ML070710027
| ML070710027 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/2007 |
| From: | Veronica Rodriguez NRC/NRR/ADRO/DLR/RLRB |
| To: | Garrett T Wolf Creek |
| rodriguez v m, ADRO/DLR/RLRB, 415-3703 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML070710027 (15) | |
Text
April 3, 2007 Mr. Terry J. Garrett Vice President Engineering
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839
SUBJECT:
REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1, LICENSE RENEWAL
APPLICATION
Dear Mr. Garrett:
By letter dated September 27, 2006, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation submitted an application pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54, to renew the operating license for Wolf Creek
Generating Station, Unit 1, for review by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the staff).
The staff is reviewing the information contained in the license renewal application and has
identified, in the enclosure, areas where additional information is needed to complete the
review.These requests for additional information were discussed with Lorrie Bell, and a mutually agreeable date for the response is within 30 days from the date of this letter. If you have any
questions, please contact me at 301-415-3703 or e-mail VMR1@nrc.gov
.Sincerely,/RA/Verónica M. Rodríguez, Project Manager License Renewal Branch B
Division of License Renewal
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-482
Enclosure:
Requests for Additional Information cc w/encl: See next page
ML070710027OFFICELA:DLRPM:RLRB:DLRBC:RLRB:DLRNAMEIKingVRodríguezRAuluck DATE03/14/0704/03/0703/20/07
Enclosure WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION (LRA)
REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAIs)Fuel Handling - Fuel Storage and Handling System RAI 2.3.3.1-1 License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01 shows the layout of the spent fuel pool, cask loading pit, and the fuel transfer canal. These three areas are adjacent and separated by
walls, except in two slots. The slots are sealed off by spent fuel gates.
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.1.2.2, describes the leaktight gates in the spent fuel pool and their functions. The USAR states that the purpose of the leaktight gate is to
allow drainage of the cask loading pit and fuel transfer canal while maintaining the proper water
inventory in the spent fuel pool. The USAR further states that an acceptable minimum water
level will be maintained in the event of loss of integrity of the gate while either the cask loading
pit or fuel transfer canal is drained.
LRA Section 2.3.3.1 does not include the spent fuel gates within the scope of license renewal.
The spent fuel gates do not appear elsewhere in the LRA. The spent fuel gates appear to be
required as a pressure boundary to maintain correct water level above the spent fuel when the
cask loading pit and the fuel transfer canal are drained. The staff requests that the applicant
justify the exclusion of the spent fuel gates and their sealing mechanisms from the scope of
license renewal. Containment Cooling System RAI 2.3.3.5-1 License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-GN-M-12G N01 shows containment coolers SGN01A, SGN01B, SGN01C, and SGN01D within the scope of license renewal because they are safety-related. LRA Section 2.3.3.5 states that the containment cooling system, in conjunction
with the containment spray system, removes sufficient energy and subsequent decay heat from
the containment atmosphere following a design basis loss of coolant accident or a main steam
line break inside the containment to maintain it below the design pressure.
Each of the containment coolers has three drain lines attached to the cooler shell (air side) of the heat exchanger upstream of their respective fan unit. The drain lines are 4-inch each and
join to form an 8-inch diameter line on each containment cooler. Each of the drain lines pass
through a drain trap as shown on license renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-LF-M-12LF09. USAR
Section 6.2.2.2.2.3, describes that condensate is collected and measured to identify leakage.
The drain lines are not shown to be within the scope of license renewal, although they appear to support the system intended function of the containment coolers. If the lines were to fail, then
excessive flow through the containment cooler casing (through the failed drain lines), could
bypass the cooling coils and defeat their intended function.
The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the drain lines from the scope of license renewal up to the drain traps.
RAI 2.3.3.5-2 LRA Section 2.3.3.5 states that portions of the system support environmental qualification in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). Drawing LRA-WCGS-GN-M-12GN01 shows containment
coolers SGN01A, SGN01B, SGN01C, and SGN 01D within the scope of license renewal.
However, the drawing shows the discharge duc twork from the containment coolers excluded from the scope of license renewal. During normal operation, the containment cooler discharge
ductwork supplies cooled air to areas that contain safety-related equipment, such as
instrumentation adjacent to the steam generator compartments.
USAR Section 3.11(B) describes the environmental conditions and design bases for which safety systems are designed to ensure acceptable performance during normal operation and
during design basis accidents environmental conditions.
USAR Section 3.11(B).2.1 describes that safety equipment (in accordance with USAR Table 3.11(B)-3) is designed for 40 years of operation in its environment during normal
operation as well as in its environment following a design basis accident.
USAR Table 3.11(B)-1 describes the maximum expected temperatures in the reactor building to be 220°F at the reactor cavity. USAR Table 3.11(B)-3 identifies the equipment and
instrumentation required to achieve and maintain shutdown conditions, such as pressurizer
pressure and steam generator level transmitters.
The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the containment cooler discharge ductwork from the scope of license renewal and explain how cooling does not contribute
towards the equipment's qualified life. Compressed Air System RAI 2.3.3.6-1 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-KA-M-12KA05, at location B-6, shows relief valve V0706 not color coded, which indicates it is not within the scope of license renewal and subject to
aging management review. The valve is within the safety-related boundary flag and protects the
safety-related accumulator, TKA05 from over pressurization. Therefore, relief valve V0706
should be within the scope of license renewal pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The staff
requests that the applicant explain why valve V0706 is not color coded in green on this drawing.
RAI 2.3.3.6-2 License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-KA-M-12KA05, at locations G-7 and E-7, shows the test connections attached to valves V0676 and V0677 color coded red in accordance with
10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criteria. On the same drawing, the test connections for valves V0683, V0684, V0685 and V0686, at locations H-6, F-6, D-6 and B-6, respectively, are not color coded which
indicate that they are not within the scope of license renewal and subject to an aging
management review (AMR). The staff requests that the applicant describe what is the license
renewal intended function of the test connections for valves V0676 and V0677 and why it does not apply to the test connections for valves V0683, V0684, V0685 and V0686.Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System RAI 2.3.3.15-1 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-JE-M-12JE 01, at locations G-7 and C-7, show flame arresters FA-0001A and FA-0001B on the emergency fuel oil storage tanks. The drawing also
shows flame arresters FA-0002A and FA-0002B, at locations H-4 and D-4, on the emergency
fuel oil day tanks which are not highlighted as within the scope of license renewal. These flame
arresters may be needed for fire protection purposes. The staff requests that the applicant
clarify whether these flame arresters should be within the scope of license renewal in
accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). If not, please justify their exclusion.Main Steam System RAI 2.3.4.2-1 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AB-M-12AB01, at locations D-3, D-6, H-3 and H-6, shows four atmospheric relief valves silencers that are not color coded as within the scope of license
renewal and subject to an AMR. These four silencers are attached to piping which are within
the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). If the piping's intended
function is to provide a pressure boundary for the steam flow path, then the staff requests that
the applicant explain why the silencers are not within the scope of license renewal in
accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) for functional support. The staff also requests that the
applicant describe the physical configuration of the silencers such that if they fail they will not prevent the atmospheric relief valves from performing their intended function.
RAI 2.3.4.2-2 License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12AB03, at locations F-8, E-8, C-8, and B-8, shows steam traps ST0001, ST0002, ST0003 and ST0004 that are not color coded as within the scope
of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The steam traps are attached to 2-inch lines. The
staff requests that the applicant explain why these four traps are not within the scope of license
renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) and how the lines are isolated.
RAI 2.3.4.2-3 License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12AB03, at location H-5, has a note stating "to be evaluated in LRID AE, Feedwater System" which points to reference continuation flags to
drawings M-12FC03 and M-12FC04. For license renewal, drawings M-12FC03 and M-12FC04
are designated as LR-WCGS-AB-M-12FC03 and LR-WCGS-AB-M-12FC04, respectively.
The staff requests that the applicant explain why the note references LRID AE, when these two drawings have been associated and evaluated with in the main steam system for license renewal.RAI 2.3.4.2-4 License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12FB01, at location G-8, has a note stating "This section is evaluated in LRID AL" which points to a reference continuation flag to drawing
M-12FC02. For license renewal, drawing M-12FC02 is designated as
LR-WCGS-AB-M-12FC02. The staff requests that the applicant explain why the note
references LRID AL, auxiliary feedwater system, when the referenced drawing has been associated and evaluated within the main steam system for license renewal.
RAI 2.3.4.2-5 License renewal drawings for the main steam system have lines highlighted in green indicating that they are within the scope of license renewal and are required to support the system
intended functions. However, multiple lines that are sized 1-inch and under, that branch off the
highlighted lines with no valve or other interfacing components, are not highlighted.
The size 1-inch and under lines in the main steam system are included on license renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12AB03. Examples of these lines include those at locations G-8 (line 237-DBD-1), H-6 (off line 148-DBD-6), G-5 (off line 167-DBD-6), G-4 (line 317-DBD-1), H-3 (line DBD-1/2), E-8 (line 206-DBD-1), and D-7 (off line 241-DBD-36), among others.
The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the size 1-inch and under lines from the scope of license renewal. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant explain whether
the impact of multiple line failures were considered on system intended functions.Liquid Radwaste System RAI 2.3.2.5-1 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-HB-M-12HB03, at locations A-5 and B-5, show piping from the discharge of the reactor makeup water transfer pump that is highlighted as
nonsafety-related affecting safety-related based due to structural integrity of the piping lines. It
is unclear where the boundary ends in the piping run going to the demineralized water
degasifier. The staff requests that the applicant identify where the piping physically transitions
from piping that is within the scope of license renewal and subject to aging management to
piping outside the scope of license renewal.Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System RAI 2.3.3.2-1 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01, at location C-3, shows a normally closed valve (V0995) at the spent fuel pool end of the fuel transfer tube.
The fuel transfer tube is noted as being safety-related and within the scope of license renewal for providing a pressure boundary. However, the valve is not listed as being within the scope of
license renewal. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of this valve from the
scope of license renewal as it provides structural support for the fuel transfer tube and meets
the criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).
RAI 2.3.3.2-2 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01, at locations E-7 and H-7, show removable spools with spacer rings installed (SS-001SR and SS-002SR). The spacer rings are
replacements for startup strainers. The piping lines are highlighted as being within the scope of
license renewal. However, spacer rings are not listed in LRA Table 2.3.3-2 as being within the
scope of license renewal. The staff requests the applicant to justify the exclusion of these
components from LRA Table 2.3.3-2.
RAI 2.3.3.2-3 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01, at location C-7, shows strainers in the suction piping from the spent fuel pool to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps. The strainers are
installed on lines 009-HCC-12 and 001-HCC-12. These lines are highlighted as within the
scope of license renewal and perform an intended function in accordance with
10 CFR 54.4(a)(1); however, the strainers are not highlighted. Failure of the strainers could
cause damage to the pumps or valves and could prevent performance of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system intended function. Section 54.4 of 10 CFR requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) whose failure c ould prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of a safety-related SSC intended function, be included within the scope of license renewal. The
staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the strainers from the scope of license
renewal.Emergency Diesel Engine System RAI 2.3.3.16-1 License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ01 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ04, at locations H-5 and H-6, show standby diesel generator jacket water expansion tanks, TKJ01A
and TKJ01B, respectively. The tanks are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted
in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Each tank has several lines
extending from it that also appear to be safety-re lated; however, these lines are not highlighted.
The lines in question are portions of 010-HBD-1, 066-HBD-1, 073-HBD-1, 011-HBD-1, 166-HBD-1, 173-HBD-1, and the chemical addition fittings.
LRA Section 2.1 states that every component meeting the scoping criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), was included within the scope of the license renewal rule. The staff
requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of these lines from the scope of license renewal.
RAI 2.3.3.16-2 License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ01 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ04, at multiple locations, show at least ten flexible connections in the standby diesel generator cooling
water system. The flexible connections are within the safety-related boundary and are
highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The flexible
connections are exposed to jacket cooling water and provide a pressure boundary intended
function.
LRA Tables 2.3.3-16 and 3.3.2-16 do not identify flexible connections as a component type exposed to a water environment. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of
the flexible connections from the scope of license renewal in the jacket cooling water portion of the emergency diesel engine system.
RAI 2.3.3.16-3 License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ01 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ04, at multiple locations, show at least three flow orifices in the standby diesel generator cooling water
system. The flow orifices are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for
meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The flow orifices are exposed to jacket cooling
water and provide a pressure boundary and flow restriction (throttling) intended functions.
LRA Tables 2.3.3-16 and 3.3.2-16 do not identify flow orifices as a component type exposed to a water environment. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the flow
orifices from the scope of license renewal in the jacket cooling water portion of the emergency
diesel engine system.
RAI 2.3.3.16-4 License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ03 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ06, at locations H-6 and H-7, show the lube oil auxiliary tanks for the standby diesel generator lube oil
system TKJ04A and TKJ04B, respectively. Thes e tanks are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Each tank has
several lines extending from them that also appear to be safety-related; however, these lines are not highlighted in green. The lines in question are portions of 071-HBD-1, 072-HBD-1, 052-HBD-1 1/2, 171-HBD-1, 172-HBD-1, and 152-HBD-1 1/2.
LRA Section 2.1 states that every component meeting the scoping criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) was included within the scope of the license renewal rule. The staff requests
that the applicant justify the exclusion of these lines from the scope of license renewal.
RAI 2.3.3.16-5 License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ03 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ06, at locations H-5 and H-6, show standby diesel generator lube oil expansion tanks TKJ04A and
TKJ04B, respectively. These tanks are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in
green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1).
Each tank has a vent line extending from them that lead to the outside atmosphere that are not highlighted in green. The vent lines in question support the operation of the tanks by allowing
free exchange of air in response to level changes in the tank. In addition, the vent lines appear
to be located above the tank where internal corrosion products could fall into the tank.
Failure of the vent lines could also allow moisture from the outside atmosphere to contaminate the lube oil.
Section 54.4 of 10 CFR requires that SSCs whose failure could prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of a safety-related SSC intended function, be included within the scope of
license renewal. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the vent lines from
the scope of license renewal. RAI 2.3.3.16-6 License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ03 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ06, at multiple locations, show at least three flexible connections in the standby diesel generator lube
oil system. The flexible connections are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted
in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The flexible connections are
exposed to lubricating oil and provide a pressure boundary intended function.
LRA Tables 2.3.3-16 and 3.3.2-16 do not identify flexible connections as a component type exposed to a lubricating oil environment. The staff requests that the applicant justify the
exclusion of the flexible connections from the scope of license renewal in the lube oil portion of
the emergency diesel engine system.Oily Waste System RAI 2.3.3.18-1 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-LE-M-12LE01 and LR-WCGS-LE-M-12LE02 show piping from the discharge of the auxiliary feed pump room sump pumps PLE12A and PLE12B, and the diesel generator building sump pumps PLE06A and PLE06B highlighted in red as
nonsafety-related components affecting safety-related components due to spatial interaction.
However, the pumps are not highlighted even though they appear to be in close proximity to
safety-related components. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the
portions of the nonsafety-related oily waste syst em that are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests
that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated. Miscellaneous Auxiliary Systems In-scope Only for Criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2)
RAI 2.3.3.21-1 LRA Section 2.3.3.21 states that systems meeting the criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) are within the scope of license renewal. The LRA states that each mechanical system was reviewed to
determine whether safety-related systems could be adversely be impacted by nonsafety-related portions of systems.
Among the systems included in this LRA Secti on are nonsafety-related systems that have a potential for spatial interaction with safety-related portions of other systems. These system
portions are shown in the drawings with a red highlight. The staff requests that the applicant
address the following:
(1) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EA-M-12EA01, for the nonsafety-related service water system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further
explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions
of the nonsafety-related service water system that are within the scope of license renewal
for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition,
the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping
boundaries where indicated. (2)License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-LD-M-12LD01, for the chemical and detergent waste system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation.
The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the chemical
and detergent waste system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the
requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests
that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where
indicated.
(3) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AN-M-12AN01, for the demineralized water makeup storage and transfer system, shows system por tions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the
portions of the demineralized water makeup storage and transfer system that are within the
scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial
interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for
terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated.
(4) License renewal drawings LR-WCGS-KD-M
-12KD01 and LR-WCGS-KD-M-12KD02, for the domestic water system, show system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the
domestic water system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the
requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests
that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where
indicated.
(5) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-GA-M-12GA02, for the plant heating system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. Additionally, references are made to drawings showing more detail of the boundaries, which are not
included in the LRA. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the
portions of the plant heating system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting
the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff
requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where
indicated. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant provide the drawings referenced
in LR-WCGS-GA-M-12GA02.
(6) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-GB-M-12G B01, for the central chilled water system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation.
The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the central
chilled water system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the
requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests
that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where
indicated.
(7) License renewal drawings LR-WCG S-HF-M-12HF01, LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF02 and LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF03, for the secondary li quid waste system, show system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. Additionally, references are made
to drawings showing more detail of the boundaries, which are not included in the LRA. The
staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the secondary liquid
waste system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated. Also, the applicant is requested to provide the drawings referenced in LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF01, LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF02 and LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF03.Condensate System RAI 2.3.4.4-1
License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AD-M-12AP01, at locations D-3, D-4, E-3, E-4, and G-3, shows penetrations to the condensate storage tank TAP01 that are not highlighted in green.
However, the tank shell is highlighted in green indicating that it meets the requirements of
10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). The penetrations are for LT-0004, TE-0005, LSL-0010, low pressure N2, and LSH-007.
USAR Section 8.3A.3.4 states that the coping duration for a station blackout is four hours.
Further, USAR Section 8.3A.5.1 states that a minimum of 156,300 gallons of condensate
storage tank inventory is required for decay heat removal for the four hour coping period.
Failure of a tank penetration could cause drainage of the inventory below the required minimum.
The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the penetrations from the scope of
RAI 2.3.4.4-2
License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AD-M-12AP01, at locations G-2, G-3, and G-4, shows vents and vacuum relief valves on the condensate storage tank TAP01 that are not highlighted
in green. However, the tank shell is highlighted in green indicating that it meets the
requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). The vent lines in question support the operation of the
tanks by allowing free exchange of air in response to level changes in the tank. In addition, the
vent lines appear to be located above the tank where internal corrosion products could fall into
the tank. Failure of the vents could cause damage to the condensate storage tank. The staff
requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the vents from the scope of license renewal.
RAI 2.3.4.4-3 License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AD-M-12AP01, at locations F-3 and F-4, show external steam heating coils EAP01A, EAP01B, and EAP01C attached to the condensate storage tank
not highlighted in green. The steam heating coil steam and drainage lines and their controls are
also not highlighted in green. However, the tank shell is highlighted in green indicating that it
meets the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3).
USAR Section 8.3A.3.4 states that the coping duration for a station blackout is four hours.
Further, USAR Section 8.3A.5.1 states that a minimum of 156,300 gallons of condensate
storage tank inventory is required for decay heat removal for the four hour coping period.
Additionally, USAR Section 9.2.6.2.2 states t hat freeze protection is provided by thermal insulation and external steam heating coils. USAR Section 9.2.6.5 states that the nominal
minimum temperature for the condensate storage tank is 50°F. The steam supply to the steam
heating coils is from the nonsafety-related aux iliary steam system and would not be available during a station blackout. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of either the steam heating coils and/or the tank insulation from LRA Tables 2.3.4-4 and 3.4.4-4 as a component types within the scope of license renewal.
Letter to T. Garrett from V, Rodriguez, dated April 3, 2007 DISTRIBUTION:
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1, LICENSE RENEWAL
APPLICATION HARD COPY DLR RF E-MAIL: PUBLIC RWeisman GGalletti DShum SSmith (srs3)
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RHernandez Wolf Creek Generating Station cc: Jay Silberg, Esq.
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP
2300 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-7005 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 311
Burlington, KS 66839 Chief Engineer, Utilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission
1500 SW Arrowhead Road
Topeka, KS 66604-4027 Office of the Governor State of Kansas
Topeka, KS 66612 Attorney General 120 S.W. 10 th Avenue, 2 nd Floor Topeka, KS 66612-1597 County Clerk Coffey County Courthouse
110 South 6 th Street Burlington, KS 66839 Thomas A. Conley, Section Chief Radiation and Asbestos Control
Kansas Department of Health
and Environment
Bureau of Air and Radiation
1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310
Topeka, KS 66612-1366 Vice President Operations/Plant Manager Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839 Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office/Callaway Plant
8201 NRC Road
Steedman, MO 65077-1032 Kevin J. Moles, Manager Regulatory Affairs
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839 Lorrie I. Bell, Project Manager Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, KS 66839Mr. James Ross Nuclear Energy Institute
1776 I Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006-3708