOR BKR BACLUP 1004(7B04) 1.00 SS 0.884 240 TRIP & CLOSE DPDP7B 07 ALTERNATE UNIT TRIP 1004(7B07) 1.00 IN 5.469 0 LOCKOUTS 1.00 SS 0.034 240 DPDP7B 09 BACK-UP ES XFMR PROT BEST (7B09) 1.00 SS 0.353 240 RELAYING DPDP8B 01 HOTWELL ISO TO TURB EFV-1 MOTOR DRIVEN EFP EFV-1 DPDP8B 02 CONTROL POWER FOR EFV-1 EFV-1 CNTRL 3.00 SS 0.150 240 DPDP8B 04 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY CR EMERG LTG 1.00 SS 7.280 240 LIGHTING DPDP8B 05 TURB DRIVEN EMERG ASV-5(8B05) 1.00 IN 19.600 0 FEEDPUMP INLET ISO VALVE ASV-5 1.00 SS 3.400 1 DPDP8B HPI RECIRC TO RB SUMP SV MUV-545/546-SV VALVE POWER & CONTROL FEEDWATER SU BLOCK DPDP8B FWV-33(8B09)

VALVE - FWV-33 DPDP8B CONTROL POWER FOR FWV-33 FWV-33(8B1 0) 1.00 SS 0.050 0 0 240 0 DPDP8B FEEDWATER BLOCK TO STM FWV-34(8B1 1)

GEN RCSG-1B; FWV-34 DPDP8B SUPPLY BLOCK TO EFP-2 MSV-55(8B13)

VALVE MSV-55 DPDP8B SUPPLY BLOCK TO EFP-2 MSV-56(8B1 5)

VALVE - MSV-56 DPDP8B CONTROL POWER FOR MSV-56 MSV-56(8B16) 4.00 SS 0.200 0 0 240 0 DPDP8B MS VALVES & CONTROL 1117(8B18) 1.00 SS 1.093 0 0 240 0 POWER DPDP8B WS SOLENOID VALVES & (8B21)

CONTROL DPDP8D EFP-1 ISOLATION VALVE - EFV-14(8D01)

EFV-14 Case Code: BN4H Printed: 4/1612009 Printed: 4116/2009 Case Code: BN4H

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.8 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery B - Negative, 4 Hour Page 4 of 7 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tao Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (mi) (sec) Imm) (sec)

DPDP8D 02 CONTROL POWER FOR EFV-14 EFV-14(8D02) 1.00 SS 0.150 0 0 240 0 DPDP8D 03 MTR DRV EMERG FWP EFP-1 EFV-33(8D03)

TO STM GEN VALVE - EFV-33 DPDP8D 04 CONTROL POWER FOR EFV-33 EFV-33(8D04) 1.00 SS 0.150 0 0 240 0 Case Code: BN4H Printed: 4/1612009 Printed: 4/16/2009 Case Code: BN4H-

Battery and Charger Sizing Calculation E90-0099, Rev. 4 Progress Energy Attachment 7.9 Crystal River Unit 3 Battery D - Positive, 4 Hour Page 2 of 5 Design Load Data Steady Rated Source Panel Op State or Current Start Time Ending Time and Switch Description Tan Number Qty Inrush (Amps) (min) (sec) jMm) (sec)

DPDP1D 00 DC POWER AVAILABLE PWR AVAIL 1.00 SS 0.050 0 0 240 0 REMOTE INDICATING LIGHT DPDP1D 03 DC TURBO SOAKBACK OIL DLP-18 1.00 IN 46.098 0 0 5 PUMP MOTOR AND CONTROL 369.80 SS 3.698 5 0 25 1.00 SS 0.010 25 1 0 1.00 SS 0.010 0 240 0 DPDP1D 04 GROUND DETECTOR DPGD-1D 1.00 SS 0.060 0 240 0 DPDP1D 05 DC FUEL PUMP MOTOR AND DFP-7 1.00 IN 34.098 0 0 5 CONTROL 279.80 SS 2.798 5 1 0 279.80 SS 2.798 0 240 0 DPDP1D 06 EFCP-1 DC CONTROL POWER EFCP-1 193.40 SS 1.934 0 240 0 DPDP1D 07 DC CIRCULATING OIL PUMP DLP-17 1.00 IN 62.098 0 0 5 MOTOR AND CONTROL 609.80 SS 6.098 5 0 25 1.00 SS 0.010 25 1 0 1.00 SS 0.010 0 240 0 DPDP1D 10 BATTERY CHARGER DPBC-1J DPBC-1J 1.00 SS 0.050 0 240 0 Case Code: EF4H Printed: 411612009 Printed: 4/1612009 Case Code: EF4H-

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 ENCLOSURE 2 BATTERY ROOM LAYOUT DRAWING - PROPOSED FCS BATTERY LOCATION

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