ML040350505

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Meeting Handouts with Progress Energy to Discuss Fire Protection Initiatives
ML040350505
Person / Time
Site: Harris, Brunswick, Crystal River, Robinson  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/07/2004
From:
Progress Energy Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
DUNNINGTON, E, NRR/DLPM 415-1486
Shared Package
ML040340495 List:
References
Download: ML040350505 (34)
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Text

Fire Protection Initiatives NRC Meeting January 7, 2004 Brunswick (BNP)

Crystal River 3 (CR3)

Harris (HNP)

Robinson (RNP)

Nuclear Generation Group Progress Energy No commitments are made or implied by this presentation.

Information is presented to stimulate dialogue.

Fire Protection initiatives Progress Energy Participants

  • Fire Protection o Paul Gaffney (Corporate Chief Elect/l&C Engineer) o Jeff Ertman (Corporate Fire Protection Engineer) b Frank Dola CR3 (Operations) o Frank Modlin RNP (Safe Shutdown Engineer)
  • Regulatory Affairs
  • John Caves HNP (Regulatory Affairs) o David Lee (Corporate Regulatory Affairs)
  • Additional personnel by phone if line is available i^ ralon W 2 Progress Energy

Fire Protection Initiatives Purpose of Meeting

. Goal of this meeting. is to communicate our current fleet plans to the NRC Nude LN Generation

~~~Grou 3 C Progress Energy

Fire Protection Goals

  • Safety
  • Compliance
  • Current Design and Licensing Basis
  • Appendix R/NUREG 800 (HNP)
  • Apply additional Safe Shutdown Analysis criteria to ensure an adequate level of safety is maintained.
  • Consistent safe Shutdown Methodologies and Processes across Progress Energy fleet
  • Prioritize resources from a Safety Significance perspective Nudear EGGS . 4
  • Progress Energy

Fire Protection Initiatives Agenda

  • Provide highlights of Progress Energy's.

Safe'Shutdown Analysis approaches fore

-the following:

o Fire Induced Circuit Failures and resulting Multiple Spurious Operations P Manual Action Feasibility Analysis

  • Provide information on Progress Energy's potential use of Fire Rated Cable as a hardware option to address Fire Safe .

Shutdown separation L G lbN urProgress 5 Energy

Safe Shutdown Analysis Methodology Overview

( ~~~ N~fuclear Generation

&'3Progress Energy me ~~~~Gmrup 6

Safe Shutdown Analysis Progress Energy Status

  • Started at HNP in June 2003
  • Started at RNP in November 2003 I Scheduled to start at BNP and CR3 in
  • 2004
  • eInitiated baseline Manual Action Feasibility i CR3 and RNP started in early 2003

. HNP as part of Safe Shutdown Analysis.l validation started mid 2003

, BNP started late 2003.

AG' 7 2 Progress Energy

Safe:Shutdown Analysis Methodology Overview

(

(udNUdearGnerrao Gwup 8 A03 Progress Energy

Fire Induced Cable Failure Position Development

  • Incorporating industry circuit failure results.

into our, Safe Shutdown design. process.to the extent information is available o Used NEI 00-01 and EPRI cable test data-

  • Incorporates informal NRC Guidance provided over the last year:

o February 2003 Fire Induced Cable Failure workshop o Revised IP71111.05

  • Draft RIS in August 2003 9tg~p g ' C ProgresslEnergy

Fire Induced Cable Failure Position Development

  • Bins were based on industry testing, Safety Significance and NRC Guidance
  • Positions developed in Fire I nduced Cable Failure paper

.apply to Safe Shutdown Analysis Nuclea I~~rq Generation

~Group 10 COO Progress Energy

Fire Induced Cable Failure Position Development v Highest Significance items (Bin 1) addressed in the Safe'.Shutdown' Analysis

  • Moderate Significance Items (Bin 2) addressed on- a'case-by-case basis
  • Low Significance Items (Bin 3) addressed only for the current design methodology-NPudEar ',

i(G=P 1a Progres§-Energy

Fire Induced Cable Failure Position Development

  • . "Current Design Methodology" generally consists of sequential spurious operations P Hi/Low pressure interface is a typical exception

i For those combinations (up to. 2) that can cause an Unrecoverable Condition or Unrecoverable Equipment Damage

  • Revised Design Methodology addresses up to 3-4 fire induced circuit failures in a circuit.

i PrgresnNudrg Energy

  • 1 lG~GrupX . 2BPoss

Fire Induced Cable Failure Design Rules

  • Fire Induced Cable Failure Paper contains the Safe Shutdown Design rules developed to.

implement 'Binning' philosophy and NGG positions into the Safe Shutdown Analysis .

  • Example 1:

Cable-Failure Mode & Comments And Impacted Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Item Related . Bin* General Discussion Analysis Task Cable Attribute EPRI / Sandia Testing 7A Intra-cable shorts. Single Y 1 This is the typicalMOV Steps 3 & 4 hot short within multi- control cable example. Cable Selection/Circuit Analysis conductor thermoset or Current design methodology is consistent. No thermoplastic control cable. change.

.teps 5&6 Flre Area Analysis Cabb 1 . Any and all one at a time philosophy used in the Area Analysis bounds this item. No Single hot short within 1 change.

cable.

Nudear L?ff; Gen"on Group 13 Progress Energy

Fire Induced Cable Failure Design Rules

  • Example 2:

Cable Failure Mode & CD Comments And Impacted Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Item Related Bin* General Discussion Analysis Task Cable Attribute (YIN) EPRI / Sandia Testing 7B Multiple concurrent intra- N 1 Any and all potential Steps 3 & 4 cable shorts. Multiple spurious operations that Cable Selection/Circuit Analysis occurrences of single shorts may occur concurrently Each individual spurious operation would have within individually distinct froma single fire. been previously captured (Item 7A). No thermoset or thermoplastic change.

controlcable. For cases involving the potential failure of more Steps 5 & 6 than one multi conductor Fire Area Analysis 6 w cable, a maximum of two Conbine the effects of the spurious operations.

Cable 1 Cable 2 concurrent spurious The new safety function screen is also applied operations will be if needed. Except for hi/lo'pressure interface Single hot short within each assumed. this is a change to the current design.

Single hot short within each mtoooy cable up to a maximum of 2* See also Item 8C. methodology.

cables involved.

~~LN

~~

~

b ~~Nuclear Gem~ration Group 14 M Progress Energy

Fire Induced Cable Failure Design Rules C,

. Example 3:

Cable Failure Mode & CDM Comments And General Impacted Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Item Related I Bln* Discussion Analysis Task Cable Attribute EPRI / Sandia Testinq _ _ .

For cases involving the Steps'3 & 4 Multiple concurrent intra- N 8B 1 cable shorts. Multiple potential failure of more than Cable Selection/Circuit Analysis occurrences of multiple one multiconductor cable, a See Item 8A above. This is a change to the shorts within individually maximum of two concurrent current design methodology.

distinct thermoset or spurious actuations should be thermoplastic control cable. assumed. For cases where more than two concurrent Steps 5 & 6 spurious actuations can occur Fire Area Analysis as the result of intra-cable See Item 8A above. This is a change to the r,4l?

shorting within a single current design methodology.

Cabe 1 Cable 2 multiconductor cable they should be considered. The Up to 2 cables will be consideration of concurrent postulated. spurious operations in more than two cables will be deferred pending additional research.

NUI I

Genexalon Gmu 15 01 Progress Energy

Safe Shutdown Analysis Resolution Process c~~

m t~~udear Gemration Group 16 Progress Energy

Safe Shutdown Analysis Methodology Overview Nuclear c idb Goneragou Group 17 C~j Progress Energy

Manual Action Feasibility Position Development u -

  • Reviewed available industry information
  • Developed fleet methodology
  • Incorporate latest NRC draft criteria into our evaluation process moving forward.

(~~~ ~Nuclear LPi., -

Generdon Group 18 - &* Progress Energy

Manual Action Feasibility'.

Historical Perspective

could be accomplished without relying on potentially damaged cables in the fire area

  • Safe Shutdown path. was considered 'free from fire damage' per III.G.1.
  • Understand that NRC remedy to address, manual action issue is through lll.G.2 Nudl L/Ii~GenraP eap1PorsE 19 Progress Eeg

Manual Action Position Suppression and Detection

  • From the history.above, suppression and' detection was not considered a.

requirement

, Fire Areas that credit manual operator actions typically have fire detection installed to. ensure quick response

  • Progress Energy.will track status of' suppression and detection.pending rulemaking, ongoing.regulatory activities Nudeaw 2

~~Gfu 20 Progress Energy

Manual-Action Feasibility Additional Positions

  • Progress Energy will use NRC interim feasibility criteria as-provided in recent l Federal Register Notice to assess manual actions

III.G.2 not specifically approved by the staff Will be submitted for approval per.

latest regulation Nud1a GIOUP ~~21Progress Energy

Manual Action Feasibility Criteria

  • Recovery Time
  • Plant Staff and Training
  • Local Accessibility
  • Environmental Considerations
  • Equipment Preconditions
  • Available. Indications
  • Special Equipment.
  • Communications
  • Procedural Guidance Gmup 22 ProgressEnergy

Manual Action Feasibility.

Complexity. and Number Criteria

  • Fire Areas.are defined as High, Medium',

or Low complexity areas

  • Complexity drives the type of operator procedure to handle the manual actions: .

. High - Directive by Fire Area

  • Specific entry conditions for the procedure to avoid premature entry o Medium - Symptom based by Fire Areas

. Low - Generic Fire Safe Shutdown.

instruction Gmup. 23 B Progress Energy

Manual Action. Feasibility Timeline Goal

  • Demonstrate that the time to complete manual operator actions is bounded by.th'e time to reach an unrecoverable condition fludear Lpi" Generation

~~Group 24 .U3Progress Energy

.Manual Action Feasibility' Timeline Graphic' Figure 4.1 - Event Timeline Operations Timeline ltto tgr Plant Transient Timeline sp t.al sgst tUn tf - fire begins tal - fire alarm tsp, - spurious actuation occurs trt - operator trips reactor tor - operator response (s) tglst - goal parameter (s)out of acceptable range (lost) tgr - goal recovery tun - unrecoverable condition is reached i 2 P rudoaE

( 1n3~~GroupX 25 Progress'Ener'gy

Safe Shutdown Analysis Summary

  • Looking forward, Progress Energy Safe Shutdown Methodology includes:

, Recent circuit failure information used to establish Fire Safe Shutdown' design rules

  • NRC Draft interim feasibility criteria from 11/26/03 Federal Register Notice used as an input
  • Manual Action Timelines is based on comparison of operator timeline vs. plant transient response timeline
  • Revised Design Method will be implemented under the Fire Protection License Condition Review Process
  • Manual operator actions for III.G.2 will be submitted after validation efforts are complete as required by the NRC requirements Nudear Gnraoup 26 Progress Ene'rgy

Fire Rated Cable

Background

  • Control cables not protected from spurious actuation at HNP
  • Fire Rated Cable will be an option for the Progress Energy Fleet to address SSD fire area casualties
  • Other typical hardware options include raceway wrap and reroute of conventional cable Gwra 27 B Progress Energy

Fire Rated Cable Industry Information

. Benchmarked the industry for use of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated cable

  • Meggitt Safety System fire rate( d cables installed at other nuclear plants
  • Cable Manufacturer v Meggitt Safety Systems Inc.

o Semi Valley,. California  %,

NucieaI Gfflration Goup 28 Progress Energy

Fire Rated Cable Cable Qualification

. Qualification addresses:

Approved App.endix B Supplier

) EQ requirements P Seismic requirements

) 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating requirements

(~~b Nuclear

~Gewat~on Group 29  ; W Progress Energy

Fire Rated Cable Cable Seismic Testing

  • Seismic Shake Table Test
  • Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization Program:

(SQURTS) 0 Bounding conductor sizes .

o Terminations o Progress Energy Bounding Seismic response spectra Lc~Group Nudw 30 Progress~ EnergJy

Fire Rated-Cable Cable Fire Testing

  • Cable Supports o Established detailed cable route' o Detailed support type identification

' Cable routed to minimize seismic IlI.

concerns

Cables routed to decrease vulnerability to overhead hazards
  • .ElectricalRequirements o.Identified conductors/sizes IINudear V, JGroupao 3C Progress Eniergy

Fire Rated Cable Cable Fire Testing

Omega Point Labs

  • UL Standard 2196, Standard for Tests of Fire Resistive Cables, First Ed. 5/11/2001.
  • Testing multiple support configurations
  • Testing multiple conductor and cable sizes
  • . Four cables with cable splices

. Fire Test plan comments

  • Recognized NRC commented in 2000 on UL Standard 21.96 Nudear QnGMUPe 32 Progress'Energy

Fire Rated Cable zummary

  • Fire Test per UL 2196
  • Plan to bound configurations used in plant
  • Evaluating the need to submit for approval Nue d Group~G 33 jProgress Energy.

Fire Protection Goals

  • Safety

, Compliance

.Current Design and Licensing Basis

  • Appendix R/NUREG 800 (HNP)

P Apply additional Safe Shutdown Analysis criteria to ensure an adequate level of safety is maintained

  • Consistent safe Shutdown Methodologies and Processes across Progress Energy fleet
  • Prioritize resources from a Safety Significance perspective' dear 34 B Progress Energy
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