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| number = ML14310A776 | | number = ML14310A776 | ||
| issue date = 11/06/2014 | | issue date = 11/06/2014 | ||
| title = | | title = IR 05000325/2014008 and 05000324/2014008, September 8-12, 2014 and September 22-26, 2014, Brunswick, NRC Triennial Fire Protection | ||
| author name = Shaeffer S M | | author name = Shaeffer S M | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2 | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2 | ||
Revision as of 09:51, 13 February 2018
| ML14310A776 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2014 |
| From: | Shaeffer S M NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Gideon W R Duke Energy Progress |
| entered for Joyce Calloway, LXG2 | |
| References | |
| IR-2014008 | |
| Download: ML14310A776 (24) | |
Text
November 6, 2014
Mr. William Vice President Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P.O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461
SUBJECT: BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000325/2014008 AND 05000324/2014008
Dear Mr. Gideon:
This refers to the inspection completed on September 26, 2014 at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Inspection Report Nos. 05000325/2014008 and 05000324/2014008, enclosed). The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the design, operational status, and material condition of the facility's fire protection program. The purpose was to also verify that B.5.b mitigating strategies were feasible in light of operator training, maintenance of necessary equipment, and any plant modifications. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. During this inspection, the NRC examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to public health and safety, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov./reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA by Omar R. Lopez-Santiago Acting For/ Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-324 and 50-325 License Nos. DPR-62 and DPR-71
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000324/2014008, 05000325/2014008
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information cc: Distribution via Listserv
SUMMARY
Inspection Report (IR) 05000324/2014008, 05000325/2014008; 9/8/2014 - 9/12/2014 and 9/22/2014 - 9/26/2014; Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection (Triennial) and Other Activities
This report covers an announced 2-week triennial fire protection inspection by a team of six Regional inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process." No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R05 Fire Protection This report documents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BNP) Units 1 and 2. The inspection was conducted in accordance with the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," dated January 31, 2013. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of three risk-significant fire areas (FAs) to evaluate implementation of the Brunswick Fire Protection Program (FPP). An additional objective was to review site specific implementation of one mitigating strategy from Section B.5.b of NRC Order EA-02-026, "Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures" (commonly referred to as B.5.b), as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The sample FAs were chosen based on a review of available risk information as analyzed by a senior reactor analyst from Region II, a review of previous inspection results, plant walk-downs of FAs, consideration of relational characteristics of combustible material to targets, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting a B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports (SERs), licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. Section 71111.05-05 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of three FAs and one B.5.b mitigating strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure by selecting a sample of five FAs and one B.5.b mitigating strategy. The FAs chosen were identified as follows: 1. Fire Zone (FZ) CB-21 - Southwest Control Room Area El. 49'
2. FZ CB-23 - Control Room El. 49'
3. FA DG-07 - E6 Switchgear Room, Diesel Building El. 20' 4. FA TB1 - Turbine Building El. 20' 5. FZ RB2-2 - HPCI Room, Reactor Building El. -17'
For each of the selected FAs, the team evaluated the licensee's FPP against applicable NRC requirements and licensee design basis documents. Applicable licensing and design basis documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment to this report.
.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensee's FPP referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 9; the licensee's safe shutdown analysis (SSA); fire hazards analysis (FHA); plant procedures; piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs); electrical drawings; and other supporting documents. The team selected a sample of SSD systems to evaluate the licensee's ability to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire. The team performed in-plant inspections to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in the SSA. The team reviewed the licensee's shutdown methodology to verify that it properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions for postulated fires resulting in shutdown from the main control room (MCR). The team focused their inspection activities on systems specified in the SSA for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, and decay heat removal; as well as process monitoring instrumentation and necessary support systems, such as the electrical power distribution system, service water and heating ventilation and air conditioning systems. The team reviewed and performed a walkthrough of procedure steps used for post-fire SSD to ensure the technical and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team verified the licensee personnel credited for performance of procedures were available in the event a fire occurred. The team also verified that the credited licensee personnel had procedures available, and were trained on implementation. The team reviewed and walked down applicable sections of procedures 1ASSD-32, "Unit 2 Reactor Building North" 2ASSD-05, "Reactor Building North," 0ASSD-01, "Control Building,"1OP-43, "Service Water System Operating Procedure," and 1OP-17, "Residual Heat Removal System Operating Procedure". The team reviewed operator actions to ensure these actions could be implemented in accordance with plant procedures in a manner necessary to support the SSD method for the applicable fire zone.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.02 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected FAs, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire barriers, including: walls, ceilings, floors, mechanical and electrical penetrations, fire doors, fire dampers and electrical raceway fire barrier systems (ERFBS). The team walked down accessible portions of the selected FAs to observe material condition of the fire barriers and reviewed work orders associated with their repair. The team reviewed the design of selected ERFBS to confirm that appropriate materials and construction methods were used to assure that the respective fire barriers met their intended design function. The team reviewed licensee calculation 0-89-0001, "Combustible Loading Calculation" to verify that the plant fire loading used by the licensee was appropriate for the stated fire resistance rating of the enclosures. The team reviewed recently completed surveillance procedures for fire doors, penetration seals and ERFBS.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.03 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected FAs, the team performed in-plant observations of the material condition and operational line-up of fire detection systems, fire protection water supply, automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems and manual fire hose and standpipe systems. The team reviewed the adequacy of the design and installation of fire suppression systems in the selected FAs. This was accomplished by review of system vendor drawings, calculations, and code compliance reviews. The team evaluated if the fire detection and suppression methods were appropriate for the hazards in the selected FAs. The team compared the fire detection and fire suppression systems to the applicable code of record for National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standard(s) for the selected FAs by reviewing the system design documents and observing their as-installed configurations as part of performing the in-plant walk-downs. The team reviewed recently completed surveillance procedures for fire detection, gaseous suppression, and fire sprinkler systems in the selected FAs and compared them to the BNP FPP. For the selected FAs, the team compared the pre-fire plan strategy of each FA to existing plant layout and equipment configurations, and the fire response procedures. The team assessed the condition of firefighting and smoke removal equipment by inspecting the equipment located in the fire brigade equipment staging and storage areas. The team reviewed fire brigade drill planning and evaluation report records for announced, unannounced and off-site fire department drills performed in 2013 and 2014.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. 04. Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team evaluated whether the installed automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems or manual fire fighting activities could adversely affect equipment credited for SSD, inhibit access to alternate shutdown equipment, or adversely affect operator manual actions (OMAs) required for SSD for the selected FAs. The team considered the consequences of a rupture, inadvertent operation, or actual operation of a fire suppression system concurrent with manual fire fighting activities that would result from a fully involved fire in one of the selected FAs. The team reviewed pre-fire plans which addressed the opening of doors to drain water so that OMAs could be performed. The team observed the material condition of floor penetration seals and concrete floor slabs to assess the potential for damage to equipment below. In addition, the team measured curb heights above the floor for installed equipment and visually checked floor slope to determine if water could inadvertently pool in such a manner as to adversely affect SSD equipment or OMAs. A specific review of postulated fusing of fire sprinklers in the Reactor Building due to steam from a High Energy Line Break (HELB) was performed to address potential flooding issues in lower elevations and to assess effects on equipment credited for mitigation of a HELB.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensee's FPP referenced in UFSAR Chapter 9, the FHA, SSA, plant procedures, P&IDs, electrical drawings, and other supporting documents for postulated fires in FZs CB-21, CB-23, and RB2-2. The team performed the review to ensure that the required functions for post-fire SSD, and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those functions, were included in the fire SSD procedures. The team assessed whether transfer of control from the MCR to the remote shutdown panel, to achieve hot and cold shutdown from outside the MCR could be successfully accomplished. The team reviewed periodic test procedures and test records of alternate shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions, to ensure that the tests were adequate to verify the functionality of alternative shutdown capability. The review included verification that shutdown from outside the MCR could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power.
The team performed in-plant inspections to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with that described in the SSA. The team focused their inspection activities on systems specified in the SSA for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, and decay heat removal, as well as process monitoring instrumentation and necessary support systems. The team reviewed shift attendance records to verify that personnel required to accomplish SSD, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members, were available. The team reviewed training lesson plans and job performance measures, to verify that the training included the shutdown methodology of the SSA and the SSD. The team reviewed and walked down selected applicable steps of 0ASSD-01, "Alternative Safe Shutdown Procedure Index," 2ASSD-05, "Reactor Building North," and 0ASSD-01, "Control Building," in order to assess technical and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also verified that operators could reasonably be expected to perform the procedure actions in order to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.06 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed Brunswick's FHA, SSA, Fire Safe Shutdown Program Manager Database (FSSDMD) and system flow diagram drawings to verify that the licensee had identified required and associated circuits that may impact post-fire SSD for the selected FAs. The team reviewed the credited components specified in the SSD Compliance Assessment Report for meeting the SSD function. The team also reviewed cable routing information for a sample of these credited components to determine if their cables had either been adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage or analyzed to show that fire induced faults would not prevent post fire SSD. The team conducted walk-downs of the chosen FAs to help determine if the credited components relied upon for SSD would still be available given a fire in the chosen FAs.
Additionally, a review was conducted of routing information for credited fire protection and SSD components to determine if a fire in the selected FAs would impact the credited defense-in-depth systems. The team reviewed the licensee's evaluations for spurious circuit failure scenarios (single and/or multiple) specified in the circuit analysis to determine if potential circuit failure scenarios, for a sample list of components, challenged the assumptions made in the SSA. The team reviewed the licensee's electrical coordination study calculations to determine if credited power supplies were susceptible to fire damage. The specific components and references reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.07 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of the sound powered phone (SSP) system to support plant personnel in the performance of OMAs to achieve and maintain SSD, as credited in the BNP UFSAR, Section 9.5.2, "Communications Systems." The team performed plant walk-downs with the licensee's operations staff to assess the credited method of communications used to complete SSD actions as specified in post-fire SSD procedures for the selected FAs. The team also reviewed the communication systems available at different locations within the plant that would be relied upon to support fire event notification and fire brigade firefighting activities to verify their availability. Additionally, the team assessed the operator's ability to communicate based upon observation of a licensee-conducted communications test with the SSP systems and fire brigade portable radios.
The team reviewed the cable routing for the plant phone system to ensure that the required communication systems remained functional following a fire in the selected FAs. Additionally, a walk-down of the fire brigade storage building was conducted to verify the material condition status of the fire brigade's communication systems. The team reviewed preventive maintenance and surveillance test records to verify that the communication equipment was being properly maintained and tested. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.08 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified the adequacy of the plant's emergency lighting systems through review of design and maintenance aspects and inspection walk-downs of the fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lighting units (ELUs), as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J and the BNP approved FPP. The team performed plant walk-downs of the post-fire SSD procedures for the selected FAs to observe the placement and coverage area of the ELUs required to illuminate operator access and egress pathways, and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire SSD. This review also included examination of whether backup ELUs were provided for the primary and secondary fire emergency equipment storage locations and dress-out areas in support of fire brigade operations should power fail during an emergency. In the selected FAs, the team observed operations personnel perform onsite functional tests of the ELUs to verify operation.
The team also reviewed completed test records of ELU battery 8-hour post-service capacity tests, completed surveillances, system health reports, and maintenance tests to ensure that they were sized, tested, rated for at least an 8-hour capacity and maintained consistent with vendor guidance, license requirements, and licensee commitments. Additionally, the team reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR 50.65, Maintenance Rule performance criteria for the ELU system. The team also reviewed the vendor manual to ensure that the ELUs were being maintained consistent with the manufacturer's recommendations and verified the battery storage conditions and maintenance practices were also being followed in accordance with the vendor guidance. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensee's FHA and SSA to verify that the licensee had evaluated the need for cold shutdown repairs. The team determined from the review that the licensee did not take credit for repairs in order to achieve cold shutdown.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.10 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
(1) Compensatory Measures for Degraded Fire Protection Components For the selected FAs, the team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded and/or inoperable fire protection features such as detection and suppression systems, and passive fire barriers. The team reviewed current fire protection impairments and compared them to the FAs selected for the inspection. Fire detection and suppression system impairments were reviewed against operability requirements and compensatory measures outlined in the BNP FPP. The team reviewed this information to determine if the risk associated with removing the fire protection feature from service was adequately addressed with appropriate compensatory measures. The team reviewed unplanned fire protection action statement entries for such items as system malfunction, failure, inadvertent actuation, out of specification operating parameters and surveillance test failures. Entry and closure dates of impaired fire protection items tracked were assessed to determine if restoration to normal operating mode was being done in a timely manner and met the overall objectives of administrative control and compensatory measures outlined in the BNP FPP. The team reviewed the fire protection and fire watch training program documents, as well as training records for personnel tasked with performing fire watch responsibilities, to ensure that individuals were properly instructed and qualified to perform the task. (2) Operator Manual Actions as Compensatory Measures for Safe Shutdown The team reviewed the SSA, FHA, and applicable abnormal operating procedures, to determine if the licensee's SSD methodology credited OMAs outside the MCR as compensatory measures for SSD, for postulated fires in FZs CB-21, CB-23, and RB2-2. For a sample of credited OMAs, the team verified the adequacy of procedural guidance and the accessibility and feasibility of the actions to be performed within the required time limit.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of FPP changes made between November 2011 and August 2014 to assess the licensee's effectiveness to determine if the changes to the FPP were in accordance with the fire protection license condition and that these changes had no adverse effect on the ability to achieve SSD.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.12 Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the controls for combustibles and ignition sources throughout the plant to verify that they were in compliance with the BNP FPP. The team verified that the transient combustible materials were being controlled in accordance with the licensee's administrative control procedures and the licensee's fire probabilistic risk assessment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.13 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed, on a sample basis, the licensee's mitigation measures for reactor pressure vessel depressurization and injection for large fires and explosions to verify that the measures were feasible, personnel were trained to implement the measures, and equipment was properly staged and maintained. The team reviewed surveillance testing records to verify that required equipment was adequately maintained. Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation, and plant walk-downs, the team verified the site's engineering assessment that the makeup capability could be provided using the specified equipment and water sources. The team reviewed the licensee's capability to provide a reliable and available water source and the ability to provide the minimum fuel supply. The team reviewed inventory records and performed a walk-down of the storage and staging areas for the B.5.b equipment to verify that equipment identified for use in the procedures was available and maintained. The team conducted an independent audit and inventory of required equipment and a visual inspection of the dedicated credited power and water sources. The team reviewed training records to verify that operations and security personnel training/familiarity with the strategy objectives and implementing guidelines were accomplished according to the established training procedures.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed recent licensee independent audits, self-assessments, and system/program health reports for thoroughness, completeness and conformance to FPP requirements described in the BNP UFSAR and FPP Manual. The team also reviewed corrective action program (CAP) documents, including completed corrective actions documented in selected condition reports (CRs), to verify that fire protection deficiencies were adequately identified, evaluated, and that appropriate corrective actions were implemented. Operating experience program documents were also reviewed to verify that industry identified fire protection problems, potentially or actually affecting BNP, were appropriately entered into and assessed by the CAP process. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1 (Discussed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000324/2013-002-00, Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition that Could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis
.a Inspection Scope The licensee reported in LER 2013-002-00 that a postulated fire in specified areas of the plant could disable components credited for achieving safe shutdown conditions. The team conducted interviews, performed plant walk-downs, and reviewed corrective action documentation to determine if the issue involved a more than minor performance deficiency.
The LER review is open pending the completion of the review in the Region II offices and, if deemed necessary, a subsequent site visit. This issue was entered into the licensee's CAP as CR 619341.
.2 (Discussed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000324/2014-004-00, Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition that Could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis
.a Inspection Scope The licensee reported in LER 2014-004-00 that a postulated fire in specified areas of the plant could disable components credited for achieving safe shutdown conditions. The team conducted interviews, performed plant walk-downs, and reviewed corrective action documentation to determine if the issue involved a more than minor performance deficiency. The LER review is open pending the completion of the review in the Region II offices and, if deemed necessary, a subsequent site visit. This issue was entered into the licensee's CAP as CR 676576.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On September 26, 2014, the lead inspector presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. William Gideon and other members of the licensee's staff, who acknowledged the results. Following completion of additional reviews in the Region II office, a conference call was held with Mr. Lee Grzeck on October 14, 2014, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the results. Proprietary information was not included in this inspection report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- S. Boyce, Nuclear Ops Specialist
- J. Brady, Nuclear Licensing Consultant
- C. Browne, Contract Safe Shutdown Engineer
- L. Davidson, Safe Shutdown Engineer
- M. Fiorino, Control Room Supervisor
- J. Gaver, Nuclear Fire Protection Coordinator
- L. Grzeck, Manager Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- G. Hamrick, Vice President, BNP
- A. Holder, Corporate Fire Protection
- B. Kelly, Fire Protection Systems
- R. Zambo, Licensing Engineer
NRC Personnel
- M. Catts, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Schwieg, Resident Inspector
- S. Shaeffer, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, DRS, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Discussed
- 05000324/2013-002-00 LER Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition that Could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis (Section 4OA3.1)
- 05000324/2014-004-00 LER Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition that Could Impact Equipment Credited
in Safe Shutdown Analysis (Section 4OA3.2)
LIST OF FIRE BARRIER FEATURES INSPECTED (Refer Report Section 1RO5.02- Passive Fire Barriers) Fire Barriers Floors/Walls/Ceiling Identification Description 3-Hour Wall RB2-1D to RB2-02 3-Hour Wall RB2-1D to RB2-03
3-Hour Ceiling RB2-1D to RB2-01F
3-Hour Ceiling RB2-1D to RB2-05
3-Hour Ceiling RB2-1D to RB2-01G (SE) 3-Hour Ceiling RB2-1D to RB2-01G (SC) 3-Hour Wall CB-23E to CB-4
3-Hour Wall CB-23E to CB-13A
3-Hour Wall CB-23E to CB-13B
3-Hour Wall DG-07 to DG-05 3-Hour Wall DG-07 to DG-06 3-Hour Floor DG-07 to DG-01 Fire Door Identification Description 3-Hour Door (FD-106/107, Double Door) DG-07 to DG 05
3-Hour Door (FD-114/115, Double Door) DG-07 to DG-06 3-Hour Door (FD-128, Single Door) DG-07 to DG-01
LIST OF COMPONENTS REVIEWED (Refer to Report Sections 1R05.01 / 1R05.03 / 1R05.05 / 1R05.06) 1-B21-LI-5977 - Remote Reactor Water Level Indicator for ASSD
2-B21-LI-5977 - Remote Reactor Water Level Indicator for ASSD
1-CAC-TR-778 - Suppression Pool Water Temperature Recorder
2-CAC-TR-778 - Suppression Pool Water Temperature Recorder 1-CAC-LI-3342 - Torus Water Level Indicator 2-CAC-LI-3342 - Torus Water Level Indicator
1-C32-PI-3332 - Reactor Vessel Pressure Indicator
2-C32-PI-3332 - Reactor Vessel Pressure Indicator
1-B21-LI-R604-BX - Remote Reactor Water Level Indicator
2-B21-LI-R604-BX - Remote Reactor Water Level Indicator 1(2) - E51-F045 - RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Valves 1(2) - E51-F012 - RCIC Pump Discharge Valves
1-E1 - 4KV Emergency Switchgear E1
1-E5-AU9 - Unit Substation E5 Main Feed Breaker Compt.
2-DG1-GEN - Diesel Generator No. 1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
- 0ASSD-01, Alternative Safe Shutdown Procedure - Index, Rev. 40
- 0ASSD-02, Alternative Safe Shutdown Procedure - Control Building, Rev. 55
- 1ASSD-32, Alternative Safe Shutdown Procedure - U2 Reactor Building North, Rev. 18
- 0PLP-01.5, Alternative Safe Shutdown Capability Controls, Rev. 13 0MST-ELU11Q, Quarterly Battery-Powered ELUs Functional Test, Rev. 2 0MST-ELU11SA, Semi-Annual Battery-Powered ELUs Functional Test, Rev. 3
- 0MST-ELU11FY, ELU Battery Discharge Test, Rev. 2
- 1OI-03.4.1, U1 Reactor Operator Daily Check Sheets, Rev. 77
- 2OI-03.4.1, U2 Reactor Operator Daily Check Sheets, Rev. 75
- ADM-NGGC-0101, Maintenance Rule Program, Rev. 24 0AP-050, Site Command, Control, and Communication Procedure, Rev. 28
- AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 2
- OPS-NGGC-1314, Communications, Rev. 3
- 0FPP-005, Fire Watch Program, Rev. 34 0PFP-013, General Fire Plan, Rev. 43 0ENP-12.4, Fuse Replacement Control Process, Rev. 8
- 0FPP-008, Fire Protection Equipment Semiannual Inspection, Rev. 56
- 0AP-033, Fire Protection Program Manual, Rev. 15
- 0EDMG-000 - Extreme Damage Mitigation User's Guide and Basis Document, Rev. 9
- 0EDMG-002 - Spent Fuel Pool Makeup/Spray and Refuel Floor Enhanced Ventilation Under Conditions of Extreme Danger, Rev. 3 0EDMG-008 - Emergency Diesel Makeup Pump (EDMP) Setup and Operation, Rev 6
- 0PFP-013 - General Fire Plan, Rev. 43
- 0AOP-38.0 - Loss of Fuel Pool cooling, Rev. 31
- 1OP-43 - Service Water System Operating Procedure, Rev. 117 1OP-17 - Residual Heat Removal System Operating Procedure, Rev. 125 0PT-34.36.1.3 - Emergency Diesel Makeup Pump (EDMP) Flow Test, Rev. 5
- AD-EN-ALL-0045, Nuclear Chemical Control, Rev. 1
- FIR-NGGC-0001, Fire Detection System, Rev. 2
- FIR-NGGC-0003, Hot Work Permit, Rev. 7
- FIR-NGGC-0004, Determination of Combustible Loading and Equivalent Fire Severity, Rev. 4
- FIR-NGGC-0005, Fire Door and Frame Repair, Rev. 1
- FPQ-0001B, Operations Qualifications Check Card Fire Brigade Member, Rev. 2
- 0E &
- RC-0220, Respiratory Protection Program, Rev. 49
- 0E &
- RC-1010, Diesel Fuel Testing Program, Rev. 45 0AOP-05.0, Radioactive Spills, High Radiation and Airborne Activity, Rev. 30 0FPP-007, Control and Use of Fire Fighting Equipment, Rev. 31
- 0FPP-015, Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Control Work, Rev.35
- 0FPP-020, Impairment Notification, Rev. 23
- 0FPP-030, Back-up and Alternate Fire Suppression, Rev. 19
- 0FPP-031, Fire Brigade Staffing Roster and Equipment Requirements, Rev. 33 0FPP-058, General Guide for Operation of the Edwards EST3 Fire Detection System, Rev. 8 0PLP-01.1, Fire Protection Commitment Document, Rev. 39
- 0PLP-01.2, Fire Protection System Operability, Action and Surveillance Requirements, Rev. 43
- 0PT-34.4.2.6, Diesel Generator Building Fire Detection Logic Test, Rev. 11
- Buildings, Rev. 4 0PT-34.5.1.1,
- Fire Protection Valve Cycle Test, Rev. 30 0PT 34.5.1.3, Reactor Building Fire Protection Valve Cycle Test, Rev. 13 0PT 34.5.1.4, Reactor Building Fire Protection Valve Cycle Test, Rev. 13
- 0PT-34.5.2.1, Fire Hose Station Inspection, Rev. 17
- 0PT-34.5.5.0, Diesel and Electric Fire Pump Functional Test, Rev. 32
- 0PT-34.5.6.0, Diesel Generator Building Halon System Functional Test, Rev. 9
- 0PT-34.6.7.10, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals, Diesel Generator Building, Rev.17 0PT-34.7.1.0, Fire Suppression Water System Flow Test, Rev. 15 0PT-34.7.2.1, Hose Station Flow, Rev. 18
- 0PT-34.8.1.0 Hose Station Service Hydrostatic Testing, Rev 23
- 0PT-34.12.1.3, Sprinkler System Water Flow Alarms, Diesel Generator Building, Rev. 14
- 0PT-34.13.4.0, Train A & Train B Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Thermal Fire
- Detection Functional Test, Rev. 2 0PT-34.15.9.7, Cable and Conduit Fire Barriers, Rev. 24
- 0PT-34.24.6.1, Cont. Bldg. Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler System Operability Test, Rev. 18
- 0TPP-219, Fire Protection Training Program, Rev. 9
- SAF-NGGC-2174, Confined Space Entry Procedure, Rev. 13 0MST-BATt10R, Diesel Fire Pump Starting Batteries 18 Month Operability Test, Rev. 9 0OP-41, Fire Protection and Well Water System, Rev. 121
- 0OP-42 Fire Detection System Operational Procedure, Rev. 32
- DBD-61, Design Basis Document, Gaseous Suppression Systems, Rev. 2
- DBD-62, Design Basis Document, Water Based Fire Suppression Systems, Rev. X
- DBD-63, Design Basis Document, Fire Detection Systems, Rev. 0
- DBD-144, DBD External and Internal Flooding Topical Design Basis Document, Rev. 0
- Calculations, Evaluations, & Specifications
- BNP-E-9.010, Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire, Rev. 1 0FP-1214, Fire Door Evaluation for Reactor Building Airlock Doors and Railroad Doors, Rev. 0
- BNP-E-6.095, U1 125/250V DC Coordination / Protection Calculation, Rev. 4
- BNP-E-6.085, U2 125/250V DC Coordination / Protection Calculation, Rev. 3
- BNP-E-8.010, AC Coordination Study, Rev. 16
- BNP-MECH-B5B - Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines: Engineering Hydraulic Basis, Rev. 1
- BNP-E-9.007 - ASSD Manual Action Feasibility, Rev. 0
- GE-NE-A22-00113-38-01 - Task T0611: Appendix R Fire Protection, Rev. 0
- GE-NE-0000-0004-6894-01 - EPU
- WIN-41: Appendix R Fire Protection, Rev. 0
- FP-85925 Progress Energy Pump Trailer Fuel Consumption Calculation, Rev. A
- 0FP-1019, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 12, Rev. 4 0FP-1025, NFPA 14 Code Compliance Engineering Evaluation, Turbine Bldg., 4/15/13 0FP-1039, NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, rev. 0
- CB-23E Fire Safety Analysis for Unit 2, 9/16/12
- EC 80408Z02R0. Att.C, Reactor Building High Energy Line Break Flooding Analysis Engineering Service Request,
- 9700375, Fire Detection System Testing Frequency Evaluation,
- Rev. 0 Specification No. 118-003, Selection and Installation of Fire Barrier and Pressure Boundary
- Penetration Seals, Rev. 0 Specification 024-001, Special Doors for BNP Units 1 & 2, Rev. 8
- 0-89-0001, Combustible Loading Calculation, Rev. 8
Work Orders
- WO 2158179 Rev. 1, ELU Battery Discharge Test, 6/24/2014
- WO 2269645 Rev. 1, Battery-Powered ELUs Functional Test, 7/16/2014
- 01936097 - 0PT-34.36.1.3 - Emergency Diesel Makeup Pump (EDMP) Flow Test, dated 1/27/2012
- WO 1863467-77, Cable H4K-JL1 Fire Coating Repair, 3/22/2012
- WO 1993020-01, Cable H8F-JG2 Fire Coating, 2/15/2012
- WO 2028655-01, Repair to Fire Seal 2-FP-DG-3-056, 8/19/2012
- WO 2050051-01, U1 Cable Tunnel Cable Coating, 3/8/2012
- WO 00213458-15, Phase 1 Test Replace Control Building Fire Detection System, 5/28/2014
Drawings
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 1, Diesel Generator Building, Rev. 6 D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 2, Diesel Generator Building, Rev. 4
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 3, U1 Control Building, Rev. 9
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 4, U2 Control Building, Rev. 6
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 5, U1 Reactor Building, Rev. 8 D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 6, U1 Reactor Building, Rev. 14 D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 7, U2 Reactor Building, Rev. 6
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 8, U2 Reactor Building, Rev. 12
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 9, U1 & U2 Breezeway, Rev. 13
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 10, U1 & U2 Service Water Intake, Rev. 10
- D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 11, U1 Reactor Building, Rev. 4 D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 12, U2 Reactor Building, Rev. 7 D-03412, Emergency DC Lighting Plan, Sheet 13, Turbine Building, Rev. 4
- LL-08304-67-1, U2 Turbine Building Emergency Lighting Support Detail, Rev. 1
- F-03672, Turbine Building - U1 & U2 Intercommunication System, Rev. 7
- F-03675, Control Building - U1 & U2 Intercommunication System, Rev. 13 F-36073, Reactor Building Intercommunication System, Rev. 7 F-09729 - Remote Shutdown system Cable & Interconnection Wiring Diagram, Sheet 2,
- Rev. 29
- F-01926 - Diesel Generator Building Plans, Rev. 19
- BN-43.0.01 - Service Water System, Rev. 02
- BN-43.0.01 - Service Water System, Rev. 0 D-02043, Plant Fire Protection System Piping Diagram, Sheet 1, Rev. 12 D-02057, Plant Fire Protection System Piping Diagram, Sheet 2A, Rev. 10
- D-02302, Diesel Generator Building Fire Protection System Piping Diagram, Rev. 8
- D-04106, Plant Fire Protection System Piping Diagram, Rev. 25
- F-01021, Site Plot Plan, Rev. 8 F-01345, Site Fire Protection Plan Site Layout, Rev. 12 F-02003, Turbine Building Plan Ground Floor, El. 20'-0" General Arrangement, Rev. 20
- F-02006, Turbine Building General Arrangement Cross Section A-A, Rev. 8
- F-02007, Turbine Building General Arrangement Cross Section B-B, Rev. 9
- F-02018, Diesel Generator Building Sections General Arrangement, Rev. 6
- F-02501, Reactor Building Plan Below Grade El. (-) 17'-0" General Arrangement, Rev. 29 F-03896, Units No 1 & 2, Fire Detection System Plan, Control Building, El. 23'-0", Sheet 13,
- Rev. 1 F-03896, Fire Detection System Plan, Reactor Building, El. (-) 17'-0", Sheet 15, Rev. 0
- F-03896, Fire Detection, Diesel Generator Building, El. 23'-0", Sheet 38, Rev. 0
- F-04081, Control Building Air Conditioning and Ventilation Plan El 23'-0" and 49'-0", Rev 22 F-04083, Control Building Units 1 & 2 Sections & Details, Rev. 24
- F-04208, Fire Protection Deluge Valve Pit Piping & Section, Rev. 4 F-4208A, Piping-Line Isometric, Deluge Valve Pit #1, Sheet No. 6, Rev. 3 F-07009, Control Building General Arrangement Sections, Rev. 7
- F-09176, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Reactor Building Plan Below Grade El. (-)17'-0", Rev. 0
- F-09177, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Reactor Building Plan Grade Elevation 20'-0", Rev. 0
- F-09176, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Reactor Building Plan El. 50'-0", Rev. 0
- F-09192, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Diesel Generator Building Plans, Rev. 0 F-09194, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Control Building Plan Elevations 23-0" & 70'-0", Rev. 0 F-09195, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Control Building Plan Elevation 49'-0", Rev. 0
- F-09680, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Turbine Building Plan Ground Floor El. 20-0", Rev. 0
- F-09176, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Reactor Building Plan Below Grade El. (-)17'-0", Rev. 0
- F-09176, NFPA 805 Ignition Sources, Reactor Building Plan Below Grade El. (-)17'-0", Rev. 0 F-41098, Unit 1 Reactor Building Fire Protection System Plan Elevation (-)17'-0" Sh. 1, Rev. 1 F-41098, Unit 1 Reactor Building Elevation (-)17'-0" Fire Protection System Piping Isometric,
- Sh. 2, Rev. 2 L-669897-D, System Arrangement, Reactor Building High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump
- Room, Rev. A
- LL-FB-04300, Turbine Building East Wall, El. 20'-0" Fire Barrier Penetrations, General Layout,
- Sheet 1, Rev. 4
- LL-FB-05200, Control Bldg., El. 49'-0" Fire Barrier Penetrations, General Layout, Sheet 1 Rev. 6
- LL-FB-05201, Control Bldg., Pressure Boundary Penetrations, Control Room Floor Northwest
- Floor Plan, Sheet 1, Rev. 5
- LL-FB-05201, Control Bldg., Pressure Boundary Penetrations, Control Room Floor Northeast
- Floor Plan, Sheet 2, Rev. 6
- LL-FB-05201, Control Bldg., Pressure Boundary Penetrations, Control Room Floor Southwest
- Floor Plan, Sheet 3, Rev. 6
- LL-FB-05201, Control Bldg., Pressure Boundary Penetrations, Control Room Floor Southeast
- Floor Plan, Sheet 4, Rev. 6
- LL-FB-07200, Diesel Generator Bldg. Fire Barrier Penetrations, General Layout, Sheet 1, Rev.1
- Completed Surveillance Procedures, Test Records
- OPT-10.16.L, U1 Remote Shutdown Panel RCIC Flow Controller, RCIC Manual Turbine Trip, and RCIC Turbine Trip Reset Local Control Operability Test, 10/24/2013
- OPT-10.16.L, U2 Remote Shutdown Panel RCIC Flow Controller, RCIC Manual Turbine Trip, and RCIC Turbine Trip Reset Local Control Operability Test, 10/24/2013
- OPT-48.4, ASSD Sound Powered Phone System Functional Test, 02/16/2014
- OPT-48.4, ASSD Sound Powered Phone System Functional Test, 05/10/2014
- OPT-19.11.L, U1 Safety Relief Valve Local Control Operability Test, 03/28/2014
- OPT-19.11.L, U2 Safety Relief Valve Local Control Operability Test, 04/20/2013 0FPP-008, Fire Protection Equipment Semi-Annual Inspection, 02/08/2014 0FPP-008, Fire Protection Equipment Semiannual Inspection, 2/8/14
- 0PT-34.1.1.0, Fire Pump Test (Electric & Diesel), 6/10/14
- 0PT-34.4.1.4, Diesel Generator Building Fire Detection Instrumentation Operability Test, 7/9/13
- 0PT-34.4.1.4, Diesel Generator Building Fire Detection Instrumentation Operability Test,
- 5/20/14
- 0PT-34.4.2.1, Diesel Generator Halon Extinguishing System Liquid Level and Cylinder Pressure
- Verification, 10/7/13 0PT-34.4.2.1, Diesel Generator Halon Extinguishing System Liquid Level and Cylinder Pressure
- Verification, 4/9/14
- 0PT-34.4.2.6, Diesel Generator Building Fire Detection Logic Test, 10/3/13 0PT-34.4.2.6, Diesel Generator Building Fire Detection Logic Test, 1/22/14
- 0PT-34.5.5.0, Diesel and Electric Fire Pump Functional Test, 2/13/13 0PT-34.5.5.0, Diesel and Electric Fire Pump Functional Test, 7/11/13 0PT-34.6.4.1, Sprinkler and Spray Systems Visual Inspection, RX1, RX2, SW, RW, WT and DG
- Buildings, 10/4/13 0PT-34.6.4.1, Sprinkler and Spray Systems Visual Inspection, RX1, RX2, SW, RW, WT and DG
- Buildings, 4/8/14 0PT-34.5.2.1, Fire Hose Station Inspection, 2/18/14 0PT-34.5.2.1, Fire Hose Station Inspection, 5/19/14 0PT-34.5.6.0, Diesel Generator Building Halon System Functional Test, 12/19/12
- 0PT-34.5.6.0, Diesel Generator Building Halon System Functional Test, 9/16/13
- 0PT-34.6.7.10, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals, Diesel Generator Building, 11/23/13
- 0PT-34.6.7.10, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals, Diesel Generator Building, 6/25/14 0PT-34.7.1.0, Fire Suppression Water System Flow Test, 1/26/14 0PT-34.7.2.1, Hose Station Flow, 4/30/14
- 0PT-34.7.2.1, Hose Station Flow, 5/14/14
- 0PT-34.8.1.0, Hose Station Service Hydrostatic Testing, 9/26/13
- 0PT-34.8.1.0, Hose Station Service Hydrostatic Testing, 11/07/13 0PT-34.12.1.3, Sprinkler System Water Flow Alarms, Diesel Generator Building, 2/8/13 0PT-34.12.1.3, Sprinkler System Water Flow Alarms, Diesel Generator Building, 2/3/14
- 0PT-34.13.4.0, Train A & Train B Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Thermal Fire
- Detection Functional Test, 5/22/14 0PT-34.15.9.7, Cable and Conduit Fire Barriers, 11/3/13
- 0PT-34.15.9.7, Cable and Conduit Fire Barriers, 5/1/14 0PT-34.24.6.1, Control Building Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler System Operability Test,
- 10/26/12 0PT-34.24.6.1, Control Building Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler System Operability Test,
- 9/26/13
- Plant Modifications and Engineering Changes
- EC-50724, Fire Detection System Replacement Project, Rev. 16
- EC-50934, Fire Penetration Seal Evaluation, Rev. 5
- EC-77370, Halon Emergency Diesel Generator Control Panel Replacement, Rev. 2
- Fire Fighting Preplan Strategies 0PFP-CB, Control Building Pre-fire Plans, Rev. 11 0PFP-DG, Diesel Generator Building Pre-fire Plans, Rev. 17
- 0PFP-RB, Reactor Building Pre-fire Plans, Rev. 15
- 0PFP-TB, Turbine Building Pre-fire Plans, Rev. 24
- Applicable Codes & Standards
- NFPA 13-1983, Installation of Sprinkler Systems
- NFPA 14-1971, Fire Standpipe Systems
- NFPA 20-1971, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps NFPA 24-1973, Standard for the Installation of Private Service Mains and their Appurtenances NFPA 30-1973, Flammable Combustible Liquids Code
- NFPA 72D-1973, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary Protection Signaling Systems
- Technical Manuals, Vendor Information
- FP-81335, Lightguard Emergency Lighting Unit Manual, Rev. 8
- Audits & Self-Assessments
- System Health Report-Fire Protection, 1/1/14 to 3/31/14 and 4/1/14 to 6/30/14 Program Health Report-Fire Protection, 1/1/14 to 3/31/14 and 4/1/14 to 6/30/14
- B-FP-12-01, Assessment of BNP Fire Protection Program, 8/16/12 B-FP-14-01, Assessment of BNP Fire Protection Program, 7/29/14 Fire Protection Triennial Readiness Self-Assessment
- 655499, 4/17/14
- License Basis Documents Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, 08/23/76 BNP UFSAR, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System; and Plant Technical Specifications,
- Rev. 24 BNP UFSAR, Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems, Rev. 24
- BNP UFSAR, Section 9.5.3, Lighting Systems, Rev. 24 BNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operating License Conditions 2.B (6), Fire Protection NRC Fire Protection Program Evaluation, dated June 23, 1977
- NRC Safety Evaluation Reports dated November 22, 1977; as supplemented April 1979;
- June 11, 1980; December 30, 1986; December 6, 1989; July 28, 1993; and February 10, 1994 BNP Operating License Conditions 2.P, Unit 1; and 2.M Unit 2; Mitigation Strategy License Condition; 10
- CFR 50.54(hh)(2)
Other Documents
- BNP Maintenance Rule - Emergency Lighting Units System Health Report, Emergency DC Lighting, 1st Qtr 2014 System Health Report, Emergency DC Lighting, 2nd Qtr 2014 System Health Report, Fire Protection, 1st Qtr 2014 System Health Report, Fire Protection, 2nd Qtr 2014 System Health Report, 4kV AC Distribution, 2nd Qtr 2014 System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliary Systems, 1st Qtr 2014 System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliary Systems, 2nd Qtr 2014
- FIR-NGGC-0003 Page 29 of 32, Hot Work Log 4/21/14 through 8/19/14 Transient Combustible Permit Nos. 141-142 and 144-149 from 6/18/14 through 8/21/14
- Off-Site Fire Department Drill Evaluation(s), 1/14/13, 1/21/13, 1/28/13, 2/4/13 and 2/11/13
- Unannounced Fire Drill Evaluation for Independent Observers, 5/28/14
- Fire Protection Impairment Log, 7/23/14 through 9/2/14 Mutual Aid Agreement, Brunswick Nuclear Plant and Southport, North Carolina, 12 June 2014 NFPA 805 Hourly Fire Watch Log, 9/9/14
- NFPA 805 Compensatory Measures Log, 9/9/14
- Transient Combustible Permit no. 409, Turbine Building, Fire Area TB1, 4/7/14
- Fire Brigade Training Records, Fire Brigade and Incident Commander, Day Shift for 9/11/14
Action Requests
(ARs) / Nuclear Condition Reports (NCRs) Reviewed During InspectionCR
- 503132, QCE, 12/7/2011
- AR 583375583375 Appendix R SSD Analysis Error, 01/16/2013
- AR 497159497159 Roof Leak Above Diesel Fire Pump Batteries, 11/30/2011
- AR 620338620338 Fire Protection System Health Report, 9/16/2013
- AR 673788673788 Fire Extinguisher not Correctly Located, 3/10/2014AR
- 687369, Halon System Replacement, QA Vault, 8/14/2014
- AR 707801707801 Missed Fire Watch Rounds, 9/15/2014
- AR 709340709340 Missed Fire Watch rounds, 9/29/2014
- List of ARs Generated as a Result of This Inspection
- AR 707454707454 Tape Used To Cover Opening In Raised Floor of Control Room
- SYS 5215 (EMERGENCY LTG)
- AR 709664709664 NRC Triennial-B5B Hose Test Record Gap
- AR 710090710090 NRC Triennial-Evaluate Testing for B5B Hose
- No LLRT on Valves
- AR 710240710240 Safe Shutdown Analysis Compliance Strategy Requires Further
- AR 710262710262 Safe Shutdown Analysis and ASSD Procedure Review
- AR 710264710264 B5B Equipment Maintenance Concern
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- AND [[]]
AR Action Request
- NRC [[]]