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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML030770183 | |||
| issue date = 07/12/2002 | |||
| title = Final Significance Determination for Red Finding & Notice of Violation NRC Special Inspection Report IR 05000266-01-017 & IR 05000301-01-017(DRS) | |||
| author name = Dyer J | |||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III | |||
| addressee name = Warner M | |||
| addressee affiliation = Nuclear Management Co, LLC | |||
| docket = 05000266, 05000301 | |||
| license number = DPR-024, DPR-027 | |||
| contact person = | |||
| case reference number = EA-02-031, FOIA/PA-2003-0094 | |||
| document report number = IR-01-017 | |||
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter, Notice of Violation | |||
| page count = 8 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000301/2001017]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:July 12, 2002 | |||
EA-02-031 | |||
Mr. M. Warner | |||
Site Vice President | |||
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants | |||
Nuclear Management Company, LLC | |||
6610 Nuclear Road | |||
Two Rivers, WI 54241 | |||
SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SIGNIFICANCE | |||
DETERMINATION FOR A RED FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION | |||
NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-266/01-17(DRS); | |||
50-301/01-17(DRS) | |||
Dear Mr. Warner: | |||
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of our review of the apparent | |||
violations and preliminary significance determination of the finding identified in the subject | |||
report of the Special Inspection we conducted. The finding and violations involved the potential | |||
common mode failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps during specific accident | |||
scenarios that you discovered during your efforts to update your probabilistic risk assessment | |||
(PRA) of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The inspection report described apparent violations of | |||
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for | |||
inadequate procedures and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for | |||
seven instances where you should have identified and corrected the vulnerability. The | |||
inspection finding was assessed using the significance determination process and was | |||
preliminarily characterized as Red, i.e., a finding of high importance to safety that could result in | |||
increased NRC inspection and other NRC action. | |||
At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on April 29, 2002, to further discuss your | |||
views on the apparent violations and preliminary risk significance determination. A copy of the | |||
handouts used at this conference are enclosed. During the conference, you provided your | |||
assessment of the significance of the finding and detailed your staff's corrective actions, | |||
including the root cause evaluations. You agreed with the NRC's preliminary assessment of the | |||
risk significance associated with the finding and the apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, | |||
Appendix B, Criterion V; however, you disagreed with the violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix | |||
B, Criterion XVI. You argued that the proposed instances of inadequate corrective actions | |||
either did not specifically relate to the root cause of the problem or that it was not reasonable to | |||
expect appropriate corrective actions because the PRA techniques used to discover the | |||
problems were not used as a formal tool until 1999. Additionally, you proposed that the finding | |||
be treated as an old design issue as specified in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0305, | |||
"Operating Reactor Assessment Program," and that there was no need for additional | |||
inspection. | |||
M.Warner -2- | |||
After considering the information developed during the inspection and the information your staff | |||
provided at the conference, we have concluded that a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion XVI, is appropriate for two of the originally proposed seven examples. The root cause | |||
of the finding was your failure to recognize that the AFW system minimum flow recirculation | |||
valves must be able to close during certain scenarios to allow full flow to the steam generators | |||
and open in other scenarios to allow adequate recirculating flow to protect the running AFW | |||
pumps. Until recently, your procedures and system design only considered the closed safety | |||
function for event response. The specific examples included in the violation occurred in 1997 at | |||
a time when your design basis document for the AFW system identified both open and closed | |||
safety functions as appropriate for the recirculation valves. In March 1997, you identified that a | |||
loss of instrument air to the AFW flow control valves could cause system failure and reported | |||
this in Licensee Event Report 97-014-00. An appropriate extent of condition review should | |||
have identified the same vulnerability for the recirculation valves given their stated open safety | |||
function identified in the AFW system design basis document. Similarly, in October 1997, | |||
Condition Report 97-3363 identified a discrepancy with your inservice test program and the | |||
design basis document concerning the open safety function of the recirculation valves. An | |||
inadequate evaluation of this condition report resulted in revising the design basis document to | |||
delete the open safety function. We also concluded that the PRA techniques you utilized in | |||
2001 to identify this issue were a valuable engineering tool to assess its significance, but were | |||
not required to identify this AFW system vulnerability. | |||
Although not cited, your response to Generic Letter 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply Problems | |||
Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," could also have identified and addressed the AFW | |||
system vulnerability associated with loss of instrument air. Generic Letter 88-14 requested that | |||
licensees verify that emergency procedures and training were adequate to ensure that safety | |||
related equipment would function as intended on a loss of instrument air and to verify that | |||
safety-related components would perform as expected on a loss of the instrument air system, | |||
including that air-operated component failure positions were correct for assuring required safety | |||
functions. This generic correspondence should have directed your attention to this very | |||
vulnerability with the air-operated AFW pump recirculation valves. | |||
As such, the NRC has determined that the potential common mode failure of the Point Beach | |||
AFW pumps is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V and XVI, as cited in the | |||
enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are | |||
described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement | |||
Policy, NUREG-1 600, the Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is | |||
associated with a Red finding. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the | |||
instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. | |||
M. Warner -3- | |||
Based on the information contained in the subject inspection report and obtained during the | |||
regulatory conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as | |||
Red. A finding characterized as Red is an issue of high importance to safety that normally | |||
could result in substantially increased NRC inspection and other NRC action. You have 30 | |||
calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of significance for | |||
the identified Red finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the | |||
criteria given in MC 0609, Attachment 2. | |||
We also considered your proposal that this issue be treated as an old design issue as specified | |||
in MC 0305. We recognize that your staff identified the issue and took prompt corrective | |||
actions to revise procedures and train operators to address the immediate safety concerns | |||
associated with the issue. Additionally, your staff installed backup pneumatic supplies for the | |||
recirculation valves to improve the safety of the AFW system design. We also concluded that | |||
although opportunities existed to identify the issue, they occurred several years ago and are not | |||
necessarily indicative of current performance. However, additional information is needed for us | |||
to complete our evaluation of whether or not it is appropriate to treat this issue as an old design | |||
issue. We therefore plan to conduct some additional inspection. Such inspection effort would | |||
be limited to an evaluation of your corrective actions and the basis for your assessment that | |||
similar issues would be appropriately addressed in your corrective action program. We would | |||
also review your plans to continue the initiative to update the Point Beach Nuclear Plant | |||
Probabilistic Risk Assessment so that other potential risk significant issues may be identified if | |||
they exist. We will inform you, by separate correspondence, of our plans for this inspection. | |||
Following that inspection, we will complete our evaluation of whether or not it is appropriate to | |||
treat the issue as an old design issue and inform you of our decision. | |||
If we determine that treatment as an old design issue is appropriate, then, in accordance with | |||
Section 6.06.a. of MC 0305, the NRC will not use this finding in consideration of Point Beach's | |||
overall performance in the Action Matrix. This means that the issue will be posted on the NRC's | |||
Web site as a Red finding for a period of 4 quarters. However, Point Beach will not be placed | |||
in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Action Matrix nor will the | |||
specified actions associated with this column be taken as would normally occur for a Red | |||
finding. The purpose of this approach is to place a premium on licensees initiating efforts to | |||
identify and correct safety-significant issues that are not likely to be identified by routine efforts | |||
before degraded safety systems are called upon to work. | |||
However, if treatment as an old design issue is not determined to be appropriate, then the issue | |||
will be posted on the NRC's Web site as a Red finding for a period of 4 quarters, Point Beach | |||
will be placed in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Action Matrix, and | |||
the NRC will take the appropriate actions in accordance with the guidance provided in | |||
MC 0305. | |||
M. Warner -4- | |||
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and | |||
its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public | |||
Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's | |||
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at | |||
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | |||
Sincerely, | |||
IRAI | |||
J. E. Dyer | |||
Regional Administrator | |||
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 | |||
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 | |||
Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation | |||
2. NRC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides | |||
3. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides | |||
4. NMC Photograph of Recirculation Valve | |||
5. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Timeline | |||
cc w/encls: R. Grigg, President and Chief | |||
Operating Officer, WEPCo | |||
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President | |||
and Chief Nuclear Officer | |||
T. Webb, Licensing Manager | |||
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager | |||
T. Taylor, Plant Manager | |||
A. Cayia, Site Director | |||
J. O'Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman, | |||
Potts & Trowbridge | |||
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman | |||
Town of Two Creeks | |||
D. Graham, Director | |||
Bureau of Field Operations | |||
A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin | |||
Public Service Commission | |||
S. Jenkins, Electric Division | |||
Wisconsin Public Service Commission | |||
State Liaison Officer | |||
M. Warner -4- | |||
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and | |||
its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public | |||
Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's | |||
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at | |||
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | |||
Sincerely, | |||
IRN | |||
J. E. Dyer | |||
Regional Administrator | |||
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 | |||
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 | |||
Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation | |||
2. NRC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides | |||
3. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides | |||
4. NMC Photograph of Recirculation Valve | |||
5. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Timeline | |||
cc w/encls: R. Grigg, President and Chief | |||
Operating Officer, WEPCo | |||
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President | |||
and Chief Nuclear Officer | |||
T. Webb, Licensing Manager | |||
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager | |||
T. Taylor, Plant Manager | |||
A. Cayia, Site Director | |||
J. O'Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman, | |||
Potts & Trowbridge | |||
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman | |||
Town of Two Creeks | |||
D. Graham, Director | |||
Bureau of Field Operations | |||
A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin | |||
Public Service Commission | |||
S. Jenkins, Electric Division | |||
Wisconsin Public Service Commission | |||
State Liaison Officer | |||
DOCUMENT NAME:P:\FOIA\Poi 01-17 drs NOV.wpd | |||
To receive a coov of this document. Indicate In the box: 'C" = Copy without attachmentlenclosure E = Copy with attachmentlenclosure IN" = No copy | |||
OFFICE Rill Ruil RI I Rill RilI I | |||
NAME RLangstaff:jb JJacobson JGrobe GGrant BClayton | |||
DATE 07/05/02 06/06/02 06/21/02 06/25/02 07/10/02 | |||
OFFICE NRR Rill I Z IL | |||
NAME MSartorius for JDyer | |||
per telecom | |||
CCarpenter | |||
DATE 07/09/02 07/12/02 1 | |||
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | |||
M. Warner -5- | |||
ADAMS Distribution: | |||
WDR | |||
DFT | |||
BAW | |||
RidsNrrDipmlipb | |||
HBC | |||
PGK1 | |||
DRPIII | |||
DRSIII | |||
PLB1 | |||
JRK1 | |||
SECY | |||
OCA | |||
M. Banerjee, NRR | |||
G. Tracy, Chief, Division of Inspection Program Management, IOLB, NRR | |||
H. Nieh, Region III Coordinator, OEDO | |||
W. Travers, EDO | |||
W. Kane, DEDRP | |||
F. Congel, OE | |||
J. Dixon-Herrity, OE | |||
J. Dyer, RIII:RA | |||
L. Chandler, OGC | |||
D. Dambly, OGC | |||
S. Collins, NRR | |||
R. Borchardt, NRR | |||
D. Holody, RI Enforcement Coordinator | |||
C. Evans, RII Enforcement Coordinator | |||
G. Sanborn, RIV Enforcement Coordinator | |||
L. Dudes, NRR | |||
P. Krohn, SRI | |||
S. Gagner, OPA | |||
H. Bell, OIG | |||
G. Caputo, 01 | |||
F. Combs, OSTP | |||
D. Dandois, OCFO/DAF/LFARB | |||
J. Strasma, RIII:PA | |||
V. Mitlyng | |||
R. Lickus, Rill | |||
J. Lynch, Rill | |||
OEWEB | |||
OEMAIL | |||
NOTICE OF VIOLATION | |||
Nuclear Management Company, LLC. Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 | |||
Point Beach Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 | |||
EA-02-031 | |||
During an NRC inspection conducted on December 3, 2001, through February 28, 2002, a | |||
violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of | |||
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed | |||
below: | |||
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," | |||
requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented | |||
instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances. | |||
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires, in part, that | |||
measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly | |||
identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the | |||
measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective | |||
actions taken to preclude repetition. | |||
Contrary to the above, as of November 29, 2001, activities affecting quality were not | |||
prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate | |||
to the circumstances. Specifically, procedures EOP-0.1 Unit 1, "Reactor Trip | |||
Response," Revision 24, and EOP-0.1 Unit 2, "Reactor Trip Response," Revision 23, did | |||
not provide adequate operator instructions to verify that the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) | |||
pump minimum flow recirculation valves were open while controlling AFW flow upon low | |||
instrument air header pressure. Low header pressure would cause the AFW pump | |||
minimum flow recirculation valves to fail closed, a significant condition adverse to quality | |||
which resulted in potential failure of the AFW pumps as a result of blocking the | |||
discharge flow path. From at least 1997 to 2001, the licensee failed to promptly identify | |||
and correct a condition adverse to quality. Prior opportunities to identify this failure | |||
mode included: | |||
In October 1997, the safety function of the minimum flow recirculation valves | |||
was considered in response to Condition Report 97-3363. | |||
In March 1997, the licensee identified a failure mode of the AFW system due to | |||
the loss of instrument air as discussed in Licensee Event | |||
Report 97-14-00. | |||
This violation is associated with a Red SDP finding. | |||
Notice of Violation -2- | |||
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Nuclear Management Company, LLC., is hereby | |||
required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory | |||
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the | |||
Regional Administrator, Region III, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that | |||
is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of | |||
Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and | |||
should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for | |||
disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the | |||
results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the | |||
date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous | |||
docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. | |||
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a | |||
Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, | |||
suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where | |||
good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. | |||
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the | |||
basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory | |||
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. | |||
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC | |||
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's | |||
document system (ADAMS), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, | |||
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without | |||
redaction. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readin--rm.html | |||
(the Public Electronic Reading Room). If personal privacy or proprietary information is | |||
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your | |||
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your | |||
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must | |||
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in | |||
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will | |||
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by | |||
10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial | |||
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please | |||
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21. | |||
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working | |||
days. | |||
Dated this -12th. day of July 2002 | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 00:13, 26 March 2020
ML030770183 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Point Beach |
Issue date: | 07/12/2002 |
From: | Dyer J NRC/RGN-III |
To: | Warner M Nuclear Management Co |
References | |
EA-02-031, FOIA/PA-2003-0094 IR-01-017 | |
Download: ML030770183 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000301/2001017
Text
July 12, 2002
Mr. M. Warner
Site Vice President
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241
SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SIGNIFICANCE
DETERMINATION FOR A RED FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-266/01-17(DRS);
50-301/01-17(DRS)
Dear Mr. Warner:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of our review of the apparent
violations and preliminary significance determination of the finding identified in the subject
report of the Special Inspection we conducted. The finding and violations involved the potential
common mode failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps during specific accident
scenarios that you discovered during your efforts to update your probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The inspection report described apparent violations of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for
inadequate procedures and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for
seven instances where you should have identified and corrected the vulnerability. The
inspection finding was assessed using the significance determination process and was
preliminarily characterized as Red, i.e., a finding of high importance to safety that could result in
increased NRC inspection and other NRC action.
At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on April 29, 2002, to further discuss your
views on the apparent violations and preliminary risk significance determination. A copy of the
handouts used at this conference are enclosed. During the conference, you provided your
assessment of the significance of the finding and detailed your staff's corrective actions,
including the root cause evaluations. You agreed with the NRC's preliminary assessment of the
risk significance associated with the finding and the apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V; however, you disagreed with the violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
B, Criterion XVI. You argued that the proposed instances of inadequate corrective actions
either did not specifically relate to the root cause of the problem or that it was not reasonable to
expect appropriate corrective actions because the PRA techniques used to discover the
problems were not used as a formal tool until 1999. Additionally, you proposed that the finding
be treated as an old design issue as specified in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0305,
"Operating Reactor Assessment Program," and that there was no need for additional
inspection.
M.Warner -2-
After considering the information developed during the inspection and the information your staff
provided at the conference, we have concluded that a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, is appropriate for two of the originally proposed seven examples. The root cause
of the finding was your failure to recognize that the AFW system minimum flow recirculation
valves must be able to close during certain scenarios to allow full flow to the steam generators
and open in other scenarios to allow adequate recirculating flow to protect the running AFW
pumps. Until recently, your procedures and system design only considered the closed safety
function for event response. The specific examples included in the violation occurred in 1997 at
a time when your design basis document for the AFW system identified both open and closed
safety functions as appropriate for the recirculation valves. In March 1997, you identified that a
loss of instrument air to the AFW flow control valves could cause system failure and reported
this in Licensee Event Report 97-014-00. An appropriate extent of condition review should
have identified the same vulnerability for the recirculation valves given their stated open safety
function identified in the AFW system design basis document. Similarly, in October 1997,
Condition Report 97-3363 identified a discrepancy with your inservice test program and the
design basis document concerning the open safety function of the recirculation valves. An
inadequate evaluation of this condition report resulted in revising the design basis document to
delete the open safety function. We also concluded that the PRA techniques you utilized in
2001 to identify this issue were a valuable engineering tool to assess its significance, but were
not required to identify this AFW system vulnerability.
Although not cited, your response to Generic Letter 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply Problems
Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," could also have identified and addressed the AFW
system vulnerability associated with loss of instrument air. Generic Letter 88-14 requested that
licensees verify that emergency procedures and training were adequate to ensure that safety
related equipment would function as intended on a loss of instrument air and to verify that
safety-related components would perform as expected on a loss of the instrument air system,
including that air-operated component failure positions were correct for assuring required safety
functions. This generic correspondence should have directed your attention to this very
vulnerability with the air-operated AFW pump recirculation valves.
As such, the NRC has determined that the potential common mode failure of the Point Beach
AFW pumps is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V and XVI, as cited in the
enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are
described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement
Policy, NUREG-1 600, the Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is
associated with a Red finding. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the
instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.
M. Warner -3-
Based on the information contained in the subject inspection report and obtained during the
regulatory conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as
Red. A finding characterized as Red is an issue of high importance to safety that normally
could result in substantially increased NRC inspection and other NRC action. You have 30
calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of significance for
the identified Red finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the
criteria given in MC 0609, Attachment 2.
We also considered your proposal that this issue be treated as an old design issue as specified
in MC 0305. We recognize that your staff identified the issue and took prompt corrective
actions to revise procedures and train operators to address the immediate safety concerns
associated with the issue. Additionally, your staff installed backup pneumatic supplies for the
recirculation valves to improve the safety of the AFW system design. We also concluded that
although opportunities existed to identify the issue, they occurred several years ago and are not
necessarily indicative of current performance. However, additional information is needed for us
to complete our evaluation of whether or not it is appropriate to treat this issue as an old design
issue. We therefore plan to conduct some additional inspection. Such inspection effort would
be limited to an evaluation of your corrective actions and the basis for your assessment that
similar issues would be appropriately addressed in your corrective action program. We would
also review your plans to continue the initiative to update the Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Probabilistic Risk Assessment so that other potential risk significant issues may be identified if
they exist. We will inform you, by separate correspondence, of our plans for this inspection.
Following that inspection, we will complete our evaluation of whether or not it is appropriate to
treat the issue as an old design issue and inform you of our decision.
If we determine that treatment as an old design issue is appropriate, then, in accordance with
Section 6.06.a. of MC 0305, the NRC will not use this finding in consideration of Point Beach's
overall performance in the Action Matrix. This means that the issue will be posted on the NRC's
Web site as a Red finding for a period of 4 quarters. However, Point Beach will not be placed
in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Action Matrix nor will the
specified actions associated with this column be taken as would normally occur for a Red
finding. The purpose of this approach is to place a premium on licensees initiating efforts to
identify and correct safety-significant issues that are not likely to be identified by routine efforts
before degraded safety systems are called upon to work.
However, if treatment as an old design issue is not determined to be appropriate, then the issue
will be posted on the NRC's Web site as a Red finding for a period of 4 quarters, Point Beach
will be placed in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Action Matrix, and
the NRC will take the appropriate actions in accordance with the guidance provided in
M. Warner -4-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and
its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
IRAI
J. E. Dyer
Regional Administrator
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation
2. NRC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides
3. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides
4. NMC Photograph of Recirculation Valve
5. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Timeline
cc w/encls: R. Grigg, President and Chief
Operating Officer, WEPCo
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
A. Cayia, Site Director
J. O'Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman
Town of Two Creeks
D. Graham, Director
Bureau of Field Operations
A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin
Public Service Commission
S. Jenkins, Electric Division
Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer
M. Warner -4-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and
its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
IRN
J. E. Dyer
Regional Administrator
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation
2. NRC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides
3. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Slides
4. NMC Photograph of Recirculation Valve
5. NMC April 29, 2002 Regulatory Conference Timeline
cc w/encls: R. Grigg, President and Chief
Operating Officer, WEPCo
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
A. Cayia, Site Director
J. O'Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman
Town of Two Creeks
D. Graham, Director
Bureau of Field Operations
A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin
Public Service Commission
S. Jenkins, Electric Division
Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer
DOCUMENT NAME:P:\FOIA\Poi 01-17 drs NOV.wpd
To receive a coov of this document. Indicate In the box: 'C" = Copy without attachmentlenclosure E = Copy with attachmentlenclosure IN" = No copy
OFFICE Rill Ruil RI I Rill RilI I
NAME RLangstaff:jb JJacobson JGrobe GGrant BClayton
DATE 07/05/02 06/06/02 06/21/02 06/25/02 07/10/02
OFFICE NRR Rill I Z IL
NAME MSartorius for JDyer
per telecom
CCarpenter
DATE 07/09/02 07/12/02 1
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
M. Warner -5-
ADAMS Distribution:
WDR
BAW
RidsNrrDipmlipb
PGK1
DRPIII
DRSIII
PLB1
JRK1
SECY
M. Banerjee, NRR
G. Tracy, Chief, Division of Inspection Program Management, IOLB, NRR
H. Nieh, Region III Coordinator, OEDO
W. Travers, EDO
W. Kane, DEDRP
F. Congel, OE
J. Dixon-Herrity, OE
J. Dyer, RIII:RA
L. Chandler, OGC
D. Dambly, OGC
S. Collins, NRR
R. Borchardt, NRR
D. Holody, RI Enforcement Coordinator
C. Evans, RII Enforcement Coordinator
G. Sanborn, RIV Enforcement Coordinator
L. Dudes, NRR
P. Krohn, SRI
S. Gagner, OPA
H. Bell, OIG
G. Caputo, 01
F. Combs, OSTP
D. Dandois, OCFO/DAF/LFARB
J. Strasma, RIII:PA
V. Mitlyng
R. Lickus, Rill
J. Lynch, Rill
OEWEB
OEMAIL
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Nuclear Management Company, LLC. Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
Point Beach Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27
During an NRC inspection conducted on December 3, 2001, through February 28, 2002, a
violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed
below:
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"
requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented
instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires, in part, that
measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly
identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the
measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective
actions taken to preclude repetition.
Contrary to the above, as of November 29, 2001, activities affecting quality were not
prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate
to the circumstances. Specifically, procedures EOP-0.1 Unit 1, "Reactor Trip
Response," Revision 24, and EOP-0.1 Unit 2, "Reactor Trip Response," Revision 23, did
not provide adequate operator instructions to verify that the auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
pump minimum flow recirculation valves were open while controlling AFW flow upon low
instrument air header pressure. Low header pressure would cause the AFW pump
minimum flow recirculation valves to fail closed, a significant condition adverse to quality
which resulted in potential failure of the AFW pumps as a result of blocking the
discharge flow path. From at least 1997 to 2001, the licensee failed to promptly identify
and correct a condition adverse to quality. Prior opportunities to identify this failure
mode included:
In October 1997, the safety function of the minimum flow recirculation valves
was considered in response to Condition Report 97-3363.
In March 1997, the licensee identified a failure mode of the AFW system due to
the loss of instrument air as discussed in Licensee Event
Report 97-14-00.
This violation is associated with a Red SDP finding.
Notice of Violation -2-
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Nuclear Management Company, LLC., is hereby
required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the
Regional Administrator, Region III, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that
is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of
Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and
should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for
disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the
results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the
date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous
docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a
Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified,
suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where
good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the
basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy,
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without
redaction. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readin--rm.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room). If personal privacy or proprietary information is
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by
10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days.
Dated this -12th. day of July 2002