ML13246A376

Email from M. King, NRR on Ioeb Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, January 23, 2012

ML13246A376
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	01/23/2012
From:	Mark King Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
FOIA/PA-2013-0273
Download: ML13246A376 (4)

Text

1 I

Robles, Jesse From: King, Mark Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 2:28 PM

Subject:

IQEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, January 23, 2012 00 E: T' NTT N S A RR)I OFFI

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• • MAYY ONTA SENSITIV ROPRIET RY OR NR NTERNAL USONLY INF RMTON***

DNO FORWAR NY P TIONS OUTS OF WITHOUT FIRST TAI G PENRM N FROM INATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): One (1)

1) Post OpE COMM on WOLF CREEK: REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOUE) - (NOUE WAS TERMINATED-1I1312012 event date), see EN 47590, (See last follow-up item below for more details / updates). Post an ODE COMM to: ALL COMMS, AFW.,

CHEM/CHEM ENG, CONTAINMENT, EDG, ELECTRICAL PWR. EP, FIRE PROTECTION, HUMAN PERF, HVAC, I&C. INSP PROGRAMS, MN STM/COND/FEED, NRO, PIPING, PUMP &VALVE, SAFETY CULTURE, SERVICE WATER/UHS, SIT/AlT. Assigned to Jesse Robles.

Follow-up/Other Tasks: Eight (8)

[Note - The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminaryin nature and is provided to help /0EB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]

Outside of Scope 1.

,C Outside of Scope t

C.

Forward to TRG Lead for I&C (Dave Rahn) and EP (Eric Schrader), assigned to Dave Garmon (completed).

8) EN 47590 - WOLF CREEK: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NOUE) AND REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER UNUSUAL EVENT - (NOUE TERMINATED) - UPDATE Update 1/2312012 - Three of four containment coolers are inoperable. The 'B' EDG is available but inoperable due to the source of the ground not being identified. The stress cones on the Startup Transformer were found out of position, and inspection revealed that there was excessive corrosion on the cones. Evidence of water hammering was found on the condensate system. During testing of a fire pump, a temporary diesel driven fire pump was left on and deadheaded for several hours. The pump was then replaced and tested by the vendor, but started smoking during a test run. The pump is being tested again by the vendor.

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A conference call to determine reactive inspection recommendation is being held today, 1/23/2012. The MD-8.3 reactive inspection risk assessment indicates this event is in the SIT/AIT overlap region. - INFO ONLY.-

Previously reported info ***1117/2012***

See EN text: (Additional information) unit is currently in a stable condition (MODE 5). Unit obtained a safe shutdown condition and is currently stable in (MODE 5). Region performing an MD 8.3 reactive inspection risk evaluation. The following is a list of post trip occurrences:

'Root Cause not well defined (licensee continues to investigate)

'Both 'A' & 'B' EDGs started/assumed safety loads

'Decay heat removal via ASDs (atmospheric steam dumps)

'Pressurizer PORV actuation (resident inspectors following up on this)

'MD/TDAFW Pumps functioned as expected

'Essential Service Water (ESW) system experienced water hammer then subsequent leak in Containment Cooling (C) system

'Containment cooling issue impacted 2 channels of source range detection (counts not tracking)

'Emergency mod to cut hole in Chemistry Building bulkhead to route power cable to restore Chem Lab (to facilitate Boron sampling)

'Emergency mod to cut hole in Aux Building bulkhead to route power cable to sump pump (sump over flow due to TDAFW steam discharge line)

'Condensate Storage Tank (CST) makeup challenges when available Diesel Driven Fire Pump failed to operate (Fire Truck staged as standby)

'Facility lighting running on backup/emergency power

'Train 'A' (vital) buses restored 1/2 hours after trip ('A' EDG secured)

'Train 'B' (vital) buses supplied via 'B' EDG

"'B' EDG air start (compressors) loss of power (EDGs remained functional)

'B' EDG experienced a ground indication which cleared (Residents following up)

'Switchyard: Three offsite (345 KV) lines remained functional (grid not suspected as initiator)

'Switchyard: Startup Transformer (SUT) oil samples were normal

'Switchyard: Startup Transformer (SUT) oil samples were normal

'Switchyard: 345 KV breaker (60)/cabinet damage

'Switchyard: 345 KV breaker/switch board inspections ongoing

'Switchyard: Work being performed on Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) to backfeed 'B' buses; projected to be completed today (1/17)

'Switchyard: Event recorder to track switchyard transients was out of service at time of event

• • • (1/13/2012; 1709 CST) licensee exited NOUE when power was restored to the east bus from offsite.

Additionally, the licensee is reporting a loss of safe shutdown capability in accordance with 1OCFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) due to the initial loss of offsite power.

The licensee has notified state and local governments, the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be issuing a press release on the event. Notified R4DO (Powers), IRD (Marshall), NRR (Cheok), FEMA (Burckart) and DHS (Hill).

(1/13/2012; 1415 CST) When the licensee determined that offsite power could not be restored within 15 minutes, they declared a Notification of Unusual Event. The trip was uncomplicated and both EDGs are supplying emergency loads. The cause of the loss of offsite power is under investigation but does not appear to be caused by plant operation.

(1/13/2012; 1403 CST) Wolf Creek experienced an automatic reactor trip from 100% power due to a loss of offsite power. All systems functioned as expected in response to this event and both Emergency Diesel Generators started and energized the safety-related buses. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 and investigation into the cause for loss of power in the switchyard is underway. During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. No primary relief valves lifted as a result of the transient. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric steam dumps with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators. The plant is stable at

3

NOP/NOT. No safety significant equipment is reported out of service. The licensee has notified state and local governments and the NRC Resident Inspector.

C..

• (i.e., Screened Ireviewed against LIC-401 criteria for initiating an "Issue for Resolution" (IFR), which is fOEB's process for conducting further evaluation of an issue to determine what, if any, additionalactions should be taken to communicate and organizationallylearn from OpE.)

NOTE: IS SUMMA OFFICIAL US Y

• Y CON NSITIV PR RIETA V OR C INTER AL US NLY IN RMA IO0N*,**

O NO ARID A P TIONS TO E OF NR IT UT FIRST TAýING PER ISSION FIRO ORIGINATO Attendees at Screening Meeting:

Mark King - by phone Bob Bernardo - by phone Russell Haskell - by phone Jesse Robles Jay Patel, NRO - by phone Mary Wegner, RES - by phone 4