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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217G0801999-10-0707 October 1999 Informs That on 990930,staff Conducted mid-cycle PPR of Farley & Did Not Identify Any Areas in Which Performance Warranted More than Core Insp Program.Nrc Will Conduct Regional Insps Associated with SG Removal & Installation ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity ML20212J8391999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards RAI Re Request for Amends to Ts.Addl Info Needed to Complete Review to Verify That Proposed TS Are Consistent with & Validate Design Basis Analysis.Request Discussed with H Mahan on 990930.Info Needed within 10 Days of This Ltr ML20212J8801999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses GL 98-01,suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util 980731,990607 & 03 Ltrs Provided Requested Info in Subj Gl.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Unit 1 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212E7031999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util Requested to Submit Plans & Schedules for Resolving Y2K-related Issues ML20212F1111999-09-21021 September 1999 Discusses Closeout of GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C8041999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun Requesting Review of J Sherman Re Y2K Compliance.Latest NRC Status Rept on Y2K Activities Encl ML20212D4581999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun,Requesting Review of J Sherman Expressing Concerns That Plant & Other Nuclear Plants Not Yet Y2K Compliant ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211N8041999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That on 990930 NRC Issued GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Condition, to Holders of Nuclear Plant Operating Licenses ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20212C0071999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-05 & 50-364/99-05 on 990627- 0807.No Violations Noted.Licensee Conduct of Activities at Farley Plant Facilities Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations & Sound Engineering ML20211Q4801999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That on 990812-13,Region II Hosted Training Managers Conference on Recent Changes to Operator Licensing Program. List of Attendees,Copy of Slide Presentations & List of Questions Received from Participants Encl ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS ML20211G6851999-08-26026 August 1999 Informs That During Insp,Technical Issues Associated with Design,Installation & fire-resistive Performance of Kaowool Raceway fire-barriers Installed at Farley Nuclear Plant Were Identified L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210T2021999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Draft SE Accepting Licensee Proposed Conversion of Plant,Units 1 & 2 Current TSs to Its.Its Based on Listed Documents ML20210Q4641999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr to La Reyes,As Listed,With List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210J8341999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re Util 990430 Amend Request to Allow Util to Operate Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Based on risk-informed Probability of SG Tube Rupture & Nominal accident-induced primary-to-second Leakage ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210G8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-04 & 50-364/99-04 on 990516- 0626.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation IR 05000348/19990091999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses Insp Repts 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09 on 990308- 10 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Failure to Intercept Adversary During Drills,Contrary to 10CFR73 & Physical Security Plan Requirements ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20196J6191999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Final Dam Audit Rept of 981008 of Category 1 Cooling Water Storage Pond Dam.Requests Response within 120 Days of Date of Ltr 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed ML20196J7471999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Cycle 16 Extension Request.Response Requested within 30 Days of Date of Ltr ML20196J5781999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re 981201 & s Requesting Amend to TS Associated with Replacing Existing Westinghouse Model 51 SG with Westinghouse Model 54F Generators.Respond within 30 Days of Ltr Date ML20196J6571999-07-0202 July 1999 Discusses Closure to TAC MA0543 & MA0544 Re GL 92-01 Rev 1, Suppl 1,RV Structural Integrity.Nrc Has Revised Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid,Version 2 as Result of Review of Responses ML20196J3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards SE of TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at Westinghouse 3-Loop Pwrs 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed L-99-024, Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC1999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC L-99-025, Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.211999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.21 ML20196J8631999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-249, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-224, Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments1999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195F1731999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-217, Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-225, Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants1999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195F0621999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195E9581999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195C6941999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program L-99-021, Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included L-99-203, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program ML20195F2101999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests That Farley Nuclear Plant Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re W WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 L-99-180, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI ML20206F4321999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI L-99-017, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers ML20206C8021999-04-26026 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Rept, for Alabama Power Co.Encls Contain Financial Statements for 1998,unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 990331 & Cash Flow Projections for 990101-991231 05000348/LER-1998-007, Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed1999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed L-99-015, Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.211999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20206B4391999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Corrected ITS Markup Pages to Replace Pages in 981201 License Amend Requests for SG Replacement L-99-172, Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.21999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205S9501999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205R0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Correction to 960212 GL 95-07 180 Day Response. Level 3 Evaluation for Pressure Locking Utilized Analytical Models.Encl Page Has Been Amended to Correct Error 1999-09-23
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20064A7131990-09-17017 September 1990 Advises That Due to Reassignment,Jj Clark No Longer Needs to Maintain Senior Reactor Operator Licenses ML20059J2811990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards List of Key Radiation Monitors Which Will Be Used as Inputs to Top Level Radioactivity Status Bar Re Spds.List Identifies Monitors Which Would Provide Concise & Meaningful Info About Radioactivity During Accidents ML20065D5961990-09-13013 September 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-19 & 50-364/90-19.Response Withheld ML20059J1661990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Rev 10 to ODCM ML20059L0751990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Revised Pages to Rev 3 to, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2911990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedules for FY91 Through FY94,per Generic Ltr 90-07.Requalification Schedules & Estimated Number of Candidates Expected to Participate in Generic Fundamental Exam,Also Encl ML20064A7111990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to Relief Request RR-1, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2891990-09-12012 September 1990 Confirms Rescheduling of Response to Fitness for Duty Program Notice of Violation 90-18-02,per 900907 Telcon ML20065D6621990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards NPDES Permit AL0024619 Effective 900901.Limits for Temp & Residual Chlorine Appealed & Stayed ML20064A3431990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Corrected Insertion Instructions to Rev 8 to Updated FSAR for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant ML20059D4711990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1990 ML20059B5101990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-June 1990.No Changes to Process Control Program for First Semiannual Period of 1990 Exists ML20056B2751990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Relief Requests from Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Testing Program for Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves. Request Incorporates Commitments in 891222 Response to Notice of Violation ML20056B2741990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to Unit Inservice Testing Program,For Review & Approval.Rev Incorporates Commitments Addressed in Util 891222 Response to Notice of Violation & Other Editorial & Technical Changes ML20058Q1481990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 3 to FNP-1-M-043, Jm Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Second 10-Yr Inservice Insp Program,Asme Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20058P6201990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to FNP-2-M-068, Ten-Yr Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components, Per 891207 & 900412 Responses to NRC Request for Addl Info ML20055G7701990-07-18018 July 1990 Updates 900713 Response to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount ML20055F7411990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 & Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1989 Through May 1990.Repts Revised to Correct Typo on Value of Cumulative Number of Hours Reactor Critical ML20055F3781990-07-10010 July 1990 Submits Final Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.3 & 4.2.4.Util Position That Procedures Currently Utilized by Plant Constitute Acceptable Ongoing Life Testing Program for Reactor Trip Breakers & Components ML20055D4861990-07-0202 July 1990 Requests Authorization to Use Encl ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Case N-395 Re Laser Welding for Sleeving Process Described by Oct 1990,per 10CFR50.55a,footnote 6 ML20055D1001990-06-26026 June 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-12 & 50-364/90-12 on 900411-0510.Corrective Actions:Electrolyte Level Raised in Lights Identified by Inspector to Have Low Electrolyte Level ML20044A6191990-06-26026 June 1990 Suppls 900530 Ltr Containing Results of SPDS Audit,Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.One SPDS Console,Located in Control Room,Will Be Modified So That Only SPDS Info Can Be Displayed by Monitor.Console Will Be Reconfigured ML20043G4741990-06-11011 June 1990 Submits Addl Info Re 900219 Worker Respiratory Protection Apparatus Exemption Rev Request.Proposed Exemption Rev Involves Features Located Entirely within Restricted Area as Defined in 10CFR20 ML20043C1851990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Proposed Schedules for Submission & Requested Approval of Licensing Items ML20043B5941990-05-25025 May 1990 Provides Rept of Unsatisfactory Performance Testing,Per 10CFR26,App A.Error Caused by Olympus Analyzer Which Allowed Same Barcode to Be Assigned to Two Different Samples. Smithkline Taken Action to Prevent Recurrence of Scan Error ML20042G7461990-05-10010 May 1990 Certifies That Plant Licensed Operator Requalification Program Accredited & Based Upon Sys Approach to Training,Per Generic Ltr 87-07.Program in Effect Since 890109 ML20042F0831990-05-0101 May 1990 Forwards Rev 18 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld ML20042G3081990-04-25025 April 1990 Forwards Alabama Power Co Annual Rept 1989, Unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 900331 & Cash Flow Projections for 1990 ML20042E4121990-04-12012 April 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per NRC 890803 Request.Relief Request RR-30 Requested Reduced Holding Time for Hydrostatically Testing Steam Generator Secondary Side ML20012E9571990-03-27027 March 1990 Forwards Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Rept,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.12.Rept Provides Number of Tests (Valid or Invalid),Number of Failures for Each Diesel Generator at Plant for 1989 & Info Identified in Reg Guide 1.108 ML20012D9661990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Annual ECCS Evaluation Model Changes Rept,Per Revised 10CFR50.46.Info Includes Effect of ECCS Evaluation Model Mods on Peak Cladding Temp Results & Summary of Plant Change Safety Evaluations ML20012D8901990-03-20020 March 1990 Clarifies 891130 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Use of Q-List at Plant,Per NRC Request.Fnpims Data Base Utilized as Aid for Procurement,Maint,Operations & Daily Planning ML20012C4701990-03-15015 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900201 Ltr Re Emergency Planning Weaknesses Identified in Insp Repts 50-348/89-32 & 50-364/89-21. Corrective Actions:Cited Procedures Revised.Direct Line Network Notification to State Agencies Being Implemented ML20012C6241990-03-14014 March 1990 Informs of Resolution of USI A-47,per Generic Ltr 89-19 ML20012C4651990-03-13013 March 1990 Provides Verification of Nuclear Insurance Reporting Requirements Specified in 10CFR50.54 w(2) ML20012C2051990-03-0505 March 1990 Forwards SPDS Critical Function Status Trees,Per G West Request During 900206 SPDS Audit at Plant.W/O Encl ML20012A1621990-03-0202 March 1990 Forwards Addl Info Inadvertently Omitted from Jul-Dec 1989 Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept,Including Changes to Process Control Program ML20012A1301990-03-0101 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-01 Re Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey.Completed Questionnaire Encl ML20043A7481990-02-0202 February 1990 Forwards Util Exam Rept for Licensed Operator Requalification Written Exams on 900131 ML20006D2311990-01-31031 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003 Re Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Refueling Procedures Will Be Revised to Incorporate Guidance That Will Preclude Inadvertent Loss of Shutdown ML20006A9091990-01-23023 January 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-13 Re Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting safety-related Equipment.Util Has Program to Perform Visual Insps & Cleanings of Plant Svc Water Intake Structure by Means of Scuba Divers ML20005E4931989-12-28028 December 1989 Provides Certification That fitness-for-duty Program Meets 10CFR26 Requirements.Testing Panel & cut-off Levels in Program Listed in Encl ML20005E3681989-12-28028 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-28 & 50-364/89-28 on 891002-06.Corrective Actions:All Piping Preparation for Inservice Insp Work in Containment Stopped & All Participants Assembled to Gather Facts on Incident ML20005E1971989-12-27027 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22 on 890911-1010.Corrective Actions:Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve Closed & Core Operations Suspended.Shift Supervisor Involved in Event Counseled ML20011D5041989-12-22022 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-26 & 50-364/89-26.Corrective Actions:Personnel Involved in Preparation of Inservice Test Procedures Counseled. Violation B Re Opening of Pressurizer PORV Denied ML19332F2111989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Final Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Updated Inservice Insp Program,Summarizing Results of Addl Reviews & Providing Exam Listing Info ML19332F0791989-12-0707 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22.Corrective Actions:All Managers Retrained on Intent of Overtime Procedures & Sys Established to Provide Independent Check of All Time Sheets Each Pay Period ML19332F1141989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Description of Instrumentation Sys Selected in Response to Generic Ltr 88-17, Loss of DHR, Per Licensee 890127 Commitment.Hardware Changes Will Be Implemented During Unit 1 Tenth & Unit 2 Seventh Refueling Outages ML19332F1241989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per 891005 Ltr ML19353B0071989-12-0606 December 1989 Forwards Rev 1 to Safeguards Security Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld 1990-09-17
[Table view] |
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M N N, a n Vce Pres acM Alabama POWCf the mulhem e!ecinc system February 5, 1979 Docket No. 50-348 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Mr. Albert Schwencer Gentlemen:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT-1 CONTAINMENT PURGING DURING NORNAL PLANT OPERATION On January 9, 1979 Alabama Power Company responded to Mr. A.
Schwencer's letter dated November 28, 1978 concerning containment purging during normal plant operation for Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. In the January 9 letter, Alabama Power Company committed to providing information concerning:
(1) justification for unlimited purging using the mini-purge (18 inch) system during power operation, (2) justification for limited purging using the main purge (48 inch) system, and (3) an evaluation of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override feature.
Justification for unlimited purging via the 18-inch mini-purge valves is provided in response to Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 (En-closure 1). This detailed response to the BTP includes the following:
(1) verification that the valves are capable of closing against the dynamic forces of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident, (2) an evaluation of the imps t of purging during power operation of ECCS performance, and (3) an evaluation of the radiological consequences of a design basis accident.
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e Mr. Albert Schwencer PAGE TWO February 5, 1979 A review of the safety actuation signal circuits for the Containment Purge Systen has been performed. We have determined that overriding the safety actuation signals for the purge system containment isolation valves is not possible.
Justification for limited purging via the 48-inch main purge valves, including a demonstration (by test or by test and analysis similar to that required by Standard Review Plan 3.9.3) of the ability of the containment isolation valves to close under postulated design basis accident conditions, is addressed in our response to paragraph R.l.f of BTP CSB6-4 (enclosed).
A review of the design of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override feature was performed considering the follow-ing items:
(1) that overriding of one safety actuation signal does not also cause the bypass of any other safety actuation signal, (2) that suf ficient physical features are provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls, and (3) that the use of each manual override is annunciated at the system level for every system impacted.
The results of this review are as follows:
(1) We have verified that overriding of the safety actuation signal to any piece of equipment does not affect the safety actuation signals to any other equipment.
(2) (3) With exceptions, all manual overrides of equipment involving safety are alarmed in the main control room. These exceptions are as follows:
Each river water pump is provided with a breaker control switch located on the Main Control Board.
The control switch has three positions-maintained contacts. The three positions are: OFF - AUTO -
RUN. If a river water pump handswitch is placed in the "0FF" position the LOSP sequencer start signal to that pump is blocked. Failure of a river water punp to start during a LOSP is indi-cated by a sequencer step failure warning light and an alarm on the EPB annunciation system. It is an "immediate operator action" for a loss of offsite power to verify proper sequencer operation so that operator action can be taken for the pump start failure.
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Mr. Albert Schwencer PAGE THREE February 5, 1979 Also, with a river water punp's handswitch in the "0FF" position and offsite power not avail-able, a low pond level signal is blocked to that pump. However, the same low pond level signal that initiates pump start also initiates a low pond level alarn to which the operator responds (by procedure) by verifying river water pumps running.
A technical specification change will be submitted in the near future to:
(1) provide surveillance requirenents for the nini-purge valvec (18 inch) as containment isolation valves, and (2) restrict the containment purge valves (48 inch) from being open in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 except for a maximum of 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year.
Yours very truly, F. L. layton, Jr.
FLCJr/TNE:bhj Enclosures cc: Mr. G. F. Trowbridge Mr. R. A. Thomas
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ATTACliMENT 1 COMPARIS0N OF FARLEY PURGE SYSTEM WITil BRANCli fECilNICAL POSITION CSB 6-4 The following is a comparison of the farley purge and Mini-Purge system with BTP CSB 6-4, Part B. The BIP requirements are reproduced herein for cl a ri ty .
GENERAL:
Requi rement:
The system used to purge the containment for the reactor opera tional modes of power operation, startup, hot standby and hot shutdown; i.e. , the on-line purge system should be independent of the purge system used for the reactor opera tional modes of cold shutdown and refueling.
RysILon_sel The operation of the Mini-Purge System, or On-Line Purge System, is independent of the operation of the purge system used for the reactor operational modes of cold shutdown and refueling, although there is common ductwork and a common fil ter.
Figures 1 and 2 show the supply and exhaust, respectively, for the Mini-Purge System (18 inch) and the Containment Main Purge System (48 inch). From these figures it can be seen that the Mini-Purge System has its own fans and isolation valves, which operate independently of the Containment Main Purge System.
Repir$ g nt:
- 1. The On-Line Purge System should be designed in accordance with the following criterb:
(a) The performance and reliability of the purge system isolation valves should be consistent with the operability assurance program outlined in Branch Technical Position MEB-2, Pump and Valve Operability Assurance Program. (Also see SRP Section 3.9.3) The design basis for the valves and actuators should include the build-ing of containment pressure for the LOCA break spectrum, and the purge line and vent line flows as a function of time up to and during valve closure.
Resppnsg:
The mini-purge isolation valves are Seismic Category I, ASME Section III, Nuclear Class 2. The operability assurance program for these valves is described in aragraph 3.9.4.1 of FNP FSAR which was reviewed and approved b the NRC.
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Requirement:
1.b: The number of purge and vent lines that may be used should be limited to one purge line and one vent line.
Response
As shown in Figures 1 and 2 there is only one supply line and one exhaust line in the Tiini-Purge System.
Requirement:
1.c. The size of the purge and ver t lines should not exceed about eight inches in diameter unless detailed justification for larger line sizes is provided.
Response
The size of the Farley mini-purge lines,18 inches in diameter, exceeds the 8 inches in diameter called for in the Branch Tech-nical Position. The justification for the larger line size is provided below.
One of the design objectives of the Mini-Purge System was to allow 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Der week occupancy of the containment during power opera tion. In order to achieve this, it was determined that a purge flow rate of 5,000 cfm was reqcired. In order to provide the 5,000 cfm flow rate and taking into account fan de-sign, the optimum size of the supply line and exhaust line was determined to be 18 inches in diameter.
A discussion of the isolation valve closure capability and the radiological consequences of a LOCA are presented under Positions 6.1.f a nd B. 5.a , respec ti vely.
Requirement:
1.d. The containment isolation provisions for the purge system lines should meet the standards appropriate to engineered safety features; i.e. , quality, redundancy, testability and other appropriate cri teria .
Response
The isolation provisions of the Mini-Purge System meet the standards for engineered safety features. There are redundant isolation "A" valves in both the supply and exhaust lines with one valve an train and the other a "B" train in each line. These valves were designed to ASME Section III Class 2 nuclear requirements and have been seismically and environmentally qualified.
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1.e. Instrumentation and control systems provided to isolate the purge system lines should be independent and actuated by diverse parameters; e.g. , containment pressure, safety injection actuation, and containment radiation level . If energy is required to close the valves, at least two diverse sources of energy shall be pro-vided, either of which can affect the isolation function.
Response
The Mini-Purge System is provided wi th independent ins trumentation and control systeas for isolation which are actuated by diverse parameters, specifically high radiation in the exhaust flow and
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a containment ventilation isolation signal (CVIS).
Figure 2 shows the relative location of the containment purge radia tion moni tors (RE-24A, B) . Upon sensing high radiation i the purge exhaust line, these monitors generate an isolation signal which results in the closing of all four mini-purge isolation valves.
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FSAR figure 7.2 'd provides details as to the various parameters wh_ict will genera te a CVIS. Upon receipt of a CVIS, all four mini-
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purge isolation valves _will_ close.
Electrical power is not required for the isolation function other than to generate the isolation signal . The isolation valves are air aperated valves which will close upon loss of air and loss of power to the so'enoid valves resulting in loss of air to the oper a tor.
Requirement:
1.f. Purge system isol< tion valve closure times, including instrumen-tatJon delays, should not exceed five seconds.
Response
Tht mini-purge and main purge isolation valves are butterfly valves designed to close in less than 5 seconds against LOCA pressure.
Specifically, the valve operators were sized to seat and unseat the valves with a differential pressure of 65 psig. The valves were shop tested by opening and closing the valves under a no flow no pressure condition with resulting closing times of 3 to 4 seconds. For reasons discutsed below, the closing times for these valves will be no greater under flow conditions.
The fluid dynamic characteristics of butterfly valves tend to produce operating torques that will close the valve. If the fluid dynamic effects were to be added to the operating tests the valve may actually close in a shorter time than those shown in a static test. Ref erences for this phenomenon may be found in "A Contri-bution to the Study of Butterfly Valves" by D. Gaden from Water Power, December 1951 and " Torque and Cavitation Characteristics of
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.. Butterfly Valves" by Turgut Sarpkaya, Paper #60-WA-105 from Trans-actions of the ASME Journal of Applied Mechanics.
Requirement:
1-9 Provisions should be made to ensure that isolation valve closure will not be prevented by debris which could potentially become entrained in the escaping air and steam.
P.e s po n s e :
The mini-purge and main purge supply and exhaust duct openings inside the containment are covered with " bird screen," preventing large pieces of material that ray break loose during a LOCA from entering the ducts and blocking isolation valve closure. The
" bird screen" is made from 1/2" mesh, .047" wire.
Requirement:
- 2. The purge system should not be relied on for temperature and humidity con-trol within the containment.
Res_ponse_:
Neither the Mini-Purge nor the Main Purge System was designed for temperature and humidi ty control within the containment. The system was designed for control of radioactivity levels wi thin the contain-r.ent as discussed in Position B.l.c. , above.
Requirement:
- 3. Provisions should be made to minimize the need for purging of the cor.tain-ment by providing containment atmosphere cleanup systems within the co nta i nment.
Response
The Mini-Purge System is designed to maintain radioactivity levels in ,
the containment consistent with occupancy requirements without the use of the installed pre-access filtration system. However, the pre-access filtration system is available for use in minimizing the need for purging the containment.
Requirement:
- 4. Provisions should be made for testing the availability of the isolation function and the leakage rate of the isolation valves, individually, during reactor operation.
Provisions have been made for testing the availability of the isolation function and the leakage rate of the isolation valves during reactor
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operation. The valves are capable of being tested bv safety train for availability of the isolation function; i.e., both "A" train valves would be tested simultaneously as would both "B" train valves. The valves are leak tested by line; i.e., the supply line and the exhaust line, by pressurizing between the closed isolation valves.
Re_ qui rement:
- 5. The following analyses should be performed to justify the Containment Purge System design:
- a. An analysis of the radiological consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident. The analysis should be done for a spectrum of break sizes, and the instrumentation and setpoints that will actuate the vent and purge valves closed should be identified. The source term used in the radiological calculations should be based on a calculation under the terms of Appendix K to determine the extent of fuel failure and the concomitant release of fission pro-ducts, and the fission product activity in the primary coolant.
A pre-existing iodine spike should be considered in determining primary coolant activity. The volume of containment in which fission products are mixed should be justified, and the fission products from the above sources should be assumed to be released through the open ptns e valves during the maximum interval required for valve closure. The radiological consequences should be within 10 CFR 100 guideline values.
Resppnse:
An analysis of the radiological consequences of a DBA LOCA during operation of the Mini-Purge System was performed. The method of analysis and the results are discussed below.
The analysis was performed in the following manner. Just prior to the LOCA, the reactor is assumed to be operating with 1% failed fuel.
There is a pre-existing iodine spike of 60 ACi/gm I-131 dose equivalent.
The Mini-Purge System is operating with two 18 inch lines fully open, one tupply and on~e exhaust line. A' containment high pressure signal .will initiate isolation of the contsinment.within 0.8 seconds after the LOCA. The isolation valves will be fully closed in the next 5 seconds (a total of 6.0 seconds was used in the analysis). The quantities of interest (e.g. , blowdown, temperature, pressure) are all time dependent; therefore, the 6 second period was divided into 1 second intervals and the flow out the mini-purge lines was calculated based on the maximum conditions (density, temperature, pressure) for the interval. The activity released to the containment for an interval was based on the incremental blowdown for that interval . No credit for the purge filter was taken in this analysis.
This analysis resulted in incremental doses resulting from purg-ing while the plant is in operation. These incremental doses were
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- then added to the doses presented in FSAR Table 15.4-12 (through Amendment 71). The resultant doses and 10CFR100 limits are summarized below.
Thyroid Dose, Rem 10CFR100 Table 15.a-12 Incremental Total _ Lir:t_
Site Boundary (2 hrs. ) 175 5.7 180.7 300 LPZ (0-30 days) 110 2.1 112.1 300 Whole Body, Rem 10CFR100 Table 15.4-12 Incremental Total Limit Site Boundary (2 hrs.) 6.5 8.7 (10-3) 6.509 25 LPZ (0-30 days) 3.2 2.2 (10-3) 3.202 25 Therefore, the thyroid and whole body doses remain well below the limits of 10CFR100 for these accident conditions.
Requirement:
5.b. An analysis which demonstrates the acceptability of the provisions made to protect structures and safety-related equipr.ent; e.g. ,
fans, filters and ductwork, located beyond the purge system isolation valves against loss of function from the environment created by the escaping air and steam.
Response
The radiological analysis was performed taking no credit for the purge filter. Therefore, this position is not applicable.
Reauirement:
5.c. An analysis of the reduction in the containment pressure resulting from the partial loss of containment atmosphere during the accident for ECCS backpressure determination.
Response
An analysis has been performed for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant based on the containment conditions defined.in the limiting FAC Analysis case (DECLG break, CD = 0.4) obtained using the February 1978 Westinghouse Evaluation Model. A containment isolation signal is received in that analysis within the first second af ter inception of the LOCA. The Mini-Purge. System utilized during reactor operation
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consists of two 18-inch diameter lines. .It is. conservatively represented in this computc
- 1. A 5 second isolation valve closure time is assumed. During the 6-second period immediately following the LOCA, no credit is taken for the reduction in effective flow area which occurs while the valve is in the process of closing.
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- 2. The frictional resistance association with duct entrance and exit losses, filters, ductwork bands and skin friction has not been considered.
- 3. No fan coastdown effects are considered.
- 4. No inertia is considered. Steady state flow out the purge system ducts is established immediately at the time of the LOCA.
A mixture of steam and air will be exhausted from the containment through the purge lines during the 6 seconds that the isolation valves are assumed to remain open. The effect of the composition of the gas being exhausted on containment pressure has been bounded by investigating the two extreme cases, air alone and steam lone.
Within several seconds of the inception of the LOCA, containment pressure will have increased to the point that critical flow will occur in the purge lines. To bound the calculated containment gas mixture exhausted through the purge lines, the critical flow rates of steam and air were calculated during the first six seconds of the CD = 0.4 DECLG break transient. Using these flow rates, critical flow was then conservatively assumed to be in effect from time zero.
Equation (4.18) in Reference (1) was employed to calculate the critical flow rate of air through the Farley purge lines. Figure 14 of Reference (2) was applied to compute the critical flow rate of steam through the purge lines. The total mass released during the 6 seconds that the valves are presumed open is calculated as 1711 lbs. air or 1235 lbs. steam. The impact on containment pressure at 6 seconds resulting from this loss of air or of steam is less than 0.25 psi in either case. The effect of a containment pressure reduction of this magnitude on the calculated peak clad temperature is expected to be minor (less than 200F). When added to the curr~ent calculated peak clad temperature for a LOCA of 21580F, the results of this evaluation indicate that the Farley Plant meets 10CFR50.46 limits (22000F).even if the containmer.t is being purged at the time of a LOCA event.
REFERENCES:
(1) Shapiro, A. H., The Dynamics and Thermodynamics of Compressible Fluid Flow, Volume 1, p.185. .
(2) 1967 ASME Steam Tables, p. 301. ,
Requirement:
5.d. The allowable leak rates of the purge and vent isolation valves should be specified for the spectrum of design basis pressures and flows against which the valves must close.
Response
The isolation valves were tested in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J and, when combined with the previous total leakage the result was found to be within allowable limits.
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