IR 05000244/2006007
| ML062150459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/2006 |
| From: | Rogge J Engineering Region 1 Branch 3 |
| To: | Korsnick M Ginna |
| References | |
| IR-06-007 | |
| Download: ML062150459 (26) | |
Text
August 3, 2006Mrs. Mary Korsnick Vice President, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC 1503 Lake Road Ontario, New York 14519SUBJECT:GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT- NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTIONINSPECTION REPORT 05000244/2006007
Dear Mrs. Korsnick:
On June 23, 2006, the NRC completed a triennial fire protection team inspection at your R. E.Ginna facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection results which were discussed onJune 23, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC identified one finding of very low safetysignificance (Green) that was a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the verylow safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I, the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and the NRC Resi dentInspector at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.The enclosed report also documented two noncompliances that were identified by your staffduring the NFPA 805 transition period. The NRC is not taking any enforcement actions forthese noncompliances because the conditions for these noncompliances meet the four criteria (licensee-identified, compensatory actions have been taken, not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, and not willful) of NRC Enforcement Policy, InterimEnforcement Policies, "Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)", and are not associated with a finding of high safety significance.
2In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 50-244License Nos. DPR-18
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000244/2006007
REGION IDocket Nos.50-244 License Nos.DPR-18 Report No.05000244/2006007 Licensee:Constellation Energy, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC Facility:R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantLocation:Ontario, New York Dates:June 5 - 23, 2006 Inspectors:L. Cheung, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRSP. Finney, Reactor Inspector, DRS K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS A. Gaudette, Inspector Trainee, DRPApproved by:John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure ii
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000244/2006007 on 06/05 - 23/ 2006, Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Triennial FireProtection Team Inspection, Fire Protection.This report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by three Region Ispecialist inspectors and one inspector trainee. One Green non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow,
Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation ofcommercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.
NRC-Identified Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The team identified an NCV of license condition 2.C.3 for the failure toimplement and maintain in effect all fire protection features. Specifically, Constellation failed to provide the required quarterly training to five fire brigade members in the fourth quarter of 2005, and subsequently failed to remove those personnel from fire brigade duty during the period from January 1, 2006, to the time when those brigade membersreceived their remedial training. Site procedures require that fire brigade members attend quarterly classroom training, and that fire brigade members who fail to attend such training be removed from brigade duties until they attend remedial training. Upon identification of this finding, Constellation removed all five personnel from fire brigade duties until properly trained, initiated a prompt investigation and entered this finding intotheir corrective action program.The finding is more than minor because the finding is associated with the MitigatingSystem cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems thatrespond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Assumptions and Limitations of the Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP), IMC 0609, Appendix F, specifically exclude fire brigade issues. As such, IMC 0612, Section 05.04.c, requires NRC management review to determine the significance of this finding.
NRC management determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). Fire brigade performance was not significantly affected, given staffing, at times, by members that lacked a single quarter of training, because the entire brigade staff had completed the annual live-fire practice sessions. (Section 1R05.04)
B.Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
BackgroundThis report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordancewith NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection." The objective of theinspection was to assess whether Constellation Energy has implemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been established and arebeing properly maintained at the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant facility. The following fireareas (FAs) were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from the Individual Plant Examination (IPE)/ Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE):Fire Area RRA,Fire Area CHG, Fire Area EDG1B-0, Fire Area IBS-1.The inspection team evaluated the licensee's fire protection program (FPP) against applicablerequirements which include plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Condition 2.C.3,NRC Safety Evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. The team also reviewedrelated documents that include the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5,the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and the Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
Analysis.
Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems1R05Fire Protection
.01 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room (Alternative Shutdown) andNormal Shutdown
a. Inspection Scope
MethodologyThe team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs), electrical drawings, the UFSAR and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that rely on shutdown from outside the control room. This review included verification that shutdown from outside the control room could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power. Plant walkdowns werealso performed to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in 2Enclosurethe safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. These inspection activities focused onensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolantmakeup, reactor decay heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation and support systems functions. The team verified that the systems and components credited for useduring this shutdown method would remain free from fire damage. Similarly, for fire areas that utilize shutdown from the control room, the team alsoverified that the shutdown methodology properly identified the com ponents and systemsnecessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. Operational ImplementationThe team verified that the training program for licensed and non-licensed operatorsincluded alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified that personnel requiredfor safe shutdown using the normal or alternative shutdown systems and procedures aretrained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire shutdown andperformed an independent walk through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also verified that the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. Time critical actions which were verified included restoration of AC electrical power, establishing the remote shutdown and local shutdown panels, establishing reactor coolant makeup, and establishing decay heat removal.Specific procedures reviewed for alternative shutdown, including shutdown from outsidethe control room included the following:ER-FIRE.1, Alternate Shutdown For Control Complex Fire, Revision 20FRP-4.0, Auxiliary Building Basement, Revision 5FRP-8.0, Intermediate Building Controlled Side Basement, Revision 5ER-FIRE.6, Response To Fire In D/G B Vault, Revision 2O-2.1, Normal Shutdown To Hot Shutdown, Revision 120ER-FIRE.0, CR Response To Fire Alarms and Reports, Revision 6The team reviewed manual actions to ensure that they could be implemented inaccordance with plant procedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each fire area. The team verified that the licensee had identified operatormanual actions for post-fire safe-shutdown and had plans in place to assess them as part of the plant wide risk evaluation for transition to NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions to ensure the tests are adequate toensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.02 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
b. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analyses and supportingdrawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properlyprotected. Under the NFPA 805 Transition Period inspection procedure, the inspection team is to validate 1 to 3 nonconformances identified in the licensee's transitional assessment of their fire areas. It is noted, as directed by and in accordance with the inspection procedure, that no fire areas have been completely assessed at the time of this inspection.The team reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for the control of ignitionsources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the FHA. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The team performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.The team also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that theprocess included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..03Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe materialcondition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.
The team reviewed installation/repair and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that theinstallation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4Enclosure
.04 Active Fire Protection
b. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design, maintenance, testing and operation of the fire detectionand suppression systems in the selected plant fire areas. This included verification that the manual and automatic detection and suppression systems were installed, tested andmaintained in accordance with the NFPA code of record and that they would control and/or extinguish fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas. A review of the design capability of suppression agent delivery systems were verified to meet thecode requirements for the fire hazards involved. The team also performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the detection and suppressions systems in the selected areasas well as a walkdown of major system support equipment in other areas (e.g. fireprotection pumps, Halon and/or CO 2 storage tanks and supply system) as assess thematerial condition of the systems and components.The team reviewed electric and diesel fire pump flow and pressure tests to ensure thatthe pumps were meeting their design requirements. The team also reviewed the firemain loop flow tests to ensure that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet the design requirements. The team also assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training andqualification records, and drill critique records. The team also reviewed pre-fire plansand smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire thatcould impact post-fire safe shutdown. In addition, the team inspected the fire brigade'sprotective ensembles, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and various fire brigade equipment (including smoke removal equipment) to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The team identified a Green NCV regarding the training program for onsitefire brigade personnel under Constellation's fire protection program. Specifically, Constellation failed to provide the required quarterly training to five fire brigade members in the fourth quarter of 2005, and subsequently failed to remove those personnel from fire brigade duty during the period from January 1, 2006, to the time when those brigade members received their remedial training.Description. During the inspection, the team requested quarterly training documents forfour randomly selected fire brigade members for calendar year 2005. Ginna's fire brigade training program is executed by covering relative topics over a two-year cyclevia quarterly training sessions. Further, Constellation evaluates each fire brigade member's level of knowledge through biannual examinations in the second and fourth quarters of each calendar year. Constellation determined that one of the four randomly-5Enclosureselected fire brigade members did not receive the quarterly classroom training orevaluation in the fourth quarter of 2005. An extent of condition search resulted in the identification of four additional fire brigade members without objective quality evidence of the fourth quarter training or examinations. Therefore, as a result of the inspection, five fire brigade members were identified as having missed the fourth quarter training and examination.Site procedure ND-FPP, Fire Protection Program, Revision10, section 3.2.1, states inpart that "the protection of personnel, facilities, structures, systems, and components(SSC) at Ginna Station from hazards due to fire is planned and executed per procedures." Procedure A-202, The Fire Protection Program and Ginna Station Staff Responsibilities for Fire Protection, Revision 21, section 3.6.3, states in part that"training shall be based on NFPA Standard 27.... and conducted at least quarterly for brigade members". NFPA 27-1981, section 4-3, states in part that brigade "members should be required to complete a specified program of instruction as a condition to membership in the brigade". Procedure A-103.9, Fire Brigade Training, Revision 18, section 3.3.1, states that "an individual not attending the required quarterly training shallbe removed from brigade duty until such time that the next training session can be attended". Constellation clarified, during the inspection, that "the next training session" meant a "remedial training" which would include an examination for the second and fourth quarter training.Analysis. The failure to provide training to five fire brigade members and thesubsequent failure to remove those personnel from fire brigade duty is a performance deficiency and a finding. The licensee determined that there were three occasions where up to three of the fire brigade members who failed to received the fourth quarter training in 2005 were on brigade duty (shift) at the same time. Traditional enforcement does not apply since there were no actual safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRC's regulatory function and the finding was not the result of any willfulviolation of NRC requirements. The finding is more than minor because the finding isassociated with the Mitigating System cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability,reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to preventundesirable consequences.
Additionally, the finding is similar to example 4.h of IMC 0612, Appendix E in that not all fire brigade positions were staffed with appropriately trained (qualified) members. The Assumptions and Limitations of the Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP), IMC 0609, Appendix F, specifically exclude fire brigade issues. As such, IMC 0612, Section 05.04.c, requires NRC managementreview to determine the significance of this finding. NRC management determined thisfinding to be of very low safety significance (Green). Fire brigade performance was not significantly affected, given staffing, at times, by members that lacked a single quarter of training, because the entire brigade staff had completed the annual live-fire practice sessions. This finding is a performance deficiency and has a human performance cross-cuttingaspect, because Constellation training personnel failed to ensure that all fire brigade members were adequately trained in accordance with procedural requirements, and 6EnclosureConstellation management subsequently failed to remove those fire fighting personnelwho were not properly trained from fire brigade duty.Enforcement. License condition 2.C.3 requires that Constellation implement andmaintain in effect all fire protection features as approved by the NRC's Fire ProtectionSafety Evaluation (SE) and SE supplements. Site procedure ND-FPP states in part that "the following documents... are utilized to implement the Fire Protection Programrequirements: Ginna Station Procedures." Procedure A-202 requires training be provided at least quarterly to fire brigade members and Procedure A 103.9 requires an individual not attending the required quarterly training be removed from brigade duty until such time that the next training session can be attended. Contrary to the above,Constellation failed to provide the required quarterly training to five brigade members in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2005, and subsequently failed to remove those personnel from fire brigade duty for the period of January 01, 2006, to June 19, 2006, before those brigade members received their remedial training. Upon identification of this finding, Constellation removed all five personnel from fire brigade duties, performed remedial training and evaluated them via examination prior to returning them to duty-eligible status. Further, Constellation initiated a prompt investigation and entered this finding into their corrective action program under CR 2006-2518. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC EnforcementPolicy.
(NCV 05000244/2006007-01, Missed Fire Brigade Training)..05Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed document reviews and plant walkdowns to verify that redundanttrains of systems required for hot shutdown are not subject to damage from firesuppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified that:A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not directly, through production ofsmoke, heat or hot gases, cause activation of suppression systems that couldpotentially damage all redundant trains.A fire in one of the selected fire areas (or the inadvertent actuation or rupture ofa fire suppression system) would not directly cause damage to all redundanttrains (e.g., sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train).Adequate drainage is provided in areas protected by water suppression systems
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7Enclosure.06Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
Alternative shutdown capability for the areas selected for inspection utilizes shutdownfrom outside the control room and is discussed in Section 1R05.01 of this report..07Circuit AnalysesThis topic was not inspected for plant in NFPA 805 transition.
.08 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis andassociated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would be available to plant operators following a fire. During this review the team considered the effects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability and coverage patterns. The team also inspected the designated emergency storage lockers to verify the availability of portable radios for the fire brigade and for plant operators. The inspectorsalso verified that communications equipment such as repeaters, transmitters, etc. would not be affected by a fire.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..09Emergency Lighting
c. Inspection Scope
The team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lightsthroughout the selected fire areas to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access andegress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentationmonitoring for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also verified that the battery power supplies were rated for at least an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> capacity. Preventive maintenance procedures and various documents, including the vendors manual and completed surveillance testswere reviewed to ensure adequate surveillance testing and periodic batteryreplacements were in place to ensure reliable operation of the eight-hour emergency lights and that the emergency lighting units were being maintained consistent with themanufacturer's recommendations and accepted industry practices.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
8Enclosure.10Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that the licensee had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, andmaterials to accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdown which might be damaged by the fire to ensure cold shutdown could be achieved within the time frames specified in their design and licensing bases. The inspectors verified that the repair equipment, components, tools and materials (e.g. pre-cut cables with prepared attachment lugs) were available and accessible on site.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..11Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service,degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems,or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive firebarriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The team also verified that the short term compensatory measurescompensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken and that Constellation was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.01Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that the licensee was identifying fire protection and post-fire safeshutdown issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The team also reviewed a sample of selected issues to verify that the licensee had taken or planned appropriate corrective actions. In addition, the team reviewed condition report CR-2006-002099 which documented alicensee-identified design deficiency that fire induced spurious actions in the control 9Enclosurecircuitry of 480V Bus 14 undervoltage relays could cause the "A" Charging Pump circuitbreaker to be in a "tripped" condition, preventing the pump from starting when it is required to be operable for hot shutdown. Since the "A" Charging Pump is the only credited charging pump for post-fire safe shutdown outside the control room, the safeshutdown capability could be impacted. The licensee determined this to be anunanalyzed condition and made an eight-hour notification to the NRC on May 18, 2006. The licensee's preliminary evaluation indicated that this issue could cause an increase in core damage frequency of approximately 1.2E-07 per year. Subsequently, during the extent of condition investigation, the licensee also identified(documented in CR 2006-002219) that fire induced spurious actions in the control circuitry of a relay associated with the safety injection signal could also have the same result, and that these spurious actions could also cause the standby auxiliary feedwaterpumps (SAFP) to be inoperable. The SAFPs are required for safe shutdown when the auxiliary feedwater pumps or the condensate storage tank are affected by a fire. The licensee initiated the necessary compensatory actions for correcting theseproblems by adding steps to three post-fire response procedures to defeat the potential fire induced spurious actions by removing the fuses of alternate DC power supplies to the affected relay control circuits. During the inspection, the team reviewed the following three affected procedures and verified that the necessary steps were incorporated into the procedures: ER.FIRE.1Alternate Shutdown For Control Complex Fire, Revision 20ER.FIRE.4Alternate Shutdown For Battery Room A Fire, Revision 16 ER.FIRE.5Alternate Shutdown For Battery Room B Fire, Revision 18
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. No enforcement action is required for theabove noncompliances (10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.3 for Charging Pump "A" issue,and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2 for the SAFPs issue) because the conditions ofthese noncompliances meet the four criteria (licensee-identified, compensatory actionshave been taken, not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, and not willful) of NRC Enforcement Policy, Interim Enforcement Policies, "InterimEnforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)", and are not associated with a finding of high safety significance.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryThe team presented their preliminary inspection results to Ms. M. Korsnick, Site VicePresident, and other members of the site staff at an exit meeting on June 23, 2006. No proprietary information was included in this inspection report.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicensee PersonnelS. AdamsManager of OperationsD. BisaillonReactor Operator M. EdelsteinFire Protection System Engineer R. FellowsSenior Reactor Operator M. GreenQuality Performance Assessment T. HardingLicensing Supervisor D. HolmPlant Manager D. JoslinCommunications S. KennedyEmergency Preparedness M. KorsnickVice President, Ginna T. LaursenPerformance Improvement B. LeonardTraining Manager M. LilleyGeneral Supervisor, Equipment ReliabilityM. McGrawFire Protection System Engineer T. O'ConnerFire Protection Consultant J. PacherGeneral Supervisor, System Engineering J. PierceFire Protection Consultant R. RandallLicensing Director M. RubyLicensing Engineer J. SharlowOperations Fire Protection Specialist W. ThompsonGeneral Supervisor, Chemistry R. WhalenEngineering Manager S. WihlenFire Marshall D. WilsonPrincipal Engineer, BOP Systems NRCJ. Rogge, Chief, Electrical and Fire Protection Branch, Division of Reactor SafetyK. Kolaczyk, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna Nuclear Power PlantM. Marshfield, Resident Inspector, Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 2AttachmentLIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED OpenedNoneOpen and Closed05000244/2006007-01 NCVMissed Fire Brigade Training ClosedNone DiscussedNone 3Attachment LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Fire Protection Licensing DocumentsFire Protection Program
- R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 3aGinna UFSAR Sections 7.4 and 9.5
Letter From RGE to NRCAppendix R Alternative Shutdown System
- R. G. GinnaNuclear Power Plant, January 16, 1985Safety Evaluation Report SER For Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50, Items III.G.3 andIII.L, February 27, 1985Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power PlantsDocketed Prior to July 1, 1976.NFPA 27-1981Private Fire Brigades
NFPA 600-2005Standard on Industrial Fire BrigadesCalculations/Engineering Evaluation ReportsDA-EE-2000-066Appendix R Conformance Analysis, Rev. 1DA-ME-98-004Combustible Loading Analysis, Rev. 4
DA-ME-99-009Condensate Inventory Requirements for Station Blackout Event,Rev.0DA-ME-2000-001City Yard Loop Capability to Supply Cooling Water to EDG,SAFW and Fight Screen House Fire With a Loss of Service
Water, Rev. 3DA-ME-2000-075Pressurizer Volume Control Tank and RWST Evaluations forAppendix R, Rev. 2DA-NS-2002-008Operator Action Time Requirement Evaluation, Rev. 4
FTI 32-5009845-00Approval of FTI Calculation 32-5009845-00 Ginna Safe ShutdownRELEPS Analysis, September 26, 2001NSL-4976-DA002Determination of Internal Flood Zones and Sources, Rev. 0
PCR 2005-0034Fire Harden "B" S/G Level Indication (EPU), Rev.0
PCR 2005-0010ADFCS I/O Power Supply Back-Up Provision and CoolingUpgrade, Rev.0DA-ME-2003-018Replacement of Appendix R Fire Barrier in the "B" DieselGenerator Vault, Rev.1DA-ME-1998-004Combustible Loading Analysis, Rev.4
DA-ME-2000-040City Water Yard Loop X-Tie to Fire Yard Loop HydraulicCalculation, Rev.1ProceduresA-54.7:1Fire Protection TourAP-CVCS.3Loss of All Charging Flow
AP-IA.1Loss of Instrument Air, Rev. 18
CME-50-02-52/EG1A1Corrective Maintenance Procedure: Westinghouse 480V AirCircuit Breaker, Type DB-75 Emergency Generator Breaker A
Bus 14, Position 18C, Rev. 02
4AttachmentCPI-APPX-R-SR-32Calibration of Appendix R Source Range, N32REOP ATT-11.2 Attachment Diesel Air Compressor, Rev. 5
ER-D/G.2Alternate Cooling For Emergency D/G, Rev. 16
ER-FIRE.0CR Response To Fire Alarms and Reports, Rev. 6
ER.FIRE.6Response To Fire In D/G B Vault, Rev. 2
FRP-4.0Auxiliary Building Basement, Rev. 5
FRP-8.0Intermediate Building Controlled Side Basement, Rev. 5
IP-CAP-1Ginna Station Interface Procedure: Condition Reporting, Rev. 24
O-2.1Normal Shutdown To Hot Shutdown, Rev. 120
O-6.11Surveillance Requirement/Routine Operations Check Sheet, Rev. 146O-9.3NRC Immediate Notification, Rev. 55
SC-3.15.15Emergency Fire Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Rev. 84
ND-FPPFire Protection Program, Rev.10
2The Fire Protection Program and Ginna Station StaffResponsibilities for Fire Protection, Rev.20, Rev.21A-103.9Fire Brigade Training, Rev.18
A-905Open Flame, Welding and Grinding Permit (Hot Work Permit),Rev.34FPS-16Bulk Storage of Combustible Materials and Transient Fire Loads,Rev.9O-6.11Surveillance Requirement / Routine Operations Check Sheet,Rev.144A-54.7Fire Protection Tour, Rev.29
FPS-1Fire Barrier Control Procedure, Rev.9
FPS-2Ginna Station Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Program, Rev.4
FPS-2.3Temporary Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Program, Rev.4
M-56.3Permanent Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Installation / Repair,Rev.26PT-13.1Annual Fire Pump Insurance Surveillance Test, Rev.34PT-13.4.20Flood Valve Testing - Suppression System #S09 Relay Room SEManual Deluge, Rev.19PT-13.4.21Flood Valve Testing - Suppression System #S10 Relay Room WManual Deluge, Rev.21PT-13.4.22Flood Valve Testing - Suppression System #S11 Relay Room NEManual Deluge, Rev.24QCIP-44Fire Barrier Inspection (Method and Acceptance), Rev.12
SC-3.16.2.8Fire Signaling System Maintenance, Rev.????
SC-3.15.5Emergency Fire Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Rev.84
SC-3Site Contingency Plan - SC-3 Fire Emergency Plan, Rev.38
SC-3.1Fire Emergency General Information, Rev.20
SC-3.1.1Fire Alarm Response (Fire Brigade Activation), Rev.17
SC-3.4.0Fire Assessment and Subsequent Actions, Rev.22
SC-3.4.1Fire Brigade Captain and Control Room PersonnelResponsibilities, Rev.37IP-RDM-3Ginna Records, Rev.13
5AttachmentCompleted Tests/SurveillancesO-6.11Surveillance Requirement/Routing Operations Check Sheet, Rev. 146, Completed March 2006SC-3.15.15Emergency Fire Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Rev. 84,Completed 4/10/06, 5/
9/06, 5/31/06 and 6/2/06FPS-2.1Control and Verification of UFSAR and/or 10CFR50 Appendix RFire Barriers, Rev.6, 09/14/05, 11/28/05FPS-7Velocity Flush of the Fire Water System, Rev.9, 05/12/06 andRev.5, 10/25/02M-56.1Establishment of Temporary Fire Seals, Rev.27, 04/21/06
PT-13.11Gamewell Zone Smoke Detector Testing Zones Z01 (Aux. Base.East), Rev.20, 12/15/04PT-13.11.26Testing of Smoke Detection Zone Z-44 Relay Room Annex,Rev.???, 01/10/06PT-13.11.6.1Testing of Smoke Detection Zone Z38D1 Intermediate Building -South Basement, Rev.0, 05/11/06PT-13.4.29Halon System Testing Relay Room / Computer Room (S08),Rev.24, 08/15/05PT-13.4.33Station Halon Systems Bottle Weighing and S08 (Relay Roomand Computer Room) Air Flow Test, Rev.24, 04/25/05PT-13.1Annual Fire Pump Insurance Surveillance Test, Rev.32, 12/21/05and Rev.31, 12/20/04PT-13.11.2Gamewell Zone Smoke Detector Testing Zones Z20 ("A' D/GVault), Z21 ("B" DG Vault). Rev.17, 05/17/05PT-13.10Fire System Spray Nozzle Air Flow Test for S05, S06, S09, S10,S11, S14, S17 and S29, Rev.17, 12/08/05P201504ECAD Testing on "A" EDG CablesQuality Assurance (QA) Audits and System Health ReportsFPP-05-01-GFire Protection Report Audit, August 2, 2005SA 2006-0005Fire Program, March 23, 2006
Audit FPP-05-01-GFire Protection, completed 08/02/05
SA 2006-0005Fire Program Assessment Report, completed 03/23/06SQUA-2004-0013-MPHSQUA-2004-0142-ENB
SQUA-2005-0050-EMG
6AttachmentDrawings21488-0100Fire Barrier Arrangement Sheet Fire, Smoke and Pressure BarrierPlan View El.253'6", Rev.1021488-0111Fire Barrier General Arrangement Sheet Diesel Generator RoomB West and South Walls Penetrations Location Floor El.253'6",
Rev.533013-2559Fire Response Plan Control Building, Rev.8
33013-1993 Sh.2Fire Service Water Header "B", Rev.9
33013-15371B Diesel Generator Cable Vault Appendix "R" Cable Chase FireBarrier, Rev.433013-1242Fire Protection Relay and Multiplexer Rooms, Rev.5
33013-1989Fire Service Water Plant Systems, Rev.22
2013-2539AC System Plant Load Distribution One Line Diagram, Rev.13
33013-2543Fire Response Plan Auxiliary Building Plan - Basement FloorEl.253'8", Rev.233013-2544Fire Response Plan Turbine Building Plan - Basement FloorEl.253'6", Rev.933013-2545Fire Response Plan Containment Structure & Intermediate Bldg.Plan - Intermediate Floor El. 253'3", Rev.833013-2559Fire Response Plan Control Building Plan Views, Rev.8
21946-0445Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump C Control Schematic33013-1736Diesel Generator A Control Schematic, Rev. 14
21946-0650TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve MOV-3504A ControlSchematic, Rev. 821946-0651TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valve MOV-3505A ControlSchematic, Rev. 721946-0054480V Bus 14 PT and UV Relays Control Schematic, Revision 5
21946-0055480V Bus 16 PT and UV Relays Control Schematic, Revision 6
21946-0445Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump C Control Schematic,Revision 621946-0446Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump D Control Schematic,Revision 510909-34Bus 14 and Bus 16 Undervoltage Control, Revision 4
10905-54, Sh 1Undervoltage Scheme, Bus 14 Elementary Wiring Diagram,Undervoltage Scheme Bus 14, Revision 1110905-54, Sh 2Auxiliary Relay Rack Elementary Wiring Diagram, Revision 1510905-54, Sh 3PT and UV Relays, Bus 14, Elementary Wiring Diagram, Revision
21498-511Appendix R Instrument Panels Wiring diagram, Rev.6
11302-0381Steam Generator A Pressure Loop PT-482 Inst Loop WiringDiagram, Rev.111302-0382Steam Generator B Pressure Loop PT-483 Inst Loop WiringDiagram, Rev.211302-0359Steam Generator A Level Loop LT-460 Inst Loop Wiring Diagram,Rev.1
7Attachment11302-0371Steam Generator B Level Loop LT-470 Inst Loop Wiring Diagram,Rev.111302-0323Pressurizer Level Loop LT-433 Inst Loop Wiring Diagram, Rev.1
10905-0445Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump C Elementary WiringDiagram, Rev. 610905-0446Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump D Elementary WiringDiagram, Rev. 5Pre-Fire PlansFire Response Plan FRP-4.0Auxiliary Building Basement, Rev.5Fire Response Plan FRP-8.0Intermediate Building Controlled Side Basement, Rev.5
Fire Response Plan FRP-19.0Relay Room/Multiplex Room/Annex Room, Rev.8
Fire Response Plan FRP-25.0Diesel Generator Room B and Vault, Rev.6Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)33013-1234Condensate Storage (CDST), Rev. 3133013-1237Auxiliary Feedwater (FW), Rev. 5233013-1238Standby Auxiliary Feedwater (FW), Rev. 2433013-1258Reactor Coolant Pressurizer (RC), Rev. 24
33013-1260Reactor Coolant (RC), Rev. 25
33013-1265, Sh. 1Chemical & Volume Control System Charging, Rev. 11
33013-1265 Sh.2Auxiliary Building Chemical & Volume Control System Charging,Rev. 1733013-1237Auxiliary Feedwater, Revision 52Fire Brigade DocumentsFire Area/Zone Analysis for Fire Areas/Zones ABI/IBS-1, CC/RR, CHG/- and EDG1B/-
Fire Brigade Dr
illsFire Brigade Drills for calendar years 2004, 2005 and 2006Fire Brigade TrainingFire Brigade Training documentsFire Brigade Qualification documents
nd Quarter 2006 Fire Brigade Member ExaminationsOperator Safe Shutdown TrainingAppendix R Composite Operator Time/Motion Study, May 16, 2006RER22C Site Contingencies, Appendix R - Alternative Shutdown, Rev. 8
8AttachmentJob Performance Measures (JPMs)JC012.007Locally Trip Reactor And Turbine, Rev. 5JC039.003Locally Operate The ARVs, Rev. 9
JC061.005Reset TDAFW Pump Turbine Trip/Throttle Valve, Rev. 7
JC079.001Startup and Align Diesel Driven Air Compressor, Rev. 8
JR004.009Take Local Manual Control of Charging Pump, Rev. 6
JR039.001Locally Close MSIV's, Rev. 10
JR061.008Open TDAFW Pump Supply Valves, Rev. 8
JR062.006Locally Operate 480 VAC Breakers, Rev. 9
JR064.004EDG Locally Per ER-FIRE.1 With No Faults, Rev. 15Hot Work and Ignition Source PermitsHWP 06-50HWP 06-51
HWP 06-52
HWP 06-53
HWP 06-54
HWP 06-55Transient Combustible EvaluationsTCP 06-26TCP 06-27
TCP 06-28
TCP 06-29
TCP 06-30Fire BarriersPenetration Seal DatabaseTemporary Fire Barrier I-590-P
Temporary Fire Barrier D-41-P
Fire Barrier Permit 06-03, 05/02/06
Fire Barrier Permit 06-13, 06/01/06
Spec IBD23A-703, IBD23 Style A Curtain Type Static Fire Dampers, 2003Miscellaneous DocumentsGinna Station EPU Licensing Report Fire Protection, December 2005Ginna Station EPU Licensing Report Risk Evaluation of EPU, December 2005
Emergency Lighting Service Manual for ALC-X Series I, AS Series I, ED Series I VTD-D1140-
201 Revision 000 VM#D1140-0377 Tab 2
Spectron Series AS-BC/BX Series I Self Contained Emergency Lighting Units AS-80 BCI, AS-
160 BCI, 12 AS-160 BCI, 12 AS-200 BXI, GMMEL-SD4 Instructions for Installation, Operation,
Service
9AttachmentDual-Lite Spectron Series Emergency Lighting Equipment Series: ALC-X-I, AS-BC/BX-1, AS-I,EDC-X-I, EDN-I Instructions for Installation, Operation, Maintenance
Equipment History Report: 52/EG1A1, 52/EG1A2, 52/EG1B1, 52/EG1A2Equipment History Report: 52/SWP1A, 52/SWP1B
Equipment History Report: 52/CHP1A, 52/CHP1B
Equipment History Report: 52/SWP1C
Audit FPP-05-01-G, Fire Protection, completed 08/02/05
Self Assessment SA 2006-0005, Fire Program Assessment Report, completed 03/23/06
SQUA-2004-0013-MPH
SQUA-2004-0142-ENB
SQUA-2005-0050-EMG
Fire Protection Program Transition Plan
Fire Protection Program Impairment Tracking System
Test Gauge Calibration Data sheet, 06/21/06Condition Reports2003-1376 2003-1478 2003-2227 2003-3333 2004-0104 2004-0190 2004-16912004-1878 2004-2663 2004-3178 2005-0712 2005-3158 2005-3179 2005-3188
2005-4462 2005-4501 2005-4737 2005-4739 2005-4928 2005-5139 2005-5308
2005-6217 2006-0785 2006-0891 2006-0905 2006-0941 2006-0962 2006-0956
2006-1040 2006-1363 2006-2368 2003-2785 2005-0682 2003-2994 2005-3190
2004-0010 2005-3191 2005-3190 2005-4936 2005-0616 2005-5119 2006-0883
2006-2375* 2006-0889 2006-2412* 2006-0941 2006-2409* 2006-0957 2006-2406*
2006-1618 2006-2407* 2006-2356* 2006-2366* 2006-2367* 2006-2363* 2006-2380*Work Orders
20002696 20505059
20505098
10AttachmentLIST OF ACRONYMS USEDACAlternating CurrentCFRCode of Federal Regulations
CO 2 Carbon DioxideCR Condition Report
DCDirect Current
DRSDivision of Reactor Safety
FAFire Area
FHAFire Hazards Analysis
FPPFire Protection Program
FZFire Zone
IMCInspection Manual Chapter
IPInspection Procedure
IPEIndividual Plant Examination
IPEEEIndividual Plant Examination of External Events
IRInspection Report
NCVNon-cited Violation
NFPANational Fire Protection Association
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission
PARSPublicly Available Records
P&IDPiping and Instrumentation Drawing
SAFPStanby Auxiliary Feedwater PumpsSCBASelf Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDPSignificance Determination Process
SESafety Evaluation
SSCStructures, Systems, and Components
UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report