ML18038A452

Forwards Responses to NRC Questions Re Licensee Restart Action Plan & Nuclear Improvement Program.Replacement Pages for Action Plan Encl

ML18038A452
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	03/02/1989
From:	DONLON W J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17055E559	List: ML17055E558 ML18038A452
References
NMP1L-0368, NMP1L-368, NUDOCS 8903150169
Download: ML18038A452 (71)

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gccE~IVTEDD1S1BUT1ONDEMONSTR0%Y'FTEMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:8903150169DOC-DATE:89/03/02NOTARIZED:NODOCKETFACIL:50-220NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe05000220AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONDONLON,W.J.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.~plRECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)RSUBUECT:Forwardsresponsestoquestionsrerestartactionplan(RAP)&nuclearimprovementplanalongw/RAFreplacementpages.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE26DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLgSIZE:@5TITLE:StartupReport/RefuelingReport(perTehSpecs)SNOTESRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-1LASLOSSON,MINTERNAL:ACRST%TONREGFILE022DRSSEPRPBEXTERNAL:LPDRNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL1022551111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-1PDARMTECHADVNUDOCS-ABSTRACTRGN1FILE01NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111118INOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIEtGS'LEASEHELPUS'IOREDUCEHASTE!CGWZACr'IHEDOCX3MWZCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)KOZZiDGZWVE~NMEFREDDISTRIK1TIGNLISTSPORDOCtIMENIS%3VDON'TNEZD!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR18ENCL17

Ilgli, NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONNIAGARAMOHAWKSOOERIEBOULEVARDWESTSYRACIISLN.Y.I2202WILUAMJ.DONLONCHHRMANANDCHIEFEXECUTIVEOFFICERUnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttention:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555March2,1989NMPlL0368Re:NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-220DPR-63Gentlemen:EnclosedareNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation'sresponsestoNuclearRegulatoryCommissionquestionsrelatingtoNiagaraMohawk'sRestartActionPlan(RAP)andNuclearImprovementProgram(NIP).ThesequestionswerecontainedinAttachments1and2ofInspectionReport50-220/89-10whichwastransmittedbyMr.WilliamF.Kane'sletterdatedFebruary3,1989.AnumberofthesequestionswerediscussedandfurtherclarificationoftheRestartActionPlanandNuclearImprovementProgramwasprovidedduringthemeetingh'eldonJanuary26,1989.AlsoenclosedarereplacementpagesfortheRestartActionPlanwhichinvolve:1)changesandclarificationsinresponsetoUSNRCquestionsandconcernstransmittedbyMr.Kane'sFebruary3,1989letter,2)changesandclarificationsbasedondiscussionswiththeUSNRCRestartPanelmembersdurinatheirreviewoftheRestartActionPlantheweekofJanuary23,1989,and3JotherchangesandclarificationsmadebyNiagaraMohawktoupdatetheRestartActionPlan.ThesereplacementpagesbearthenotationREV1atthetoprightcornerofeachpageandaverticallineintheleftmargintoassisttheNRCinidentifyingthechanges.TheRestartActionPlanupdates(pagechanges)willbeprovidedtotheNRCasacontrol.leddocumentuntilrestartauthorizationisgrantedbytheNRC.ThePlanwillnotbeupdatedwithanynewspecificissueunlessitaddressesanewunderlyingrootcause.AnupdatingprocesssimilartothatdescribedfortheRestartActionPlanwillbefollowedfortheNuclearImprovementProgramwhichwillcontinuetobeavailableforyourreviewattheSite.WearegratifiedbytheNRC'spromptreviewoftheRestartActionPlan,theRestartPanel'sgeneralagreementwithNiagaraMohawk'sUnderlyingRootCausesanditsrecognitionoftheleadershipchangesimplementedasaresultofourongoingassessmentofmanagementeffectivenessoftheNuclearDivision.Aswediscussedwithyou,werecognizeandareundertakingtheremainingtasksthatrequirecompletionbeforeUnit1isreadyforrestart.Inthemeantime,shouldyourequireanyadditionalclarificationofouranswerstoyourquestions,pleasedonothesitatetocontactus.Verytryours,8903i5016~>';"),90302PDRAOOCK<>5050..0IO'-DIWilliamJDonlonChairmanandChiefExecutiveOfficer p

Page2xc:RegionalAdministrator,RegionIMr.W.Kane,Director,DivisionofReactorProjects(DRP),RegionIMr.W.Johnston,DeputyDirector,DRSMr.R.Bores,TechnicalAssistant,DivisionofRadiationSafetyandSafeguardsMr.R.Capra,Director,ProjectDirectorI-l,NRRMr.E.Wenzinger,Chief,Branch2,DRPMr.J.Johnson,Chief,ProjectsSection2C,DRPMs.M.M.Slosson,ProjectManager,NRRMr.W.A.Cook,SeniorResidentInspector,NineMilePointUnits1and2RecordsManagement NRCConcernsandQuestionsontheNineMilePointUnit1RestartActionPlanandNiaaraMohawk'sResonsesGENERALThePanelhaddifficultyinunderstandingthelogicusedtodeterminetheunderlyingrootcausesoutlinedinTable1,PageB-3oftheRAP.Inparticular,thecorrelationbetweenalloftheSavannahRiver(SR)CausalTreesusedandthefinalunderlyingrootcausesofManagementandOrganizationalEffectivenessoutlinedinFigure1,PageB-4oftheRAPisconfusing.ItisnotclearhowthetransitionwasmadefromuseoftheSavannahRiverCausalTreestotheNMPCManagementandOrganizationalEffectivenessCauseTree.Forexample,whythequalityassurancesectionwasdeleted,andwhatwasdonewiththe25%oftherootcausesnotattributedtomanagementandsupervision(Pg.B-1)arenotclear.Pleaseexplain.RESPONSE:Theinitialassessmentofvariousdeficiencies,includingtheSpecificIssues,fortheircommoncausesofconcerns/problemsinvolvedusingtheSavannahRiverReactorIncidentRootCauseCodingTreecontainingsevenbranches,Dl-D7(SeeFigurel-l).TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenclarifiedtoshowthisspecificinformation.Approximately75./ofthecauseswereattributedtotheManagementSystemsD5branchandtheImmediateSupervisionD6branch.Theremaining25KofthecauseswereattributedtoProcedures,Communication,HumanFactors,andTraining(Dl-04).TheQCbranch07wasnotdeterminedtobethe'causefor,anyoftheidentifieddeficiencies.Basedonthedistributionofcausesidentified,theRestartTaskForcedeterminedtheneedtomodifytheSavannahRiverReactorIncidentRootCauseCodingTreetoexpandupontheManagementSystemsbranch.Thiswasnecessarytoreflectmorespecificcausesinvolvingmanagementandorganizationaleffectivenessofthenormalday-to-dayrunningofthebusiness.ThisresultedintheexpansionoftheCodingTreetoincludeabranchentitledManagementandOrganizationalEffectiveness.ThisbranchincludesthebroaderprogrammaticelementsoftheotherbranchesoftheSavannahRiverReactorIncidentRootCauseCodingTreerelatednotonlytoD5&06,buttotheremaining25'/ofthecausesrelatedtoDl,D2,D3,andD4.Atthesametime,theQCbranch(D7)wasdeletedbecauseitwasconsideredtobeapartoftheoverallManagementandOrganizationalEffectivenessCodingTree.Forexample,E15onAssessmentsandAuditsandE16onProblemIdentificationandResolutionaretwokeyfunctionsthatdirectlyinvolveQA/QC.6754Gg031501 Insummary,therootcausesoftheunderlyingissueswereselectedfromtheNiagaraMohawkRootCauseCodingTreewhichwasdevelopedusinganiterativeprocessduringtheinitialassessmentoftheissuesimpactingperformance.AllcausesidentifiedfortheunderlyingissuesfallundertheManagementandOrganizationalEffectivenessbranchandtheresultingcorrectiveactionsaddressthoserootcauses.These.causesandcorrectiveactionswerethengroupedintothefiveUnderlyingRootCausecategories.TheRestartActionPlanAppendixBhasbeenrevisedtoreflectthisclarification.2.ThelicenseeindicatedthattheSavannahRiverrootcausetreesystemwasusedtoanalyzetheSpecificIssues;however;intheSpecificIssueAnalysissectionof-thePlan,thereisnoreferencetotheSavannahRiverrootcausecoding.Pleaseclarify.RESPONSE:TherootcausedevelopmentprocessfortheSpecificIssuesisdiscussedonPageI-4oftheRestartActionPlan.TherootcausesweredevelopedbyknowledgeablelinemanagersusingavarietyofmethodologiesincludingNiagaraMohawk'sRootCauseEvaluationPrograms,,Kepner-Tregoe(K-T)ProblemAnalysis,SavannahRiverReactorIncidentRoot.CauseCodingTree,andINPOHumanPerformanceEvaluationSystem(HPES)dependingonthe,typeofissueunderconsideration.AconsensusonrootcauseswasthenreachedthroughdiscussionswiththeIntegratedTeam.TheTeam'sconclusionswerethenreviewedbySeniorManagement.DuringtheRestartTaskForcereviewoftherootcausesforeachSpecificIssue,theNiagaraMohawkRootCauseCodingTreewasusedasaguidetoassuresystematiccoverageoftheissue.Astherootcauseswereidentified,theywerecharacterizedintermsrelatingtotheSpecificIssuetoachieveclarityandfocustosupportthedevelopmentofeffectivecorrectiveactions.TheRestartActionPlanPartI,Section3,SpecificIssueshasbeenrevisedtoindicatethemethodsusedtoanalyzeissues.3.TheNRCdidnotunderstandhowthelicenseeaddressedthreespecificareas:1)adequacyofmanagementandleadershipskills,2)adequacyofindependentassessmentsandqualityassurance,and3)adequacyoftrainingpersonnelintheidentificationandresolutionprocess.PleaseexplainhowthesefundamentaltopicsarerelatedtotheNMPCidentified"underlyingrootcauses".Updatetheplantoreflecttheresponse.RESPONSE:ThethreeareaslistedarerelatedtotheUnderlyingRootCauses,asfollows:l.AdequacyofmanagementandleadershipskillsrelatestoallfiveoftheUnderlyingRootCauses.ThecorrectiveactionsassociatedwiththeUnderlyingRootCauseswillprovidein-linetrainingwhichwill6754G 2.3.improvemanagementandleadershipskills.Spbcifically,NiagaraMohawkwillbeaddressingthefollowingskillsthroughin-linetraining:planning,goalsetting,establishingstandardsofperformance,performingself-assessments,identifyingandresolvingproblemsinatimelymanner,communicating,chordinat1ng,delegating,andfosteringcooperation.AnexampleofthisisCorrectiveAction1.1.1,thedevelopmentoftheNuclearDivisionvisionandgoals,inwhichmanagerswillimprovetheirskillsinestablishinggoals.OtherexamplesincludeCorrectiveActions1.1.2,1.1.3,1.3.1,2.1.10,3.1.1,3.1.2,3.1.3,4.1.1,4.2.1,5.1.1,5.1.2,and5.1.3,.AdequacyofindependentassessmentsandqualityassurancearerelatedtoUnderlyingRootCause4whichstates,inpart,that"self-assessmentshavenotbeenconsistentoreffective."Theterm"self-assessments"includesthoseindependentassessmentsperformedbyNiagaraMohawk'sQualityAssuranceDepartment.RestartCorrectiveAction4.2.1specificallyaddressesthecomprehensiveself-assessmentprogramtobecarriedouttodetermineoverallreadinessforrestart.AlsorelatedisUnderlyingRootCause2,inthattheprocessthatNiagaraMohawkisimplementingforproblemsolvingincludesassessingtheresultsinaccordancewithCorrectiveActionObjective2.1.ItisalsoimportanttorecognizethatimprovementsinQualityAssuranceareanintegralpartofthemanagementeffectivenesscorrectiveactions.'heQualityAssuranceDepartmentactivelyparticipatedinthedevelopmentoftheRestartActionPlanincludingdefiningunderlyingrootcauses.ManyofthecorrectiveactionsapplytoQualityAssurancepersonnelaswellaspersonnelinotherdepartments(e.g.,CorrectiveActions2.1.1,2.1.4,2.1.8,2.1.9,3.1.3,4.2.1,5.1.1,5.1.2).Also,ourreviewofpriorissueshasidentifiedmanyelementsoftheunderlyingrootcauses,inthepast,andmanagementhasnotbeeneffectiveinaddressingtheseissuesinatimelyway.CorrectiveactionsforUnderlyingRootCause2areintendedtoaddressthisproblem.Insummary,correctiveactionsidentifiedintheRestartActionPlanandtheNuclearImprovementProgramaredesignedtoimprovetheeffectivenessofQualityAssuranceandotherindependentreviewersinidentifyingproblemsaswellasenhancingoverallmanagementeffectivenessinresolvingidentifiedconcernsinatimelyway.AdequacyoftrainingpersonnelintheidentificationandresolutionprocessisrelatedtoUnderlyingRootCause2whichstates,inpart,that:"therewas.notanintegratedorconsistentprocessusedtoidentify,analyze,correct,andassessproblemsinatimelyway."Asthecorrectiveactionsareimplementedinresponsetothiscorrectiveactionobjectiveandtheprocessesusedforrecognizingandresolvingproblemsareimproved,trainingwilloccur.Asproceduresareissuedorrevised,formaltrainingoccursaspartofthenormalNiagaraMohawkproceduredevelopmentandimplementationprocessand.therefore,trainingisnotaddressedasaspecificcorrectiveactionoftheRestartActionPlan.6754G Inadditiontotherestartcorrectiveactionsandlong-termstrategiesassociatedwithUnderlyingRootCause2,correctiveactionsassociatedwiththeSpecificIssuesprovidetrainingintheidentificationandresolutionprocess.AnexampleofthisisSpecificIssue4,InserviceInspection,CorrectiveAction4.A.4.EventhoughthiscorrectiveactionaddressesSpecificIssue4,ithasbroaderimplicationsinthatitrequirestheretrainingofpersonneltorevisedproceduresrelatedtooccurrencereportingthatisnotlimitedmerelytoinserviceinspections.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenupdatedinPartI,Section2,UnderlyingRootCausestoreflecthowthesethreeareaswereaddressed.4.Itisnotclearhowtheunderlyingrootcausesareappliedtotheindependentoversightfunctionsinadditiontothelinemanagement.InlightoftheshortcomingsthatexistedintheapparentrolethattheQualityAssurance(QA)Departmenthadinassuringthatpreviousissueswereidentifiedandresolved,thelicenseeneedstoexplainmorefullytheorganizationalandreportingrelationshiptotheExecutiveVicePresidentfornuclearmatters.WhatspecificcausesandcorrectiveactionshavebeenidentifiedtoassurethatQAcanbeaneffectivemanagementtoolfortheExecutiveVicePresident?RESPONSE:TheNineMilePointUnitlRestartActionPlanissues,causes,andcorrectiveactionsapplytotheQualityAssuranceDepartmentandothersupportdepartmentsaswellasnucleardepartments.Forexample,improvedidentificationofproblemsandmoreaggressivecorrectiveactionmonitoringarejusttwooftheitemsbeingactivelyaddressedbytheQualityAssuranceDepartmentasitstrengthensitseffectiveness.RegardingtheQualityAssuranceDepartmentorganizationalandreportingrelationshiptotheExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperationsfornuclearmatters,NiagaraMohawkhasmodifiedtheorganizationtostrengthenthisrelationshipbyhavingtheVicePresident-QualityAssurancereportadministrativelyandfunctionallytotheExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperationsforallnuclearmatters.TheVicePresident-QualityAssuranceretainsdirectaccesstothePresidentandtheChairmanandChiefExecutiveOfficeronanynuclearqualityassurancematters.SeveralactionsassurethatQualityAssurancecanbeaneffectivemanagementtoolfortheExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperations.TheseincludeperformingassignedverificationactionsplusapplicablecorrectiveactionscontainedinRestartActionPlanTablesUlthruU5.activeparticipationinNuclearDivisionstaffand.othermeetingsatalllevels,andreportingonqualityassurancerelatedmattersincludingsignificantfindings,recommendations,trends,andoverdueactionstovariousNuclearDivisionmanagersincludingtheExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperations.6754G 5.6.TheRestartActionPlan(RAP)doesnotadequatelyaddressthelastsentenceofitem2inCALSS-17."Foractionsproposedforcompletionafterrestart,youwillprovidejustificationforwhycompletionafterrestartwillnothaveanadverseimpactonsafeplantoperation."Thecriteriaorprocessthelicenseeusedtodeterminewhichitemscouldaffectsafeoperations(andthereforeshouldbecompletedpriortorestart)wasnotsufficientfortheNRCtounderstandandthereforejudgeacceptability.Pleaseprovideanexplanationofthecriteriaormethodsusedtodeterminepotentialimpactonsafeplantoperation.ThePlandoesnotaddressascheduleforcompletionofitemsafterstartupascommittedtoinitem2oftheCAL.Adequatejustificationwasnotdocumentedfordeferraltopostrestartorlongterm,strategies.PleaseprovidethedeferralJustificationinarevisiontotheRAPandprovideascheduleforimplementationofthoselongtermstrategiesthataddresstheunderlyingrootcausesofmanagementineffectiveness.RESPONSETOUESTIONS5AND6:Eachcorrectiveactionwasevaluatedtodetermineitssignificancetosafeplantoperationoritsnecessitytodemonstratesufficientprogressonresolutionoftheissuesthatwillnotbefullyresolvedbeforerestart.Theprioritizationofcorrectiveactionscanbecharacterizedasfollows:Priority1-Thosecorrectiveactionsconsiderednecessarytosupportsafeoperationoftheplant,todemonstratesufficientprogressinweakperformanceareas,ortocorrectsignificantdeficiencies.Priority2-Correctiveactionswhichidentifyadditionalimprovementstoareaswhicharefunctionallysatisfactorynoworwhichwhencompletedachievethedesiredculturalenvironment.Priority3-Correctiveactionsinvolvinglonger-termenhancementstoprograms/processeswhichareconsideredcurrentlysatisfactory.NOTE:IntheNuclearImprovementProgram"priority"hasbeenchangedto"category."Although"priority"hasnotbeenchangedintheRestartActionPlantoavoidconfusion,itshouldbenotedthat"priority"isusedtocategorizethecompletionofactionsinadditiontoidentifyingtheirrelativeimportancetorestart.Priority1actionsmustbecompletedbeforerestart.Priority2and3actionswillbecompletedafterrestarteventhoughsomemaybestartedpriortorestart.CorrectiveactionsrequiringcompletionbeforerestartwereclassifiedasPriority1.CompletionofPriority2and3correctiveactionswillestablishlevelsofperformancebeyondthatnecessarytosupportsafeoperationandis,therefore,notrequiredbeforerestart.6754G Wheresignificantdeficiencieswere'identified,Priority1correctiveactionsweredevelopedtoaddressthem.Themethodsusedtodeterminepotentialimpactonplantoperationtypicallyincludedconsiderationofthefollowing:A.Whethertheactionisneededtoresolveknownhardwareorprogrammaticdeficienciestoensureequipment/systemoperability.B.Anassessmentofseveral"whatif"scenarios,e.g.,whatifwestartedupandmissedaTechnicalSpecificationrequiredsurveillance.(ThisresultedinCorrectiveAction1.2.3beingclassifiedaPriority1.)C.Therelative.impactonemployeeeffectivenessandattitudes.D.Whetherthecorrectiveactioncontributessignificantlytoourabilitytoidentify,avoid,orresolveproblems.E.Whetherothercorrectiveactions,ifimplemented,accomplishsimilarresults.F.Whetherthecorrectiveactioncontributestoidentifyingand/ordescribingthedesiredculturalenvironment.Theprocessusedtoassesstheimpactofcorrectiveactionsonsafeplantoperationconsistedofareviewofcorrectiveactionsbyseverallevelsoftheorganizationrepresentingacross-sectionoftheNuc'learDivisionanditssupportorganizations.Typically,reviewsweredonebytheassig'nedTaskManager(forSpecificIssues),theRestartTaskForce,theIntegratedTeam,andSeniorManagement.Asaninitialstepinthepriorityprocess,theIntegratedTeamreviewedeachcorrectiveactionlistedforeachunderlyingissueandassignedeachcorrectiveactionapriority.TheIntegratedTeamreviewedeachcorrectiveactionanditsassociatedpriorityagainafteritwasredistributedunderitsrespectiveCorrectiveActionObjective.ThisresultedinsomechangesinprioritiesaseachcorrectiveactionwasconsideredinthecontextofthegroupofcorrectiveactionstobecarriedouttosatisfyitsCorrectiveActionObjective.SeniorManagementreviewedtherecommendedpriorityforeachcorrectiveaction,consideringthecorrectiveactionbothindividuallyandinthecontextofagroupofcorrectiveactionsundereachCorrectiveActionObjective,todetermineifthecorrectiveactionscollectivelywouldbesufficienttosatisfytheCorrectiveActionObjective.SeniorManagementalsoassessediftheintendedcompletionofeachcorrectiveactioneitherbeforeorafterrestartwasconsideredreasonablebasedonthemethodsusedtoprioritizethem.6754G 7.Duringthesereviews,eachparticipantwasgiventheopportunitytoexpresshis/herposition.Themeritsofthesepositionswerescrutinized,debated,andagreedupon.Duringthisprocesssomecorrectiveactionshadtheirprioritychanged.Severalwerechangedfroma2toa1,somePriority2and3correctiveactionsweresubdivided,andtheresultingelementsweredesignatedasPriority1correctiveactions.Othercorrectiveactionswereloweredinprioritybasedoninformationpresentedanddiscussedingroupmeetings.Thereviewswereiterativeandparticipativeinthateachreviewingbodycommunicatedextensivelywiththeothers,i.e.,feedbackwasestablishedandmaintained.Thecollectivejudgmentoftheparticipantsprovidedthebasisfordecidingonthepriorityofeachcorrectiveaction.Additionally,employeefeedbackwasreviewedtoensuregeneralconsensuswiththedirectionandtheprioritiesoftheimprovementprogram.Thisresultedinsomeadditionalchangesinsomecorrectiveactionsandsomeoftheprioritiesassignedtocertaincorrectiveactions.IPriority1itemsarescheduledforcompletionpriortorestart.Priority2itemsareprojectedtobecompletedwithinapproximatelyoneyearfollowingrestart.Priority3itemsareintendedtobecompletedwithinafiveyeartimeframeafterstartup.SincetheNuclearImprovementProgramisconsidereda"living"process,periodicreview,evaluationandadjustmentmayaffectthelonger-termcompletiondatescurrentlyenvisioned.Theprocessusedforprioritizingcorrectiveactionswascompleteandcomprehensiveandprovidesconfidencethatthepriorityassignmentsareappropriate.Usingtheprocess,NiagaraMohawkhasidentifiedPriority1correctiveactionsthat,whenconsideredinconjunctionwithotherday-to-dayandprogrammaticactivities,wi11establishtheconditionsnecessaryandsufficienttosafelyoperatetheplant.TheExecutiveSummaryoftheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtoclarifythecriteriausedtoclassifyitemsasPriority1,2,or3.AnewAppendixChasbeenincludedintheRestartActionPlantoaddresstheprocessforprioritizingcorrectiveactions.(NOTE:ThisresponseappliestoQuestion1ontheNuclearImprovementProgram.)InmultipleexamplesidentifiedbytheRestartPanel,thedesignatedverificationaction(s)werenotconsideredadequatetoprovideforacomprehensiveassessmentofthesatisfactorycompletionofthecorrespondingcorrectiveaction.ItappearedtothePanelthatthisintegralstepoftherestartprocesswarrantsfurtherdevelopmentbythelicensee.PleaserevisetheRAPtoreflectanimprovedexplanationoftheverificationactivitieslistedonPageII-1oftheRAP.6754G RIKKIEE:TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtomoreclearlyreflecttheintendedtwo-stepprocessthatwillbeemployedtoassurethatcorrect1veactionsarecompletedandverified.Follow1ngcompletionofthecorrectiveaction,areviewbytheresponsiblemanagerisconducted.Followingthisreview,theresponsiblemanagersignsoffontheIssuesandCorrectiveActionClosureForm,signifyinghis/hercertif1cationofthesatisfactorycompletionofthecorrectiveaction.Thesecondstepintheassessmentprocessistheperformanceoftheverificationactions,asdescribedintheRestartActionPlan.The1ndividualcompletingtheverificationaction(s)signsofftheVerificationActionClosureForm,signify1ngcompletionoftheverif1cationaction(s).Hehaveclarifiedtheverif1cationact1onslistedonPageII-loftheRestartActionPlantoprov1deanimprovedexplanationofthever1ficationactivit1esthatwillbeperformed.Inaddition,wehaverev1ewedTablesUlthroughU5,andhavespecif1edadditionalver1ficationact1onsforcertaincorrectiveactions.Thecomposite11stofverificationactionsalsoprovidesthebasisfromwhichthecomprehensiveself-assessmentprogram(seeCorrectiveAction4.2.1)1sdeveloped.Thatis,wh1letheself-assessmentprogramdevelopedinCorrectiveAction4.2.lcontainstheentiresetofactionslistedonPageII-1oftheRestartActionPlan,theverificationofCorrect1veAction4.2.1requ1resonlytheperformanceofVer1ficationAct1ons2and6.TheExecutiveSummary,PartISection4,PageII-1andTablesUlthroughU5oftheRestartActionPlanhavebeenrev1sed.8.Whatdocument(s)assignaccountabilityandresponsibilityforcorrectiveactionsandverificationactions?AddtothePlanthosepersons(bytitle)whoareresponsibleforthecorrectiveandverificationactions.Explainhowthecorrectiveactionswillbeverifiedbyboththelineandindependentorganizations.KWSHK:Temporar'yAdmin1strativeControlProceduresNl-88-6.0,N1-88-7.0(currentlydraft),andNl-88-8.0(currentlydraft)1dent1fytherespons1ble1ndividualsororganizationsforeachcorrect1veact1onandver1f1cat1onaction.Inaddition,each1ssuehasanassociatedschedulewhichdetailsthecorrectiveactionsandverificationactions,ident1fiesresponsibilitiesforcorrect1veactionsandver1ficationact1ons,andestablishesschedules.Sincetheseproceduresarereferredto1ntheRestartActionPlanunderSpecificIssuel,alistofthosepersons(bytitle)whoare-respons1bleforthecorrectiveandverificationact1onshasnotbeenincludedinthisresponseandthePlan.Theproceduresareavailable6754G forNRCstaffreviewonsite..Wehaver'evisedtheRestartActionPlan,however,toidentifymoreclearlyhowaccountabilityandresponsibilityisassignedforcorrectiveandverificationactions.Theverificationactionsareexplainedinresponsetoguestion27.TheRestartActionPlanPartI,Section4hasbeenrevised.9.TheRestartActionPlanneedstobeupdatedtoaddress(NRC)questionsandconcerns.Updates(pagechanges)shouldbeprovideduntilplantrestartisauthorized.NMPCneednotupdatethePlanwithanynew~secificissueunlessitaddressesanewunderlyingrootcause.RESPONSE:TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenupdatedtoaddressNRCquestionsandconcerns.Updates(pagechanges)willbeprovidedtotheNRCasacontrolleddocumentuntilrestartauthorizationisgrantedbytheNRC~ThePlanwillnotbeupdatedwithanynewspecificissueunlessitaddressesanewunderlyingrootcause.Updates(pagechanges)willbecontrolledbyappropriateidentificationof,revisions,review,andapprovals.Therevisedpageswillbeidentifiedatthetop,right-handcornerbyrevisionnumber,andaverticallineintheleftmarginwillindicatethelocationofthechange.TheIntroductionoftheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.EXECUTIVE'SUMMARY10.lnthediscussionofreviewofpastinitiatives"Shortcomings"inpreviousactionplansandtheself-assessmentprocessarerecognizedbyNiagaraMohawk.ExplainwhytheseshortcomingstookplaceandwhytheywillnotappearinimplementingthisPlan.RESPONSE:Theseshortcomingsinpastinitiativesresultedfromdeficienciesinmanagementandorganizationaleffectivenessasevidencedbytheabsenceofbuy-inbylinemanagement;resourcesappliedtoNineMilePointUnit2,atthattime,attheexpenseofNineMilePointUnit1activities;toonarrowafocusinidentifyingrootcausesandcorrectiveactions;andtooshortanevaluationtime.TheshortcomingswillnotappearinimplementingthisPlanbecausecurrentimprovementstomanagementandorganizationaleffectivenessinvolveamorecomprehensivereviewofissues;aretrospectivelook;focusonmanagementissues;aformalrootcauseanalysis;expandedinvolvementbyseniormanagement;andbuy-inbyresponsibleorganizationstoassuretimelyandeffectiveimplementation.TheExecutiveSummaryoftheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.6754G 11'hesummaryof5underlyingr9otcausesissilentregardingwhatappearstohavebeensignifi'c8ntweaknessesin:1)managementandleadershipskills;2)effectivenessofindependentassessment;and3)whytheplandoesn'taddresswhatappearstohavebeenasignificantknowledge,training,orsensitivityweaknesswithregardstotimelyresolutionofidentifieddeficiencies?ThisquestionpertainstogroupssuchasEngineering,QualityAssurance,andUnit2personnel.RESPONSE:ThethreeareaslistedarerelatedtooneormoreoftheUnderlyingRootCauses,asfollows:l.AdequacyofmanagementandleadershipskillsisrelatedtoallfiveoftheUnderlyingRootCauses.ThecorrectiveactionsassociatedwitheachUnderlyingRootCausewillprovidein-linetraining.whichwillimprovemanagementandleadershipskills.Specifically,NiagaraMohawkwillbeaddressingthefollowingskillsthroughthein-linetrainingassociatedwithimplementingthecorrectiveactions:planning,goalsetting,establishingstandardsofperformance,performingself-assessments,identifyingandresolvingproblemsinatimelymanner,communicating,coordinating,andfosteringcooperation.AnexampleofthisisCorrectiveAction1.1.1,thedevelopmentoftheNuclearDivisionvisionandgoals,inwhichmanagerswillimprovetheirskillsinestablishinggoals.2.EffectivenessofindependentassessmentsisrelatedtoUnderlyingRootCause4whichstates,.inpart,that"self-assessmentshavenotbeenconsistentoreffective."Theterm"self-assessments"includesthoseindependentassessmentsperformedbyNiagaraMohawk'sQualityAssuranceDepartment.AlsorelatedisUnderlyingRootCause2,inthattheprocessthatNiagaraMohawkisimplementingforproblemsolvingincludesassessingtheresultsoftheactionstakenagainsttheresultsexpected.3.Relativetoitem3,thePlanaddressestheunderlyingrootcausesofthisissue.Specifically,UnderlyingRootCause5,lackofeffectiveteamwork,contributedtothetimerequiredtoresolvedeficiencies;UnderlyingRootCause3,anorganizationalculturethatdivertsattentionawayfromtheneedsandeffectiveuseofemployees,contributedtoestablishingaclimateinwhichtheconcernsoftheemployeeswerenotlistenedto;andUnderlyingRootCause2,nothavinganintegratedandconsistentprocessforresolvingdeficiencies,contributedtothetimerequiredtoresolvedeficiencies.ThecorrectiveactionsassociatedwiththeseUnderlyingRootCausesapplytotheNuclearDivisionanditssup'portingorganizations.12.RootCauseNo.5involveslackofcoordinationandcommunicationincarryingoutresponsibilities.Whydidthistakeplace?Isitcontinuing?6754G

'ESPONSE:Lackofcoordinationandcommunicationtookplacebecauseoflackofeffectiveteamworkaspartoftheoverallmanagementandorganizationaleffectivenesscategoryofcauses.TheRestartActionPlanandtheNuclearImprovementProgramprovideforassimilatingpropermanagementofcooperationandcommunicationintotheorganization'sstandardmanagementpractices.Thiswillbeoneoftheconsequencesofcompleting,verifying,assessingtheresults,andmonitoringtheimplementationofthecorrectiveactionsforthefiveUnderlyingRootCauses,particularlythoseassociatedwithUnderlyingRootCause5,lackofeffectiveteamwork.$3.Improvementofcooperationandcommunicationis.anon-goingprocessthatwillcontinueastheRestartActionPlanandNuclearImprovementProgramcorrectiveactionsareimplemented.Thelastparagraphonpage3andconclusiononPageI-7indicatesthatalloftheissuesfallintotheManagementandOrganizationalEffectivenesscategoryandhave,therefore,hadacorrespondingdetrimentaleffectonmoraleandattitude.Inlightofthiswhatactionisbeingtakentocorrectandverifycorrectionofthe".....detrimentaleffectonmoraleandattitude....",andwhyshouldnotitbecompletebeforerestart?RESPONSE:Moraleandattitudeareindicatorsofthequalityofleadership,mutualrespect,workingrelationships,andachievementinanorganization.As.weaddressthefiveUnderlyingRootCauses(whichareessentiallyleadershipandmanagementeffectivenessissues),moraleandattitudewillimproveatalllevelsoftheworkforce.ThefollowingRestartActionPlancorrectiveactionswiththeirassociatedverificationactionsillustratethetypesofactionsbeingtakenpriortorestarttocorrectcauseswhichaffectedmoraleandattitude:2.1.12.1.83.1.35,1.15.1.25.1.3-Problemsidentified,evaluated,andcorrected-Personnelinterviewedtodetermineproblemsinvolvingprocess-RestartActionPlancommunicatedtoemployeeswithfeedbackontheirconcerns-Managementmeetingsconvenedtopromoteteamwork-TownHallmeetingsconvenedtoshareinformationandgatherfeedback-NuclearDivisionvisionandgoalsfor1989communicatedtoemployees.Theabove-mentionedcorrectiveactionswillbecompletedbeforerestart.Itisrecognizedthatactionsrelatedtomoraleandattitudeinvolveculturalchange.(SeeresponsetoQuestion14regardingculturalchangerelatedmatters.)Inaddition,CorrectiveAction3.2.1hasbeenaddedtotheRestartActionPlanstating:"ProvideorganizationaldevelopmentprofessionalstoworkwiththeExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperationsandhisdirectreportstofacilitatein-linetrainingwithintheirrespectiveorganizations."6754G Theorganizationaldevelopmentprofessionalsprovideindividualcoach1ngtomanagement,facil1tatemanagementstaffmeetingsatwhichgoodmanagementpracticesarediscussed,offerinformaltra1ningsessionsonspecificsk1lls,andreinforcedemonstratedgoodmanagementpract1ces.Othermethodusedbytheseprofessionalstoimprovemoraleandattitude1ncludeholdingmeet1ngsbetweenworkgroupstoidentifywaystoimproveworkingrelationshipsandprogrammanagement,andpromotingmanagementmodelingbyobservingandlearningfromrecogn1zedexcellentmanagers.Theprocessthathasbeenin1t1atedisintendedtobeaniterativeprocess,constantlypushingforimprovementtobringabouttheintendedculturalchange.Itcanbeexpectedthattheprocesswillcontinuouslyidentifyinterfacerelationshipswhichwillrequirecorrectiveandpreventiveattent1onastheNuclearDivisionevolvesanddealswithinevitableexternalandinternalchanges.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.14.Theplandiscussesonpage4theneedfora"culturalchange",butimpliesthiseffortwillbeaddressedonlyintheNuclearImprovementProgram.Whateffortstoinitiatea"culturalchange"willbepursued/completedbeforerestart'PWhatisthejustificationforthoseeffortsthatwillnotbecompleteduntilafterrestart?RESEQHK:TheefforttochangethecultureoftheNuclearDivisionhasalreadybegun.Specif1cally,theidentificationofthefiveUnderlyingRootCausesandthdevelopmentofcorrect1veact1onsandtheirrespectiveCorrect1veActionOb)ectivesandtheimplementationofPr1orityIcorrect1veactionsensurethatthepresentNuclearDivisionculture1salreadyintheprocessofbeingchanged.Thisculturalchangeeffortisaugmentedbythefollowingrestartcorrectiveactionsthathavebeenestablished.Identificationandcommunicat1onofproblemshavebeenactivelyencouragedbyalllevelsofmanagement.Anintegratedrestartplanandschedulehavebeendeveloped,exemplify1ngteamwork,cooperation,andpart1c1pat1onbyallaffectedparties.Anintens1veeffortisbeingmadetoprovidemanagementresponsestoconcernsra1sedbyemployees.NiagaraMohawkhasinit1atedadditionaleffortstohelpemployeesunderstandeachofinterrelatedchangesintheNuclearDivision'sorganizationalcontext:AnintegratedsetofVision,Mission,Ob]ectives,andGoalsfortheNuclearDivisionthatw111provideaclearstatementofd1rectiontowh1challNuclearDivisionemployeesareexpectedtocontributeandsupport.ThisisanoutcomeofCorrectiveActions1.1.1,1.1,2,and5.1.3.6754G StandardsofPerformance,validatedbyconsensus,thatwillguidethewayinwhichNuclearDivisionemployeesatalllevelsdecidetoperformtheirrespectiveresponsibilities.ThisisanoutcomeofCorrectiveAction4.1.1.AnexplicitstatementoftheExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperation'sphilosophyandpoliciesonmanagementinwhichheclearlydescribeshisexpectationsofallNuclearDivisionsupervisoryandmanagerialpersonnel.ThisisaderivativeoutcomeofthecompletionofCorrectiveAction5.1.2.NiagaraMohawkmaintainsthat,bycompletingthecorrectiveactionscommittedtobedonebeforerestart,itconsiderstheseactionscollectivelyrepresentappropriateculturalimprovements,sufficienttosupportsafeplantoperation.Thus,theculturechangeefforthasalreadystarted.Therateofchangeis,bydefinition,limitedbytheextenttowhichelementsoftheNuclearDivisionculturearedeeplyembeddedinthefabricoftheorganization.Nevertheless,theprocess(describedabove)ofmakingappropriatechangesintheseculturalelementsisproceeding.Butitisunlikelytoeverbecompleted-beforeorafterrestart-sincetheNuclearDivisionculture,likeallcorporatecultures,mustcontinuouslyevolvetomatchtheinevitablechangesinthecompany'sinternalandexternalenvironments.TheRestartReviewPanelischarteredtoreviewandevaluatetheeffectivenessoftheactionsreferencedabovetoensurethecontinued.movementinthedesireddirectionpriortorestart,andthatsuf'ficientculturalchangehastakenplacetosupportrestartandsafeoperation.TheExecutiveSummaryandPartISection2havebeenrevisedintheRestartActionPlan.15.TheOutageManagerreceivesplansandschedulesfor"eachissue"fromtheresponsiblemanager.WhataretheOutageManager'sdutiesandresponsibilities?Howdoesheensurehetracksallissuesneedingtobetracked?RESPONSE'emporaryAdministrativeControlProceduresN1-88-6.0andN1-88-7.0(currentlydraft),togetherwithmemoJ.L.WillistoDistribution,datedll/15/88,Subject.-OrganizationChangesandResponsibilityReassignmentsdefinetheOutageManager'sdutiesandresponsibilities.ARestartActionPlanCorrectiveActionDatabaseManagementSystemhasbeendevelopedandimplementedtotrackrestartcorrectiveactionsthroughtheclosureandverificationprocess.ProceduresNl-88-6.0andN1-88-7.0controlthetracking,closure,andverificationprocess.OVERVIEWOFPLANDEVELOPMENTANDIMPLEMENTATION16.6754GInseveralplacesplantstaff"asabuy-in"meansandhas.beenachievedUnit2?thePlanalludestoa"previouslackofbuy-inbysignificantpastproblem.Explainwhat"lackofwhyitexisted.HowdoesthisPlanensure"buy-in"throughoutthenuclearorganization,including13-RESPONSE:"Lackofbuy-in"meanslackofownershipduetonotinvolvingpeoplewhoareimpactedbyadecisioninthedecisionmakingprocesssuchthattheyareawareofandsupporttheresultingsetofactions.Itspecificallyreferstoalackofbuy-inofthecorrectiveactionsassociatedwiththeI&Ctechnicianallegations.Thelackofbuy-inexistedpreviouslybecauseoftheapproachusedtodefineandresolvetheissue.Inparticular,ataskforcewasestablishedoutsideofthelineorganization.ThistaskforceperformedananalysisandmaderecommendationstoSeniorManagement.Thecorrectiveactionswerecommittedtowithoutdirectlyinvolvingal.lofthepeopleresponsibleforcarryingouttheactions.ThisPlanensuresbuy-inbyhavingthemanagerwhowillberesponsibleforimplementingtheactionsalsoresponsiblefordoingtherootcauseanalysisandactionplanningwithinputandagreementbyaffectedparties.Buy-inisalsoenhancedbyimplementingCorrectiveActions5.1.1through5.1.5:5.1.1-Conveningmeetingswithseniormanagement,managers,andsupervisors5.1.2-TownHallMeetings5.1.3-Communicatingvisionandgoals5.1.4-EstablishingaRestartTaskForce5.1.5-EstablishinganIntegratedTeamThecorrectiveactionsassociatedwiththeUnderlyingRootCausesapplytobothUnit1andUnit2throughtheNuclearImprovementProgram,andthusthebuy-inprocessdescribedaboveappliestopersonnelfrombothUnits,asappropriate.17.Withrespecttothe3rdbulletonPagel-1,whatinvolvementinidentificationofissues,developmentofrootcausesandcorrectiveactionsisintendedfortheQAorganization'PRESPONSE:TheQualityAssuranceDepartmenthasbeenrepresentedontheRestartTaskForcesinceitsinception.ThisprovidedanopportunityfortheremainderoftheQualityAssuranceorganizationtoinputintothecontentoftheRestartActionPlan.TheQualityAssuranceDepartmentisalsopartofthelineorganizationwithwhichtheRestartTaskForcecoordinatedinthedevelopmentandimplementationoftheelementsofthePlan.AsdiscussedintheresponsestoQuestions3and4,theQualityAssuranceDepartmentisanintegralpartofthecorrectiveactionsrelatedtotheUnderlyingRootCausescontainedintheRestartActionPlan.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.18.ThelistofhistoricaldocumentsusedassourcesofproblemsonpageI-2andI-3islimited.PleaseexplainwhyNMPCfeelsthisisasufficientbodyofinformationtoevaluate.Asanexamplewhyweren'thefollowingused?NMP2LERsandtheSelf-AssessmentReport.6754G RESPONSE:Indevelopingthebodyofinformationtobeevaluated,NiagaraMohawkconsideredinformationfrominternalassessmentsandexternalassessmentsduringtheperiodswhichitfeltwouldprovideextensivedatatoidentifytheunderlyingrootcauses.ThisdatawassufficientinthatitallowedNiagaraMohawktodeterminethepresenceofpatternswhichadditionaldataonlyprovedtocorroborate.Thesepatternsindicatedtheunderlyingrootcausesthatneedtobeaddressedinordertobringaboutthefundamentalimprovementsrequired.tominimizerecurrenceofproblemsandconcerns.Threesourcesofinformationwereassessedforissuesandtrends.Indevelopingoneofthosesources,theRestartTaskForceMatrix,variousdocumentswerereviewed.Inparticular,theNineMilePointUnit2Self-AssessmentReportwasreviewed.RelativetotheNineMilePointUnit2LicenseeEventReports,itwasdecidedthattheinformationfromthemwouldhavebeenincludedinthemostrecentSystematicAssessmentofLicenseePerformanceinformationand,therefore,didnotrequireanadditionalreview.PartISection2oftheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.19.Pagel-2mentionsan"....ongoingprocessforidentifyingandreviewingnewissues....todetermineiftheyinvolveregulatoryconcerns....".HowdoesNMPCtracktheseissuestoresolution?RESPONSE:20.PerRestartActionPlanSpecific'Issue1,OutageManagementOversight,onceanissueisdeterminedtoinvolvea.regulatoryconcern,itisaddedtothecomputerizedtrackinglistoftheRestartActionPlanCorrectiveActionDatabaseManagementSystemunderTemporaryAdministrativeControlProceduresN1-88-6.0,NI-88-7.0(currentlydraft),andN1-88-8.0(currentlydraft).TheOutageManagerisresponsiblefortrackingtheseitems.TemporaryAdministrativeControlProceduresN1-88-6.0,N1-88-7.0,andN1-88-8.0requireeachTaskManagertosubmitanIssuesandCorrectiveActionClosureFormdocumentingcompletionofallcorrectiveactions.TheseproceduresalsorequirethatindividualscompletingverificationactionssubmitaVerificationActionClosureFormdocumentingcompletionofverificationactions.TheseclosureformsarereviewedbytheOutageManagerandaresubjecttoSiteOperationsReviewCommitteeapprovalbeforeanissueisconsideredresolved.Page1-6TowhatdegreeandinwhatmannerhavetheNuclearOversightCommitteeoftheBoardparticipatedinthedevelopmentoftheRestartPlan'?WhatexpertisewillthisCommitteebringtoitsreviewandmonitoringoftherestartprocess?Also,providethequalificationsandreviewfunctionsoftheSafetyReviewandAuditBoard,andtheRestartReviewPanel.67546 TheRestartAct1onPlanwasregularlydiscussedwiththeNuclearOvers1ghtCommitteeoftheBoardpriortoitssubmiss1ontotheNRC.ThemembersofthisCommitteeareallDirectorsoftheCompanyandhavebeenelectedtothesepositionsbecauseoftheirknowledge,sk11lsandexperience.Th1sCommitteehasconsiderablemanagementexperiencewhichitwillbringintotherestartassessmentprocessasdescr1bed1nPartISect1on4oftheRestartActionPlan.Thequa11ficationsforSafetyReviewandAuditBoardmembersare1ncludedintheplant'sTechnicalSpec1f1cations.Thecr1teriafortheselectionofindividualsfortheRestartReviewPanelandtherev1ewfunctionsoftheSafetyReviewandAuditBoardandRestartReviewPanelwillbedescribedintheRestartReadinessAssessmentPlan.21.Page1-5:OnlyaverypreliminaryoutlineoftheSelf-Assessmentprocess(l.e.,ReadinessforRestart),andRestartReviewPanelarepresentedintheRestartActionPlan.WhenandhowdoesNMPCplanonprovidingmoredetailsonthiscriticalportionoftherestartplan'PJKSB26E:ARestartReadinessAssessmentPlanhasbeendrafted.TheRestartRev1ewPanel,whichisexpectedtobe.selectedandholditsinitialmeetinginMarch,willreviewthisplanbeforeitisapprovedbytheExecut1veVicePresident.ItisthenNiagaraMohawk's1ntent1ontomeetwiththeNRCanddescr1betheassessmentprocess1nmoredetail.WhentheRestartReadinessAssessmentPlanisapprovedinternally,wewillprovideacopytotheNRC'.Theimplementationdetailsoftheself-assessmentprocessandtheRestartReviewPanelwillalsobedocumentedintheRead1nessforRestartReport.TheReadinessforRestartReportwillbesubmittedtotheNRCasrequ1redbyConditionthreeofConfirmatoryActionLetter88-17.22.DescribetherelationshipbetweentherootcausesdiscussedinTablesU1throughU5andtherootcausesprovidedforthespecificissues.fKSLQHK:UnderlyingRootCausesarerelatedtospecificbranchesoftheNiagaraMohawkRootCauseCodingTreeinvolv1ngManagementandOrganizat1onalEffectivenessshowninboxesnumberedM2,E16,M4,E15,andM3.ProgrammaticaspectsofthestatedrootcausesoftheSpec1ficIssuesarealsoreflectedasapartofthefiveUnderlyingRootCauses.Therefore,carryingoutcorrectiveactionsrelatedtothefiveUnderlyingRootCauseswillalsoprovideforpreventivemeasurestominimizerecurrence'fs1milarspecificissuesinthefuture.6754G UNDERLYINGROOTCAUSES:23.PageII-1:Elevenverificationactionsarelisted,butonlynumbers1,2,3,5,6and7arereferredtointhefollowingTables.Wherearetheotherverificationactionsapplied?Explainwhymore"handson"verificationactionsarenotplanned.RESPONSE:VerificationActions3,4,9,10,andllarenotusedfortheUnderlyingRootCauses,butareusedwithspecificwordingfortheSpecificIssues.UnderlyingRootCausecorrectiveactionshavebeenreviewed,anduseof"hands-on"verificationactions,includingAction8,hasbeenreflectedintheupdatingoftheRestartActionPlanunderUnderlyingRootCauseTablesUlthroughUS.AlsonoteperresponsetoQuestion7thatRestartCorrectiveAction4.2.1willincludetheentiresetofactionsonPageII-1oftheRestartActionPlanaspartoftheoverallselfassessmentofreadinessforrestart.24.PageII-1,Item¹6:Willinterviewswithpersonnel,inadditiontotesting"knowledgeandunderstanding",attempttoexamineattitudeandmoraleissues,orsolicitfeedbackonoldornewissues?Whatmeasureswillbeusedtojudgeattitudeandmorale?RESPONSE'5.Aslistedherethisactionrepresentsaverificationtechnique.Verificationtechniquesareusedtodetermineifcorrectiveactionshavebeencompleted.TheseinterviewswillnotnecessarilyexamineattitudeandmoraleissuesorsolicitfeedbackonoldornewissuesunlesstheCorrectiveActionObjectiveandcorrectiveactioninvolvetheseissues.However,anassessmentofattitudeandmora)ewillbeamajorfunctionoftheRestartReviewPanel.AdditionaldiscussionregardingthemeasuringofattitudeandmoraleisincludedintheresponsetoQuestion13.VerificationAction6hasbeenclarifiedintheRestartActionPlantoreadasfollows:"Interviewpersonneltoconfirmthatcorrectiveactionshavebeencompletedandareunderstood."PageII-1,Item¹9:Whatdoes"Inspect....forcondition"mean?Doesitmeanonlydoavisualexaminationforappearanceofcleanlinessordoesitmeantesttheequipmenttodetermineitsoperability,orwhat?RESPONSE:VerificationAction9hasbeenclarifiedandchangedtoreadasfollows:"Inspectequipmentorfacilitiesforhousekeepingandmaterialconditionasappropriate."6754G 26.Pagell-1,Item511:Whatdoes"checkequipmentstatusandlineups"mean?RESPONSE'erificationAction11referstoatypeofverificationthatcouldbeappliedtoconfirmthatcorrectiveactionsinvolvingphysicalplantequipmentorsystemshavebeensatisfactorilycompletedrelativetooperatingstatusperrequiredplantproceduresfortheexpectedplantoperatingcondition.Item11hasbeenclarifiedintheRestartActionPlan.27.Pagell-1,verification:Whatwillbetheinstructionstothepersondoingtheverification?RESPONSE:Agenericsetofinstructionsisbeingdevelopedforusebyindividualsassignedthetaskofverifyingthecompletionofcorrectiveactions.Theinstructionswillprovide:guidanceforconfirmingthatcorrectiveactionhasbeencompletedandthatdocumentationsubstantiatesthiseffort;stepstobetakenwhen'conditionsexistwhichdonotpermittheverificationofcompletionofcorrectiveaction;anddirectioninthedevelopmentofthedocumentationoftheverificationactionperformed.UNDERLYINGROOTCAUSEI:28.Inpart,CorrectiveActionObjective1.1istodevelopandcommunicateseniormanagement'svision,direction,andperformanceexpectations.NoneofthethreeRestartCorrectiveActionsdiscussescommunicatingthesepolicies.Whenandhowisthistobeaccomplished?Howwillthe"management'svision,directionandperformanceexpectation"bemadeavailabletotheNRC?RESPONSE:AllfiveUnderlyingRootCausesinterrelate.ThecorrectiveactionsthatcoverthecommunicationsaspectofSeniorManagement'svisionandgoals(CorrectiveActions1.1.1and1.1.2)arelistedwithUnderlyingRootCause5,specifically,.5.1.3.ManagementexpectationsareaddressedviaCorrectiveAction1.1.3inwhichamonthlydocumentisdistributed.Communicationoccursthroughthedistribution,review,anddiscussionofthisdocumentwhichcontainscurrentdatafromtheresponsiblemanagersandtargetsestablishedasmanagementexpectations.6754G Communicationregardingmanagement'svision,goals,andperformanceexpectationsisongoinginaccordancewithCorrectiveActions5.1.3and1.1.3.Managementvision,direction,andperformanceexpectationsarebeingdocumentedaspartofthecorrectiveactionsand,assuch,theywillbemadeavailablefortheNRCtoreviewonsiteasthedocumentsarefinalized.TableUlhasbeenrevisedintheRestartActionPlan.29.CorrectiveActionObjective1.1discussesmanagement'svision,directionandperformanceexpectations.ThethreeCorrectiveActionsdiscuss:NuclearDivisionvisionandgoals;Corporateobjectives;andseniormanagementexpectations.TheLong-TermStrategiesdiscussgoals,objectivesandoperatingprinciples?Howarealloftheseitemsrelatedtoeachother?RESPONSE:SeniorManagement'svisionanddirectionarepromulgatedthroughthedevelopmentofavisionandmissionstatement.Itsperformanceexpectationsarepromulgatedthroughthedevelopmentofobjectivesandgoals.Thehierarchyandinterrelationshipoftheseitemsareevidencedbythefollowingdefinitions:l.Vision-Clearstatementoftheoveralllong-termexpectationfortheorganization..2.MissionStatement-Clearstatementofreasontoexistincludingwhoisservedinsideandoutsideoftheorganizationandwhatisdoneforthem.3.O~bective-Anintendedaccomplishmentdesignedtoresolveacriticalissue,improvetheexecutionofkeyoperationalresponsibilities,and/orfulfill~maoroperationalobligationsbyidentifyingmeasurableresults.4.Goals-Aspecifictargettobeachievedinasettimeframeinsupportofanobjective.Theterm"operatingprinciples"hasbeenreplacedintheRestartActionPlanwiththeterm"standardsofperformance"tomaintainconsistencywiththeRestartActionPlanforCorrectiveActionObjectives3.2,3.3,4.1,and4'.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtoincludethesedefinitionsinaglossary.6754G 30.RegardingCorrectiveAction1.1.3,whyisverificationaction6notincludedtobesureexpectationsofmanagementareknownandunderstoodbysubordinates?RESEQHK:UponcompletionofCorrectiveAction1.1.3,thecoverletterthattransmitstheMonthlyPerformanceMonitoringReporttothedesignateduserswilldetail'howandwhereSeniorManagement'sexpectationshavebeenincorporated1ntothereport.Withth1saction,itisfeltthatVerificationAction6isunnecessary.Knowledgeandunderstandingbysubord1natesw111beassessedaspartofCorrectiveAction4.2.1,Self-AssessmentReadinessforRestart.,31.Concerningthetong-termstrategy,whyisItnotnecessarytoimprovelinkagebetweenorganizationgoalsandindividualperformancebeforeplantrestartsBKRQHK:Itwasnotfeltnecessarytoprovidelinkagebetweenorganizationalgoalsandind1vidualperformanceexpectationspriortoplantrestartbecausethisact1vitywasdeterminedtobebothnon-regulatoryandnotrequiredforsafeoperat1onoftheUnit.However,it1sestimatedthatindiv1dualperformancegoalslinkedtoorganizationgoalsshouldbeg1nabouteightweeksfollow1ng1ssuanceoftheNuclearD1vis1on1989Goals.Individualperformance,goalsformingpartofemployeeevaluationsareonanapprox1matetwelvemonthcycle.32.Concerningthefollowingrestartcorrectiveactions:1.2.3-Whyshouldnotexistingproceduresbereviewedforadequacyandneededimprovementsmade'P1.2.4-Howcanverificationaction1(reviewprocedure)assurethatresponslblIltlesareunderstood.RKQQKK:1.2.31.2.4TheoriginalproblemsinthisareaconcernedmeetingTechnicalSpecificationschedulefrequenc1es,notprocedureacceptab1lity.Inadditiontothenormaltwoyearcycle,procedureupdateandreviewrequiredbyAdministrativeProcedure2.0,asamplingofSurveillanceProcedureswillbereviewedforcompletenessandtechnicalaccuracyaspartofRestartAct1onPlanCorrectiveAction1.2.5.Thesamplewillnumberabout10'AofthetotalSurveillanceProceduresandconsistofinstrumentchannelfunct1onaltestswhicharetypicallythemostcomplexanddifficultSurveillanceProcedures.InadditiontoVer1ficationActionl,VerificationAction6hasbeenaddedtoassurethatpersonsunderstandresponsibilitiesassignedastheyrelatetoth1scorrectiveact1on.6754G 33'oncerningcorrectiveaction1.2.5,howwillitbeassuredthatallpreventivemaintenance,surveillancetesting,orotheroperationalrequirementsonthecontrolledlistshavebeencompletedbeforerestart?RESROHK:ThewayN1agaraHohawkwillbeassuredthat.thepre-restartprevent1vemaintenance,surveillancetesting,orotheroperat1onalrequirementsarecompletedbeforerestartistohavethemtrackedbytheOutageHanagerforcompletion,review,anddocumentationaspartofSpecificIssue1(seeTable111stingforexamplesintheRestartActionPlanPageI-6).Notallthecontrolledlistsofpreventivemaintenance,surveillancetesting,orotheroperationalrequ1rementswillbecompletedbeforerestart.Acompilat1onoflistswasprepared,relatingtoCorrect1veAct1on1.2.5requirementitems,andwasevaluatedbyNuclearEngineeringandNuclearGenerationdepartmentmanagementpersonneltodeterminethosespecificliststhatareneededpriortorestarttoassuretherequiredlistsareinplaceandcontrolledpriortostart-up.Forexample,TechnicalSpec1f1cationsetpointsw111beincludedinthelistsbeforerestartwhileothersetpointswillbeaddedtothelistsafterrestart.These-11stsarenot11mitedtoact1onsrequiredbeforerestart,butaddressthebroadspectrumofrequirementsnecessaryforoveralloperat1on.Anadministrativeprocedureisbe1ngdevelopedtoincludetheuseoftheselistsintheperformanceoftheseactivities.34.Howistheidentificationandthereportingofproblemsdiscussedinrestartcorrectiveaction2.1.1tobeaccomplishedinan"integratedandconsistentprocess"?Howwillthe"processing,evaluation,andimplementation"oftheproblemreportsdiscussedinitem2.1.2be,accomplished?fKSRQHK:CorrectiveAction2.1.1waswrittentoencourageallpersonnel,bothonsiteandatSalinaHeadows,to"flush-up"problemsorconcernsthattheywereawareof,whichhadnotbeenput1naformaltrack1ngsystem.S1nce10/1/88,over400newProblemReportshavebeengenerated.ProblemReportsareprocessed,prior1tized,evaluated,andimplemented1naccordancewithsiteproceduresS-SUP-2,ProblemReportProgramandOI-34-1,HCCInstructionforProblemReportsatUnit1.Inaddition,ProblemReportshavebeenandwillcontinuetobeevaluateduntilstart-upusingestablishedcriteriatodetermineifanissueisaregulatoryconcernrequiringinclusionintheRestartActionPlan.ProblemReportsaretrackedonacomputerprogramintheplantEngineer1ngDocumentTrackingSystem.TheyarereviewedbytheHanagerofNuclearEngineeringandtheStationSuperintendentwithsupportfrom6754G theirstafftoestablishpriorityforeithercorereloadorstartupinaccordancewithProcedureS-SUP-2.ProblemReportsareclosedoutinaccordancewiththerequirementsofProcedureS-SUP-2.Theseactionsensurethatanintegratedandconsistentprocess1sappliedtothegeneration,processing,prioritization,evaluat1on,implementat1on,andclose-outofProblemReportspr1ortotheunitreloadorstart-up.3S.Concerningrestartcorrectiveaction2.1.8,whichpersonnelaretobeinterviewedandwhy?Pleaseexplain.lKSB2HK:ManagersinNuclearGeneration,NuclearEngineeringandLicensing,Training,QualityAssurance,MaterialsManagement,NuclearServices,Purchasing,andConstructionServicesselectedacross-sectionofindiv1dualsfromtheirorganizationstobeinterviewedfromManager/Superintendenttorepresentedlevels.Ouringtheper1od.November1988toFebruary1989,193individualswereinterviewedconfidentiallyusingastandardagendaincludingawrittenquestionnairetoidentify,atvariouslevelsintheorganization,theexistingmanagementprocessesandtools,to1dent1fyprocessproblems,andtoobtainrecommendedsolut1ons.Theinterv1ewsidentif1edconcerns,obtainedimprovementrecommendations,andprovidedanopportunityfororalfeedbackinadditiontowrittenresponsesfromtheTownHallMeetings.36.37.Concerningrestartcorrectiveaction2.1.9,willNiagaraMohawkassesstheeffectivenessofthecurrentProblemReportprogram?Explainhowthiscorrectiveactionincludestraining.RESEQHK:iYes,aninterdepartmentalteamhasbeenformedtoevaluatetheex1st1ngdef1ciencyreport1ngsystemsandtoenhancethosesystemsinthelongtermbyintegratingsomeprocesses.Thisteamhasevaluatedtheeffectivenessoftheexistingproblemreportingsystemandconcludedthat,whenusedinconcertwiththeotherdefic1encyreportingdocuments,theproblemreportprocessiseffective.PerCorrectiveAction2.1.9,N1agaraMohawkwillprovidetrainingontheex1stingdefic1encyreportingsystems.Thepurposeofthetrainingwillbeto:1)clarifythevarioussystems;2)identifythedocumentstobeused;and3)trainpersonnelonthepurposeofthevar1ousforms,andtheinterrelationship,respons1bil1tyandimplementationoftheprogram.Concerningrestartcorrectiveaction2.1.9,clarifytheproblemreportprocess.LongtermstrategiesIncludetrainingandaccountabilityissues.Asdiscussedabove,whydonotcorrectiveactionsinthisareaneedtobedonebeforestartup?Whydelayimprovingthecapabilityofemployeestorecognizeandrespondtoproblemsuntilafterrestart?HowwillNiagaraMohawkmeasuretheeffectivenessofcorrectiveactionsinthisregard?Shatwillbeconsideredsuccess?Howmeasured?6754G RESPQHK:38.Thebas1cproblemreportprocessisdescribedinprocedureS-SUP-2.Itisoneofourdeficiencyreportingmechanisms(othersincludenonconformancereportsandcorrectiveactionrequests)'.Becauseofthevolumeofproblemreportsgeneratedduringthisoutageinresponsetomanagement'srequest,thebasicprocesswassupplementedasfollows:l.ProblemReportcoord1natorswereassignedtoprior1tizeandmon1tortheprocess.2.Acomputerizedtrackingsystemwasestablished.3.Atrend1ngevaluation/reviewprocesswasestablished.4.Independentperiod1crev1ewsbytheStationSuperintendentandManagerofNuclearEngineer1ngwereperformedtoassureconsistentprioritizationandclosure.5.Closuremechanismswerestrengthenedbyrequiringfollow-updisposit1onactivitiestobeeithercompletedorenteredintoanotherformaltrack1ngsystembeforetheproblemreportwasclosed.Hebelieveouremployeeshaveadequatecapabilitytorecognizeandrespondtoproblemsnow.Th1sisevidencedbythenumberofproblemreportsgeneratedsince1986,asstatedtntheresponsetoQuestion36.The.actofencouragingemployeestoreportanyperceivedproblemsonacontinualbasisandprovidingaresponsetoaddresssuchmattersprovidesameasureofimprovementtowardrecognizingproblems.Additionally,participation1ncorrectiveactionsrelatedtoSpecific,Issues(suchasInserviceInspectionandFireProtection)which1nvolveproblemidentificationprov1desanopportunityforin-linelearn1ng.Communicatingtoemployeesthe.typesofproblemsencounteredalsoservestoimproveproblemident1ficationcapabilityoftheorganizat1on.Enhancementstothereport1ngsystemsare1ntendedtosimplifyandclarifytheprocesstofurtherimproveitseffectiveness.Sometraining,includ1ngsomeinvolv1ngthecurrentdeficiencyreportingschemesandtheirinterrelations,willbedonebeforerestart.Sincethelong-termstrategiesaddressimprovements1nareasthatweconsidersatisfactorynow,theyarenotrequ1redbeforestartup.MeasurestodeterminetheeffectivenessoftheLong-TermStrategieshavenotyetbeendeveloped.Hithregardtoth1soutage,however,successwillbeattainedwhenallproblemreportsprior1tizedas"necessarybeforestartup"areresolved,withfeedbacktotheorganization.Interviewswillalsobeconductedtodeterminetheeffectivenessoftrainingandemployeeawarenessanduseofthedeficiencyreportingsystems.Restartcorrectiveaction2.1.7states,"ReviewlessonslearnedfromNMP-2thatmayidentifyissuesapplicabletoNMP-1thatmayrelatetorestart."Pleaseclarifywhatspecificallywillbereviewed.6754G RESPONSE'heUnit2Operations,SiteMechanical/ElectricalMaintenanceandSite18CLessonsLearnedbooksandtheUnit2ChemistryAssignedReadingLogarebeingreviewedforissuesapplicabletoUnit1thatmayrelatetorestart.UNDERLYINGROOTCAUSE3:39.RegardingUnderlying'ootCause3,howwillemployeeneedsbedeterminedoractedon?RESPONSE'mployeeneedswillbedeterminedandacteduponthroughacombinationofapproachesandcorrectiveactions.Forexample,duringthe"TownHall"meetings,employeeshavebeenencouragedtoreporttheirneedstotheirsupervisors,andsupervisorshavebeenrequestedtoputhighpriorityonmeetingthoseneeds.Inthenear-term(i.e.,priortorestart),identificationofandresponsetoemployeeneedsarebeingfacilitatedandaccomplishedthroughCorrectiveActions5.1.1,5.1.2,and5.1.3,Thesecorrectiveactionsprovideforinformationexchangeamongalllevelsandorganizations.CorrectiveAction2.1.S,involvinginterviewsofpersonnel,alsoprovidesanadditionalsourceofrelevantinformation.Inaddition,NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationusesaformalbutvoluntaryapproachforemployeeinputandfeedbackcalledthe"ReverseReviewProcess"whereby:Themanagerconductsaself-assessmentofhis/hermanagerialknowledgeandskills.Themanager'sksthreeorfourpeersand/orsubordinates(nominees)tousethesameinventorytoassesshim/her.Thenominees'atingsareaveragedandcomparedwiththemanager'sself-assessment,itembyitem.Hherethescoresare"low,"themanagerreviewstheresultswithatrainingstaffmemberwhosuggestsself-developmentactivities.Inthelongterm,aprogramisbeingdeveloped(seetheLong-TermStrategyforUnderlyingRootCause3)thatwillbuilduponthenear-termactionsandresultinacomprehensiveprocesstoassureemployeeneedscontinuetobeidentifiedandmet.40.Concerningcorrectiveactionobjective3.2,whatwillbethecriteriaformeasuringsuccessofeffortstoimproveinterpersonalmanagement,teambuildingandcoachingskills?Whatimprovementwillbesoughtpriortostartup?Whatcouldbeconsideredsuccess?Howisitmeasured?6754G 41.42.FConcerningcorrectiveactionobjective3.3,whatdegreeofimprovementintrainingandrecruitingpracticeswillbesoughtpriortostartup?Howwillsuccessbemeasured?Regardingcorrectiveactionobjectives3.2and3.3,describewhyan"IncreasedFocusontraining"isnotrequiredforrestartbasedonthesignificanceofthefindingsdiscussedinspecificissues2and3.RESPONSETOUESTIONS4041and42:6754GCorrectiveActionObjectives3.2and3.3areexplicitlytiedtoCorrectiveAction4.1.1whichrequiresthedevelopmentandcommunicationofStandardsofPerformance.Thisactionmustbecompletedbeforewecandevelopthecriteriaagainstwhichtomeasureandassessperformance.CorrectiveAction3.2.1hasbeenaddedtotheRestartActionPlanandinvolvestheuseoforganizationaldevelopmentexpertstoassistintheimprovementofcertainmanagementskills.CorrectiveAction3.3.1hasalsobeenaddedtotheRestartActionPlan.Itrequiresin-linetrainingregardingstandardsofperformancefortheentiremanagementchaininsupportofrestartCorrectiveAction4.1.1.Inaddition,therearerestartcorrectiveactionsrelatedtoUnderlyingRootCause5thatsupporttheCorrectiveActionObjectives3.2and3,,3.CorrectiveActions5.1.1through5.1.5,whichwillbecompletedbeforerestart,arerelatedtothedevelopmentofanenvironmentthatpromotesteam-buildinganddevelopmentofthemanagementskillsofcoordination,cooperation,andcommunication.AlthoughtheRestartAetio~Plandoesnotspecifyanydegreeofimprovementintrainingandrecruitingpracticesbeforerestart.improvementisexpectedasaresultofimplementingCorrectiveActions4.1.1and5.1.Ithrough5.1.5.Furthermore,theRestartReviewPanelwillbeassessingtrainingandrecruitingpractices,aswellasinterpersonalmanagement,team-building,andcoachingskills.TheassessmentconclusionswillbeincludedintheReadinessforRestartReport.AlthoughanincreasedfocusontrainingisnotexplicitlystatedintherestartcorrectiveactionsfortheUnderlyingRootCauses,thereareanumberofcorrectiveactionsrelatedtoSpecificIssuesthatdoinvolvetraining.InadditiontoSpecificIssues2and3,wheretrainingisacentralissue,trainingactivitiesareinvolvedinCorrectiveActions4.C.2,14.C.1,and18.A.3.Furthermore,manyoftheSpecificIssuecorrectiveactionsinvolverevisingprocedures.Changestoproceduresalsoinvolvetrainingofthoseindividualswhomustusethem.Finally,CorrectiveActionssuchas3.1.2,3.1.3,and4.1.1whichinvolvecommunicationofinformationtopersonnelareconsideredbyNiagaraMohawkasaformoftrainingactivityinthebroadestsenseofthe-term.AllthesecorrectiveactionsthatwillbecompletedpriortorestartarefurthersupportedbytheaddedemphasisontrainingcontainedwithinthecorrectiveactionsoftheNuclearImprovementProgram.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtoaddCorrectiveActions3.2.1and3.3.1.

UNDERLYINGROOTCAUSE4:43.DoesRestartCorrectiveAction4.1.1includestandardsofperformanceforindividuals?RESPONSE:44.AproposedplanforrestartCorrectiveAction4.1.1hasbeendevelopedforgenerating,reviewing,establishing,approving,andcommunicatingasetofStandardsofPerformance.ThissetofStandardswillserveasguidelinesandprovidequalitativevaluesfororganizationsandindividualcontributorswithintheNuclearDivisionanditssupportgroups.DescribethedifferencebetweenRestartCorrectiveAction4.1.1andtheLong-TermStrategyassociatedwithCorrectiveActionObjective4.1.IIowmuchof"....developandcommunicatestandardofperformance....."Isintendedtobecompletedpriortostartup?RESPONSE:RestartCorrectiveAction4.1.1providesforthedevelopmentandcommunicationofStandardsofPerformanceintermsofqualitativevaluesandguidelineswhichwillapplyacrossalllevelsoftheNuclearDivisionanditssupportgroups.AninitialsetofStandardsofPerformancefortheNuclearDivisionwillbedevelopedbeforerestart.Correctiveactionwith.regardtotheLong-TermStrategyrelatesto-thedevelopmentofmorespecificStandardsofPerformanceatthedepartmentlevelandlower.45.Underlyingrootcause4states"....self-assessmentshavenotbeenconsistentoreffective....".Pleaseclarify,"self-assessments"ofwho,orwhat?Whyhavetheynotbeeneffective?RESPONSE'elf-assessmentsreferstomanagement'sreviewofitsownperformanceandtoevaluationsofcorrectiveactionprogramsperformedbyNiagaraMohawkresources(e.g.,IECTechnicianAllegations).Self-assessmentswerenoteffectiveinthepastbecausetheywerenotperformedinatimelyfashion;theywerenotperformedbytheappropriatepeopletoassurebuy-in;therewastoonarrowafocusonidentifyingrootcausesandcorrectiveactions;andtheassessmentofresultswaslessthaneffective.46.Forrestartcorrectiveaction4.2.1shoutdn'tallverificationactions1-11beused?6754G fKSB25E:HotallelevenverificationactionsarerequiredtoconfirmCorrectiveAct1on4.2.1;includedareonlythoseactionstakentoverifythatacomprehensiveself-assessmentprogramhasbeenimplementedtodeterminereadinessforrestart.TheCorrectiveAct1on4.2.1.self-assessmentprogram1tselfwill1ncorporatemost,ifnotall,oftheelevenverif1cat1ontechniques11stedonPageII-1oftheRestartActionPlan.Theoutcomeofthisself-assessmentwillbedocumentedintheReadinessforRestartReport.PartIISectionlhasbeenrevisedintheRestartActionPlan.47.lnordertoimprovecommunications,wherearecorrectiveactionstoaddressthepastproblemofuntimelyresolutionofIdentifieddeficiencies'P(Timeconstraintsonresolvingpotentialsystemoperabilityissues)lKWZHK:Correct1veact1onstoaddressthepastproblemofuntimelyresolutionofident1f1eddefic1enciesareaddressedunderUnderly1ngRootCause2,CorrectiveActionObjective2.landarelistedundertheSpec1f1cIssueassociatedwiththatdef1ciency.Forexample,resolutionofidentifieddeficienciesassociatedwithinserviceinspect1onwillbeaddressedv1atheInserviceInspectionCoord1natorestabl1shedbyCorrectiveAction4.B.3;def1cienciesassociatedw1thfirebarr1erpenetrationswillbeaddressedviarevis1onstoWalkdownSpecifications/InstructionsbyCorrect1veActions6.A.l,6.A.2,6.A.3,6.A.4;deficienciesassociatedw1thinservicetestingwillbeaddressedbychangestotheadministrativecontrolsperrevisedCorrectiveActions17.A.land17.B.1.TheRestartAct1onPlanhasbeenrevisedtoaddrestartCorrectionAction5.1.6.Restartcorrectiveaction5.1.1through5.1.5:Whyshouldobservationoftheeffectivenessoftheseactivitiesthroughobservingworkortraininginprogressnotbeusedtoverifysuccess(verificationactions)?Pleaseexplain.E~EKK:Verificat1onAction5wasnotusedbecausemorepreciseVerificationAct1ons6or7wereused1nstead.Ver1ficationAct1on7,Observemeetingstoassesscommunicat1onsandrelationships,meetstheob)ectivesforCorrect1veAct1ons5.1.1,5.1.2,and5.1.5.Verificat1onAct1on6,Interviewpersonnel,meetstheob)ectivesforCorrectiveActions5.1.3and5.1.4.6754G 49.Pg.II-10ofRAPRegardingthelong-termstrategies,whowillbeperformingthe"follow-upassessment"?(ThirdpartyorinternalNMPC)?RESPONSE'hereisnotaspecificNuclearImprovementProgramcorrectiveactiontoperformafollow-upassessmentoftheseactivities.ThewordsinUnderlyingRootCause5,Long-TermStrategiesrequiringafollow-upassessmentoftheactivitieslistedwereincludedintheRestartActionPlantohighlightthatassessmenteffortswillbeintegraltoeffectingchangesinteamwork,communication,andcooperation.ThespecificLong-TermStrategieswillbeimplementedbytheNuclearImprovementProgramCorrectiveActions5.1.7and5.1.6.Thesecorrectiveactions,aswithallotherNuclearImprovementProgramcorrectiveactions,willbesubjecttoanassessmentconductedbyNiagaraMohawkpersonnelincludingselfandindependentassessments.Duringdevelopmentofactionplans,theresponsiblemanagerwillidentifywhatindicatorswillbeusedtojudgetheplan'seffectiveness.Theactionplan,includingtheseaspects,willbereviewedbytheIntegratedTeamandapprovedbySeniorManagement.Asspecifictasksintheactionplanarecompleted,theNuclearImprovementProgramAdministratorwillcoordinatetheassessmentofthetasktodeterminethelong-lastingeffectivenessoftheactionstakentoresolvetheoriginalissueorproblem.TheNuclearImprovementProgramAdministratorwilluseQualityAssurance,Nuclear.Compliance&.Verification,orotherpersonneltoperformtheassessments.ProcedureS-89-1providesfurtherdetailsofhowassessmentsarepartoftheoverallNuclearImprovementProgramprocess.NOTE:ThisanswerisprovidedinresponsetothisquestionaswellasQuestion8ontheNuclearImprovementProgram.SPECIFICISSUEIOUTAGEMANAGEMENT-OVERSIGHT:50.PageII-14,Sub-element1.2:Whatcriteriawillbeusedtodeterminewhichmaintenancebacklogitemsmustbecompletedpriortorestart?RESPONSE:ProcedureN1-88-6.5requiresthatadesignatedUnit1SeniorLicensedOperatorrevieW'penworkrequests(NRs)andidentifythoserequiringclosurepriorto(1)reloadand(2)startup.Followingthisreview,theOperationsSuperintendentwillreviewandapproveormodifytheclassificationofworkrequests.Thecriteriausedtoclassifyworkrequestsare:(a)RequiredforsystemoperabilitybyTechnicalSpecificationsforreloadorstartup.6754G (b)RequiredtosupportaSurveillanceTestrequirement.I(c)Requiredtosupportaregulatorycommitment/requirement.(d)Requiredtoassureahighdegreeofplant.reliabilityinthejudgmentofthereviewer.SPECIFICISSUE2MAINTENANCEOFOPERATORLICENSES:51~Regardingthelong-termstrategy,whatisthebasisforallowingupgradestotheoperatorrequalificationprogramtogobeyondrestart?RESPONSE:52.Thecurrentoperatorrequalificationprogrammeetstherequirementsof10CFR50.55.TheupgradesdescribedherearetosupportaccreditationoftheSystematicApproachtoTraining(SAT)program.Howmanylicensedindividualswillbetrainersby12/31/89?RESPONSE:53.Currently,therearetwolicensedsupervisorsintheTraining.Department.Instructors.conductinglicensedoperatortrainingareSeniorReactorOperatorcertifiedbutarenotlicensed.Twootherinstructorsareundergoinglicensedoperatortrainingtobecomelicensedby12/31/89.Inaddition,actionisongoingtorotateoneortwolicensedoperatorsfromUnit1'perationstotheTrainingDepartmentby12/31/89.Arestafflicenseholderspresentlyattendingrequalificationtraining,pendingthedeterminationoftheneedfortheirlicense?RESPONSE:54.Insufficientinstructorresourcesandsimulatortimepreventedupgradingallstafflicenseholderspri'orto2/22/89,theendoftherequalificationyear,whichisamorerestrictivetimerequirementthanrestart.Theneedfortheselicenseshasbeenre-evaluatedandsixstafflicenses'arebeingdropped.TheremainingstafflicenseholdershavereceivedtheupgradedtrainingandtheLong-TermStrategyonPageII-16oftheRestartActionPlanhasbeendeletedtoreflectthis.TheLong-TermStrategyonPageII-21oftheRestartActionPlanhasalsobeendeletedbecausein-planttrainingonEmergencyOperatingProcedureshasbeencompletedforthereducednumberoflicenseholders.Regardingcorrectiveaction2.A.2,howwilloperatorfeedbackonprogramcontentbeincorporatedintheoperatortrainingprogram?Howwilltrainingprogramownershipbytheoperators,aswellasmanagement,beencouraged?6754G RESPONSE:IOperatorfeedbackissolicitedinthefollowingways:l.Acourseevaluationformismadeavailabletooperatorsfollowingeachweekoftrainingoreachdiscretecourse(forexample,followingthe12hoursofelectricalprintreading).CompletedformsarereviewedbyOperationsandTrainingmanagementwhodeterminewhatactionshouldbetakeninresponse.2.FeedbackissolicitedthroughtheOperatorTrainingProgramAdvisoryCommittee(OTPAC),byOTPACmembersonspecificissues,andthroughOTPACfeedbackformsavailableintheclassroom.TheseformsaresenttotheOTPACchairman(currentlyalicensedoperator)andreviewedbythefullcommitteeatthenextmeeting.Aresponseismadetothesubmitterandchangestotheprogramaredeterminedduringthatmeeting.OTPACisacommitteemadeupofoperators,instructors,andOperationsandTrainingmanagement.Thiscompositionwasselectedtoprovideacross-section-ofjobstoobtaindifferingviewpointsandhavepeopleonthecommitteewithauthoritytoactexpeditiouslyoncommitteedecisions.3.OperationsmanagementholdsshiftmeetingsonFridaysduringthetrainingweekdependingonthetraining.scheduleandworkload.Generallythefirsttopicofdiscussionisthequalityandcontentoftheweek'straining,andthisfeedbackisdiscussedwiththetrainingcoordinatorshortlyafterthemeeting.4.ASystematicApproachtoTraining(SAT)programiswellunderway,havingstartedinlatesummer1988.Thisprogramhasinvolvedvirtuallyalloperatorsinthetaskidentificationprocess,andmanyofthemparticipatedonavoluntarybasisinthetaskanalysisprocess.Participationhasgrownduringthiseffortandtheprocessisdesignedtoencourageownershipthroughparticipation.5.Operatorsareactivelyinvolvedwiththesimulatorfidelityprocessinvolvingidentificationofdiscrepanciesandverificationthatthediscrepanciesarefixed.OwnershipofoperatortrainingbytheOperationsSuperintendenthasbeenachieved,andtheaboveeffortsareprovingsuccessfulinencouragingownershipoftrainingbytheoperators,asevidencedbytheirparticipationintheprogram.55.Withreferencetocorrectiveaction2.A.2,whatactionsareplannedtocontrol(andlimit)theassignmentonshifttothosepersonnelwhohaveproperlyparticipatedinorcompletedtherequalificationprogram?RESPONSE:Theactivelicenseholders(shiftoperators)missedrelativelysmallamountsoftraining,andtheycompletedtherequiredtrainingseveralmonthsago.Thelicenseholderswhohadnotcompletedsignificantportionsoftheprogram(stafflicenses)havebeenInactivesincethe6754G-30-~1 56,revisionto10CFR50.55in1987.Asthetrainingstaffresourceswerelimitedtomake-uptraining(includingextensiveEmergencyOperatingProceduretraining),sixindividualscouldnotbemadeup.withintheallottedtimeframe,andtheselicensesarebeingdropped.Atthistimeallremaininglicenseholdersareuptodateintheirtraining.Procedureshavebeenrevisedtoidentifyinatimelymannerindividualswhoarefallingbehindintheirtrainingthrough.cycledelinquencyreports.AnActiveLicenseprocedureisbeingpreparedtoensureall'equiredattributesareuptodateortheindividualisdeclaredInactiveandprohibitedfromlicensedduties.IVerificationaction2.A.3.2-Shouldthisbelimitedtoobservationofa(one)trainingsession?Isthisatypographicalerror?RESPONSE:57.Thisisintendedtostatethateachshiftofoperatorswillbeobservedthroughatleastonetrainingsession,notthatonlyonesessionwillbeobserved.However,aswithallverifications,theverifiermustbeconvincedthatthecorrectiveactionhasbeencompleted,"andobservationsasnecessarywillbemade.ThewordinghasbeenclarifiedinarevisiontotheRestartActionPlan.Verificationaction2.A.4.1-Shouldthisbelimitedtoattendanceofa(one)OTPACmeeting?Explain.RESPONSE:58.OperatorTrainingProgramAdvisoryCommittee(OTPAC)membershipincludestheOperationsSuperintendentandtheAssistantSuperintendentofTrainingandisoftenattendedbytheUnit1StationSuperintendent.Themeetingshavebeenobservedbyavarietyofpeople,sothemembershipisaccustomedtothispractice.Onesessionshouldbeenoughforanobservertoverifythatthecommitteefunctionswellasateamandcaneffectivelyresolveissues.However,aswithallverifications,theverifiermustbeconvincedthatthecorrectiveactionhasbeencompletedandobservationsasnecessarywillbemade.ThewordinghasbeenclarifiedinarevisiontotheRestartActionPlan.Correctiveaction2.A.4,item(2)-Whatismanagementapprovalrequiredfor?RESPONSE:Managementapprovalisrequiredtoimplementrecommendationsmadebyoperatorsandtrainers.TheOperatingTrainingProgramAdvisoryCommitteewassetuptoincludemanagersasmembersofthecommitteesothatrecommendationsadoptedbythecommitteecanbeimplementedexpeditiously(managementapprovalisaninherentpartofcommitteerecommendations).6754G-311~"~

59.Concerningcorrectiveaction2.BE3:Whatistheschedulefor1)identifyingsimulatordeficiencies,2)correctingsimulatordeficiencies(installingandverifyingmodifications),and3)trainingtheoperatorsusingtheimprovedsimulator?Whatisthenatureandextentofsimulatorchangestobeperformedpriortostartup?RESPONSE:60;Currently,thesimulatorisuptodatewithplantmodificationsaffectingoperatortraining.Operatorshavebeentrainingonthesimulatorthroughouttheprocessandhavealsobeenanintegralpartofidentifyingproblemsandverifyingcorrections.Althoughupgradingisanongoingprocess,thesimulatorcurrentlymeetsAmericanNationalStandardsInstitutestandardsforfidelity,Rootcause2.Bstates,inpart,thatthequalityoftraininginsomeinstanceswasnotadequateduetoinadequatemanagementoversight.Correctiveaction2.B.1directsthesuperintendentoftrainingtoprovidemanagementoversighttoassurequalityoftraining.Isthesuperintendentoftrainingtheonlyindividualassignedtheresponsibilityorprovidingoversightonthequalityandeffectivenessoftraining?WillQAparticipate?RESPONSE:OversightofthequalityandeffectivenessoftrainingisajointresponsibilityoftheTrainingSuperintendentandtheOperationsSuperintendent.Inadditionto,andinconjunctionwith,managementtheOperatorTrainingProgramAdvisoryCommitteeoverseesthequalityandeffectivenessofthetrainingprogram.TheQualityAssuranceorganizationparticipatesintheprocessbyconductingsurveillancesofTrainingDepartmentactivities.SeniorManagementoversightisalsoconducted.Forexample,thePresidentandExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperationshaveseparatelyobservedsimulatortrainingforbothunits.61.Regardingverificationaction2.B.5.2,whatpercentoftheoperatorswillbeinterviewedtoassessthequalityandeffectivenessofthetraining?RESPONSE:62.Eachshiftwillbe.interviewedasashift.Thiswillinvolve100Kofthelicensedoperators.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtoclarifythis.RegardingRootCause2D,whatwillbedonetoassurethatindividualoperatorsareknowledgeableoftheirownresponsibilitiesforgettingtherequiredtraining?RESPONSE:AtrainingmodulewasdevelopedandtaughttoalllicensedoperatorsduringrequalificationtrainingontherequirementsandresponsibilitiesoflicensedoperatorscontainedinlOCFR50.55.The6754G 63;traininginstructorandtheOperationsSuperintendentindependentlyquestionedtheshiftsfollowingthetrainingtoassurethatindividualsunderstoodtheirresponsibilities.Regardingverificationaction2.D.3.1,whatwillbedonetoverifythatthetrainingwaseffective?RESPONSE:VerificationAction2.D.3.1hasbeenchangedintheRestartActionPlantoincludeinterviewinginstructedpersonnel.ThesepersonnelwillbealsointerviewedtoassesseffectivenessofthetrainingaspartoftheRestartReadinessSelfAssessment.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.SPECIFICISSUE3EMERGENCYOPERATINGPROCEDURES:64.PleasedescribehowtheRestartActionPlanaddressesthefollowingconcerns:InspectionReportFindings50-220/88-22-06andtheportionof88-22-08,Item8,regardinginstructortraining,donotappeartobeadequatelyaddressedinSpecificIssue3.RESPONSE'5.Investigationofthisissuedisclosedthatinstructorshadthe'ropercredentialstoinstructoperatorsonEmergencyOperatingProcedures,butrecord-keepingwaspoorandretrievalwasdifficult.Therecordswerefoundlater.Thedeficiencyneedingcorrectionisrecord-keepingpract1ces,which1sreflectedinRestartActionPlanitem3.F.l.Correctiveaction3.D.1seemstosay"operationslinemanagement"isresponsible.Correctiveaction3AC.2says"operationssuperintendent"isresponsible.Whichiscorrect?RESPONSE:66.InCorrectiveAction3.1.1"operationslinemanagement"isabroadtermincludingtheOperationsSuperintendentandothersuperintendentsasapplicablewhereasinCorrectiveAction3.C.2"OperationsSuperintendent"isspecifictooneindividual.Regardingverificationaction3.C.4.1,shouldtrainingdepartmentsupervisorsalsobeinterviewed?RESPONSE'es,TrainingOepartmentsupervisorsshouldalsobeinterviewed.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedaccordingly.6754G 67.Regardingcorrectiveaction3'.6,whichitemswillnotbecompletedpriortorestart?Whyisthatacceptable?RESPONSE:68.Asdiscussedandagreeduponinateleconof8/30/88betweenREG.Randall,NiagaraMohawkOperationsSuperintendentUnit1andD.J.Florek,NRCSeniorOperationsEngineer,DivisionofReactorSafety,Region1,actionisbeingdeferredonsomeoftheconcernsfromAttachmentC,NRCInspectionReport50-220/88-22and50-410/88-23.Theconcernsbeingdeferredincludesuchitemsas:renumberingsteps,useoftransitionsymbols,embeddedlogicwithinsteps,formattingofdecisiontablestoextremewidth,incorporatinggeneraloperatinginstructions,hybridsteps,useofmarginaltypesize,anduseofdottedlinesandintersectionsofdottedandsolidlines.Theseitemsareconsideredenhancementsorneedfurtherevaluation.Someoftheitemsinvolve'ajorchangestotheflowchartEmergencyOperatingProceduresandwillbeevaluatedduringuseofRevision3totheEmergencyOperatingProcedures.Changeswillbemade,ifnecessary,inRevision4oftheEmergencyOperatingProceduresinlate1989.Regardingverificationaction3.E.1.1,whylimitthereviewtoonlya(one)EOP?Isthisatypographicalerror?RESPONSE'9.VerificationAction3.E.l.lreferstoanOperatingProcedure(OP)ratherthan'anEmergencyOperatingProcedure<EOP).TheRestartAction.Planhasbeensorevised.TheOperatingProcedureshavebeenwalkeddownbyoperatorswhodocumentedanydiscrepanciesinstepsorlabels,andsoon.Correctiveactionshavebeenorarebeingtakenandwillbeverifiedbytheworkingorganization.Theverificationactionistoindependentlyreviewthedocumentationandperformonerandom,independentre-verification.Regardingverificationaction3.E.2.1,whynotcheckanumberofprocedurechangestoconfirmthattheapplicableEOP'swerenotaffectedor,iftheywere,thatEOP'swereappropriatelychanged.RESPONSE;70.TheproceduresthataffecttheEmergencyOperatingProcedureshavebeendetermined,andthislistisbeingindependentlyverified.ThisverificationandtheprocessofverifyingthattheseprocedureshaveadministrativecontrolswillsubstantiatethatnochangeshavebeenmadethatarenotcurrentlyreflectedintheEmergencyOperatingProceduresorviceversa.CheckingproceduresthatareknownnottoaffecttheEmergencyOperatingProceduresisnotuseful,andtheproceduresthatareknowntoaffecttheEmergencyOperatingProceduresarebeingchecked.Rootcause3Fisnotusedtoaddressanyofthesub-elements(1,2,or3)ofSpecificIssueNo.3.IdentifytheapplicabilityofRootCause3.F.6754G 71.RESPONSE:RootCause3.f,notRootCause3.C,isapplicabletoSub-Element3.3.TheRest'artActionPlanhasbeenchangedtoreflectthis.Regardingrootcause3Fandactions3.F.1,3.F.1.1,whatproceduralrequirementsarereferredtohere?RESPONSE:This,referstoproceduralrequirementsfordocumentationofpersonnelqualifications(seeresponsestoQuestions64and70).SPECIFICISSUE4INSERVICEINSPECTION:72.Theissuedescriptionaddressthat1)Engineering,QA,andtheISIgroupdidnotrecognizethatundispositionedDCA'saffectedcomponentoperabilityandfailedtoreporttheseconditionstooperationsmanagement.How,isthisproblembeingcorrected?Alsohaveallmissing(orotherwiseimproper)examinationsintheISIprogrambeenreportedtotheNRCinLER88-01orasupplement?RESPONSE:DeficiencyCorrectiveActionReports(DCA's)wereusedonlyduringthe1986outage,andNiagaraMohawkhasreviseditsprocedurestoeliminatetheuseofOCA's.AnyconditionidentifiedduringaninserviceinspectionexaminationortestthatexceedstheASMEXIacceptancecriteriaisbeingreportedandtrackedbyaQualityAssuranceNonconformanceReport.ThenonconformanceprogramassuresthatdefectsarerecognizedandthatOperationsmanagementisinformed.DCA'shavebeenre-evaluatedbyEngineeringandanyrepairsorre-inspectionsrequiredarebeingperformedduringthecurrentrefuelingoutage.Theexaminationsthatwerenotperformedduringthefirstintervalarebeingexaminedduringthecurrentoutage.ThefinalsupplementtoLER88-01willcontainasummaryoftheexaminationsthatweremissedinthefirstinterval.Regardinglong-termstrategieswhyisoversightofcontractorsnotashort-termitem?RESPONSE:NiagaraMohawkhasassembleda.specialtaskforcetosuperviseinserviceinspectionactivitiesduringthecurrentoutage.TheindependentreviewofinserviceinspectionexaminationdataconductedbyQualityAssuranceprovidesassuranceofthequalityandcompletenessoftheexaminationperformedbythenondestructiveexaminationcontractor.Inthefuture,thenondestructiveexaminationwillbeperformedbyNiagaraMohawk'sQualityAssuranceDepartmentandwillbereviewedbySiteEngineeringtoassurethattherequiredexaminationshavebeenperformed.Theseandotherorganizationalchangesprovideadequatecontractoroversightduringthisoutageandinthefuture.6754G 74.Insub-element4.1referencetorootcause4.8suggeststhatthelackofmanagementoversightwasmanifestedonlybyfailuretoadequatelyassessresources.Wasthistheonlymanifestationoflackofoversight?RESPONSE:75.No,RootCauses4.Aand4.Dalsoapply.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenchangedaccordingly.CorrectiveActions4.A.1and4.A.4discussprocedurerevisionsandpersonnelretraining.Explainwhytheverificationactionsincludeverifyingthattheproceduresarerevised,butdonotincludeverifyingretrainingiscompleted.RESPONSE:76.Verificationactionsaspresentlyimplementedincludeaconfirmationthatretrain1ngiscompleted.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.CorrectiveAction4.A.6discussestheperformanceofamaintenancewalkdownofalargeboresafety-relatedpipingsystemnotincludedintheISIprogram.Whatisthespecificpurposeofthesewalkdowns?RESPONSE:77.Baseduponanalysisofdeficienciesreportedduringtheinserviceinspectionofsafety-relatedsupports,NiagaraMohawkdecidedto.implementanexaminationofsafety-relatedsupportsexemptfromASMEXIInserviceInspection.Thismaintenancewalkdownfocusesonthesametypesofdeficienciesidentifiedduringtheinserviceinspection.NiagaraMohawkmadeapresentationtoRegionIpersonnelinOctober1988on,thisprogram.Regardingverificationaction4.A.1.1,whyisitlimitedtoNCRsissuedduringoutage?RESPONSE'onconformanceReportshavereplacedDeficiencyCorrectiveActionReports(DCA's)asthemethodforreportingandtrackinginserviceinspectionidentifieddeficiencies.Theverificationactionensuresthatthenonconformanceprogramisbeingimplementedduringthecurrentoutagefordeficiencyreports.Inaddition,weareindependentlyverifyingthatDCA'sfromthe1986outageareproperlyclosed.(SeeresponsetoQuestion72forfurtherinformation.)SPECIFICISSUE5CONTROLOFCOMMERCIALGRADEITEMS:78.Wereallpurchaseordersreviewedforsafety-relatedandcommercialgradeitemsbackto1985,orjustasample?Ifjustasample,justify.Whatotherdocumentswerereviewedforeachpieceofequipmenttodeterminewhatitemsneededtobere-evaluated?6754G RESPONSE'9.ToinvestigatethescopeofthisissueMaterialsEngineeringreviewedallpurchaseordersforsafety-relatedandcommercialgradeitemsbacktoAugust,1985.DocumentsreviewedtodetermineitemapplicationincludedMaterialIssues,WorkRequests,andtestandinspectionresults.RegardingitemsprocuredpriortoAugust1985,whatwasdoneonthoseitems;whererecorded;whatweretheresults?RESPONSE'temsprocuredpriorto1985wereevaluatedasaresultofaNiagaraMohawkQualityAssuranceCorrectiveActionRequest(CAR)85.3045.TheCARidentifiedonecaseofacommercialgradeiteminstalledinasafety-relatedapplicationwithoutdedication.Thepurposeofthereviewwastodetermineifthiswasanisolatedoccurrenceorifothercommercialgradeitemshadbeeninstalledthatmighthavedegradedplantsafety.Areviewwasperformedtodeterminethetotalpopulationofcommercialgradepurchase.orderspriortoAugust,1985.Atotalofapproximately335purchaseorderswereidentifiedofwhich154purchaseorderswerereviewed.Theapproachtakenforthereviewwas'asfollows:IdentifyMaterialIssuesIdentifyWorkRequestthatinstalledcommercialgradeitemsReviewEngineering,Procurement,andMaintenancedocumentationDetermineAcceptabilityDocumenttheReview80.Theresultsofthereviewidentifiedthatnoitemswereinstalledthatmighthavedegradedplantsafety.Regardinglong-termstrategiesC.2andC.4,whatwillbethescheduletocompletetheseitems.Howcanthecommercialgradeprocessproceedwithouttherequiredtrainingpriortorestart?RESPONSE:WithregardtotheLong-TermStrategies,itshouldbenotedthatNiagaraMohawkmanagementhadtakencorrectivemeasuresforthecontrolandprocurementofcommercialgradeitemsapproximatelysixmonthspriortothisbeingconsideredarestartissue.NiagaraMohawkhadalreadywrittennewproceduresandrevisedthosethatwerebeingusedforcommercialgradeprocurement.Thenewandrevisedproceduresrequiredthatallcommercialgradeprocurementsbereviewedbythenewly-formedMaterialsEngineeringGroup.Thisprovidedafocalpointthatwouldallowgreatercontrolandacommonphilosophywithrespecttocommercialgradeprocurement,6754G Hiththatinmind,ItemC.2involvestrainingpersonnelonproceduresnecessarytoimplementthecommercialgradeprocess.ThisisanongoingprogramandwillstartwhenanindividualbeginsworkintheMaterialsEngineeringGroupandwillnotenduntilthatindividualleavesthegroup.Thistrainingincludes,butisnotlimitedto:NiagaraMohawkProceduresEPRICommercialGradeGuidelinesNRCAuditsofUtilitiesonCommercialGradeIssuesItemC.4,theprocurementprogramatNineMilePoint,requiresprocurementsforsafety-relatedandcommercialgradeitemstobereviewedbyaMaterialsEngineerpriortoplacingapurchaseorder.Allengineeringworkwithrespecttoprocurementofanitemisdocumentedandincludedinadatabase.Theengineeringdocument,a"ProcurementRequirementEvaluationForm,"iscontrolled,asisthedatabase.Thisprogramwasinplacepriortotheissuebeingevaluatedasarestartitem.NiagaraMohawkbelievestheprogramcurrentlyinplacewillcontrolfuturecommercialgradeitemsandthatthein-depthreviewsthatwereperformedonpastprocurementshavecompletelyaddressedthisissue.Traininghastakenplaceandwillcontinuetobeperformedasnewpersonnelareassigned.81.NoneofthethreecorrectiveactionsdescribedinTable5addressprocedurechangesortraining.Doesthis-implythatcurrentproceduresandtrainingforthecontrolofcommercialgradeitemsaresatisfactory?Explain.RESPONSE:Atthetimethecorrectiveactionwasprovided,theproceduresrelatedtocommercialgradeprocurement,aswellasprocurementingeneral,hadbeenwrittentoestablishaprogramconsistentwiththeEPRIguidelinesoncommercialgradeitems.ThisprogramwasdevelopedbytheMaterialsEngineeringGroupinlate1987.Experiencedpersonnelwereobtainedto.performthisactivity.Asstatedabove,thesepeopleweretrainedintheseissues,andtheirworkwasreviewedindetailpriortoacceptance.82.Regardingcorrectiveaction5.A.i,whatwillbedonetoassurethatpotentiallyinadequatepartsarenotinstalledintheplant?RESPONSE'onconformanceReportswerewritten,andthepotentiallyinadequateitemswereplacedonholdpertheNiagaraMohawknonconformanceprogram.Theitemswillremainonholduntiladispositionisprovidedandaccepted.Todate,wehavescrappedsomeitems,upgradedsomeitemsthroughdedication,andkeptotheritemsinaholdstatusawaitingdisposition.Also,MaterialsEngineeringpersonnelhavebeenassignedinthestoreroomtoprovideadditionalassurancethatthecorrectpartsarerequestedandprovided.6754G SPECIFICISSUE6FIREBARRIERPENETRATION:83.Long-termstrategiesindicatethattheFireDepartment'ssurveillancetestisbeingrevised.Whyisthisnotdonepriortostartup?RESPONSE84.TheFireDepartment'sSurveillanceProcedurerevisioniscompleteforTechnicalSpecificationfirebarriers.TheFireDepartment'sSurveillanceProcedurerevisionisunderwayfortheremainingNRCrequiredfirebarriersandwillbecompletepriortostartup.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedaccordingly.Rootcauses6.Athru6.Kdonotaddressthe"root"cause.Pleaseexplain.RESPONSE'5'hesecausesweredevelopedasaresultofathoroughself-assessmentofthefirebarrierpenetrationdeficienciesandaretheoutcomeofastructuredapproachutilizingtheKepner-TregoeProblemAnalysismethod.RootCauses6.Athrough6.Kcontributeddirectlytothedeficienciesdiscoveredandaresomewhatnarrowinfocus.ThebroaderrootcausesinvolvelackofmanagementeffectivenessandareincludedinthefiveUnderlyingRootCauses.Regardingrootcause6.D,whatisthecommitmentmentioned'PRESPONSE'6.ThecommitmentmentionedisAmendmentNo.33toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.OPR-63,theNineMilePointUnit1SafetyEvaluationReport(SER),dated7/26/79.Regardingverificationactions6.8.3.1,and6.C.1.1,shouldn'verificationsinclude.inspectionofworkcompletedtoassurethattheworkwasdonesatisfactorilyaswellasassuringthatthepaperworkisproper?RESPONSE'es,visualverificationofCorrectiveActions6.B.3and6.C.1willbeaccomplishedforTechnicalSpecificationbarriers/penetrationsusingtherevisedFireDepartmentSurveillanceProcedureswhichprovidesassurancethattheworkwasdonesatisfactorily.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.87.Regardingcorrectiveaction6.8.5,pleaseexplainthe"confidencelevel"beingachievedduringdestructiveexaminationsonthepenetrationsandthejustificationforthislevel.RESPONSE'saresultofthedestructiveexaminations,thereisa95/.confidencethatlessthan4'Aofthepenetrationsarenon-functional.The6754G non-functionalpenetrationsfound)nthesampl)ngp)aAconta)nedasbestos.Althoughadequatetestdocumentationforasbestospenetrationsealswasnotavailable,asbestosisanon-combustiblematerialwithfavorableheattransfercharacteristics.IThejustificationfora95'/confidencethatlessthan4'/ofthepenetrationsarenon-functionalisbasedontheinherentconservatismofthefirebarrierpenetrationsealdesign.Therequiredratingofamajorityofthefirebarriersissubstantiallylessthan3hours;andwherethecombustibleloadingissignificant,suppressionsystemshavebeeninstalled.Inaddition,alloftheseassemblieswerevisuallyinspectedandfoundtohaveacceptableconfigurations.Evenintheworstcase,thesamplingplannon-funct)onalpenetrationsare=non-combustibleenclosuresw)thsomedegreeoff)rerating.Ifpenetrationswithfireratingslessthan3hoursarefound,itisexpectedthatanEngineer)ngevaluationwoulddemonstratethattheassemblywouldbeadequateforthehazardspresentusingtheguidanceofGenericLetter86-10.88.Regardingverificationactions6.E.1.1and6.1.1.1,shouldn'tproperprocedureusebeverified?RESPONSE'es.VerificationAction6.I.1.1intheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtover)fyproperuseofprocedurespriortorestart.VerificationofuseofproceduresperCorrectiveAction6.E.lwillbeperformedsubsequenttothe)r)ssuanceanduse.Theuseoftheseproceduresmaynotoccurunt)lafterrestart.SPECIFICISSUE7TORUSWALLTHINNING:89.Whatarethelong-termplansforpreventingcorrosionofthetoruswallbeyondonecycle?RESPONSE'0.NiagaraMohawk'slong-termprogramfortoruswallthinningbeyondonecyclewassummarizedtotheNRCinitsletterdated2/14/89.Thislong-termprogramisto)nstallmid-baysaddlesinthetwentybaysofthetorus.Thismodificationwillprovideaddit)onalstructuralintegritysuchthattheanticipatedcorrosionforthelifeoftheplantwillnotreducethewallthicknessbelowminimumrequirements.Table7oftheplanindicatestherootcauseofthisissuewasfailuretoresolvetheNRCinspector'sconcernsbeforetheyleftthesite.Thisisnotavalidassessment.Inadequatetechnicalreviewand.possibleunderstaffingarecontributors;although,management'sapproachofdetermininghowmuchmorecorrosionallowancecanbeusedup,ratherthantryingtopreserveasmuchmarginaspossible,isprobablythelargestcontributortothisproblem.Pleaseaddresstheseconcerns.6754G RESPONSE:NiagaraMohawk'srootcauseanalysisofthisSpecificIssue,TorusHallThinning,indicatedthatNiagaraMohawkdidnotprovideadequatemanagementoversightduringtheinspectiontoanswerquestionsinatimelymanner.NiagaraMohawkhadaprograminplacetoaddresstheTorusHallThinningIssue.WehavebeenmonitoringTorusHallthicknesssince1975.Datawasbeingtrendedandevaluated.Programswereunderconsiderationtoresolvetheissue.ThiseffortwasprioritizedalongwithotherworkforUnitl.Therefore,hadNiagaraMohawkprovidedthisinformationduringtheinspection,lessconfusionandmisunderstandingwouldhaveresultedregardingthisitem.Ourprogramonthisissuewasoutlinedinour4/26/88meetingwiththeNRCatRegionIheadquartersandoursubsequentsubmittalof5/27/88.Hedescribedourpastandpresentprogramsandourfutureplanstoaddressthisconcern.Theprogramconsistedofnotonlymeasurementsdatingbackto1975,butstudiesconductedfrom1979tothepresentregardingmethodstocontrolthecorrosionandproposedlong-termfixes.Theearlierstudies(1979-1985)didnotconcentrateonthemainsourceofcorrosion(i.e.,oxidation)butratherfocusedonasecondarysourceofcorrosion(i.e.,ironbacteria)andfixesrelatedtothatsourceofcorrosion.Additionally,ourearlier.studiesdidnotrecognizethattheoriginalcorrosionallowanceof1/16"wasusedtosupportanalysesundertheMarkIContainmentProgram.Theseshortcomingswereidentifiedin1987,andweinitiatedanacceleratedefforttoidentifytherequiredmarginversustheremainingwallthicknessandtostudylong-termsolutions.ThiseffortwaswellunderwayatthetimetheinspectorstooktheirmeasurementsinApril,1988.Additionalexaminationsandinspectionshaveverifiedthemainsourceofcorrosionasoxidation,andthatironbacteriaisnotaconcernintheNMP1Torus.Wehavestudiedthelong-termsolutionsandselectedone,Ourstudyevaluatedmethodstoreducethecorrosionrateand.structuralimprovementstoaddresscorrosioneffects.Asindicatedinour2/14/89submittal,installationofmid-baysaddlesisthemosteffectivewaytoresolvethisconcern.NiagaraMohawkhasconcludedthat,hadweprovidedmoremanagementoversightduringtheinspection,lessconfusionandmisunderstandingwouldhaveresulted.HehavemodifiedtheRestartActionPlantoclarifyRootCause7.A.SPECIFICISSUE9APPENDIXJTESTINGOFEMERGENCYCONDENSERANDSHUTDOWNCOOLINGVALVES'1.ChangestoTechnicalSpecificationsthatinvolveAppendixjtestingrequirementsarenot"administrative"andwouldbeexpectedtoaffectplantoperations.Thisitemshouldbeclarified.6754G

\RESPONSE:NiagaraMohawkagreesthatnotallchangestoTechnicalSpecificationsareadministrativeandwouldbeexpectedtoaffectplantoperations.ThesecondsentenceunderLong-TermStrategyonRestartActionPlanPageII-44hasbeendeleted.Additionally,theRestartActionPlanhasbeenchangedtoindicatetheneedforanexemptionforthecontainmentsprayisolationvalves.Asapointofclarification,priorto.restart,NiagaraMohawkwi11beincompliancewiththeexistingTechnicalSpeci-ficationsandAppendixJasdocumentedintheNRC'sSafetyEvaluationReport,orNiagaraMohawkwillhaveNRCapprovedexemptionrequests.92.Discussionofthisopenitemisincomplete.RefertoNRCletterdated11/15/88.RESPONSE'sdiscussedinresponsetoQuestion91,NiagaraMohawkhasagreedtosubmitaTechnicalSpecificationchangeaddressingAppendixJpriortostartup,Therefore,NiagaraMohawkhasaddressedalloftheitemscontainedintheNRC'sletterdatedll/9/88.SPECIFICISSUE11EROSION/CORROSIONPROGRAM93.Thelicensee'sproposedcorrectiveactionsappeartoadequatelyaddresstheissue;however,itshouldbenotedthatproblemintheerosion-corrosionproceduresanddataacquisitionprocessstillexistedduringtheDecember1988NRCinspectioninthisarea.(SeeInspectionReport88-81).Pleaseaddresstheseconcerns.RESPONSE'heNRCconcernswereaddressedverballybyNiagaraMohawkduringtheExitMeeting(Page8ofNRCInspectionReport50-220/88-81dated1/19/89).Thefollowingactionshavebeentakentodatetoaddressthisissue:1.NEXTOUTAGELOCATIONSRE-EXAMINED-TherepeatlocationsfornextoutagewereestablishedbyEngineeringandactioninitiatedbythePro]ectEngineer.AsurveillancewasperformedbyQualityAssurancetheweekof1/27/89.QASurveillanceReportNo.89-10015isbeingfinalizedtoreflecttheresults.Anydeviationslistedinthereportwillbeaddressed.6754G2.DOCUMENTATION/STDORIENTATION-NESwasdirectedtoreviseitsUTexaminationprocedure,toincorporatethechangesregardingstandardorientationandnomenclature.Thesechangesarebeingincorporated.Thedocumenthasbeenreviewed-byNiagaraMohawkQualityAssurance,SiteEngineering,andtheAuthorizedNuclearInspector.Finalapprovalispending.3.INDEPENDENTREVIENERVERIFICATION-ThenextrevisionoftheNineMilePointUnit1CarbonSteelandLowAlloyPipingSystemErosion/CorrosionReviewProgramwillrequirethatanindependentreviewer'erifythatthegridmarkingandUTexaminationproceduresareadheredto.-.42-SPECIFICISSUE12MGSETBATTERYCHARGERS94.Whatwasthebasisfororiginallychangingthebatterychargerstonon-safetyrelated?RESPONSE'5.Thebasisfororiginallychangingthebatterychargerstonon-safetyrelatedwasthattheirfailurewouldnotresultintheinabilityforsafeshutdownorcauseasignificantreleaseofradioactivity.Atthetime,itwasbelievedthatthebatteriesweresizedtobeself-sufficientandthereforedidnotrequirerecharging.ProvidedetailsofyourcloseoutofthisissueforNRCreview.RESPONSE:CloseoutofthisissuewithregardtorestartwillproceedinaccordancewithguidancecontainedindraftTemporaryProceduresNl-88-7.0(currentlydraft)andN1-88-8.0(currentlydraft),andapprovedTemporaryProcedureNl-88-6.0.Briefly,closeoutrequiresdetaileddocumentedevidencethatcorrectiveactionsandverificationactionshavebeencompleted.ThisisrecordedandreviewedbytheTaskManager.andOutageManager,andapprovedbytheSiteOperationsReviewCommittee.Forthisissue,closeoutincludesgenerationandresolutionofNonconformanceReportsNl-88-0115andN1-88-0116,areviewoftheseismicqualificationofcomponents,andconfigurationdocumentupdates.Resolutionofthenonconformanceswillbeaccomplishedbydedicationofcomponentsandrepairsorreplacementofcomponentswithsafety-relatedcomponents.96.Regardingcorrectiveactions12.A.2andverificationaction12.A.2.1,whoarethe"involvedpersonnel"?WhatistheNiagaraMohawkcorporate'sunderstandingof"Safety-related"'?Isanoverallreviewof.the0-listforcompletenessandaccuracyneeded?RESPONSE:CorrectiveAction12.A.2andVerificationAction12.A.2.1statethatinvolvedpersonnelwillsignaLessonsLearnedTransmittaldetailingtheconcern'ofIssue12andcautionarystatementsaboutusinginadequatedocumentation.InvolvedpersonnelincludeallpersonnelthatperformAppendixBdeterminationsandare,therefore,inapositiontoduplicatetheerroridentifiedinRootCause12.A.NiagaraMohawkdefinessafety-relatedasactivities,structures,systems,components,orpartsthereofwhicharerequired'toassure:a~b.c~IntegrityofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryCapabilitytoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownCapabilitytopreventormitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidentswhichcouldresultinoff-siteexposurescomparabletotheguidelinesof10CFRPart100.6754G-43-I~,~

Whenanactivity,structure,system,componentorpartthereofisdeterminedtobesafety-relatedasdefinedabove,theeighteencriteriaof10CFR50AppendixBarethenapplied.AsindicatedbyCorrectiveAction12.A.3,areviewofsystemandmajorcomponentleveldeterminations,whichdowngradedcomponentsfromsafety-relatedtonon-safetyrelated,willbeperformed.Additionally,aspartofalong-rangedesignbasereconstitutioneffort;theQ-Listwillbereconciledwithassembleddesignbasedocumentationinordertoensureitsconsistencyandaccuracy.Thiseffortwi11provideanoverallreviewoftheQ-Listforcompletenessandaccuracy.97.Regardingcorrectiveaction12.A.4,providedetailsofdedicationplansfortheMGsetbatterychargers.RESPONSE:Theplansforcorrectingnonconformingitemsviadedicationtosafety-relatedaredetailedinNonconformanceReportsNl-88-0115(MGSet161)andNl-88-0116(MGSet171)andinclude1)dedicationthroughverificationofcriticalcharacteristicsor2)dedicationbasedonpastperformance.Inadditiontodedication,anothermethodofcorrectingnonconformingitemswillbebyreplacingthemwithitemsprocuredsafety-related.Theabove-mentioned.NonconformanceReportsareavailableonsite.AsummaryofthededicationplansisprovidedonTable97-1.SPECIFICISSUE13IMPLEMENTATIONOFl!KTECHNICIAN'SALLEGATION98.Regardingcorrectiveactionobjective2.1.1,whatistheNiagaraMohawkcorporatepolicyonhowemployee'sconcernandproblemsareidentifiedandbroughttomanagementattention,evaluatedandactedupon?RESPONSE'754GThepolicyisthatemployeeconcernsandproblemsarehandledthroughthechainofcommand,buttherearemanyby-passeswhichareencouragedifthethechainofcommandisnotworking:QualityFirstProgram,telltheGeneralSuperintendent,calltheExecutiveVicePresident-NuclearOperations,andsoon.RestartCorrectiveActionF1.1requiredallsupervisorstoidentifyandreportproblemsofwhichtheyortheirpeopleareawareandwhichhavenotbeenputintoatrackingsystem.Thisactioninvolvednotjustthesupervisorsbutalsotheiremployeestoidentifyproblemsandbringthemtomanagementattentionforevaluationandaction.Asaresultofthiscorrectiveaction,alargenumberofproblemreportshavebeenwrittenbymanyemployeesandprocessedthroughtheirsupervisorsforevaluation,furtherprocessing;action,andresponsebacktotheinitiatingemployee.Inaddition,perrestartCorrectiveAction5.1.2,oyer400FeedbackReportscontainingover1200commentshavebeenreceivedfromemployeesresultingfromtheTownHallgeneralmeetingsandsubsequentmeetingsbetweensupervisorsandtheirpeople.Eachofthesecommentsisbeingevaluated,acteduponasappropriate,andresponsestotheoriginatorsprovidedthroughthechainofcommand..Thesearebuttwospecificexamplesofhowemployees'44-concernsandproblemsarebeingbroughttomanagementa5iention,evaluated,andactedupon.Thisprocessisongoingandisplannedtobecontinuedbeyondrestart.AsstatedinCorrectiveAction2.1.12oftheNuclearImprovementProgram,anintegrateddeficiencyreportingsystemisbeingdevelopedtobringconcernstomanagemerit'sattentionfromtheNuclearDivisionanditssupportorganizations.SPECIFICISSUE14SSFI:99.Regardingcorrectiveactionitem14.A.4,forwhatpurposewillthe"one-timetestofeachcorespray,system"berun?RESPONSE:Theone-timetestofthecorespraysystemistestingnecessarytovalidatethecorespraysystempumpcurves.Thisvalidationisofthecombined(coresprayplustopping)pumpcurves.Afterthistesttovalidatethepumpcurves,thecorespraypumpsystemoperabilitywillbedeterminedinaccordancewithnormalASMEinservicetestingrequirementsatonepointonthecombined(coresprayplustopping)pumpcurves.Testingtorevalidatethecurveswillbedonefollowingmajorpumpmaintenance.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.100.Correctiveaction14.A.7states"....topreventannunciationand...."Whypreventannunciation?Underwhatconditiona?RESPONSE:MoreappropriatewordingforCorrectiveAction14.A.7wouldbe"revisethealarmsetpointstopreventnuisancealarmsandreviseoperatingprocedurestoprovideappropriateresponsetoalarmswhentheyoccur."TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.101.Clarifywhatarethecorrectiveactionsforsub-elementsofitem14'ESPONSE:Table101-1providesthecorrespondencebetweensub-elementsandcorrectiveactions.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.102.Regardingcorrectiveaction14.A.11,arenotdifferentgraphsneededforflowinthecommondischargeline.(Ratherthanrelabelingexistinggraphs)?RESPONSE:TheNPSHandVortexgraphswererelabeledtoindicatethatthe.flowvaluesapplytocorespraysystemoperationwithonepumpset(coresprayandtopping)oneachloop.CalculationspreviouslysubmittedtoNRCshowthattwopumpsetoperationdoesnotapproachVortexorNPSH.6754G 103.limits;therefore,differentgraphsarenotdequired.NOTE:Althoughtwopumpsetoperationresultsinhighertotalflow,theflowfromeachpumpsetissignificantlylowerthanwhenapumpsetisrunsingly.Regardingcorrectiveaction14.A.14,whatels'ewiltbedoneinadditiontoevaluating"system"capabilities?Isthisareferencetothesystemdiscussedin14.14?RESPONSE:104.Thesystemaddressedin14.A.14isHPCI/FeedwaterSystemandcorrespondstoSub-Element14.14.AsindicatedinNiagaraMohawk'sresponseof12/16/88totheNRCQuickLookLetterdated10/26/88,nocreditforHPCIistakeninthecurrent10CFR50AppendixKanalysesand,therefore,nofurtheranalysisisrequired.NRCInspectionReport50-220/88-201concurswiththisassessment.TheFinalSafetyAnalysisReportwillberevisedtomoreclearlystatetheHPCI/FeedwaterSystemcapabilities.General-thecorrectiveaction(s)applicabletoeachsub-elementshouldbeexplicitlystated,e.g.,does14.A.14.applyto14.14?14.A.18to14.18?Pleaseexplain.RESPONSE:Thecorrectiveaction,alpha-numericdesignatorrelatesthecorrectiveactiontotheroot'causeofeachsub-element,nottoeachsub-element(e.g.,CorrectiveAction14.D.2appliestoSub-Element.14.21andRootCause14.D).Aone-for-onecorrespondencebetweenthesub-elementandthecorrectiveactionisprovidedinTable101-1.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.105.Regardingcorrectiveaction14.8.1,justificationshouldbeprovidedforanyvendorrecommendedmaintenanceactivitynotincludedinNiagaraMohawkProcedures.RESPONSE'tistheintentofCorrectiveAction14.B.ltoevaluateandprovidejustificationforpreviousconclusionsastowhyvendorrecommendationswerenotincludedinMaintenanceProcedures.IfJustificationcannotbeprovided,therecommendationswillbeincludedintheappropriateMaintenanceProcedureoranewproceduredeveloped.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.105.Regardingrootcause14.Dandsub-element14.18,itisnotclearhow"audits/evaluationlackedtechnicaldepth"causedexcessiveuseoffurmaniteasdiscussedin14.18.Pleasereviewandclarifyhowthespecificactionsaddresseachsub-element(problem)androotcause.6754G RESPONSE:RootCause14.DisconsideredapplicablesincethecontinuedapplicationofFurmanitewasnotsufficfentlyevaluatedwithregardtocumulativeeffectonthespecificcomponentorotherpotentiallyaffectedsystems.Table101-1relatessub-elementstocorrectiveactions,ThecorrectiveactionsapplytorootcausesperthedescriptioncontainedonPageII-12oftheRestartActionPlan.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtoclarifyhowthespecificactionsaddresseachsub-element.107.ThreeitemsfromtheSSFI"quicklook"letterweremissingfromthelist.Themissingitemsmaynotneedtoberesolvedbeforerestart,buttheyshouldbeevaluatedandaddressed.RESPONSE'hethreemissingitemsfromtheSSFIQuickLookLetterwereevaluatedandwerenotspecificallyaddressedintheRestartActionPlanforthefollowingreasons.Issues2.aand2.fwereconsideredprogrammaticandaree,lementsofourLong-TermStrategy.Eachisaddressedinour12/16/88submittal.Issue2.cdidnotrequireanyadditionalaction.Theissuesandabriefresponsearestatedbelow:Issue2.a-ExampleswerefoundwhereSurveillanceTestProgramdatacollection,results,rev-iew,andacceptancevaluedeterminationwouldnotadequatelysupportsystemoperabilitydecisions.RESPONSE'sstatedintheNiagaraMohawkresponsetotheNRCQuickLookLetter,webelievetheexamplescitedduringtheauditwereisolated.Toverifythisassessment,NiagaraMohawkisperformingasamplingofothersurveillancerecords.Ifthissampleindicatesgenericconcerns,thismatterwillbeevaluatedandaddressedinamannerconsistentwiththeapproachusedintheRestartActionPlan.Issue2.c-Investigationintoproblemsandassessmentofreportabilityinaccordancewith10CFR50.72and10CFR50.73didnotalwaysappeartobeadequate.RESPONSE:AsindfcatedintheNiagaraMohawkresponsetotheNRCQuickLookLetter,NiagaraMohawkbelievesittakesaconservativeapproachwithrespecttoreportabilftyofitemsunder10CFR50.72and10CFR50.73.Issue2f.-TheQAAuditProgramconcentratedonprogrammaticissuesandwouldnotnecessarilybeabletoidentifysignificanttechnicalissueswithsafetysystemoperation,testing,designormaintenance.6754G RESPONSE:AsindicatedintheNiagaraMohawkresponsetotheNRCQuickLookLetter,NiagaraMohawkagreesthattheQualityAssuranceauditprogramneedstoconcentratemoreontechnicalissues.Startingin1987,theauditprogramfocushasbeenchangedfromcompliance-basedtoperformance-based,althoughitisunderstoodtheauditprogramcannotcompletelyremovetherequirementtoreviewcomplianceissues.Specificactionshavebeentakentoimprovetheauditprogram.TheseareincreaseduseoftechnicalspecialistsintheareasauditedtrainingofauditorsandsurveillancepersonnelinSeptember1988inperformance-basedauditandsurveillancetechniques;andupdatesofindividualauditchecklistsasauditsareperformed.Todate,wehavecompletedinitialtrainingofourauditorsinperformance-basedauditing.Hehavebegunassigningtechnicalexpertstotheauditteams'heseexpertscomefromvariousgroupswithintheNuclearDivision.Healsohaveplanstofillexistingopenauditpositionswithtechnicalspecialists.NiagaraMohawkexpectstheseactionstohavethesamepositiveresultsasthoseachievedinourSurveillanceProgram.SPECIFICISSUE15CRACKSINWALLSANDFLOORS:,108.Thelicensee'sproposedcorrectiveactionsappeartoadequatelyaddressthespecificconditionsidentified.However,doesalicenseeprogramforcontinuedperiodicmonitoringoftheconditionofmasonryandconcretestructuresexistorwillonebeimplemented?RESPONSE:109.Heareintheprocessofdevelopingaprogramtoidentifyanddocumentcracksinsafety-relatedmasonryandconcretestructures,includingidentifyinganyunusualindications(e.g.,rustmarks).Theprogramwilloutlinevisualinspectionandacceptancecriteria,andreportingproceduresforengineeringevaluation.Theprogramwillincludeengineeringassessmentandacceptanceguidelinestoaddressvariousaspectsofthecrackedstructuralelements,suchasthecauseofthecracks,effectsofcorrosion(ifapplicable),andrepairrequirements.Regardingrootcause15.B,whatisthebasisforspeculationthatthesourceofthewateristhespentfuelpool?Whatisthebasisfortheconclusionthatthecracksarenottheresultsofoverstress?Whatisthecause?RESPONSE:InSeptember1987,aProblemReportwasinitiatedwhichidentifiedbuild-upofaprecipitatedmaterialatandaroundthetelltalepipeendcapofthespentfuelpoolleakdetectionsystem.Basedonaninitialchemicalanalysisofthebuild-up,theProblemReportdispositionhypothesizedthatthelikelysourceofthewaterwasfromthespentfuelpool.However,furtherinvestigationisbeingconductedtodeterminethesourceofleakage,sincetheinitialchemicalanalysisisnotconclusive.6754G 110.'preliminaryreviewofcalculationsrevealedthattheconcretestructuralcomponentsofthespentfuelpoolareadequatetoperformtherequiredfunctionevenwiththecracks.However,adetailedassessmentisbeingcarriedouttoconfirmthepreliminaryassessment.Thecauseofthecrack,asdeterminedanddocumentedinPreliminaryReportSDR-002,isbelievedtobeduetotemperatureandshrinkage.Regardingcorrectiveaction15.C.1,onwhatbasishasNiagaraMohawkconcludedthatnocorrectiveactionisrequired?RESPONSE'iagaraMohawkhashadanassessmentdoneofthecrackedconcreteinthesteamtunnel.Theassessmentindicatesthatthemostplausiblereasonforthecracksistheshrinkageoftheconcrete.Acontributorycausemaybethatthethermalmovementsofthestructuralelementsinducedrestraintforcesresultingintensilestresscracksintheslabandbottomofthewall.Theassessmentalsodocumentsthatitisunlikelythatthecrackswerecausedduetoloading.Therecommendedcourseofactionistoperformminorsurfacerepairofthecrackstoprotectthereinforcingsteelfrompotentialexposuretomoisture.Aquantitativeevaluationisbeingpreparedtofurthersubstantiatetheassessment.Correctivemeasureswillbetakenifnecessarybasedontheresultsoftheevaluation.~SPECIFICISSUE16FEEDWATERNOZZLES:Thelicensee'sproposedcorrectiveactionsaddressthespecificitemsidentifiedbutnottherootcauseoftheproblemwhichappearstobepooroversightofcontractoractivities.Theproposedactionsdon'appearadequatetopreventsimilarprobleminthefuture.RESPONSE:AsstatedinresponsetoQuestion73,futurenondestructiveexaminationwillbeperformedbyNiagaraMohawkQualityAssuranceunderthenewinserviceinspectionorganization.ContractorswillworkundertheQualityAssuranceprogram.TheexaminationresultswillbereviewedbySiteEngineeringtoensurethattherequiredexaminationshavebeenperformed.SPECIFICISSUE17IST'12.Sub-element17.1statesthattheISTProgramdoesnotincludeallASMEclass1,2,and3(safety-related)pumpsandvalves.CorrectiveAction17.A.1statesthatNMPCwillfinalizeandimplementthe2ndintervalISTProgram.ConfirmthatCorrectiveAction17.A.1meansthatthe2ndIntervalISTProgramwillincludeallASMEClass1,2,and3{safety-related)pumpsandvalves.Whatwillbetestedpriortorestart?6754G49 RESPONSE:Table17hasbeenextensivelyrevised.RevisedCorrectiveAction17.A.2meansthatthesecondintervalinservicetestingprogramwillincludeallactiveASMEClass1,2and3safety-relatedpumpsandvalves.ThepumpsandvalvesidentifiedinthesecondintervalprogramplanwillbetestedinaccordancewithASMEcoderequirementspriortostartup..TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.113.NMPCrecentlyreportedthattheISTprogramonlyincludedabout50%ofrequiredcomponents.Explainthebasisforplanstorequest"interimrelief"fromtheNRC.Whyshouldmissedsafetyrelatedcomponentsnotbetestedbeforestartup?RESPONSE:NiagaraMohawkwilltestthecomponentsidentifiedinthesecondintervalprogramplanpriortostartup.SinceNineMilePointUnit1wasdesignedpriortothepromulgationofASMEXI,therearecertaincoderequirementspertainingtotestmethodsthatarenotfeasibletoimplement.Thesesituationsareidentifiedinreliefrequestsandalternativetestmethodsproposed.NiagaraMohawkisrequestinginterim(orfinal)approvalof'thesereliefrequeststosupportplantstartup.SPECIFICISSUE18125VDCSYSTEMCONCERNS:114.Thelong-termstrategystatesthatseveralenhancementstothe125VDCsystemhavebeenidentifiedandthatreviewsareexpectedtobecompletedwithinayearafterrestart.Regardingthelong-termstrategies,whenwillthedecisiononpriorityandresourceassignments.bemade.Ifsomemodificationsareneededtoassuresafetytheyshouldbedonepriortostartup.Clarifythatpriortorestart,the125VDCsystemwillmeetitsdesignandfunctionaloperabilityrequirements.RESPONSE'115.HeanticipatemakingthedecisionregardingpriorityandresourceassignmentsforLong-TermStrategiesbytheendof1989.TheinclusionofCorrectiveAction18.A.2inTable18isintendedtoensurethe125VOCsystemwillmeetitsdesignandfunctionaloperabilityrequirements.Modificationsnecessarytomeetsafety-relatedrequirementswillbecompletedpriortostartup.Regardingcorrectiveaction18.A.2,whyshouldNiagaraMohawknotcompletethemodificationandperformteststoverifydesigncalculationspriortostartup?RESPONSE'754GCorrectiveAction18.A.2willbecompletebeforerestart.Tothedegreethatfieldtests/measurementsareappropriate,theywillbeusedtoverifycalculations.Theappropriateverificationrelatedtestingwillbe.completedbeforerestart.

APPENDIXC-CRITERIATODETERMINEIFANISSUEISAREGULATORYCONCERN:~~~~116.ImmediatesafetyconcernsshouldnotbelimitedtoitemsathroughI.Wenoteemphasison"regulatoryconcern(s)"andcompliance.Theissueshouldbesafety.RESPONSE:NiagaraMohawkagreesandhasputtheprincipalfocusonsafetyindevelopingtheRestartActionPlan.ThisisfurtheramplifiedinresponsestoQuestions5and6totheRestartActionPlanandQuestion1totheNuclearImprovementProgram.AlthoughAppendixC,Question4states"Doesthisconcernaddressanimmediatesafetyissuerelatingto..~"itemslistedasathrough1,itisonlyoneofninequestionsthatarealladdressed.Forexample,questionsthatrelatetootherspecificaspectsofsafetyinclude.Questions5and6.InapplyingthecriteriaofAppendixCtoanygivenissue,eachoftheninequestionswereansweredandifanyoneormoreanswerswas"yes,"theissuewasputintotheRestartActionPlan.Atthe10/18/88meetingwiththeNRC,NiagaraMohawkdiscussedtheissueofregulatorysignificance.InrespondingtoNRCconcerns,weagreedtoprovideI:intheRestartActionPlan]onlythoseproblemsorissuesthatareofregulatorysignificance.WealsoagreedthattheNRCstaffwillreviewtheremainderoftheissuesonsitetoseeifthereisanydisagreement.AppendixCdelineatedtheprocessNiagaraMohawkusedtodecidewhichissueswereofregulatorysignificance.NiagaraMohawkconsiderstheninequestionsinAppendixCtoberesponsivetotheagreementof10/18/88andthat'hesequestionsdogobeyondcompliance,e.g.,Questions6-9.Sincethislist.ofquestionsisnotnecessarytobeincludedintheRestartActionPlan,ithasbeendeleted.Ithasbeenreplacedwithmaterialrelatedtotheprocessusedtoprioritizecorrectiveactions.-6754G-51 NRCQuestionsConcerninNineMilePointUnit.1NuclearlmrovementProramAndNiaaraMohawk'sResonsesTheNIPestablishesthreeprioritylevelstoProgramobjectives(priorityone-itemsmustbecompletedpriortorestart;prioritytwo-completedneartermfollowingrestart;andprioritythree-completedlongertermafterrestart).NeithertheRAPortheNIPadequatelydefinesthecriteriafortheseprioritizations.Furtherclarificationofthesecriteriaisrequested.RESPONSE:Eachcorrectiveactionwasevaluatedtodetermine.itssignificancetosafeplantoperationoritsnecessitytodemonstratesufficientprogressonresolutionoftheissuesthatwillnotbefullyresolvedbeforerestart.Theprioritizationofcorrectiveactionscanbecharacterizedasfollows:Priority1-Thosecorrectiveactionsconsiderednecessarytosupportsafeoperationoftheplant,todemonstratesufficientprogressinweakperformanceareas,ortocorrectsignificantdeficiencies.Priority2-Correctiveactionswhichidentifyadditionalimprovementstoareaswhicharefunctionallysatisfactorynowor'whichwhencompletedachievethedesiredculturalenvironment.Priority3-Correctiveactionsinvolvinglonger-termenhancementstoprograms/processeswhichareconsideredcurrentlysatisfactory.NOTE:IntheNuclearImprovementProgram"priority"hasbeenchangedto"category."Although"priority"hasnotbeenchangedintheRestartActionPlantoavoidconfusion,itshouldbenotedthat"priority"isusedtocategorizethecompletionofactionsinadditiontoidentifyingtheirrelativeimportancetorestart.Priority1actionsmustbecompletedbeforerestart.Priority2and3actionswillbecompletedafterrestarteventhoughsomemaybestartedpriortorestart.CorrectiveactionsrequiringcompletionbeforerestartwereclassifiedasPriority1.CompletionofPriority2and3correctiveactionswillestablishlevelsofperformancebeyondthatnecessarytosupportsafeoperationandare,therefore,notrequiredbeforerestart.Nheresignificantdeficiencieswereidentified,Priority1correctiveactionsweredevelopedtoaddressthem.Themethodsusedtodeterminepotentialimpactonplantoperationtypically'includedconsiderationofthefollowing:A.Nhethertheactionisneededtoresolveknownhardwareorprogrammaticdeficienciestoensureequipment/systemoperability.6754G B.Anassessmentofseveral"whatif"scenarios,e.g.,whatifwestartedupandmissedaTechnicalSpecificationrequiredsurveillance.(ThisresultedinCorrectiveAction1.2.3beingclassifiedaPriority1.)C.Therelativeimpactonemployeeeffectivenessandattitudes.D.Whetherthecorrectiveactioncontributessignificantlytoourabilitytoidentify,avoid,orresolveproblems.E.Whetherothercorrectiveactions,ifimplemented,accomplishsimilarresults.F.Whether'thecorrectiveactioncontributestoidentifyingand/ordescribingthedesiredculturalenvironment.Theprocessusedtoassesstheimpactofcorrectiveactionsonsafeplantoperationconsistedofareviewofcorrectiveactionsbyseverallevelsoftheorganizationrepresentingacross-sectionoftheNuclearDivisionanditssupportorganizations.Typically,reviewsweredonebytheassignedTaskManager(forSpecificIssues),theRestartTaskForce,theIntegratedTeam,andSeniorManagement.Asaninitialstepinthepriorityprocess,theIntegratedTeam-reviewedeachcorrectiveactionlistedforeachunderlyingissueandassignedeachcorrectiveactionapriority.TheIntegratedTeamreviewe'deachcorrectiveactionanditsassociatedpriorityagainafteritwasredistributedunderitsrespectiveCorrectiveActionObjective.ThisresultedinsomechangesinprioritiesaseachcorrectiveactionwasconsideredinthecontextofthegroupofcorrectiveactionstobecarriedouttosatisfyitsCorrectiveActionObjective.SeniorManagementreviewedtherecommendedpriorityforeachcorrectiveaction,consideringthecorrectiveactionbothindividuallyandinthecontextofagroupofcorrectiveactionsundereachCorrectiveActionObjective,todetermineifthecorrectiveactionscollectivelywouldbesufficienttosatisfytheCorrectiveActionObjective.SeniorManagementalsoassessediftheintendedcompletionofeachcorrectiveactioneitherbeforeorafterrestartwasconsideredreasonablebasedonthemethodsusedtoprioritizethem.Duringthesereviews,eachparticipantwasgiventheopportunitytoexpresshis/herposition.Themeritsofthesepositionswerescrutinized,debated,andagreedupon.Duringthisprocesssomecorrectiveactionshadtheirprioritychanged.Severalwerechangedfroma2toa1,somePriority2and3correctiveactionsweresubdividedandtheresultingelementsweredesignatedasPriority1correctiveactions.Other'orrectiveactionswereloweredinprioritybasedoninformationpresentedanddiscussedingroupmeetings.6754G Thereviewswereiterativeandparticipativeinthateachreviewingbodycommunicatedextensivelywiththeothers,i.e.,feedbackwasestablishedandmaintained.Thecollectivejudgmentoftheparticipantsprovidedthebasisfordecidingonthepriorityofeachcorrectiveaction.Additionally,employeefeedbackwasreviewedtoensuregeneralconsensuswiththedirectionandtheprioritiesoftheimprovementprogram.Thisresultedinsomeadditionalchangesinsomecorrectiveactionsandsomeoftheprioritiesassignedtocertaincorrectiveactions.Priority1itemsarescheduledforcompletionpriortorestart.Priority2itemsareprojectedtobecompletedwithinapproximatelyoneyearfollowingrestart.Priority3itemsare.intendedtobecompletedwithinafiveyeartimeframeafterstartup.SincetheNuclearImprovementProgramisconsidereda"living"process,periodicreview,evaluationandadjustmentmayaffectthelonger-termcompletiondatescurrentlyenvi'sioned.Theprocessusedforprioritizingcorrectiveactionswascompleteandcomprehensiveandprovidesconfidencethatthepriorityassignmentsareappropriate.Usingtheprocess,NiagaraMohawkhasidentifiedPriority1correctiveactionsthat,whenconsideredinconjunctionwithotherday-to-dayandprogrammaticactivities,wi11establishtheconditionsnecessaryandsufficienttosafelyoperatetheplant.TheExecutiveSummaryoftheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevisedtoclarifythecriteriausedtoclassifyitemsasPriority1,2,or3.AnewAppendixChasbeenincludedintheRestartActionPlantoaddresstheprocessforprioritizingcorrectiveactions.(NOTE:ThisresponseappliestoQuestions5and6ontheRestartActionPlan.)2.Objective1.1.1.A"integrate,alignanddevelopgoals,objectives,criticalissues,andoperatingprinciplesfromtopdowntothefirstlinesupervisorwithactionplansdevelopedfrombottomup.Provide'inkagebetweentheorganizationgoalsandindividualperformanceexpectation"isassignedpriority(2).Providethebasisfornotmakingthisobjectiveapriority(1).RESPONSE:6754GObjective1.1.1.AwasgivenaPriority2classificationbecauseitwasdeterminedtobenotcriticalforsafeoperationoftheunits,anditwasintendedtobecompletedintheneartermfollowingrestart.Wearedevelopingamissionstatement,issues,goals,andstandardsofperformancefromthetopdowntofirst-linesupervisionusingthe"buy-in"process;theseitemswillbecompletedfor1989beforerestart.Intheneartermafterrestarttheseitemswillbereviewedfor1990withactionplansdevelopedfromthebottomupandwithlinkagebetweengoalsandperformance.(NOTE:Theterm"operatingprinciples"hasbeenreplacedwith"standardsofperformance"tomaintainconsistencywiththeRestartActionPlan.TheNuclearImprovementProgramwillberevisedtoreflectthechange.)

3.Objective1.1;7-"DevelopNuclearDivisionpolicyondeveloping.proceduresincluding:(sub-steps1through6)"isa"non-regulatory"objective,butappearstobefundamentaltoimprovingperformancein"regulatory"areas.Clarifyandjustifythe,classificationsand,prioritizations.RESPONSE'.ThemethodscurrentlyusedbyNuclearGenerationandNuclearEngineering&Licensingtodevelopprocedureshavebeenandareeffective.NuclearImprovementProgramCorrectiveAction1.1.7willaddresshowtheNuclearDivisionwilldealwithprocedures-fromhowtheywillbewrittentohowproposedchangeswillbereviewedandapproved.TheintentofCorrectiveAction1.1.7istostreamlineourprocedureprocessandprovideauniformmethod.InsomecasesNuclearGenerationandNuclearEngineering&Licensingusedifferentmethodstoaccomplishthesameobjectives.Consequently,therearesomepotentialefficienciesavailableifacommonmethodfordealingwithproceduresisestablishedforbothorganizations.CriticalIssue2.1-"Developandimplementanintegratedandconsistentproblemsolvingprocessbywhichissuesareeffectivelyidentifiedandanalyzed,andcorrectiveactionsareimplementedandassessedinatimelyway,"doesnothaveaspecificobjectivewhichaddresses"assess(ment)inatimelyway."Pleaseexplain.RESPONSE'.YouarecorrectthatthespecificobjectivesintheNuclearImprovementProgramunderCriticalIssue2.1donotspecificallymentionassess(ment)inatimelyway.Thiswasanoversight.TheNuclearImprovementProgramwillbechangedtoincludeassessmentsofeffectivenessbeingperformedinatimelywayasanintegralpartoftheproblemsolvingprocessforObjectives2.1.11and2.1.12.Objectives3.1.8and3.1.8.A,andtheirrespectiveprioritiesappeartobeinconflict.ExplainwhycriticaltrainingneedsofEngineeringpersonnelare"non-regulatory"priority(1)and"regulatory"trainingneedsarepriority(3).RESPONSE:Theuseoftheterm(non-regulatory)onObjective3.1.8.AismisleadingandhasbeendeletedfromtheNuclearImprovementProgram.Objective3.1.8relatestoactiontobecarriedoutinresponsetounderlyingissuesthatrelatetoregulatorymattersbutinvolveenhancements.AppropriatetrainingofNuclearEngineering&Licensingisaregulatoryconcern.Resolutionofthisissueinvolvesdevelopingandimplementinganimprovedtrainingprogram.Theprogramisintendedtoenhancecurrenttrainingandavoidafuturesafetyconcern.InthereviewoftheRestartActionPlanbyourpersonnel,therewasastrongfeelingthatactionsshouldbetakeninthetrainingareapriorto6754G restart.ThiswasnotbecauseofaconcernaboutsafeoperationwithoutimmediateNuclearEngineeringN5Licensingtraining;butrather,personnelwantednear-termvisibilityofactionsbeingtakentoimprovetraining,particularlyincertaincriticalareas.Consequently,NiagaraMohawkdecidedtodetermineNuclearEngineeringNKLicens.ingcriticalneedstrainingbeforerestart.ThisresultedinaPriority1classificationbeingassigned.Thisactionincludesidentifyingcriticaltrainingandestablishingascheduleforit.Itwasconsidered"non-regulatory"becausecompletionofthisactivitywasnotrequiredtosatisfyanNRCcommitmentortosafelystartupUnit1.6.Objective4.1.3-"Establishperformanceexpectationsanddefineresponsibilityforcontractoroversjght,administrativelyandtechnically."Explainwhythisisapriority(2)vicepriority(1)item,inlightofthecurrentoutageeffortsandpastproblemswithcontractoroversight.RESPONSE:ImprovementwithregardtocontractoroversightisanongoingeffortwithintheNuclearDivisionanditssupportgroups.CorrectiveAction4.1.3intheNuclearImprovementProgramisclassifiedasPriority2sincewedonotanticipatecompletingformalactivitiestoestablishperformanceexpectationsanddefineresponsibilitiesuntilafterrestart.Someimprovementshavebeeninitiatedandcontinuetobepursuedastheyareidentified.Forexample,a)revisionstoour"MasterSpecification"weremadetomoreclearlyidentifyanddefineinterfaces,strengthentechnicalandadministrativerequirements,andemphasizequalityofworkmanship(the"MasterSpecification"isaguidancedocumentavailabletocontractoriginatorsdescribingdifferentprogrammaticand/ortechnicalcriteriaorrequirementsforwork),b)internalprocedureshavebeendevelopedtofurtherdefineresponsibilitiesandworkflow,c),anobservationchecklisthasbeendevelopedandwillbeusedtomonitorcompliancetoadministrativeproceduresandpractices,andd)TaskManagerresponsibilities/accountabilitieshavebeenemphasizedinspecificcases.Theseactionsarecontributingtoimprovedcontractoroversight.Inaddition,NiagaraMohawkwilldevelopanddisseminateapolicytomoreaccuratelydefinespecificresponsibilitiespertainingtocontractoroversight.ThiswillbedonebeforerestartofUnitl.TheRestartActionPlanhasbeenrevised.7.Objective4.2.1-"Developandimplementacomprehensiveself-assessmentprogramtodeterminereadinessforrestart"isapriority(1);however,objectives4.2.2,4.2.3,and4.2.4arepriority(2)andappearessentialelements/prerequisitestoacomprehensiveself-assessment.Explainreasoningforthisprioritization.6754G RESPONSE:TheNuclearImprovementProgramCorrectiveActions4.2.2,4,2.3and4.2.4arethestepsthatmustbetakentoinstitutionalize,forthelongterm,theself-assessmentprocesswhichwillbecarriedouttoassessreadinessforrestart.TheseNuclearImprovementProgramcorrectiveactionsareconsistentwiththeLong-TermStrategydescribedintheRestartActionPlanunderCorrectiveActionObjective4.2.NiagaraMohawkexpectsthatthelong-termself-assessmentprocesswilldevelopfromtheknowledge,experienceandskillsobtainedduringtheperformanceoftheRestartSelf-AssessmentProgramrequiredbyrestartCorrectiveAction4.2'.8.Long-TermStrategiesforRAPUnderlyingRootCause5addressestheperformanceofafollow-upassessmentoftheseactivities.TheinspectorscouldnotfindacorrespondingNIPobjectiveforthislong-termitem.Identifyorexplainhowthislong-termstrategyisaccomplishedpertheNIP.RESPONSE:ThereisnotaspecificNuclearImprovementProgramcorrectiveactiontoperformafollow-upassessmentoftheseactivities.ThewordsinUnderlyingRootCause5,Long-TermStrategiesrequiringafollow-upassessmentoftheactivitieslistedwereincludedintheRestartActionPlantohighlightthatassessmenteffortswillbeintegraltoeffectingchangesinteamwork,communication,andcooperation.ThespecificLong-TermStrategieswillbeimplementedbyNuclearImprovementProgramCorrectiveActions5.1.7and5.1.6.Thesecorrectiveactions,aswithallotherNuclearImprovementProgramcorrectiveactions,willbesubjecttoanassessmentconductedbyNiagaraMohawkpersonnelincludingselfandindependentassessments.Duringdevelopmentofactionplans,theresponsiblemanagerwillidentifywhatindicatorswillbeusedtojudgetheplan'seffectiveness.Theactionplan,includingtheseaspects,willbereviewedbytheIntegratedTeamandapprovedbySeniorManagement.Asspecifictasksintheactionplanarecompleted,theNuclearImprovementProgramAdministratorwillcoordinatetheassessmentofthetasktodeterminethelong-lastingeffectivenessoftheactionstakentoresolvetheoriginalissueorproblem.TheNuclearImprovementProgramAdministratorwilluseQualityAssurance,NuclearCompliance&Verification,orotherpersonneltoperformtheassessments.ProcedureS-89-1providesfurtherdetailsofhowassessmentsarepartoftheovera11NuclearImprovementProgramprocess.(NOTE:ThisanswerisprovidedinresponsetothisquestionaswellasQuestion49ontheRestartActionPlan.)6754G 9.Objective6.1.3-"Continuewithcorporateresearchanddevelopmentprogramtoimprovetheman-machineinterface."ProvidethebasisforthisobjectiveandspecificNNPCobjective(s)inthisregard.RESPONSE:ThisobjectiveisrelatedtohumanfactorsdevelopmentswhichcouldbeappliedtoimprovetheuseofEmergencyOperatingProcedures.Theintentistocontinueourinvolvementinindustry.developmentsrelatingtohumanfactorsandman-machineinterface.Thiswillallowforongoingevaluationoffutureprogramimprovements.6754G FIGURE1-1(ReferenceRAP(questionI)SavannahRiverReactorIncidentRootCauseCodingTreeD110PROCEDURESEt11NotUsedFollowedtncorrectfy12WrongIIncomplete14FtFenoprocedure11notavailableor11inconvenientforuaeprocedure11difficulttouaecat3or41fpfocedufeF5F6F7FdFgF10F11F12F13F14formatconfusing12i1ation/step12mua.areareferencesf>Aochecftofff3spacepfovidedchecmmisusedf>data/computations13wrongorcxomptetographicsLTA18~quipidentificationLTAf~ambiguousinstructone14limitsLTA14F15FtlF17FtdF19po14sequencewfoa)14factswrong14incompleteIsauauon14notcoveredwrongrevisionused14D2COMMUNICATIONSF21MisunderstoodVerbalComm.standardfS'leIminotogynotusedrepeatbacftfSnotusedtongmessagefSnoisyfg~IlVlrofuhe4%NoComm.orNotTimelyF21nomethodavailabl~1+F25latecommunication1dE6ShiftTurnoverLTAD31dHUMANFACTORS67Man-MacheteInterlaceEdtran,rdEnvironment691dComplesSystemEto20Non.FsueToierantSyst~iriF26F27F26F30labelaLTA17~rgonomegf7lsdinstrumentI17displaysIcontrolsLTAmonitoring17atoftnesaLTAarea17differencesF31F32F33F34F35houaefiooping1dhotIcofdfdbaddghts1dnoisyfdtilthradiation-59-F37knowledge-19baseddecisionrequired~319itemsatoncecomplexf9F39~fforsnot20detectableF40errorsnot20fecovefabio FIGUREI-I(ReferenceRAPquestionI)SavannahRiverReactorIncidentRootCauseCodingTreeTRAINING2007QC27Ett20NoTrainingEt221MethodsLTAEIS27CCLTAIE20F4tFa2taskanalysis21LTAinfrequenttask21FwF47incomplete21trchingfacilities21LTArepetaion21LTAtestingLTA21continuing21trainingLTAF72noQC2lcalledforOCm2rQVcneca28sheett.rAfor~igh28matehat~sctusionLrAF76pansLra2805MANAGEMENTSYSTEM22EtcFibFagF50F5222noSPAC22notstrict~noughconfusing23orincompletetechnical~rrordrawings!23printsLTAStandards.Potciee.orAdminControls(SPACILTANotUsedF53comm.of23SPACLTArecently23changedenforcementLTAnowayto24mof%F57accountabiTityLTA2424AuditsIEvaluationsinfrequent24lack24depthFQ)not24Ets24CorrectweAct'anFetcorr.actiohLTAF62corr.25actionho'tyetimoiemenreaIMMEDIATESUPERVISIONEI7Preparationhoprepare@+planI.TA2SinstructionstooperatotsLTAwak~fhruI.TAlockoNLTAEta28SiaservisonOwingvyorkF70nosupenroonF7tsupenrisionLTAschedulingLTAwontersetectcnLTA FIGURE6-1(ReferenceQuestions5-6)ForSpecificIssues,TaskManagerinitiallyestablishesshort-termandlong-termcorrectiveactions.Engineering&Generationmeetingsheldindependentlytoidentifyissuesand.brainstormcorrectiveactions.ForUnderlyingIssues,sub-groupsoftheIntegratedTeamdevelopandschedulecorrectiveactions.RestartTaskForceEvaluationofcorrectiveactionsandassociatedschedule.ReviewofcorrectiveactionsandassociatedschedulebyfullIntegratedTeam.InitialSeniorManagementreviewandevaluationofcorrectiveactionsandschedules.SummaryofcommonthemesfromemployeefeedbackpresentedtoIntegratedTeam.Proposedrevisionstocorrectiveactionsandschedulesreviewed/evaluatedbySeniorManagement.Approveandimplement,*Ongoing,ContinualReview**ApplieswhileRestartTaskForceisinoperationasagroup6754G TABLE97-'1(ReferenceQuestion97)DedicationPlansHGSet161,171Component/RepairMGSetFunctionNo.DedicationMethodACVoltageRegulatorsPotentiometers161,17190V161,1711P,2P,3PVerifyfunctionalitybybenchtest(applyratedvoltageandestablishregulationpointexists).Verifyinsulationresistance,end-to-endresistance,noresistancediscontinuitiesforfullrotation(benchtest).BearingsRectifierAssemblyRelayCoi1,I161,171171161CRPartof"2"Verifypropertypereceived,dimensions(benchtest),andvibration(post-installation).Verifyvoltagewaveformasexpected,voltagelevel,.currentproperforloadresistance(allpost-installation).Installinrelayandverifypickupvoltage,andinsulationresistance.ControlSwitchrpDCMachineShaftRepairACMachineEnd-BellReplacementDCMachineBrushesControlTransformer161171171161,171161,171CS5PTVerifycontactcontinuity,contactdevelopment(configuration).Verifybearingtemperatures,vibration,windinginsulationresistance,polerationindex.Sameasabove.Verifypastperformances'atisfactory.Verifypastperformancesatisfactory.UnijunctionTransistor6Q(partofDCSpeedRegulator)171Partof90SVerifyDCregulatorcontrolsHGSetproperlyinallmodes(postinstallation).

TABLE101-1(ReferenceQuestions101,104,106)SUB-ELEMENT/CORRECTIVEACTIONCORRESPONDENCESub-Element14.114.214,314.414.514.614.714.814'14,1014.1114.1214.1314.1414.1514.1614.1614.1714F1814.1914.2014.2114.2214,2314.24noneCorrectiveAction14.A.l14.A.214.A.314.A.414.A.514.A.614.A.714.A.B14.A.914.A.1014.A.ll14.A.12!4.A.1314.A.1414.A.1514.A.16.a14.A.16.b14.A.1714.D.114.A.1814.A.1914.D.214.8.114.D.314.c.l14.0.46754G

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1RESTARTACTIONPLAN TI