IR 05000334/2006008
| ML062410159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/29/2006 |
| From: | Doerflein L T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Lash J FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-06-008 | |
| Download: ML062410159 (31) | |
Text
August 29, 2006
Mr. James LashSite Vice President, Beaver Valley Power Station FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT05000334/2006008 AND 05000412/2006008 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Mr. Lash:
On July 20, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atthe Beaver Valley Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspectionresults, which were discussed on July 20, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components andoperator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents.
The inspection also reviewed FENOC's response to selected operating experience issues. The inspection involved field walkdowns; examination of selected procedures, calculations and records; and interviews with station personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, anoncompliance was identified during the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 implementation transition period. The NRC is not taking any enforcement action for this item because the conditions for this noncompliance meet the enforcement discretion criteria specified in the NRC Enforcement Policy, Interim Enforcement Policies, "Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)."In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Lawrence T. DoerfleinEngineering Branch 2 2J. LashDivision of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 50-334, 50-412License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000334 and 05000412/2006008
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:G. Leidich, President and Chief Nuclear OfficerJ. Hagan, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating OfficerD. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering J. Rinckel, Vice President, Fleet Oversight L. Myers, Executive Vice President, Special Projects R. Anderson, Vice President, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Manager, Fleet Licensing, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company R. Mende, Director - Site Operations T. Cosgrove, Director, Maintenance P. Sena, Director, Engineering L. Freeland, Director, Site Performance Improvement and Manager, Regulatory Compliance D. Jenkins, Attorney, FENOC B. Sepelak, Supervisor, Nuclear Compliance M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA D. Allard, PADEP C. O'Claire, State Liaison to the NRC, State of Ohio Z. Clayton, EPA-DERR, State of Ohio Director, Utilities Department, Public Utilities Commission, State of OhioD. Hill, Chief, Radiological Health Program, State of West Virginia J. Lewis, Commissioner, Division of Labor, State of West Virginia W. Hill, Beaver County Emergency Management AgencyJ. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club 3
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000334/2006008, 05000412/2006008; 06/12/2006 - 07/20/2006; Beaver Valley PowerStation, Units 1 and 2; Engineering Design Inspection.This inspection was conducted by a team of five NRC inspectors and two NRC contractors.The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.B.Licensee-identified ViolationsNone.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R21Component Design Bases Inspection (IP 71111.21).1Inspection Sample Selection ProcessThe team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review usinginformation contained in the Beaver Valley Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)and theNuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR)model. Additionally, the Beaver Valley Significance Determination Process (SDP)
Phase 2 Notebook, Revision 2, was referenced in the selection of potential componentsand actions for review. In general, the selection process focused on components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth (RAW) factor greater than 2.0 or aRisk Reduction Worth (RRW) factor greater than 1.005. The components selected were located within both safety related and non-safety related systems, and included a varietyof components such as pumps, valves, tanks, diesel generators, transformers, and electrical buses.The team initially compiled a list of approximately 40 components based on the riskfactors previously mentioned. The team performed a margin assessment to narrow the focus of the inspection to 20 components. The team's evaluation of possible low design margin considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, and margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipment reliability issues. The margin review also evaluated the impact of licensing basis changes that could reduce safety analysis margins, such as the extended power uprate (EPU) which was being reviewed by the NRC at the time of this inspection. Several of the EPU-related modifications had already been implemented, and were considered in the team's margin assessment.As part of the evaluation, the team reviewed items such as failed performance testresults, significant corrective action history, repeat maintenance, maintenance rule (a)(1)status, operability reviews for degraded conditions, system health reports and industryoperating experience. The team also considered NRC resident inspector inputregarding equipment problems. A margin review of operator actions was performed by the team which assessed the complexity of the action, the time to complete the action and the extent of training of the action; as well as the uniqueness and complexity of the design and available defense-in-depth margins. The team performed a detailed review of seven operator actions.The team performed the detailed design review of the components and operator actionsas outlined in Inspection Procedure 71111.21. This inspection effort included walk-downs of selected components, interviews with operator s, system engineers and designengineers, and reviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of the components to meet design bases requirements. A summary of the 2Enclosurereviews performed and the specific inspection results are discussed in the followingsections of the report. The documents reviewed and key points of contact are identified in the attachment to this report..2Results of Detailed Reviews.2.1 Detailed Component Design Reviews (20 Samples).2.1.1Refueling Water Storage Tank 2QSS-TK-210 (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design and current condition of the Unit 2 refueling waterstorage tank (RWST). Tank volume and level setpoint calculations were evaluated to ensure that design basis specifications could be satisfied. The team also considered net positive suction head (NPSH) and vortex concerns, and tank drawings and dimensions in the calculation review. The team verified that instrument setpoints wereproperly translated into system procedures and tests, and reviewed completed testsintended to demonstrate component operability. Further, uncertainty calculations werereviewed, including those regarding the switchover to the recirculation mode of safety injection. Finally, the team discussed the design, operation and maintenance of theRWST and associated equipment with desi gn and system engineers, and completed awalkdown of the RWST with the system engineer.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.2Reactor Coolant Pump Seals (Units 1 and 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design and operation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor coolantpump (RCP) seals. To assess the condition of the seals, the team reviewed systemhealth and condition reports, technical bulletin correspondence, and industry operating experience relating to RCP seal failure concerns. The team also reviewed the potential impact that the upcoming EPU could have on RCP seal operation (higher reactor power and possible decrease in time to core damage for various seal leak scenarios). Finally, the team reviewed calculations relating to seal design and injection flow, as well as completed test results that were associated with the RCP seals.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3Enclosure.2.1.3Emergency Diesel Generator EE-EG-1 [electrical] (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the electrical capabilities of Unit 1 emergency diesel generator(EDG) EE-EG-1. The evaluation of EE-EG-1 focused on its ability to power safety-related loads during design basis events. Specifically, the team reviewed: 1) the loadflow analysis and voltage drop calculations to verify that adequate voltage was provided to the safety-related loads during worst-case loading conditions; 2) the 4160 Vac coordination analysis to ensure that the protective devices were adequately rated; and3) the sequential starting of loads to determine if EE-EG-1 had sufficient capability toaccelerate the loads within the time periods specified in the UFSAR. The team also verified that EDG loading calculations have been revised to incorporate the electrical load increases of the 4160 Vac charging pump motors and the 460 Vac control rod drive mechanism shroud fan motors needed to support unit operation at the proposed EPU conditions. The team reviewed the EDG test results to verify that the test conditions verified compliance with technical specification requirements as well as the actual loading conditions that would be present under design basis events.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.4Emergency Diesel Generator 2EGS*EG2-1 [mechanical] (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the mechanical capabilities of Unit 2 EDG 2EGS*EG2-1. Included inthis review were selected portions of several design and licensing documents.
Calculations reviewed focused on fuel consumption requirements, fuel storage and day tank level/volume and associated instrumentation and setpoints, and heat removalrequirements of the EDG building. Further, the team reviewed system health andcondition reports, including those concerning tornado wind loading on the building and heat exchanger degradation due to bio-fouling. Also, the results of recently completed monthly surveillance tests were reviewed. Finally, the team discussed the design, operation and maintenance of the EDG and related equipment with desi gn and systemengineers, and completed a walkdown of the EDG building.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4Enclosure.2.1.5Recirculation Spray Pump 2RSS-P21C (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed design documents, including drawings, calculations, procedures,tests and modifications to evaluate the functional requirements of the Unit 2 recirculation spray system (RSS) pump 2RSS-P21C. The team reviewed these documents to ensure the pump was capable of meeting design basis requirements, with consideration of allowable pump degradation, heat exchanger tube plugging impact and NPSH. To assess the current condition of the pump, the team interviewed the R SS systemengineer and review ed system health and related condition reports. Recent surveillancetest results were reviewed to determine whether pump performance margin was sufficient to assure design basis assumptions could be achieved. Finally, EPU documentation and related calculations were reviewed to assess the associatedrequirements for higher power operations.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.64160 Vac Emergency Bus 2DF (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The Unit 2 4160 Vac emergency bus 2DF serves one train of safety related loads required for mitigating design basis accidents and for achieving safe shutdown. The team reviewed the applicable voltage and load analysis calculations and degraded voltage protection calculations to confirm that selected equipment ratings would not be exceeded; and that selected loads would have adequate terminal voltage for transient and steady state design basis conditions. This included a review of selected loads impacted by the proposed EPU to confirm that the electrical calculations considered the load characteristics required for operation at the EPU rating. The team also reviewed a sample of preventive maintenance performed for selected 4160 Vac circuit breakers, as well as a sample of calibration and test records for the degraded voltage protection circuits. The team performed a visual external inspection of the switchgear bus to assess external material condition and potential vulnerability to hazards. The team alsoreviewed system health reports and a sample of condition reports to confirm that thelicensee was adequately addressing the conditions. This review assessed the licensee's consideration of apparent or root cause; extent of condition; and theappropriateness and timeliness of corrective actions. The team also reviewed the licensee's disposition of selected industry operating experience pertinent to 4160 Vac switchgear. To supplement the document reviews and walkdowns, the team interviewed design engineers, t he system engineer, and other cognizant licensee staff.
b. Findings
5EnclosureNo findings of significance were identified..2.1.7Station Service Transformer TR-1A (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed calculations, drawings, maintenance procedures, and vendor data to determine whether the Unit 1 Station Service Transformer TR-1A, which supplies powerfrom offsite to safety-related 4160 Vac buses, was adequately designed and maintained.
The team also reviewed the protective relaying for the transformer and the fast transfer relaying schemes to determine adequacy of the offsite power to safety-related 4160 Vac buses upon a trip of Unit 1. The team reviewed preventive maintenance work orders, which included selected periodic tests, oil sampling analysis, and tap changer inspection. Condition reports associated with the station service transformer were also reviewed to ensure the issues had been appropriately addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.1.8High Head Safety Injection Charging Pump 1CH-P-1B (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The high head safety injection (HHSI) charging pumps provide for injecting coolant intothe reactor coolant system and the reactor coolant pump shaft seals. The designrequirements for the pumps discharge pressure considered the full range of reactor coolant system pressures up to the pressurizer safety valve settings, and includedcalculated charging system pressure drops at maximum flow. The team reviewed design basis documentation (including calculations, modifications,UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and vendor design specifications) to identify design requirements related to flow, developed head, NPSH, minimum flow and runout protection, and HHSI pump motor sizing. The team reviewed the design change package and calculations that increased the maximum safety injection flow rates of the HHSI pumps runout limit to 580 gpm. The team conducted walkdowns of installed pump configuration, and flow and pressure instrumentation, and reviewed calibration documentation to verify the adequacy of flow measurement.The team reviewed test results to verify 1CH-P-1B pump performance. Maintenancework orders, in-service testing, and corrective actions were also reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins or pump performance.
In addition, the team verified the charging pump lube oil cooler required flow was sufficient by reviewing operator logs, thermal performance testing results, and heat exchanger cleaning and inspection records.
b. Findings
6EnclosureNo findings of significance were identified..2.1.9River Water Pump WR-P-1B (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team examined the functional requirements of the Unit 1 'B' river water (RW) pump(WR-P-1B) by reviewing calculations, modifications, the UFSAR and Technical Specifications. During design basis accident conditions, the RW pump is required to supply cooling water to several safety-related heat exchangers. Specific design documentation reviewed by the team included drawings, calculations addressing pump performance, and vortex and NPSH requirements. After review of these and related documents, including system health and condition reports, the RW system was walkeddown and visually inspected. Completed surveillance tests, with focus on pumpoperability and performance margin, were also reviewed. Finally, the team discussedsystem silting and bio-fouling concerns, as well as the licensee's program to monitorand control these concerns, wit h system engineers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 0Safety Injection Accumulators 1SI-TK-IA, B, C (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The accumulators are pressure vessels filled with borated water and pressurized withnitrogen gas. Each of the three accumulator tanks is connected to a reactor coolant system cold leg through a normally open motor-operated valve and two check valves. The team interviewed the Unit 1 SI system engineer to gain an understanding ofmaintenance issues and overall reliability of the SI accumulators and associated motor-operated and check valves. To assess the capability of the SI accumulators tooperate as required, the team reviewed equipment specifications, calculations, SIsystem health reports, design basis documents, modifications, condition reports, leveland pressure transmitter calibration records, in-service test records, maintenance work orders, and vendor drawings.The team verified that each SI accumulator tank contained the required volume, boronconcentration, and nitrogen cover pressure to ensure the Technical Specification limits were met and operability was maintained by reviewing control room level and pressureindications, logs and completed surveillance tests. The team also verified theaccumulator tank discharge isolation valves were de-energized open.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7Enclosure.2.1.11Safety Injection Accumulator Level and Pressure Instrumentation (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed portions of the scaling, instrument uncertainty, and setpointcalculations for the Unit 1 SI accumulator level and pressure instrumentation to confirm that assumptions and design inputs regarding tank geometry, process effects, reference leg configuration, instrument uncertainty, and analytical or process limits had been appropriately considered, and that appropriate statistical methodology had been used.
This included confirming that the calculations were consistent with operation at theproposed EPU rating. The team also reviewed portions of a design modification for the Unit 1 level instruments to confirm that the current configuration satisfied the designbases. In addition, the team reviewed a sample of calibration results and trending data, as reported by the licensee's maintenance measured data program. The team also reviewed a sample of condition reports to ensure issues had been appropriately addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.2.12 Service Water Pump 2SWS-P21B (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
There are three service water pumps, which supply cooling water to various turbineplant and reactor plant heat exchangers during routine plant operations, and also to essential safeguards equipment in the event of a design basis accident. The team reviewed the design basis documents (calculations, safety evaluations, UFSAR, Technical Specifications and vendor design specifications) to identify design requirements related to flow, developed head, NPSH, minimum flow and runout protection for service water pump 2SWS-P21B. To ensure that adequate NPSH is maintained and test acceptance criteria satisfied, the team reviewed surveillance testresults, modifications, technical evaluation reports, and condition reports. The team reviewed service water system health reports and corrective maintenancework order history records; and performed a walkdown of the service water pump, pressure and flow instrumentation, strainers, bellows, and vacuum check valves to verify material condition and reliability of the pump. The team reviewed flood door protection seal test results for the service and river waterpump cubical doors inside the Intake Structure to verify the assumed UFSAR leakage rate. The team also reviewed structural drawings and performed walkdowns to verify the fresh air intakes on top of the service water/river water pump cubicles inside the 8EnclosureIntake Structure were installed at the proper elevation to prevent water from entering thefresh air intakes during the assumed maximum flood.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.13Recirculating Spray Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves MOV-1RW-103A & B (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
Motor operated valves MOV-1RW-103A & B are normally closed and are required toopen after receiving a containment isolation phase B signal to provide river water to the recirculation spray heat exchangers. The team interviewed, and conducted walkdowns with, the MOV program engineer and MOV design engineer to observe the condition of the selected valves, and gain an understanding of maintenance issues and overall reliability of the MOVs. The team also reviewed MOV calculations, with focus on weak link analysis, maximum thrust/torque, maximum differential pressure, seismic analysis, and degraded voltage. In addition, the team reviewed river water system health reports,design basis documents, drawings, condition reports, work orders, and in-service testing results to assess the capability of the valves to operate as required during design basisevents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.14480 Vac Substation 1-9P (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed calculations and drawings to determine whether the loading of 480 Vac Substation 1-9P was within equipment and design ratings. The team reviewed the adequacy of design assumptions and calculations related to motor starting and loading voltages to determine if the voltages across motor terminals, under worst-case motor starting and loading conditions, would remain above the minimum acceptable values. The team also verified that calculations have been revised to incorporate the load increases of the 460 Vac control rod drive mechanism shroud fan motors and 460 Vac containment air recirculation fan motors to support unit operation at the proposed EPU condition. On a sample basis, the team reviewed maintenance and test procedures to verify that 480 Vac Substation 1-9P was capable of supplying the minimum voltage necessary to ensure proper operation of connected equipment during normal and accident conditions. On a selected sample of associated equipment, the team reviewed the adequacy of the short circuit ratings of the switchgear and circuit breakers, and the adequacy of protective device coordination. The team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedures to determine whether undervoltage relay 9Enclosuresetpoints were adequate. Finally, the team conducted a walkdown of Substation 1-9P todetermine if the material condition and operating environment were consistent with the design basis, and to verify t hat system alignments were consistent with the designbasis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.1.15Switchyard 138 kV Oil Circuit Breaker 92 (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected 138 kV oil circuit breaker (OCB) 92, which supplies one of the twocredited independent offsite power sources to Unit 1. The team reviewed the calculations and capacity test results for the switchyard battery to confirm that adequate DC voltage would be available for breaker control so that offsite power could be restored following a station blackout. The team also reviewed a sample of preventive maintenance and testing performed on OCB 92 and similar switchyard circuit breakers.
The team performed a visual inspection of the switchyard, the switchyard 125 Vdc battery and distribution panels, and OCB 92. Inspection of OCB 92 included a visual inspection of material condition and conformance of as-found hydraulic pressure settings to vendor specifications for the breaker control mechanisms. The team reviewed selected condition reports and supporting documentation. The team also interviewed the licensee's switchyard coordinator, the system engineer, and switchyardsupport staff regarding the design aspects and operating history for the circuit breakers, battery, charger, and 125 Vdc distribution equipment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.1.16120 Vac Vital Inverter Bus 2-2 (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the one-line diagrams that described the configuration of the 120Vac vital distributi on system and equipment. The team also reviewed the calculationsthat determined the equipment loading margins and maximum/minimum load terminal voltages to confirm that equipment ratings and load performance requirements would be satisfied for design basis conditions. In addition, the team review ed system healthreports, a sample of preventive maintenance performed, and a sample of corrective actions involving operating history, to confirm that the licensee was adequately addressing the conditions. The team also interviewed the design and system engineersregarding the design aspects and operating history for the inverters, internal capacitors, static switches, and regulating transformers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.1.17Low Head Safety Injection MOV-1SI-890C (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The 10-inch safety-related MOV is the outside containment isolation valve whichprovides/isolates flow from low head safety injection (LHSI) pumps to the reactor coolant system (RCS) cold legs. The valve is administratively controlled open during normalplant operation and is required to close during design basis events. As part of the proposed EPU, the team reviewed the design modification for MOV-1SI-890C, which enables the simultaneous hot and cold leg safety injection recirculation (LHSI to RCS hot legs) by changing the valve position to closed during a design basis event. In addition, the team reviewed the motor replacement modification which was implemented to increase the MOV's design margin. The modifications were reviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins or performance.The team interviewed the MOV program and design engineers, and conductedwalkdowns to observe the installed configuration of the reach rod assembly and handwheel attachment. To assess the capability of the valves to operate as required,the team review ed system health reports, design basis documents, drawings, conditionreports, work orders, and in-service testing results. To ensure valve performance during design basis events, the team reviewed weak link analyses, and static and dynamic flow testing results obtained during the most recent refueling outage.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.1.18125 Vdc Bus 2-5 (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The Unit 2 125 Vdc bus 2-5 is a non-safety related bus, but is risk significant because itprovides the 125 Vdc control power necessary for the 4160 Vac fast bus transfer scheme. In selecting this component, the team considered the potential failure of 125 Vdc bus 2-5, which would result in an initiating event such as unit trip. The team reviewed the one-line diagrams for the bus; the calculations for battery sizing and determining minimum voltage at the trip and close coils for the transfer scheme; the calculations that established coordinated protection between selected loads and themain circuit breaker serving the bus from the battery; the results of the last battery capacity test; and a sample of tests and preventive maintenance performed. The team also reviewed system health reports and a sample of condition reports involvingoperating history to confirm that the licensee was adequately addressing the conditions.
11EnclosureThis included a review of the DC ground history, methods for detecting grounds, andelectrical ground management to assess vulnerability to "sneak circuits" resulting frommultiple grounds. The team also performed a visual inspection of the battery regarding material condition, potential hazards, and ventilation configuration. The teaminterviewed the cognizant design and system engineers, and other cognizant licenseestaff regarding the design aspects and operating history for the battery, charger, and circuit breakers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.1.19Station Battery BAT1-2 (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the station battery calculations to verify that the battery sizing wouldsatisfy electrical loading requirements and that the minimum possible voltage was taken into account. The team focused on verifying that the battery and battery chargers were adequately sized to supply the design duty cycle of the 125 Vdc system for both the loss-of-offsite power/loss-of-coolant accident and station blackout loading scenarios, and that the adequate voltage would remain available for the individual load devices required to operate during a two hour coping duration. The team reviewed battery test results to verify that applicable test acceptance criteria and test frequency requirements specified in Technical Specifications were met. The team also reviewed a modification of the battery chargers and its calculations associated with the capability of supplyingthe continuous DC loads and recharging the batteries. In addition, a walkdown was performed to visually inspect the physical and material condition, and component readiness of the battery and battery chargers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.1.204160 Vac Safety Bus 4KVS-1AE (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed calculations and drawings to determine if the loading of 4160 VacVital Bus 4KVS-1AE was within equipment and design ratings. The team reviewed the adequacy of design assumptions and calculations related to motor starting and loading voltages to determine whether the voltages across motor terminals (under worst-case motor starting and loading conditions) would remain above minimum acceptable values.
The team also verified that calculations have been revised to incorporate the loadincreases of the 4160 Vac charging pump motors to support unit operation at the proposed EPU condition. On a sample basis, the team reviewed maintenance and test procedures and acceptance criteria to verify that 4160 Vac Vital Bus 4KVS-1AE was 12Enclosurecapable of supplying the minimum voltage necessary to ensure proper operation ofconnected equipment during normal and accident conditions. The team reviewed the adequacy of the short circuit ratings of the switchgear and circuit breakers, and the adequacy of protective device coordination provided for a selected sample of equipment.
13EnclosureThe team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedures to determine whetherundervoltage relay setpoints were adequate. Finally, the team conducted a walkdown ofthe 4160 Vac vital bus to determine if the material condition and operating environment were consistent with the design basis, and to verify that system alignments wereconsistent with the design basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.2Detailed Operator Action Reviews (7 Samples)The team assessed manual operator actions and selected a sample of seven operatoractions for detailed review based upon risk significance, time urgency, and factors affecting the likelihood of human error. The operator actions were selected from a PRA ranking of operator action importance based on RAW and RRW values. The non-PRA considerations in the selection process included the following factors:*Margin between the time needed to complete the actions and the time availableprior to adverse reactor consequences*Complexity of the actions
- Reliability and/or redundancy of components associated with the actions*Extent of actions to be performed outside of the control room
- Procedural guidance
- Training.2.2.1Operator Response to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected the manual operator actions required to respond to a steamgenerator tube rupture (SGTR) on Unit 2. The team reviewed facility documentation ofthe validation of operators' ability to meet action times stated in the EPU steamgenerator overf ill analysis, and observed a crew respond to a steam generator tuberupture in the Unit 2 simulator. Ability to accomplish certain field actions was evaluated by walkdown with an operator. The specific control room actions evaluated were to identify and isolate the ruptured steam generator, cooldown down and depressurize the RCS to the emergency procedure target value, and to terminate safety injection. Field actions observed were local makeup to the RWST (potentially required for a ruptured/faulted SGTR event) and local isolation of auxiliary feedater (AFW) to theaffected SG (emergency procedure action in response to a single active failure of the ruptured SG AFW throttle valve to close).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
14Enclosure.2.2.2Operator Response to a Loss of All Steam Generator Feed (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected the control room manual operator actions required to actuate AFWfollowing automatic initiation failure, attempt main feedwater restoration, and to initiate RCS feed and bleed in response to a loss of all steam generator feed capability on Unit2. The team observed one crew in the Unit 2 simulator in a scenario requiring these actions to verify adequacy of the procedure and ability of the operators to recognizefeed and bleed initiation criteria and perform the required actions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.2.3Operator Response to Station Blackout (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected the manual operator actions to protect RCP seals and attempt torestore power after a station blackout on Unit 1. The team observed a loss of all AC power scenario in the control room and walked down the following field actions with an operator: - Establish station blackout crosstie; - Restoration of AC power from offsite; and
- Isolation of RCP seal return line.The control room actions evaluated were to direct maintenance actions to replace failedoffsite power breakers, crosstie power from the other unit, and accomplish cooldown and depressurization of the RCS when power restoration was unattainable. The team verified that the total time to accomplish these actions was within the time assumed in the PRA human reliability analysis or within the battery capacity time capability stated inthe 125 Vdc design basis document.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.2.4Operator Response for Loss of RCP Seal Cooling (Units 1 and 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected the manual operator actions for a loss of RCP seal cooling on Units 1and 2. The team observed a simulator scenario in which the operators were required to respond to a loss of component cooling, loss of charging (seal injection), and high seal 15Enclosureleakoff flow. The team reviewed the adequacy of abnormal operating proceduresconcerning a loss of all seal cooling and subsequent restoration and verified these procedures addressed actions to prevent thermal shock to the seals. The team also reviewed the procedure for shutdown from outside the control room to determine if RCPseal thermal shock and thermal barrier water hammer concerns were addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. However, one noncompliance was identifiedwith 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures) for the failure to include appropriate criteria for restoring cooling to the RCP seals in Unit 2 procedure 2OM-56C.4.B, "Alternate Safe Shutdown from Outside the Control Room." This procedure is intended to address events requiring control room evacuation, including fires.
Specifically, while the procedure properly stated that the EDG must be manually started within 10 minutes of aspurious EDG trip (thereby restoring RCP seal cooling), there were no contingency actions for subsequently restoring RCP seal cooling (in the event the EDG could not be promptly restored) in such a fashion to prevent creating a thermal shock to the seals. In response to this issue, the licensee entered the deficiency in the Corrective Action System by initiating Condition Report 06-04134; and promptly implemented compensatory actions (2OM-56C.4.B was revised).The team concluded that the licensee's compensatory actions were sufficient to correctthe noncompliance while the licensee is in the National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 implementation transition period. Further, the licensee completed a risk assessment of the deficiency, and concluded that the risk significance was very low.
The team reviewed the licensee's assessment, and performed an independent review, and similarly concluded that this was an issue of very low safety significance. No enforcement action is required for this issue because the criteria of NRC EnforcementPolicy, Interim Enforcement Policies, "Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10CFR50.48)," were satisfied. Team follow-up of this issue determined that the noncompliance was not willful and, as stated above, the issue was not of high safety significance..2.2.5Operator Response to Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident with Loss of High HeadInjection (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected the actions necessary to respond to a loss of coolant accident withloss of high head injection on Unit 1 when the break size is small enough that the leak does not depressurize the RCS to the low head safety injection system injectionpressure. The team observed a simulator scenario requiring these actions and reviewed the associated procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.2.6Establish Local Emergency Switchgear Cooling (Unit 1)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected the actions necessary to provide emergency cooling to Unit 1 vitalswitchgear. The team verified the adequacy of the procedure and the availability of allequipment called for in this procedure. The team also walked down the activity using the procedure to ensure the activity could be successfully completed within assumed time requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2.2.7Transfer to Simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg Recirculation (Units 1 and 2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team selected the actions necessary to align for simultaneous hot leg and cold legrecirculation following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. The team verified that emergency procedures direct this action at the time called for in the EPU analysis, and walked down the action in the control room to verify adequacy of the procedure and that the final flowpath is as specified in the modification documentation. The team alsoreviewed modification 05-280-01 (for simultaneous hot leg/cold leg injection) and associated calculations to ensure appropriate failure analyses and evaluation of adequacy of the new flowpaths had been performed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..3Review of Industry Operating Experience (6 Samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at nuclearfacilities for applicability at Beaver Valley. The team performed an i ndependentapplicability review and selected issues that appeared to be applicable to Beaver Valleyfor a detailed review to verify that the licensee had taken appropriate actions.
Documents reviewed for these issues are listed in the attachment.
17Enclosure.3.1NRC Information Notice 90-45: Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump OverspeedThe team reviewed the potential consequences of the turbine driven AFW pumpoperating at higher speeds due to the loss of control air or a malfunction of the turbine driver. The areas reviewed included potential AFW system over-pressure, excess flowto the steam generators, and increased NPSH requirements..3.2Westinghouse Technical Bulletin 2004-22, Rev. 1: RCP Seal PerformanceThe team selected this operating experience because this bulletin recommended areduction in the operator response time to a loss of RCP seal cooling, and also recommended additional plant specific analysis to evaluate any potential increase in the assumed consequences for a loss of seal cooling..3.3NRC Information Notice 94-76: Recent Failures of Charging/SI Pump ShaftsThe team reviewed the applicability and disposition of IN 94-76, Recent Failures ofCharging/Safety Injection Pump Shafts. The basis of IN 94-76 was to describe numerous failures of pump shafts and vendor guidance on vibration monitoring, operation and maintenance of the pumps, and allowable vibration amplitude limits..3.4NRC Information Notice 88-23: Potential for Gas Binding of High-Pressure SafetyInjection Pumps during Design Basis EventsThe basis of IN 88-23 was to describe industry experience regarding the transport andaccumulation of gases in high pressure safety injection systems. The team reviewed the licensee's procedure on void monitoring and also walked down portions of the charging system piping..3.5NRC Information Notice 2002-12: Submerged Safety-Related Electrical CablesThe team selected this operating experience due to its potential applicability to safetyrelated underground cables. The team reviewed the underground duct drawings and preventive maintenance procedures. The team also performed a walkdown of the underground systems and inspected the inside of a sample of safety related cablemanholes to verify and the licensee was appropriately identifying issues in this area..3.6NRC Information Notice 99-13: Insights from NRC Inspections of Low and MediumVoltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance ProgramsThe team selected IN 99-13 due to industry wide concerns regarding inadequatepreventive and corrective maintenance programs and corrective actions of safety related breakers. The team reviewed the licensee's preventive maintenance program and procedures to deal with lubrication issues with circuit breakers.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of problems that were identified by the licensee andentered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues, and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design or qualification issues. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment tothis report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4AO6Meetings, Including ExitOn July 20, 2006, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Lash, Senior VicePresident, BVPS, and other members of licensee staff. The team verified that no proprietary information is documented in the report.
A-1AttachmentATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
M. AdamsSystem EngineerJ. AnkneyNuclear Engineer
D. BeerworthNuclear Construction Supervisor
D. BloomNuclear Engineer
R. BoyleSystem Engineer
D. BucklewElectrical Maintenance Supervisor
- S. CheckettsSuperintendent, Nuclear Operations
K. DeberrySystem Engineer
R. FerrieElectrical Maintenance Specialist
K. FrederickDesign Engineer
G. CaccianiDesign Engineer
D. HooverNuclear Engineer
- C. KellerSuperintendent, Nuclear Engineering Analysis
E. LauckSystem Engineer
K. LynchDesign Engineer
R. MankoSystem Engineer
J. MauckCompliance Specialist
J. MeyersSystem Engineer
D. MickinacPerformance Improvement Specialist
L. MillerSystem Engi
neerB. MurtaghDesign Engineer
F. OberlitnerDesign Engineer
M. PatelDesign Engineer
B. PaulNuclear Specialist
J. RedmondSystem Engineer
M. ResslerNuclear Engineer
- B. SepelakSupervisor, Regulatory Compliance
M. TestaDesign Engineer
W. TobacDesign Engineer
P. VakhariaSystem Engineer
- M. WimmelNuclear Engineer (MOV Program)NRC Pers onnelP. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Werkheiser, Resident Inspector
- C. Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst
A-2Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened / Opened and Closed /
Discussed
None.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations10080-DEC-0211, Unit 2 - 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage - Degraded Voltage, Rev. 110080-E-0309, Protective Device Setting Calculation, RSS Pump Motor Feeder, Rev. 0
- 10080-E-0310, Protective Device Setting Calculation, SW Pump Motor Feeder, Rev. 0
- 10080-E-037, Battery Duty Cycle and Size Calculation [Battery 2-5], Addendum 2, Rev. 8
- 10080-E-222, 4160 and 480 Volt Load Management/Voltage Profile Calculations, Rev. 0
- 10080-E068, Station Service Voltage and Load Analysis, Addendum 3, Rev. 4
- 10080-N-789, High Head Safety Injection Pump NPSHA from the RWST, Rev. 1
- 10080-N-SP-2QSS-012, RWST Level Transmitters Uncertainty & Scaling Calculations, Rev. 3
- 10080-SP-2EGF-3, Setpoints for 2EGF-LIS 201A/B on Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks, Rev. 4
- 10080-US(B)-239,
- BV-2 Containment Response for DBAs - Containment Conversion, Rev.1
- 11700-140, Sizing of Air Vessels for Water Tight Doors in the Intake Structure, Rev. 0
- 241-B-161, EDG Building Ventilation Flow Rate and Operating Temperature, Rev. 2
- 211-MT-145, Analysis to Verify the Adequacy of Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil System, Rev. 5
- 211-N-519, Development of CVCS Seal Water Injection Design, Rev. 0
- 8700-DEC-0117, Voltage Drop Analysis of
- SBO 4160 V Cross Tie Circuit, Rev. 0, Addendum 0
- 8700-DEC-0149, Unit 1 Emergency Bus Undervoltage-Degraded Voltage (Addendum 1), Rev.
- 8700-DEC-068, Station Service Load Flow and Voltage Profile Analysis (Addendum 1), Rev. 4
- 8700-DEC-182, Tech. Spec. EDG Voltage and Frequency (Addendum 1), Rev. 0
- 8700-DMC-127, Maximum Pressure Upstream of
- MOV-RW-103A, Rev. 1
- 8700-DMC-1430, Minimum Safeguards Injection System Performance (Addendum 1), Rev. 1
- 8700-DMC-1434, High Head Safety Injection Pump NPSHA from the RWST, Rev. 0
- 8700-DMC-1569, Maximum Safety Injection Flow Rates, Rev. 0
- 8700-DMC-1615, River Water and Service Water Pump Intake Bay Vortex Analysis, Rev.1
- 8700-DMC-2282, ECCS Performance-Recirculation Mode (Addenda 2, 3, 4), Rev. 0
- 8700-DMC-2740, Torque Calculations for
- MOV-1RW-103A, B, C, D, Rev. 5
- 8700-DMC-2772, Torque Calculations for
- MOV-1SI-890A, B, C, Rev. 7
- 8700-DMC-2959, Evaluation of
- MOV-SI-890A-C Using ASME Allowable Stresses, Rev. 1
- A-3Attachment8700-DMC-3136, River Water Minimum Operating Point, Rev. 38700-DMC-3443, Intake Structure Cubicles Internal Flood Analysis, Rev. 2
- 8700-E-0343, Protective Device Setting Calculation, Attachment 9, (WR-P-1B), Rev. 0
- 8700-E-0343, Protective Device Setting Calculation, Attachment 10, (CH-P-1B), Rev. 0
- 8700-E-048, EDG Loading Analysis at Frequency Above 60 Hz, Rev. 4
- 8700-E-074, Station Service Fault Analysis (Addendum 3), Rev. 2
- 8700-E-202, DC System Management
- BAT-2 and
- BAT-CHG-2, Rev. 1.
- 8700-E-310, Protective Device Setting Calculation, Rev. 0A1
- 8700-SP-1CH-10, Instrument Uncertainties - Charging Pump Disch Pressure Loop, Rev.0
- 8700-SP-1IA-01, Air Supply Relief Valves for Intake Structure Doors, Rev.1
- 8700-SP-1SI-05, Accumulator Pressure Uncertainties, Rev. 3
- 8700-SP-1SI-09, Unit 1 SI Accumulator Level Uncertainties and Instrument Scaling, Rev. 2
- BV1-MCC-1-E3-B, Motor Control Center Setting Sheets for
- MOV-1RW-103A, Rev. 2
- BV1-MCC-1-E4-B, Motor Control Center Setting Sheets for
- MOV-1RW-103B, Rev. 4
- BV1-MCC-1-E6-AA, Motor Control Center Setting Sheets for
- MOV-1SI-890C, Rev. 4
- BV2-DC5-1, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, Rev. 6
- BV2-DC5-7, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, Rev. 5
- BV2-DC5-8, Electrical Protective Device Setting Sheet, Rev. 1
- DLC 8700-06.048-0167, Anchor/Darling Weak Link Analysis Report, Rev. G
- DLC-8700-06.48-0173, Design Analysis Review - MOVs, Rev. C
- DMC-3016,
- DCP-2078, RSS Heat Exchangers Bypass Piping Flow Analysis, Rev. 0
- E-76, Voltage Levels at 120 Vac Loads, Rev. 4
- E-77, 125 Vdc Class Non-1E Voltage at Loads, Rev. 2
- N-211-423. Determine the Available NPSH for the LHSI Pumps at the Design Flow, Rev. 0
- Switchyard - Battery/Charger Calculations, Shts 1-12 (Battery A) & Shts 1-7 (Battery B), 5/26/70
- TER No. 10253, Replacement Motors for
- MOV-RW-103A and
- MOV-103B, Rev. 0
- TER No. 7646, Evaluate Butterfly Valve Drawings for Permanent Plant Records, Rev. 0Functional, Surveillance and Modification Acceptance Testing1MSP-11.15-1, l-SI920, SI Accumulator 1A Level Calibration, Issue 4, Rev. 121MSP-11.21-1, P-SI921, SI Accumulator Tank 1A Pressure Calibration, Issue 4, Rev. 9
- 2MSP-11.15-1, 2SIS-L920, SI Accumulator Channel I Level Calibration, Issue 4, Rev. 6
- 2MSP-11.21-1, 2SIS-P921, SI Accumulator Channel I Pressure Loop Calibration, Issue 4, Rev. 7
- Maintenance Measured Data reports for calibrations performed 2003 - 2006 for various accumulator level and pressure instrumentsCompleted Surveillance Test Procedures1/2-BVT1.11.03, SI Accumulator Discharge Check Valves Full Stroke Test (2/26/06)1/2-OST-30-21A, Group 1 Flood Door Seal System Operability Check (6/13/06)1/2-MI-75-Manhole-1E, Inspection of Manholes for Water Induced Damage (9/30/01)
- 1/2-PMP-E-36-015, ITE Medium Voltage Circuit Breaker Inspection and Test (10/3/03, 6/5/05)1/2-PMP-36TR-Transformer-1E, System Transformer Inspection (3/11/06)
- 1/2-OST-30-21B, Group 1 Flood Door Seal System Operability Check (7/12/05)1/2-PMP-E-75-001, 4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication (12/07/04)
- A-4Attachment1BVT 2.30.7, Charging Pump Lube Oil Cooler Heat Exchanger Testing (5/18/06)1MSP-11.03-I, L-SI920, SI Accumulator Tank 1A Level Loop Test (11/23/05)
- 1MSP-11.04-I, L-SI922, SI Accumulator Tank 1A Level Loop Test (11/21/05)
- 1MSP-11.17-I, L-SI924, SI Accumulator 1B Level Calibration (5/16/06)
- 1MSP-11.18-I, L-SI926, SI Accumulator 1B Level Calibration (4/26/06)
- 1MSP-11.21-I, P-SI921, SI Accumulator Tank 1A Pressure Calibration (5/05/05)
- 1MSP-11.22-I, P-SI923, SI Accumulator Tank 1A Pressure Calibration (3/15/05)
- 1MSP-11.25-I, P-SI929, SI Accumulator Tank 1C Pressure Calibration (8/10/05)
- 1MSP-36.01A-E, Calibration of Voltmeter
- VM-VE109 (12/12/05)
- 1MSP-36.52A-E, 1P 480 Volt Bus Degraded Voltage Relays Calibration (3/26/06)
- 1OST-11.4A, Accumulator Check Valve (1SI-51, 52, 53) Test (2/15/06)
- 1OST-11.4B, Accumulator Check Valve (1SI-48, 49, 50) Test (2/14/06)
- 1OST-24.13, Overspeed Trip Test of Turbine Driven AFW Pump [1FW-P-2] (4/16/06)
- 1OST-30.3, Reactor Plant River Water Pump 1B Test (1/27/06, 5/18/06)1OST-36.1, Diesel Generator No. 1 Automatic Test (2/15/06, 5/
- 03/06, 5/31/06, 6/26/06, 6/28/06)
- 1OST-7.11, CHS and SIS Operability Test, Train B (2/14/06)1OST-7.11A, CHS and SIS Operability Test, Train A (4/04/06)1OST-7.5,
- Centrifugal Charging Pump 1
- CH-P-1B Test (5/16/06)
- 1PMP-38VB-UPS-1-31, Uninterruptible Power Supply (Solid State Controls) No. 1 (2/24/06)1PMP-38VB-UPS-2-31, Uninterruptible Power Supply (Solid State Controls) No. 2 (3/29/06)1PMP-38VB-UPS-3-31, Uninterruptible Power Supply (Solid State Controls) No. 3 (2/26/06) 1PMP-38VB-UPS-4-31, Uninterruptible Power Supply (Solid State Controls) No. 4 (4/3/06)
- 1PMP-E-37-011, Low Voltage Circuit Breaker Inspection/Test Model
- AK-3A & 7A-25 (11/13/01)
- 1T-39-20076-2, Battery Chargers 1-2A and 1-2B Load Test (11/04/04)
- 2BVT 01.39.10, Station Battery 2-5 Capacity Test (3/11/99)
- 2ICP-36-LIS203A, EDG 2-1 Fuel Tank Level Indicating Switch Calibration (2/10/06)
- 2ICP-36-LIS204A, EDG 2-1 Fuel Tank Level Indicating Switch Calibration (2/16/06)
- 2ICP-36-LIS205A, EDG 2-1 Fuel Tank Level Indicating Switch Calibration (6/09/06)
- 2MSP-36.37-E, 2DF 4 KV Bus Degraded Voltage Relay Test (10/12/05, 1/4/06, 3/29/06)2OST-24.9, Overspeed Trip Test of Turbine Driven AFW Pump [2FWE*P22] (4/22/05)
- 2OST-30.13A, Train A Service Water System Full Flow Test (3/22/05, 4/28/05)2OST-30.13B, Train B Service Water System Full Flow Test (3/23/05, 4/28/05)2OST-30.17B, SW Pump Train B Seal Water System Operability Test (4/17/06)
- 2OST-30.3, Service Water Pump 2SWS-P21B Test (4/27/06)
- 2OST-36.1, [2EGS*EG2-1] Monthly Test (6/07/06, 7/05/06)2OST-6.2, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance (8/15/01)
- 2OST-6.4, Measurement of Seal Injection Flow (6/18/06, 6/28/06)2PMP-38-VBS-UPS-3-21,
- UPS-VITBUS2-3 Uninterruptible Power Supply No. 3 (4/10/05)
- A-5Attachment2PMP-38-VBS-UPS-4-21,
- UPS-VITBUS2-4 Uninterruptible Power Supply No. 4 (4/18/05)2PMP-E-39-006, Battery Inspection - BAT 2-5 and BAT 2-6 (6/29/06)
- 3BVT 01.11.04, Void Monitoring (4/16/06)
- Beaver Valley Substation Control Battery Load Testing (1/6/2003)
- Quarterly Switchyard Battery A & B test results (5/9/06)2OM-30.4.M,
- BV-2 Asiatic Clam and Zebra Mussel Chemical Treatment (4/19/06, 5/03/06)Corrective Action Documents - Condition Reports (CR)01-0202001-05040
- 01-05084
- 01-05833
- 01-06520
- 01-06550
- 01-06552
- 2-00291
- 2-00844
- 2-00989
- 2-01378
- 2-01409
- 2-01796
- 2-02348
- 2-03705
- 2-04489
- 2-05649
- 2-06088
- 2-06183
- 2-06292
- 2-06449
- 2-06897
- 2-06988
- 2-07426
- 2-08574
- 2-08767
- 2-09368
- 2-09991
- 2-10843
- 2-1126502-1143803-00374
- 03-00606
- 03-00900
- 03-01606
- 03-01915
- 03-02559
- 03-05498
- 03-06217
- 03-07621
- 03-08209
- 03-09338
- 03-09431
- 03-10149
- 03-10686
- 03-10888
- 03-11526
- 03-12115
- 03-12302
- 04-00448
- 04-00980
- 04-01884
- 04-02715
- 04-03668
- 04-04030
- 04-04865
- 04-04872
- 04-05191
- 04-05346
- 04-0534704-0568504-05831
- 04-05925
- 04-06592
- 04-06594
- 04-07696
- 04-08246
- 04-08247
- 04-08298
- 04-08957
- 04-09276
- 04-09424
- 05-01889
- 05-02206
- 05-02402
- 05-02403
- 05-02409
- 05-02947
- 05-02954
- 05-02963
- 05-02964
- 05-03118
- 05-03260
- 05-03624
- 05-03630
- 05-03840
- 05-04024
- 05-04275
- 05-0477005-0501205-05301
- 05-05914
- 05-06287
- 05-06293
- 05-06403
- 05-06406
- 05-07032
- 05-07271
- 05-07330
- 05-07542
- 05-07747
- 06-00900
- 06-01032
- 06-01299
- 06-01705
- 06-01784
- 06-02216
- 06-02343
- 06-02987
- 06-03127
- 06-03216
- 06-03411
- 06-03480
- 06-03743
- 06-03952
- 06-03998
- 06-03999*
- 06-0401906-04019*06-04093*
- 06-04095*
- 06-04097*
- 06-04110*
- 06-04110*
- 06-04116*
- 06-04144
- 06-04151
- 06-04181*
- 06-04188*
- 06-04191*
- 06-04218*
- 06-04270*
- 06-04272*
- 06-04281*
- 06-04286*
- 06-04287*
- 06-04290*
- 06-04303*
- 06-04311*
- 06-04361*
- 06-04368*
- 06-04373*
- 06-04375*
- 06-04382
- 06-07271*
- 970428
- 980329* CR written as a result of inspection effortDesign Baseline Documents1DBD-30, Unit 1 Design Basis Document for River Water System, Rev. 131DBD-36A, Unit 1 Design Basis Document for Emergency Diesel Generators, Rev. 11
- A-6Attachment1DBD-37, Unit 1 Design Bases Document for 480 V Distribution System, Rev. 71DBD-39, Unit 1 Design Basis Document for 125 VDC Power System, Rev. 3
- 2DBD-06, Unit 2 Design Basis Document Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 12
- 2DBD-13, Unit 2 Design Basis Document Containment Depressurization System, Rev. 10Drawings10080-E-5DR, Elementary Diagram, Recirculation Spray Pump 2RSS*P21C, Rev. 1710080-RE-1AR, 125 Vdc One Line Diagram Sht. 1, Rev. 20
- 10080-RE-1AW, One Line Diagram, Vital Bus System Sheet 1, Rev. 19
- 10080-RE-1C, Equipment One-Line Diagram, Rev. 12
- 10080-RE-1DJ, 4160 V One-Line Diagram Sht. 3A, Rev. 6
- 10080-RE-1F, 4160 V One-Line Diagram Sht. 3, Rev. 19
- 241-ESK-130A, Coordination curves for 125 Vdc battery 2-5, breaker N-10, 2/2/99
- 241-ESK-130C, Coordination curves for 125 Vdc battery 2-5, breaker N-8, 3/15/84
- 241-ESK-130E, Coordination curves for 125 Vdc battery 2-5, breaker N-9, 2/2/99
- 8700-RE-100A, 4KV Station Service System, Rev. 8
- 8700-RE-1A, Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 24
- 8700-RE-1B, Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 24
- 8700-RE-1C, Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 22
- 8700-RE-1F, 4160 V One Line Diagram, Rev. 19
- 8700-RE-1K, 480 V One Line Diagram, Rev. 24
- 8700-RE-1V, 125 V DC One Line Diagram Sheet 1, Rev. 27
- 8700-RE-1Z, Vital Bus & DC One Line Diagram, Rev. 27
- 8700-RE-21DL, Elementary Diagram-Emergency System 90% Undervoltage Protection, Rev. 8
- 8700-RE-21KL, Elementary Diagram, Safety Injection, Sht 3, Rev. 11
- 8700-RE-21LA, Elementary Diagram, River Water, Sht 5, Rev. 7
- D-77-106-6A, Nozzle Orientation, Shell & Bottom Layout Details, Tank 2QSS*TK21
- D-77-101-9A, 50'-0" I.D. x 62'-0" RWST 2QSS*TK21Engineering Change Documents (Modifications)DCP-2014, Replace Relief Valves
- RV-IA-107 A thru F, Rev. 0DCP-2300, Charging Pump Mini-Flow Restricting Orifice Modification, Rev. 0
- ECP 02-0260-09, Safety Injection Accumulator Level Transmitter Replacement [Unit 1], 1/30/04
- ECP 02-0260-10, Safety Injection Accumulator Level Transmitter Replacement [Unit 1], 4/1/03
- ECP 02-0260-05, Safety Injection Accumulator Level Transmitter Replacement [Unit 1], 8/23/05
- ECP 02-0076, Replace Unit #1 Station Battery Chargers, Rev. 0
- ECP No. 02-0212-01, Replacement Steam Generator (RSG) Master
- BVPS-1, Rev. 1
- ECP 02-0260-08, Safety Injection Accumulator Level Transmitter Replacement [Unit 1], 2/3/03
- ECP-00056,
- MOV-1SI-890C Motor Replacement, Rev. 1
- ECP-00150, Replacement of Charging High Head Safety Injection Pump 1CH-P-1B, Rev. 0
- ECP-02-0193, Raise Allowable Charging Pump Recirculation Flow, Rev. 0
- ECP-02-0246,
- BV-1 Changing System Rethrottling for Power Uprate, Rev. 0
- ECP-02-0260-04, Unit 1 SI Accumulator Level Transmitter Replacement, Rev. 3
- ECP-05-0280, Simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg SI Recirculation (LHSI to Hot Legs), Rev. 0
- A-7AttachmentES-E-004, Protective Relaying Philosophy for BVPS Unit No. 1, Rev. 7Procedures1/2-OST-30.21B, Group 2 Flood Door Seal System Operability Check, Rev. 21/2-PMP-E-39-300, Station Battery Charger Inspection, Issue 4, Rev. 5
- 1/2-ADM-2046, Rubber Expansion Joint In-Service Inspection Program, Rev. 0
- 1/2-OST-30.21A, Group 1 Flood Door Seal System Operability Check, Rev. 31/2-PMP-E-36-015, Medium Voltage Breaker Inspection and Test, Model 5HK-250/350, Rev. 13
- 1/2-PMP-24FW-T-2/22-1M, Turbine AFW Pump, Linkage, Governor and Turbine, Rev. 5
- 1/2-PMP-E-75-001, 4160 VAC Motor Inspection and Lubrication, Issue 4, Rev. 7
- 1CMP-6RC-P-1A-B-C-1M, RCP Mechanical Seal Inspection and Replacement, Rev. 11
- 1MSP-39.07-E, Battery No. 2 Inspection and Interconnection Resistance Check, Rev. 5
- 1MSP-E-39-001, Vital Bus Batteries, Test and Inspection, Issue 4, Rev. 5
- 1MSP-E-39-003, Vital Bus Batteries, Test and Inspection, Issue 4, Rev. 5
- 1MSP-E-39-300, Vital Bus Weekly Battery Inspection, Issue 4, Rev. 9
- 1MSP-E-39-302, Vital Bus Weekly Battery Inspection, Issue 4, Rev. 7
- 1OM-54.3.PAB1, Unit 1 PAB Log Readings, Rev. 34
- 1OST-11.15, Safety Injection Accumulator Check Valve Test, Rev. 6
- 1OST-30.12B, Train B Reactor Plant River Water System Full Flow Test, Rev. 23
- 1OM-7.4.Q, Makeup to the Refueling Water Storage Tank, Rev. 8
- 1OM-53A.1.A-1.14,
- BV-1 Actions to Establish Station Blackout Cross-Tie to
- BV-2, Rev. 2
- 1OM-56C.4.F-12, Establishing Portable Emergency Ventilation, Rev. 6
- 1OM-53C.4.1.7.1, Loss of Charging or Letdown, Rev. 6
- 1OM-53C.4.115.1, Loss of Primary Component Cooling Water, Rev. 2
- 1OM-53A.1.A-1.14,
- BV-1 Actions to Establish Station Blackout Cross-Tie to
- BV-2, Rev. 2
- 2OM-53C.4.2.7.1, Loss of Charging or Letdown, Rev. 2
- 2OM-53C.4.2.15.1, Loss of Primary Component Cooling Water, Rev. 3Unit 1 Emergency ProceduresECA-0.0, Loss of All Emergency 4KV AC Power, Rev. 6E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev. 10
- E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 8
- ES-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Hot Leg and Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 6Unit 2 Emergency ProceduresECA-0.0, Loss of All Emergency 4KV AC Power, Rev. 6E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev. 8
- E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 10
- ES-1.4, Transfer to Simultaneous Hot Leg and Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 3
- A-8AttachmentMiscellaneous Documents125 Vdc System Health Report. 4th Quarter 20054 KV Station Service System, 4th Qtr 2005
- 480 Volt Sation Service System, 4th Qtr 2005
- 676441 General Accumulator Tank Specification, Rev. 1
- 8700-DES-0513, Procurement Specification - 130 VDC Station Battery Chargers 1-4, Rev. 1BVPS Switchyard 138 kV BVPS Output Breaker History, 6/16/06
- DLS-00327, Safety Injection Accumulators, 10/18/68
- DLS-00544, Specification for the Accumulator Tanks, 2/18/69
- DLW-1115, Input Data for Containment Analysis, 2/17/71
- DLW-3705, Accumulator Water Level Setpoints, 1/15/75
- DLW-4097, Injection Accumulator Blowdown Tests, 2/02/76
- DLW-4206, Automatic Switchover to Recirculation, 7/30/76
- DLW-84-683, Seismic Analysis for Charging/HHSI Pumps, 9/24/84
- DMW-D-469, System Description, Safety Injection System, 4/29/74
- Emergency Diesel Generators, 4th Qtr 2005
- L-98-001, Response to NRC Generic Letter 97-04, Assurance of Sufficient NPSH forEmergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps, 1/06/98NSAL-94-003H2, Design and Use of Mini-Flow Line for the Charging/SI Pumps, 2/08/94
- Pump Minimum Operating Point Curves and System Hydraulic Models, 1/2006 - 3/2006
- SE Report No. 870147-3, Test Report Environmental Qualification, 4/1988Vendor Documents2501.100-224-001, SW Pumps-Motors Instruction Manual, Allis Chalmers Corp., Rev. D2502.242-007, Motor Instruction Manual, Westinghouse Corp., Rev. C
- 2502.540-224-009, Installation, Operation & Maintenance Manual for SW Pumps, ByronJackson Division, Rev. POkonite Co. Report N-1, Qualification of Okonite Ethylene-Propylene Rubber Insulation, 7/3/78
- Report CSR562, Evaluation of Inadvertent Fire Protection System Actuation, 6/2/06Technical Bulletin
- TB-04-22,
- RCP Seal Performance - Appendix R Compliance, Rev. 1
- WCAP-10541, Analysis and Transient Behavior of the Westinghouse 8-Inch Design No. 2
- RCPSeal During a Loss of All Seal Cooling Event Representative of a LOOP, Rev. 2
- WCAP-15603, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakage Model for Westinghouse PWRs, Rev. 1-A
- WCAP-16141, RCP Seal Leakage PRA Model Implementation Guidelines for PWRs Westinghouse Instruction Book Reactor Coolant Pump Model W-11001-A1(93A), Rev. 1Work Orders
- 200135741 200020554
- 200157038
- 200103661
- 200103662 200103664
- 200086035
- 200086034
- 200157816 200203705
- 200154636
- A-9Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
USEDACAlternating CurrentAFWAuxiliary FeedwaterBVPSBeaver Valley Power Station
CRCondition Report
DBDDesign Basis Document
DCDirect Current
EDGEmergency Diesel Generator
EPUExtended Power Uprate
FENOCFirst Energy Nuclear Operating Company
gpmGallons per Minute
HHSIHigh Head Safety Injection
IN[NRC] Information Notice
LHSILow Head Safety Injection
LOCALoss of Coolant Accident
LOOPLoss of Offsite Power
MOVMotor Operated Valve
NFPANational Fire Protection Association
NPSHNet Positive Suction Head
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission
OCBOil Circuit Breaker
PRAProbabilistic Risk AnalysisRAWRisk Achievement Worth
RCPReactor Coolant Pump
RRWRisk Reduction Worth
RSSRecirculation Spray System
RWRiver Water
RWSTReactor Water Storage Tank
SDPSignificance Determination Process
SGSteam Generator
SGTRSteam Generator Tube Rupture
SISafety Injection
SPARStandardized Plant Analysis Risk
SWService Water
UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report
VacVolts Alternating Current
VdcVolts Direct Current