ML20005A821

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Forwards LER 81-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20005A821
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/13/1981
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20005A822 List:
References
NUDOCS 8107010331
Download: ML20005A821 (2)


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Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-269, -270, -287

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/81-4. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is con-sidered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

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William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:pw Attachment ec: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 10412 Palo Alto, California 94303 Washington, D. C. 20555 ejh i

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OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Report Number: R0-269/81-4 Report Date: March 13, 1981 Occurrence Date: February 12, 1981 Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolin.

Identification of Occurrence: Loss of EWST Level Indication Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1 - cold shutdown Oconee 2 0% (startup)

Oconee 3 - cold shutdown Description of Occurrence: At approximately 0208 on February 12, 1981, the primary level indication for the Elevated Water Storage Tank (EWST) was de-clared inoperable. . Computer alarms on low water level in the EWST were re-ceived. A visual inspection of the control room indicator showed 0% water level, and the HPSW pumps were running due to automatic initiation on low level. An inspection of the Heise Gauge on the turbine building floor verified the EWST level at 100%. Investigation revealed that the air ccm-pressor which provides instrument air to level instrumentation was not running, and the air tank was at 0 psig. Loose connections were discovered on the motor 1contactor. After the connections were tightened, the com-pressor star'ted normally, but would build up pressure only when the evacuation horn was valvec out. It was discovered that the valves were sticking for the area evacuation horn. All solenoid valves for the evacuation horn were replaced, and the system was returned to service.

This incident constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Speci-

' fication 3.17.2.1 and io thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause~of Occurrence: The primary cause of this incident was loose connectors on the air compressor starter terminals. A second significant cause was the sticking valves for the area evacuation horn.

Analysis of Occurrence: Units 1 and 3 were mt cold shutdown and Unit 2 was at 0% power at the time of this incident. In addition, the EWST was verified full by use of the seise Gauge in the turbine building. Both HPSW pumps were manually operable. Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action: All connections on the motor starter were tightened.

Additionally, all solenoid valves for the area evacuation horn were replaced.

Insulation will be installed on the exterior walls and ceiling of the air compressor room, and thermostatic control will be provided for the present heater. An air drier will be installed on the compressor to eliminate water in air lines.