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{{#Wiki_filter:Brunswick Nuclear Plant Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Trip and Failure of Engine Crankshaft Bearing IntroductionScotty HinnantSenior VP & CNOJim ScarolaSite Vice PresidentSteve HowardManager OperationsRandy IveyManager Support ServicesSusan RogersManager MaintenanceTim TraskManager EngineeringBob RishelSupervisor -PSA Agenda Opening Remarks Event Review Diesel Generator Reliability Mitigating Systems Key Lessons Learned Closing Comments Opening Remarks BNP agrees with the finding and preliminary significance determination.
{{#Wiki_filter:Brunswick Nuclear Plant Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Trip and Failure of Engine Crankshaft Bearing
EDG 1 -Sequence of EventsPlanned Maintenance October 23 -30 Oct 23 rd -EDG 1 Removed From Service For Planned Maintenance Activities. Corrective MaintenancePreventive Maintenance72 Month Inspection ActivitiesMargin ImprovementPower Potential Transformer Replaced EDG 1 -Sequence of EventsPlanned Maintenance October 23 -30 Oct 29 th EDG 1 AvailablePost-maintenance testing run, lubricating oil strainer high differential pressure alarms were


received Oct 28 th& 29 thPost maintenance activitiesEDG 1 started and was run 5 timesCumulative run time ~15 1/2hours  Oct 30 th EDG 1 declared operable At Power Electrical System Lineup U2 SAT Flex Link on Phase A Fails Operators Insert Manual Trip on U2 Loss of Offsite Power Unloaded DG 1 Trip Backfeed Established Emergency Power Loads EDG 4 E4 Division II EDG 3 E3 Division I EDG 1 E1 Division I EDG 2 E2 Division II CSW Pump 1A RHR SW Pump 1B RHR SW Pump 2B CSW Pump 2B RHR Pump 1B Fire Pump CS Pump 2B RHR Pump 2B NSW Pump 2B E4 Loads RHR SW Pump 1A RHR SW Pump 2A CSW Pump 2A RHR Pump 1A CS Pump 2A RHR Pump 2A NSW Pump 2A E3 Loads CSW Pump 2C RHR SW Pump 2C RHR SW Pump 1C CSW Pump 1A RHR Pump 2C CS Pump 1A RHR Pump 1C NSW Pump 1A E1 Loads RHR SW Pump 2D RHR SW Pump 1D CSW Pump 1C RHR Pump 2D Fire Pump CS Pump 1B RHR Pump 1D NSW Pump 1B E2 Loads Unit 2 Unit 1 EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure High Differential Pressure Caused By:Aluminum shavings from failed bearingFibrous material from towel left in system during maintenance
Introduction z Scotty Hinnant Senior VP & CNO z Jim Scarola    Site Vice President z Steve Howard  Manager Operations z Randy Ivey    Manager Support Services z Susan Rogers  Manager Maintenance z Tim Trask      Manager Engineering z Bob Rishel    Supervisor - PSA


activities EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure Root Cause of Trip:  Inadequate FME controls resulting in a cleaning cloth left in lube oil system Contributing Causes:
Agenda z Opening Remarks z Event Review z Diesel Generator Reliability z Mitigating Systems z Key Lessons Learned z Closing Comments
-Method of refilling LO duplex strainer basket while DG running
-Rationalized cleaning duplex strainer multiple times following maintenance as normal 
-Shavings from failed bearing contributed to high dp EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure Inadequate Worker Practice Action to Prevent Recurrence: Establish High FME Job Classification for the DG Crankcases Immediate Actions:Improved High FME ControlAccountability for Cleanliness Closeout Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 Bearing Failure Occurred Prior to Diesel Trip Bearing Damage/Cracking Probably Occurred Prior to Final Run Damage Similar to 1992 Failure of Same Bearing  Bearing # 9 in


Service 14 years Prior Bearing in Service 16 years Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9  Cause: Increased Crankshaft Bearing ClearancesResulted In Lower Initial Bearing CrushGreater Operational Stresses on Bearings Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 Action to Prevent RecurrenceReplace DG1 Main Journal Bearings With Oversized Bearings Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9  Other Corrective ActionsDetermine Methodology for Performing Lift ChecksInstall New BearingsEstablish Accurate Bearing Clearance MeasurementPerform plastigauge or similar measuring techniqueReplace Main Journal Bearings on DG #2, #3 and #4 Evaluate Bearing WearEstablish Preventative Maintenance ActivitiesReplace Connecting Rod Bearings on All DG'sDetermine Acceptable Babbitt Thickness Diesel Generator Reliability Review Completed in January 2007 Performed Pareto Analyses using key inputs:MSPIMaintenance RulePlanned and Unplanned UnavailabilityCorrective Action ProgramWork OrdersSelf Assessments, Benchmarks, Audits, NRC InspectionsVendor Input / Industry OE Diesel Generator Reliability Review Key Reliability Improvements Items Allen Bradley Control RelaysAll Normally Energized Critical Relays replacedEDG #3 and #4 Normally De-energized Critical Relays replaced in Refueling OutageEDG #1 and #2 Normally De-energized Critical Relays to be replaced before June 2007 Starting Air Reconfiguration and Improvements6 of 8 Pressure Reducing Valves replaced. EDG #2 to complete before June 2007.6 of 8 Shuttle Valve replaced. EDG #1 to complete before June 2007.Design work commencing to change from air-to-run to air-to-stop Aging of Capacitors in Control System30 of 56 Capacitors replacedSpecial Manufacturing Run in progressNo current evidence of degradation. Power Potential Transforme r replaced on all EDGsEDG #3 and #4 logic upgrade (27 PK Relays) complete. EDG #1 and #2 in Unit 1 2008 Outage. EDG #1 Bearings Diesel Generator Reliability Preventive Maintenance EvaluationIn Progress, To Complete in May 2007 ObjectivesValidation of component criticalitiesUpgrade of existing functional equipment groupsIdentification of single-point vulnerabilitiesStrengthening of PM basis Identification & prioritization of health issuesSystem monitoring improvements Diesel Generator Reliability Interim Actions Increased Monitoring During EDG runs:Thermography of electrical cabinets / componentsMonitoring of critical engine parametersMonitoring of operation and health of support systems Diesel Generator Reliability Technology TransferEngine Solution Inc. to acquire NAK Technology (current vendor for Nordberg
Opening Remarks z BNP agrees with the finding and preliminary significance determination.


EDGs)Joint Progress Energy / Duke agreementEnsures continued and improved vendor
EDG 1 - Sequence of Events Planned Maintenance October 23 - 30 z Oct 23rd - EDG 1 Removed From Service For Planned Maintenance Activities.
Corrective Maintenance Preventive Maintenance 72 Month Inspection Activities Margin Improvement Power  Potential Transformer Replaced


support for EDGs Other Mitigating Systems Mitigating System ReliabilityReviewing mitigating systems for similar vulnerabilitiesService WaterHigh Pressure Coolant InjectionResidual Heat RemovalReactor Core Isolation CoolingDetailed review of NCRs generated over the
EDG 1 - Sequence of Events Planned Maintenance October 23 - 30 z Oct 29th EDG 1 Available Post-maintenance testing run, lubricating oil strainer high differential pressure alarms were received z Oct 28th & 29th Post maintenance activities EDG 1 started and was run 5 times Cumulative run time ~15 1/2 hours z Oct 30th EDG 1 declared operable


past 5 years Lessons Learned Technical Rigor FME Culture and Practices Improved Contingency Plans Corrective Action Program Improvements Closing Comments Mr. Scotty Hinnant Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Questions & Comments}}
At Power Electrical System Lineup U2 SAT Flex Link on Phase A Fails Operators Insert Manual Trip on U2 Loss of Offsite Power Unloaded DG 1 Trip Backfeed Established Emergency Power Loads Unit 2                        Unit 1 E4              E3          E1                E2 Division II        Division I  Division I        Division II EDG 4            EDG 3        EDG 1              EDG 2 E4 Loads        E3 Loads    E1 Loads        E2 Loads NSW Pump 2B    NSW Pump 2A  NSW Pump 1A    NSW Pump 1B RHR Pump 2B    RHR Pump 2A  RHR Pump 1C    RHR Pump 1D CS Pump 2B      CS Pump 2A  CS Pump 1A      CS Pump 1B Fire Pump                                    Fire Pump RHR Pump 1B    RHR Pump 1A  RHR Pump 2C    RHR Pump 2D CSW Pump 2B    CSW Pump 2A  CSW Pump 1A    CSW Pump 1C RHR SW Pump    RHR SW Pump  RHR SW Pump    RHR SW Pump 2B              2A          1C              1D RHR SW Pump    RHR SW Pump  RHR SW Pump    RHR SW Pump 1B              1A          2C              2D CSW Pump 1A                  CSW Pump 2C
 
EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure z High Differential Pressure Caused By:
Aluminum shavings from failed bearing Fibrous material from towel left in system during maintenance activities
 
EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure z Root Cause of Trip: Inadequate FME controls resulting in a cleaning cloth left in lube oil system z Contributing Causes:
  - Method of refilling LO duplex strainer basket while DG running
  - Rationalized cleaning duplex strainer multiple times following maintenance as normal
  - Shavings from failed bearing contributed to high dp
 
EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure z Inadequate Worker Practice z Action to Prevent Recurrence: Establish High FME Job Classification for the DG Crankcases z Immediate Actions:
Improved High FME Control Accountability for Cleanliness Closeout
 
Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Bearing Failure Occurred Prior to Diesel Trip z Bearing Damage/Cracking Probably Occurred Prior to Final Run z Damage Similar to 1992 Failure of Same Bearing z Bearing # 9 in Service 14 years z Prior Bearing in Service 16 years
 
Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Cause: Increased Crankshaft Bearing Clearances Resulted In Lower Initial Bearing Crush Greater Operational Stresses on Bearings
 
Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Action to Prevent Recurrence Replace DG1 Main Journal Bearings With Oversized Bearings
 
Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Other Corrective Actions Determine Methodology for Performing Lift Checks Install New Bearings Establish Accurate Bearing Clearance Measurement Perform plastigauge or similar measuring technique Replace Main Journal Bearings on DG #2, #3 and #4 Evaluate Bearing Wear Establish Preventative Maintenance Activities Replace Connecting Rod Bearings on All DGs Determine Acceptable Babbitt Thickness
 
Diesel Generator Reliability Review z Completed in January 2007 z Performed Pareto Analyses using key inputs:
MSPI Maintenance Rule Planned and Unplanned Unavailability Corrective Action Program Work Orders Self Assessments, Benchmarks, Audits, NRC Inspections Vendor Input / Industry OE
 
Diesel Generator Reliability Review Key Reliability Improvements Items z Allen Bradley Control Relays All Normally Energized Critical Relays replaced EDG #3 and #4 Normally De-energized Critical Relays replaced in Refueling Outage EDG #1 and #2 Normally De-energized Critical Relays to be replaced before June 2007 z Starting Air Reconfiguration and Improvements 6 of 8 Pressure Reducing Valves replaced. EDG #2 to complete before June 2007.
6 of 8 Shuttle Valve replaced. EDG #1 to complete before June 2007.
Design work commencing to change from air-to-run to air-to-stop z Aging of Capacitors in Control System 30 of 56 Capacitors replaced Special Manufacturing Run in progress No current evidence of degradation.
z Power Potential Transformer replaced on all EDGs z EDG #3 and #4 logic upgrade (27 PK Relays) complete.
z EDG #1 and #2 in Unit 1 2008 Outage.
z EDG #1 Bearings
 
Diesel Generator Reliability Preventive Maintenance Evaluation z In Progress, To Complete in May 2007 z Objectives Validation of component criticalities Upgrade of existing functional equipment groups Identification of single-point vulnerabilities Strengthening of PM basis Identification & prioritization of health issues System monitoring improvements
 
Diesel Generator Reliability Interim Actions z Increased Monitoring During EDG runs:
Thermography of electrical cabinets / components Monitoring of critical engine parameters Monitoring of operation and health of support systems
 
Diesel Generator Reliability z Technology Transfer Engine Solution Inc. to acquire NAK Technology (current vendor for Nordberg EDGs)
Joint Progress Energy / Duke agreement Ensures continued and improved vendor support for EDGs
 
Other Mitigating Systems z Mitigating System Reliability Reviewing mitigating systems for similar vulnerabilities Service Water High Pressure Coolant Injection Residual Heat Removal Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Detailed review of NCRs generated over the past 5 years
 
Lessons Learned z Technical Rigor z FME Culture and Practices z Improved Contingency Plans z Corrective Action Program Improvements
 
Closing Comments Mr. Scotty Hinnant Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
 
Questions & Comments}}

Latest revision as of 08:16, 23 November 2019

Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Trip and Failure of Engine Crankshaft Bearing
ML071080406
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/05/2007
From:
Progress Energy Carolinas
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML071080396 List:
References
Download: ML071080406 (30)
v • d • e


Text

Brunswick Nuclear Plant Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Trip and Failure of Engine Crankshaft Bearing

Introduction z Scotty Hinnant Senior VP & CNO z Jim Scarola Site Vice President z Steve Howard Manager Operations z Randy Ivey Manager Support Services z Susan Rogers Manager Maintenance z Tim Trask Manager Engineering z Bob Rishel Supervisor - PSA

Agenda z Opening Remarks z Event Review z Diesel Generator Reliability z Mitigating Systems z Key Lessons Learned z Closing Comments

Opening Remarks z BNP agrees with the finding and preliminary significance determination.

EDG 1 - Sequence of Events Planned Maintenance October 23 - 30 z Oct 23rd - EDG 1 Removed From Service For Planned Maintenance Activities.

Corrective Maintenance Preventive Maintenance 72 Month Inspection Activities Margin Improvement Power Potential Transformer Replaced

EDG 1 - Sequence of Events Planned Maintenance October 23 - 30 z Oct 29th EDG 1 Available Post-maintenance testing run, lubricating oil strainer high differential pressure alarms were received z Oct 28th & 29th Post maintenance activities EDG 1 started and was run 5 times Cumulative run time ~15 1/2 hours z Oct 30th EDG 1 declared operable

At Power Electrical System Lineup U2 SAT Flex Link on Phase A Fails Operators Insert Manual Trip on U2 Loss of Offsite Power Unloaded DG 1 Trip Backfeed Established Emergency Power Loads Unit 2 Unit 1 E4 E3 E1 E2 Division II Division I Division I Division II EDG 4 EDG 3 EDG 1 EDG 2 E4 Loads E3 Loads E1 Loads E2 Loads NSW Pump 2B NSW Pump 2A NSW Pump 1A NSW Pump 1B RHR Pump 2B RHR Pump 2A RHR Pump 1C RHR Pump 1D CS Pump 2B CS Pump 2A CS Pump 1A CS Pump 1B Fire Pump Fire Pump RHR Pump 1B RHR Pump 1A RHR Pump 2C RHR Pump 2D CSW Pump 2B CSW Pump 2A CSW Pump 1A CSW Pump 1C RHR SW Pump RHR SW Pump RHR SW Pump RHR SW Pump 2B 2A 1C 1D RHR SW Pump RHR SW Pump RHR SW Pump RHR SW Pump 1B 1A 2C 2D CSW Pump 1A CSW Pump 2C

EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure z High Differential Pressure Caused By:

Aluminum shavings from failed bearing Fibrous material from towel left in system during maintenance activities

EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure z Root Cause of Trip: Inadequate FME controls resulting in a cleaning cloth left in lube oil system z Contributing Causes:

- Method of refilling LO duplex strainer basket while DG running

- Rationalized cleaning duplex strainer multiple times following maintenance as normal

- Shavings from failed bearing contributed to high dp

EDG 1 Trip On Low Lube Oil Pressure z Inadequate Worker Practice z Action to Prevent Recurrence: Establish High FME Job Classification for the DG Crankcases z Immediate Actions:

Improved High FME Control Accountability for Cleanliness Closeout

Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Bearing Failure Occurred Prior to Diesel Trip z Bearing Damage/Cracking Probably Occurred Prior to Final Run z Damage Similar to 1992 Failure of Same Bearing z Bearing # 9 in Service 14 years z Prior Bearing in Service 16 years

Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Cause: Increased Crankshaft Bearing Clearances Resulted In Lower Initial Bearing Crush Greater Operational Stresses on Bearings

Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Action to Prevent Recurrence Replace DG1 Main Journal Bearings With Oversized Bearings

Failure Of Main Journal Bearing #9 z Other Corrective Actions Determine Methodology for Performing Lift Checks Install New Bearings Establish Accurate Bearing Clearance Measurement Perform plastigauge or similar measuring technique Replace Main Journal Bearings on DG #2, #3 and #4 Evaluate Bearing Wear Establish Preventative Maintenance Activities Replace Connecting Rod Bearings on All DGs Determine Acceptable Babbitt Thickness

Diesel Generator Reliability Review z Completed in January 2007 z Performed Pareto Analyses using key inputs:

MSPI Maintenance Rule Planned and Unplanned Unavailability Corrective Action Program Work Orders Self Assessments, Benchmarks, Audits, NRC Inspections Vendor Input / Industry OE

Diesel Generator Reliability Review Key Reliability Improvements Items z Allen Bradley Control Relays All Normally Energized Critical Relays replaced EDG #3 and #4 Normally De-energized Critical Relays replaced in Refueling Outage EDG #1 and #2 Normally De-energized Critical Relays to be replaced before June 2007 z Starting Air Reconfiguration and Improvements 6 of 8 Pressure Reducing Valves replaced. EDG #2 to complete before June 2007.

6 of 8 Shuttle Valve replaced. EDG #1 to complete before June 2007.

Design work commencing to change from air-to-run to air-to-stop z Aging of Capacitors in Control System 30 of 56 Capacitors replaced Special Manufacturing Run in progress No current evidence of degradation.

z Power Potential Transformer replaced on all EDGs z EDG #3 and #4 logic upgrade (27 PK Relays) complete.

z EDG #1 and #2 in Unit 1 2008 Outage.

z EDG #1 Bearings

Diesel Generator Reliability Preventive Maintenance Evaluation z In Progress, To Complete in May 2007 z Objectives Validation of component criticalities Upgrade of existing functional equipment groups Identification of single-point vulnerabilities Strengthening of PM basis Identification & prioritization of health issues System monitoring improvements

Diesel Generator Reliability Interim Actions z Increased Monitoring During EDG runs:

Thermography of electrical cabinets / components Monitoring of critical engine parameters Monitoring of operation and health of support systems

Diesel Generator Reliability z Technology Transfer Engine Solution Inc. to acquire NAK Technology (current vendor for Nordberg EDGs)

Joint Progress Energy / Duke agreement Ensures continued and improved vendor support for EDGs

Other Mitigating Systems z Mitigating System Reliability Reviewing mitigating systems for similar vulnerabilities Service Water High Pressure Coolant Injection Residual Heat Removal Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Detailed review of NCRs generated over the past 5 years

Lessons Learned z Technical Rigor z FME Culture and Practices z Improved Contingency Plans z Corrective Action Program Improvements

Closing Comments Mr. Scotty Hinnant Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Questions & Comments

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