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MONTHYEARML13346A0132013-11-26026 November 2013 Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Project stage: Supplement ML14037A2072014-01-31031 January 2014 Update to Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Project stage: Response to RAI ML14171A2002014-06-26026 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (MF0264) Project stage: Acceptance Review 2014-01-31
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24151A6482024-06-0303 June 2024 Changes in Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Assignments for Some Decommissioning Facilities ML24129A1042024-05-26026 May 2024 Preapplication Readiness Assessment Plan for the Holtec Decommissioning International License Termination Plan ML24136A2382024-05-14014 May 2024 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 2023 ML24135A3212024-05-14014 May 2024 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, January 1 Through December 31, 2023 IR 05000293/20240012024-05-0707 May 2024 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2024001 L-24-009, HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 20232024-04-29029 April 2024 HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 2023 L-24-010, Request for Preapplication Readiness Assessment of the Draft License Termination Plan2024-04-22022 April 2024 Request for Preapplication Readiness Assessment of the Draft License Termination Plan L-24-007, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations – Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI)2024-03-29029 March 2024 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations – Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) IR 05000293/20230032024-02-29029 February 2024 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000293/2023003 and 05000293/2023004 L-24-002, Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2024-02-0202 February 2024 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML23342A1182024-01-0909 January 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan L-23-019, Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152023-12-18018 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 ML23334A1822023-11-30030 November 2023 Biennial Report for the Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Summary, and Regulatory Commitment Change Summary November 2021 Through October 2023 L-23-012, Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point2023-11-13013 November 2023 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point ML23306A0992023-11-0202 November 2023 and Indian Point Energy Center, Notification of Changes in Schedule in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7) L-23-011, 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Change Summary Report2023-10-27027 October 2023 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Change Summary Report IR 05000293/20234012023-08-31031 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2023401 & 2023001 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000293/20230022023-08-0404 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2023002 L-23-008, Correction to Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI)2023-05-23023 May 2023 Correction to Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) ML23135A2152023-05-15015 May 2023 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, January 1 Through December 31, 2022 ML23136A7792023-05-15015 May 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, January 1 Through December 31, 2022 L-23-004, HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 20222023-04-24024 April 2023 HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 2022 L-23-003, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-31031 March 2023 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ML23088A0382023-03-29029 March 2023 Stations 1, 2, & 3, Palisades Nuclear Plant, and Big Rock Point - Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance ML23069A2782023-03-13013 March 2023 Request for Scoping Comments Concerning the Environmental Review of Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 Subsequent License Renewal Application ML22361A1022023-02-24024 February 2023 Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Changes for Some Decommissioning Facilities and Establishment of Backup Project Manager for All Decommissioning Facilities IR 05000293/20220042023-02-15015 February 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022004 ML22356A0712023-01-31031 January 2023 Issuance of Exemption for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ISFSI Regarding Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report - Cover Letter ML22347A2782022-12-21021 December 2022 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan Dated December 21, 2022 L-22-042, Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152022-12-14014 December 2022 Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 L-22-041, Supplemental Information to Enhance Exemption Request Detail for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Due Date Extension2022-12-0909 December 2022 Supplemental Information to Enhance Exemption Request Detail for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Due Date Extension IR 05000293/20220032022-11-18018 November 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022003 L-22-036, Decommissioning Trust Fund Agreement2022-11-0808 November 2022 Decommissioning Trust Fund Agreement ML22276A1762022-10-24024 October 2022 Decommissioning International Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22266A1922022-09-23023 September 2022 and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Request to Withdraw Prior Submissions from NRC Consideration ML22269A4202022-09-22022 September 2022 Citizen Lawsuit ML22272A0352022-09-22022 September 2022 S. Lynch-Benttinen Letter Regarding U.S. Citizen Intent to Sue U.S. Fish and Wildlife and NOAA Fisheries Representing the Endangered Species (Na Right Whale) Which Will Be Adversely Affected by Holtec International Potential Actions ML22241A1122022-08-29029 August 2022 Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (B)(5)(i), (b)(11), and 72.214 for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report IR 05000293/20220022022-08-12012 August 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022002 ML22215A1772022-08-0303 August 2022 Decommissioning International (HDI) Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22221A2592022-08-0101 August 2022 LTR-22-0217-1-NMSS - Town of Duxbury Letter Opposing the Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim (Docket No. 05000293) ML22206A1512022-08-0101 August 2022 NRC Office of Investigations Case Nos. 1-2022-002 & 1-2022-006 ML22175A1732022-07-28028 July 2022 LTR-22-0153-1 - Response Letter to D. Turco, Cape Downwinders, from A. Roberts, NRC, Regarding Holtec-Pilgrim Plans to Dump One Million Gallons of Radioactive Waste Into Cape Cod Bay ML22193A1662022-07-28028 July 2022 LTR-22-0154-1 - Heather Govern, VP, Clean Air and Water Program, Et Al., Letter Regarding Radioactive Wastewater Disposal from the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 05000293) ML22154A4882022-06-0101 June 2022 Letter from Conservation Law Foundation Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22154A1622022-05-26026 May 2022 Letter and Email from Save Our Bay/Diane Turco Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22136A2602022-05-16016 May 2022 Submittal of Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for January 1 Through December 31, 2021 ML22136A2572022-05-16016 May 2022 Submittal of Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for January 1 Through December 31, 2021 ML22102A0932022-05-12012 May 2022 LTR-22-0067 Response to Matthew P. Levesque, President, Barnstable Town Council Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim IR 05000293/20220012022-05-11011 May 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022001 2024-06-03
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARL-21-078, Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2021-07-0606 July 2021 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML18158A1332018-06-0606 June 2018 Extent of Condition Review in Response to Findings Associated with Inspection 95003: Evaluation of NRC Assessment and Inspection Processes at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML19056A1932017-08-17017 August 2017 Attachment 2 Design Input Record ML17212A5712017-07-28028 July 2017 Recovery Plan ML16153A3722016-06-20020 June 2016 Final ASP Analysis Pilgrim (LER 293-15-001) ML15043A7542015-03-24024 March 2015 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 1 of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) ML15075A0822015-03-12012 March 2015 Entergy'S Required Response of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding-Hazard Reevaluation Report ML14294A5912014-11-0404 November 2014 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (LER 293-13-009) ML14171A2002014-06-26026 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (MF0264) ML14176A9612014-06-24024 June 2014 Submittal of Non-Proprietary BWROG Technical Product, BWROGTP-11-006 - ECCS Containment Walkdown Procedure, Rev 1 (January 2011), as Formally Requested During the Public Meeting Held on April 30, 2014 ML14324A0402014-04-17017 April 2014 HI-2104715, Seismic Analysis of the Loaded HI-TRAC in the SFP and SFP Slab Qualification. ML14092A0232014-03-31031 March 2014 Entergy'S Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima... ML13338A6672013-12-0909 December 2013 Mega-Tech Services, LLC Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, TAC No.: MF0777 ML13232A1322013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C85 of C413 Through Page C173 of C413 ML13232A1342013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C174 of C413 Through Page C250 of C413 ML13232A1352013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C251 of C413 Through Page C331 of C413 ML13232A1372013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C332 of C413 Through Page C413 of C413 ML13232A1382013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment D, Page D1 of D127 Through Page D73 of D127 ML13232A1402013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment D, Page D74 of D127 Through Attachment H, Page H12 of H12 ML13232A1412013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment I, Page I1 of I9 Through Attachment J, Page J77 of J134 ML13232A1312013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C1 of C413 Through Page C84 of C413 ML13232A1302013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment a Through Attachment B ML13232A1292013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment J, Page J78 of J134 Through End ML13232A1282013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Cover Through Page 37 of 37 ML12342A3862012-12-0606 December 2012 Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Testing Program and Request for Approval of IST Relief Requests, PR-03 and PR-05 ML12333A3212012-11-27027 November 2012 Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergy'S Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML12160A3712012-06-11011 June 2012 Review of 60-Day Response to Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Related to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident ML13196A1892012-04-12012 April 2012 Email from B. Balsam, NRR to J. Crocker, NOAA Pilgrim: NRC Complete Responses to 4-9-12 NMFS Questions ML13196A2362012-04-12012 April 2012 Email from M. Smith, OGC to S. Uttal OGC Et Al., on Additional Pilgrim Exhibits ML12047A1192012-02-29029 February 2012 Request to Include Atlantic Sturgeon in Ongoing Informal Section 7 Consultation for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML1204403512012-02-27027 February 2012 Acknowledgement of Withdrawal and Results of Acceptance Review Proposed License Amendment Request for Rod Withdrawal Minimizer Bypass Allowance to Allow Reactor Startup ML11346A5682011-12-0909 December 2011 Report Entitled - Regulatory Meltdown: How Four Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners Conspired to Delay and Weaken Nuclear Reactor Safety in the Wake of Fukushima ML1127000692011-09-26026 September 2011 Enclosure 2, Mfn 10-245 R4, Description of the Evaluation and Surveillance Recommendations for BWR/2-5 Plants ML14086A5022011-06-13013 June 2011 Enclosure 1 to PNPS Letter 2.14.027 - Entergy Nuclear Engineering Report No. PNPS-RPT-11-00001, Re-assessment of Pilgrim Seismic Core Damage Frequency ML1104203062011-01-31031 January 2011 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Report, NEDC-33532, Revision 2, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safety Valve Setpoint Increase, Enclosure 4 to 2.11.007 ML1007704512010-03-31031 March 2010 NEDO-33532, Rev 0, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safety Valve Setpoint Increase. ML1019004142009-03-12012 March 2009 Condition Report, CR-PNP-2009-00879 ML0821900132008-08-0707 August 2008 Monthly Operating Reports Second Quarter 2008 ML0712300162007-05-0202 May 2007 FSEIS Reference - Nonradioactive Waste Information ML0712102522007-04-21021 April 2007 Weld Filler and Welding Electrode Materials for Structural Weld Overlays within the Scope of Pilgrim Relief Request, PRR-15 ML0711303842007-04-10010 April 2007 GE-NE-0000-0066-0380-R1-NP, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Torsion Arm Clamp Stress Evaluation Report. ML0710802222007-04-10010 April 2007 Repair of the Core Shroud Stabilizer Assemblies - Torsion Arm Clamp Stress Evaluation Report ML0708701322007-03-22022 March 2007 Request for Authorization Under the Provision of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Modification of the Core Shroud Stabilizer Assemblies ML0708701342007-03-21021 March 2007 GE-NE-000-0064-9392-R2-NP, Pilgrim Unit 1, IGSCC Assessment of Shroud Repair X-750 Component Other than the Replacement Upper Support Assembly and Tie Rod Nut. ML0709303132007-03-14014 March 2007 GE-NE-0000-0061-6306-R4-NP, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Shroud Repair Replacement Upper Support Assembly-Stress Analysis Report. ENOC-07-00002, Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 20062007-02-28028 February 2007 Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 2006 ML0629104322006-11-17017 November 2006 Final Response to Task Interface Agreement 2006-01 Related to the Adequacy of Emergency Diesel Generator and Shutdown Transformer Load Testing at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML0634804022006-11-0606 November 2006 E-MAIL: (PD) Fwd: Entergy Nuclear Cultural Resources Protection Plan ML0707901202006-10-0606 October 2006 CR-PNP-2006-03702, an Issue Was Raised During the Region I Inspection for License Renewal Regarding the Expected Service Life of a Protective Coating for Buried Piping ML0707901152006-10-0404 October 2006 CR-PNP-2006-03677, Controls to Prevent and Monitor for Corrosion of the Drywell Shell Need to Be Assessed and Strengthened 2021-07-06
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARL-21-078, Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2021-07-0606 July 2021 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML18158A1332018-06-0606 June 2018 Extent of Condition Review in Response to Findings Associated with Inspection 95003: Evaluation of NRC Assessment and Inspection Processes at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML17212A5712017-07-28028 July 2017 Recovery Plan ML16153A3722016-06-20020 June 2016 Final ASP Analysis Pilgrim (LER 293-15-001) ML15043A7542015-03-24024 March 2015 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 1 of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) ML15075A0822015-03-12012 March 2015 Entergy'S Required Response of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding-Hazard Reevaluation Report ML14171A2002014-06-26026 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (MF0264) ML12342A3862012-12-0606 December 2012 Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Testing Program and Request for Approval of IST Relief Requests, PR-03 and PR-05 ML12333A3212012-11-27027 November 2012 Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergy'S Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML12160A3712012-06-11011 June 2012 Review of 60-Day Response to Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Related to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident ML13196A1892012-04-12012 April 2012 Email from B. Balsam, NRR to J. Crocker, NOAA Pilgrim: NRC Complete Responses to 4-9-12 NMFS Questions ML11346A5682011-12-0909 December 2011 Report Entitled - Regulatory Meltdown: How Four Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners Conspired to Delay and Weaken Nuclear Reactor Safety in the Wake of Fukushima ML1127000692011-09-26026 September 2011 Enclosure 2, Mfn 10-245 R4, Description of the Evaluation and Surveillance Recommendations for BWR/2-5 Plants ML1019004142009-03-12012 March 2009 Condition Report, CR-PNP-2009-00879 ML0712300162007-05-0202 May 2007 FSEIS Reference - Nonradioactive Waste Information ML0712102522007-04-21021 April 2007 Weld Filler and Welding Electrode Materials for Structural Weld Overlays within the Scope of Pilgrim Relief Request, PRR-15 ENOC-07-00002, Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 20062007-02-28028 February 2007 Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 2006 ML0629104322006-11-17017 November 2006 Final Response to Task Interface Agreement 2006-01 Related to the Adequacy of Emergency Diesel Generator and Shutdown Transformer Load Testing at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML0707901202006-10-0606 October 2006 CR-PNP-2006-03702, an Issue Was Raised During the Region I Inspection for License Renewal Regarding the Expected Service Life of a Protective Coating for Buried Piping ML0707901152006-10-0404 October 2006 CR-PNP-2006-03677, Controls to Prevent and Monitor for Corrosion of the Drywell Shell Need to Be Assessed and Strengthened ENOC-06-00018, Stations - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January 2006 - June 20062006-08-29029 August 2006 Stations - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January 2006 - June 2006 ML0622806022006-07-31031 July 2006 Groundwater Protection - Data Collection Questionnaire CNRO-2006-00034, Supplement to Request for Use of Delta Protection Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits; Arkansas Nuclear One, Indian Point, Grand Gulf, Waterford, FitzPatrick, River Bend, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee2006-07-13013 July 2006 Supplement to Request for Use of Delta Protection Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits; Arkansas Nuclear One, Indian Point, Grand Gulf, Waterford, FitzPatrick, River Bend, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee ML0630603022006-07-11011 July 2006 Email: (PA-LR) FW: Pilgrim Document 83 ML0704404792006-05-18018 May 2006 CR-PNP-2006-01914 - Pilgrim ML0634701762006-03-29029 March 2006 Pilgrim: NRC Contact Report - Arrange Meeting with Town Officials During Site Audit (Intergovernmental) BVY 06-016, Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2005 - December 20052006-02-27027 February 2006 Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2005 - December 2005 BVY 05-089, Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Proof of Financial Protection2005-09-28028 September 2005 Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Proof of Financial Protection BVY 05-078, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 20052005-08-29029 August 2005 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 2005 ML0707901612005-05-16016 May 2005 CR-PNP-2005-02621, Rollup CR with Various Problems Inservice Inspection Related BVY 05-018, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 20042005-02-28028 February 2005 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 2004 BVY 03-069, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for Period January - June 20032003-08-18018 August 2003 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for Period January - June 2003 ML0707901832003-08-12012 August 2003 CR-PNP-2003-02976, Pilgrim Construction Activity and Damage to Underground Utilities ML0707806532003-04-22022 April 2003 CR-PNP-2003-01471, Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) 262-F-013A Experienced Increased But Acceptable Local Leak Rate Test Results ML0707806242003-04-19019 April 2003 CR-PNP-2003-01413, Secondary Containment Leakrate Testing Was Aborted ML0707806322003-04-19019 April 2003 CR-PNP-2002-01414, the Concrete Shield Block for the Drywell Equipment Hatch Was Removed Prior to the Reactor Being Less than 212F ML0707806152003-04-17017 April 2003 CR-PNP-2002-01411, Secondary Containment Leakrate Testing Was Aborted ML0308403822003-03-17017 March 2003 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Appendix K Measurement Uncertainty Recovery - Power Uprate Request JPN-03-004, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 20022003-02-26026 February 2003 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 2002 ML0707806032002-12-13013 December 2002 CR-PNP-2002-12941, P-208D (D Salt Service Water Pump) Shaft Had Pitting JPN-02-024, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 20022002-08-15015 August 2002 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 2002 ML0707805642002-06-19019 June 2002 CR-PNP-2002-10639, Received Blackout Diesel Generator Alarm (C3L-A4) Several Times During Shift on 06/19/2005 ML0707805452002-02-27027 February 2002 CR-PNP-2002-09283, Unable to Reassemble E-122B, B Tbccw Heat Exchanger Head JPN-02-002, Entergy Nuclear Northeast'S Submittal of Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 20012002-02-25025 February 2002 Entergy Nuclear Northeast'S Submittal of Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 2001 ML0707805082001-11-0808 November 2001 CR-PNP-2001-04779, T- 112 Cation Regen Tank Found Second Leak ML0707906032001-10-10010 October 2001 Pr 01.4238, Tour Operator Reported That HCU 50-31 Leak Appears Worse - Closure ML0707804912001-09-27027 September 2001 CR-PNP-2001-04238, HCU 50-31 Leak ML0707905962001-09-25025 September 2001 Pr 01.4171, Tour Operator Found Alarm C190-D3 on D# SBO DG Fuel Tank Leakage in Alarm. Panel Indicates Probe #1 Wet Alert Water Detected Alarm ML0707804532001-09-20020 September 2001 CR-PNP-2001-04171, Alarm C190-D3 SBO DG Fuel Tank Leakage in Alarm ML0707905832001-09-17017 September 2001 Pr 01.4048, Received Sdo DG Fuel Tank Leakage Alarm Alert Wet Probes 1 2021-07-06
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. John A. Dent, Jr. Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360-5508 June 26, 2014
SUBJECT:
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION-STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE FLOODING WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0264)
Dear Mr. Dent:
On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions that may be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake, resultant tsunami, and subsequent accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures. By letter dated November 27, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated November 26, 2013, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) submitted a Flooding Walkdown Report for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, as requested in Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter. By letter dated January 31, 2014, Entergy provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the staff to complete its assessments. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and determined that the information was responsive to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter, as documented in the enclosed NRC staff assessment.
J. Dent If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1016 or by e-mail at Nadiyah.Morgan@nrc.gov Docket No. 50-293
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Sincerely, Nadiyah S. Morgan, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 STAFF ASSESSMENT OF FLOODING WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-293
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 20121, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR), Section 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 4, "Recommendation 2.3: Flooding,"2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct flooding walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC. The 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to include the following: a. Describe the design basis flood hazard level(s) for all flood-causing mechanisms, including groundwater ingress. b. Describe protection and migration features that are considered in the licensing basis evaluation to protect against external ingress of water into structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety. c. Describe any warning systems to detect the presence of water in rooms important to safety. d. Discuss the effectiveness of flood protection systems and exterior, incorporated, and temporary flood barriers. Discuss how these systems and barriers were evaluated using the acceptance criteria developed as part of Requested Information item 1.h. 1. Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12053A340 2. ADAMS Accession No. ML 12056A050 Enclosure e. Present information related to the implementation of the walkdown process (e.g., details of selection of the walkdown team and procedures) using the documentation template discussed in Requested Information item 1.j, including actions taken in response to the peer review. f. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision 1, Revision to the NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the CAP. g. Document any cliff-edge effects identified and the associated basis. Indicate those that were entered into the CAP. Also include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these effects. h. Describe any other planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures including flood barriers that further enhance the flood protection. Identify results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review. In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 4, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the flooding walkdown guidance. By letter dated May 21, 20123, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff submitted NEI 12-07, Revision 0, "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features" to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31, 20124, the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance. By letter dated November 27, 20125, as supplemented by letter dated November 26, 20136, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy, the licensee), provided a response to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim). The NRC staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) to the licensee regarding-the available physical margin (APM) dated December 23, 20137* The licensee responded by letter dated January 31,20148. The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter. 3. ADAMS Accession No. ML 121440522 4. ADAMS Accession No. ML 12144A142 5. ADAMS Accession No. ML12333A321 6. ADAMS Accession No. ML 13346A013 7. ADAMS Accession No. ML 13325A891 8. ADAMS Accession No. ML 14037 A207
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The SSCs important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," Criterion 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 1 00, "Seismic and Geological Criteria for Nuclear Plants." Criterion 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions to be performed by an SSC, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design. The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated. The current licensing basis (CLB) is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, and the licensee's written commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis that are in effect.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Design Basis Flooding Hazard for Pilgrim The licensee reported that the design basis flooding hazard for Pilgrim is the maximum northeaster or hurricane produced storm surge. The design basis storm surge flood tide level is 13.5 feet (ft) mean sea level (MSL). The licensee stated that this type of event is the only CLB flood hazard event at Pilgrim. The duration of the maximum storm tide is not defined. For comparison, the elevation in the vicinity of the power block is 22 ft MSL and the building floor elevation at grade level is 23ft MSL. The licensee's flood walkdown report (FWR), as supplemented, evaluates the design storm and flood protection for the CLB and for a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) event evaluated as part of the Pilgrim Individual Plant Examination for External Events, which is not a part of the design basis. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have described the design basis flood hazard level requested in the 50.54(f) letter and consistent with the walkdown guidance. 3.2 Flood Protection and Mitigation 3.2.1 Flood Protection and Mitigation Description The licensee stated that that CLB provides flood protection to an elevation of 13.5 ft MSL. The licensee reported that the flood protection and mitigation features were developed with the conservative approach that the storm tide level is 3 ft higher that what has ever been observed in the Boston Harbor area over the 244-year period of record. The licensee reported that the exterior passive protection features include the main and east breakwaters, the east and west jetties at the end of the discharge canal, the east and west discharge canal revetments, and the shorefront revetment. There are no time dependent actions required for implementation of flood protection features that are credited in the Pilgrim CLB. Wave action model studies conducted by the licensee for severe storms indicated no flooding of safety significance for stillwater elevations of 13.5 ft and open ocean waves of 31 ft. Groundwater ingress is not specifically identified in the Pilgrim Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), however the Pilgrim FSAR describes the groundwater table and gradients with flow toward Cape Cod Bay. Pilgrim does not have any credited flood protection actions or procedures and therefore, no time dependent actions. Warnings for a storm surge or maximum precipitation event is based on monitoring weather services such as the National Weather Service for severe weather alerts. 3.2.2 Incorporated and Exterior Barriers The licensee stated that Pilgrim has incorporated exterior barriers that are permanently in-place, requiring no operator manual actions. Storm surge external barriers include the main and east breakwaters, the east and west jetties at the end of the discharge canal, the east and west discharge canal revetments, and the shorefront revetment. The passive shorefront features are the only credited protection against a storm surge. 3.2.3 Temporary Barriers and Other Manual Actions The licensee stated that Pilgrim has no temporary barriers and other manual actions that require operator action for the CLB storm surge event. 3.2.4 Reasonable Simulation and Results There are no reasonable simulations for procedures associated with the CLB. 3.2.5 NRC Staff Findings Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have described protection and mitigation features as requested in the 50.54(f) letter, and consistent with the walkdown guidance. 3.3 Warning Systems The licensee reported that there are no credited external flooding room level warning systems associated with the Pilgrim CLB storm surge event. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have provided information to describe any warning systems as requested in the 50.54(f) letter, and consistent with the walkdown guidance.
3.4 Effectiveness of Flood Protection Features The licensee stated that the design basis flood for Pilgrim is based on a storm surge event. All storm surge protection features used to protect safety-related equipment are passive design features at Pilgrim. The licensee reported that the flood protection features that protect against the maximum storm tide are exterior passive features and include the main and east breakwaters, the east and west jetties at the end of the discharge canal, the east and west discharge canal revetments, and the shorefront revetment. The licensee indicated that the flood protection features at the shorefront are in adequate condition to function as flood protection features. Further, the effectiveness of the shorefront features is periodically assured because the features are included in a condition monitoring program under NRC 10 CFR 50.65 "Maintenance Rule," which requires a periodic visual inspection to ensure that there are no displaced rocks that would violate the design function of the feature. Visual inspections revealed no issues in the features that would diminish their effectiveness. All rocks and capstones on the breakwaters were in place and no significant gaps or crevices existed that would jeopardize the function of the breakwaters. Visual inspections are required yearly, or after a major storm when onshore winds exceed 50 miles per hour (mph) for two consecutive hours. Conduit seals are incorporated in the power block exterior walls. The licensee observed that these walls did not show any significant water stains indicating water ingress. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have discussed the effectiveness of flood protection features as requested in the 50.54(f) letter, and consistent with the walkdown guidance. 3.5 Walkdown Methodology By letter dated June 8, 20129, the licensee responded to the 50.54(f) letter that they intended to utilize the NRC endorsed walkdown guidelines contained in NEI 12-07, "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features." The licensee's walkdown submittal dated November 27, 2012, indicated that the licensee implemented the walkdowns consistent with the intent of the guidance provided in NEI 12-07. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have presented information related to the implementation of the walkdown process as requested in the 50.54(f) letter, and consistent with the walkdown guidance. 3.6 Walkdown Results 3.6.1 Walkdown Scope The licensee performed walkdowns for a total of 33 flood protection features including passive shorefront features, barrier walls, doors and seals. No reasonable simulations were performed by the licensee. Adverse weather conditions assumed to exist during the CLB event are weather conditions typically associated with a hurricane, a northeaster, and intense precipitation. The licensee 9. ADAMS Accession No. ML 12164A336 stated that there are no concerns for these weather conditions since there are no manual actions required. The licensee used acceptance criteria consistent with the intent of NEI 12-07. 3.6.2 Licensee Evaluation of Flood Protection Effectiveness. Key Findings, and Identified Deficiencies The licensee performed an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the Pilgrim flood protection features. The licensee indicated that the flood protection features at the shorefront are in adequate condition to function as flood protection features. Visual inspections revealed no issue in the features that would diminish their effectiveness. All rocks and capstones on the breakwaters were in place and no significant gaps or crevices existed that would jeopardize the function of the breakwaters. NEI 12-07 defines a deficiency as follows: "a deficiency exists when a flood protection feature is unable to perform its intended function when subject to a design basis flooding hazard." The licensee did not identify any deficiencies during the flood walkdowns. NEI 12-07 requires licensees to identify observations in the CAP that were not yet dispositioned at the time the walkdown report was submitted. In the supplemental walkdown, one observed condition did not meet the NEI 12-07 acceptance criteria and was entered into the CAP program, but was determined not to be a deficiency that causes the feature to be unable to perform its intended flood protection function as defined in NEI 12-07. 3.6.3 Flood Protection and Mitigation Enhancements There are no recently implemented or planned enhancements to the Pilgrim site identified by the licensee that are intended to improve or increase flood protection and/or mitigation. 3.6.4 Planned or Newly Installed Features The licensee did not determine that changes were necessary by the flood walkdowns. 3.6.5 Deficiencies Noted and Actions Taken or Planned to Address The licensee noted no deficiencies or actions to be taken or planned. Entergy entered some items from the initial walkdown that did not meet NEI 12-07 acceptance criteria into the CAP. However, none of these observations were determined to be deficiencies, which is a condition that causes the feature to be unable to perform its intended flood protection function as defined in NEI 12-07. The functionality determinations for these conditions concluded that the feature could perform its intended flood protection function when subject to its design basis flooding hazard. 3.6.6 NRC Staff Analysis of Walkdowns The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's walkdown report dated November 27, 2012, as supplemented on November 26, 2013. The licensee's FWR, as supplemented, evaluates the design storm and flood protection for the CLB and for a PMP event which is not a part of the design basis. The staff review of the walkdown report focuses on those items related to the CLB. The licensee adequately evaluated the CLB flood protection features and the features are functional and in good condition. There are no procedures in regards to the CLB requiring one or more reasonable simulations. The licensee issued work orders for repair of the conditions that did not meet the NEI 12-07 acceptance criteria; however, these features can still perform their intended function. All of the items that did not meet NEI 12-07 criteria have been entered into the licensee's CAP and no observation identified required corrective actions since the CAP evaluation encountered no deficiencies. Within the CLB, the shorefront protection features are routinely inspected and evaluated for effectiveness in accordance with the Maintenance Rule. The features are routinely visually inspected once a year or after a major storm when 50 mph onshore winds are observed for two consecutive hours. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee has provided results of the walkdown and described any other planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures as requested in the 50.54(f) letter, and consistent with the walkdown guidance. Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. 3.6.7 Available Physical Margin The NRC staff issued an RAI to the licensee regarding the APM by letter dated December 23, 201310. The licensee responded with a letter dated January 31,201411. The licensee has reviewed their APM determination process, and entered any unknown APMs into their CAP. The staff reviewed the response, and concluded that the licensee met the intent of the APM determination per NEI 12-07. Based on the NRC staff's review, the licensee appears to have documented the information requested for any cliff-edge effects, as requested in the 50.54(f) letter, and consistent with the walkdown guidance. Further, the staff reviewed the licensee's RAI response, and concludes that the licensee met the intent of the APM determination per NEI 12-07. 3.7 NRC Oversight 3.7.1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors On June 27, 2012, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction {TI) 2515/187 "Inspection of Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns."12 In accordance with the Tl, NRC inspectors independently verified that Entergy implemented the flooding walkdowns consistent with the intent of the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of flood protection features. The inspection report dated 10. ADAMS Accession No. ML 13325A891 11. ADAMS Accession No. ML 14037 A207 12. ADAMS Accession No. ML 12129A 1 08 January 31, 201313, documents the results of this inspection which indicated that no findings were identified. 4.0 SSCs Not Walked Down The licensee identified restricted access and inaccessible features. 4.1 Restricted Access There are four items classified as restricted access due to industrial safety concerns and plant configuration and operating mode: 1. Ductbank in the NW corner of the B RBCCW room; 2. Conduits in the Condenser Bay, Turbine Building, Area 8, start-up Transformer (SUT E3) J122; 3. Ductbank located in the Monitor Tank Room; and 4. Shut-down Transformer (SOT E3) J653 Ductbank located in the Monitor Tank Room. The licensee provided justification for the delay in walkdowns of restricted access features. The licensee indicated that these features could not be walked down due to industrial safety concerns and plant configuration and operating modes. The licensee completed walkdowns of restricted access features by September 30, 2013, and provided a supplemental response on November 26, 2013, documenting the results. 4.2 Inaccessible Features The licensee reported that there are conduit seals located in areas that are considered inaccessible due to their configuration which would require destructive work to inspect. The licensee provided assurance that these as-designed and built seals can perform their intended function citing design documentation, specifications, and acceptable inspections of similar interior conduit seals. 13. ADAMS Accession No ML 13031 A253
5.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of flooding walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The staff concludes that the licensee, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and, in accordance with plant processes and procedures, verified the plant configuration with the current flooding licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed flooding conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore, the licensee's walkdown results, which were verified by the staff's inspection, identified no immediate safety concerns. The staff reviewed the information provided and determined that the provided information was sufficient information and responsive to Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.
J. Dent If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1016 or by e-mail at Nadiyah. Morgan@nrc.gov Docket No. 50-293
Enclosure:
As stated Sincerely, IRA/ Nadiyah S. Morgan, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION: PUBLIC LPLI-1 RIF RidsNrrLAKGoldstein RidsNrrPMPilgrim SFianders, NRO PChaput, NRO EMiller, NRR RidsRgn1 MaiiCenter RidsOpaMail RidsAcrsAcnw_MaiiCTR RidsNrrDorllpll-1 RKuntz, NRR MJardaneh, NRO AKock, NRO ADAMS Accession Number: ML 14171A200 OFFICE DORL/LPLI-1 /PM DORLILPLI-1 /LA NAME NMorgan KGoldstein* DATE 6/24/2014 6/24/2014 OFFICE DORL/LPLI-1 /BC DORL/LPLI-1 /PM NAME BBeasley (DPickett NMorgan for) DATE 6/26/2014 6/26/2014 JNick, EDO Rl RidsNroDsea Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource CCook, NRO RKaras, NRO
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