ML20195D023

Protests Util 860516 Request for Amend to License SNM-912 to Authorize Possession & Use of 40 G U-235 Per 860418,19 & 21 Telcons.Nrc Should Remove SNM from Site for Storage in Legally Approved Facility

ML20195D023
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak, 07002932
Issue date:	05/23/1986
From:	Ellis J Citizens Association for Sound Energy
To:	Crow W, Jennifer Davis, Noonan V NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-#286-334 OL, NUDOCS 8606020069
Download: ML20195D023 (4)

Text

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C. A S E == 214/9h6-9hh'6 (CITIZENS ASSN. FOR SOUND ENERGY)

May 23, 1986 Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5 Division of PWR Licensing-A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. W. T. Crow, Chief Uranium Licensing Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subj ect : Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) -- Docket No. 50-445 5/16/86 Request of Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) to Amend Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1912 To memoralize the several conversations I had with individuals associated with your three offices on May 21, 1986 (and, in the instance of Mr.

Noonan's office, on May 18 and 19 as well), CASE strongly protests the illegal and unauthorized shipment, receipt, and storage at Comanche Peak.of the material covered by subject Request to Amend, described as:

". . . a maximum of 40 grams total of U-235 in uranium enriched to a maximum of 93.57. In the U-235 1sotope, in the form of five (5)

GAMMA-METRIC excore neutron detector assemblies. The physical and chemical form of the units is solid uranium oxide sealed inside the detector assemblies."

According to the Attachment to the Request to Amend:

". . . The excore neutron detectors will be used for post-accident neutron flux monitoring. Two (2) of these excore neutron j detectors will be installed in the Unit I spare instrument wells adjacent to the reactor vessel when required for operational testing prior to fuel load. These two (2) excore neutron detectors I

will not be released for installation until suitable physical security arrangements have been approved. The remaining excore neutron detectors will remain in storage as spares for Unit 1.

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These remaining detectors will not be released for Unit 2 construction until the receipt of a suitable Unit 2 license."

- It is CASE's understanding that this material alone is not of sufficient quantity (though it is of sufficient quality) to make a nuclear bomb.

Further, we understand that it is sealed inside detector assemblies and that (as was stated by one of your offices) it would take a saw or a torch to penetrate the assemblies. Although we do not view this as beyond the realm of possibility for terrorists and do not believe it is a matter to be treated lightly, our concerns go beyond the questions of possible terrorism or proliferation.-

CASE is also concerned about the portent of this latest episode insofar as it relates specifically to Comanche Peak and the public which is now, and will be, affected by the plant. As all of you are well aware, the Applicants themselves recently stated that they no longer believe their previously predicted inservice date of mid-1987 is achievable -- due

! primarily to the unexpected (apparently to everyone but CASE) severity and large number of problems in design and construction which their current (and only partial) reinspection efforts have already uncovered -- and that they themselves do not know when the plant may actually go on line. This means (according to the Applicants' own statement of intended use) that there is obviously no legitimate or necessary reason for having this material onsite at any time in the immediate future.

It also means that Comanche Peak is not a secure site. To the contrary, there are currently at least a few thousand (CASE is not certain of the 1 exact number) people reworking, reinspecting, and redesigning the plant, especially Unit I where Applicants propose to install or store this material. It is CASE's understanding that many (probably most) of these

individuals have not had security background checks or security clearances 1 issued commensurate with what should be called for considering the type of material involved. At this point in time, it is anybody's guess how many other individuals may end up onsite before Comanche Peak finally (if ever) gets an operating license. In addition, the current and future security .

measures which are set forth in the Applicants' 5/9/86 initial letter to Mr.

Crow and their 5/16/86 Request to Amend are, to say the least, questionable at best considering the large number of people now working (and who will be working in the future) onsite.

Additional questions are raised by this entire latest episode in the 4

continuing saga of Comanche Peak: somebody (apparently) would have had to order the material; somebody (apparently) would have had to ship it; l

somebody (apparently) would have had to receive it -- all without authority to do so. And in the meantime, the NRC didn't even know anything was being i shipped, received, or stored until the Applicants told them about it.

i How could this have possibly happened? Does the NRC really not see anything wrong with all of this? Why should the pyblic have any confidence that the utility will operate Comanche Peak -- when the stakes are much higher and there are large quantitles of material onsite which can be extremely dangerous if not handled correctly -- with any more diligence, care, or competence than they have exibited by this and other recent events at

, Comanche Peak? And (perhaps even more importantly) why should the public, in light of these events and the NRC's response to them, have any confidence ,

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a that the NRC can adequatelf regulate Comanche Peak or the nuclear industry

+ -- or that the public health and safety can be assured?

! The response by the NRC to this most recent Comanche Peak snafu could and should have been so sluple, so immediate. Why wasn't it? It was an opportunity for the NRC to send a strong message to the Applicants that they ,

would no longer tolerate such flagrant disregard for NRC regulations.

s Instead, it appears that the NRC's response is going to be the same as it was when these same Applicants continued construction on Unit 1 of Comanche Peak for months without a construction permit in effect -- to ignore the breach of the NRC's own regulations and just go ahead end give the Applicants an after-the-fact license.

CASE again urges, as I did by telephone, that the NRC remove this material from the Comanche Peak site immediately and have it shipped and stored, at a ,

legally approved facility which has special security measures appropriate

.for.such material, until the plant is ready for fuel load and until the site is secure.

Respectfully submitted, CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy)

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rs.) Juanita Ellis President cc: Service List (Docket 50-445)

U. S. Congressman Morris K. Udt.11 U. S. Congressman Edward J. Markey U. S. Congressman John D. Dingell ,

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