ML19301D253

Requests Listed Info Re Measurement of Transuranics in Facility Low Level Radwastes to Be Packaged for Burial,Per J Holonich 831221 Response to 831111 Request.Answers Not Found in Tech Spec 3/4 11.3 Concerning Solid Radwastes

ML19301D253
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	03/11/1985
From:	Drey K AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Stevens J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8503190362
Download: ML19301D253 (1)

Text

'MEMORANDUM FOR: Dennis M. Crutchfield, Assistant Director for Safety D 5 iSS5 Assessment, Division of Licensing FROM: L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems, Divisien of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (PHASE I) - NUREG-0612 - YANKEE R0WE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - DOCKET NO. 50 029 - TAC 08091 Enclosed is a copy of our safety evaluation report (SER) for Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station which was developed based on the licensee's response to the December 22, 1980 generic letter on " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." This SER was prepared after receiving the TER, which was developed by the Franklin Research Center (FRC). We concur with the findings contained in the TER and conclude that the guidelines in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.1 and 3.3 have been satisfied and, therefore, conclude that Phase I for Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station is acceptable. The TER is considered a part of our SER.

We consider our effort on TAC No. 08091 to be complete. We have al.o enclosed our SALP input. ..,,,._, ,,,, ,

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_ i L. 5. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

As Stated cc w/o enclosure:

R. Bernero R. Capra

0. Parr D. Eisenhut J. Wilson J. Wermiel cc w/ enclosure:

J. Zwolinski P. Erickson A. Singh

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Contact:

A. Singh X29492 Distribution Docket File ASB Rdg. File LRubenstein

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UITTCIAL' RECORD CDPY B502190362 850205 CF ADOCK 05000029 CF

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t YANKEE ROWE NUCLEAP POWER STATION CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS - PHASE I SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH I. Introduction As a result of Generic Tack A-36, " Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel," NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," was developed. Following the issuance of NUREG-0612, a ceneric letter dated December 22, 1980, was sent to all operating plants, applicants for operating licenses and holders of construction permits requesting that responses b? prepared to indicate the degree of compliance with the

, guidelines of NUREG-0612. As indic6ted above, in accordance with the generic letter dated December 22, 1980, Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC), licensee for Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station was requested to review their provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station to determ ne the extent to which th; guide-i lines of NUREG-0612 are satisfied and to commit to mutually agreeable changes and modifications that would be required in order to fullf satisfy these guidelines. By letters dated February 12, 1982, November 4, 1983 and November 14, 1984, the licensea provided the responses to this request.

II. NRC Review And Evaluation The staff and its consultant, the Franklin Research Center (FRC),

have reviewed the applicant's sL5mittals for Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Stat 1on. As a result of its review, FRC has issued the Technical Evaluation Repcrt (TER). The sta.'f has reviewed the TER and concurs with its findings that the guidelit.es in NUREG-0612. Sectier.s 5.1.1 have been

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satisfied. This TER is a part of this SER. We conclude that Phase I of NUREG-0612 for Yankee Rowe Nuclear A?wer Station, is acceptable.

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SALP INPUT Plant: Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station

1. Management Involvement and Control In Assuring Quality: Not Applicable

2. Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues from a Safety Standpoint:

Category 3

3. Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives: Category 3

4. Enforcement History: Not Applicable

5. Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events: Not Applicable

6. Staff (Including Management): Not Applicable

7. Training and Qualification Effectiveness: Not Applicable The licensee's initial submittal and subsequent responses for Heavy Loads were not complete. It took co.asiderable time to close a number of open !tems as indicated in the draft TER for Phase I.

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT .

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS .

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YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY YANKEE R0WE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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NRC DOCKET NO.50-029 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRCTACNO. 08r)91 ,

FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT.NO. NRC-03-B1-133 . FRC TASK 402

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Preparedby -

Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bo=berger

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20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent

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Nuclear Regulatory Cornmission

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Leadd' RC Engineer: A. Singh

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January 31, 19D

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This report was prepred as an account of work sponsoree .sy an agency of the United States Government. Neither the UniteG States Goverr. ment nor any agency thereef. ".4 any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or linpliad, or assumes ar'/ 10741 liability or responsibility for any third party's use. or the results of such use. of any mfttmetion, appa-retus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such thsrd t

party yould not infringe private!y owned rfghts.

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FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER DM90N OF ARVIN/CALSPAN f,. m& r eA 20tt:1 RACE STREETS.PHILADELP6MA,PA 19105 ga m s J OD I

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS

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YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY YANKEE R0WE NUCLEAR POWER STATION es -

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NRC DOCKET NO.50-029 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRCTAC NO. 08091 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-133 FRC TASK 402 Prepared by Frank!in Research Center Author: C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent

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Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh

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Janttary 31, 1985

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• This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, of any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied. Or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such >se, of any information, appa-ratus, g '! duct or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe private 8y owned rights.

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Prepared ay: Reviewed by: Approved by:

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, Principal Authdt NGroup Idader Department D ctorj

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Date. ,i/a/K Date: o in t s Date. .

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FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER OfVISION OF ARVIN/CALSPAN 20tn & RACE STREET 5, PHILADELPHIA.PA 19103 - -

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TER-C5506-402

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CONTE 1CS Sectico Title Pace

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1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Geaeric B.ackground . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Tiant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 F/ALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 19 3 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling . . . . . . 22 3.2 Interim Protection . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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TER-C5506-402 FOREWORD This Technical Evaluction Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regu?atory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of HRC operating reactor licensing ac'tions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.

Mr. C. Bomberger and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

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'TER-C5506-402

1. INTRODUCTION

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1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW

.This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company's (YAEC) Yankee Rowe Nuclee.r Power Station. This evaluation was performed with the follouing objectives:

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o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

1.2 GENERIC BACKGRO%'D Genaric Techr. cal Activity Task A-36 was established by the Nuclear

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Regu' atory C' mission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing critaria ant' the. adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power

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plar e s to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary chan ts in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the I;C staff on May 17, 1978 .2) to all power reactor licensees, requesting

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inferiation concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

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• results of Task A-36 were eported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads ai Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not

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adequately cover the major c'auses of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.

. In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy loads 7 the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first part of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handJing systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability c4f

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failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which

. they are employed. The second part of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations o'f load handling accidents indicate

- that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the

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following:

o define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training

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so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment

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o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a progrrim be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

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1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to YAEC, the Licensee I for Yankee Rowe Nuclear power Station, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at the Yankee Rowe plant, evaluate these previsions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and

, provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determi-nation of conformance to these guidelines. On February 12. 1982 [4), November 4, 1983 [5), and November 14, 1984 [6), YAEC responded to this request. These procedures have been incorporated into this evaluation.

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TER-C5506-402

2. EVALUATION

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This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at the Yankee Rowe plant with respect to NRC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is

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presented, Licensee-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELIhTS The NRC has established seven general guidelines that must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy

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loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

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Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training

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Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed)

Guideline 6 - Cranes. (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

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These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling

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systems and procedures used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems.

2.1.1 Overhead Heavy Load Handlino Systems

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems identified the vapor container polar crane and the yard crane to be the only cranes subject to

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Table 2-8. ventee powe woeleer Power Plent/utmRG-0612 Compliance seetr as weight Interie Interim or Guldeline 1 Culdeline 2 Guideline 3 Culdeline 4 Guideline S Guideline 4 Guideline 7 feeeeure 1 Seessure 6 Capacity safe imod Crane Operator special Lifting Crane - Test Tochalcel special peevy Icede Stonel Pethe Procedur es Training Devleen stinge end Inspection Crane Deels) speelfleetione Attention

1. veed Crane 75 -- R C - -- R R C --

Puel poet and sling aseeely 2.75 C C -- - C -- -- C -

Spent Puel Cesk and sling Assembly 15 C C -- .. C -- -- C --

Tempprery Cote end sling Ateeably 14.5 C C -- -

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Shield Penete and

[ sling assembly 9 C C -- - C -- -- C --

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• sileg assembly 1.5 C C -- - C - -- C --

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2. Vepor contelner Polet Crone ISS - 9 C -- -- R R -

C peector Wood and 8.lftleg mig $4.4 C m -- R - -- -- == C Cuide Tuhe Isolddown Plate end Lifting Pleture 2.4 C C -- R ~ -- -+ -- C Culde Tube support Piete end Lif ting Fleture 2.1 C C == R -- -- - -- C

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• peevy 1, cede itemel Fathe Precedures Tr aining Deelees Bilngs and Inspectlen Cr one Deelget precificettene Attention

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Incere Instavamm-totien end Lifting g Pleture 12.23 C C - 3 -- -- - -- C w

1 Cdolant Pump and Sting Aseeably 11 C C -- -- C -~ -- - C Shield Plug end Sting Ave *ehty S.25 C C -- - C - - -- C eggtp=ent stetch and Sting Asseattly S C C - -- C -- - -- C Mleelle Shield 1g C C -- - C -- . - - C n

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• TER-C5506-402 compliance with the criteria of NUREG-0612. Licensee review has excluded the following cranes from further consideration for the indicated reasons:

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1. No equipment required for safe' shutdown is located in the vicinity or sufficient physical separation exists:

o primary auxiliary building lower-level hoist and monorail system o shutdown coeling heat exchanger hoist and monorail

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o low-pressure surge tank cooler hoist monorail o component cooling heat exchanger host and monorail

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o spent fuel pit annex crane o new fuel vault crane o boiler feed pump chainfall monorail o condensate pump chainfall monorail

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- o screenwell pumphouse load handling system

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o reactor lower core support assembly lifting structure.

2. Handing system capacity is less than that defined to be a heavy load:

o new fuel monorail and hoist o spent fuel manipulator crane o fuel manipulator crane.

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In addition, the turbine room overhead bridge crane has been excluded from further consideration. Although there is equipment required for safe

- shutdown located within this building (the emergency boiler feed pump discharge piping), the crane has been excluded for the following reasons:

1. The area of concern is reasonably small, and it has been procedurally designated as a restricted (exclusion) area.

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2. Several physical bartiers erist that would limit the damage to this piping, including a 6-inch operating floor slab, a 12-inch-diameter condensate pipe, and an 8-inch heater drain pipe.

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3. System redundancy is provided by the recent installation of a motor-driven emergency f d pump.

The main steam non-return valve hoist and monorail system has also been excluded because work performed by these systems can only be performed after i

the piant is shut down and the non-return valves are no longer required to achieve safe shutdown.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion Evaluation of those cranes subject to compliance with the general guide-Use of an exclusion area lines is consistent with the criteria of NUREG-0612.

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TER-C5506-402 for the turbine room is also acceptable because the area of concern is a relatively small fraction of the overall area and is procedurally administered.

2.1.2 Safe Load Paths [Guid21ine 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(1)}

" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimis:e the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact sefe shutdown equipment. The path ohould follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and 1

clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Information provided by the Licensee indicates that safe load paths have

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been defined in procedures and, where practical, are shown on drawings contained within these procedures. Deviations from these load paths require shift supervisor and/or Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) review.

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.i For the vapor container polar crane, a safe load path with a restricted area has been developed. Safe load paths are not permanently marked however,

the Licensee stated that use of a procedurally designated signalman responsible for directing the operator in all crane movements meets the intent of this

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requirement. The restricted area for the polar crane is that area directly over the core. With the head removed, only the reactor head, the upper core barrel and plates, and the internals may be moved over this area. Movement of any other load over this area requires written approval from the PORC.

A safe load path and a restricted area (spent fuel pool area) have been developed for the yard crane. Movement of loads over the restricted area is

• governed by plant technical specification 3.9.7.

b. Evaluation Development of safe load paths at the Yankee Rowe plant is consistent with the requirements of this guideline for the vapor container polar crane and the yard crane. Use of a signalman whose duties are defined by procedure ,.

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TER-C5506-402 is a reasonable alternative to permanent marking of the operating floors.

Plant procedures for approving deviations to established load paths are also

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aceeptable.

c. Conclusion Development and use of safe load paths at the Yankee Rowe plant are performed in a manner consistent with the requirements of this guideline.

2.1.3 Load Handling Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREC-0612, Section J.l.l(2)]

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' Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be htndled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, pro edures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-06;.2. These procedures should include: identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the .tafe path; and other special precautions."

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a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

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The Licensee ctated that written procedures currently satisfy the criteria of Guideline 2: those that do not will be revised or new procedurer will be written where they do not presently exist. Inspection procedures meet or will meet the intent of ANSI B30.2-1976.

A one-time procedure to handle the 32-ton shipping cask will be vritten prior to using the cask for shipment of control roda. Procedures to handle shield plugs inside containment will also be written and impleaented prior to the next scheduled refueling outage.

The following is a list of applicable procedures currently inplemented:

OP-1501 Removal of VC Equipment Hatch Cover

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QP-1507 Reactor Head - Reroval, Handling, and Storage OP-1510 Reactor Upper Core Barrel and Plates - Removal and Storage OP-1513 Reactor Head Replacement OP-1514 Reactor Upper Core Barrel and Plates - Replacement OP-1520 Replacement of VC Equipment Ha ?,ch Cover DP-4500 Monthly Holst Inspection OP-5203 Main Coolant Pump Removal and Handling for Maintenance OP-5?G5 Main Coolant Pump Reinstallation DP-5953 Operating Instructions for Overhead Cranes

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TER-C5506-402 OP-5960 CR3-Yard Area Crane General Procedure DP-5961 Turbine Crane General Procedure

. DP-5962 Polar Crane General Procedure

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b. Evaluation and Con'clusion Development of procedures to control movements of heavy loads at the Yankee Rowe plant is consistent with the requirements of this guideline.

2.1.4 Crane Operato'r Trainino [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3)]

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" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter,2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [7)."

a. Summary of' Licensee Statements and Conclusions

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The Licensee stated that operators are trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976, with no exceptions.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion

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Training and qualification of operators is performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 3.

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? 1.5 Special Liftino Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4)]

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"Special lif ting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI H14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [B].

, This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be irparted on the handling g device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is Stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device [NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.1(4 )) . "

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

_ The Licensee identified the fol29 wing special lifting devices to be subject to compliance with the criteria of this guideline and ANSI N14.6-1978:

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o reactor head lifting device o plate / barrel and incore instrumentation lifting device.

The head lifting device is a symmetrical structural steel and tripod lif ting device with turnbuckles on each leg to assure even distribution of the load. The device is used and stored in a controlled environment. Design of the device was in accordance with ASME Section VIII and conformed to accepted industry standards of the time. Critical welds were identified in the original specification, as were requirements for magnetic particle inspec-tions, weld repairs, and stress relief. The device was designed with factors of safety of 2 on yield stress and 4 on ultimate stress. Fabrication records for this device are no longer available.

• Regarding the requirement for load testing of this device, the Licensee stated that load testing was not originally required and a load test on-site is not presently practical. In lieu of this load test, inspections and

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dimensional and nondestructive examinations (NDE) in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1978 requirement will be conducted to verify the continued reliability of these devices. In addition, a technical feasibility study will be con-ducted to determine if the 75-ton capacity load cell can be used with the

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lifting device tc provide further assurance that the device or the crane will not be overstressed.

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The plate / barrel and incore instrumentation lifting device is also a device of simple design, consisting of three wire rope slings connected at the top to an oval ring and connected at the lower end by Y-shaped pipe spreader bars. This device is also used and stored in a controlled environment. A i stresg analysis of the lifting device has been performed which indicates a yield strength factor of safety of 2.4 for the critically stressed portions of the spreader bar pipe sections. A similar working stress analysis, based upon AISC specification criteria, indicates that the weld shear stress at working load is only 60% of the AISC allowable shear stress of the base metal, and is considered by the Licensee to be satisfactory. The Licensee stated that the

TER-C5506-402 predictability tf performance based upon AISC ir evidence of the device's suitability. Other critical elements of the spreader bar mechanism are the

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end plates, which are capable of an ultimate load of 56,000 lb (factor of safety of 2.3). Several mechanical components of the lifting device also do not satisfy the ANSI requirements: therefore, the following actions are being undertaken: the shackles and turnbuckles will be replaced, and the top oval

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link will be either replaced or load-tested to demonstrate adequacy. Slings will be replaced as necessary to achieve a minimum factor of safety of 5.

The lifting device is inspected prior to use, and a load cell is used to prevent an overstress craditfon from occurringo Visual, dimensional, and NDE will be performed in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1978 to assure the continued reliability of these devices. In addition, the incore instrumentation lifting device has been load tested to 150%.

For both the head lifting device and the plate / barrel and incore

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instrumentation lifting device, the Licensee stated that load testing and/or NDE will be performed prior to returning the lifting device to service after any damage, major maintenance, alteration, or overstressing.

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b. Evaluation Although not in strict compliance with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978,

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it is apparent from the Licensee's responses that these devices will provide a degree of load handling reliability consistent with that specified in the ANSI standard.

For the reactor head lift rig, the device is cf relatively simple design and was originally designed in accordance with ASME criteria. Design margins, although not in strict compliance with ANSI criteria, are well defined and are adequate based upon controlled usage of the devices and use of a load cell to 1 prevent overstress conditions. Although no fabrication records exist, per-formance of NDE following fabrication provides assurances that these devices were assembled properly. The Licensee's commitment to comply with ANSI requirements for continuing compliance is also in accordance with guideline criteria.

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TER-C5506-402 For the plate / barrel and incore instrumentation lifting device, similar informattbn,has been provided to document simplicity of design and adequacy of

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design margins for existing or replacement components. Fabrication proof of workmanship is documented by a load tect to 150%. ' Continuing compliance of

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this device is also assured by commitment to comply with ANSI requirements.

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c. Conclusion Design and fabrication of special lifting devices, as well as programs to ensure their continuing compliance with ANSI criteria, are consistent with requirements of Guideline 4. -

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2.1.6 Liftino Devices (Not Specially Desioned) [ Guideline 5, 17UREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(5))

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" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.S-1971, ' Slings' [9).

However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum

. of the static and maximum dynamic load. - The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' that prodaces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used." .

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that all slings at the Ya,nkeee Rowe plant are inspected in accordance with procedure DP-5950

• Periodic Inspection of

. Slings." The procedure is being revised to include ANSI B30.9-1971 as a reference and to include specific criteria for evaluating the physical condi-tion of the slings. In addition, rated capacity of all slings will be reduced by 204 to account for dynamic sling loading. All slings are tagged in

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accordance with OSHA Regulation 1910.210. Slings that are used with the turbine room crane are specially marked and stored in a separate area. All

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other slings may be used throughout the plant.

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b. Evaluation and conclusion Sling selection, marking, and use are in accordance with the requirements of Guideline 5.

2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) { Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(6)]

"The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead'and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use when it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where fre,uency of crane use is less

• than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may or,1y be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations and is gesnerally not accessible during power oper ation. ANSI B30.2, howevtr, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. ?or such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that procedures for the inspection and maintenance of

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the polar crane and yard crane will be revised to comply with ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2. The only exception taken is the requirement for the frequency of

inspection of the polar crane: this crane is inspected prior to its use due to the inaccessibility of the polar crane during reactor operation. This

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deviation, however, does not violate the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion Upon revision of procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the polar crane and the yard crane, the Yankee Rowe plant procedures will satisfy the cr,iteria of Guideline 6.

2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(7)]

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes' [10). An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70

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TER-C5506-402 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the iatent of the specification is satisfied.'

a. Summarv of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The cranes at the Yankee Rowe plant subject to compliance with this guideline are the vapor container polar crane and the yard area crane. Both cranes were originally built in accordance with EOCI-49. A detailed evalua-tion hcs been performed of both cranes regarding the major differences between EOCI-49 end the more restrictive requirements of CMAA-70.

1. Impact allowance. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.1.3 requires that crane design calculations include an impact allowance of 0.5% of the load per foot per minute (fpm) of hoisting speed, but not less than 154 nor more than 50%.

EOCI-49 provides a similar requirement, but witn a maximum allowance of 25%.

Consequently, for cranes with hoist speeds in excess of 50 fpm, it is possible that the impact allowance applied under EOCI-49 will be less than that

'.' required by CMAA-70. Impact allowance is not an issue since the maximum hoisting speeds of the vapor container polar crane and the yard crane are less than 50 fpm.

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2. Lateral forces. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.2.1 requires that lateral loads due to crans acceleration or deceleration be considered as 2-1/2% of the live load plus the weight of the crane bridge for Class A cranes and 5% for crane Classes B, C, and D. EOCI-49 requires that this lateral load be considered as 5% of the weight of the crane bridge, trolley, and rated load for bridge speeds above 300 fpm, but allows a proportionate reduction of these loads for speeds below 300 fpm. The vapor container polar crane and yard area crane are both Class A cranes with bridge speeds of 60 fpm. Per EOCI-49, this allows a reduction in the acceleration / deceleration lateral loads to 1%, as opposed to the minimum 2-1/2% of CMAA-70. The yard area crane was upgraded

• such that the allowable stresses are one-fif th the ultimate, as~ opposed to approximately one-half the yield, as specified in both E0Ci-49 and CMAA-70.

Thevaporcontainerpolarcranebridgewasdesignedfor15dtonhkandisnow used at a 75-ton rating after derating one of two main. hoists. Therefore, the intent of CMAA-70 for conservative girder design is met for both cranes.

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3. Torsional forces. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting

. moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the distance between the center of gravity of the load, or force centerline, and the girder ~

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shear center mearured normal to the force vector. EOCI-49 provides no ,

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specific requirement for considering torsional forces in design calculations.

Both the cranes have trolley rails centered over the box girders;

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therefore, overhanging loads are not an issue.

Lateral forces which cause major torsional force's are the result of

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bridge girder wind loads acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of -

the girder. The vapor container polar crane operates indoors and therefore is -

not expe, sed to such wind loads. The yard area crane girders are synnetrically designed and therefore such wind loads do not act eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of the girders.

. 4. Bendino stress. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.2 requires that bending ,

stress calculations include a wind load of 5 lb per square foot in design stress calculations based on the sum of dead and live loads. EOCI-49 requires

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that the design of outdoor cranes include a wind load of 30 lb per square foot of projected area, in combination with the dead load and the weight of the trolley only. .

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The yard area crane girder design did not include a wind load of 5 lb per

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square foot under operating conditions. The design did include a 30-lb per square foot wind loading under nonoperating conditions. The yard area crane was upgraded such that the allowable stresses are one-fifth the ultimate, as

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i opposed to approxir.ately one-half the yield as specifitd in CMAA-70. There-fore, the intent of CMAA-70 for conservative girder design is met.

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R 5. Girder proportions. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.1 provides girder

,o proportion restrictions which are either not present in EOCI-49 (i.e.,1/h JT less than 25) or more restrictive than EOCI-49 (i.e., h/t less than 188 per s

yk CMAA-70 vs. h/t less than 240 per EOCI-49) . Further, CMAA-70 provides design

]' ' rules for the use of longitudinal stiffeners. This topic is not addressed in EOCI-49. The yard area crane has a 1/h ratio of 8.6 and an h/t ratio of 131, NL .

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thereby complying with CMAA-70. The vapor container polcr crane has 1/h ratio of 11.0 and an h/t ratio of 65.6; therefore, it also complies with CMAA-70.

6. Allowable compenssive stress. CMAA-70,, Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies

, allowable compressive att esses to be approximately 50% of yield strength of the recommended structural material (A-36) for girders, where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c ratio) is less than or equal to 38. Allowable compressive stresses decrease linearly for b/c ratios in excess of 38. EOCI-49 provides a similar method for calculating allowable compressive stresses except that the allowable stress decreases from approximately 50% of yield only after the b/c ratio exceeds 41.

The b/c ratio for both cranes is less than 38.

7. Fatigue considerations. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substan-tial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable stress

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ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads. EOCI-49

. does not address fatigue considerations. Since the number of design loading cycles at or near rated load will be far less than 20,000 cycles for both cranes, no reduction in allowable stress would be required if the cranes were

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designed to CMAA-70.

8. Holst rope requirements. CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the capacity load plus the bottom block divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. EOCI-49 is not specific with regard to calculating design safety f actors on published breaking strength.

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The 75-ton main hoists for both the vapor container polar crane and the

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yard area crane meet the CMAA-70 standard. The 15-ton auxiliary hoist of the vapor container crane has a safety factor of 4.95, which is also considered to be acceptable. However, the safety factor of 5 imposed by CMAA-70 for the

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published rope breaking strength was not met by the 15-ton yard area crane auxiliary hoist. The wire rope for this hoist will be replaced with new rope with an appropriate breaking strength.

9. Drum design loads. CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand crushing and bending loads. EOCI-49 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum bending and crushing loads with no

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TER-C5506-402 stipulation that these loads be combined. Although not required by the EOCI

, code, in accordance with crane industry practices for drum design and as verified by the crane supplier, the drum designs of the vapor container crane and of the yard area crane were based upon the combination of crushing and bending loads. Therefore, these cranes comply with the requirements of this CMAA-70 article.

10. Drum design groove depth. CMAA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recommended drum groove depth. EOCI-49 provides no similar guidance.

All drum groove depths comply with the recommendations of CMAA-70 with the exception of the yard area crane auxiliary hoist. This hoist has a drum groove depth 1/32 of an inch smaller than that recommended by CMAA-70. This variation is minor and should not affect the safety or operation of the yard crane auxiliary hoisting system.

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11. Gear design. CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower

,. ratings be based on certain Americra Gear Manufacturers Association Standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. EOCI-49 provides no similar guidance. However, the gear horsepower ratings for these cranes

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were based upon Association of Iron and Steel Engineers (AISE) criteria which referenced AGMA standards.

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12. Holst brake design. CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist holding brakes be provided with a rating equal to at least 100% of hoist motor torgoe or 125% of motor torque if a control braking means other than mechan-ical is provided. EOCI-49 places no torque rating requirements on hoist holding brakes. The braking arrangements of both cranes exceed the require-ments of CMAA-70 since all brakes aave a minimum torque of 150% of motor torque.

13. Bumpers and stops. CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial i

guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. No similar gu' idance is provided in EOCI-49. Bumpers were selected based upon the manufacturer's experience. Both the polar crane and yard crene proce(ares will be revised to add precautions concerning crane movements under load near the bridge bumpers and trolley stops,

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TER-C5506-402 The main and auxiliary hoists of the yard crane are provided with screw-type limit switches to limit travel in both the raising and lowering modes.

Redundant limit switches on the hoisting mechanisms will be added to provide an additional margin of safety against two-blocking. Engineering is now in process for these switches, which will be installed prior to the next scheduled refueling outage.

14. Static control systems. CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-49 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only. The vapor container polar crane and the yard -

area crane do not use static controls and therefore are in compliance with CMAA-70.

15. Restart protection. CMAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not equipped with spring-return controllers or momentary-contact push tons be

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provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power f6 ure and

. will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle .s brought to the OFF position. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-49.

Both the vapor container polar crane and the yard crane were designed with

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motor controllers of the

• dead-man" type with spring-returns to tbc OFF position, in compliance with CMAA-70.

b. Evaluation The polar crane and the yard crane at the Yankee Rowe plant satisfy, to a coasiderable extent, the criteria of Guideline 7 on the basis that both cranes were originally procured to EOCI-49. In addition,' the Licensee has performed a detailed analysis of the nonrestrictive design requirements imposed by CMAA-70 chat could affect the cranes' ability to handle a heavy load safely, and adequately demonstrated that design of both cranes now complies with or will be modified to conform with CMAA-70 requirements.

c. Conclusion Design of cranes at the Yankee Rowe plant will be consistent with the requirements of Guideline 7 when the proposed modifications have been completed.

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2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at ors:rs:ing nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads w nl be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exis; to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of Guideline 1 Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures Guideline 3, Crane Operator Trainings and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interin measures cover the following criteria:

1. Beavy load technical specifications

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

The status of the Licensee's implementation and an evaluation of these interim protection measures are summarized in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

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2.2.1 Technical Specifications (Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1) )

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' Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specifications 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Building,' for PWR's and Standard .

.. Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit

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handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of mecsures which satisfy the guidelines of Saction 5.1 [of NUREG-0612]."

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a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7 has been adopted at the Yankee Rowe plant to prohibit movement of loads in excess of 900 lb from travel over the spent fuel pit. Specific exceptions to this control are identified in the specification.

b. Evaluation and Cor.clusion The Yankee Rowe plant complies with Interim Protection Measure 1.

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TER-C5506-402 2.2.2 Administrative Controls (Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 (5)]

• Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crine inspection)...

can be accomplished in a ahort time period and need not be delayed for completior,of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 (of NUREG-0612]."

4. Evaluation The specific requ.'rements for load handling administrative controls are contained in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6. The

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Licensee's compliance with these guidelines has been evaluated in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7, respectively, of this report.

b. _ Conclusions and Recomment*ations

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Conclusions e.no recommendations concerning the Licensee's compliance

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- with these noministrative controls are contained in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7 of this report.

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2.2.3 Special Review for Heavy Loads Handled Over the Core IInterim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-063 2, Section 5.3 (6))

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"...special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and conciser (2) visual inspecticas of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could Icad to failure of the components (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components: and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of

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, operation, and content of procedures."

a. Evaluation The Licensee stated that the specifi: tasks required by Interim Protection Measure 6 have been accomplished at the Yankee Rowe plant. Numerous procedures have been identified as being in force which control the installation of

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TER-C5506-402 rigging and lifting devices over the core, as well as the proper handling of

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lifted loads. A plant-wide visual inspection of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices (where feasible) was performed within 45 days after receipt of the initial generic implementation letter (December 1980). Defective components of load handling systems are repaired or replaced on a continuous basis as part of the plant load handling service

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program. The plant-wide review of load handling systems originally conducted did not identify any defective components. As previously discussed, all operators are trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with ANSI B3 0.2-19 76, Chapter 2.3.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion The special review of plant equipment, procedures, and personnel operating over the reactor core was performed in a manner consistent with the guidance

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of Interim Protection Measure 6.

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3. CONCLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluatian contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staf f guidelines into sn overall evaluation of heavy load handling at the Yankee Rowe plant. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section

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5.1.5) and completion of the staff recommendations for interim protection (NUPIG-0612, Section 5.3).

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD PANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guiw lines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment

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required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guide-

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lines is twofold.' A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and' implemented, through procedures end operator training, safe load travel

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paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training,

• handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as exprested in these guidelines.

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3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION

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The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) certain measures

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that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implenentation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is conolete. Specified measures include: the implementation of a technical spe HJication to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool; compliance with

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TEE-C5506-402 Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a vi.r_tal inc-*ction program,

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including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. Evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that that the staff's measures for interim protection at the Yankee Rowe plant have been satisfied.

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4. REFERENCES

1. NRC

• Control of deavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980 NUREG-0612

2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all Licensees.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on

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Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel May 17, 1978

3. D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)

Letter to all operating reactors.

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads December 22, 1980

4. J. A. Kay (YAEC)

Letter to D. M. Crutchfield (NRC).

Subject:

Cor .- I Heavy Loads February 12, 1982

5. J. A. Kay (YAEC)

. Letter to D. M. Crutchfield (NRC).

Subject:

Coatrol of heavy Loads November 4, 1983

6. J.A. Kay (YAEC)

, Letter to J. A. Zwolinski (KRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads November 14, 1984

7. American National Standards Institute

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes"

• New York: 1976 ANSI B30.2-1976

8. American National Standards Institute

" Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Cdntainers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978

9. American National Standards Institu:e

" Slings" ANSI B30.9-1971

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10. Crane Manufacturers Association of America "Specificetions for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes" Pittsburgh, PA CMAA-70