ML14126A636

APS Supplement to the Seismic Walkdown Report Requested by the NRC Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force.

ML14126A636
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/30/2014
From:	Mims D C Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14126A645	List: ML14126A636
References
102-06868-DCM/MAM/PJH WCAP-17681-NP, Supple. 1, Rev. 0
Download: ML14126A636 (117)

Text

10 CFR 50.54(f) DWIGHT C. MIMS Senior V i ce President, N uclear Regu l atory & Oversight Pa l o Verde Nuclear Gene r ating S t at i on P.O. Box 52034 Phoen i x, AZ 85072 102-06868-DC M/M A M/PJH April 30, 20 1 4 Ma ll Station 7605 Tel 623 393 5403 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pi k e Rockville, M D 20852

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of t he Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, d ated March 12, 2012

Dear Sir s:

Su b ject: 2. NRC Letter, Endorsement Of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, " Seismic Walkdown Guidance," dated M ay 31, 2012 3. APS Letter 1 02-06626, Se i sm i c Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter , Request for Information Pu rsuan t to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regu la tions 50.5 4 (f) Regard ing Recommendat i ons 2.1 , 2.3, and 9. 3 , of the Near-Term Task Force Rev ie w of Ins igh ts from the Fukush i ma Da i-i chi Accident, dated Novembe r 27, 2012 4. NRC Letter, Staff Assessment of the Seismic Wa/kdown Reports Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-lchi Nuclear Power Plant, dated Apr i l 11, 20 1 4 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 APS Supplement to the Seismic Walkdown Report Requested by the NRC Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Se i smic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ich i Accident On March 12, 2012, the U. S. N uclea r Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to Arizona Public Service {A P S). Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains s pecific Requested Actions, Requested Informat ion, and Required Responses a ssoci ated with Seismic Recommendat i on 2.3. For Seismic Recommendation 2.3, Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 states that within 180 days of NRC endorsement of the walkdown guidance (Re f erence 2), each addressee w i ll submit its final response for the requested i nformat ion, inclu ding a list of any areas that are A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway

• Comanche Peak

• Dl.ablo Canyon

• Palo Verde

• Wolf Creek ENCLOSURE APPENDICES A and B CONTAIN UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED 102-06868-DCM/MAM/PJH ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission APS Supplement to the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report Page 2 unable to be inspected due to inaccessibility and a schedule for when the walkdown will be completed.

On November 27, 2012, APS provided the PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report (Reference

3) in response to the request of Reference 1 for Seismic Recommendation 2.3. In that submittal, APS noted that some components were inaccess i ble for inspection during the initial seismic walkdown and other components required additional inspection.

As a result, APS committed to provide a supplement to the PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report that contains the supplemental seismic walkdown and seismic licensing basis evaluation results. The supplemental seismic walkdowns include both seismic walkdowns of equipment and area walk-bys.

The enclosure to this letter provides the results of the supplemental seismic walkdowns of inaccessible components and components related to question 4.20 of the frequently asked seismic questions, which addressed interior inspections of electrical cabinets.

In addition, the enclosure provides the results of seismic licensing basis evaluations related to the supplemental seismic walkdowns.

This submittal completes the Seismic Walkdown Report for PVNGS Unit 3, as addressed i n Reference

4. Appendices A and B of the enclosure contain security-related information.

Therefore, APS is requesting that those appendices be withheld from public disclosure.

No commitments are be i ng made to the NRC by this letter. Should you have any questions concerning the content of this letter, please contact Mark McGhee, Department Leader Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-4972. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on il-f:Jj;}

Sincerely, '

Enclosure:

Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Gene r ating Stat i on Unit 3 -Supplemental Information DCM/MAM/PJ H ENCLOSURE APPENDICES A and B CONTAIN UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED ENCLOSURE, APPENDICES A and B CONTAIN UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED 102-06868-DC M/MAM/PJH ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission APS Supplement to the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report Page 3 cc: E. J. Leeds M. L. Dapas J. K. Rankin A. E. George M.A. Brown N. DiFrancesco NRC Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Region IV Regional Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager NRC NRR Project Manager NRC Senior Resident In spector for PVNGS NRC NRR/JLD Project Manager UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED ENC LOS URE , AP PE NDI CES A and B CONT A I N UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED ENCLOSURE Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 -Supplemental Information UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED Enclosu r e Appendices A a nd B Upon separation this page is deconlro ll ed Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 WCA P-1768 1-NP , S u ppleme nt 1 Revision 0 A pr il201 4 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 -Supplemental Information (8) Westinghouse E n clos ure Appendices A and B conlainJIIIIIIIIII*IIIll*lll*********

Upon separa t ion this page is decontrolled WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3-Supplemental Information Rolando Perez

• Risk Applications

& Methods II Walter Djordjevic Seismic Walkdown P ee r Review Team Leader April2014 Reviewer:

Derek Seaman* Ri s k Applications

& Methods II Reviewer:

Chris Wandell Senior Consulting Engineer, Arizona Public Service Approved:

Dan Sadlon

• Manager, Risk Applications

& Methods II *Electronically approved records are authenticated in the electronic docum e nt management system. We s tinghouse Electric Company LLC 1000 We stinghouse Drive C ranberry Town s hip , PA 16066, USA 0 2014 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC All Rights Reserved

( Enclosure Appendices A and B conta i n*****************

Upon separatJon this page Is decontrolled Rev. Date Rev.O 4/2 014 WCAP-17681-NP, Su ppl emen t 1 PVNG S-3 REVISION LOG Revision Description S uppl e ment 1 includes the main body ofWCAP-17681-NP, Rev. 0 (Reference 48, "Executive S ummary" through "References")

and new or r ev i sed content in the appendices that address th e conduct and results of the follow-on walkdown ac t ivi ti es performed prior to and during refueling outage 3Rl7. Revision bars are used in the m ai n body to e as ily i dentify th e updat es. With th e exce ption o f Appendices A and B , revision b ars are utiliz e d in the appendices to ide n tify t h e updat es rela t ive to the corresponding appendices of WCAP-17681-NP , Rev. 0. Note that Appendices A and B c onsist of the completed checklists re s ulting from th e follow-on walkdowns only. Editorial and formatting corrections relativ e to WCAP-17681

-NP, Rev. 0 are not iden tified with individual revi s ion bars in this documen t. Rev i s i on 0 April2014 E ndosure Append ices A and B conta i n Upon separat 1 on thiS page IS <lecontrolle<l Executive Summary Following the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) established the Near-Term Task Force (NITF) in response to Commission direction.

The NITF made several recommendations, some of which are related to improving the protection of nuclear power plants against natural phenomena.

With Recommendation 2.3 (Rec 2.3), the NITF recommended the NRC require licensees to perform seismic and flooding walkdowns to identify and address vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of hazard protection features.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), that requests information from all power reactor licensees related to NITF Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3. For the seismic aspect of Rec 2.3, licensees are required to perform Seismic Walkdowns to verify the current plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis, verify the adequacy of current strategies and maintenance plans, and identify and address degraded.

non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions.

This report contains the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) response for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 to the request for information related to the seismic aspects of NITF Rec 2.3, as addressed in Enclosure 3 of the NRC letter. The original version of this WCAP report summarizes the results from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed from August 6 through August 13, 2012. Supplement 1 incorporates the results from the additional walkdowns performed on April 6, 2013, and during refueling outage 3R17, on October 13,2013. To establish a consistent methodology for performance of the Seismic Walkdowns, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), in conjunction with the industry, developed guidance in EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286.

This guidance was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The Seismic Walkdowns conducted at PVNGS Unit 3 conform to the requirements of the EPRI Technical Report. Consistent with the guidance, the following topics are addressed in this PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown report: 1. Sei s mic Licensing Basis for Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) 2. Personnel Qualifications

3. Process used for selection ofSSCs 4. Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys 5. Licensing Basis Evaluations

6. Peer Review 7. IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report The required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed for accessible equipment in PVNGS Unit 3 during the period from August 6 through August 13, 2012, while the plant was operating in Mode 1. Inaccessible equipment (contairunent building and energized high-voltage equipment) are identified in the PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report and walkdowns were conducted on April6, 2013, and during refueling outage 3Rl7, on October 13, 2013. Also during 3Rl7, supplemental inspections of electrical cabinets were performed in accordance w i th the NRC response to industry frequently asked question 4.20. In addition, Area Walk-Bys were completed, as required, during these follow-on activities.

Documentation of these additional inspections and the related evaluations is provided in this supplement report. The following information identities the requests in the 50.54(f) Jetter (in italics) followed by a swnmary of the APS response:

a. Information on the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E n closure Appendices A and B conta i nJIIIIIIII!!IIIJ.IIJI!IJ.IIIIII********

Upon sepa r at1on this page is decontrolled ii The PVNGS current Seismic Licensing Basis (seismic codes, standards, and methods) is documented in report Section 1 and was used to inform the Seismic Walkdown licensing basis evaluations.

• b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process. The approach used to implement the Seismic Walkdown process at PVNGS conforms to the guidance of EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286.

Report Sections 3 through 5 provide detailed descriptions of how the walkdown process was implemented at PVNGS. c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including any seismic anomalies, outliers , or other findings) identified by the IPEEE and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them (including their completion dates). No plant-specific seismic vulnerabilities were identified at PVNGS Unit 3 by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program. The results of the IPEEE program are described in report Section 7. d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision, 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety ," including entering the condition in the co"ective action program. The summary of the key fmdings of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys is provided in report Section 4. The licensing basis evaluations of potentially adverse seismic conditions and their resolutions are described in detail in Section 5 and Appendix D of this report. A total of 28 licensing basis evaluations have been satisfactorily closed and nine open evaluations have been entered into the PVNGS Corrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution.

Items entered into the CAP are annotated in Appendix D. None of these identified conditions prevent the equipment from performing the intended safety functions during or after a design basis seismic event. Results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are documented on EPRI TR-1025286 checklists in report Appendices A and B, respectively.

e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features. There are no planned or newly installed protection or mitigation features that resulted from the implementation of the Seismic Walkdown guidance at PVNGS. However, one potentially adverse seismic condition that was identified during the Seismic Walkdowns resulted in action being taken to restore seismic design margin. Bookcases installed near the control boards in the Unit 3 Control Room were removed. The condition related to this change would not have prevented safety-related eq uipm ent from performing its intended safety function during or after a design basis seismic event; the change was implemented to restore seismic design margin. f Results .. and any subsequent actions taken in re s ponse t o the peer review. The peer review process performed at PVNGS confirmed and informed the selection of SSCs process, provided real-time feedback to the Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) during WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B conta i niiiiJ***************

Upon separation this p age is d econ tr o lled iii performance of the walkdowns, and confrrm e d that the licensing basis evaluations carefully compared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licen si ng b asis documentation.

Details of the peer r ev i e wer activiti es are de s cribed in report Section 6. In summary, PVNG S Unit 3 equipment that was inspected and evaluated for the Seismic Walkdown proc ess, including initial and s uppl e mental in s pections and related licensing basis evaluations, was determined to be capable of performin g intended sa fety functions during and aft e r a design basi s seismic event and the site monitoring and maintenance procedure s were determined to be adequate. Follow-on activities to complete the remaining aspects of thi s process were completed as de sc ribed in thi s supplemental report. Therefore, the requi re d NTTF 2.3 walkdown activities have been successfully completed for PVNGS Unit 3 in accordance with the EPRI Guidance document and the intent of Enclosure 3 to the NRC 50.54(f) letter has been satisfied. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNG S-3 Revi s i o n 0 April2014 E nclosure Append i ces A and B contain Upo n separat i on th i s page i s decon t rolled ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We wish to acknowledge t he following contributors to the effort. Mike Powell-Arizona Public Service (Director Fukushima Response)

Chris Wandell -Arizona Public Service Justin Wood -Arizona Public Service Winsto n Borrero -Arizona Public Service Randall "Gene" Eimar-Arizona Public Service Jonathon Lucero -Arizona Public Service Nick Reidenbach

-Arizona Public Service Derek Morris-Arizona Public Service Mark Meyer-Arizona Public S e rvice Nathan Hadwick -Arizona Public Service Jose "Angel" Delgadillo

-Arizona Public Service Mi c ha e l Crib bin s -We s tingho use E lectric Company Rolando Perez-W es t ingho u se Electric Company Derek Seaman -Westinghous e Electric Company Gary Douglas -We s tinghouse Electric Company Joe Somsel -We sti nghouse Electric Company Paul Karavou ss ianis -Stevenson

& As so ciates Walter Djordjevic

-Stevenson

& As s ociat es Hunter Young-Stevenson

& Associates Timothy Nealon -Stevenson

& Associates Andr e w Masiunas-Stevenson

& Associates Cory figliolini-Steven s on & A ssoc iate s WCAP-17681-NP , Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 iv Revi s ion 0 April2014 Acronym AFAS AF AFW AHU APS ASME AUX AWC CAP CE CF CH CLB CP CST CT CTMT CTRL eves DBM DCM OF DG DHR EAHU EC EPRI EQCF EQID EW FAQ FCR GA GR HA HC HD HJ HPSI HVAC Enc l osure Append i ces A and B contain********

Upon separation th i s page i s deco nt rolled LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Definition Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal Auxiliary Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater System Air Handling Unit Arizona Public Service American Society of Mechanical Engineers Auxiliary Building Area Walk-By Checklist Corrective Action Program Combustion Engineering Containment Function Chemical and Volume Control Current Licensing Basis Containment Purge Condensate Storage Tank Condensate Transfer and Storage Containment Control Building Chemical and Volume Control System Design Basis Manual Design Criteria Manual Die s el Fuel Oil and Tran s fer Diesel Generator Decay Heat Removal Essential Air Handling Unit HVAC Es s ential Chilled Water Electric Power Research Institute Equipment Qualification Control Form Equipment Identification Essential Cooling Water Frequently A s ked Question(s)

Field Change Request Service Gas Gaseous Radwaste HVAC Auxiliary Building HVAC Containment Building HVAC Diesel Generator Building HVAC Control Building High Pressure Safety Injection Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 v Revision 0 April2014 E ndosure Appe n dice s A and B contain Upon separation th i s page i s decontro ll ed vi Acron:tm Definition lA Instrument and Service Air IC Reactor Coolant Inventory Contro l IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISRS In-Structure Response Spectra MCC Motor Control Center MOV Motor-Operated Valve MSSS Main Steam Support Structure NCR Non-Conformance Reports NQR Non-Quality Related NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply Sy s tem NTIF Near-Term Task Force OBE Operating Basis Earthquake P&ID Piping and Instrumentati on Diagram PB C lass IE 4.16 kv Power PC Reactor Coo lant Pressure Co ntrol PE C l ass 1 E Standby Generation PG C l ass IE 480v Power Switchgear PGD Project General Des i gn Criteria PH C las s 1 E 480v Power Motor Control Center PK Class IE 125 VDC PN Class IE Instrument Power PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Asse ss ment PVAR Palo Verde Action Request (Corrective Action Program) PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station RAS Re-circu la tion Actuation Signal RAW Ri s k Achievement Worth RC Reactivity Control or Reactor Coolant RCPB Reactor Coolant Pre ss ure Boundary RCS Reactor Coolant Sy s tem RD Radioactive Waste Drain RLE Review Level Earthquake RM Main Control Board ROB Ru l e of the Box RWT Refueling Water Tank S&A Steven s on & Associates SA Engineered Safety Actuation System SB Reactor Protection SC-1 Sei s mic Category I soc Shutdown Cooling WCAP-17681-NP, Supplemen t I Revision 0 PVNG S-3 April2014 Acronym SDOC SFP SG SI sov SP SPRA SQUG SSCs SSE SSEL swc SWE SWEL SWG SWMS SWT UFSAR UHS ZA *ZG ZJ En c l osure Appendices A and B contain Upo n separa tio n this pag e is decontrolled Definition Vendor/Supplier Document Spent Fuel Pool Main S team Safety Injection Solenoid-Operated Valve Essential Spray Ponds Seismic Probabilistic Risk Asse ss ment Sei s mic Qualification Utility Group Structures, Systems, and Components Safe Shutdown Earthquake Safe Shutdown Equipment Li st Seismic Walkdown Checklist Seismic Walkdown Engineer Se i s mic Walkdown Equipment List Seismic Walkdown Gu i dance (EPRI TR-1025286)

Site Work Management System Sei s mic Walkdown Team Updated Final Safety Analysi s Report Ultimate Heat Sink Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Building Control Building WCAP-17681-NP, S upplement I PVNGS-3 vii Revi s ion 0 Apri12014 Enclosure Append ices A and B conta i n*************

U pon separa ti o n th i s page is decontrolled TABLE OF CONTENTS viii 1. SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS ..............

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.................. 1-1 1.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA ...........................

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............ 1-l 1.2 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT..

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......................... l-1 2. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

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2-l 2.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PERSONNEL

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....... 2-l 2.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS

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............ 2-1 2.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEWERS

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.............. 2-3 2.4 JPEEE REVIEWERS

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2-3 2.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM .......................

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2-3 3. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS

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........... 3-1 3.1 SELECTION PROCESS

SUMMARY

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3-1 3.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS

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........ 3-4 3.2.1 Base List 1 ..............................

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.. 3-9 3.2.2 SWEL 1 ................

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..... 3-9 3.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEMS .........................

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.......... 3-10 3.3.1 Base List 2 ..............................

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3-12 3.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down

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.................................... 3-12 3.3.3 SWEL 2 .................................

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3-12 3.4 fNACCESSIBLE ITEMS .....................

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3-13 4. SEISMIC WALKDOWNSANDAREA WALK-BYS .....................

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4.1 BACKGROUND

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................................... 4-l 4.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISMIC WALKDOWNS

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..... 4-2 4.3 WALKDOWN RESULTS .............

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........... 4-3 5. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

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............. 5-l 6. PEER REVIEW ..................................................................................

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.... 6-1

6.1 INTRODUCTION

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............................... 6-1 6.2 PEER REVIEW-SELECTION OF SSCS ..........................................

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6-2 6.2.1 Purpose ...............................

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.... 6-2 6.2.2 Peer Review Activity -Selection of SSCs .....................................

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.................... 6-2 6.2.3 Peer Review Findings-Selection of SSCs .............

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..... 6-3 6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments-Selection of SSCs .............

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...... 6-5 6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review-Selection ofSSCs ..................

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.................. 6-5 6.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS

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6-5 6.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

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6-11 6.5 REVIEW SUBMITTAL REPORT ....................................

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6-12 7. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES

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7-1 8. REFERENCES

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... 8-l WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNG S-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B conla i n ************

Upon separation lhls page Is decontrolled ix APPENDIX A -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCS) ...........................................

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A-1 APPENDIX B -AREA )VALK-BY CHECKLISTS (AWCS) .................................................................

B-1 APPENDIX C -PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS

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C-1 APPENDIX D -LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

SUMMARY

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D-1 APPENDIX E -QUALIFICATIONS

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E-1 APPENDIX F -PVNGS UNIT 3 SWELREPORT

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F-1 APPENDIX G -SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES .............................................................................

G-1 WCAP-17681-NP, Su pplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 Apri12014 E n c l os ur e Appendices A and B con ta in****************

Upon se p aration t h is p age i s de co n t ro ll ed LIST OF TABLES X Tabl e 3-1: Sort of the Base Li st I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Sy s tem Type" .................. : ..............

3-6 Table 3-2: Equipment S e lect e d for SWE L Based on th e "M a jor Ne w or Replacemen t Equipment" Attribute

........ 3-7 Table 3-3: Sort of th e B ase Li st I Data and S e l ec ted SWEL Items Based on " Equ i pment Type N umber" .............

3-8 Table 3-4: Sort of the B ase L is t I Data and S elected SWEL Item s Based o n " Environ me nt (T e mperature)" ......... 3-9 Table 3-5: PVNGS-3 Equipment Inacc es sible During th e Scheduled At-Power Walkd o wn ................................. 3-13 T a ble 3-6: PVNGS-3 FAQ 4.20 S upplemental Cabinet In s pections ...................................................................... 3-14 Table 3-7: PVNG S-3 Equipment In s pected During R e fu e ling Outage 3 RI7 ..................................................

....... 3-15 Table 3-8: PVNG S-3 It e m s Completed During the April6, 2013 , Inspecti o n ............................

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...... 3-16 Table 6-l: SWC and AWC Peer Review Sampl es from Sei s m ic Walkdown In s pection for Unit 3 ......................... 6-6 Table 6-2: Table of CAP S tatu s from Sei s mi c Walkdown In s pe c tion for U nit 3 ...............

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6-11 Table G-1: P VN GS-3 B as e Li st! ....................................

........................................................................................ G-1 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL I ...............

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... G-2 Table G-3: PVNGS-3 B as e Li st 2 (SWEL 2 i s the same as B ase Li s t 2) .....................

......................................... G-14 W C AP-1 7681-NP , S upplem e nt I PVNGS-3 Rev isio n 0 Apri l 2014 Enclos ure Appendices A and B contain*****************

Upon separation th i s page is decontrolled

1. SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS This report is applicable to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3. Page 1*1 The licensing basi s for Seismic Category I (SC-1) equipment at PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 is defined in the Updated Final Safety Analy sis Report (UFSAR, Reference

32) Section 3.7 and is s upported by summary seismic design criteria defmed in Design Criteria Manual

• Project General Design Criteria (DCM-PGD, Reference

42) Section 1.3.2. Site design ground motion response spectra for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) are provided in UFSAR Figures 3.7*1 and 3.7*2, as well as UFSAR Sections 3.9.2.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10, and adhere to Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 43). Damping values for SC-1 equipment are listed i n UFSAR Table 3.7-1 and conform to Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 44). As defined in UFSAR Section 2.5, the SSE is based on the postulated occurrence of a magnitude 8.0 earthquake located 72 miles from the site. Through use of attenuation curves, extrapolation of response spectra, and analysis of intensity data, 0.2g is considered a conservative representation of the severity of horizontal and vertical vibratory ground motion for the SSE. For additional conservatism , the seismic analysi s of all Category I structures was performed utilizing a 0.25g SSE. Figures 3.7-1 through 3.7-4 of the UFSAR show the horizontal and vertical design response s pectra corresponding to the SSE and Opera ti ng Basis Earthquake (OBE), respectively. 1.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA A time-hi s tory analysis was used to develop in-s tructure response spectra (lSRS) for building s hou s ing SC-I equipment.

Modeling techniques such as the selection of the minimum number of mas s points, number of dynamic degrees of freedom per mass point, and torsional effects, are described in Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A (Reference 51). The seismic input was defined in term s of the free* field acceleration time hi s tory and the soil-structure interaction parameters. The structural damping values used were per Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 44). Soil damping characteristics were modified to account for strain levels. Design basis ISRS are plotted in DBM-C5 (Reference

53) Appendix A. 1.2 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT SC-I equipment is classified according to Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design. Classification (Reference 45), and is discussed in UFSAR Section 3.2 (Reference

32) and in DCM-PGD Section 1.4.3 (Reference 42), which states: Category I structures, systems, and components are those that are important to safety and designed to remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). Thes e structures, systems , and components are those necessary to assure:

• The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).

• The capability to s hutdown the reactor and maintain it in a s af e condition.

• The capability to prevent or m i tigate the consequences of accidents that could result .. in potential offsite exposures.

P e r UFSAR Section 3.10.2, SC-1 electrical equipment within the Bechtel scope of s upply was qualified per In s titute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 344-75 (Reference 46). Thi s stan dard i s comprehensive and similar to current requirements for nuclear safety-related components.

Per UFSAR WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 RevisionO April2014 Enclosure Append i ces A and B contain Upon separat1on thi s page is decontrolled Page 1-2 Section 3.10.5, SC-I electrical equipment within t he Combustion Engineering scope of supply wa5 qualified per IEEE Std 344-71 (Reference

41) plus the additional requirements listed. With the additional requirements, the qualification criteria and methods are s imilar to those of IEEE Std 344-75 (Reference 46). For qualification by testing, per application of the preceding criteria, much of the electrical equipment was subject to shake table testing. The required test levels were typically based on the s tructure response s pectra discussed above. Per Section 3.9.2.2 of the UFSAR, analytical methods without testing were employed to qualify Se is mic Category I mechanical equipment s uch as piping, ductwork, tank s and vessels, heat exchangers, filters, and pumps. Qualification for mechanical components with mechani s ms th a t mu s t change position in order to perform the safety-related funct i on was performed by test or a combination of test and analysis as per the IEEE Std 344-1975 requirement s and UFSAR Sections 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10. These components include American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and non-ASME items s uch as valves with actuators and their appurtenances as well as check valves, relief valves, fans, chillers, air handling units, and various skid-supplied devices. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 R e vision 0 April2014 E nclosure Append i ces A and B contain ******* Upon separation th i s page is decontrolled Page 2-1 2. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 2.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PERSONNEL The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) development was performed by Westinghouse personnel, Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman. Resumes are provided in Appendix E. PVNGS Operations (Gene Eimar, Shift Manager and Angel Delgadillo, Senior Auxiliary Operator) provided verification of safety function selections.

PVNGS Engineering (Chris Wandell, Winston Borrero) provided technical input to screening and selection of equipment.

PVNGS System Engineering input was provided by performing a review of System Health Reports. Rolando Perez-Mr. Perez is the Technical Leader for the Palo Verde Unit 3 SWEL development activity in the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and Major Projects Division.

Rolando has over 15 years of experience in Westinghouse and over 35 years of experience in the .nuclear safety area. Rolando has worked for Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering (CE) as a Training Engineer, Transient Analyst, and Setpoint Analyst. Rolando h as conducted lectures on reactor core physics, health physics, fluid systems, protection systems, and plant operational concepts.

In 2009 Rolando expanded his expertise to include CE-designed plants that employ digital-based reactor trip and monitoring systems ("CE digital plants").

Derek Seaman -Mr. Seaman is a member of the Palo Verde Unit 3 SWEL development team in the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse

's Engineering, Equipment and Major Projects Division.

Derek has over 6 years of experience in Westinghouse in the nuclear engineering area Derek has rotated through various plant outage positions including reload engineering analyses and project management of fuel reload campaigns.

Derek has evaluated power increase proposals from a safety analysis perspective and has designed and implemented quality assurance systems in the nuclear engineering area. Chris J. Wandell, P.E. -Mr. Wandell is a Senior Consulting Civ il Engineer in the Palo Verde Nuclear Design Engineering Department.

Chris is a Professional Civil Engineer with over 30 years of experience in the design, analysis, and modification of Seismic Category I pipe s upport s, electrical raceway supports, heating, ven tilation and air conditioning (HVAC) s upports , instrument supports, and s teel and concrete structures.

His experience also includes Class 1 E Seismic Equipment Qualification.

Mr. Wandell is Palo Verde's structural and seismic subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

Winston G. Borrero -Mr. Borrero is a Senior Consulting Mechanical Engineer in the Palo Verde Nuclear Design Engineering Department.

Winston has over 30 years of experience in the design and construction of Nuclear Plants having worked for Bechtel, Stone & Webster and Sargent & Lundy Engineers at various nuclear sites. Areas of expertise include stress analysis, fracture mechanics and fatigue analysis, se i smic and environmental qualification of equipment, and bolted joint analysis.

Mr. Borrero is Palo Verde's bolted joint and fatigue stress analysis subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

2.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS The Seismic Walkdown team (SWT) consisted of Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) from Stevenson and Associates (S&A). S&A is recognized as a leading seismic consultant to the nuclear industry and as a regular contributor to the advancement of earthquake engineering knowledge through funded research WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nc losure Append i ces A and B contain U p on separa t i on t hi s page is d econt r olled Page2-2 projects. The profe ss ional staff has expertise and capabilities in earthquake engineering, structural d yn amics , and s tructural design. S&A has performed seismic evaluations of US nuclear power plants, u s i ng either Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) or Sei s mic Margin Asses s ments, to address US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Ind i vidual Plant Evaluation for External Events (IPEEE) for over 35 US and European plant s. S&A conducted seismic PRA analy s es for all of the US Army depots that are demilitarizing their stores of nerve gas ordnance. The SWT for PVNGS Unit 3, consisting of Hunter Young and T i mothy Nealon of S&A, conducted the initial walkdowns performed August 6 through August 13, 2012, and the supplemental walkdowns performed October 13, 2013 , during refueling outage 3R17. For the supplemental walkdown s performed April 6 , 2013 , the S WT consisted of Hun t er Young and Cory Figliolini of S&A (Re s umes are provided in Appendix E). Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero led the s upport from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as the in t erface with plant operators.

Other PVNGS profe ssi onal staff provided support and guidance and these persons are acknowledged wi t hin this report. The Stevenson

& Associate s Seismic Walkdown Engineers were accompanied by at least one of the following PVNGS qualified Sei s mic Walkdown Engineers:

Chris Wandell, Nicholas Reidenbach, Wmston Borrero, Justin Wood , Derek and Mark Meyer. The PVNGS engineers (along with the Auxiliary Operator team member) provided walkdown oversight relative to expected conduct in the plant (Nuclear, Radiological and Indu s trial Safety), compliance with NRC-Approved EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (TR-1025286), PVNGS procedural compliance (inclusive of CAP), and insight into Licen s ing Bas is issues. Hunter Young. P.E. -Mr. Young is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with s pecialization in the dynamic analysis and des ign of struc tures and equipment for seismic, blast, flu i d, and wind loads. He has managed and led Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analy ses of s tructures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. Young has performed the se i s m i c analy s e s of braced steel frame s, concrete found a tion s, m as onry walls, large storage tanks, and electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage.

In a ddition , Mr. Youn g has executed the walkdown and analysis of tank structures and their associated l e ak path piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of be y ond-design-basi s se i s mic events using manual and fin i te element methods. Mr. Young has a Master of Engineering i n Structural Engineering from the Massa ch usetts In sti tute of Technology and Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Notre Dame. He i s a l ice nsed P.E. (civil) in California and has completed the 5-day Sei s mic Qualification U tility Group (SQUG) Walkdown training course. Timothy Nealon -Mr. Nealon i s an Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in the dynamic analysis and design of s tructures and equipment for s ei s mic, blast, fluid, and wind load s. He has particip at ed in Seismic Walkdowns and fra g ility analyse s of s tructure s and components for use in probabili s tic ri s k assessments.

In addition, Mr. Nealon h as conducted walkdown s and analysis of tank s tructures and the i r associated l e akpath piping to assess lo ss of inventory in the event of b eyonbasi s seis m i c events u s ing various methods. Furthermore, he h as b e en trained and has conducted NTTF 2.3 Fukushima response Seismic Walkdowns at multiple nuclear s tation s. Mr. Nealon has a Master of Science in Structural Engineering and a Bachelor of Science in Civil and E nvironmental Engineering from the University at Buffalo. Mr. N ea lo n has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course. Cozy Figliolini

-Mr. Figliolini is a Staff Engineer in the S&A Pho en ix office. He has planned and performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for u s e in probabilistic risk assessments.

M r. Figliolini has conducted se i s mic analy ses of electrical and mechanical equipment anc ho rage, s torage tanks, and ci v il s tructures in c luding containment.

Mr. Figliolini has a Joint Master of Science, Structural Engineering & M ec hanic s fro m the Universities o f Glasgow and Edinburgh and a Bachelors o f Science in Civil Engineering from Worce s ter P o l y te c hnic In sti tute. H e i s regiSt e red as an E.l.T. in M ass achusetts.

Mr. Figliolini has compl e ted th e 5-day S QUG Walkdown training course. WCAP-17681-NP , Supplement l PVNG S-3 Revi sio n 0 April20l4 E nclosure Appendices A a nd B contain Upon separat1on tn 1 s page IS decontrolled 2.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEWERS Page2-3 The Licensing Basis Reviewers for PVNGS Unit 3 consisted of Hunter Young, Timothy Nealon, and Cory Figliolini from the SWT. Their qualifications are provided under Section 2.2. Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero participated in the development of the licensing basis evaluations and provided technical bases for Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments for potentially adverse seismic conditions which were entered into the Corrective Action Program. 2.4 IPEEE REVIEWERS The IPEEE Reviewers consisted of a combination of the Equipment Selection Personnel and the SWT. Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (qualifications listed in Appendix E) identified equipment subject to IPEEE enhancements for incorporation in SWEL I. Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A (qualifications listed in Section 2.2) performed the identification of actions taken to eliminate or reduce the IPEEE vulnerabilities previously identified. Jonathan Lucero, Engineer Sr. PRA from PVNGS, contributed to the IPEEE review. Jonathan L. Lucero-Mr. Lucero is a Senior Engineer in the Palo Verde Probabilistic Ri s k Assessment Department.

Jonathan has over 10 years of engineering experience in foundation design, structural dynamics, and uncertainty analysis. His experience also includes multidisciplinary applications, generalized information theory and fuzzy logic. Mr. Lucero i s Palo Verde's seismic PRA subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's Education of Risk Professionals Program and Seismic PRA training course. 2.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM The peer reviewers for PVNGS Unit 3 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas of Westinghouse. Mr. Djordjevic is also designated t he peer review Team Leader. Neither was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process as to maintain their independence from the project. Mr. Djordjevic is an advanced-degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience and has been trained as a Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, and Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE). Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with IS years of nuclear engineering experience and I 0 years of aerospace engineering experience.

Resumes are provided in Appendix E. Mr. Djordjevic led the seismic peer review activities and Mr. Douglas led the SWEL selection peer review. All peer review activities were performed by both engineers.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B co n tain Upon separat1on tn1s page IS decontrolled Page 3-l 3. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1. SELECTION PROCESS

SUMMARY

This section describes the process used by Westinghouse to select the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that were included in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 (PVNGS-3)

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The process described in Section 3 (Selection of SSCs) of EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was used as guidance to develop the PVNGS-3 SWEL. The following steps from the integrated project schedule outline this process of SWEL selection:

Project Kickoff Meeting Obtain customer inputs Retrieve original Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE-full-scope Seismic Margin Assessment) documentation-basis for Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Base List I Review current Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database Retrieve containment function equipment Retrieve modifications since the IPEEE Retrieve recently modified/upgraded equipment information Retrieve seismic vulnerabilities from Corrective Action Program (CAP) Retrieve System Health Reports Retrieve spent fuel pool (SFP) SC-1 equipment (piping and instrumentation drawings, Design Basis Manuals, and Training Manual)-basis for SSEL Baselist 2 Assemble preliminary Safe Shutdown Equipment List (i.e., Base List 1) Perform Screen #l, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out) Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out) Perform Screen #3, Safety Function Support Assemble preliminary SSEL (Base List 2) Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out) Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out) Site visit to confirm preliminary SSEL Finalize SSEL Select S WEL l Perform Screen #4 System variety Equipment type variety Environment variety Risk importance considerations Equipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects) IPEEE Seismic Vulnerability fmdings Sample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Select SWEL 2 (spent fuel pool related items) Perform Screen #3 System variety Equipment type variety Environment variety WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclos u re Appendices A and B contain Upon separat i on th is page is decontro ll ed Equipment access con s iderations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects) Sample considerat io ns including unit-to-unit variation Perform Screen #4 rapid drain-down assessment Confirm SWEL with Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE s) Obtain PVNGS-3 Operation s approval of SWEL SWEL Peer Review Page 3-2 Per the guidance provided in Section 2 of Reference 1 , PVNGS Operation s and Design E ngineering staff members participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided input and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel collecting the data associated with the equipment considered.

The exchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the PVNGS s taff members included:

• Review of the IPEEE and PRA list of components was performed by the Westinghouse and PVNGS team to correct di s crepancies in classification, errors in equipment identification (EQID), omissions, risk ca tego rization, etc.

• Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

• A presentation held on July 17, 2012, to discu ss Westinghouse

's methodology for SWEL selection.

• Verification of equipment information through PVNGS's Site Work Management System (SWMS) (Reference 2).

• Provide risk importance data derived from the PVNGS Internal Events Probabilisti c Risk Assessment (PRA) model (Reference 33).

• Assist in identifying and categorizing the different operating environment types existing at the plant.

• Di sc u ss ions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that have the potential to be relevant to the SWEL.

• Discussions with Design Engineering and Operation s to s elect equipment with operational experience r e levant to SWEL selection.

• Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) Database for review of CAP and modification s against s eismic equipment.

• Provide System Health Reports and De s ign Basis Manual s (DBMs) for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

• SWEL Peer Review and approval of the SSCs se lected for the Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys (see Appendix F). WCAP-17681-N P , Su pplem e nt I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April20l4 En dosure Append i ces A and B contain***************

Up o n separation th i s pag e is deco nt rolled Page 3-3 Meeting s were conducted from June 26, 2012, through June 29, 2012, to perform a Pre-Job Brief of the project and to conduct working sessions with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff members with the goal of achieving confirmation of at least 80% of the SWEL and to identify items for follow-up.

The agenda followed during the meetings included:

• Pre-Job Brief of the SWEL selection project

• D i scuss high-level approach to SWEL Development

• Review of preliminary Base List l for accuracy and completeness o Populate th e Screen #4 Sample Selection attributes o Select the SWEL I i tems o Identify items for follow-up

• Review of preliminary Base List 2 for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #3 Sample selection attributes o Select the SWEL 2 item s o Identify items for follow-up

• Identify any unit-to-unit con s iderations

• Summarize re s ults

• Summary post-job briefing A second meeting was held on July 17, 2012, to provide a presentation summarizing the Westinghouse/PVNGS team's selection methodology and conduct a second working session with PVNGS staff members to further refine the SWEL. The following personnel participated in these working sessions:

Attendee Chris Wandell Winston Borrero Justin Wood Jose (Angel) Delgadillo Randall (Gene) Eimar Company APS APS APS APS APS Position Senior Consulting Engineer (Civil) Senior Consulting Engineer (Mechanical)

Engineer (Modifications)

Auxiliary Operator Operations Shift Manager Rolando Perez Derek Seaman Westinghouse SWEL Development Lead (participated remotely via WebEx 1) Westinghouse SWEL Developer Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1 , SSCs were selected in the following two groups:

• SWEL 1 -A sample of it e ms that safely shutdown the reactor and maintain containment integrity.

• SWEL 2 -A sample of s pent fuel pool (SFP) related items, including items that c ould result in a rapid drain-down of the SFP. The SWELs from th e se two groups were combined into a s ingle SWEL for use during the Sei s mic Walkdowns and Area Walk-By s. The following s ections di s cus s how the PVNGS-3 SWEL s election proces s has met the objectives of the guidance of Reference l , particularly as it relates to incorporating the appropriate vari e ty of classe s of WebEx i s a trademark or registered trademark of Cisco Systems , Inc. WCAP-1 7681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revi s ion 0 April2014 Page 3-4 equipment, environments, primary and secondary systems, new and replacement equipment, and other elements discussed in Section 3 of Reference I. 3.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS The five safety functions include the four safe shutdown funct i ons (reactor reactivity control, reactor coolant pressure control, reactor coolant inventory control, and decay heat removal, which includes the ultimate heat sink), plus the containment functions. The IPEEE (Reference

3) Safe Shutdown Equipment Li s t (SSEL) was used as the start ing point for compiling a list (Base List 1) of the SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 1 selection process. A list consisting of 979 SSCs was assembled based on the following tables documented in Appendix 3.A of Reference 3:

• Table 3A-l -Reactor Protection System SSEL (36 items)

• Table 3A-2-Support Systems SSEL (403 items)

• Table 3A-3-Required Instrumentation SSEL (72 items)

• Table 3A-4-Primary Auxiliary feedwater SSEL (70 items)

• Table JA-5-Secondary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (59 items)

• Table 3A-6-Atmospheric Dump Valves SSEL (72 items)

• Table 3A-7-Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray SSEL (42 items)

• Table 3A-8-Shutdown Cooling System SSEL (84 items)

• Table JA-9-High Pressure Safety Injection SSEL (89 items)

• Table 3A-10-High Pressure Recirculation SSEL (52 items) A review of the Seismic Probabili s tic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database (Reference

34) was then performed to expand the equipment list. Seismic Category I (SC-I) equipment that was considered in the SPRA, but not included in the IPEEE tables, was identified and added to the equipment list, resulting in a total equipment count of 1236 items. Since the IPEEE applies to the three PVNGS Units, general EQIDs were used in the SSEL tables (i.e., the EQIDs presented therein do not show the Unit number, which is normally indicated by the first character of the EQID). In contrast, in the SPRA database, much of the equipment was identified by using the Unit 1 designation.

Therefore, all EQIDs in the list were converted to the Unit 3 designation. Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference I , the process for s electing a sample of the SSCs associated with the safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity must include the following four screens:

• Screen #I-Seismic Category 1: The purpose of Screen #1 is to re s trict the scope of SSCs in the SWEL to those that are classified as SC-I. This is intended to comply with the request in the NRC 50.54(£) letter (Reference 50), under the "Requested Actions" section, to "verify current plant configuration with the current license basis." Out of 1236 SSCs initially con si dered , 1119 wer,e retained by Screen # 1 and subsequently passed to Screen #2. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revi s ion 0 April2014 Enclosure Append i ces A and B contain*****************

Upon separation this page is deconlrorted

• Screen #2-Equipment or Systems: Page 3-5 The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their co nfigurati on continues to be consistent with the established plant li censing basi s. The types of SSCs that are excluded consist of SC-I Structures, Containmen t Penetrations, and SC-1 Piping Systems. Manual valves , check valves, flow orifices, fire dampers, and relief valves were also excluded in accordance with the guidance, since they are either considered in-li ne com ponen ts or equipment that is regularly in s pected. Out of 1119 items coming in from Screen # 1 , 775 were retained by Screen #2 and su bsequently pas se d to Screen #3.

• Screen #3 -Support for the 5 Safety Function s: The purpose of Screen #3 is to filter out the SSCs that do not s upport at least one of the following safety fun ct ion s: o Reactor rea c tivity control o Reactor coolant pre ssure contro l o Reactor coolant inventory control o D ecay heat removal , including the ultimate heat s in k o Containment function The safety functions sup ported by each SSC exiting Screen #2 were determined in consultation with PVN GS staff members (Shi ft Manager/Auxiliary Operator) during the ftrst set of meetings.

Out of 775 items coming in from Screen #2, 412 were reta ined by Screen #3 and su bsequently passed to Screen #4. The list of equipment from Screen #3, entering Sc reen #4 , is defmed as Base List I.

• Screen #4 -Sample Considerations:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to narrow the Base List I candidate item s to those of most s ignificance.

The PVNGS-3 SWEL I contains 124 2 repre se ntative items from each of the following sampl e s election attributes:

o A variety of types of systems: The PVNGS-3 Base List I equipment was categorized based on the third and fourth charac ters of their EQIDs, which ide ntifie s the plant sys tem. There were 3 1 system categories contained in Base Li st I. Table 3-1 shows h ow the se sys tem categories were represented in SWEL 1. The o riginal SWEL 1 consisted of 125 item s. One i tem was removed (3MCHEEOI) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radia t i on area. See discussion in Section 3.4. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 Apri l 2014 Page 3-6 Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type" System Type Defmitioo Nu mber of Items Number of Items in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 AF Auxiliary Feedwater 14 8 CH Chemical and Volume Control 29 9* CP Containment PuT2e 4 1 CT Condensate Transfer and Storage 3 I DF Diesel Fue l Oil and Transfer 1 0 DG Diesel Generator 14 3 EC Essential Chil led Water 8 4 EW Essential Cooling Water 8 3 GA Service Gas I 0 GR Gaseous Radwaste 2 I HA HV AC Auxiliary Build 4 I HC HV AC Containment Building 12 6 HD HV AC Die s el Generator Building 4 2 HJ HV AC Control Building 21 II lA In s trument and Service Air 1 I PB C l ass IE 4.16 kv Power 3 I PE Class IE Standby Generation 2 I PG C lass I E 480v Power Switchgear 6 3 PH Clas s IE 480v Power Motor Contro l Cent e r 8 4 PK Class IE 125 VDC 20 9 P N C lass l E In s trument Power 1 2 6 RC Reactor Coolant 16 8 RD Radioactive Waste Drain 2 I RM Main Control B o ard 30 8 SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation Sys t em 11 I SB Reactor Protection 14 I SG Main Steam 40 7 SI Safety Injection 101 20 SP Essential Spray Ponds 4 2 ZA Aux i liary Building 6 0 ZJ Contro l Building II l

• Refer t o Section 3.4 for exp lana tio n of change to SWEL I System Type. Note that the OF (Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer), GA (Service Gas), and ZA (Auxiliary Building) systems are not represen ted because the equipment type s covered b y each sys tem are already well represented.

o Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications):

Major new and replacement equipment were identified through a revi ew o f either: I) Section 8 (System Design Hi s tory) or 2) Section 11 (Change Hi s tory), of a selection of the major s ystem DBMs (Reference s 4 through 30). Recent modifications were assessed through con s ultation with PVNGS Operations and Des i gn Engineering staff members. Additionally, System Health Reports were reviewed to ensure that recent modifications were captured and examined for potential impact. The participating PVNGS Operation s staff members were asked to provide any informatio n they felt the Sy s tem Health Reports may not have touched upon. This was to address any recent modifications where I) weight and/or the location of the center of gravity of the replacement are significant l y WCAP-I 7681-NP , Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nclosu re Ap pend i ce s A a nd B co n ta i n Upon sep a r a ti o n this page is de co ntro ll ed Page 3-7 different, or 2) design of the mounting and anchorage of the replacement is significantly different than the original, or 3) items within the zone ofi.nfluence had to be reinstalled. Based on thi s sampling consideration, 38 Base List I items were identified as having major new or replacement modifications. Of these, the 15 items s hown in Table 3-2 w e re represented in SWEL I. Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on tbe "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute Item II 12 14 so liS 2 2 2 223 272 3 03 310 312 313 314 319 3 21 Walkdowo Description Major New or Replacement Eoulpmeot 3JAF8UV0034 SG-EOIA isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See Reference 4 , p. 104. 3JAf8UV00 3 5 SG*E O I 8 isolation valve Replaced actuator and yok e assembly on valves. See Reference 4, p. 104. 3JAFCUV00 3 6 SG-EO I A i solation valve Replaced actuator and yok e assembly on valves. See Re f erence 104. 3MDG8F03 DG " 8" air intalce filter Modified hangers. See Reference 6, p. 104. 3 E P88S04 4.16 kV bus S04 Add i ti o n of relay s. See Refere n ce 6 , p. 101 3JSG8UV01 3 0 SG-EOIA isolation val v e Lock nut screw See Reference 29 ,_1). 154 3JSGBUVO 1 3 5 SG-E018 isolation v a lv e Lock n ut screw repl a ced See Ref e rence 29. p , 154 Relo cated the motor operated valv e from outside the 3 J S IAUV0651 RC loop I long-tenn recirc/SDC bioshield wall to th e inside near the hot leg nozzle to valve e l im i na te flow induced vibration in the line. See Reference 30 , p. 248. 3MSI8POJ LPSI pump "8" LPSI pump s haft and mechanical seal retrofit.

See Re f erence 30 , p. 246. Modified th e HP S I throttle valv es and minitlow isolating 3 JSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A isolation valv e valv es from risin g/rot a ting stem valve s and changed the motor operated a c tuators. S ee Ref e rence 30, p. 250. Modified the HPSI throttle v a l ves and mi.nitlow isolating 3 J S IBUV0626 RC loop 2 8 i solation val v e v al v es from rising/rotating stem valve s and chang e d the motor operated actuators.

See R e ference 30._p, 250. Modified th e HPSI throttl e v a lves and miniflow i solating 3J S IBUV06 3 6 RC l oo p I A isolation valve valve s from rising/rotating stem valve s and changed the mot o r actuators. S ee Reference 30.J). 250. Mod i fied the HPSI throttle valves and minitlow isolating 3 J S IBUV0646 RC l oop I 8 i solation valve valve s from rising/rotating stem valve s and chang e d the motor o perated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250. 3JSIBUV6S6 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valve Added pre ss ure relie v ing spring check valves. See Re f erence 30 248. HP S I pump "8" rec i rc iso (clo se s on Mod i fied the HPSI throttle val v e s and miniflow isolating 3JSIBUV667 valv es from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the RAS) mo to r operated actuat o rs. See R e ference 3 0, p. 250. o A vari e ty of types of equipment:

The Base List 1 i tem s were each assi gned to one of the 22 c lasses of equipment listed in Appendix B of Referenc e I. Table 3-3 s hows how these classes were represented in S WEL I. T wo clas s e s, compre ss ors and motor g enerators , were not represented be c ause there are no SC-I equipment in t hese categorie s. Additionally, the transformers that are SC-I were con s idered part of the larger equ i pment typically repr e sented as switchgear or motor control centers (MCC s). Thu$, this classification is not individually represented in SWEL I. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revi s ion 0 April2014 Enc lo su r e Appe nd ices A a nd B contai n*******************

U p on sepa ratlon this page i s decontrolled Page 3-8 Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number" Equipment Type Number of Items Number ofltems Description Selected for Number in Base List 1 SWELl 0 Miscellaneous 13 6 I Motor Control Centers 13 6 2 Low-Voltage 1 2 4 3 M edium-Voltage Switchgear 2 I 4 Transfonners 0 0 5 Horizontal Pump s ll 5 6 Vertical Pumps 8 4 7 F lu i d-Operated Valve s 2 3 10 g Valv es So lenoid-Operated Valves 11 5 31 9 F an s g 4 10 Air Handlers 10 4 II Chillers 2 1 12 Air Co mpre ssors 0 0 13 Motor G enerators 0 0 14 Di s tribution Panel s 41 5 15 Batteries on Rack s 4 2 16 Battery C hargers and Inverters 12 5 17 Engine Generators 2 l 18 In struments on Racks 74 16 19 Temperature Sensors 3 2 20 Instrumentation and Control Panel s and Racks 39 9 2 1 Tank s and Heat Exchangers 20 8*

• Refer to Sect ion 3.4 for explanation of change t o SWEL I Equipment Type N umber. o A variety of environments

Si n ce the s ite i s located in a dry environment, typical of a desert climate, it was decided to identify the equipment operating environments b ase d on its location either "inside" (i.e., in si de an equipment room) or "outsid e" (i.e., outdoors) and b ase d on the nonnal maximum design temperature of the corresponding equipment e nvironment.

The s e d esi gn temperature s were detennined from a review of Appendix A of the Equipment Qualification Program Manual (Reference 3 1) and Section 9.4 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 32). Based on thi s review, seven categories of equipment operating environment s were identified. Table 3-4 s how s how th ese equipment operating environments were repre sented i n SWEL 1. WCAP-1768 1-NP , Su pplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 En cl osure Appendices A and B Upon Page 3-9 Table 3-4: Sort oftbe Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (femperature)" Temperature Number of Items Number ofltems (oF) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 80 142 (All inside) 47 (All inside) 104 150 (All inside) 43 (All inside) 113 8 (2 inside and 6 outside) 3 (All outside) 120 62 (All inside) 16 * (All inside) 122 4 (All outside)_

2 (All outside) 124 18 (All inside) 5 (All inside) 140 28 (All inside) 8 (All inside)

• Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Environment list. o Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program: Based on a review of the IPEEE report (Reference 3), there were no Unit 3 seismic vulnerabilities identified.

However, the IPEEE report states that a limited number of actions were taken to improve plant seismic capacity; no specific actions other than a Unit 3 example were provided, e.g., the anchorage on the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in Unit 3 was improved to reduce the possibility that the cabinets would be impacted during a seismic event. The following additional considerations were factored into the SWEL I selection process: o Numerical measures of risk importance:

The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) derived from the Internal Event s PRA model (Reference

33) was compiled for the Base List I items to determine potentially ri ssignificant SSCs. Items with a RAW value greater than 2 were considered of "high" risk importance.

There were 70 items of high risk importance in Base List I; 26 were selected for SWEL l. o Protected train restrictions during the walkdown week: The protected train schedules

[PVNGS "Work Week Schedule")

during the PVNGS-3 walkdown dates (from August 6, 2012, through August 10, 2012) were reviewed so that inaccessible items could be identified and deferred from SWEL I. Of the 125 items selected for SWEL I, one (I) item was inaccessible due to protected train restrictions (see Appendix G, Table G-2, Item 101). Item 101 was subsequently walked down during PVNGS refueling outage 3RI7 and its respective checkli s t is located in Appendix A. 3.2.1 Base List 1 The list of equipment retained by Screen #3 (and subsequently entering Screen #4) is defined as Base List I and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-1. 3.2.2 SWELl The list of equipment retained by Screen #4 is defined as SWEL I and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-2. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nclosure Appendices A and B conta i n******************

U pon separation th iS p age I s deco nt ro lled Page 3-10 3.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEMS The starting point for compiling a list of the SFP-related SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 2 selection proce ss was a review of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System DBM (DBM PC; Reference

35) and its associated drawings (References 36 through 40). This review identified fifteen SC-J components. Eleven additional components were later identified (during the first set of meetings) based on a system review. Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1 , the proces s for se lecting a sample of the SSCs associated with the SFP includes the following four screens:

• Screen #1 -Sei s mic Category I: The proc ess for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #1 is s imilar to the proce ss de scribe d earlier for Screen #I ofSWEL 1. The purpose of Sc reen #I i s to limit the item s to those that have a s eismi c licensing basi s. All SSCs initially con s idered for SWEL 2 (26 items) were passed from Screen #I to Screen #2.

• Screen #2-Equipment or Systems: The proce ss for se lecting SFP-related SSCs u s ing Screen #2 i s similar to the process de s cribed earli e r for Scre e n #2 of SWEL 1. Scr ee n #2 c ons i de rs only tho s e items associated with the S FP that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown proces s. The purpo se of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspection s to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis. Of the 26 items retained by Screen # 1, 6 wer e retained b y Screen #2 and subsequently p assed on to Screen #3.

• Screen #3 -Sample Considerations:

The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently e ntering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2. Th e proce ss for selecting SFP-r e lated SSCs u si ng Screen #3 is si milar to the proce ss described earlier for Screen #4 of SWEL 1. The purpo se of Screen #3 i s to narrow the Base List 2 candidate item s to tho se of mo s t s ignificance, considering the following sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systems o Major n e w and repl ace ment equipment (in c ludin g recent modification s) o A variety of types of equipment o A variety of environments Since there were only s ix items associated with the SFP, all items contained in Base List 2 were se lected for input to SWEL 2. W C AP-17681-NP , Supplement I PVNGS-3 R evis ion 0 Apri12014 Page 3-11

• Screen #4 -Rapid Drain-Down:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to identify items that could allow the SFP to drain rap id l y. Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1 , the SSCs con s idered are not limited to SC-I items. Any items identified as having the potential for rap i dly draining the SFP should be considered. The Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference

1) s pecifies the following on page 3-8: "Determine whether ther e are SFP penetrations below about 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

If there a re no such penetrations, then no rapid drain-down items would be added to SWEL 2." UFSAR (Reference

32) Section 9.1.3.3.1.1.1, pages 9.1-35 and 9.1-36, states the following: "If a pipe break were to occur in the Seismic Category Uquality portion of the system, pool cooling could be lost. However, the eve nt would be se/f-li miling as all pipe penetrations thr o ugh the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water levels for spent fuel shielding of 10 fi as required by Regulatory Guide 1.1 3. All pipes ex t endi ng down into the pool have siphon breaker holes at or above the minimum required water level. Under these conditions, sufficient time (longer than 30 minutes) is available to isolate the break and recover the minimum level required for start of the pool cooling sys tem. If the spent fuel pool clean up system is aligned with the refueling pool (drain valves), administrative procedures are in place to identify , locale and isolate a pipe break within the containment in a timely manner." The first two sentences of this UFSAR excerpt deal with the possibility of lo sing SFP water inventory following a pipe break. The next two sen tence s deal with how quickly the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System can be restored following a pipe break and are not pertinent to rapid drain-down.

Based on this documentation, there are no rapid drain-down item s for input to SWEL 2. A review of the SFP and its relationship to the adjacent fuel transfer canal and cask load pit was conducted to ensure that a rapid drain-down could not occur via a loss of gate seal integrity. A system review s howed that the bottom of the fuel transfer canal gate and cask load pit gate invert are 3-1/2 inche s below the top of the s pent fuel racks. Although a los s of these gate seals would re s ult in flooding of the cask load pit and the fuel transfer canal, it would not result in a water level les s than 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

This is due to the relatively small volume of the fuel transf e r canal and cask load pit. The fuel transfer tube within the fuel transfer canal was also considered since it provides an isolation path to the reactor cavity. The fuel transfer tube seal, canal i so lation valve PPCNV118, and quick-operating closure device MPCEMOIA are SC-1 items considered part of the SFP structure assessed by analysis and periodic inspections and were therefore excluded from SWEL 2. Drainage from the cask load pit to the decontamination pit would be limited because the bottom of the decontamination gate invert is 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

Although a rapid drain-down threat associated with the gate seal system was not found, the instrument air supp ly syste m to tlie SFP gate was included in the Area Walk-B y. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nc los ur e Appendices A and B conta i n*****************

Upon separa tion th is page is d econ tr olled Page 3-12 3.3.1 Base List 2 The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2 and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3. 3.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down SWEL 2 is augmented by the equipment that could potentially cause the SFP to drain rapidly (the equipment retained by Screen #4). As discussed earlier, there are no rapid drain-down items for input to the PVNGS-3 SWEL 2. 3.3.3 SWELl SWEL 2 is defined as the list of equipment retained by Screen #3 plus the equipment retained by Screen #4. As di scuss ed earlier, Screen #3 was not utilized because all 6 items contained in Base List 2 were selected for input into SWEL 2. In addition, there was no equipment associated with rapid drain-down.

Therefore, SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2 (summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3). WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 R evis ion 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B

...

Upon separation th i s page Is decontrolled Page 3-13 3.4 INACCESSffiLE ITEMS The equipment items that were inaccessible during the scheduled PVNGS-3 at-power walkdown dates (from August 6, 2012, through August 10, 2012) are identified in Table 3-5. The guidance allows for items to be deferred to a later date if inspection poses a safety concern. Items with electrical safety challenges or items within containment were deferred to ensure safety when inspecting.

The items in Table 3-5 were subse quently walked down prior to and during PVNGS refueling outage 3R 17. Table 3-S: PVNGS-3 Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdown SWELl Walkdown Equipment Item Description Number Equipment Location 13 3MCHEEOl Regenerative heat exchanger C1MT 14 3JCHEHV0239 Charging line to reactor coolant loop 2A isolation globe valve C1MT 19 3JCPBUV0005A Containment power access purge supply isolation butterfly damper C1MT 35 3JHCBUV0044 sarnpliJ!&

from.RU-1 containment isolation valve C1MT 36 3JHCBUV0047 Inlet sampling to RU-1 containment isolation valve C1MT 53 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL 55 3EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL 56 3EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL 77 3JRCBHVOI05 Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to reactor drain tank globe valve C1MT 78 3JRCBHV0108 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank_&lobe valve C1MT 79 3JRCBPTO I 028 Przr pre ss ure (required for RPS/SIAS)

C1MT 80 3JRCBPTI04 SOC RCS pre ss ure interlock CTMT 83 3JRCDPT106 SOC RCS pre ssure interlock CTMT 84 3JRCN1El01 Pressurizer t emperature CTMT 100 3JSGCL Tlll3C SG-EOIA WR level(required for AFAS) CTMT 101 3JSIAUV0651 RC loop I long-term recirc!SDC valve CTMT 107 3JSmPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sum p CTMT 108 3JSIBUV0614 Safety injection tank 2A discharge isolation globe valve CTMT 110 3JSmUV0624 Safety inject ion tank 28 di scharge isolation globe valve CTMT 119 3JSINPT391 HPSI long-term r ec irc loop I pre ss ure xmtr CTMT Item 3MCHEEOI was inaccessible in a locked high-radia tion area. For radiological safety considerations, it was decided to remove this component from SWEL I. A new item was not selected to replace this item for the following reasons:

• This item belongs to sys tem type CH. The removaJ of this item reduced the number of CH items in SWEL I from 10 to 9 (see Table 3-1), which i s still a good representation of this system type.

• This item was not identified as having major new or replacement modifications (see Table 3-2). Therefore, the removal of this item fro m SWEL I had no effect on the representation of equipment having major new or rep lac ement modifications.

• 3MCHEEOI belongs to equipment type 21. The removal of this item from SWEL I reduced the number of type 21 items from 9 to 8 (see Table 3-3), which is still a good representation of the equipment type. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nclos ure Append ices A and B contain Up on separatio n this page 1s decontr oll ed Page 3-14

• 3MCHEEOI is assigned a maximum environment temperature of 120°F. The remova l of thi s item reduced the number of "120°F items" in SWEL 1 from 17 to 16 (see Table 3-4), which is still a good representation of the environment temperature type. *

• 3MCHEEO I is not a risk-significant SSC. Therefore, the removal of this item from SWEL I had no effect on the representation of high-risk-importance item s in SWEL I. Following the completion of the Unit 3 at-power walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified a po s ition on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic condition s. Supplemental inspections of 18 electrical cabinets per F AQ 4.20 were conducted during the follow-on walkdowns.

The list of electrical cabinets that require supplemental inspection is i n cluded in Table 3-6. Table 3-6: PVNGS.3 FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections SWEL 1 Walkdown Description Equipment Item Equipment Location Number 3 4 57 3EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL 58 3EPHBM32 480V MCCM32 CTRL 59 3EPHBM34 480VMCCM34 AUX 60 3EPHBM36 480VMCCM36 AUX 61 3EPHBM38 480V MCCM38 AUX 62 3EPKBD22 (ROB t o LC 34 conttol power CTRL 3EPKBM42) 64 3EPKBH 12 Battery charger "B" CTRL 65 3EPKBM42 DC power to TCB l contro l circuit CTRL 66 3EPKCD23 ' (ROB to DC di s tribution panel D23 CTRL 3EPKCM43) 68 3EPKCM43 4 DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL 69 3E PKCN43 Inverter for s hutdown cooling iso lation valve 3JSICUV653 CTRL 70 3EPKDN44 Inverter for 3JSIDUV654 s hutdown coo lin g B return in s ide CTRL containment isolation valve 71 3EPNBD26 Power to PPS " B" in s trumentation CTRL 72 3EPNBNI2 DC/AC inverter "B" CTRL 75 3EPNCN13 DC I AC inverter "C" CTRL 93 3JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX 12 3 3JSABCO I B Train ESF AS re l ay cabinets CTRL 125 3JZJBE01 Remote shutdown panel CTRL 3EPKCD23 was inacce ss ible during 3RI7 and was therefore replaced with 3EPKDD24, which was in s pected to s ati s fy FAQ 4.20. 3EPKCM43 was inacces s ible during 3Rl7 and was ther e fore replaced with 3EPKDM44, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 420. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nclosure Appe n di ces A and B conta i n*****************

Up o n se paratio n th i s page is d e co n trolled Page 3-15 The inacce s sible equipment walkdowns perfonned during refueling outage 3R 17 are summarized in Table 3-7. Since Train C was protected during refueling outage 3R17 , Train C electrical components were s ubstituted with their counterpardrom Train D. Table 3-7 indicates equipment substitutions. Table 3-7: PVNGs-3 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage 3R17 SWELl Walkdown Item Number Equipment 14 3 JCHEHV0239 19 3JCPBUV0005A 35 3JHCBUV0044 36 3JHCBUV0047 5 3 3 E PBBS04 55 3EPGBL32 56 3EPGBL34 57 3EPGBL36 58 3EPHBM32 59 3EPHBM34 60 3EPHBM36 61 3 E PHBM38 62 3EPKBD22 65 3EPKBM42 3EPKCD23 was inaccessible during 3Rl7 and was 66 therefore replaced with 3EPKDD24 , which w as insp ec ted to satisfy FAQ 4.20. 3EPKCM43 was inacc ess ible during 3RI7 and was 68 therefore replaced with 3EPKDM44 , which was inspected t o sati s fy FAQ 4.20. 77 3JRCBHVO I 05 78 3 JRCBHVOI08 79 3JRCBPTOI02B 80 3JRCBPTI04 83 3JRCDPT106 84 3JRCNTE101 100 3JSGCL Tlii3C 101 3JSIAUV0651 107 3JSIBPSVI89 108 3JSIBUV06 1 4 110 3JSIBUV0624 119 3JSINPD91 WCAP-17681

-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Description Charging line to reactor coolant loop 2A isolation

_g_lobe valve Containment power access purge supply isolation butterfly damper Di s charge sampJinA from RU-1 containment i s olati o n valve Inlet sampling to RU-1 c ontainment isolati o n valve 4.16 kV bus S04 480 V LC32 bus 480 V LC34 bus 480 V LC36 bus 480V MCCM32 480V MCCM34 480V MCCM36 480VMCCM38 LC 34 control power DC power to TCBl control circuit DC power to TCB I control circui t DC power to TCB I control circuit Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to reactor drain tank globe valve Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe valve Przr pres s ure {required for RPS/SIAS) SDC RCS pressure interlo c k SDC RCS pressure interlock Pressurizer temperatur e SG-EOIA WR level (required for AFAS) RC loop I loJ!g-term recirc/SDC valve RC loop 2 L TOP reli e f to s ump Safety injection tank 2A dischar_ge iso lation gl o be valve Safety injection tank 28 discharge isolation globe valve HPSI recir c loop_l_pJe ss ure xmtr Equipment Location CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL AUX AUX AUX CTRL CTRL CTRL CTRL CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT CTMT Revision 0 April2014 Enc l os ur e Appendices A a nd B contain Upo n separat1on tn 1 s page IS decontrollecl Page 3-16 The equipment that was in s pected on April 6, 2013, prior to refueling outage 3R17, is identified in Table 3-8. Table 3-8: PVNGS-3 Items Completed During tbe April 6, 2013, Inspection SWELl Walkdown Equipment Item Description Number Equipment Location 64 3EPKBHI2 Battery charger "B" CTRL 69 3EPKCN43 Inverter for s hutdown cooling isolation CTRL valve 3JSICUV653 Inverter for 3JSIDUV654 shutdown 70 3EPKDN44 cooling 8 return inside containment CTRL isolation valve 71 3EPNBD26 Power to PPS "B" instrumentation CTRL 72 3EPNBNI2 DC/AC inverter " B" CTRL 75 3EPNCNI3 DC/AC inverter "C" CTRL 93 3JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX 123 3JSABCOI B Train ESF AS relay cabinets CTRL 125 3JZffiEOI Remote shutdown panel CTRL All required and supplemental inspections are complete. Inspection results are documented on the corresponding Seismic Walkdown checklist in Appendix A. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nclosu r e Appendices A and B cont ai n Upo n separation this p a ge is decontrolled Page4-1 4. SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS

4.1 BACKGROUND

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were perfonned in accordance with the requirements of Section 4 ofEPRl TR-1025286 (Reference 1). The walkdowns were conducted by the SWT, consisting of the two SWEs mentioned in Section 2.2. Members of PVNGS Operations and Engineering provided support during all walkdowns. The SWEs utilized engineering judgment based upon experience and training indicated in Section 2.2, supplemented by existing current licen s ing basis (CLB) plant documentation and analyses , where applicable, to identify poten t ially adverse seismic conditions. For items on the SWEL, these potential s eismic conditions included any adverse anchorage conditions, adverse s ei s mic spatial interactions, or other adverse seismic conditions.

The results of the walkdown and any pertinent observations were documented for each item on the SWEL using the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) included in Appendix A. In addition to potentially adverse seismic conditions, observations de s cribed in the SWCs include those that, after discussion between the SWEs, were detennined to be adequate.

Area Walk-Bys were conducted by the SWT in each area of the plant that contained an item on the SWEL. The Area Walk-Bys identified potentially adverse sei s mic condition s as s ociated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item (up to a maximum radius of 35 ft from the component).

The area examinations identified:

I) adverse anchorage conditions, 2) degraded equipment in the area, 3) potential seismic spatial interactions, 4) adverse cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting, 5) potential flooding/spray or frre hazards , and 6) other adverse housekeeping conditions.

The results of the walk-by s and any pertinent observations were documented for each inspected area using Area By Checkli s ts (A WC s), which are included in Appendix B. Observations described on the A WCs include potentially adver s e seismic conditions as well as conditions that were discussed and detennined to be adequate at that time. The SWT was assisted by other individuals present on the walkdown, including PVNGS Operations and Engineering personnel.

The SWT fo r PVNGS Unit 3 con s isted of Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A. For supplemental walkdowns during refueling outage 3RI7, the SWT consisted of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini.

Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero Jed the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as the interface with plant operators.

Additional PVNGS staff facilitated access to equipment and provided additional infonnation regarding plant procedures and functions of SWEL items. In addition, these individuals assisted in identifying nearby equipment and systems that could cause adverse seismic interaction.

Any issue that could not be resolved by consensus of the SWEs during the walkdowns was identified as a poten t ially adverse s eismic condition on th e SWC or A WC (as applicable).

The conditions identified were evaluated with respect to the CLB. The se Licensing Basi s Evaluations are listed and described i n Appendix D. WCAP-17681

-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nclosure Appen di ces A and B contai n *****************

Upon s e parat i on t his page i s de c ont ro lled 4.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISMIC WALKDOWNS Page 4-2 In preparation for the Seismic Walkdow ns and Area Walk-Bys, SWT obtained the SWEL and selected 50% of the items (excluding line-mounted equipment) for anchorage configuration verification.

A total of 79 components were identified as potential anchorage verification candidate s and 42 were randomly cho s en to fulfill the 50% anchorag e configuration verific a t i on requirement.

The s election was adjusted to consider equ i pment of intere s t ident i fied by PVNGS , including items that had recent modifications or anchorage change s. PVNGS de s ign drawings, s ei s mic qualification calculations, and vendor/s upplier documents (SDOCs) were reviewed and later taken to the field to verify as-installed configurations were consistent with the CLB established by these documents. The SWT also obtained PVNGS equipment layout drawings to establish a detailed walkdown schedule. To prepare for observations involving potential interaction with masonry block walls , the SWT reviewed the equipment layout drawings associated with th e SWEL and located masonry walls in proximity. The Control Building 74 ft, 100 ft, and 140 ft elevations, in addition to the Auxiliary Building s ub-100 ft elevat i ons, w e re found to have wall s adj a cent to SWEL item s and Area Walk-By items. J'he SWT obtained and re v iewed calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120 (Reference

60) for Control Building masonry wall s and 13-CC-ZA-0125 (Reference

61) for Auxiliary Building masonry walls. The calculations

,]ndicate that all in-scope walls were designed and analyzed to not collapse under SSE accelerations, which en a bled the SWT to conclude that the SWEL items were free of sei s mic sp a t i al interaction due to a postulated masonry block wall collap s e. The SWT as s essed SWEL and Area Walk-By equipment for seismic spatial interaction due to diff e rential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls. In anticipation of potential flooding/s pray interaction hazard s due to threaded fire piping , the SWT obtained fire suppre ss ion diagram s provided within the IPEEE Report (Reference 3). These diagrams were later used in the field for Area Walk-By s to determine whether threaded fire piping , where present , was normally wet or pre-actu a ted and dry. Preliminary review of the fi r e s uppre ss ion diagram s indicated that areas with threaded fi re p i ping are generally pre-activated s prinkler sy s tem s and therefore are normally dry, thu s precluding potential flooding/s pray interaction hazards. However , the SWT was cognizant of exceptions where threaded piping could be normally wet. For these cases, the SWT would look for long s pan s with flexible s upports , which may lead to excessive threaded joint rotation and potential s pray. Additional current licensing basis documentation obtained and reviewed to s upport the walkdowns included: the in-s tructure floor re s po ns e s pectra f or the S S E (DBM-C5, Reference 53), structural damping criteria per UFSAR Table 3.7-l (Reference 32), the PVNGS s caffolding procedure and installation s pecification s (30DP-9WP11 and 13-CN-0380, Ref e rence s 54 and 55), the PVNGS housekeepin g procedure (30DP-OWMI2, Reference 56), the P VN GS tran s ient material details and analys es (1 3ZYD-0034 and 13-CC-ZZ-0309, Reference s 57 and 58), the PVNGS lighting detail s (13-E-ZAL-001 1 , Reference 59), and the control room ceiling qualification (Log No. 13-10407-A216-12 , Reference 65). The PVNGS IPEEE Report (Reference

3) was al s o obtained and reviewed. This document i s di s cussed in further detail in S ection 7. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 P VN GS-3 R e vi s ion 0 April2014 E nclosure Appendices A and B contain.II.IIIIIJIIIIIIJIIIIIII********

Upon separation th1s page is decontrolled Page 4*3 4.3 WALKDOWN RESULTS The SWT conducted the initial Seismic Walkdowns for Unit 3 at PVNGS August 6, 2012, through August 9, 2012. For components not originally inspected due to having either inaccessible internal anchorages, being located inside containment, or requiring additional interior inspection related to F AQ 4.20, additional walkdowns were conducted during follow-on inspections performed on April 6, 2013, and on October 13, 2013, during refueling outage 3Rl7. When walkdown activities identified potentially adverse seismic conditions, licensing basis evaluations were performed and are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D. Appendix D provides additional information on the resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of each of these conditions.

Detailed walkdown results are provided on the SWCs and A WCs in Appendices A and B, respectively.

A summary of initial walkdown statistics follows:

• A total of 132 SWEL components were walked down and 59 Area Walk-Bys were performed.

Six items listed on the SWEL (3EPKBD22, 3EPKDD24, 3EPKCD23, 3JRMBB02, 3JRMBB04, and 3JRMCB05) were child components contained within parent SWEL components.

These child components are referred to as "Rule of the Box" (ROB) items, for which the walkdown observations are identical to those of the parent item.

• Eighteen ( 18) S WEL components were e lectri cal cabinets whose interiors were not completely examined dwing the initial walkdowns.

Following the completion of the at-power Seismic Walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified under F AQ 4.20 a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 18 electrical cabinets occurred on April 6, 2013, and October 13, 2013. The list of electrical cabinets requirin g supplemental inspection per F AQ 4.20 is included in Section 3.4. Two (2) SWEL electrical cabinets originally inspected during at-power walkdowns were inaccessible during the supplemental inspections due to the plant protected train (3EPKCD23 and 3EPKCM43).

To fulfill the recommendations ofFAQ 4.20, sister components for these cabinets on the opposite train were fully inspected-including the cabinet interiors-and documented on SWCs.

• One-hundred-four (104) components and 50 Area Walk-Bys were resolved in the field as having no potentially adverse seismic concerns.

Two Area Walk-Bys were confirmed in the field to have potentially adverse seismic concerns involving seismic housekeeping.

• Thirty-seven (37) observations for twenty-eight (28) SWEL components and eight (8) Area Walk-Bys could not be readily resolved in the field by the consensus of the SWEs and were considered potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation.

It is important to note that some SWEL components or Area Walk-Bys may have multiple potentially adverse conditions that involve anchorage, spatial interaction, or other adverse concerns.

Twenty-three (23) of the 37 observations requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; ten (1 0) involved potential seismic spatial interaction concerns; two involved other potentially adverse concerns; and two involved spray/flooding hazards. Twenty-eight (28) of the 37 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet the current seismic licensing basis. Nine (9) conditions could not be readily resolved per the Licensing Basis Evaluation process and were entered into the CAP. All 37 Licensing Basis Evaluation items are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D, which includes additional information on the current status of potentially conforming conditions.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E n d osure Appendices A a nd B conta i n Upo n sepa r ation this page Is decontrolled Summarie s of Seismic Walkdown observations follow: Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions Page 4-4 While inspecting anchorages for SWEL equipment and i n-scope Area Walk-By equipment, the SWT noted 23 cases where as-in s talled configurations could not be verified by the PVNGS documentation brought in the field (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations).

Discrepancies included:

exceeded bolt projection length s, varying equipment pad thicknesses for mechanical components, varying weld patterns for electrical equipment, and varying anchorage spacing. Detailed descriptions of these discrepancies are also indicated in Appendix D. To a limited extent, Field Change Requests (FCRs) and Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) associated with the anchorage documentation that could verify the as-installed configurations were reviewed as part of Licen s ing Basis Evaluations.

No potentially d e graded anchorage conditions were observed in the field that required further evaluation. The SWT ob se rved no indications of reinforcement y ie lding and no s igns of excessive corrosion for s cope safety-related equipment.

All cracks observed were noted to be hairline or small cracks (less than 0.03 inch) as defined in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 47). Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions T he SWT noted 10 observations for SWEL components or areas where equipment had potential adverse sei s mic *S patial interactions that required further evaluation. Nine observations involved potential equipment spatial interaction with nearby permanent equipment due to potentially in s uffic i ent clearance s. Electrical components with potentially insufficient clearances to pennanent equipment included MCC 3EPHBM32, cabinets 3JESACOI I 3JZJBC02A (refer to A WC CTRL Outer Horseshoe), MCC 3EPKCM43, MCC 3EPKDM44 (refer to AWC CTRL J-109), 1/V Converters 3JSBBC02A and 3JSBCC02A , and junction box 3EZAAAKJKRJOI (refer to A WC AUX A-A02). All nine interaction concerns due to potentially insufficient clearances were documented for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations.

One Area Walk-By involved potential adverse seismic s patial intera c tions due to overhead item s. In the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Room of the Fu e l Building, th e SWT observed safety-related components in the area within the zone of influence of large, flat panel light i ng mounted overhead should they fail in a seismic event. Documentation detailing the anchorage of thes e lights was so ught as part of Licensing Basi s Evaluation

s. The SWT inspected overhead piping and distribution sys t e ms including cable tray s and found them anchored and ruggedly supported throughout the unit. Large fire extingui s hers on small hooks that could pos s ibly uplift and fall were found throughout the unit, but no safety-related equipment items were within fire extinguisher zone of influence.

Overhead lighting was also noted to be rugged in all areas with sensitive equipment, particularly the Control Building. Where equipment i s le ss sensitive to impact, several instance s of lighting fixtures s upported by S-hooks with di se ngaged or mi ss ing setscrews were observed. The SWT judged all cases not to be hazardou s to sa fety-related equipment, but the conditions were noted and documented in the CAP. All attached lines and piping to SWEL equipment were i nspected and readily concluded to have adequate flexibility in the field. As noted in Section 4.2 , all SWEL components and Area Walk-By equipment within the zone of influence of masonry block walls were evaluated prior to walkdowns not to be impact hazards due to WCAP-17681-NP , Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revi s ion 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B conta i n*************

Upon sepa r ation this page is decontrolled Page 4-5 collapse per existing calculations.

No seismic s patial interaction hazards due to differential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls were observed during the walkdowns. All scaffolding encountered by the SWT was found to be adequately braced and anchored in addition to having sufficient clearances to safety-related equipment in accordance with station procedures.

Several housekeeping issues were discovered within the unit. Two hou sekee ping issues were confirmed as found in the field by the SWT to be potentially adverse seismic conditions.

On the 100ft. elevation of the Fuel Building near the air handlers, the SWT observed a tall Radiation Protection vacuum on unlocked wheels secured to safety-related junction box 3EZF1ABKKJOI.

The concern was that the combined rocking and s liding mode could potentially damage the safety-related junction box and its conduit. The condition was corrected immediately by Operations and documented under Palo Verde Action Request (PV AR) 4225114. On the 140ft elevation of the Control Building, the SWT also observed a rolling step ladder chained off to the west wall but with enough slack to contact cabinets 3JSAAC04 and 3JSDACOS.

Operations corrected the condition immediately and PVAR 4218227 was generated.

Housekeeping issues that were found in violation of the housekeeping procedure (Reference

56) were entered into the CAP.

• Detailed description s of all potentially adverse se i smic s patial interaction concerns are provided in Appendix D. Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions The SWT observed an apparent modification to the DC Room "B" Emergency AHU (3MHJBZ04) where a PIOOO Unistrut member was welded off the AHU to support an NQR component.

Verification is required to determine whether the modification reconciled the configuration so as not to invalidate the individual AHU seismic qualification. In addition, the SWT observed a door middle hinge pin not engaged with the lower half of the hinge on load center 3EPGBL34 , which was corrected immediately and documented under PV AR 4465161. These observations were documented for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations.

SWT did not note any other degraded conditions, mis s ing equipment fasteners, or irregular mounting s on equipment.

Potential Flooding/Spray Hazards The SWT was cognizant of potential spray and flooding hazards particularly from threaded fire p i ping. Overhead fire piping was generally found to be welded and ruggedly su pported (no rod hung piping) at short and regular interval s. Areas that had threaded piping were either confirmed to be pre-activated and therefore normally dry or have adequate rigid su pport s pacing so as to preclude excessive joint rotation.

Two Area Walk-Bys were ob serv ed by the SWT to have potential spray hazards that required additional review as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The Area Walk-By for the "B" Diesel Generator Room (refer to A WC DG G-1 04) was observed to have DS piping within the zone of influence of heavy heaters and lights overhead should they fall during a seismic event. The Area Walk-By associated with Reactor Trip Breaker " 8" (refer to A WC AUX A-227) was observed to hav e large air handlers on vibration mounts. The concern is that the AHUs could fall off their mount s, allowing the ir pipe connections to break, flood the area, and open the reactor trip breakers.

Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interaction s No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit 3 by the SWT. This included no observations of hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored shelves, or unlocked cabinets; and no adverse natural gas or hydrogen lines. No hydrogen or oxygen tanks were observed in the vicinity of SWEL equipment during the Area Walk-By s. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosu r e Appen di ces A a nd B conta i n*****************

Upon sepa r at i on t his page is decontrolled Non-NTTF 2.3 Related Observations Page 4-6 The SWT (including PVNGS Operator and Engineering SWEs) were also cognizant of issues not necessarily pertaining to the seismic qualification of safety-related equipment.

The SWT noted conditions such as:

• Broken/missing floor grating clips

• Mi ss ing or partially-engaged set-screws on pendant lighting S-hooks

• Missing confined space sign

• Oil re s ervoir cap on valve cannot be tigh t ened

• Phone enclosure missing door

• Door handles not aligned properly Non-NJ'TF 2.3 observations were recorded on the SWCs/A WCs and entered into the PVNGS CAP. Many of these conditions were also corrected on-the-spot by the Operations member of the SWT. None of these observations (by definition) represented potentially adverse sei s mic conditions

-fasteners were located on non-seismic components; lighting and loose or unsecured items were not within the zone of influence of any soft targets. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain*****************

Upon separation this page I s d econtrolled Page 5-l S. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS The 37 potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation identified in either the equipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys as discussed i n Section 4 were evaluated with respect to their seis mic licensing basis. As indicated in Section 4.3, 23 of the 37 items requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; 10 involved potential seismic spatial interaction concern s; two involved other potentially adverse seismic concerns; and two involv e d sp ray/flooding hazard s. The s e potentially adverse conditions are included in Appendix D, along with their dispo s itions. Twenty-eight (28) of the 37 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. The nine (9) potentially adverse seismic conditions that could not readily be shown to meet the current seismic licensing basi s were entered into the site's Corrective Action Program (CAP). For each of the items that fell into thi s category, the PVAR number i s included in the dispo s ition text, which is shown in Appendix D. Additional information pertaining to the current resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional As s e ssme nt s of th ese items is included in Appendix D. General methodologies adopted by the Licensing Basis Reviewers listed in Section 2.3 for addressing the observations noted in Section 4 are summarized in the following subsections.

Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions For the anchorage observations noted in Section 4 that involved discrepancies between the as-installed configurations and the anchorage documentation (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations) taken into the field , the Licen s ing Basi s Rev i ewer s collected and reviewed FCRs and NCRs for updates to the field documents that represent the Current Licensing Basis (CLB). Sixteen (16) as-installed anchorage configurations were determined to meet their se ismic licensing bas is. Seven (7) as-installed anchorage configurations for SWEL components 3EPKBHI2, 3EPKBM42, 3JHCBPT0351B, 3JHCDPT0351D, 3JSGBPT0306, 3JSINPT391 , and 3MEWBPOI could not be readily shown to reflect CLB documentation , and therefore were entered into the CAP and indicated as potentially non-conforming conditions by the listing of"No" under Question 5 of the SWCs. Evaluations of Potentially Adve rse Seismic Spatial Interact io n s Observations involving th e po ssi bility of insufficient clearances between safety-related componen ts were generally resolved by estimating relative di s placement from the in-s tructure respon s e spectra of Reference

53. Given equ i pment anchorage and s patial configuration , the Licen s ing Basi s Reviewers determined lower-bound estimates of component frequencies.

Th ese frequency estimates along with the appropriate damping values from UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Ref e rence 32) were used to o btai n spec tral accelerations.

Component di s placement was then estimated by the following formula (Reference 6 3): so *386.4 d=SF* s (lU. 2.ni Where SF= modal s hape factor (1.6 for cantilever)

Sa = spectral acceleration (g) from response spectra (J) = fundamental frequency (Hz) If the combinations of co mponent di s pl ace me nts under SSE loadin gs did not exceed the gap noted in the walkdown , the gap was noted as s ufficient to preclude impact. WCAP-17681-NP , Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revi s ion 0 April2014 E nclos ure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation th i s page is decontro ll ed Page 5-2 In some instances, licensing basis evaluations of potential spatial interactions were resolved by inspection of installation details. Nine of the potent ial spa tial interaction concern s were determined to meet their seismic licen s ing basis. SWEL component 3EPHBM32 could not be readily shown to be adequate, and therefore was entered into the CAP and indicated as potentially non-conforming condition s by the listing of "No" under Question 5 of the SWCs. Evaluation s of Other Potentially Adverse Sei s mic Conditions One identified Licensing Basis Evaluation pertaining to other adverse seismic conditions involving the apparent modification to the DC Room "B" Emergency AHU (3MHJBZ04) could not be readily shown through documentation to reconcile the individual equipment seismic qualification , and therefore was entered into the CAP and indicated as a potentially non-conforming condition by the listing as a "No" under Que stio n 11 of the s we. The compartment door to load center 3EPGBL34 with a middle hinge pin not engaged with the lower half of the hinge was determined not to be an adverse seismic concern given that the hinge pin was still effective at the upper half of the hinge and moreover that there is no vibration-sensitive equipment on the door. Evaluations of Potential Flooding/Spray Hazards Potential flooding/s pray hazards noted during the walkdown were evaluated by a combination of further documentation review and reassessment of photographs and walkdown information.

Of particular note, the vibration-mounted AHUs in proximity to the reactor trip breakers on the 120 ft elevation of the Auxiliary Building were determined to pose no spray or flood hazard to the reactor trip breakers.

Per PVNGS, potential impacts of flooding/spray hazard s are mitigated by the enclosed protective cabinets (designed as drip-proof per SDOC N001-1303-00057 (Reference 65)), which house the reactor trip breakers and the di s tance from the AHUs. All potential flooding/spray hazards were resolved. Evaluations of Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced ftre interactions were noted for Unit 3 by the SWT; therefore, there are no L i censing Basis Evaluations.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Endosure Append i ces A and B containiiiiJIIIIIJ*************

Upon separation th i s page is decontro ll ed 6. PEER REVIEW

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Page 6-1 This section documents the independent peer review for the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns performed by Stevenson

& Associates (S&A) for Unit 3 of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). The peer review addresses the following activities:

• Review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)

• Review of a sample of the checkJists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

• Review of any licensing basis evaluations

• Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP)

• Review of the final and supplement submittal reports The peer reviewers for Palo Verde Unit 3 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas of Westinghouse. Mr. Djordjevic is designated the peer review Team Leader and participated in all peer review activities as the seismic subject matter expert. Mr. Douglas participated in all peer review activities and led the SWEL selection peer review as the SWEL selection subject matter expert. Neither peer reviewer was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process. Mr. Djordjevic is an advanced degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience.

He has received Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) training.

Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15 years of nuclear engineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience.

Resumes are provided in Appendix E. The peer review ofthe SWEL development began on July 25, 2012 and was completed on July 28, 2012. All fmdings noted on the SWEL Peer Review Checklist were resolved.

The completed SWEL Peer Review Checklist is found in Appendix C. The results of the SWEL development peer review are discussed in Section 6.2. The peer review of the Seismic Walkdown inspection started on July 25 , 2012, with a peer check of the actual walkdowns for Unit 2. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas joined the walkdown team for a portion of the day's planned walkdowns to observe the conduct of walkdowns and adherence to the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (SWG) (Reference I). No additional peer review site visits were made for the Unit 3 walkdown as the same procedures were implemented and a similar suite of SWEL equipment was inspected as selected for PVNGS Unit 2. The required interviews were conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team on August 24, 2012, after review of a sample of the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown CheckJists (SWC) and Area Walk-By CheckJists (A WC) to ascertain the quality and procedural compliance with the SWG. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young on November 14, 2013, to review the SWCs and A WCs completed during the follow-on walkdowns. The discussion of the results of these sample SWC and AWC reviews are provided in Section 6.3. The results of the peer review of licensing basis evaluations are provided in Section 6.4. These assessments and their outcomes were also discussed with the SWE inspection team on August 24, 2012, and November 14, 2013. The peer reviewers reviewed the 37 licensing basis evaluations and found the WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosu re Appendices A and B con ta in Upo n separat ion this page is decontrolled Page 6-2 final determinations made by the SWEs to be correctl y performed, and also concurred with the conclusions for the 9 items that were not readily determined to meet c urrent licen s ing basi s, which were placed in the corrective action program. 6.2 PEER REVIEW-SELECTION OF SSCs 6.2.1 Purpose The purpo se of this sect ion i s to describe the process used to perform the peer review of the selected SSCs that were included in the SWEL. 6.2.2 Peer Review Activity -Selection of SSCs The guidance in EPRl Technical Report 1025286, Seism ic Wa/kdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Rec om mendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference I), Section 3: Selection ofSSCs was u s ed as the basi s for this review. This peer review was based on reviews of the s preadsheets utilized by the SWEL developers to generate the Base Li s ts and Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists. Peer review was also based on interviews with the following individuals who were directly responsible for development of the SWEL: o Rolando Perez (W es tinghouse) o Derek Seaman (Westinghouse) o Chris Wandell (Palo Verde Engineering) o Win s ton Borrero (Palo Verde Engineering)

This peer review utilized the Seismic Walkdown Guidance checklist shown in Reference I Appendix F: Checklist for Peer Review of SSC Selection.

For SWEL 1 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process: Verification that the SSCs se lected repr ese nted a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions:

o Reactivity Control (RC) o Reactor Coolant Pres s ure Control (PC) o Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (IC) o Decay Heat Removal (DHR); U ltimate Heat Sink (UHS) o Containment Function (CF) Verification that the SSCs selected include an appropriate repre se ntation of items having the following sample se lection attributes:

o Various types of sys tem s o Major new and replacement equipment o Various types of equipment WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revi sio n 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain*****************

Upon separation this page is decontrolled o Various environments o Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE program o Risk insight consideration For SWEL 2 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process: Page 6-3 Verification that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added to SWEL 2. Verification that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related items that were not included in SWEL 2. 6.2.3 Peer Review Findings-Selection of SSCs This peer review found that the process for selecting SSCs that were added to the SWEL complied with the process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. SWEL 1 selections totaled 124 items and SWEL 2 selections totaled six items.

• The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perfonn the five safety functions.

The bases for items selected to SWEL I were the IPEEE Report, Appendix 3.2 (Reference 3), which listed safe shutdown equipment from each redundant train of the systems supporting the five safety functions, and Seismic Category I items from the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database. A breakdown of the safety functions represented by the SWEL I selections follows: Reactivity control-38 SWEL selections support this function Pressure control-79 SWEL selections support this function Inventory control -52 SWEL selections support this function Decay heat removal/ultimate heat sink-89 SWEL selections support this function Containment function-21 SWEL selections support this function The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected to SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the required sample selection attributes.

A breakdown of the sample selection attributes represented by the SWEL I selections follows: Twenty-eight (28) of 31 Base List systems were represented in the SWEL I list. The peer reviewers recommended that equipment from two unrepresented systems be added to the SWEL list. Components from the remaining unrepresented systems were component types that were adequately represented by other system selections.

Since all five safety functions are also adequately represented by the SWEL, the peer review team concluded that the "various types of systems" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

Fifteen (15) of 38 major new or replacement items were represented in the SWEL I list. The sources for these items were Design Basis Manuals for the systems supporting the five safety functions.

Several of the new or replacement items involved a change to a group of similar items, and at least one item was selected from each group to represent the change. The peer review team concluded that the "major new and replacement equipment" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

During review of the submittal report, a revision to the SWEL was needed to correct an error to this sample consideration attribute in the spreadsheet that was used to track. and implement the SWEL selection process. This error did not result in a change to the WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 En clos u re Appendices A and B conta i n Upon separation th is page is deco nt ro lled Page6-4 Base List or SWEL selections; it increased the number of major new or replacement item s represented in the SWEL I list. The peer reviewers verified that the Seismic Walkdown Guidance requirements for this sample consideration attribute were maintained.

Twenty (20) of 22 types of equipment were represented in the SWEL 1 list. The equipment types not represented were "compressors" and "motor-generator sets." The site does not have related equipment in these equipment types. Equipment type "transfonner" is a subcomponent to equipment type "switchgear." The peer review team concluded that the "various types of equipment" s ample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

All environments were represented in the SWEL I list. *The Palo Verde Units are located in a dry environment

therefore environment classification was based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment room s. Since at least one item was selected from each environment classification the peer review team concluded that the "various environments" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

No items were added to the SWEL 1 list based on finding s of the IPEEE program; however emphasis was placed on the inspection of bookcases near the Main Control Board during Area Walk-By s because action had been taken to improve the seismic capacity of the bookcases.

Twenty-six (26) of 70 risk-significant items were represented in the SWEL li s t. Risk insights were applied from the Seismic PRA and Internal Events models to the selection of items to the SWEL. The peer review team concluded that the "risk insights" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

The peer reviewers verified that spent fuel pool related item s were considered and appropriately added to SWEL2. Spent fuel pool related it e ms considered wer e based on a review of design basis manual description s , piping and instrumentation drawings , isometric drawings, and a system review using the Site Work Management System (SWMS). All items that screened into Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2. The peer reviewers verified that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related item s that were not included in SWEL 2. The justification for sc reening out spent fuel pool related items was reviewed and found to be supported by the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference I). Components in-line with Seismic Category I piping were screened out. No rapid drain-down item s were included in SWEL 2. This conclusion was supported by a review of the UFSAR (Reference

32) which detennined that all pipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ft above top of fuel assemblies.

All pipes extending down into the pool have siphon breaker hole s at or above the minimum required water level of 10ft above top of fuel assemblies.

All items that screened in to Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2; therefore the peer review team concluded that appropriate justification was documented.

The completed pe e r review c hecklist in Appendix C documents the peer review results. The SWEL was revised during the follow-on walkdowns to remove component 3MCHEEOI, and to replace two (2) protected Train C components with corresponding Train D components which were readily accessible. This change reduced the number of SWEL 1 item s from 125 to 124. The component was removed because it was located in a locked high-radiation area It was not necessary to replace 3MCHEEOI with a similar equ i pment type since the s ampling selection attributes remained adequately represented by multiple i t ems on the SWEL. The replacement of Train C components with corresponding Train D components is acceptable per the guidance requirements.

The Peer Review Team reviewed these W C AP-17681-NP , Supplement]

PVNGS-3 RevisionO April2014 Enclosur e Appendices A and B Upo n '"'n*""""Mi Page 6-5 SWEL changes and verified that all sampling selection attributes remained adequately represented on the SWEL. 6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments-Selection of SSCs The peer review comments documented in the peer review checklist in Appendix C were resolved in a timely manner and improved the Seismic Walkdown process as summarized in the following:

• Additional SWEL selections from systems SA and ZJ were recommended; this enhanced the s ystem variety represented on the SWEL.

• Adding an Area Walk-By of the SFP to evaluate interactions of equipment with the SFP tran s fer gates and inflatable seal equipment was recommended; this enhanced the walkdown effort.

• The enhancements and editorial corrections made to the Unit 2 SWEL report were incorporated into the Unit 3 SWEL report prior to this peer review; this improved report clarity.

• Provided clarification that OF system items will be adequately evaluated by the DG system SWEL walkdown s and Area Walk-Bys; this provided for clarity in the report. 6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review -Selection of SSCs This peer review concluded that the process for s electing SSCs to be included in the Seismic Walkdown equipment list complied with the process outlined in Reference I , Section 3: Selection of SSC s. It is further concluded that the SWEL sufficiently represents a variety of the required sampling of plant Seismic Category I safe shutdown equipment to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter (Reference 50). 6.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS A site visit was made on July 25, 2012, by Messrs. Walter Djordjevic and Mr. Gary L. Douglas to perform the peer review ofthe Seismic Walkdown team's inspection of Unit 2 equipment.

This allowed constructive feedback to be provided to the walkdown team in the field for subsequent application in the Unit I and Unit 3 walkdowns. A final review of the SWCs and A WCs was performed on August 23 and 24, 2012, after which an interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team in accordance with the SWG requirements.

The SWE trained walkdown engineers were Messrs. Hunter A. Young and Timothy S. Nealon. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young in accordance with the SWG requirements on November 14,2013. Table 6-1 lists the SWC and A WC samples which represent 24% of the SWC and 20% of t he A WC populat i ons , respectively. The sample includes the equipment inspected during the peer review and other equipment items from other classes to introduce diversity to the sampling procedure. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April20l4 Enclosu re Appendices A and B conta l n-"lliJI!IIIIIII!*III**

Upon separa tion t hi s page i s decontrolled Page6-6 Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Uoit3 Equipment Equipment (GIP) Walkdown Item Observations Identification Class 3EPEBG02 3EPHBM32 3E PKBF12 3EPKCN43 3 JAFBFT0041B 3E PNBV26 W C AP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 17 15 16 18 0 Emergency Diesel Generator B 480VM CCM32 DC Batt e ry " B" Inverter for s hutdown cooling i so lation valve 3JSICUV653 AFW Instrument R ack 120 V vital ac voltage r eg ulator " B" Two issues: 2 dowels on N end not installed and bolt projec t ion is 5.75" max vs. 5.25" required.

Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Regarding d owe l s, th e as-installed configuration was verified against CLB documentation. Regarding bo l t projection , due t o combined t olerance o f bolt placement , concrete fmishing , and field measurement by SWT , 1/2" discrepancy o f bolt projecti on i s determined to be acceptable.

One i ss ue with 3/8" c learance with cable tray. Licen si ng Basi s Evaluation d e termined that se i s mi c displacement exceeds the 3/8" gap requirement

thu s the potentially adverse concern cannot b e readily de te rmined to b e acceptable.

A more accurate frequency estimate may yield an acceptable di s placement less than the as-found gap. PV AR 4293351 generated to resolve the i ssue No co mment Licensing Basis Evaluation in s pe ctio n ofE054-00047 confirms that the as-installed configuration sa ti s fies the vendor requirement

s. Verified that Draw i ng J3.J. ZZS-157 applies to thi s equipment.

An cho rage i s pr es umed to b e plug-welded like others per documents; it appears that weld wa s grinded flu s h with steel and painted. Licensing B as i s Evaluation:

S DOC EI05-00011 (Ref. 65) i ndicate s that the provided c hann e l s have .. mounting ho les. Since the holes are absent in the fie ld, the SW T concludes that the holes are filled with plug welds. Re v i si on 0 April2014 Page6-7 T bl 6-l SWC dAW C P R . S I a e : an eer eVJew amp1es rom s .. w lkd I e1sm1c a own nspect1on f, u . 3 or mt 3 JAF CUV 00 36 3JCHEHVOS36 3JHCBPT0351B 3 JHCDPT03 52 D 3JRCBPTOI02B 3JRMBBOI 3JSABC OI 3 J SGBHVO 178 3JSGBUV0 1 30 3JSIBPSVOI66 3JSIBUV 0624 3 JSIBUV61 5 3 JZJB E0 1 3MCHETOI 3MECBEOI 3MEWBTOI 3MHFBJO I WCAP-17681-NP;Supplement I PVNGS-3 8 8 18 18 18 20 14 7 7 7 8 8 20 21 II 21 10 SG-EO IA I so l atio n Valve RWT MOV suct ion isolation valve Co ntainm ent pressure instrument rack Co ntainm e nt pressure instrument rack Co ntainm e nt pressure instrument rack Main Co n trol Board Sec ti o n BOI B Train ESF AS Rel ay Cabinets Atmospheric Dump Va lve HV-178 SG-EO I A I so lation Valve HPSI Recirc Train B Pressure Relief Valve Sl Tank 28 Discharge I so lation Globe Valve RC Loop 2A LPSI I so lation Valve Remote S hutd o wn Panel R e fueling Water Tank Essent i a l Chiller B EW "B" Tank Fuel Bldg Air Handling Un it No comments No comments Drawing detail calls for "a ll -around" 1/8 fillet weld with column flanges. Only top and botto m is provided. Licensing Basis Eva luation: As-installed configuration could n ot readily be verified against CLB d ocume ntati o n. PVAR 42 75 118 generated to r eco n ci le the configuratio n di screpancy.

No co mment N o comment No co mm e n ts -se i smic interact i o n s n o ted and properly add res sed No comment No comment No comme nt Sca ffold well s upported -n o i ss ue s No comme nt No comment No comments-seismic interactions noted and p rope rl y add r essed No comments-seismic interactions noted and properly addressed Bolts have 11-112" max projection from base s lab vs. 11 " requirement on dra w in g. Licensing basis evaluation determined that th ey are acceptable a s found. No comment Maximum projection of 4-1/2" re corded in field versus 4" r equ ir ed per drawing. Licen s in g basis eval uat ion determined th a t th ey are acceptable as found. Revision 0 April 2 014 E n dosure Append ice s A and B con tai n Upon separation t hi S page I s decontrolle<l 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review 3EPGBL34 3JSINPT391 3EPKDD24 3EPBBS04 3EPHBM36 3EPKBH I2 Area: Aux, 100', A-116 WCAP-17681-NP , S uppl e m e nt I PVNGS-3 2 18 14 3 16 480 V LC34 bus HPSI l o ng-t e rm recirc loop I pres s ure xmtr DC distribution panel 024 4.16 kV bus S0 4 480VMCCM36 Battery c h arger " B" Page 6-8 I. Compartmen t 3E PGBL34C I door m i ddle hin ge pin n ot engaged with the l ower half of the hinge. Licen s ing basis eva luation detennined t hat co nditi o n is acceptab le as found. 2. Also noted door hinge pin i n 3GPGBL3 4 B4 is s itting high All-around are to provided between the U ni s trut members and the steel column flanges. Only the o ut s id es of the flanges are we ld e d i n field. Licensing Basis Eva lu ation: As-installed configuration co uld n o t be readil y verified again s t CLB documentation. PVAR 4 275 118 updated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

GIP C l ass (8) for this item o n the SWC is incorrect; changed to GIP C l ass in3EPKDM44 and is therefore R.O.B. component.

No comments-prior observation noted in SWC for 3EPKDM44 is p roper l y addressed. Recommend r emov in g ladd er phot ograph intended to show open cabinet door, or ad d a clarifying s tat e ment of the outage co ndition. Photograph rem oved. Internal in s pection. No comments.

Internal inspect io n. No comments. Noted threaded fire with Victau li c co uplin gs but frequ en tly s upported. N o issue. Externa ll y braced mas o nry wall also noted. No issue. Revision 0 Apri l2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain ***************

Upo n sepa ra tion t hls page is de controlled Page 6-9 Table 6-l: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspect1on for Unit 3 Area: Aux, 120', A-227 Area: Aux, 52' A-CIS Area: Aux 88' A-AO I Area: Control,1 00', J-110 Area: Control, 140', Outer Hors es hoe Area: DG, 120', G-108 WCAP-17681-NP, S upplement I . PVNGS-3 Large AHU on vibration mounts is approximately 15' N of reactor trip switchgear.

The concern is that the AHUs could lo s e lateral supports causing water lines to break and flood the Follow-up detennined that potential impacts of flooding/spray hazards are mitigated by drip-proof enclosed protective cabinets, which hou se the reactor trip breakers.

No comment No comment Noted eyewash I shower adjacent to battery rack in SE comer with threaded piping. Pipe is low mass and well-supported so as to preclude excessive joint rotation. No spray hazard. 1/16" gap between cabinets ZJB-C 02A and ESA-COI in E-W direction.

ZJB-C02A is 32" wide in direction of motion considered and is judged to be very stiff. Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per PVNGS PRA Group, review of CN-RAM-12-015 , spatial interaction due to a seismic event between the two cabinets 3JZJBC02A and 3JESAC01 results in acceptable relay chatter. Therefore, se i sm ic gap is acceptable.

No adverse condition.

Noted ftre extinguishers that may uplift off of small hook. 'No safety-related targets with in fall range. Book cas e in S corridorS ofRMN-BOl i s anchored to the stud wall. Judged to be of no interaction concern. Temporary instrument rack (approximately 400lbs) on wheels I" East of QSPD Channel B. East 2 wh ee ls of ra c k are tied off with nylon rope (WO# 3733934).

Rack i s approximately 70"H x 24"x24". Concern i s if rack can overturn and impact adjacent cabinets SAA-COl or COI. Rack was immediately tied off at top and the QSPD cabinet was con finned to be out of service at the time. Potential hazard was corrected on the spot. Temporary tool cart is well tied off with nylon rope t o printer cart that is heavily bolted into slab. No hazard. Noted rolling step ladder chained off t o W wall but has enough slack to impact cabinets SAA-C04 and SDA-COS. Could impact safety-function of cabinets.

Notified control room. Corrected on the spot. Pe er Review Team advised thaJ th e SWC must cite the interaction question as a 'No' given thaJ in the 'as found' situation it was a real seismic interaction concern. The condition report should indicate the problem {as found) and note that the condition has been .fixed by relocating the ladder. No comments -seismic interactions noted and properly addressed Revision 0 April2014 E n clos ure Append i ces A and B contain Upon separation t his page is decontrolled Page 6-10 T bl 6 1 SWC d AWC P R . S I fi a e -: an eer eVJew amptes rom sis . w lkd fi u. 3 e m1c a own nspect on or DJt Area: Fuel Bldg, 140' SFP Proximity

• Area: MSSS, 80', C-A09 Area : CTMT, 100 3JCHEHV239 Proximity Area: CTMT, 120, Pressurizer C ube Area: CTMT, 87 , 3JHCBUV0044

/3>>>CBUV0047

/3JSIBPSV 189 Proximity WCAP-1 768 1-NP , Supplement l PVNGS-3 Noted scaffolding on E wall by pool. Scaffolding is well-braced but legs not anchored.

Friction judged s ufficient so that lower leg s do not kick out. PVNGS Eng ineers confinned not a procedural violation.

Good clearance provided nea r seal tubing on N wall. Told SWE team to read sca ffolding and h o usekeeping procedure as a practic e. Noted upright ladder against S wall that was tied off but could still ovenum and damage NQR conduit No adverse concern but notified PVNGS: PV AR 4225 I 16 documents the condition.

No comments -se i s mic interactions noted and properly addressed No comments No comments No comments RevisionO April 2014 Encl os ure Appendices A and B cont a i n**************

Upon separation th i s page is dec o ntrolled Page6-11 6.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS Appendix D provides a list of the potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys and how they were addre ss ed. If a PVAR was generated, it is referenced in Appendix D. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas conducted interviews with the SWE inspection team on August 23, 2012, and November 14, 2013, to discus s the issues identified to determine if, in the opinion of the peer reviewers, any of them potentially challenged the current licensing basis of the plant. As noted in Section 5, there were 37 potentially adverse seismic condit i ons identified in either the equipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys requiring evaluation with respect to their seismic licensing basis. Not all potentially adverse conditions were resolved.

The peer reviewers performed a review of all completed licensing basis evaluations and the walkdown team's decisions for entering these potentially adverse seismic conditions into the plant's CAP. Twenty-eight (28) of the licensing basis evaluations determined that the potent i ally adverse conditions were ultimately found to be in compliance with the current licensing basis. Of the remaining 9 potentially adverse s e is mic condition s that were entered into the plant's CAP, 7 involved difficulty in verifying the as-built anchorage configuration with plant documentation, one (1) involved potential interact i ons between an MCC and cable tray and between a pair of control pane ls, and one (1) involved seismic qualification of modified equipment.

The peer reviews of Sections 4.3 and 5, and Appendix D led the peer reviewers to conclude that the licensing basis evaluations carefully compared the actual as-found plant configuration s to the current licensing basis documentation in order to assess configuration compliance with the Palo Verde design basis, and the deci s ions for entering condition s into the plant's CAP complied with the expectations of the SWG. CAP Status Review The peer reviewers performed a review of the status of items that were entered into the plant's CAP as a result of the Seismic Walkdown s (see Table 6-2). This s upplement submittal report was found to appropriately reflect the s e update s. Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 3 CAP Item PV AR 4225114 Area: FUEL 100' near air handlers, tall Radiation Protection vacuum on unlocked wheels secured to safety-related junction box 3EZFIABKKJOI PV AR 4218227 Area: Controll40' rolling step ladder chained otT to the west wall with enough s l ack to contact cabinets 3JSAAC04 and 3JSDAC05 PV AR 4465161 Door midd l e hinge pin not engaged with the lower half of the hinge on load center 3EPGBL34 PV AR 4293351 3EPHBM32 seismic displacement exceeds the 3/8" gap requirement WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 CAP Status Action completed.

Condition corrected. Action completed.

Verified no contact with sensitive equipment.

Action completed. Condition corrected.

Evaluated as no impact on s eismic ca pability and no operability impact. CMWO 4293566 issued to trim/remove cable tray end. Revi s ion 0 April2014 E nclosure Appendices A and B cont ai n Upon separat i on t his page is decontr o lled Page6-12 Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 3 CAP Item CAP Status PV AR 4275118 3EPKBH12 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation.

evaluated against vendor requirements.

EDC 2013-00471 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-EOO I to enhance documentation.

PVAR4275118 3EPKBM42 anchorage configuration could not be A s-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation.

evaluated in existing calculation 13-CC-ZQ-EOOI.

PVAR4275118 3JHCBPT0351B anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation.

capability and no operability impact. EDC 2013-00471 will updateDwg 13-J-010-0105/0106 to enhance documentation.

PV AR 4275118 3JHCBPT0351D anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentat i on. capability and no operability impact. EDC 2013-00471 will update Dwg 13-J-0 ID-0 I 05/0 I 06 to enhance documentation. PVAR4275118 3JSGBPT0306 anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation.

capability and no operability impact. EDC 20 13-004 71 will update Dwg 13-J-ZZS-0165

/13-J-OID-0173 to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4275118 3MEWBPOI anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation. capability and no operability impact. EDC 2013-00471 will update Dwg 13-C-ZAS-012l/024l to enhance documentation.

PV AR 4275118 3MHJBZ04 verification to determine whether apparent Evaluated as no impact on seismic modification reconciled individual AHU seismic capability and no operability impact. qualification.

EDC 2013-00471 will update AHU s e ismic qualification to enhance documentation.

PV AR 4275 118 3JSINPT0391 anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentat i on. capability and no operability impact. EDC 2013-00471 will update Dwg 13-J-0 ID-0 119 to enhance documentation. 6.5 REVIEW SUBMITTAL REPORT The entire final submittal report has been reviewed by Me ss rs. W. Djordjevic and G. Douglas and found to meet the requirements of the EPRI TR-1025286-Se i smic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). The update submittal report has been reviewed by Messrs. W. Djordjevic and G. L. Doug l as and found to meet the requirements of EPRI TR-1025286

-Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). WCAP-1 7681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E n dosure Append i ces A and 8 co nt a i n Upo n separat1on t hiS page IS Cleco nt r o ll eel 7. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES Page 7-l A summary of IPEEE vulnerabilities is available in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events report (Reference 3). Per Reference 3, no seismic vulnerabilities were determined to exi s t at PVNGS-3 and no significant changes to plant design were required i n order to demonstrate the ability to mitigate the Rev i ew Level Earthquake (RLE). All observations identified from the IPEEE walkdowns were resolved prior to issuing of the IPEEE report on June 1, 1995. Table 4-1 ofPVNGS CORR 94-001-506 (Reference

62) had documented items to review for the Seismic IPEEE prescreening and walkdown of all three unit s; and Table 3-4 of Reference 3 s ummarized the resolution of these original walkdown concerns.

The IPEEE report (Reference

3) concluded that all components have capacities exceeding the 0.3g peak ground acceleration of the RLE. However, action was taken to improve the seismic capacity of the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in the Unit 3 Control Room. The existing anchorage was determined to be marginal, and additional anchorage was provided prior to issuing of the IPEEE report to resolve the concern. As noted in Section 4.2, the SWT reviewed the IPEEE report prior to conducting walkdowns.

Similar observations noted in the IPEEE report regarding the Control Room bookcases were also noted for review during these walkdowns.

The SWT rev i ewed Detail 35 of 13-A-ZYD-0034 (Reference 57), which specifies 23 metal screw s fastening the bookcases in all three units to the metal stud wall. The SWT and licensing basis reviewers determined that, although the as-installed anchorage for the Unit 3 bookcase did not comply with this detail , the demand forces were adequately low to preclude failure; therefore, no adverse s patial interaction was identified.

A s a result of thi s observation, PVAR 4214832 was generated and PVNGS removed these bookcases from the zone of i nfluence of the main control boards in all three units. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revisi o n 0 Apri12014 Enclosure Append i ces A and B con t ain*****************

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8. REFERENCES Page 8-I I. EPRI Technical Report I 025286, Seismic Walkdowit Guidance for Re solution of Fukushima Near-Tenn Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 2. Drawing 13-1-ZZI-OO Ol.ROlt, "Site Work Management System (SWMS) Equipment Database." 3. CORR 102-03407 , "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station-IPEEE." 4. Design Basis Manual DBM AF, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," Revision 22. 5. Design Basis Manual DBM CH, "Chemical and Volume Control System," Revision 21. 6. Design Basi s Manual DBM DF/DGIPE, "Diesel Generator, C l ass IE Standby Generation, Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System," Revision 23. 7. Design Basis Manual DBM EC, "Essential Chilled Water System," Revision 13. 8. Design Basi s Manual DBM EW, "Essential Cooling Water System," Revision 23. 9. Design Basi s Manual DBM FW, "F eedwate r System," Revision 13. 10. Design Basis Manual DBM HA, "Auxiliary Building HVAC System," Revi s ion 1 7. 11. Design Basis Manual HC, "Conta inment Building HVAC System," Revi s ion 9. 12. Design Basis Manual DBM HD, "HVAC-Diesel Generator Buildin g," Revision 12. 13. Design Basis Manual DBM HP, "Co ntainment Hydrogen Control System," Revision 13. 14. Design Basis Manual DBM MA, "Main Generation System," Revi sio n 8. 15. Design Basis Manual DBM NA, "13.8 kV AC Non-Class IE Power System," Revi sion 10. 16. Design Basis Manual DBM NC, "Nu c lear Cooling Water Sys tem," Revision 19. 17. Design Basis Manual DBM NE, "Statio n Blackout Topical," Revi sio n 18. 18. Design Basis Manual DBM PB , "Class IE 4.16 kV Power System," Revision 13. 19. Design Basis Manual DBM PG, "Class IE 480 V AC Power Switchgear System," Revision 11. 20. Design Basis Manual DBM PH, "Class IE 480V Power-MCC," Revision 11. 21. Design Basis Manual DBM PK, "Class IE 125 VDC Power System," Revision 17. 22. Design Basis Manual DBM PN, "Class IE Instrument AC Power System," Revision 10. 23. Design Basis Manual DBM QD, "E mergency Lighting System," Revi si on 10. 24. Design Basis Manual DBM RC, "Reactor Coolant System," Revi sion 29. 25. Design Basis Manual DBM SA, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," Rev is ion 16. 26. Design Bas is Manual DBM SB, "Reactor Protection System," Revision 18. 27. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-FWCS , "feedwater Control System," Revision 6. 28. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-SBCS, "Stearn Bypass Control System," Revi sio n 6. 29. Design Basis Manual DBM SG, "Main Stearn," Revision 31. 30. Design Basis Manual DBM Sl, "Safety Injection System," Rev ision 33. 31. Equipment Qualification (EQ) Files EQDF EQ-PM, Equipment Qualification Program Manual, Revision 21. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E n clos ure Appendices A and B contain*****************

Upon separation th is pa ge is decon trolled Page 8-2 32. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units I, 2 , and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 16B, August 2012. 33. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-11-0 I 9, "Validation of Probabilis t ic Ri s k A ssess ment Model Conversion for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station," September 2012 (We s tinghouse Proprietary Class Revision 0. 34. Interim Version of the Westinghouse Seismic PRA Database (Microsoft Access database file "APS-SPRA.mdb," dated August 22, 2012). 35. De sign Basi s Manual DBM PC "Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 18. 36. Drawing Number 03-M-PCP-000 I, "P & I Diagram, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 27. 37. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0501, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System I so metric," Revi s ion 2. 38. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0502, "Fuel Building Isometric Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 0. 39. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0503, " Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometri c," Revision 0. 40. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0504, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Sy s tem I so metric ," Revision 0. 41. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-71, "Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." 42. Des ign Criteria Manual DCM-PGD, "Project General Design Criteria," Revi s ion 24. 43. Regulatory Guide 1.60, "Design Response Spectra for Seismic De s ign of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision I , December 1973. 44. Regulatory Guide 1.61, "Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 0, October 1973. 45. Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," Revi s ion I , August 1973. 46. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-75, "Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." 47. EPRI Report NP-6041-SL , "A Methodology for A ssess ment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision I)," Revi s ion 1. 48. WCAP-17681-NP, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3," Revision 0 , November 2012. 49. Not used. 50. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of t he Code of federal Regulations 50.5 4(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," Enclosure 3 , "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic." 51. Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A, Rev. 3, "Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants ," November 1974. 52. Not used. 53. Design Basi s Manu a l DBM-C5 , "Sei s mic Topical," Revi s ion 4. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Endosure Append i ces A and B co nta i n*************

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54. Procedure 30DP-9WP1 I, "Scaffolding In s tructions," Revi s ion 24. Page 8-3 55. Specification 13-CN-0380, "Installation Specification for Seismic Cat IX and Non-Seismic Scaffolding," Revi s ion 20. 56. Procedure 30DP-OWM12, "Housekeeping," Revi s ion 20. 57. Drawing 13-A-ZYD-0034, "Tran s ient Material Re s traint Detail s ," Revi sio n 20. 58. Calculation 13-CC-ZZ-0309 , "Transient Material Analysi s ," Revi s ion 5. 59. Drawing 13-E-ZAL-0011, "Lighting Fixture Mounting," Revi s ion 31. 60. Calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120, "Concrete Block Walls," Revi s ion 5. 61. Calculation 13-CC-ZA-0125, "Auxiliary Building Non-Bearing Non-Shear Walls," Revision 2. 62. Correspondence 94-001-506 , "Transmittal of Report Pre s creening and Walkdown ofPVNGS for Seismic IPEEE." 6 3. "Dynamics of Structures, Theory and Application to Earthquake Engineering," Anil K. Chopra, University of California at Berkeley.

64. Not used. 65. PVNGS Documents used for Anchorage Configuration Verificat io n and Licensing Basi s Evaluations a Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-EOO 1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation-Electrical Equipment," Revision 5. b. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-1001, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation-Control Equipment," Revision 6. c. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-MOO l, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-Mechanical Equipment," Revi s ion 8. d. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-0001, "Civil-Structural Generator Notes," Revi s ion 24. e. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-0011 , "Anchor Bolt Schedule and Detail s," Revi s ion 9. f. Drawing Number 13-C-SPS-0376 , "Nuclear Service Spray Ponds Sections and Details Sht 1 ," Revi s ion 11. g. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0240 , "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Detail s Sht 1 ," Revision 10. h. Not used. i. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0241, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Detail s Sht 2," Revi s ion 9. j. Draw ing N umber 1 3-C-ZAS-0242, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 3," Revi s ion 11. k. Drawing N umber 13-C-ZAS-0243, "Auxiliary Build i ng Equipment Foundation Details Sht 4," Revi s ion 1 3. I. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0245, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Detail s Sht 5 ," Revision 8. m. Drawing Number 13-C-ZC S-0703, "MSSS Concrete Sections and Details ," Revision 8. n. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0705, "MSSS Floor Ins e rts and Penetrat i on s," Revi s ion 20. WCAP-17681

-NP, Supplement l PVNGS-3 Revi s i on 0 April2014 E ncl os ur e Appendices A and B conta i n****************

Upon separation this page i s decontrolled Page 8-4 o. Drawing Number 13-C-ZFS-0187, "FuelBuilding Concrete Sections & Details," Revision II. p. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0110, "Dies e l Generator Building Diesel Generator Foundation Plan Sections and Details," Revision 5. q. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0116, " Diesel Generator Building Concrete Section and Details Sht 2," Revision 7. . r. Drawing Number 13-J-OID-0173, "MSSS Building Iso Sensing Line SGA-PT308, 315; SBG-PT301, 321," Revision 6. s. Drawing Number 13-J-040-01 18, "MSSS ISO AFA-FT-40A and AFB-FT-41A Sensing Lines," Revision 2. t. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0157, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for 12"W x 24"H Plate with Unistrut," Revision 6. u. Log Number 13-10407-A216-12, "Wyle Job No. 44815-Seismic Test of Compact Ceiling Light Module and an Incandescent Light Module," Revision A. v. SDOC Number E051-00047, "Qualification Report for Class IE Battery Charger," Revision 10. w. SDOC Number E054-0070, "Class IE Inverter IEEE 323 and 324 Qualification Report," Revis i on 7. x. SDOC Number El05-000ll, "Outline Line Voltage Regulator 2SKVA," Revision 17. y. SDOC Number EN050B-A000l5, "General Arrangement 28-Cell Battery Rack Sht. 3," Revision 5. z. SDOC Number MS98-01433, "Mounting and Wiring Detail for Q Class HVAC Instruments," Revi s ion 21. aa. Drawing Number 13-E-ZAL-0011, "Lighting Fixture Mounting Detail Sheet 1," Revision 32. bb. Drawing Number 13-E-ZFL-0001, "Fuel Handling Building Li ghting & Communications El. 100ft, & El. 120ft, Level 1&2," Revision 14. cc. Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) 095-0038, "Restraints for Aux. Relay Cabinets." dd. SDOC Number NOOI-0502-00322, "Bridge Assembly SFHM V-CE-14439, 3-22-81," Revi s ion 4. ee. SDOC Number NOOI-0502-00326, "Trolly Hoist Assy SFHM V-CE-14439,3-22-81," Revision 6. ff. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZG-0070, "Diesel Generator Building Equipment Supports," Revi s ion 6. gg. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0143 , "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for 12"w x18"h Plate with Unistrut," Revision 7. hh. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0 I 02, "Control Building Area Jl D Concrete and Steel Plans for El. 74' and 100'," Revi sio n 10. ii. Drawing Number 13-C-SPS-0385, "Nuclear Service Spray Sect & Oti s Sht 7 ," Revision 4. jj. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-01 1 0, "Auxiliary Building AreaADA,B ,C & D Plan At EI40'-0"," Rev is ion 17. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosur e Appendice s A and B contain Upon separation th is page i s deco nt rolled Page 8-5 kk. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0122 , "Auxiliary Bldg Area ABD Plan At El70ft-Oin," Revision 18. II. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0138, "Aux Bldg Area AID Plan At E1100ft-Oin," Revision 20. mm. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0145, BldgAreaA2C Plan At El120ft-Oin," Revi s ion 10. nn. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0700, "Mn Stm Support Struct Cone Plan Area C1E,C2E,C3E&C4E," Revision 11. oo. Drawing Number 13-C-ZFS-0100, "Fuel Bldg Area FIA & FIB Plan@ El 100'," Revi s ion 17. pp. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 00, "Diesel Generator Building Plan s At El 1 00'-0" & 115"-0"," Revision 15. qq. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0102, " Diesel Generator Bldg Area G3A&G4A Plans At El 131 ft-Oin & El 146ft-Oin," Revision I 0. rr. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0116, "Diesel Generator Bldg Cone Sects & Dtls Sht.2," 7. ss. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-01 00, "Control Bldg Area JAA & B Plan At E l 74ft-Oin," Revi s ion 18. tt. Drawing Number 13-J-010-0105 , "Aux Bldg TSO HCB-PT-351B, 352B & 353B Sensing Line ," Revision 6. uu. Dr a wing Number 13-J-010-0106, "Sensing Line s For HCD-PT-351D

& 3520 Aux Bldg ," Revi s ion 4. vv. Drawing Number 13-J-04D-0117 , "MSSS Bldg ISO Sensing Lines AFA-FT-40B, AFB-FT-41B," Revision 3. ww. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0160 , "Instrument Mounting Assembly Rosemount Transmitter Model 1152 , 1153 Packed & 3 051 (Below Line)," Revision 7. xx. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZ S-0 165, " ln s tr Mtg Ass Rosemount Transmitter Model 1152,53 Packed (Below Line)," Revi sio n 7. yy. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0137, "Aux Bldg Area A1C Plan At E1100ft-Oin," Revi s ion 16. zz. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0581 , "Control Bldg Mi se Steel Platform s & Oti s Sht.2," Revisio n 7. aaa. Drawing Number 13-P-ZYC-0099 , "SSR Equpmt B l dg & Nuc Serv Spray Pond PMP House HVAC & Hanger Plan & Sections," R ev ision 2. bbb. SDOC Number EN050B-A00005, "General Arrangement 32 Cell Battery Rack Sht.1," Revi s ion 2. ccc. SDOC Number EN050B-A00006, "General Arrangement 28-Cell Battery Pack Sht.l," Revi s ion 2. ddd. SDOC Number EN050B-A00030, "Battery Room Layout Unit 3 Room B ," Revi si on 4. eee. SDOC Number EN050B-A00013 , "G eneral Arrangement 32-Cell Battery Rack Sht.J," Revi s ion 4. fff SDOC Number M721A-00092, "HDA-AOl Assy/Outline ," Revi si on 9. ggg. SDOC Numb e r E054-00047 , "Installation Drawing Inv e rter 253-1-101 SHT.1," Revision 6 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement l PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 E nc los ure Append i ces A and B conta i n ....... Upo n separat i o n t his page is decontrolled Page 8-6 hhh. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0191, "Control Building Plans And Details Sht. 2," Revision 8 iii. Drawing Number 03-E-ZGL-000 I, "Diesel Generator Bldg. Lighting & Communications Plan At El. 100'-0" and 115'-0"," Revision 6 jjj. Westinghouse Ca l culation CN-RAM-12-015, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment-Model Development," November 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2). kkk. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-022 , " Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment

-Quantification," December 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2). Ill. SDOC EOIS-02803, "Seismic Simulation Test Program on a IC7700 MCC," Revision 3. mmm.SDOC Number NOOI-1303-00057 , "Std Spec Reac Brkr Swtgr System Com Ltr Log 66,72," Revision 3. non. Drawing Number 13-J-OID-119, "Containment Bldg Isometric SIB-PT-391 Sensing Line ," Revi s ion 3. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014

. E nclosure Appendices A and B con tain U p o n separation t hi s page I s decont ro lled APPENDIX C -PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS Page C-1 There was no change to this appendix.

The SWEL Peer Review Checklist can be found in Appendix C of Reference 48 (Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde N uclear Generating Station Unit 3"). WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosu r e Appendices A a nd B contain Upon separation th1s page IS de c ontrolled Page D-1 APPENDIX D-LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

SUMMARY

Item EQID Item Description 3EPHBM32 480VMCCM32 Problem Description PVAR No. (if issued)s Dowell per Dltlll G oi13-C-nl* ZGS-lJD (W. &5) .... not lnltlllld-5-3/4. ........ proJedlon not.cl on ..... ...._bolts

--5-l/c-. Verify wMdw'QI documentdon IUOURts for diso"epllldes.

Noted approx. 3/8" 4293351 clearance on E side of MCC to separately supported cable tray. Evaluate MC C frequency in transverse direct i on and determ i ne whether clearance is adequa t e so as to preclude i mpact. NTTF Resolution Status' Y l.lcenlkW Bills ...........

doMis, lllll*tiOft ollJ.CZGS-0110 (W.IS) IIIII., 1l1*'-t photos,.....

that the dOMis .,. 2*1n clllmelllr wllh en *"liP It c:enlllr. 11111 rwflec:ts the

• fowld conr.nuon.

thetllfole.

._.II no ..._.. .. IC:horlle conc.m. .... -bolt prajedlon , due to led tdlllftCII ol bait CDIICietl flnllhlnr.

Ifill tleld m-UFIIMnt b¥ SWf, 1J2* dlscreplncy of bolt projKtion

.. .......,..

to be IQllptlble. sse meets tun11nt 1c:en11nt buls. N Licensing Basis Evaluation

Pe r SDOC E018*02803 (Ref. 65), MCC front-to-back frequency is 6 Hz with a spectral acceleration from the 100' elevation at 4% damping of 1.23g (= 1.1g

• sqrt(5%/4%)).

Using a modal shape factor of 1.6 for cantilever action , t he upper bound displacement is calculated to be 0.53". This exceeds the 3/8" gap requirement; thus the poten t ially adverse concern cannot be readily determined to be acceptable.

APS reports that PVAR i ndicates the use of 7% damping and an SSE anchored to a 0.20G PGA results in a displacement less than 3/8"; therefore no adverse seismic condition exists. APS reports th i s is a non-conforming cond i tion. An Operability Determination concluded that the SSC remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that this is a conforming condition.

Condition will be corrected by trimming end of cable tray to increase clearance (refer to EWR 4377344).

5 PVAR denotes Pa lo Verde Action Request whic h is the entry doc u ment fo r the P VNGS corrective action program. 6 NITF Status denote s conclusions of LBE for the condition. Y-Cond it ion was found to confo nn t o the Current Licensing Basis. N-Cond it ion is e i ther a Confo nnin g Cond it ion o r a P otentia l Non-Confonning Cond it ion (if P V AR resolution is on-goi n g) WCAP-1768 1-NP, Sup pl ement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2 014 Item EQID 3EPKBM42 Item Description Problem Desc r ipt.ion Ncad IPPfOII. 2. stltd1 weld (1 pp) 4. o.c. ** oppOIId to ln datad &* continuous weld at SE embed piN. Verify whether a.a documentation KCOUnts for the dlscrepency. DC power to TCB1 control As-installed configuration circuit could not be verified against CLB configuration indicated in 13-CC-ZQ-E01.

Verify extended channels and welds from E end. WCAP-17681-NP , Supp l emen t I P VNGS-3 PVARNo. {If Issued) 5 4275118 4275118 NTTF Status' N N Page D-2 Resolution Llc;ensq 8uls Sheet 149 of 13-CC*ZQ-£01 (Ref. 65) lndlaltes the required weld pattern of 6 no. 1W filet welds In lenlth wherus the on the followlnt sheet consetWtlvely c:hlclcs for 6 no. 1/4* welds 3* In lenlth. Therefore, the ......,_lied meets SSE requirements

• shown In the mlcu'-tlon but does not reflect the *required" cond iti on per Sheet 149. PYAR 4275118 pneratecl by PYNGS to Hdress. SWC AH!Stded weld meets vendor requirements

no IICMrse seismic condition exists. APS reports this Is

• poiMtiM non-confonnlnt condition. An Openbllty concluded that the sse retMined aper.ble. SupplemenUI Report ....,.._: APS reports that this Is not

• conformlnl CICIIIdnlon, but does Identify

• documentMion discrepM1cy. EDC 2013-00471 wll updMa c.lculatlon 13-CC*ZQ-£01 to correct document dlscrepMcy.

Ucensing Basis Evaluation

As-installed configuration could not readily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVAR 4275118 generated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

APS reports that PVAR indicates as-found extended channels and welds on east end are bounded by configuration analyzed in calculation 13-CC-ZQ-E001 page 102; therefore no adverse seismic co n d i tion exists. APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition.

Operability Determination concluded that the SSC rema i ned Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that this is not a conforming condition, but does identify a documentation discrepancy. EDC 2013-00471 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-E01 to correct document discrepancy.

Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon separation this page is decontrolled Item EQID JEJIKCMU 3EPKCN43 3EPNBV26 Item Description DC power to TC81 control circuit Inverter for shutdown cooling isolation valve 3JSICUV653 Inverter For 3JSIDUV654 Shutdown CoollniB Return Inside Containment Isolation Valve 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "B" WCAP-17681-NP, S u pplement 1 PVNGS-3 Problem Description

1) Notal approac. 1/#t c:leerwa between verttc.l Uniltrut tny support suspended from 120' and tapofMCC.

2) Also, 1-1/2" deMwa ncad betwel!n muonry MCC. Verify whether both .Jil!![!!!!!..!

a!!!.adequate. 13-CC-ZQ-EOl shows 8" fillets on fronts and backs of tube sections.

7-1/4" provided.

Check ClB documents to determine if deviation is accounted.

u.cc-ZQ-£01 shows a* filets on fronts and backs of tube secdons. 7-1/4" pravlded.

Checlc Q.8 documents 10 determine If deviation Is accounted. Drawing calls for plug weld s or alternate fillet pattern. Canno t be verified from visual inspection, but it is presumed that plug welds were grinded flush and painted. Verification requir ed. PVAR No. (If issued) 5 n/a n/a n/a n/a Pa ge D-3 NTTF Resolution Status' Y 1) l.lcensq Basis Evaluation

Inspection of SSE vertical floor response spectra at thne elevMiollllndlcatellow ZPAs (both 1t.ms considered rflld In ¥Wtlall diNctlon) ht will result In I'ICifllinel dltplac:erMnts the 1/4" pp. sse basis. y y y 2) l.lcensq luis Evlluatlon

....... the ciMnnce 10 the masonry well, the 1*1/2" pp II bounded by -'viii of a smaller pp shown 10 be acceptable for AWC CTRl No adverse se1sm1c: condition exists. sse meets curnnt balls. Ucensing Basis Evaluation:

Sheet 172 of 13-CC-ZQ-EOl indicates that 3-E-PKC-N43 and 3-E-PKD-N44 were Installed per the original vendor requirement shown on SDOC E054-00047 (Ref. 65). Insp ect ion of SDOC EOS4-00047 confirms that the as-installed configuration satisfies the vendor requirements.

SSC meets current licensing basis. LansintBuls Evaluation

Sheet 172 of 13-CC-ZQ-£011ndlcates that H-PKC-N43 and H-PKD-N44 were Installed per the orJa1na1 shown on SOOC !054-00047. Inspection of SDOC E054-00047 confirms that the as-Installed conflpntlon utlsfles the v.ndor requi.......a sse meets current licensln8 basis. Ucensing Basis Evaluation:

SDOC E105-00011 (Ref. 65) indicates that the vendor-provided channels have mounting holes. Since the holes are absent in the field , the SWT concludes that the holes are filled with plug welds. SSC meets current licensing basis. Revi sion 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain .. I!!IIIIIJ!!IJ!!II!IIIIJIIII*********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Item EQID Item Desalption 1 JEPNCNU DC/AC Inverter *c-3EPNDV28 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "0" SJAFBFT00411 Auxlllery WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement l PVNGS-3 Problem Description pfttem Is different from tNt Indicated on 13-CC*ZQ-£01. Vertfy whether devlltlon noted on a-built Is doc:urneraclln a.a documents.

Drawing calls for plug welds or alternate fillet pattern. Cannot be verified from visual inspection, but it is presumed that plug welds were grinded flush and painted. Verify from required.

13-J.lZS-157 inctlJ..J.ZZS.

160 (Refs. 65) ... In field do not Indicate whether they lfiPiv to 1WIIF'T00418.

Veflflcdon PVAR No. (If NTTF issued) 5 Status 6 n/1 y n/a y nl* v Pa ge D-4 Resolution IJcensinl Basis Evllulltlon:

Sheet 172 cf C.lculdan lKC*ZQ-£01 lndates thlt 3EPNCN13 wu Instilled per the "ffeed tnstallltion*

shown. Inspection ofSOOC E054-00047 , however, confirms tNt the IS-Instilled conllpr'ltlon IN1dles the v.ndor requirement shown llld not the "ffeed lnstddon*

dmwlnl shown on Sheet 172. Therefore, the lftChorltp c:onftpmlon meets llcenslni JWqUinlments , but It Is recommended tNt PVNGS updnts Sheet 172 cf 13-CC-ZQ-£01 to reflect the IICtullllt-bullt COIIdltlon. Note tNt PVAR 4220252 W81 .........

by PVNGS to liPd* 13-CC..ZO.

E01 to correct minor document chcreplndes.

APS reports this Is not

• non-c:onforrnln condition, but does Identify

• minor documentltlon deflclenty. sse meets current buls. Supplemenal Report Updm: APS ,..,arts tNt this Is not 1 non-COitfoillliltl condition, but does Identify.

docurnent.uon EDC 2013-00471 wtl updlte C.lculetlon J.3.CC*ZO.E01 to c:orTeCt document dlscreplnsy. Licensing Basis Evaluation:

SDOC ElOS-00011 indicates that the vendor-provided channels have mounting holes. Since the holes are absent in the field, the SWT concludes that the holes are filled w i th plug welds. sse meets current licensing bas is. Ucenslfll Basis EV8Iultion:

Inspection cf 13-J-040.0117 (Ref. 65) ll'ldic:.tM that 13-J.ZZS.0157 Detllll applies II the llansecl Mtchorlp c:onflturdon.

The IHIItlllld contlpratlon 11tlsfles the cf U-J.ZlS-0157. No sse meets current Revision 0 April2014 Enc l osure Appendices A and B

...

Upon separat i on th i s page is decontrolled Item E QIO 3JHCBPT 0 3.S18 JJHCDPT0351D 3JHJBTIC0124 Item D e scription Containment pressure Containment pressure Control room temp i ndicating controller WCAP-1 7681-NP, Su p plemen t l PVNGS-3 Problem D esc ript i on PVAR No. (if is sued) s 13-J-0 1 D-0105 (R ef. 65) 4 275118 detail calls for "all-around" 1/8" fillet weld at con t act with column flan g es. Only top and b ottom is provided.

Verify wheth e r FCRs or NCRs document deviation.

13-J.01[).()105 cleWII Qlls 42 7 5118 for ..... round" 1/8. fillet weld It axltKt wtth column tt.nps. Only top nl bottom Is provided.

v.wy whether FCRs or NCRs document deNtlon. Verify approximately 3/16" filled welds, 4" long top and bottom to tube steel into wall. n/a P age 0-5 NTTF Resolution Statu s 6 N licensing B a sis Evalua t ion: As-installed configuration could not r eadily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVAR 4275118 generated to reconcile t h e configuration discrepancy.

APS reports th a t PVAR indicates as-found weld capacity is 7400 lbs which excee d s th e equipment load; t herefore no adverse seismic condition exists. APS re p orts this is a potential non-conforming condition. An Operability Determ i nation concluded that the sse remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that this is a nonconforming condition.

EDC 2013-00471 will update Drawing 13-J-010-0105 t o reflect as-found configu r ation. N 1JcensinC luis Evlluatlon

As lnstlllled c:onfltumlon could not reedlly be verllled lplnst Cl8 doc:urnentMion.

PVM 4275111 ... ..-cl to reconcile the c:onflturdon dlscrepMicy. y AI'S reports that PVM ( .........

wortc) lndlaltes

..-found weld c:apKity Is 7400 lbs which ..... the equipment lolld;........,.

no ICMne sellmlc conditiOn eldlll. AIS reports this Is 1 paCentlll non-confOi 111 11 11 c l o n dltlon. An Operability conduded that the sse relllllllld Operable. Supplemental Report Update: liPS reports thlt this Is

• confonnlnc condition. EDC 2013-00471 wll upd.a. Drewin113-J-010.0105 to reflect IS-found <<i!!!!I:!I!!W.!S

!!L.. _____ _ licensing Basis Evaluation

Mounting plate connection verified per Detail 3 on 13-C-ZJ$-0581 (Ref. 65); sse meets current licensing basis. R evision 0 Apri l 2014 Endosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation thiS page IS decontrolled Item EQID 3 JSBCC02A 3MAFBP01 Item Description 1/V converter Instrument air line J)NSSUre transmitter AFpump"B" WCAP-17681-NP, Supple m ent 1 PVNGS-3 Problem Description verticil clearence between P1000 Unlstrut mount.d on top of Clblnet and lnclepet ldent Unlstrut support suspended from 160' elevdon. Verify whether cleanlnce Is SWT observed a similar concern as cabinet 3JSBBC02A with appro x im a t e ly 3/16" between Unistrut on top and the sus p ended Unistrut from 160' elevation.

Verify if clearance is adequate.

13-J-ZZS.0165 (Ref. 65) calls for 11/2. stitch welds It 3. o.c. Al-lnlallecl conflalntlon

e. 21/2. welds It HCh end , top and bclttom. YertfV whether CL8 doc:umlnbttlon ICXOUntS for cleNIIan.

No t ed bolt on NE side has 4 1/2" projection instea d o f indicated ma x imum projection of 4". Verify w h etherCL B documentation accounts for devia t ion. PVARNo. (If Issued) 5 n/1 n/a 4275118 n/a NTTF Status* y y N y P ag e D-6 Resolut i on IJcenslntBisls Both Unls1rut (suspended from 160') lnCI i MCC (anchored on 140') are rtplln vertical dlredlon.

ZPAs of 0. 791 and 0.901 for the 140' and 160' alemlons , raspectMiy, yield a maximum relative clllplacement of o.o15* (* (0.791 + 0.901)*386.4 I (2*p1*33 Hz)A2 ). Therefore the 1/r pp llsufllclent; not an adverse seismic C:OIIdltiOI'i. S5C meets current bnsl111 basis. Licensing Basis Evalua t ion: Both Unist r ut (suspen d ed from 1 60') and MCC (a nchored on 140') are ri gid in v e rtical direction.

Z PAs of 0.79g and 0.90g for the 140' and 160' elev a tions, respectively, yield a maximum relative displacement of 0.015" (=(0.79g + 0.90g)*386.4 I (2*pi*33 Hz}"2 ). Therefore the 3/16" gap is sufficient; not an adverse seismic condition. sse meets current licensing basis. Ucenslnc Basis Evaluation

At-Installed c:onflluretion could not readily be vertfted aplnst CLB documentation.

P'VAR 4275111 pnerated to reconcile the conflturation dlsCfti*ICY. APS reports 1hlt P'VAR (l'lllted wortc) lndat.s as-found weld capacity Is 11,600 Ill which UCftdl the equipment loecl; tNrelore no...,._ Mlsmlc calllltlon ec1sts. APS reports 1hls is a potMtlal non-conformlnl condltlciiL An Operability Detennll..aan c:onduded 1hlt the S5C rernelned Operable.

Licensin g Basis Evaluation:

Due to combined tolerance of bolt place m ent, conc r e t e finishing, an d field measu r ement by SWT, 1/2" discrepancy of bolt p r ojection is determined to be a cceptable; sse meets current licensing basis. R e visio n 0 A pr il2 01 4 Enclosure Appe n dices A and B contain******II!!IIIJIJIII!!IJ**********

Upon separa t ion this page is decontrolled Item EQID JMCHIP01 3MECBE01 JMECIP01 3MEWBE01 Item Descr i ption CbuJiu& pump 2 Essential chiller "B" C rculltil'll water pump *a* EW "B" heat exchanger WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 P ro blem Descr i pt i on Verify .nchor bolt mulmum projection of 4-3/r from top of ped ** adequate.

Bolts have 111/2" ma x projection from base slab versus t he 11" requirement indicated on the drawing. Verify whether CLB documentation accounts for the deviation.

1/2" required on sliding saddle bolts and 102'-10 3/4" on fixed saddle bolts. Verify whether CLB documentation accounts for deviation.

PVAR No. (If issued)5 n/* n/a nl* n/a NTTF Status 6 y y y y Page D-7 Re so lution Ucensll'll Basis Evaluation

Further review of 13<-ZAS-0241 Detail 1 (Ref. 65) Indicates an anchor bolt T.O.S. of 101'-o" with a ped T.O.C. of 100'-r. TheNfore , the mulmum proJection Is 4* from top of 3/8.

1s judpd &Mn typlcel1/_r to l er a nce on both the COIIUw .. llab ftnllh and In addltloMI to 111* meuurement error; sse meets current 11cens1nt bMis. Ucensing Basis Ev a luation: Due to combined tolerance of bolt placement, concrete finishing.

and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" discrepancy of bolt p r ojection is determined to be acceptable; sse meets current licensing basis. Ucensinc Basis Evaluation:

Detail 2 of 1 3-C-ZJS.0191 (Ref. 65) c:onflrms thR the as-Installed c:onflauration found In the field matches theW; SSC meets current llcwnslnc buls. Ucensing Basis Evaluation:

Due to combined tolerance of bolt placement, concrete finishing, and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" discrepancy of bolt projection is determined to be acceptable; sse meets current licensing basis. Revision 0 A pr il2014 Item EQID Item Description EWpump*a* 3MHFBJ01 Fuel Building AHU JMIUBZ04 DC room " B" EAHU WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supplement 1 P VNGS-3 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain.IIJII*IIJJ*IJtiJII*********

Upon separation thiS page IS decontrolled Problem Description SWT oblenled pletes welcMd eround the motor MChar bolls. Verify whether welded plates ..-ound motor anchor bolts ereiiCCICIUnMd for In Cl8 doc:unleiUtlon. Maximum projection of 4-1/2" recorded in field versus 4" re quirement from drawing. Verify if CLB docs account for deviation. SWT observed NQR Un l strut mounted off af AHU. Vertflcdol*

required to determine whether IPPirent modification reconc:llecllndlvldual AHU seismic quallllcatlon. Pa geD-8 PVAR No. (if NTIF Resolution issued} 5 Status' 4275118 N Evllutlon: As-illltlllled c:onflpratlon could not rudlly be vertfled aplnst Cl8 cJocum.ntdon.

PYM 4275118 ...,.,. ... to reconcile the c:onflprltlon dlscrepMcy. n/a y 4275118 N APS reports that PYAit (related wort) lncllcMes aHound plas do not physlallly lntlrKt wfttt/or fWie MY aclvene .tfec:t on the anchor bolts or their mpaclty; therefore no....,.,_

Mlsmlc COIIdltlon exists. APS reports thills

• pcMndll noft<lonlonnllll concllloiL An conc:luded that the sse ....

ep.rable. SupplemenUI Report Updete: APS reports that the _.found conftturetlon Is not 1 non-confornmt condition.

Further .......n:h confirms that the as-found mountl .. plate confllumlons meet the wrrent bnsinl basis as ldlli *tilled In Section G af Draw1f1113-C-

4. Ucensing Basis Evaluation:

Due to combined tolerance of bolt placement , concrete finishing, and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" discrepancy of bolt projection is determined to be acceptable; sse meets current licensing basis. llcenslfll Basis EvaluM!on: Recondllatlon Of AHU equipment qualification due to modlfbtlon could not be readily obtained. PVAR 4275118 pnerated by PVNGS to resolve the Issue. APS reports that PYAR (rellted work) lndlaas that the loldln& reac:wd by the NQR Unlstrut and transferred to the AHU Is necllllble r.latM to the lodli reslstad by the AHU Itself; thelwfore no...,...

Mllmlc condition exists. APS reports this Is a P<<**ltiiii'IOIH:OI1fonnl11 condition.

An Operability c:onc:ludld that the sse .....,..,..

Operable.

SUpplemental Report Updete: APS reports that this Is I COIWfounq condition. EDC 2013-G0471 will upd8W Equipment Qualtflcatlon reconl to reflect .. found cont!pntlon.

Revision 0 April2014 Enclosu r e Appen d ices A and B con t ai n _Ill******************

Upon separation this page is d econtrolled Item EQID 3MHSBJ01 A-Z27Roam A-A02 Room Item Desa i pt i on Spray pond pump house exhaust fan "B" AREA WALK BY AREA WALK BY WCAP-1 768 1-NP, Sup pl ement I P VNGS-3 Problem Description PVAR No. (if i ssued} 5 Inadequ a te anc h orage n/a documentation taken into field. Verify 1/2" bolts, 1-3/4" long a t 6 pl a ces into W8 sections.

SWT oblerwci*P AHU on 0/* vlbmlon mounts. The coram Is thR If not Miequn.ly desflned for Ml SSE event. the AHU *nchcnae could t.H *nd Mtlr lines to rupture .nd flood/.-.v the room. Verify whether a.rp AHU on vltntlon mounts poses haunt to T SWT observed N QR Header n/a 3PCH N V M 28 having approxim a tely 3/16" to condui t for saf ety-related J-box 3EZAAA K RJ01. M 28 is sup p ort e d approximately 10' W at the Auxiliary building and approximately 10' E a t Con ta inment. Verify whe t h e r M28 mo v ement due t o differential support motion could Impact safety-rel a ted conduit. Pag eD-9 NTIF Resolution Status' Y Licensin g Basis Evaluation:

As-installed confi g uration verified per inspection of 1 3-C-SPS-0385 (R e f. 65); sse meets current licensing basis. v Ucenslnc Buts Per PVNGS. potentiellmpllctl of floodlncl.-.v t.urds.,.

mltlpted by the endoMcl PI olKtlve (desfllled u drip-proof per SDOC NOOl-1303-00057 (Ref. 65)), which house the ruc:tor trtp breakers n the dlance from the AHUs. All floodlnc /spray Nlzerds were resolved.

The conflcuration meets current lans!ncbllsls.

Y Licensin g Basis Evalua t ion: Reinspection of photogra p hs s h o w s that 3PCH N V M 28 is closely supported so tha t only differenti a l a nchor movemen t betw e en the containment shell and the Auxiliary building w ould lead to differential dis p lacement betwe e n th e header and junction box. Given their deep founda t ion embedme n ts and s t iff concrete structures, the gap is conclu de d to be acc e p t abl e. No adverse s e ismic condition exists. The configuration meets current licensin g b a sis. R evisio n 0 April2 0 14 Item EQID Item Des c r i pt i on G-1041oom AREA WALK BY J-108Room AREA WALK BY J-109Roam AREA WALK BY WCAP-17681

-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Endosure Appendices A and B contain.IIJI!!II****************

Upon separat i on this page is decontrolled Problem Descript i on PVAR No. (if issued) 5 Observed DS pipl"' on E n/1 and W walls under llrp heaters and ll&hts. Verify these objects are securely lldlol eel to pw:lude filii end potentllllne rupture that would result In spqy h8urd. SWT presumes that n/a 3EP N CV27 is plug welded to embeds but not readily apparent due to possible grinding and painting.

Verification r e quired. SWT observed 3EPKDM44 n/1 with IPPf'CIICimetel3/l. clurlnce to east 1111sonry Mil Verify whether clarlnce Is ..... Page D-10 NTTF Resolution Statu s' Y Ucensl"' Blsls Evlluatlon

..._, vertfled M Sels c.t IX per Cllculatlon 13-CC*ZG-0070 (Ref. 65) and Is therefore no lrurec:tlon hazard; sse meets current 11cens1nt basis. Diesel Generator lllhtlnl plan 03-E-ZGL.OOOl (Ref. 65) lndlc:Mes thet the lllht fixture Is mounted per o.t.lll d 13-E-lAL.CJ011 (Ref. 65). 1hls ... spec:lftes

• 1/4* kwlk bolt rnoum.d junction bole thlt supports

• 3/4* conduit stwn. GMn thlt these fllsteners have ccnslderlbty more CIIPidtY thin the demand dthe lllhts under-"* udtltlon , the c:annect1on Is ductile lnd there Is no lmplc:t/flll hazard; no ldverse seismic condition e111sts. The c:onflpf'ltlon meets cumnt llcenslnc balls.

• Y Ucensing Basis Evaluation:

SOOC £105-00011 indicates that the vendor-provi de d channels have mounting holes. Since the holes are absent in the field, the SWT concludes that the holes are filled with plug welds; SSC meets current licensing basis. Y Ucensl"' Blsls Evlluetlon

Dlspllcement d both block waH 1nd MCC are cHul8ted U11nt SSE floor raporwe spectra Md lilllnicaly summed. For MCC;. Dempq, IHI Freq., 0.7fil (Se It 100' ell¥.), lnd 1.6 moct.l shape flctar for cantilever.,.

UHd. For the block Willi; 9Hz hq. (st.t A14 of 13-CC-ZJ-120, Ref. 60), o.npq per u.cc-zJ.120, o.&OI (1¥1 of S.11t 100' lnd 120' elevdons),lnd L3 modllsMpe fld!Orfor

,.. ...........

a..n ... used. The *II** sum of dllpllcemeniJ Is then 0.21" Hz)A2 + u-o.--.ut(2*pa*t Hz)AZ

• 0.211n). Since the .... lnlc sum (c,oiRI lldve) of--IMntl Is._. thin the minimum pp of 3/r, there Is no lmpect '-'I; no se1sm1c condition e1111t1. sse meets bnslnt bells. Rev i s i on 0 A p ril2014 I te m EQIO I tem Des cri pt i on Out.et' H orseshoe AREA WALK BY S FP Cooli ng Room AREA WAUC BY AREA WALK BY 410 v LC34 bus WCAP-1768 1-NP, Suppleme nt I PVNGS-3 Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon separation th i s page is decontrolled Problem Descript i on Noted 1/16" gap between 3JZJBC02A and 3JESAC01 in east-west direct i on. 3JZJBC02A is 32" wide In direction of motion and has rugg e d external steel frame. Verify gap as adequa t e. Vdy wMther the Spent Fuel Pool HMdllnl MKhlne (3MZFNM03) hes support deslped to prevent uplift off of trKics. Observed large flat panel lighting suspend from single vertically cantilevered rod above potentially soft targ e ts of safety-related equ i pment. Verification i s required to determ i ne whether connections of lighting are adequate so as to predude impact. Compertment 3EPG8l.34Cl door middle .... pin not ...... wllhthe--hllf olthe '*"'*CometH on 1he spot. Unit not In .... It the tlnle; .....,.., melntlnlncl CNWI warldnt blfcn end clurtnt Inspection.

unknown whether plnciiMIITII" prior or durlnc rnalrUnlra. P V AR No. (If l ssu ed)5 n/a n/1 n/a n/a P age D-1 1 NTTF Resolution Statu s' Y Ucensing Basis Evaluation

Per PVNGS PRA Group , review of CNRAM-12-Q15 (Palo Verde Probabilistic Risk Assessment-Mode l Development, R ef. 65), spatial interact i on due to a seismic event between the two cabinets 3JZJBC02A and 3JESAC01 results In acceptable relay chatter. Therefore , seismic gap is not required for seismic licensing basis of cabinets. No adverse condition; sse meets current licensin g basis. y y y Supplemen t a l Report Update: APS reports that this condition will be corrected by removing a protruding bolt to Increase clearance (refer to EWR 4377344).

t.lc:llnsq

... Ev81u8tion

Spn Fuel Handlnt MediN 3MZFNM03 SDOCs N001-G502-40322 end N001-G502-oo326 (IW. 65) indbte thet uplift Is ..ast.d by lllll'ftbers on the hlndllnl mKhlne thet enpplfOCMI on the INide of the rell. 111eNfore , there 1s no Mnnl: sse meets current balls. Ucensin g Basis Evaluation:

Per 13-E-ZFL-0001 (Ref. 65) and Oetail1 of 13-E-ZAL-0011, lights are mounted to the ceiling with 1/4" Hilti Kwik Bolts. Given that these fasteners have cons i derably more capacity than the demand of the lights under seismic excitation, the connection is ductile and t here i s no i mpact/fall hazard; not an adverse se i smic condition. The configurat i on meets current licensing basis. uc.ns1n1 Blsls Evllultlon

GMn thet the '*Ill pin was still effKIM. the upper helfcl the .... end morecMr thet there Is no vlllmloi,.....IIIIM

.._.lp meftton the door, It Is Judlld tMt the as-found COidtlan .. nat ... ...,... ..... concern. sse..,...

Cl8. Noll tMt P'VM44f5161MIIIIIIIf'dldtD documlnttlwt COIICIIIIon.,.

CIDI'NC:tld on the IPQt. sse cunwd llclll'*'l bull. Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appe n d ices A and B conta l nJIII.IIIIIIIIIIIII!!I**********

Upon sepa r a t i on this page is decontrolled ltemEQID 3JSINPT391 Item Description HPS I I ong-term reclrc l oop 1 pressure JCmtr WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Problem Description Per 13-J-010*0119 (Ref. 65), all-around welds are to be pro vided between the Un l strut members and the steel column flang es. Only the outsides of the flang es are welded in field. Ve r ify configuration meets CLB do cumenta tion. PVARNo. (If issued) 5 4275118 NTTF Status' N Page D-12 Resolution Licen sing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configu ration cou ld not be readily verified against C L B documentation. P VAR 4275118 updated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

APS reports that this Is a non-conforming condition.

EDC 2013-00471 will update Drawing 13-J-010-0119 to reflect as-found configuration. Revision 0 April2014 APPENDIX E -QUALIFICATIONS This appendix contains only the qualifications of new personnel involved with the Seismic Walkdowns perfonned onApril6 , 2013 , and on October 13, 2013 , during refueling outage 3R17. The qualifications of personnel involved with the power Seismic Walkdowns performed from August 6 through August 13 , 2012, can be found in Appendix E of Reference 48 ("Near-Tenn Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 "). Page E-1 WCAP-17681-NP, Suppl e ment I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon separation ltlis page Is decontro ll ed CORY T. FIGLIOLINI, E.LT. EDUCATION 2009-20 10 University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland.

United Kingdom U niversity of Edinburgh.

Edinburgh.

Scotland , United Kingdom Join/ Master of Science, Structural Engineering

& Mechani cs (M.Sc.) 2004 -2009 Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester , Massachusetts Bachel or of Sc i e n ce, Civil and Environmental E ngin ee ring (BSCE) REGISTRATION AND AFFILIATIONS Engineer in Training, Massachusetts , Certificate No. 22279 PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES Structural analysi s and design of s teel , concrete, and masonry structures using IB C and UBC Dynamic analysis of structures for seismic, vibration, blast, fluid , and wind l oads Page E-2 Competed 5-day SQUG training course for walkdown and fragility analy s i s of nuclear facilities and their components Comp l eted 5-day ASME Power Piping Design and Fabrication training course Ri s k and hazard analy s i s Co nstruction s upport and inspec t ion PROFES S IONAL HISTORY 201 0 -Present Stevenson and A ssocia tes, Goody ear , Arizona E n gi n ee r PROJE CT EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

Se i s mi c Fragility Projects Mr. Figliolini has planned an d performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analy ses of structure s and components for use in probabili s tic risk asse ss ments. On these projects , he has walked down both Safety Related and no n-Safety Related structures, systems and co mponent s in all areas of the power block. Mr. Figliolini has conducted seis mi c analyse s of e l ectrical and mechan ical equipment anchorages, s torage tanks , and civil s tru c ture s including containment.

Security Pro jects Mr. Figliolini has performed s tructural modifications to exi s ting structures for hardened alarm stations and s ecurity related equ i pment supports.

He has performed blast analy s e s to determine the vulnerability of s e c urity s tructure s. Piping Projects Mr. Figliolini has worked on Safety Related piping analyses and modifi c ation s whi c h include assessment and co nversi on of pipin g anal ysis model s, sc reening and re view of pip ing s upports, and modifi c at ions to p i ping s upports. W C AP-17681-NP , Su pplement I PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014

I. !i. -"' N -* oo _c .... Certificate offlcliievement

%is is to Certify tliat c: ... : .. *.:::.

• .

.*.. i:::::: ..... !!:: ')! lias Compfeted tfze SQVq Screening and Seismic f£va{uation riraining Course Jfe{([ (])ate Ju{y 11 .thru 15, .2071 SteYeMon&

.* *.* ,< Phtl Gazda . . . p. ** :

• P. Brown * * * * *. * * ; iiiSirllctur io/...,c.

insuuctor SQU(i lns11uctor E ncl os ur e Appe n d i ces A an d B con ta in U p o n s eparat i on t his pag e is d eco nt r oll e d APPENDIX F -PVNGS UNIT 3 SWEL REPORT This appendix i s attached to reflect the changes made in Revision 2 of the SWEL tran s mittal associated with the 3R 17 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed on April 6, 2013, and afterward s on October 13, 2013. Please s ee the "Revi s ion History" on page F-3 for a complete explanation. The Revision 0 SWEL tran s mittal for the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from August 6 through August 13 , 2012, can be found in Appendix F of Reference 48 Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3"). Page F-1 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Revi s ion 0 April2014 Enc l osure Appendices A a nd B conta i

• Upon separation th i s page is decontrolled Page F-2 (8 Westinghouse Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Revision 2 In Response to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 3 Rolando Perez Equipment Selection Lead oerek Seaman *u ..k , . '¥'-' 1 ate Eimar Randall: o;g;rany st gncd byEimar, I Rand* II G(Z34606)

Date Equipment Sel ectio n Personne l Randall Elmar G (z 34606) O N: cn-fimar, Randall G(Z34606)

(. *Date: 2013.11.12 08: 58:1 0 -07'00' Station Operations Date PVNGS Un it 3 Se ismic Walkdown Equi pmen t List N o vember 11, 2 0 13 I VVCAP-17681-N P, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclos ur e App e n d i ce s A and B co n t a i n U p o n s eparation t h is p ag e is d econt r ol l ed Seismic Walkdown Equipment list , Rev. 2 P a g e F-3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 Revision History Revision 0 of this document provides the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) developed prior to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) At-Power .. Seismic Walkdowns performed between Monday , August 6th , 2012 and Friday , August 10th , 2012. The SWEL contained a total of 131 components (125 SWEL 1 & 6 SWEL 2). Revision 1 of this document updates the " Major New or Replacement Equipment" column of the SWEL 1 table include in Attachment 1 and Table 3-2 of Attachment

3. The information related to " Major New or Replacement Equipment" was revised as a result of an error found in the Microsoft spreadsheet that was used track and implement the SWEL selection process. This error did not result in a change to the Base List or SWEL data. Revision 2 of this document revises the SWEL 1 table provided in Attachment 1 to document changes required for the additional walkdowns performed on April 6 , 2013 , and on October 13, 2013 , during refueling outage 3R 17: 1. Train C was inaccessible during refueling outage 3R17. Therefore , the following Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D , which were selected from Base List 1 :

• 3EPKCD23 was substituted with sister component 3EPKDD24.

• 3EPKCM43 was substituted with sister component 3EPKDM44. These components were inspected to fulfill Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 4.20 regarding the supplemental inspection of electrical cabinets. These substitutions did not affect the number of SWEL items and since the replacements were performed with equipment of the same type , the revised SWEL 1 still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance. That is , component type , along with other attributes , remains adequately represented on the SWEL. 2. SWEL 1 Item 13 (3MCHEE01) was removed for radiological safety considerations. 3MCHEE01 was identified as inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. A new item was not selected to replace 3MCHEE01 since the resulting equipment list still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance.

That is , all attributes remain adequately represented on the SWEL. In addition, Revision 2 corrects minor typographical errors found in the equipment descriptions. PVNG S Unit 3 Se i sm ic W a l k do w n E q u i pm ent Li s t Novemb e r 11, 2 0 1 3 WCAP-1 7 681-N P. Su p p l e ment 1 PVN GS-3 P ag e 2 Revisio n 0 Apri l2 0 14 E nc los ure Ap pe ndices A and B Upon sepa r at i on th is p age i s decontrolled Seis mic Walkdown Equipment List, Re v. 2 Page F-4 Nm Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Pa l o Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List CSWEL) A listing of structures , systems , and components (SSCs) that will be inspected during the walkdown , the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), has been prepared in advance of the walkdown effort. The selection of SSCs process described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 {Reference 1}, was utilized to develop the SWEL for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3. The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items: *:* SWEL 1 (Attachment

1) is a sample of items to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity

• !* SWEL 2 (Attachment

2) is a list of spent fuel pool related items APS Operations and Design Engineering Staff Members participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided inputs and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel to find the data associated with the equipment considered. The interchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the APS Staff Members included:

• Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

• Verification of equipment information through APS's SWMS Database system.

• Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that might be relevant to the SWELs.

• Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment with operational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

• Provided System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

Details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL have been provided to APS in the form of a formal presentation , given on July 18 , 2012. Additionally , details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL are provided in the " Selection of SSCs" section of the Submittal Report. PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 WCAP-17681-NP. Supp lement 1 PVNGS-3 Page 3 Revision 0 April2014 E nclos ur e Append i ces A and B contain Upon separation t hi s page is de co n t ro ll ed Page F-5 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 References

1) EPRI Technical Report 1025286 , Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic , dated June 2012. Attachments

1) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 1 2) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 2 3) SWEL Sort Tables PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment Li s t November 11,2013 WCAP-17681-NP , S upp l e me nt 1 PVNGS-3 Page4 Rev isio n 0 Apr il 2014 Enclosure Appen di ces A and thi s page i s decont r olle d S eism ic W alkd o wn Equipment li st, Rev. 2 NTT F Recommendatio n 2.3: S ei s m ic Walkdown Attachment 1-SW Ell Scree n 114 Sample Conside r ations Screen Screen#3 SWEL lf1 Screen #2 Wal k down Description Building (SC*l (Regular (Sa fe ty Eq uip ment System Item Equi p m ent Function Number Uc ensing Inspec t ions?) Class Type Basis?) Support) 1 3JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feed water fio w MSSS Yes Ye s PCDHR lnst. Rack AF (18) 3 J AF8 FT0041 8 A ux iliary fe edwa t er Aow MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR lnst. Rac k AF 2 (18) 3 3JAF8HV0030 SG*EOlA reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC D H R MOV (8) AF 4 3 JA F8HV0031 SG*E018 reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR M OV(8) AF s 3MAFBP01 AFpump"8" MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR Horz. Pump AF (5) 6 3JAF8UV00l4 SG*EOlA Isolation valve MSSS Yes Y es PC DHR MOV(8) AF 7 3JAF8UV0035 SG-EOlB i solation va lve MSSS Yes Yes PCOHR MOV(8) AF 8 3JAFCUV0036 SG*EOlA isola t ion valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR MOV(S) AF 9 3JCH8HV0530 RWT outlet to 5 1 train "8" A U X Yes Yes RC IC DHR M OV(S CH 10 3MCHBP01 Cha r ging pump 2 AUX Yes RC PCIC Ho rz. Pump C H (S) Train 8 For Charging lnst. Rack 11 3JCHBPSL0218 Pump 3MCHEP01 Suct i on AUX Y es Yes RC IC (18) CH Line Press ur e Switch 12 3JCHCL T02 03C RWT level(r equired for YARD Yes Yes D H R lnst. Rack CH RAS) (18) e t:lea* --IIG '"=ee r Ql Ch arg ing Li ne To Reacto r ;1,4 3JC HE HV023 9 Coolant Loop 2A Isolation CTMT Yes Yes RCIC POV(7) CH Globe Va l ve PVNGS Unit 3 Se ism ic Walkdown Equipment Li st No ve mb er 11 , 2013 WCAP-1768 1-N P , Su ppleme n l 1 P V NGS-3 Env i ronment Ma j or ne w rremp, " f) or (I for r eplacement

,.Inside-or equipmen t? Ofor *outside*)

No 140(1) No 140 (1) No 104 (I) No 104 (I) No 104(1) Yes 104 (I} Yes 104 (I) Yes 104(1) No 1 04 (1) No 1 04 (I) No 104(1) N o 113 (0) N& No 120(1) IPEEE vul ner ability en h anceme n t? No No No No No No N o N o N o No No No N& No Page F-6 Palo Ve rd e Nuclear Station-Unit 3 Wa lk down Deferred to Outage? No N o No No No No No No No No No No -Yes Comment.s Operat i ons noted engineered scaffold i ng was r ecently added to t h e MSSS. This sho ul d be exam i ned by area walk by. Operations no ted eng i neered s<affold i ng was recently added to the M SSS. This s h ou ld be examined by are a walkby. Operations noted eng ineered scaffolding was recently added to the M SSS. This should be e xa mined by area wa l k by. Operations noted e n gineered scaffolding w as recent ly adde d to the M SSS. Th i s shou l d be e x amined by area walk by. Oper a tions noted e n gineered scaffolding was recently added to the M SSS. This s h ou l d be e xa mined by ar ea walkby. Operations no t ed engi n eered scaffoldin g was rec e ntly added t o the M SSS. This should be examined by a r e a waikby. Opera ti ons noted engineered was recently added to th e MSSS. This shoul d be examined by area w alkby. Ope r ations noted engi n eered scaffolding was rece ntl y a dded to the MSSS. Th i s should be e x am i ned by area wa lk by. Th i s i t em w as removed fr o m SWEll. Page 5 Revisi on 0 Apri 12 014 Enclosu re Appe n d ices A an d 8 con t ain iiiii ** IIJI!IIIIIIIIJI**********

Upon separat ion t his page Is decontrolled Seis mic Walkdown E quipm e nt List , Rev. 2 NTIF R eco mmendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1-SWEL 1 Screen 114 Sample Consid e rations Screen Screen 113 Environment SWE L Ill Screen 112 Major new (Temp , *F) Walkdown (Sa f ely Item Equipment Description B u ilding (SC-1 (Regular Function Equipment System or (I for N umber Licensing Inspections

7) Suppart) Class Type replacement "Inside" or Basis?) equipment?

Ofor "Outside")

15 3JCHEHV0532 RWT suction I so (falls AUX Yes Yes RCPC POV(7) CH No 104 (I) open on loss of air) 16 3JCHEHV0536 R WT suction Isol ation AUX Yes Yes RCPC MOV(8) CH No 104 (I) 17 3MCHEP01 Charging pump 3 AUX Yes Yes RC PCIC Horz. Pump CH No 1 04 (I) (S) 18 3MCHET01 RWT (refueling water Ya rd Yes Yes RC PCIC Tank (21) CH No 113(0) tank) D HR Containment Power 19 3JCPBWOOOSA Access Purge Su p ply CTM T Yes Yes CF MOV(8) CP No 120(1) Isolatio n Butterfly Damper 20 3MCT£T01 CS T (condensate storage Yard Yes Yes PCDHR Tan k (21) CT No 113(0) tank) 21 3MDGBF03 DG *a* air I ntak e DG Yes Yes RC PCIC Othe r (O) DG Yes 140(1) struc t ure DHR 22 3MDGBX01A Starting air accumulator DG Yes Yes RC PCIC Tank (21) DG N o 140(1) DHR 23 3MDGBX01B St a rt i ng air accumulator OG Yes Yes RC P CIC Tank (21) DHR DG No 140 (1) 2 4 3MEC B E01 Essen t ial ch iller *a* CTR L Yes Yes R C P CIC Chlllet(ll)

EC N o 80(1) DHR 2 5 3MECBP01 Circula t ing water pump CTR L Y es Yes RC PCIC Horz Pump EC No 80(1) " B" D HR (S) 26 3MECBT01 EC expansion tank "8" CTRL Yes Yes R C PCIC Tank (21) EC No 80(1) DHR 27 3JECBTV0030 Cont r o l room "8" EAHU CTRL Yes Yes PC IC D HR POV(7) EC No 80 (1) now feR valve He at 28 3MEWBE0l EW "B" heat e x chan g er AUX Yes Y es PC IC D HR Exchanger E W No 1 04 (I) (21) 29 3MEWBP01 EWpump"B" A UX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Horz Pump EW No 1 04 (I) (S) 30 3MEWBT01 EW " B" surge tank A UX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Tank (21) EW No 10 4 (I) (lLRT) RD T/G ASSUrge 31 3JGRBUV0002 Header Isolation Valve AUX Yes Yes C F SOV(8) GR No 104 (I) (Outside C on tainment) AFWpumproom "A" 32 3 MH AA204 EAHU AUX Yes Yes PC iC DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (I) 33 3JHC8PT0351B Containment pressure A U X Yes Yes CF lnst. Rack HC N o 104 (I) (18) 34 3J HC BPT0352B Co ntainm ent pressu re A U X Yes Yes CF lnst. Ra ck HC N o 104 (I) (1 8) PVNGS Unit 3 Seism i c Walkdown E q uipme nt Li s t N ovember 11, 20 13 WCAP-1 7681-N P , Supplemen t 1 PVN GS-3 IPEEE vu lnerabili ty enh a nceme nt 7 No No No No No No No No N o No N o No No No No No No No No No Pa ge F-7 Pal o Ver de Nuclear Station -Unit 3 Walkdown Deferred to Outa g e? N o N o N o No Yes No No No N o N o No No No No No No N o Y es N o No Comments A lthough T rain "A" , the AH U's are of greater Import an ce due to cascad i ng Tech Specs. HAAZOII w as selected as a r epresentitive p iece of equipment for the new inte rpretati on of T ech Specs. Page 6 Revision 0 April2014 Enc los ure Append ices A and B containiiiiJI!II******************

Upon separation t his page i s decontrolled Seismic Walkdown Equ ipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Screen SWEL N1 Walkdown Item Equipm ent Description Bu i ld i ng (SC

• 1 Number Licensing Ba s is?) Discharge Sampling From 35 3JHCBUV0044 RU*1 Con ta i nment CT M T Yes Isolation Valve Inlet Samp lin g To RU*1 36 3JHCBUV004 7 Containment I solation CT M T Yes Va l ve 3 7 3JHCDPT03S1D Containment pressu r e AUX Yes 38 3JHCDPT0352D Containment pressu r e AUX Yes 39 3MHDBA01 OG "8" room EAHU fan OG Yes 40 3MHDB J 01 OG "s* room essential OG Yes eJ<haust fan 4 1 3MHJ8F04 Contro l room EAHU (fan, CTR L Yes filters and HX) 4 2 3MHJ8J01A DC room " D'" essentia l CTRL Yes exhaust f an 4 3 3 MHJ BJ0 1 B DC room II au esse nt ia l CTR L Yes exhaust fa n 44 3MHJBM02 motor-operated damper CTRL Y es 4S 3MHJBM03 motor-operated damper CTR L Yes 46 3MHJ8M31 Air-oper at ed dampe r CTRL Yes 47 3MHJ8MS8 Air-operated DC room "8" CTR L Yes i solation 48 3MH JBM 67 Air-operated computer CTR L Yes room DP 4 9 3JHJBT I C0124 Contro l room temp CTR L Yes i ndicat i ng co n troller so 3MHJBZ03 ESF sw i tchgear room " 8" CTR L Yes EAHU 51 3MHJBZ04 oc room *a* EAHU CTR L Yes I nstrument Air Supply 52 3JIAAUV0002 Containment lsolat.ion AUX Yes Gate Valve 53 3EPBBS04 4.1 6 k V bus 504 CTR L Y es 54 3EPEBG02 E mergenc y diesel OG Y es g enerator **a* 55 3£PGB L32 480 v LC32 b us CTRL Yes 56 3EPGBL34 4 80 v LC34 bus CTRL Yes 57 3EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes 58 3EPHB M 32 4 80V M CCM32 CTR L Yes 59 3EPHBM34 480VMCCM34 AUX Yes Scree n *2 (Regular I n spections?)

Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Attachment 1-SWEll Screen #4 Sample Consider at ion s Screen 113 Environment Major new {Temp, "F) (Safety Funct i on Eq u ipm e nt System o r (If or Support) Class Type replacement equipment?

Ofor "Outside")

CF SOV(8) HC N o 120 (I) CF SOV(8) HC N o 120(1) CF l n st. R a c k HC N o 104 (I) (1 8) Cf lnst. Rack H C No 104 (I) (1 8) PCIC D HR Fa n (9) HD No 140(1) P C IC DHR F an (9) HD No 140 (1) PCIC D HR AHU (10) HJ N o 80(1) PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ N o 80(1) P C IC DHR Fan (9) HJ N o 80(1) PC IC DHR MOV(8) H J No 80(1) PC IC DHR MOV(8) H J No 80(1) PC IC DHR P OV(7) HJ No 80(1) PC IC DHR POV(7) HJ No 80(1) PCIC DHR PO V (7) HJ N o 80(1) PC IC DHR Temp HJ NO 80(1) Sensor (19) PC IC DHR AHU (1 0) HJ N O 80(1) P CIC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(1) Cf SOV(8) lA N o 104(1) RC PC I C Med. Volt PB Yes 80(1) DH RC F SWGR(3) RC PC I C Eng. Gen. PE No 140(1) DHR (17 1 RCPC DHR Low Volt. PG N o 80(1) SWGR (2) RC P C DHR Lo w Volt PG N o 80(1) SWGR(2) RC PC DHR Lo w Volt. PG N o 80(1) SWGR(2) RCPC DHR MC C (l) P H No 80(1) RC P C DHR MCC(l) P H No 104(1) PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 WCAP-1 7681-NP , Supplement1 PVNGS-3 IPEEE vulnerability enhancement?

No No No No No N o N o N o N o N o N O N o No No No No No N o No No NO No No No No Page F-8 Palo Verde Nuclear Statio n -Unit 3 Walkdown Deferred to Outage? Yes Yes N O N o No No No No N o No No No N o No No No N o Yes No No N o NO N o No N o Comments This component has a h is to ry of failure resulting in a pl ant t rip *Page 7 R evis i on 0 April201 4 Enclosure Append i ces A and B con t ai nJIIIIII!IJIII!IIIII**********

U pon separation th is page is decon tro lled Page F-9 Seismic Wa l k d own E quip m ent Li st, Rev. 2 N TI F Recommendat i o n 2.3: S ei s m i c Wa l k d own Attac h men t 1 -SW EL 1 P a l o Ver d e Nuclear S t atio n-Unit 3

• 4 Sample Cons i derations Screen Scr een n En vi ronment SW EL Wa l kdown *1 saeen *2 (Sa f e ty Maj or ne w (Temp, *f) It e m EQ u ipm en t Desc ripti on Bui l d in g (SC-1 (R eg ul ar Function EQuipment Sys t em or (I for N u m ber Ucensing Inspect io ns?) Support) Oass Type replacement "Insi d e" or Ba s i s?) eQ ui pment? Ofo r "Outsid e") 60 3EPHBM36 4 80 VMCCM36 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC(1) PH No 104 (I) 61 3EPHBM38 480V M CC M 38 A UX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC(1) PH No 104(1) 62 3EPK8D22 l C 34 co n trol power CTRL Yes Yes RC PC D HR D l st Panel PK No 80(1) (14) 63 3EPKBF , 12 DC batte ry "8" CTRl Yes Yes RC PC D H R Batt e ry PK N o 80(1) Rack (15) 64 3EPKBH12 Battery charger *a* CTRl Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery Chg PK No 80(1) (16) 65 3E PK BM42 DC po we r to T CB1 co ntrol CTRL Y es Yes RCPC M CC(1) PK N o 80(1) circuit 66 3E PKD D24 DC d i stribution panel D2 4 CTRl Yes Yes RC PC DHR D is t Panel PK N o 80(1) (1 4) 67 3E PK CF13 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Ba ttery PK N o 80(1) Rack (1 5) 6 8 3EPKOM44 D C power to TCB1 control CTRl Y es Yes RCPC M CC(1) PK No 80 (1) circuit I nve rt er Fo r Shutdown I nv erter 69 3EPKCN43 Coo lin g Iso la tion Va l ve CTRl Yes Yes DHR (16) PK No 8 0{1) 3JSICUV653 I n vert er For 3JSIDUV6S4 Shutdown Cooling B I nverter 70 3EP K D N44 Return Inside CTRl Yes Y es CF (16) PK No 80(1) Cont a inmen t Isola t ion Valve 71 3EPNBD26 Po w er to PPS "8" CTRL Yes Yes RCPCIC Oist P anel PN No 80{1) I nstru mentatio n DHR (14) 72 3EPNB N 12 DC/AC Inverter "8" CTRl Yes Yes PC IC DHR In v erte r PN N o 80{1) CF (16) 73 3EP NBV 26 120 v vital ac v olta ge CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Other(O) PN N o 80(1) regula t or *a* CF 7 4 3EPNCD27 Power to PPS *c* CTRL Yes Ye s RCPC IC Dist Panel PN No 80(1) i nstrumentat io n D HR (1 4) 75 3EPNCN13 DC/AC inverter "C" CTR L Y es Yes PC IC DHR I nv erter PN N o 80(1) CF (16) 76 3EPNDV28 1 20 V vital ac voltage CTRL Y es Yes PC IC DHR Other (0) PN No 80(1) regu l at o r "D" CF P ressurize r and Reactor 77 3JRCBHV0 10 S vessel H e ad vent To CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV(8) RC No 120(1) Reacto r Drain T a n k Glob e Valve P ressurizer vent To 78 3JRCBHV0108 Reactor Drain Ta nk Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV(S) RC No 120(1) Valve 79 3JRCBPT01028 Pm pressure (reQuired CTMT Yes Yes PC lnst. Rack RC No 120(1) for RPS/SIAS)

(1 8) PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 WCA P-17681-NP. S u pple m ent 1 PVNGS-3 IP EEE vuln erab il ity enhancement?

No N o No No No No No No N o No No N o No N O N o N o N o N o No No Walkdown Deferre d to Outage? No N o N o No No No No No No No N o No N o No No No N o Yes Yes Yes Comments Page 8 Revision 0 April201 4 Enclosure Ap p en d ices A an d B con t a i n*******************

U pon sepa r a t ion this p age i s dec o ntroll ed Sei s mi c W alkdo w n E quipm en t Li s t , Re v. 2 NTIF Rec o mme n dat i on 2.3: S ei s mi c W alkdo w n A t tac h me nt 1 -SW Ell Sc r een 114 Sample Cons i derations Sc r een Screen 113 EMir onment SWEL Walkdown Ill Screen 112 (Sa f ety Ma j or new (Temp. *F) I tem Description B uil ding (SC*l (Regular Equipment Sys t em (I fo r Equipment FunctiOn o r Number Ucenslng Inspections?)

S upp ort) Oass Type replacement

" I nside" or Basis?) equipment?

Ofor "Outside")

80 3JRCBPT104 soc RCS pr ess ure CTMT Yes Yes DHR l nst. Rack RC No 120 (I) Inter l oc k (18) 81 3 J SBIIC02A 1/V con*erter CTRL Yes Yes OHR l nst. Rack RC No 80(1) _(18) 82 3JSBCC02A 1/V converter CTRL Yes Yes OHR l nst. Rack RC No 80(1) (18) 83 3 J RCDPT 1 06 SOC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes OHR l n st. Rac k RC N o 120(1) interlock (18) 1!4 3JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature CTMT Yes Yes PC Temp RC No 120(1) Sensor (19) Isolation Containme n t 85 3 J RDBUV0024 Radwaste SUmp Out l et AUX Yes Yes CF MOV(8) RD N o 104 (I) Isolation Ga t e Vallie 86 3 J RMBB02 R WT ievel CTRL Yes Yes IC ContJo l RM No 80(1) Panel (20) 87 3 JR MBB04 RCS temperature CT RL Yes Yes RC Contro l RM No 80(1) P anel (20) 88 3JRMBBOS Containment pressu r e CTRL Yes Yes CF Contro l RM No 80(1) Panel (20) 89 3JRMBB06 Auxiliary feedwater flow CTRL Yes Yes PCDHR Contro l RM No 80(1) Panel (20) 90 3JRMCBOS Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF Con t r ol RM No 80(1) Panel (20) 91 3JRMNB02 SOHX A outl et CTRL Yes Yes DHR Control RM No 80(1) temperature Panel (20) 92 3JRMNB04 P ressurizer temperatu r e CTRL Yes Yes PC Contro l RM No 80(1) Panel (2 0) 93 3 J SBBC03 Reactor trip breaker " 8" A U X Yes Yes RCPC Breake r SB NO 104(1) Panel (2) 9 4 3JSGBHV0178 Atmospheric dump va l ve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR POV(7) SG No 124 (I) HV*178 95 3JSGBHV0185 Atmospher i c dump va l ve MSSS Yes Yes PCOHR POV(7) SG No 124 (I) HV*lSS 96 3JSGBPT0306 Instrum e nt ai r line MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR l ns t. Rac k SG No 104(1) pressure transm i tter (18) 97 3JSGBPV0306B N2 s u pply solenoid valve MSSS Yes Yes PCOHR SOV(8) SG No 124 (I) P V NG S U n i t 3 Se i smic W a l kdow n E qui pme nt List N ove m ber 11 , 20 13 WCAP-17681-N P , Supplemen t 1 P VN GS-3 IPEEE vulnerabi l ity enhancement?

No No No No No No N o No No No No No No NO No No N o N o Pa g e F-10 Pal o Ve rde Nuclear Sta t ion :...uni t 3 W a l kdown Deferred to Outage? Yes N o No Yes Yes No N o NO No No No No No No No No No No Comments When choosing conta inme nt isolatiO n vat.es t hat exist for both ins ide and o ut side containment, outs i de was c h osen. Operat i ons n oted eng i neered scaffolding was recently added t o the MSSS. This should be exam i ned by area wa l kby. Operations n oted engin ee red scaffolding was recently added to the MSSS. This should be exam i ned by area wa l k by. Operations noted engineered scaffolding was r ecently added to the MSSS. This s h ould be examined by area wa l kby. Opera t iOns noted engineered scaffo l ding w as r ecently added to t h e M SSS. ThiS should be examined by area wa l k by. Pa g e 9 Rev i sion 0 A pril 20 1 4 E nclosu r e Appendices A and B Upon sepa r ation t h is page i s deco n tro ll ed Seismic Walkdown Equipment li st, R ev. 2 NTIF R eco mmendation 2.3: Seis mi c Walkdown Attachment 1 -SW EL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen *3 Environment SWEL Walkdown Ill Screen *2 (Sa fety Major n ew (Temp, *Ft Item Descrip tio n Building (SC-1 (Regular E quipment System (I f o r Equipment Function or Number Ucenslng Inspections

?t C l ass Type replacement or Basis?) Support I equipment?

Ofor *ou ts ide"t 98 3JSG8UV0130 SG*EOlA i solation valve MSS S Yes Yes PCDHR POV(7t SG Yes 1 24 (II 99 3JSG8UV0135 SG-E018 i solation valve M SSS Yes Yes PCDHR POV(71 SG Yes 1 24 (0 100 3JSGCLTIU3C SG*EOlA W R level CONT Yes Yes PC D HR lns t. Rack SG N o 120 (11 (required for A FASI (18) RC loop 1 lon g term 10 1 3JSIAUV065 1 CT M T Yes Yes I CDHR M OV(8) 51 Y es 120(1) recirc/SDC valve He at 102 3 M 5 1BE0 1 SDHX "8" AUX Yes Yes DHR Exc hange r 51 No 104(0 (21) 103 3MSIBPOI LPSI pump "8" AUX Yes Yes DHR Vert. Pump Sl Yes 104 (1) (6) 104 3MS I BP03 Containment Spray Pump AUX Yes Yes CF Vert. Pump Sl No 104 (1) 8 (6) HPSI Long Term 105 3J518PSV0166 Recirculation T rain 8 AUX Y e s Yes PC DH R Other(O) Sl N o 104(1) Pressure Relief Valve 106 3JS 1 8PSV0409 HPSI train " B" in j ection to AUX Yes Yes ICDHR Other (0) Sl N o 104 (1) EDT r e l ief 107 3JS I 8PSV189 RC loop 2 L T OP r e l ief to sump CTMT Yes Yes DH R Other (0) 51 N o 120(1) Safety Inject i on Tank 2A 108 3JS 1 8UV06 14 Discharge Isola tio n Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV(8) Sl N o 12 0(1) Valve 109 3JSIBUV0616 RC lo op 2A I solation v alve AUX Yes Yes IC DH R MOV (S) Sl Ye s 104(1) Safety I nject i on Tank 28 110 3JSI8UV062 4 Discha r ge Iso la tion Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV(8) Sl N o 120(1) Va l ve 111 3 J SIBUV0626 RC loop 28 i solation valve AUX Yes Yes ICOHR MOV(8) 51 Y es 104(1) 112 3JSI8UV0636 RC loop 1A Is olation v al ve AUX Yes Yes ICDH R MOV(8) Sl Yes 104(1) 113 3 J Sf8UV0646 RC loop 18 iso la tion v a l ve AUX Yes Yes IC DH R MOV(8) Sl Yes 104(1) Contai n ment Spray Pu mp 114 3 J SI8UV0665 Reci r culation To Refueling AUX Yes Yes C F MOV(8) Sl No 104(1) Water Ta nk Tra i n 8 Globe Valve 115 3JSIBUV615 RC loop lA LPSI isola t ion AUX Yes Yes D HR MOV(8) Sl N o 104(1) va l ve 116 3JS18 UV 656 RC loop 2 soc isolat io n AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) 51 Yes 104(1) va l ve PVNG S Uni t 3 Se i smic Walkdown Equipment List No vem b er 11 , 2013 WCAP-17 68 1-NP. Supplement 1 PVNG S-3 I PEEE vul n erabi lity enhancement?

No N o No No No No N o No No N o N o N o No No N o No No N o No Page F-11 Palo Verd e Nuclear Station-Unit 3 Walkdown Deferred to Outage? No No No Yes N o No No N o No Yes Y es No Y e s No N o No No No No Comme n ts Operations no ted engineered sca ffold in g was rea ntfy added to the M SSS. This sho uld be exam i ned by area wa l k by. Operations noted engineered scaffolding was recently added to the MSSS. Th i s shou l d be exam i ned by area wa l kby. This i t em is being specifically walked down due to its significance in plant his tory (pi p e vibration I. T h e CS pump was selected fo r wa l kdown per ops/eng i neering request. Pa ge 1 0 R e vis ion 0 April 2 01 4 E nclosure Append i ces A and B U pon sepa ration this page is decontro ll ed Se ismic Wa lkdo wn Equipment list, Rev. 2 Pa ge F-12 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seism ic Wa lkdo wn Attachment 1-SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Stat i on-Unit 3 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen 113 Envi r onme nt SWEL Walkdown Ill Screen 112 (Safety Major new (T emp, 'F) W a lk dOwn Item Description Buil ding (SC-1 Eq uipment System (I for I PEEE Deferred to Comments Equipment Function or vu l nerability N umbe r licensing I nspections?)

Suppon) Class Type repl acement " l nside"or enhance me nt? Outage? Basis?) equipment?

Ofor "Outside*)

117 3JSI8UV667 HPSI pump " B" recirc iso AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MO V(II) Sl Yes 104(1) No No (closes on RAS) 118 3JSIBUV676 SUMP iso la tion va l ve AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MOV(B) Sf No 104 (I) No No HPSt l ong term retire loop tnst. Rack Non Oass Power however kept in list 119 3JSINPT391 1 pressure xmtr CTMT Yes Yes ICDHR (18) Sl No 120 (f) No Yes beca us e of pressure boundary conside r ations. 120 3MSP8P01 Spray po nd pump " B" SP Yes Yes PC DHR UHS Vert. Pu m p SP No 122(0) N O No (6) 121 3MHSB J0 1 Spray po n d pump house SP Yes Yes PC DH R UHS AHU (6) SP No 122(0) No No Selected per cps/enginee ring re qu est eKhaust fan "'8" due to the e nvironmental conditions Main Control Board Cont ro l T he bookshelves next to RMA, RMB, 122 3JRMB801 Section 801 Electrical CTR L Yes Yes PC IC DHR Panel (20) RM N o 80(1) No N o RMC, RMD and RMNB01 where Systems anchored as an IPEEE enhancement 123 3JSABC01 B Train ESFAS Rel ay CTR L Y es Yes RC Dist. Pane l SA No 80(1) No N o Cabinets (14) 124 3JSIAUV0672 A Train CS Injection MOV AUX Yes Yes CF MOV(8) St No 104 (I) No Yes Repetitive MR FF on valve 125. 3JZJBE01 Remote ShutdOwn Pa nel CTRL Yes Yes RC PCIC Cont r ol ZJ N o 80(1) No DHR Panel (20) NO

• T he total number of SWEL l 1 tems 1 s 124 instead of 125 because 1tem 13 (3MCHEE01) was removed. The 1tem numbers tn the f1rst colum n of th 1 s tab le w ere not adJusted to make 1t eas1er to compare the i tems listed herein to those in previous revis i ons of this document.

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List WCAP-1768 1-N P, Supp l ement 1 PVNGS-3 November 11, 2013 Page 11 Revision 0 Apri l 20 14 Enclo s ure Appendioes A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Seismic Walkdown Equipment list , Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seism ic Walkdown Attachment 2-SWEL 2 SWEl Item Wa l ltdown DIKription Equipment System lv i klins Equipment Class Type Number 1 3MPCAP01 Fuel pool cooli:nc pump 1 pp PC Fuel 8uildi111 2 3MPCAE01 Fuel pool cooline he1t txdl l.,-1 IIX PC futiBuildq 3 3MPCBI'Ol Fwl pool coormc pump 2 pp PC fu ** Build in& 4 lMPCB£01 Fuel 11001 hut 2 HX PC Fu*l Buildinl 5 3MHFA101 Fuel 8u i lclin1 AHU AHU HF Fu*l Builod"lfll

' 3MHFBJ01 Fwl Builclinc AH U AHU HF fu ** Bui l d"q PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List N ovem b er 11, 20 13 WCAP-17681

-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 SO"RRIl (Seism" IC Ucans*a Basis?) Yes YIS Yes Yes Yes Yes Scrft:n 112 In?) YltS Yes YltS YH YltS YltS PageF-13 Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Un i t 3 hsod*t.cl wid! RApid No No No No No No Commtnt Page 12 Re v ision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B cont a inJI*I**************

Upon sepa r at 1 on this page I s d e cont r olled Seismic Walkdown E quipment List, Rev. 2 Page F-14 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 -SWEL Sort Table s Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 Table 3-1 : Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "System Type" (Note: The OF (Tank), GA (SOV) and ZA (Dist. Panels) systems are not represented due to the equipment types covered by each system a r e already well rep r esented.)

System Type Number of I tems Number of Items in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 AF 14 8 CH 29 9 C P 4 1 CT 3 1 OF 1 0 DG 14 3 EC 8 4 EW 8 3 GA 1 0 GR 2 1 HA 4 1 HC 12 6 HD 4 2 HJ 21 11 lA 1 1 PB 3 1 PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipmen t List November 11, 2013 W C AP-17 6 81-NP , S u pp l e me n t 1 PVNGS-3 ' System Type Number of Items in Base List 1 P E 2 PG 6 PH 8 PK 20 PN 12 RC 16 RD 2 RM 30 SA 11 SB 14 SG 40 Sl 101 SP 4 ZA 6 ZJ 11 Number of Items . Selected for SWEL 1 1 3 4 9 6 8 1 8 1 1 7 20 2 0 1 Page 13 R e vis i o n 0 Apri l 2014 Enclosure Appendices A a.nd B contain Upon ""n::miiinn Page F-15 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3-SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 3 Table 3-2: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Major new or replacement equipment" (Of the 412 items comprising Base List 1 , 38 items were identified as "Major new or replacement equipment." The following 15 items were selected for SWEL 1.) Item Walkdown Description Equipment 115 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 11 3JAFBUV0034 SG-E01A isolation valve 12 3JAFBUV0035 SG-EOlB isolation valve 14 3JAFCUV0036 SG-E01A isolation valve 272 3JSIAUV0651 RC loop 11ong term recirc/SDC valve 313 3JSIBUV0636 RC loop 1A isolation valve 312 3JSIBUV0626 RC loop 28 isolation valve so 3MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake structure 222 3JSGBUV0130 SG-E01A isolation valve 223 3JSGBUV0135 SG-EOlB isolation valve 321 3JSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on RAS) 303 3MSIBP01 LPSI pump "B" 310 3JSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A Isolation valve 314 3JSIBUV0646 RC loop 18 Isolation valve 319 3JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SOC isolation valve PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 WCAP-17681-NP. Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Page 14 Revis ion 0 Apri12014 Page F-16 Sei s mic Walkdown Equipment Li st, Rev. 2 NTTF Re co mmendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3-SWEL Sort Tab l e s Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Equipment Type" (Note: Equipment type 4 (trans fo rme rs) are not mentioned as they are part of larger parent equipment (i.e. switchgear, load ce nters). Add i tionally , EO type 12 (Air Compressors) and 13 (Motor Generator s) are not in c luded as Palo Verde does not have any safety rela t ed equipment in this category.)

Equipment T ype De s crip t ion Numb er 0 Miscellaneous 1 Motor Control Centers 2 Low Vo ltage Sw itchgear 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear 4 T ran s former s 5 H or izonta l Pumps 6 Ve rtica l Pumps 7 Flu i d Operated Va l v es 8 Moto r Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 9 Fan s 10 Air Handler s 11 C hiller s 12 Air Compressors 13 Motor Generators 1 4 Di s tribution Panel s 15 B a tterie s on Racks 16 Battery Chargers and Inverter s 1 7 Engine Generators 18 Instruments on Ra c ks 19 Temperatur e Se n s ors 20 In s trumentation and Control Pan e l s and Racks 21 Tanks and Heat Exchang e r s (G IP Section 7) PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic W a lk down Equipment List Novembe r 11, 2013 WCAP-17681-NP , Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Numbe r of Items Number of Items in Base list 1 Selected for SWEL 1 13 6 13 6 12 4 2 1 0 0 11 5 8 4 23 10 115 31 8 4 10 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 41 5 4 2 12 5 2 1 74 16 3 2 39 9 20 8 P age 15 Re vi s ionO April 2 01 4 Page F-17 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list , Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 -SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 3 Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Environment (Temperature)" (Since the PVNGS Units are located in a dry environment, it was decided to classify the environmen ts based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Temperature values were determined from a review of the EQ DBM and the UFSAR.) Temperature Number of Items (oF} i n Base list 1 80 142 (All i nside} 104 150 (All i nside) 113 8 (2 Inside and 6 outside) 120 62 (All inside) 122 4 (All outside) 124 18 (All inside) 140 2.8 (All inside) PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 WCAP-17681-NP , Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Number of Items Se l ected for SWEll 47 (All inside) 43 (All inside) 3 (All outside) 16 (All inside) 2 (All outside) 5 (All inside) 8 (All inside} Page 16 Revis i o n 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain .. !IJIJIJ.IIJIIIIIIIJIJI!IIJ********

Upon separation th i s page is decont rolled Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 F-1? NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3-SWEL Sort Tab l es Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Uni t 3 Table 3-5: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and the Availability of the Associated Train Base Walkdown Li s t 1 Equ ipment Description It em 45 3MCTET01 CST (conde nsate s t o rage tank) 40 3MCHET01 RWT (refuel in g wa ter tan k) 138 3EPK B F12 DC battery " 8" 115 3EPB BS04 4.16 kV b us 504 10 3MA FBP0 1 AFpump"B" 122 3EPGBL34 480 V l C3 4 bus 129 3EPHBM34 480VMCCM34 121 3EPGBL32 480 V L C32 bus 131 3EP HBM 3 8 480V MCCM38 336 3MSP 8P01 Spray pond pump "8" 324 3JS I BUV676 SUMP iso lat io n valve 123 3EPGB L36 480 V LC36 bus 130 3EPHBM36 480VMCCM36 89 3MHD8A01 DG "B" room EA H U fan 90 3MHDBJ01 DG "B" room esse ntia l exhaust fan 1 28 3EPHB M 32 480V MC CM32 37 3 JCH E HV0532 RWT suction iso (fai l s open on l oss of a i r) 307 3JSIBPSV0409 H PS I tr ai n "B" i nje ct io n to EDT re li ef 67 3MEWBP01 EW p ump "B 68 3M EWB T0 1 EW "B" surge ta nk 25 3JCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to Sl tra in "B" 321 3JSIBUV667 HPSI p ump " B" recirc iso (closes o n RAS) 66 3MEWBE01 EW " B" heat exc h ange r 283 3MS IBE0 1 SDHX "B" PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 RAW 30500 56.89 9.34 9.32 6.44 4.92 4.92 4.81 4.7 4 low Ri s k l ow Risk L ow Risk lo w Risk L ow Ri sk Lo w Risk Lo w Risk low Risk low Risk low R i s k Low Ris k low Ris k lo w Ris k lo w Ris k Low Risk Is the T rain Unavail a b le? No No No No No N o No No No No No No No No No No No No N o No N o No No No Pa ge 17 RevisionO April2014 Enclosure Append i ces A and B conta in*******************

U pon separation this page is decontro ll ed Se is mic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 Page F-19 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3-SWEL Sort Tab les Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 Base Walkdown List 1 Equ ipm ent Description Item 117 3EPEBG02 Emergency diesel generator "B" 306 3JSIBPSV0166 HPS ilong Term Recirculation Train B Press u re Relief Valve 60 3JECBTV0030 Co ntrol room " B" EA H U flow reg valve 101 3MHJBF04 Control room EAHU (fan, filt e rs and HX) 309 3JSIBUV0614 Safety I njection Tank 2A Discharge Is o lation Globe Valve 57 3MECBE01 Essential chiller "B" 58 3MECBP01 Circulating water p ump "B" 311 3JSIBUV0624 Safety Injection Tank 28 isolat ion Globe Valve 8 3JAFBHV0030 SG-E01A reg valve 9 3JAFBHV0031 SG-E01B reg valve 11 3JAFBUV0034 SG-EOlA i so lat ion valve 12 3JAFBUV0035 SG-E01B iso lat io n valve 14 3JAFCUV0036 SG-E01A isolation valve 38 3JCHEHV0536 RWT suction i solation 315 3 JSIB UV0665 Containment Spray Pump Recirculation To Refueling Water Ta n k Train B G l obe Valve 143 3EPKCF13 DC battery "C" 308 3JS IBPSV 189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump 272 3 JSIA UV065 1 RC loop l long term recirc/SDC valve 313 3JS IBUV0 636 RC loo p 1A i sola tion valve 27 3 MCHBP0 1 Charging p ump 2 146 3EPKC N43 Inverter For Shutdown Cooling Isola t ion Valve 3 JSICUV653 15 1 3EPKD N44 I nverter For 3JSIDUV654 Shutdown Coo l ing B Return Inside Containment I solatio n Valve 213 3JSGBHV0178 Atmospheric dump valve HV-178 214 3 JSGBHV0185 Atmospheric dump valve HV-185 303 3MS IB P01 LPSI pump "8" 305 3MSIBP03 Containment Spray Pump B 310 3JSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A isolation valve PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11 , 2013 WCAP-17681

-NP. Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 RAW Low Risk low Risk Low Risk low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Lo w Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk L ow Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk L ow Risk Low R i sk Low Risk Low Risk Low Ri s k Lo w Ri s k Low Ri s k L ow Risk Is the Train Unavailable?

No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes No No N o No No No No No No Page 18 RevisionO April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3-SWEL Sort Tables B ase Walkdown List 1 Equipment Desc ript io n Item 312 3JSIBUV0626 RC loop 28 isolation valve 314 3JSIBUV0646 RC loop 18 isolation valve 316 3JSIBUV615 RC loop 2A lP S I isolation valve 319 3JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SOC isolation valve 338 3MHSBJ01 Sp_ray pond pump house exhaust fan "B" 6 3JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feedwate r flow 7 3JAFBFT0041B Auxiliary feedwater flow 29 3JCHBPSL0218 Train B Fo r Charging Pump 3MCHEP01 Suction line Pressure Switch 32 3JCHCl T 0203C RWT level (required for RAS) 35 3JCHEHV0239 Charg i ng Line To Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Isola tio n Globe Valve 39 3MCHE P01 Charg i ng pump 3 42 3JCP BUVOOOSA Containment Power Ac cess Purge Supply I solat i on Butterfly Damper so 3MDGBF03 DG "B" air in ta ke structure 51 3MDGBX01A Starting air accumu l ator 52 3MDGBX01B Startil!g ai r accumulator 59 3MECBT01 EC expansion tank "B 70 3JGRBUV0002 (LLRT) ROT/GAS Surge Header Iso la tio n Valve (Outside Containment) 73 3MHAAZ04 AFW pump room "A" EAHU 79 3JHCBPT0351B Containment pressure 80 3 JHCBP T 0352B Containmen t pres su r e 81 3 JHCBUV0044 Discharge Sampling Fro m RU-1 Contai nment Isolation Valve 82 3JHCBUV0047 Inlet Sampling To RU-1 Co ntainment Isolation Valve 85 3JHCO P T03510 Containment pressure 86 3JHCDPT0352D Containment pr essu r e 102 3MHJBJ01A DC room "D" essentia l exhaust fan 103 3M H JBJ01B DC room "B" essen tia l exhaust fa n 104 3M H JB M0 2 m otor-operated damper PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipm e nt List November 11, 2013 WCAP-17681

-NP. Supp l ement1 PVNGS-3 Page F-20 Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 RAW Low Risk low Risk low Risk low Risk Not Modeled in t he PRA Not Modeled in t he PRA Not M o deled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled in t he PRA No t Model ed in the PRA No t Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA No t M o deled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA N ot Modeled in the PRA N ot Modeled in the PRA N ot Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mode led in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Modeled In th e PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mod e l ed in th e PRA Is the Train Unavailable?

No No No No No No N o No No No No No No No No No No Yes . No No No No No No No No No Page 19 Revision 0 April2014 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3-SWEL Sort Tables Base Walkdown Ustl Equipment Description Item 105 3MHJBM03 motor-operated damper 106 3MHJBM31 Air-operated damper 10 7 3MHJBM58 Air-operated DC room "B" isola tio n 108 3MHJBM67 Air-operated computer room O P 109 3JHJBTIC0124 Control room temp in d ic at i ng controller 110 3MHJBZ03 ESF switchgear room " B" EAHU 111 3MHJBZ04 DC room "B" EAHU 112 3JIAAUV0002 Instrum en t Air Supply Containment Isola tion Gate Valve 137 3EPKB022 LC 34 co ntrol po wer 139 3EPKB H1 2 Battery charger B" 141 3EPKBM42 DC powe r to TCB1 control c ircuit 147 3EPK0024 DC distribution panel 024 150 3EPKOM44 DC power to TCB 1 control circu it 155 3EP NB026 Power to P PS "B" instrumentation 156 3EPNBN12 OC/AC inv erter "B" 157 3EPNBV26 120 V vital ac voltage regulator

" B" 158 3EPNC027 Power to PPS "C" ins trumentat io n 159 3EPNC N13 OC/AC inverter "C" 163 3EPNOV28 120 V vital ac voltage regula tor "0" 167 3JRCBHV0105 Pressur i zer and Reactor Vessel Head Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve 168 3 JRCB HV0108 Pressur i zer Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve 170 3JRCBPT0102B Pnr pressure (re quir e d for RPS/S IAS) 171 3 JRCB PT 104 SOC RCS pressure interlock 172 3JSBBC02A 1/V converter 175 3JSBCC02A 1/V converter 177 3J R COPT106 SOC RCS pressure int e r l ock 179 3JRCNTE101 Pressurizer t empera ture PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11 , 2013 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Page F-21 Palo Verde Nuclear Station-Unit 3 RAW Not Mode le d in the PRA Not Mode led in t he PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mode led in t he PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mode le d in th e PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mode le d in the P RA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mode led in th e PRA Not Mode led in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mode led in the PRA Not Mode led in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA No t Mode le d in the PRA Not Model e d in the PRA Not Mode le d in the PRA Not Mode led in the PRA Not Mode le d in the PRA Not Mode led in the PRA Not Mode le d in the PRA Not Mode le d in the PRA Not Modeled in the PRA Not Mode le d in the PRA Not Mode le d in the PRA Not Mod eled in the PRA Is the Train Unavailable?

N o No No No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No Page 20 Revision 0 April2014 En cl osure Appen d ices A and B co n taln i!IJIIIIIIII!Ill*lll************

Upon separa ti on t hi s p age is decon t rolled S e i sm i c W alkd o wn Equip men t li st , R e v. 2 NIT F R ec omm en d a ti on 2.3: S e i sm i c W alkdo w n Att a c hmen t 3 -SW EL So rt Tabl es Base Wa lk dow n list 1 Equi p me nt Descrip t ion Item 181 3JR DB UV0024 Isolation Co n tainment Radwas te Sump Outlet Isola t ion Gate Valve 186 3JR M BB02 RWT i evel 187 3JRMBB04 RCS temperature 188 3JRMBB05 Con t ai n me n t p r essure 189 3JRMBB06 Auxi l iary f eedwater flow 190 3JRMCB05 Con t ai n me nt pressure 192 3JRMNB02 SDHX A outlet tempe r atu r e 1 93 3JRMNB04 Pressu ri ze r temperatu r e 195 3JSBBC03 Reactor t r ip breake r "B" 219 3JSGBPT0306 Instrume nt a i r l i ne pressure trans mi tter 221 3JSGBPV0306 B N 2 supp l y solenoi d va l ve 222 3JSGBUV0130 SG-EOlA iso l at i on valve 223 3JSGBUV0135 SG-E01B iso l ation valve 228 3JSGCLT1113C SG-E01A WR level (r equ ire d fo r AFAS) 334 3JS IN PT39 1 HPS I long term recirc loop 1 pressure xmt r 355 3JRMBB01 Main Con t rol Board Sectio n B01 E l ectrical Systems 37 4 3JSABC0 1 B Tra i n ESFAS Relay Cab i nets 392 3JS I AUV0672 A Tra i n CS Injection MOV 409 3 J ZJBE0 1 Re m ote Shut d own P a n e l P VN G S Unit 3 Se i smic Wa l k do w n Equ ipm e nt List N ovember 11 , 20 1 3 WCAP-17681

-N P, Supp l emen t 1 PVNGS*3 Page F-2.2 Palo V er de Nuclea r Sta tion-U n it 3 RAW Not M od e led in the PRA Not M odeled in the PRA Not M odeled in the PRA Not M odeled in t he PRA Not M odeled in t he PRA Not M odeled in t he PRA Not M odeled in the PRA Not M ode l ed in the P R A Not M ode l ed i n t he PRA Not M ode l e d in t he P RA N ot M ode l ed in the P RA Not M ode led in t he PRA Not M ode l ed in the PRA N ot Mode l ed in t he PRA N ot Mode l ed in the PRA N ot Mode l ed in the PRA N ot M ode l ed in t he PRA N ot Mode l ed in the PRA N ot Mod el e d in t he PRA Is the T ra i n Unava i lab l e? N o N o N o No No No No Nq N o No N o No No No No N o N o Yes N o P age 2 1 Revision 0 Apri l 20 14 E nc losu r e Appendices A and B Upon .... n , rnur.nn Page G-1 APPENDIX G -SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES There were no changes to the equipment selected for Base List I (Table G-1 ). One item was removed from SWEL I (Table G-2) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area and two Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D because they were inaccessible during refueling outage 3Rl7. These changes are discussed in Section 3.4. There were no changes to Base List 2 and S WEL 2. Table G-1: PVNGS-3 Base List I (Refer to Table G-1 of Reference 48, "Near-Tenn Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stat io n Unit 3") WCAP-1 768 1-NP, Supplement!

PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appen d ices A and B contain U pon separa t 1on til l S page I S decont r olled Table G-2: PVNGS-3 S W E L 1 Suee n #4 Sa mple_ C on sidera tio ns SWEL W a lkdown II e m E quipm e nt Description N um be r I 3 J AFBFT004 1 A Aux i liary feedwater Oow 2 3J AFB FT0041 B Auxil i ary fee d water Oow 3 3JAFB H V0030 SG-EOIA regulat in g valve 4 3JAFBHV003 1 SG-EOIB regulat in g valve 5 3MAFBPOI Afpump *a* 6 3JAFBUV0034 SG-EOI A i solation valve 7 3JAFBUV0035 SG-EO I B isolation valve 8 3JAFCUV0036 SG-EO I A i solation valve 9 3JCHB H VOS30 RWT o u tle t to Sl train *a* 10 3MC HB POI Chargi n g p u mp 2 Train B For Charging Pump II 3JC H BPS L 0218 3MCHEPOI Suction L ine Pressure Swi t ch 12 3JCHCL T0203C RWT i evel (requ ir ed for RAS) W CAP-1 7 681-NP, Su pp le ment l P VNGS-3 Sc ree a #I Sc reeo#2 Build i ng (SC-I (Regul a r Li c en sing In s pe ctions?) B asis?) M SSS Y es Y es MSSS Yes Yes MSSS Y e s Yes MSSS Yes Yes MSSS Y es Yes MSSS Y es Y es MSSS Yes Y es MSSS Yes Y es AUX Yes Yes AUX Yes Yes AUX Y es Y es YARD Yes Y es Sc r ee n E nviroom e at 113 M ajor new T e mp., °F (S afety Eq ui p me nt Syste m o r (I f o r " In side" F un c tion C l a ss T y pe r e pla ce m eo t or S upport) e q u ipment? Ofor "O utsid e") PCD HR Jnst. Rack AF No 1 40(1) ( 18) PC D HR l nst. Rack AF No 1 40 (I) ( 18) PCDHR MOV (8) AF No 1 04 (l) PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 1 04 (I) PCDHR H orz. AF No 1 04 (I) Pump (5) PCDHR MOV(8) AF Yes 104 (I) PCDHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (I) PCDHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (I) RC I C MOV (8) CH No 104 (I) DHR RCPC H orz. CH No 104 (I) IC Pump(S) lnst. Rack R CIC (1 8) CH No 10 4 (I) D HR l nst. Rac k CH No 1 13 (0) (1 8) IPEE E vulo era bili ty eobao ce m e n t ? No No No No No No No No No No No No P ageG-2 Walkdown D e f er red t o Outa ge? No No No No No No No No No No No No R evis i on 0 A p r i l2 014 Enclosure Appe nd ices A and B contain SWEL Walkdown II em Equipment Description N umber (Tbls hem was H removed from RegeReRll:ive l!eat SWEL I in thi s report. See Section 3.4.) Charging Line To 14 3 J CHEifV0239 React o r Coo l ant Loop 2 A I solation Globe Valve RWT sucti on iso I S 3 J CHEifV0532 (fa ils o pen on l oss o f air) 1 6 3 J CHE H V0536 RWTsuction isol atio n 1 7 3 MCHEPOI Charging p ump 3 18 3MCHETOI RWT (refue ling water tank) Conta inme n t powe r ac cess 1 9 3JCPBUV0005A p ur ge sup ply iso l a ti o n bu tterfly damper 20 3MCTETOI CST (condensate storage tank) 21 3MDG BF0 3 DG *a" air intak e filter 22 3MDGBXOIA Starting air accumulato r 23 3MDG BXOIB Start ing air accumulator 24 3MECBEOI Es sential chiller " B" W CAP-17681-NP , Supplement I PVNG S-3 &rten #I Buildin g (SC-I Lic e osiog Basis?) ¥es CfMT Y es AUX Y es AUX Yes AUX Yes Yard Y es CTMT Y es Yard Y es DG Y es DG Y es DG Y es CTRL Y es Upon separatio n th t s pag e is decontrolled Table G-2:

SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Consldentioas Serten Enviroomeot Screen#2 #3 Major new Temp., °F (ReguJar (Sa f ety Equlpmeat System or (I for " Inside" lospeclions

?) Function Class Type replacement or S upport) equipment? oror "Outside") Heel ¥es lOne I! !lAger bW We Yes R CIC POV (7) CH No 1 20 (I) Yes RCPC PO V (7) C H No 1 04 (I) Y es RCPC MOV (8) C H No 104 (I) Yes R CPC Hon. CH No 104 (1) IC Pump (5) Y es R C PC Tank (21) CH No 1 13 (0) ICDHR Yes CF MOV (8) CP No 1 20 (I) Y es PCDHR T ank (21) CT N o 1 13 (0) Yes R C PC Othe r (0) DG Y es 14 0 (I) IC DHR Yes RCPC Tank (2 1) DG N o 14 0 (I) I CDHR Y es RCPC T ank (21) DG No 140(1) ICDH R Y es R CPC Chille r (I I) EC No 80 (I) ICDHR IPEEE vulnerability enllancement

? We No No No No No N o No No No No No PageG-3 Walkdown D e ferred to Outage? ¥es Yes No N o .No N o Y es N o No No No No Revi sion 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and 8 conta in ******** Upon separa t ion th is p age is decontrolled SWEL ' Walkdown Item Equipment D est riptioo Jll umbtr 25 3MECBPOI C ircu l ating water p ump *e* 26 3MECBTOI EC expansion tank *s* Control r oom *s* 27 3JECBTV0030 EAHUflow r egulat i n g valve EW *a* heat 28 3MEWBEOI exchanger 29 3MEWBPO I EWpump" B" 30 3MEWBTOI EW *a* surge tank (LLRT) ROT/GAS Surge 31 3 J GRBUV0002 Header I solation Valve (Outside Containment) 32 3MHAAZ04 AFW pump room "A" EAHU 33 3JHCBl'T0351 B Containment pressure 34 3J H CBPT0352B Containment pressure Di scharge 35 3JHCBUV0044 Samp l ing From RU-t Containment I solation Valve WCAP-17681-NP, Supp l eme nt l PVNGS-3 Screen #I Building {SC*I Lite using S.sis?) CTRL Yes CTRL Y es CTRL Yes AUX Yes AUX Yes AUX Yes AUX Yes AUX Yes AUX Yes AUX Yes CTMT Yes Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWE L 1 Screen 1#4 S.mple Considerati ons Screen E nvironment Screen #1 #3 Major new Temp., °F (Regular (S.ftty Equipment System or (I for " lo si d e" In s p ecti ons?) Function C l w Type replacement or Support) e qui pment? oror "Oucslde")

Yes RCPC HorzPum p EC No 80(1) I CDHR (5) Yes RCPC Tank(2l) EC No 80 (I) I CDHR PC IC Y es DHR POV(7) EC No 80(1) PC IC H eat Yes DHR Exchanger EW No 104 (I) (21) Y es PCIC HorzPump EW No 1 04 (I) DHR (5) Yes PC I C Tank(21) EW No 1 04 (I) DHR Yes Cf sov (8) GR No 104 (I) Yes PCIC AHU (1 0) HA No 104 (I) DHR Yes CF lnst. Rack HC No 104 (I) ( 18) Y es Cf Ins!. Rack HC No 104 (I) (18) Yes C F sov (8) HC No 120 (I) IPEEE v ulotrlbUlt y enbancemeot

! No No No No No No No No No No No PageG-4 Walkdown Deferred to Ontage? No No .. No No No No No Yes No No Yes Rev ision 0 April 20 14 E ncl os ure Appendices A a n d B co ntainii!I.IIIIIIIJI!!IIIIIIIIJI!***********

Upon se p a r a t io n th is p age i s decont r oll ed SWEL Walkdown Item EquipllltDI Description Number I n l e t Sampling T o 36 3JHCB U V00 47 R U-1 Containment I s o la t i on Valv e 37 3 JHCDPT0 35 1D C o ntainment press ur e 38 3 J HC DPT0 35 2D Containment press ur e 39 3 MHDBA OI oo*e* r oo m EAH Ufan DG"B" r oom 40 3 MHDBJ O I esse nt i al e xha ust f an C o n tr ol r oom 4 1 3 MHJB F04 E AHU (f an , fil ters and HX) DC room *o* 4 2 3 MHJB JOIA essential e xh aus t f an DC room *s* 4 3 3 MHJB JO IB e ssen t ial e xh aust fan 44 3 MH JBM02 m o tor-operated damper 4 5 3 MHJBM 03 motor-o pe rated damper 46 3 MHJ B M 31 Pneumatic d amper 4 7 3MH JB M58 Pne umatic DC roo m " B" iso l ati o n W CAP-17681-NP , Supplem e nt I PVNGS-3 Screen I# I Building (SC-I Lken s lng Basis?) CTMT Y es A UX Yes AUX Yes DG Y es DG Y es C TRL Yes CTRL Y es CTRL Ye s CTRL Y e s CfRL Y es CTRL Y es CfRL Yes Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Screen 114 Sampl e C oa s ideradons Screen Eovlroom e ot Scrteo 112 N3 Major new Temp., °F (Regular (Safely Equipmeat Sys tem or (I ror " la s ide" lnspettlon s?) Function CIISS Type replacement or Support) equipment? oror "Outside") Y es CF sov (8) HC No 12 0 (I) Y es C F l n st. Rac k H C N o 1 04 (I) (1 8) Y es CF lnst. Rac k HC No 1 04 (l) (1 8) Y es PC IC Fan (9) HD No 14 0 (I) DHR PCIC Y es D HR F an (9) HD No 14 0 (1) PC IC Y es DHR AHU (1 0) HJ No 80 (I) PC IC Yes DHR Fan (9) HJ N o 8 0 (I) PC I C Yes DHR Fan(9) HJ N o 80 (I) Y e s PCIC MO V (8) HJ N o 80(1) DHR Yes PC I C MO V (8) HJ No 8 0(1) D HR Yes PCIC POV (7) H J No 80 (I) DHR Y es PC I C PO V (7) HJ N o 8 0 (1) D HR IPE EE vuloenbUily enbaocemeot

? N o No N o N o No N o No N o No N o N o No Pag e G-5 W a lkdowo Deferred to Outage? Ye s No N o No No N o No No No No No No Rev is i o n 0 A p ril 2 014 E n dosu re Appendices A and B conta i n******** Upon separa t i on t h i s page is decontrolled S WEL Walkdown Item E quipment Description N umber 48 3 MHJBM67 Pnewnatic computer room DP Control room tem p 49 3JHJBT I CO I 24 i n dicati ng con troller 50 3 MHJBZ 03 ESF s witch g ear r oo m *s* EAHU 5 1 3MHJBZ04 DC room *s* EAHU I nstrurnent Air Supply 5:Z 3JIAAU V 0002 Containment I so l ation Gate Valve 53 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 54 3EPEBG02 Emergency diesel genera1or

• s* ss 3EPGBL32 480 V L C3 2 bus 56 3EPG B L34 48 0 V L C3 4 bus 57 3E PGB L36 480 V L C36 bus 58 3E PHBM3 2 480VMCCM32 WCAP-1 7681-NP , Supplement I PVNGS-3 Screen #I Building (SC-I Llcenshag Ba sis?) CTRL Y es CTRL Yes CTRL Y es CTRL Y es AUX Yes CTRL Yes DG Y es CTRL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Y es CTRL Y es Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Scr<<n #4 Sample ConsideratioDJ Scree n Environment Screen #2 #3 M a jor new Temp,. °F (Regul a r (Sifety Equipment System or (I for " Inside" IDJpection s?) Function Class T ype replacement or Support) equipment?

oror "O utside") Yes PC I C POV (7) HJ No 80 (I) DHR PCIC Temp Y es DHR Senso r ( 1 9) HJ No 80 (I) Yes P C I C AHU (1 0) HJ No 80 (I) DHR Y es PC I C AHU(IO) HJ No 80 (I) DHR Y es CF s o v (8) l A No 1 0 4 (I) R CPC Med. Volt Y es IC DHR SWG R(3) PB Yes 80 (I) CF Y es R CPC E n g. Gen. P E No 140 (I) IC DHR (17) Yes RCPC Low Volt. PG No 80 (I) DHR SWG R (2) Y es R C PC Low V o lt. PG No 80 (I) DHR SWGR(2) Y es R C PC Low Volt. PG N o 80 (I) DHR SWG R(2) Yes RCPC M CC(l) PH No 80 (1) DHR IPEEE vulnerability enbancemeat

? No No No No No No No No No No No PageG-6 Walkdown Dd e rrtd C o Outage! No No No No Yes No No No No No No Revision 0 April 2014 Encl osure Appendices A a nd B con t ain JIIIIIIJIIIIIIIIIJIIIIIIIJIIIJIIIII**********

Upon separation th is page is deco n tr o ll ed SW£L Walkdowa Item E quipment Description N umber 59 3E PHBM34 480V MCCM34 ' 60 3EPHB M 36 480VMCCM36 6 1 JE PHBM38 480VMCCM38 62 3 EPKB D22 LC 34 control power 63 3EPKBF 1 2 DC battery "B" 64 3EPKBHI2 Batte ry charger ,.8 n DC power to 65 3EPKBM42 TCB I control circuit 3EP KDD24 DC d i stri bu tion 66 (substi tute for pane l 024 3EPKCD23) 61 3EPKCFJ3 DC battery *c* 3 EPKDM44 DC power to 68 (substitute for TCB I co ntro l 3EPKCM43) circuit In verter for 69 3EPKCN43 shutdown coo ling isolation valve 3 J SICUV653 WCAP-I 768 1-NP, Supp lement I PVNGS-3 Scrte o #I Building (SC-I Licensing Basis?) AUX Yes AUX Yes AUX Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Y es CTRL Y es CTRL Y es Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Scrte o 114 Sam ple Coosideratloos S<reen Euvironmeat Scree n 112 113 Maj o r new Temp., °F (Regullr (Sa fe ty Equipment System or (I for " In side" Iosp ecti o os?) Fuactioa Class Type replace ment or Su pport) eqllipmeot?

Ofor "O utsid e") Yes RCPC M CC (I) PH No 104 (I) DHR Yes RCPC MCC(l) PH No 104 (I) DHR Yes RCPC MCC(I) PH No 104 (l) DHR Y es RCPC Dist Pane l PK No 80 (I) DHR ( 14) Yes R CPC Battery PK No 80 (I) DHR Rack (1 5) Yes R CPC B attery PK No 80 (I) DHR Chg(l 6) Yes RCPC MCC (l) PK No 80 (I) RCPC DistPanel Ye s DHR ( 14) PK No 80 (I) Yes R CPC Battery PK No 80 (I) DHR Rack (1 5) Ye s RCPC MCC (1) PK No 80 (I) Yes DHR l.n vert e r PK No 80 (I) ( 16) IPEEE vulaerabillty eoba o cemeot ? No No No No No No No No No No No PageG-7 Walkdowo Deferred to Ou ta ge? No No No No ***No No No No No No No R evisionO April 2014 SWEL Walkdowo It e m Equipment Description N umber Jnvener For 3 JSIDUV 6S4 70 3EPKDN44 Shutdown Cool in g B Return I nside Containment Isol ation Valve 7 1 3EPNBD26 Power to PP S " B

• instrum enta tion 72 3EPNBNI2 DC/ AC inv ene r *s* 1 20 V vital ac 73 3EPNBV26 voltag e regulator

• s* 74 3EPNCD27 P ow er t o PPS *c* instrumentati o n 75 3EPNCNI3 DC/ AC inve ne r *c* 1 20 V vital ac 76 3EPNDV28 voltage re gulator " D" Pr essurizer and Reactor Vesse l 77 3 JR CB HV O I OS H ead Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Pre ssurizer Vent 78 3 JR CB H V0108 To React or Dra in Tank G l obe Valve Pnr pressure 79 3 JR CB PT0 102 B (req u ired f o r RPSISIAS)

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Screen #I Building (SC-I Licensing Basis?) CTRL Yes CTRL Ye s CTRL Yes CT RL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Y es CTRL Y es CTMT Yes CTMT Y es CTMT Yes Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Screen Screen #2 #3 (Regular (Sa fety Equipment Inspections?)

Function Class Support) Yes CF Inverter ( 16) Yes RC PC Dist Panel I CDHR (14) Y es PCJC Inverter DHRCF (1 6) PCIC Y es DHRCF Other (0) Yes RCPC Dist Panel ICDHR (14) Yes PCIC Inv erte r DHRCF ( 1 6) PCIC Yes DHRCF Other (0) Yes PC sov (8) Yes PC s o v (8) lnst. Ra c k Yes PC ( 18) Screen #4 Sample Considerations Eovironmeot Major new Temp., °F Syst em or (I for " Inside" Type replac ement or equipment?

Ofor "OIIIside")

PK No 80 (I) PN No 80 (I) PN No 80 (I) PN No 80 (I) PN No 80 (I) PN N o 80 (I) PN No 8 0 (I) RC N o 12 0 (I) RC No 12 0 (I) RC No 1 20 (I) IPEEE vulnerability cobanccmeot

? .. No No No No No No No No No No PageG-8 Walkdown Deferred to Outage? .. No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Revision 0 Apri l 20 14 Enclosure Append ices A and B contain********************

Upon sepa r a t ion this page is decont roll ed S WEL Walkdowu Item Equipment De s criptioo N umber 80 3 J RCBPTI04 SOC R CS press ure inter l ock 8 1 3 J SBBC02A IN converter 82 3 J SBCC02A IN converter 83 3 JR C D PTI06 SOC RCS pressure inte r l ock 84 3JRCNTEIOI Pres surize r tempera ture Iso l a tion Containment 85 3JRDBUV0024 Radwaste S urnp Out let I solatio n Gate Va l ve 86 3JRMBB02 RWTi evel 87 3JRMBB04 R CS temperature 88 3JRMBB05 Containment pressure 89 3JRMBB06 Aux i l i al)' feedwater flow 90 3J RM CB05 Containment pressure WCAP-17681-NP , S upplem e nt I PVNG S-3 ' S<reen Il l Buildiag (SC-I Lkeoslng Basis?) CTMT Yes CTRL Ye s CTRL Yes CTMT Yes CTMT Y es AUX Y es CTRL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Yes CTRL Y es CTRL Yes Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL I

1. 4 Sa mole C oosidualion s

Environment Screen Il l 113 Major n ew TemP-> °F (Regular (Safety Equlpmeot System or (I for " Insid e" Inspec:tloos

?) Fuoc:tioo Class Type r e plac:emeot or Support) equipment?

Ofor "Outside") Y es DHR lns t Rack RC No 12 0 (I) (18) Yes DHR Inst Rack RC No 80 (I) (1 8) Ye s DHR l nst. Rack RC No 80 (I) (1 8) Yes DHR l nst. Rack RC No 120 (I) ( 18) Yes PC Temp RC No 1 20 (I) Sensor (1 9) Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 104 (I) Yes IC Con trol RM No 80 (I) Panel (2 0) Yes RC Con tr o l RM No 80 (I) Panel (2 0) Yes CF Co n tro l RM No 80(1) Pane l (20) Yes PCDHR Control RM No 80(1) P an e l (20) Yes CF Contro l RM No 80 (I) P an e l (20) IPEEE v ulnerability e nbancem e nt ? No No No No No No No No No No No PageG-9 Walkdown Deferred to . Yes No No Yes Yes No No No No No No Revision 0 April2014 Enc l osure Append i ces A a nd B con t a i n JI!I.IIIIIIIJIIIIIIIliJIII***********

U pon separa tt on lhts page is decont r olled SWEL Wal kd o wa It em E q u ipm en t D est ript lo a Number 91 3 J RMNB02 S D HX A outlet temperature 92 3JRMNB04 Pressurizer tempera tur e 93 3JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "8" Atmospheric 94 3JSG B HV0 1 78 dump valve HV-178 A trnospheric 95 3 J SGBHVOI85 dump valve HV-185 I nstrument air l i ne 96 3 J SG B PT0306 p ressw e transm itter 97 3 J SG B PV0306 B N2supp l y solenoi d valve 98 3 J SGBUV0 1 30 SG-EOIA isolation valve 99 3JSGBUV0 1 35 SG-EO I B isol at i on valve SG-EOIA WR 1 00 3 J SGC L T l ti3C level (requ ired fo r AFAS) R C l oo p I l ong-101 3JSIAUV0651 term recirc/SDC valve W CAP-176 8 1-NP, S u p pl e m en t I P VNGS-3 Scre en Il l BuUdi aa (SC-I Lle e nslaa B asis?) CTRL Yes CTRL Yes AUX Y es MSSS Yes M SSS Yes MSSS Y e s MSSS Yes MSSS Yes MSSS Yes C O NT Y es CTMT Yes T a ble G-2: P VN G S-3 S WEL I S c ree n 1#4 Sa mpl e Co a s id e r a tioos Sc r ee n E av i roameot Sc re e n 11 2 113 Majora e w T e mp., °F (R egu l a r (Sa f e ty Eq uipm e nt System or (I f o r " l asi d e" lospec ti o a s?) F u ae lioa C l ass Type r e p laceme nt or S u ppo rt) equipmen t? O for "O u ts id e") Y es DHR Control RM No 80 (1) Panel (20) Yes PC Contro l RM No 80 (I) Panel (20) Yes RCPC Breake r S B No 1 04 (I) Panel (2) Y es PCDHR P0V(7) SG No 1 24 (I) Yes PC DHR POV(7) SG No 1 2 4 (I) l nst Rack Yes PCD HR (18) SG No 1 04 (I) Yes PCDHR s o v (8) SG No 1 24 (I) Y es PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 1 2 4 (I) Yes PCDHR PO V (7) so Y es 12 4 (I) lnst. Rack Yes PCDH R (1 8) so No 1 20 (I) Yes ICDHR MO V(8) Sl Yes 1 20(1) IP EEE vuln e r a bili ty ? No No No No N o No No No No No No P ageG-10 W a lkdowa Dderredto O ut age? No No No No No No No No N o No Yes R e vi s i o n 0 Apr il 20 14 SWEL Walkdown It em Equipme nt D escriptio n Number 102 3MSIBEO I SDHX " B" 103 3MSIBP01 LPSI pump " B* 104 3MS IBP0 3 Containment Spray PumpB HPSI Long-T erm 105 3JSIBPSV0166 Rec irculation Train B Pressure Relief Valve HPSI train " B" 106 3 J SIBPSV0409 injection to EDT relief 107 3 J SIBPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump Safety lnjection Tank2A 108 3JSIBUV0614 Discharge I solation G l obe Valve 109 3JSIBUV0616 RCloop2A isolation valve Safety lnject i on Tank2B 11 0 3JSIBUV0624 Discharge I so l at i on Globe Valve Il l 3JSIBUV0626 RC loo p 2 B isol ation valve 11 2 3 J SIBUV0636 RC loop l A isolation valve WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supp l ement I PVNGS-3 Enclosure Append i ces A and B contain i!I!IIIIIII(IIII.III!IJiliJIIIII**********

Upon separation th is page is decontrolled Table G-2: PVNG S-3 SWEL 1 Screen 114 Sample Coasideratiou.s Sc reen Screen Eavlronmeot

1. I Sc reen #2 113 Majo r new Te mp., °F Buildiog (SC-I {Rf&Uiar (Safety Eq uipment Sys tem or (I for " I ns id e" Litt n siog Inspections?)

Fuottion Class T ype replacement or Basis?) Support) equipment?

Ofor "O utsid e") Heat AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger Sl No 104 (I) (21) AUX Yes Yes DHR Ven.Pump Sl Yes 104 (I} (6) AUX Yes Yes C F Ye n. Pump Sl No 104 (I) (6) AUX Yes Yes PCDHR Other (0) Sl No I 04 (I) AUX Yes Yes I CDHR Other (0) Sl No 10 4 (I) CTMT Yes Yes DHR Other (0) Sl No 120 (I) CTMT Yes Yes RCJC MOV(8) SI No 120 (1) AUX Yes Y es I CDHR MOV (8) Sl Yes 104 (I) CTMT Yes Yes RCIC MOV (8) Sl No 120 (I) AUX Yes Yes I CDHR MOV(8) Sl Yes 10 4 (1} AUX Yes Yes I CDHR MOV (8) Sl Yes 104 (I) IP EE E vuln erability enhancement

? No No No No No No No No .. No No No Page G-Il Walkd o wn Deferred to Outage? No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Revision 0 April2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separat 1 on tn 1s page 1s aecontrolleel Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Scnea 114 Sample Co nsiderations SWEL Walkdown Item Equipment Description Number 113 3JS!BUV0646 RC loop IB isolation valve Containment Spray Pump 114 3JS!BUV0665 Recirculation To Refueling Water Tank Train B Globe Valve 115 3JS!BUV615 RC loop 2A LPSI isolation valve 116 3JS1BUV656 RCioop2SDC isolation valve HPSI pump *a* 117 3JS!BUV667 rec irc iso (closes onRAS) 118 3JSIBUV676 Sump isolation valve HPSIIong-term 119 3JSINPT391 recirc loop I pressure xmtr 120 3MSPBP01 Spray pond pump *a* Spray pond pump 121 3MHSBJ01 house e xhaust fan *a* Ma i.n Control 122 3JRMBB01 Board Section BOl Electrical Systems 12 3 3JSABCOI B Train ES FAS Relay Cabinets 124 3JSIAUV0672 A Train CS Injection MOV WCAP-1 7681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Screen #I Screen #2 Building (SC-I (Regular Licu si ng laspections?)

Basis?) AUX Y es Yes AUX Yes Yes AUX Yes Yes AUX Yes Yes AUX Yes Yes AUX Yes Yes CTMT Yes Yes SP Yes Yes SP Yes Yes CTRL Yes Yes CTRL Yes Yes AUX Yes Y es Screen Environment 113 Major new Temp., °F (Safety Equipmcat S)'Jttm or (I for "uside" Fuaction Class Type replacement or S upport) eqllipment?

0 for " Outside") ICDHR M0V(8) Sl Yes 104 (I) CF MOV (8) Sl No 104 (I) DHR MOV (8) Sl No 104 (I) DHR MOV (8) Sl Yes 104 (I) ICDHR MOV (8) Sf Yes 104 (I) ICDHR MOV (8) Sf No 104 (I) lnst. Rack ICDH.R ( 18) SI No 120 (T) PCDHR Yen. Pump SP No 122 (0) UHS (6) PCDHR UHS AHU (6) SP No 122 (0) PCIC Control DHR Panel (20) RM No 80 (I} RC Dist. Panel SA No 80 (I) (14) CF MOV (8) Sl No 104 (I) lPEE E vulnerability enbaacement

? No No No No No No No No No No No No Page G-12 Walkdown Deferred to Outage? .No No No No No No Yes No No No No Yes Revision 0 April2014 Encl os ure Appendices A and ii s page is decont rolled PageG-13 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL I Screea #4 Sample Coosidentioas Screen Screen Eoviroament SWEL Walkdown #I Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp.,°F lPEEE Walkdowa Item Equipment Destriplloo Building (SC-1 (Regular (Safety Equipment System or (I for "l a si de" vulnerability Deferred to Number Lieeasiag IDSpections

?) Fuatlioo a ass Type replacement or eobantement Outage? Basis?) Support) eqaipmeal?

Ofor ? "Outside") 1 25 I 3 JZJBEOI Remote Shutdown CTRL Yes Yes RCPC Contro l ZJ No 80 (I) No No Panel I CDHR P ane l (20) The total number ofSWEL 1 item s is 124 instead of 125 because item 13 (3MCHEEOI) was remo ved (see d isc ussion in Section 3.4). The it e m numbers in the first column of this table wer e not a dju sted to mak e it eas ier to co mpare th e items to those in Table G-2 of Reference

48. WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 PVNGS-3 Revision 0 April2014 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I PVNGS-3 Table G-3: PVNGS-3 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base.List 2) (Refer to Table G-3 ofReference 48 , "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3") PageG-14 Revision 0 April2014