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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20137X727 | |||
| issue date = 10/25/1985 | |||
| title = Insp Rept 50-482/85-35 on 850901-1004.Violations Noted: Failure to Follow Radiation Work Procedural Requirements, Failure to Implement Fire Watch & Flexible Conduit Not Installed in Accordance W/Design Drawings | |||
| author name = Bartlett B, Cummins J, Hunnicutt D | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000482 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-482-85-35, NUDOCS 8512100611 | |||
| package number = ML20137X701 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 19 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000482/1985035]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:r' | |||
, | |||
., | |||
APPENDIX A | |||
US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/85-35 License: NPF-42 | |||
Dockut: 50-482 | |||
Licensee: - Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E) | |||
Post Office Box 208 | |||
Wichita, Kansas 67201 | |||
Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) | |||
Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas | |||
Inspection Conducted: September 1 to October 4, 1985 | |||
~ Inspectors b $2Ymem e& /0/.;?f/85 | |||
d. E. Cummins, Senior Reactor Inspector, Date | |||
Operations | |||
, | |||
b h!_ ss d /o/.Ls/85 | |||
;. B. L. Bartlett, Resident Reactor Inspector, Date ' | |||
Operations | |||
Approved: ? ![ * | |||
/o/ds/F# | |||
D. M. Hunnicutt, Acting Chief, Project Date' | |||
Section B, Reactor Projects Branch - | |||
. | |||
Inspection Summary | |||
Inspection Conducted September 1 to October 4,1985 (Report 50-482/85-35) | |||
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status; | |||
' | |||
followup on previously_ identified items; operational safety verification; | |||
engineered safety features system walkdown; startup test data review; onsite | |||
followup of events; onsite followup of written repor_ts of nonroutine events; | |||
fire protection / housekeeping; monthly maintenance observation; monthly | |||
surveillance observation; allegation followup; plant safety parameter display | |||
system; security; and plant tours. The inspection involved 248 | |||
inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 38 inspector-hours | |||
onsite during offshifts. | |||
8512100611 851125 | |||
' | |||
DR ADOCK 05000482 | |||
PDR | |||
r | |||
* | |||
. | |||
_2_ | |||
Results: Within the 14 areas inspected, five violations were identified | |||
(failure to follow radiation work procedural requirements, par.11; violation | |||
of Technical Specification - fire zone, par. 8C; flexible conduit not installed | |||
in accordance with design drawings, par.15; failure to control combustible | |||
materials in accordance with administrative procedures, par. 9A; and review | |||
of LER 85-063-00, Technical Specifications violation, par. 8B). One open | |||
item is identified (flooding in chemistry het lab, par. 12A). | |||
, | |||
i | |||
e | |||
* | |||
. _ | |||
' | |||
. | |||
-3- | |||
DETAILS | |||
1. Persons Contacted | |||
Principal Licensee Personnel | |||
G. L. Koester, Vice President-Nuclear | |||
C. C. Mason, Director-Nuclear Operations | |||
*F. T.-Rhodes, Plant Superintendent | |||
*M. G. Williams, Supt. of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative | |||
Services | |||
0. L. Maynard, Licensing Supervisor | |||
*H. K. Chernoff, Licensing | |||
*K. Peterson, Licensing | |||
*G. J. Pendergrass, Licensing Engineer | |||
*J. A. Zell, Operations Superintendent | |||
*A. S. Mah, Supt. of Training | |||
*G. D. Boyer, Supt. of Technical Support' | |||
*C. E. Parry, Supt. of Quality Systems Engineering | |||
*M. Nichols% Supt. of Plant Support | |||
W. B. Norton, Reactor Engineering Supervisor | |||
J. J. Johnson, Chief of Security | |||
.R. Hoyt, Emergency Plan Supervisor | |||
*C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist | |||
*J. L. Blackwell, Fire Protection Coordinator , | |||
*D. L. Reed, Lead Engineer, ISEG | |||
*J. Ives, Site Health Physicist | |||
*C. Rice, Health Physics Operations Supervisor | |||
*D. Walsh, Maintenance Service Supervisor | |||
The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff | |||
during the inspection period to discuss identified issues. | |||
* Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on | |||
October 4, 1985. | |||
2. Plant Status | |||
On September 3, 1985, Wolf Creek Generating Station, having met the | |||
necessary regulatory and state requirements, went into commercial | |||
operation. | |||
3. Followup on Previously Identified Items | |||
(Closed)OpenItem(50-482/8508-02): ASME Sections III and XI Training | |||
for Superintendent of Maintenance. | |||
e | |||
O | |||
-4- | |||
This item tracked the licensee's commitment made in Letters KMLNRC | |||
82-165'and KMLNRC 85-017 to provide additional training for the | |||
~ | |||
< Superintendent of Maintenance in the areas of ASME Code Sections III and | |||
XI. 'The NRC verified by review of training records and a course | |||
description that ;.he Superintendent of Maintenance attended training | |||
sessions in the ASME Code Sections III and XI. This item is closed. | |||
(Closed)OpenItem(50-482/8508-01): Baseline Inspection of Selected | |||
Electrical Cables'in Containment. | |||
This open item tracked the licensee's implementation of a surveillance | |||
program of seleWd safety-related cables installed inside containment | |||
to detect cable inf/Jlation degradation. Work Request 03933-85 documents | |||
the baseline inspection and was completed on March 26, 1985. The NRC | |||
inspector verified that the surveillance inspection of these cables was | |||
included in the Managed Maintenance Program for inspection every five- | |||
. 5 years. This item is closed. | |||
' - (Closed)'Open Item (50-482/8460-02): Prccedural Control of a Hazardous | |||
' | |||
.. Cleaning Sol vent. | |||
Maintenance Procedure MPM-M7:1Q-02 referenced for use a hazardous | |||
cleaning solvent, but did not reference existing administrative | |||
procedures that controlled its use. The NRC inspector verified by. | |||
review of Procedure MPM-M711Q-02 that the subject cleaning solvent had | |||
, | |||
been deleted from the procedure. The licensee's maintenance training | |||
program includes training on general type procedures such as the use and | |||
- control of cleaning solvents. Therefore, these procedures are not | |||
. always referenced in work performance type procedures. This item is | |||
closed. | |||
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-482/8460-01): Inadequate Documentation in | |||
Maintenance Procedures. | |||
The licensee reviewed and rewrote (as necessary) all safety-related and | |||
special scoped maintenance procedures to insure they contained adequate | |||
documentation of work activities. The NRC inspector reviewed a random | |||
sample of the affected maintenance procedures and verified that they | |||
contained verification signoffs and data recording requirements to | |||
adequately document work activities delineated in the procedures. The | |||
NRC inspector reviewed the following maintenance procedures: | |||
. | |||
MPE E017Q-04, Revision 4, Circuit Breaker Test for AKR-50 and | |||
AKR-30 Electrically Operated Breakers | |||
. MPE E050-03, Rev h ion 2, Inspection of Lead-Calcium Batterias | |||
During Outage | |||
. MPE M766Q-01, Revision 2, Bi-Weekly Rod Drive Motor Generator Set, | |||
A/C Power Supply System Generator | |||
Inspection | |||
! | |||
y. , | |||
. | |||
?;; + o. ~ | |||
8_. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
, , , | |||
Q,' s , | |||
[N - | |||
# t. | |||
+ | |||
, -5- | |||
5 | |||
' ~ ~ | |||
< | |||
.. MPE M766Q-03, Revision 3, Reactor Trip Switchgear Breaker | |||
~ | |||
. MPM M021Q-02, . Revision 2, Auxiliary Feedwater . Pump Turbine | |||
-Inspection | |||
, | |||
LThis item is closed.- | |||
4. , Operational Safety Verification | |||
:The NRC ' inspectors verified that the-facility is being operated safely | |||
' | |||
_and:in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation'of | |||
- | |||
. | |||
-licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions | |||
E* with 1.icenseeEpersonnel,iindependent verification of safety system | |||
c- ' status and . limiting conditions for. operatic 7s, 'and reviewing _ facility | |||
- , | |||
..c | |||
- records.. The NRC inspectors, by observation and direct -interview, | |||
-verified the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance | |||
with-the security plan. | |||
The NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of the safety injection | |||
' - | |||
-system and the coolant charging system by observing valve positions, | |||
electrical breaker positions, and control. room indication. The NRC. | |||
. . inspectors. also visually inspected components for leakage, physical | |||
J. damage, and any other impairmerit that could prevent them from performing- | |||
" their designed function. | |||
No violations or deviations wens identified. | |||
. | |||
* ' | |||
5. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Walkdown | |||
: | |||
' ' | |||
c The NRC inspectors verified the operability of ESF systems by Walking - ' | |||
;down selected accessible portions of the systems. The NRC inspectors? | |||
- | |||
" ~ | |||
. verified valves and electrical circuit breakers were in the required' | |||
. | |||
- | |||
* | |||
+ | |||
- | |||
position, powerfwas available,.and valves were locked where required. , | |||
* | |||
, | |||
=The NRC inspectors also inspected system ' components for damage or other , | |||
'' | |||
conditions that might degrade system performance. The ESF systems ^ | |||
' ' - | |||
l listed-below were walked down during this~ inspection report period: | |||
- | |||
, | |||
+ . | |||
1 !- N. , . Auxiliary Feedwater System , | |||
y , | |||
. : Class -1E Electrical Switchgear | |||
ttv | |||
s | |||
V y -Red Train Yellow Train | |||
I' | |||
i NB01 4160.V AC NG02 480'V AC | |||
r | |||
' | |||
, | |||
. NG01 480 V AC' NG04 480 V AC | |||
L NG03 480;V AC. NB02-4160 V AC | |||
fx. .MCC NG01A MCC NG02A | |||
' | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
p | |||
- | |||
. | |||
,,, | |||
~ | |||
3 | |||
[. . . - - an----.a. _--- - - . - - - | |||
.,. | |||
' ' | |||
. | |||
. | |||
i. | |||
, | |||
l | |||
-6- - ' | |||
. | |||
L. | |||
i | |||
~6. Startup Test Data Review | |||
,, The NRC inspectors reviewed completed power ascension test' procedures. | |||
' | |||
, | |||
The following items were considered in this review: , | |||
c .. Verification that all test changes,' including deletions,1were | |||
xc approved, reviewed, and incorporated properly. | |||
. Verification that all test deficiencies were resolved in accordance | |||
' | |||
with the appropriate procedures. | |||
4 | |||
. | |||
Verification that deficiencies which. constitute a reportable | |||
i occurrence as defined by Technical Specifications (TS) have been | |||
properly recorded. | |||
. Verification that the as-run copy of the completed test data | |||
package was properly completed. | |||
. Verification that the test summary and evaluation were completed in - | |||
accordance with procedure. | |||
. Verification that the test results were properly approved. | |||
The following test data packages were reviewed by the NRC inspectors: | |||
. SU7-S016, Revision 3, " Test Sequence at 100% Power," dated 7/13/85 | |||
. SU7-0011, Revision 1, " Plant Trip From 100% Power," dated 8/27/85 | |||
. SU7-SE02.10, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Nuclear | |||
Instrumentation," dated 8/8/85 | |||
. 507-0010.2, Revision 1, "Large Load Reduction-100% Power," | |||
dated 8/8/85 | |||
. SU7-SE03.3, Revision ~1, " Axial Flux Difference Instrumentation | |||
-Calibration," dated 8/12/85 | |||
. SPE BB06.1, Revision 0, "RTD/TC Cross Calibration," dated 5/19/85 | |||
. SU7-SE02.9, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Nuclear | |||
Instrumentation," dated 7/23/85 | |||
. SU7-SF06.6, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Process | |||
Temp 6rature Instrumentation," dated 8/8/85 | |||
. | |||
. SU7-SF07.5, Revision 1, "Startup Adjustments of Reactor Control | |||
, | |||
System," dated 8/2/85 | |||
. | |||
T & | |||
. . | |||
,2' | |||
. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
-7- | |||
. SU7-SC03.7, Revision 1, " Thermal Power and Statepoint Data | |||
' | |||
Collection at 98% Power," dated 8/1/85 | |||
. SU7-SC03.8, Revision 1, " Thermal Power and Statepoint Data | |||
Collection at 100% Power," dated 8/2/85 | |||
, . | |||
. SU7-S008, Revision 3, "Startup Test Program Reference Document," | |||
' | |||
dated 1/27/85 , | |||
. 5U7-0907.2, Revision 2, " Plant Performance Test," dated 6/12/85 ' | |||
. SU7-009.3, Revision 1, " Load Swing Tests 100% Power," dated 7/2/85 | |||
' | |||
~ No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
7. Onsite Followup of Events | |||
The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that | |||
occurred during this report period. The NRC inspectors (when available) | |||
observed control room personnel response, observed instrumentation | |||
indicators of reactor plant parameters, reviewed logs and computer | |||
printouts, and discussed the event with cognizant personnel. The NRC | |||
inspector verified the licensee had responded to the event in accordance | |||
with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required | |||
in a timely fashion. | |||
Engineered safety feature actuations that occurred during the report | |||
period are listed in the table below. The NRC inspector will review the | |||
license event report (LER) for each of these events and will report any | |||
findings in NRC inspection reports. | |||
Date Event * Plant Status Cause | |||
9/2/85 CRVIS 3 Failed component in | |||
chlorine monitor | |||
9/2/85 RxTrip 2 LO-L0 S/G level | |||
9/5/85 RxTrip 1 Loss of EHC pressure | |||
9/14/85 CRVIS 1 Broken detector tape | |||
9/23/85 RxTrip 1 LO-L0 S/G level | |||
~* Event | |||
CRVIS - control room ventilation isolation signal | |||
RxTrip - reactor trip | |||
S/G - steam generator | |||
EHC - Electro hydraulic control | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
" | |||
a | |||
* | |||
. | |||
-8- - | |||
8. Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events | |||
a. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) | |||
During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors performed | |||
followup on selected Wolf Creek LERs. The LERs were reviewed to | |||
ensure: | |||
. | |||
The corrective action stated in the report has been properly | |||
completed. | |||
. Responses to the events were adequate. | |||
. Respanses to the events met license conditions, commitments, | |||
or other applicable regulatory requirements. | |||
. | |||
The information contained in the report satisfied applicable | |||
reporting requirements. | |||
- | |||
. That any generic issues were identified. | |||
. The report conformed to the guidelines contained in NUREG-1022 | |||
and Supplements 1 and 2. | |||
The NRC inspectors reviewed the following LERs: | |||
50-482/85-006-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-FBVIS and CRVIS" | |||
50-482/85-007-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-CRVIS" | |||
50-482/85-008-00 "ESF Actuation-CPIS and CRVIS" | |||
50-482/85-009-00 "ESF Actuation-CPIS, FBVIS, and CRVIS" | |||
50-482/85-010-01 " Sprinkler Out of Service Without Fire Watch" | |||
50-482/85-011-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS" | |||
50-482/85-012-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-Safety Injection (SI)" | |||
50-482/85-013-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS" | |||
50-482/85-014-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS" | |||
50-482/85-019-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-AFAS and SGBSIS" | |||
50-482/85-020-00 "ESF Actuation-FWIS and Turbine Trip" | |||
50-482/85-021-00 "ESF Actuation-SI and MSLIS" | |||
! | |||
- | |||
7 | |||
! | |||
* | |||
, | |||
9 , | |||
-9- | |||
50.482/85-022-00"ESFAckuation-SIandMSLIS" | |||
' | |||
_ | |||
-50-482/85-023-00"ESFActu$ tion-ReactorTripandFWIS" | |||
ESF engineered safety. featuresj | |||
' | |||
FBVIS-' fuel;buiIdingventilationisolationsignal | |||
~ | |||
, | |||
~ | |||
, CRVIS L control room ventilation isolation signa.1 | |||
' | |||
.CPIS '- containment purge isolation signal. ' | |||
AFAS - auxiliary feedwater actuation signal | |||
. s | |||
SGBSIB - steam generator blowdown system isolation signal | |||
FWIS - main feedwater. isolation signal | |||
MSLIS - main steamline isolation signal , | |||
Selected NRC inspector' comments are noted below: | |||
.. In LER No'. 50-482/85-006-00 and 50-482/85-007-00, the | |||
licensee comitted to include these LERs in the I&C personnel | |||
required reading. On October 2, 1985, the NRC inspector | |||
verified through inspections of training files that the LERs | |||
had been included as a part of required reading and.that ISC | |||
personnel had signed off as having read them; however, even | |||
though the inspection was 5 months after the issuance of | |||
the LER, there were~still some personnel who had not signed | |||
. | |||
E - | |||
off.. Plant' management should consider setting a time limit | |||
:for finishing required reading. | |||
' | |||
. In comparing NUREG-1022 and its supplements.to the LERs listed | |||
above, the NRC inspector observed that the early LERs'were not- | |||
written to the: highest quality which could be expected but that as | |||
, the LER preparers and reviewers gained in experience the quality | |||
has improved. - ' | |||
b. ~ Review'of LER'85-063-00, Technical "pecifications (TS) Violation - | |||
' | |||
Centrifugal Charging Pump 'A' | |||
L LER 85-063-00. documented that centrifugal charging pump 'A' (CCP-A) | |||
L :had been-out-of-service in excess of the 72 hours allowed by TS 3.1.2.4 | |||
. | |||
and 3.5.2 Action Statements. The following chronological sequence of | |||
L | |||
- | |||
events occurred, resulting in this violation of Tcchnical | |||
Specifications. | |||
i | |||
f | |||
, + | |||
. | |||
' | |||
. | |||
-10- | |||
On August 27, 1985, at approximately 2112 CDT, CCP-A was taken out of | |||
service for maintenance. At that time, CCP-A was declared inoperable | |||
and TS 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 Action Statements were entered which required | |||
CCP-A to be returned to operable status within 72 hours. | |||
On August 30,1985, at 2030 CDT, upon completion of repairs and | |||
satisfactory performance of Surveillance Test STS BG-100A, " Centrifugal | |||
Charging-System ' A' Train Inservice Pump Test" CCP was declared operable. | |||
- | |||
There was some confusion in declaring CCP-A operable because, at shif t | |||
-turnover, the oncoming shift had been told it was operable. However, at | |||
approximately 2000 CDT it was determined that the equipment out-of-service | |||
log still showed that the pump was inoperable, that there was no supervi- | |||
sory operator log entry stating CCP-A was operable, and the Surveillance | |||
Procedure STS BG-100A, " Centrifugal Charging System 'A' Train Inservice | |||
Pump Test," which verified pump operability after repairs, could not be | |||
located. At approximately 2030 CDT, the applicable copy of STS BG-100A | |||
was located. It had been completed except for system restoration'. | |||
STS BG-100A was completed and CCP-A declared operable at 2030 CDT. | |||
However, in performing the restoration, a caution in the procedure | |||
was misinterpreted and CCP-A Discharge Valve BG-8485A was left in | |||
the shut position. This makes CCP-A inoperable. | |||
On August 31,1985, at 2200 CDT, the auxiliary building watch | |||
determined that the valve was in the wrong position and it was | |||
innediately returned to the correct open position, thus returning | |||
CCP-A to operable status. | |||
This series of. events had allowed CCP-A to be inoperable for | |||
97-hours in lieu of the 72 hours allowed by the above-mentioned TS. | |||
, | |||
This failure to perform the actions specified by Technical | |||
Specifications is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-01) | |||
The licensee immediately initiated an evaluation of the event. | |||
The results of this evaluation were,that procedures STS BG-100A | |||
and STS BG-100B (surveillance of CCP-B) were expeditiously revised | |||
(September 10,1985) to clarify the required valve position for the | |||
current plant operating mode. Shift supervisors have been | |||
reinstructed in the administrative procedural requirement for | |||
post-test review of completed surveillances by the shift supervisor, | |||
and the licensee event report was n.ade required reading for all | |||
operations personnel. | |||
c. Review of Licensee Defect / Deficiency Report 85-110 | |||
' | |||
Defect / Deficiency Report 85-110 documented the following violation | |||
of Technical Specifications: | |||
During the time period from 0700 through 1459 on August 13, 1985, | |||
hourly air temperature readings.inside containment were not | |||
recorded by operating personnel. Technical Specifications. | |||
l | |||
L | |||
_ , . | |||
__ _ _ - _ _ __ - ___ - _ - _ - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - | |||
' | |||
. | |||
-11- - | |||
paragraph 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b) requires hourly air | |||
temperature readings or an inspection at least once per 8 hours ; | |||
whenever the Zone 201 fire detector is out of. service. { | |||
The licensee's evaluation of this report determined that since a | |||
health physics technicia_n, who was also a member of the fire | |||
brigade and a qualified fire watch, had entered the containment ' | |||
within the 8-hour time limit, the intent of TS 3.3.3.8 had been | |||
satisfied. | |||
Action Statement (b) to TS 3.3.3.8 states that when the fire | |||
detection instrument for Fire Detection Zone 201 is inoperable | |||
(which was the case), a fire watch patrol must be established and | |||
Zone 201 inspected at least once per 8 hours or the containment | |||
air temperature must be monitored at least once per hour at the | |||
locations listed in TS 4.6.1.5. | |||
Since TS 3.3.3.8 specifically states that a fire patrol be | |||
established, the NRC inspector determined that the health physics | |||
technician's presence in containment did not meet the intent of the | |||
TS even though he was qualified. He did not have prior knowledge | |||
that he was on a fire watch or that a specific fire zone was to be | |||
inspected because the fire detection instrumentation was | |||
inoperable. Based on this interpretation, this failure to perform | |||
the actions delineated in TS 3.3.3.8.b within the specified time is | |||
an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-03) | |||
i | |||
{ 9. Fire Protection / Housekeeping | |||
, | |||
a. Conditions Observed During Plant Tours | |||
During plant tours, the NRC inspectors observed the conditions in | |||
the auxiliary building which were not in compliance with the fire | |||
protection and housekeeping practices delineated in Administrative | |||
Procedures ADM 13-103, Revision 4, " Control of Combustible | |||
Materials," and ADM 01-034, Revision 7, " Housekeeping and | |||
Cleanliness Control." Specific NRC inspector findings are | |||
discussed below: | |||
. Nineteen cardboard boxes were stored and unattended in the | |||
north end of the auxiliary building on the 2026' level. The | |||
NRC inspector determined that the volume of these combustible | |||
boxes exceeded the allowable limit of (at or below) 10 cubic | |||
feet and 100 pounds, without having a combustible materials | |||
permit as required by ADM 13-103. , | |||
. ADM 01-034 requires that oily wiping rags be stored in | |||
noncombustible containers when not in use; that rags, paper, | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
- | |||
. | |||
~ | |||
-12- | |||
and other debris be placed in suitable waste containers; that | |||
combustible waste material be disposed of at least once per | |||
working shift in noncombustible covered waste receptacles; and | |||
that oily rags and waste be disposed of in portable metal | |||
waste cans with a self-closing cover. However, the conditions | |||
identified below existad in excess of I day in violation of | |||
one or more of the above requirements: | |||
. A metal trash container (flapper lid type) located in | |||
Room 1509 on the 2047' level and adjacent to main steam | |||
isolation valve AB HV-20 was overflowing with combustible | |||
trash to the extent that the flapper lid was being held | |||
open by the trash and a paper towel was on the floor | |||
beside the trash container. | |||
. On the 1974' level adjacent to Column AJ-A6 in | |||
c north-south corridor on east side of building a trash | |||
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately half | |||
full of mostly combustible material. , | |||
s | |||
. | |||
In Room 1412 on the 2026' level and adjacent to main | |||
feedwater isolation valve AE FV-041, approximately 20 oil | |||
soaked rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot in size) were | |||
laying on the floor. | |||
. | |||
On the 2026' level adjacent to Column AJ-A13, a trash | |||
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately | |||
two-thirds full of mostly combustible material. | |||
. On the 2000' level adjacent to Column A13 at the south | |||
, | |||
end of the north-south corridor, an unattended pile of | |||
approximately 10 rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot) | |||
was on the floor beside an overturned maintenance cart. | |||
. On the 2047' level adjacent to Column AJ-A9, a trasil I | |||
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately | |||
three-fourths full of mostly combustible material. . | |||
1 | |||
The NRC inspectors discussed general housekeeping and fire | |||
, | |||
protection practices with appropriate licensee personnel. The | |||
above examples of failure to comply with fire protection and | |||
housekeeping requirements as delineated in administrative | |||
procedures is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-05) | |||
b. Fire Drill | |||
On September 13, 1985, the NRC inspector observed a fire drill and | |||
attended the following critique. The simulated fire was in an | |||
electrical load center located in the turbine building. Fire | |||
_ _ | |||
- | |||
s .. | |||
- | |||
-12- | |||
and other debris be placed in suitable waste containers; that | |||
combustible waste material be disposed of at least once per | |||
' working shift in noncombustible covered waste receptacles; and | |||
-that oily rags and waste be disposed of'in portable metal | |||
waste cans with a self-closing cover. Ilowever, the conditions | |||
identified below existed in excess of 1 day in violation of | |||
tf one or more of the above requirements: | |||
._ | |||
A metal trash container (flapper lid type) located in | |||
Room 1509 on the 2047' level and adjacent to main steam | |||
isolation valve AB HV-20 was overflowing with combustible | |||
trash to the extent that the flapper lid was being held | |||
- | |||
open by the trash and a paper towel was on the floor | |||
beside the trash container. | |||
. | |||
On the 1974' level adjacent to Column AJ-A6 in | |||
north-south corridor on east side of building a trash | |||
.,'' | |||
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately-half | |||
' | |||
full of mostly combustible material. , | |||
- | |||
. | |||
. | |||
In Room 1412 on the 2026' level and adjacent to main | |||
feedwater isolation valve AE FV-041, approximately 20 011 | |||
." soaked rags (approximately'1 foot by 1 foot in size):were | |||
. laying on the floor. | |||
p. | |||
. | |||
On the 2026' level adjacent to Column AJ-A13,.a trash | |||
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximat'ely | |||
two-thirds full of mostly combustible material. | |||
, | |||
, | |||
' | |||
' | |||
. | |||
On the 2000' level adjacent to Column A13 at.the. south. | |||
-, | |||
end of the north-south corridor, an unattended pile of | |||
' | |||
7 approximately 10 rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot) | |||
, | |||
was on the floor beside an overturned maintenance cart. | |||
. | |||
On the 2047' level adjacent to Column AJ-A9, a trash | |||
barrel (50 gallon open' top drum) was approximately | |||
. '. | |||
three-fourths full of mostly combustible material. . | |||
' | |||
The NRC inspectors discussed general-housekeeping and fire | |||
protection practices with appropriate licensee personnel. The | |||
above examples of failure to comply with fire protection and | |||
housekeeping requirements as delineated in administrative | |||
procedures is an: apparent violation. (50-482/8535-05) | |||
b. Fire Drill | |||
On September 13,-1985, the NRC inspector observed a fire drill and i | |||
' | |||
attended the following critique. The simulated fire was in an | |||
electrical load center located in the turbine building. Fire | |||
r | |||
. | |||
- | |||
. > | |||
-.. | |||
, | |||
- | |||
., | |||
E | |||
' | |||
-13- | |||
' | |||
, | |||
brigade members' responded promptly to the fire equipment lockers, | |||
donned appropriate fire protective clothing, checked personal | |||
equipment, obtained backup equipment as necessary, and proceeded to | |||
the simulated fire. Applicable procedures were used and the fire | |||
brigade members and other onshift personnel responded in a | |||
professional. manner.. | |||
10. Monthly' Maintenance Observation | |||
The NRC inspectors observed maintenance activities performed on | |||
safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities | |||
were. conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical | |||
Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The | |||
following elements were considered by the NRC inspectors during the | |||
observation and/or review of the maintenance activities: | |||
. Limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were met and, where | |||
applicable, redundant components were operable. | |||
. Activities complied with adequate administrative controls. | |||
. Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were | |||
used. | |||
. Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and | |||
technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations) | |||
were made available when appropriate. | |||
. | |||
. Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certified. | |||
. Required radiological contrcls were irylemented. | |||
. Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate. | |||
. Required alignments and surveillances to verify post maintenance | |||
operability were performad. | |||
. Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when | |||
appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work | |||
activities. | |||
< | |||
Salected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work | |||
vequest(WR)listedbelowwereobservedand/orrelateddocumentation | |||
reviewed by the NRC inspectors: | |||
. WR No. 91703-85, Valve AE-FC 540, 'D' Steam Generator Main Feed | |||
. Regulator Valve, failed shut. Failed power supply | |||
card in control cabinet was replaced. | |||
~ | |||
. | |||
b 4 | |||
0 | |||
* | |||
. | |||
-14- - | |||
. | |||
WR No. 07127-85: Rework Limitorque Operator and Perform Scheduled | |||
Maintenance on Valve AL-HV 009, Auxiliary | |||
Feedwater to Steam Generator 'B' Control Valve. | |||
' | |||
. | |||
WR No. 0752-85: Rework Limitorque Operator and Perform Scheduled | |||
Maintenance on Valve AL-HV 035, Condensate Storage | |||
Tank to Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump ' A'. | |||
. | |||
WR No. 91635-85: Valve AL-V002 did not return to fully closed | |||
position during surveillance testing-condition | |||
investigated and repaired. , | |||
. WR No. 09724-85: | |||
. | |||
Valve AL-V009, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater | |||
-Pump 'A' Suction Check Valve from Essential | |||
Service Water, did not close when manually | |||
. opened. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
- | |||
11. Monthly Surveillance Observation | |||
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of | |||
surveillance testing and/or they reviewed completed surseillance test | |||
procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in | |||
accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC | |||
inspectors considered the following items while inspecting surveillance | |||
activities: | |||
. Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance | |||
with an approved procedure. | |||
. The surveillance procedure conforms to TS requirements. | |||
. Required test instrumentation was calibrated. | |||
. Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were | |||
satisfied. | |||
. | |||
Test ata va., accurate and complete. The NRC inspectors performed | |||
independent calculations of selected test data to verify their | |||
accuracy. | |||
. The performance of the surveillance procedure confonned to | |||
applicable administrative procedures. | |||
. The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and | |||
the test results met the required limits. | |||
- | |||
, | |||
f | |||
* ' | |||
. . | |||
r , | |||
, | |||
-15- | |||
, | |||
Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed | |||
below: | |||
. STS RE-008, Revision 1, Target Flux Difference Determination | |||
. STS RE-004, Revision 2, Shutdown Margin Determination | |||
. STS RE-002, Revision 2, Determination of Estimated Critical | |||
Position | |||
. STS BB-004, Revision 2, RCS Water Inventory Balance | |||
. STS AL-101. Revision 3, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 'A'- | |||
Inservice Pump Test | |||
NRC inspector observations are discussed below: | |||
During a surveillance beh conducted on August 30, 1985, the NRC | |||
inspector observed a worker walk across a step-off pad into a posted | |||
potentially contaminated area, the coolant charging pump 'A' room, | |||
without donning the protective clothing required by Radiation Work | |||
Permit 85-0143, which had been implemented to specify the radiological | |||
requirements for working in the area. The worker realized his mistake | |||
and immediately frisked himself at a frisking station in the corridor | |||
outside the room. The worker subsequently notified health physics of | |||
what had occurred and a health physics technician swiped the affected | |||
area. Health physics personnel documented the incident on a Notice of | |||
' | |||
Radiological Work Practice Violation and discussed it with the worker. | |||
l The failure to follow radiological requirements for working in a posted | |||
potentially contaminated area is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-02) | |||
12. Allegation Followup | |||
a. Flooding in Chemistry Hot Lab | |||
In NRC Inspection Report 50-482/85-26, the NRC inspector reported | |||
the details of an allegation related to rainwater entering the | |||
chemistry hot lab. The NRC inspector reported that the licensee | |||
had sealed the electrical conduit that the water was getting into | |||
the lab through. The licensee had also performed a satisfactory | |||
leak test of the hot lab and determined that the leak had been | |||
fixed. However, during a heavy rainstorm on August 22, 1985, , | |||
rainwater again flowed into the chemistry hot lab. During the | |||
rainstorm on August 22, 1985, rainwater flowed into the chemistry | |||
het lab via two paths. One path was through electrical conduit on | |||
the east wall of the lab in the same area that had previously | |||
leaked; the other path was under a door between the chemistry hot | |||
. | |||
lab and a corridor on the west wall of the hot lab. | |||
* | |||
b | |||
^ - . | |||
* | |||
o | |||
-16- | |||
Water entered the hot lab through the corduit that had previously | |||
leaked and also from a conduit which vas providing a flow path for | |||
water from the outside to enter a stairwall on the west side of the | |||
chemistry water lab and then flow along the floor and under the | |||
door of the hot lab. The licensee has determined that one of the | |||
conduit seals previously installed failed. The licensee has | |||
initiated paperwork to seal the flow paths for rainwater entering | |||
the chemistry hot lab. This is an open item pending completion of | |||
the work necessary to ensure that rainwater does not enter the | |||
chemistry hot lab. (50-482/8535-06) | |||
b. Allegation Concerning Disposal of Weld Rod Material | |||
On September-26, 1985, at approximately 8:00 a.m., an unidentified | |||
individual ~ called the NRC resident inspector's trailer and made the | |||
following allegation: | |||
"They cut up a bunch of weld rods and threw them in a trash | |||
dumpster to try to cover something up. The dumpster is' located in ' ^- | |||
the northwest corner of the facility, adjacent to the small . | |||
electrical maintenance building. The last load was put in the | |||
dumpster on September 25, 1985, at about 4:30 p.m." The alleger, | |||
who did not want to identify himself, stated he heard instructions | |||
to remove all tags and make sure nobody knew about it. The alleger | |||
contended the weld rod material was being disposed of to cover | |||
something up, but he did not know what was being covered up. The | |||
alleger also stated that it was a KG&E employee directing General | |||
Electric personnel to durnp the rods in the dumpster. | |||
The NRC resident inspectors located the trash dumpster and verified | |||
there was weld rod material in it. There appeared to be | |||
approximately 2 cubic feet of weld rod material in the dumpster. | |||
All the coated rod had been bent and the bare wire weld material | |||
had been cut into shorter than normal (36") lengths. The NRC | |||
inspectors took samples of the welding material from the dumpster | |||
and asked cognizant licensee personnel to provide them with | |||
information related to the disposition of the welding material in | |||
the dumpster. | |||
Licensee personnel investigated the disposed of-wcld material and | |||
determined that the material was excess from a General Electric | |||
tool r om that was being dismantled in the turbine building. As a | |||
part of the disposal process, the weld rod electrodes had ueen bent, | |||
the tags had been removed from the bare wire welding material, and | |||
it had been cut into short lengths. The welding material was | |||
subsequently taken to the county land fill during routine trash | |||
removal from the site. | |||
The NRC inspectors could not relate one above incident to any type | |||
of cover up or wrongdoing and, therefore, this allegation is closed. | |||
m | |||
. | |||
,. . | |||
s | |||
-17- | |||
13. Plant Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) | |||
The following excerpts from NUREG-0737 and Supplement 5 to the Wolf | |||
Creek Safety Evaluation Report, respectively, provide background | |||
information on the SPDS and SAS systems. | |||
"In accordance with Task Action Plan 1.D.2, Plant Safety Parameter | |||
Display Console (NUREG-0660), each applicant and licensee shall install | |||
a SPDS that will display to operating personnel a minimum set of | |||
parameters which define the safety status of the plant. This can be | |||
attained through continuoJs indications of direct and derived variables | |||
as necessary to assess plant safety status." | |||
"The SNUPPS SPDS conceptual design and prototype was the Safety | |||
Assessment System (SAS). The SAS was based on a design developed | |||
jointly by a group of Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) | |||
utilities of which the SNUPPS utilities were members. SAS provides a | |||
centralized, flexible, computer-based data and display system to assist | |||
control room personnel in evaluating the safety status of the plant. | |||
The highest level graphical display format contains a minimum set of key | |||
plant variables representative of the plant's safety status, and these | |||
constitute the SPDS. In addition, there are critical safety function | |||
display formats, accident identification display formats, and process | |||
variable trend display formats within the library of the display | |||
system." | |||
During an audit review, the licensee described the method used to derive m | |||
the overall program to validate the SPDS variable set. As part of the | |||
validation program, the licensee has committed to exercise the SPDS for | |||
a number of scenarios. On September 30 and October 1, 1985, the NRC | |||
inspector attended a briefing and training session given to the | |||
operators on the functions and capabilities of the SPDS and SAS and then | |||
observed selected portions of the licensee's exercise scenarios .hich | |||
utilized licensed operators from the Callaway Nuclear Plant on the Wolf | |||
Creek simulator. | |||
The test scenarios observed were " Loss of Main Feedwater" and " Severe | |||
Accident (LOCA with inadequate core cooling and fuel damage)." The NRC | |||
inspector verified that each scenario was randomly selected without | |||
advance operator knowledge of which scenario was next and that only the | |||
SPDS portioa of the SAS was utilized by the operators. | |||
, | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
14. Security | |||
The NRC inspectors verified the physical security plan wa3 being | |||
implemented by selected observation of the following items: | |||
. The security organization is properly manned and the security | |||
personnel are capable of performing their assigned functions. | |||
.. * | |||
-18- | |||
. Persons within the protected area (PA) display their identification | |||
badges, when in vital areas are properly authorized and, when | |||
required, are properly escorted. | |||
. Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or | |||
controlled within the PA. | |||
. Persons and packages are properly cleared and checked before entry | |||
into the PA is permitted. | |||
- | |||
. The effectiveness of the security program is maintained when | |||
security equipment failure or impairment requires compensatory | |||
measures to be employed. | |||
. Response to threats or alarms, or discovery of a condition that | |||
appears to require additional precautions is consistent with | |||
procedures and the physical security plan. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
15. Plant Tours | |||
At various times during the course of the inspection period the NRC | |||
inspecters conducted general tours of the reactor building, auxiliary | |||
building, radwaste building, fuel handling building, control building, | |||
turbine building, essential service water building, and the secured area | |||
surrounding the buildings. During the tours, the NRC inspector observed | |||
housekeeping practict.s, fire protectian barriers and equipment, | |||
maintenance on equipment, and discussed various subjects with licensee | |||
personnel. | |||
Selected NRC inspector findings are discussed in appropriate paragraphs | |||
of this inspection report. | |||
Selected NRC inspector findings are discussed below: | |||
During a tour of the auxiliary building on September 26, 1985, the NRC | |||
inspector observed the following: | |||
, . Flexible Conduit 1U1276, running between rigid conduit mounted on | |||
the room wall and Terminal TV-AB05 mounted on MSIV AB HV-20, was | |||
tied with a plastic stay strap to an air line (approximately | |||
3/4-inch diameter) going to the same valve. | |||
. Flexible Conduit 1U1279, going to MSIV AB HV-17, was tied with a | |||
plastic stay strap to the conduit connector (at the valve) for | |||
conduit IU1277. | |||
By reviewing the design drawing (E-IR8900, Re01sion 3. " Raceway Notes, | |||
Symbols, and Details") which delineates the acceptable methods for | |||
i | |||
r - - | |||
e 6 | |||
, | |||
! | |||
* | |||
-19- - | |||
- ' installation of flexible conduit, the NRC inspector determined that the | |||
.use of stay straps to tie off these conduits was not in accordance with. | |||
' ' - - the drawing. Tying off these flexible conduits with plastic stay | |||
' ' | |||
, - straps in the manner described is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-04) | |||
1 | |||
t, ' , | |||
_ | |||
16. Exit Meeting | |||
4 ,- s . | |||
, | |||
_. | |||
4 l, , | |||
The~NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the' scope and | |||
' | |||
findings of this inspection on October 4, 1985. The licensee | |||
< _ | |||
, . acknowledged the findings. | |||
-5 | |||
u | |||
g | |||
) v | |||
. | |||
t | |||
b | |||
o | |||
I | |||
E | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 04:08, 2 September 2020
ML20137X727 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Wolf Creek |
Issue date: | 10/25/1985 |
From: | Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20137X701 | List: |
References | |
50-482-85-35, NUDOCS 8512100611 | |
Download: ML20137X727 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000482/1985035
Text
r'
,
.,
APPENDIX A
US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/85-35 License: NPF-42
Dockut: 50-482
Licensee: - Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)
Post Office Box 208
Wichita, Kansas 67201
Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)
Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas
Inspection Conducted: September 1 to October 4, 1985
~ Inspectors b $2Ymem e& /0/.;?f/85
d. E. Cummins, Senior Reactor Inspector, Date
Operations
,
b h!_ ss d /o/.Ls/85
- . B. L. Bartlett, Resident Reactor Inspector, Date '
Operations
Approved: ? ![ *
/o/ds/F#
D. M. Hunnicutt, Acting Chief, Project Date'
Section B, Reactor Projects Branch -
.
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted September 1 to October 4,1985 (Report 50-482/85-35)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status;
'
followup on previously_ identified items; operational safety verification;
engineered safety features system walkdown; startup test data review; onsite
followup of events; onsite followup of written repor_ts of nonroutine events;
fire protection / housekeeping; monthly maintenance observation; monthly
surveillance observation; allegation followup; plant safety parameter display
system; security; and plant tours. The inspection involved 248
inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 38 inspector-hours
onsite during offshifts.
8512100611 851125
'
DR ADOCK 05000482
r
.
_2_
Results: Within the 14 areas inspected, five violations were identified
(failure to follow radiation work procedural requirements, par.11; violation
of Technical Specification - fire zone, par. 8C; flexible conduit not installed
in accordance with design drawings, par.15; failure to control combustible
materials in accordance with administrative procedures, par. 9A; and review
of LER 85-063-00, Technical Specifications violation, par. 8B). One open
item is identified (flooding in chemistry het lab, par. 12A).
,
i
e
. _
'
.
-3-
DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Personnel
G. L. Koester, Vice President-Nuclear
C. C. Mason, Director-Nuclear Operations
- F. T.-Rhodes, Plant Superintendent
- M. G. Williams, Supt. of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative
Services
0. L. Maynard, Licensing Supervisor
- H. K. Chernoff, Licensing
- K. Peterson, Licensing
- G. J. Pendergrass, Licensing Engineer
- J. A. Zell, Operations Superintendent
- A. S. Mah, Supt. of Training
- G. D. Boyer, Supt. of Technical Support'
- C. E. Parry, Supt. of Quality Systems Engineering
- M. Nichols% Supt. of Plant Support
W. B. Norton, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
J. J. Johnson, Chief of Security
.R. Hoyt, Emergency Plan Supervisor
- C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist
- J. L. Blackwell, Fire Protection Coordinator ,
- D. L. Reed, Lead Engineer, ISEG
- J. Ives, Site Health Physicist
- C. Rice, Health Physics Operations Supervisor
- D. Walsh, Maintenance Service Supervisor
The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff
during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.
- Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on
October 4, 1985.
2. Plant Status
On September 3, 1985, Wolf Creek Generating Station, having met the
necessary regulatory and state requirements, went into commercial
operation.
3. Followup on Previously Identified Items
(Closed)OpenItem(50-482/8508-02): ASME Sections III and XI Training
for Superintendent of Maintenance.
e
O
-4-
This item tracked the licensee's commitment made in Letters KMLNRC
82-165'and KMLNRC 85-017 to provide additional training for the
~
< Superintendent of Maintenance in the areas of ASME Code Sections III and
XI. 'The NRC verified by review of training records and a course
description that ;.he Superintendent of Maintenance attended training
sessions in the ASME Code Sections III and XI. This item is closed.
(Closed)OpenItem(50-482/8508-01): Baseline Inspection of Selected
Electrical Cables'in Containment.
This open item tracked the licensee's implementation of a surveillance
program of seleWd safety-related cables installed inside containment
to detect cable inf/Jlation degradation. Work Request 03933-85 documents
the baseline inspection and was completed on March 26, 1985. The NRC
inspector verified that the surveillance inspection of these cables was
included in the Managed Maintenance Program for inspection every five-
. 5 years. This item is closed.
' - (Closed)'Open Item (50-482/8460-02): Prccedural Control of a Hazardous
'
.. Cleaning Sol vent.
Maintenance Procedure MPM-M7:1Q-02 referenced for use a hazardous
cleaning solvent, but did not reference existing administrative
procedures that controlled its use. The NRC inspector verified by.
review of Procedure MPM-M711Q-02 that the subject cleaning solvent had
,
been deleted from the procedure. The licensee's maintenance training
program includes training on general type procedures such as the use and
- control of cleaning solvents. Therefore, these procedures are not
. always referenced in work performance type procedures. This item is
closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-482/8460-01): Inadequate Documentation in
Maintenance Procedures.
The licensee reviewed and rewrote (as necessary) all safety-related and
special scoped maintenance procedures to insure they contained adequate
documentation of work activities. The NRC inspector reviewed a random
sample of the affected maintenance procedures and verified that they
contained verification signoffs and data recording requirements to
adequately document work activities delineated in the procedures. The
NRC inspector reviewed the following maintenance procedures:
.
MPE E017Q-04, Revision 4, Circuit Breaker Test for AKR-50 and
AKR-30 Electrically Operated Breakers
. MPE E050-03, Rev h ion 2, Inspection of Lead-Calcium Batterias
During Outage
. MPE M766Q-01, Revision 2, Bi-Weekly Rod Drive Motor Generator Set,
A/C Power Supply System Generator
Inspection
!
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.
?;; + o. ~
8_.
.
.
, , ,
Q,' s ,
[N -
- t.
+
, -5-
5
' ~ ~
<
.. MPE M766Q-03, Revision 3, Reactor Trip Switchgear Breaker
~
. MPM M021Q-02, . Revision 2, Auxiliary Feedwater . Pump Turbine
-Inspection
,
LThis item is closed.-
4. , Operational Safety Verification
- The NRC ' inspectors verified that the-facility is being operated safely
'
_and:in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation'of
-
.
-licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions
E* with 1.icenseeEpersonnel,iindependent verification of safety system
c- ' status and . limiting conditions for. operatic 7s, 'and reviewing _ facility
- ,
..c
- records.. The NRC inspectors, by observation and direct -interview,
-verified the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance
with-the security plan.
The NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of the safety injection
' -
-system and the coolant charging system by observing valve positions,
electrical breaker positions, and control. room indication. The NRC.
. . inspectors. also visually inspected components for leakage, physical
J. damage, and any other impairmerit that could prevent them from performing-
" their designed function.
No violations or deviations wens identified.
.
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5. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Walkdown
' '
c The NRC inspectors verified the operability of ESF systems by Walking - '
- down selected accessible portions of the systems. The NRC inspectors?
-
" ~
. verified valves and electrical circuit breakers were in the required'
.
-
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position, powerfwas available,.and valves were locked where required. ,
,
=The NRC inspectors also inspected system ' components for damage or other ,
conditions that might degrade system performance. The ESF systems ^
' ' -
l listed-below were walked down during this~ inspection report period:
-
,
+ .
1 !- N. , . Auxiliary Feedwater System ,
y ,
. : Class -1E Electrical Switchgear
ttv
s
V y -Red Train Yellow Train
I'
i NB01 4160.V AC NG02 480'V AC
r
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,
. NG01 480 V AC' NG04 480 V AC
L NG03 480;V AC. NB02-4160 V AC
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
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[. . . - - an----.a. _--- - - . - - -
.,.
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~6. Startup Test Data Review
,, The NRC inspectors reviewed completed power ascension test' procedures.
'
,
The following items were considered in this review: ,
c .. Verification that all test changes,' including deletions,1were
xc approved, reviewed, and incorporated properly.
. Verification that all test deficiencies were resolved in accordance
'
with the appropriate procedures.
4
.
Verification that deficiencies which. constitute a reportable
i occurrence as defined by Technical Specifications (TS) have been
properly recorded.
. Verification that the as-run copy of the completed test data
package was properly completed.
. Verification that the test summary and evaluation were completed in -
accordance with procedure.
. Verification that the test results were properly approved.
The following test data packages were reviewed by the NRC inspectors:
. SU7-S016, Revision 3, " Test Sequence at 100% Power," dated 7/13/85
. SU7-0011, Revision 1, " Plant Trip From 100% Power," dated 8/27/85
. SU7-SE02.10, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Nuclear
Instrumentation," dated 8/8/85
. 507-0010.2, Revision 1, "Large Load Reduction-100% Power,"
dated 8/8/85
. SU7-SE03.3, Revision ~1, " Axial Flux Difference Instrumentation
-Calibration," dated 8/12/85
. SPE BB06.1, Revision 0, "RTD/TC Cross Calibration," dated 5/19/85
. SU7-SE02.9, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Nuclear
Instrumentation," dated 7/23/85
. SU7-SF06.6, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Process
Temp 6rature Instrumentation," dated 8/8/85
.
. SU7-SF07.5, Revision 1, "Startup Adjustments of Reactor Control
,
System," dated 8/2/85
.
T &
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-7-
. SU7-SC03.7, Revision 1, " Thermal Power and Statepoint Data
'
Collection at 98% Power," dated 8/1/85
. SU7-SC03.8, Revision 1, " Thermal Power and Statepoint Data
Collection at 100% Power," dated 8/2/85
, .
. SU7-S008, Revision 3, "Startup Test Program Reference Document,"
'
dated 1/27/85 ,
. 5U7-0907.2, Revision 2, " Plant Performance Test," dated 6/12/85 '
. SU7-009.3, Revision 1, " Load Swing Tests 100% Power," dated 7/2/85
'
~ No violations or deviations were identified.
.
.
7. Onsite Followup of Events
The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that
occurred during this report period. The NRC inspectors (when available)
observed control room personnel response, observed instrumentation
indicators of reactor plant parameters, reviewed logs and computer
printouts, and discussed the event with cognizant personnel. The NRC
inspector verified the licensee had responded to the event in accordance
with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required
in a timely fashion.
Engineered safety feature actuations that occurred during the report
period are listed in the table below. The NRC inspector will review the
license event report (LER) for each of these events and will report any
findings in NRC inspection reports.
Date Event * Plant Status Cause
9/2/85 CRVIS 3 Failed component in
chlorine monitor
9/2/85 RxTrip 2 LO-L0 S/G level
9/5/85 RxTrip 1 Loss of EHC pressure
9/14/85 CRVIS 1 Broken detector tape
9/23/85 RxTrip 1 LO-L0 S/G level
~* Event
CRVIS - control room ventilation isolation signal
RxTrip - reactor trip
S/G - steam generator
EHC - Electro hydraulic control
No violations or deviations were identified.
"
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8. Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events
a. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors performed
followup on selected Wolf Creek LERs. The LERs were reviewed to
ensure:
.
The corrective action stated in the report has been properly
completed.
. Responses to the events were adequate.
. Respanses to the events met license conditions, commitments,
or other applicable regulatory requirements.
.
The information contained in the report satisfied applicable
reporting requirements.
-
. That any generic issues were identified.
. The report conformed to the guidelines contained in NUREG-1022
and Supplements 1 and 2.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the following LERs:
50-482/85-006-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-FBVIS and CRVIS"
50-482/85-007-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-CRVIS"
50-482/85-008-00 "ESF Actuation-CPIS and CRVIS"
50-482/85-009-00 "ESF Actuation-CPIS, FBVIS, and CRVIS"
50-482/85-010-01 " Sprinkler Out of Service Without Fire Watch"
50-482/85-011-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS"
50-482/85-012-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-Safety Injection (SI)"
50-482/85-013-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS"
50-482/85-014-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS"
50-482/85-019-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-AFAS and SGBSIS"
50-482/85-020-00 "ESF Actuation-FWIS and Turbine Trip"
50-482/85-021-00 "ESF Actuation-SI and MSLIS"
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50.482/85-022-00"ESFAckuation-SIandMSLIS"
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_
-50-482/85-023-00"ESFActu$ tion-ReactorTripandFWIS"
ESF engineered safety. featuresj
'
FBVIS-' fuel;buiIdingventilationisolationsignal
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, CRVIS L control room ventilation isolation signa.1
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.CPIS '- containment purge isolation signal. '
AFAS - auxiliary feedwater actuation signal
. s
SGBSIB - steam generator blowdown system isolation signal
FWIS - main feedwater. isolation signal
MSLIS - main steamline isolation signal ,
Selected NRC inspector' comments are noted below:
.. In LER No'. 50-482/85-006-00 and 50-482/85-007-00, the
licensee comitted to include these LERs in the I&C personnel
required reading. On October 2, 1985, the NRC inspector
verified through inspections of training files that the LERs
had been included as a part of required reading and.that ISC
personnel had signed off as having read them; however, even
though the inspection was 5 months after the issuance of
the LER, there were~still some personnel who had not signed
.
E -
off.. Plant' management should consider setting a time limit
- for finishing required reading.
'
. In comparing NUREG-1022 and its supplements.to the LERs listed
above, the NRC inspector observed that the early LERs'were not-
written to the: highest quality which could be expected but that as
, the LER preparers and reviewers gained in experience the quality
has improved. - '
b. ~ Review'of LER'85-063-00, Technical "pecifications (TS) Violation -
'
Centrifugal Charging Pump 'A'
L LER 85-063-00. documented that centrifugal charging pump 'A' (CCP-A)
L :had been-out-of-service in excess of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by TS 3.1.2.4
.
and 3.5.2 Action Statements. The following chronological sequence of
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events occurred, resulting in this violation of Tcchnical
Specifications.
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On August 27, 1985, at approximately 2112 CDT, CCP-A was taken out of
service for maintenance. At that time, CCP-A was declared inoperable
and TS 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 Action Statements were entered which required
CCP-A to be returned to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
On August 30,1985, at 2030 CDT, upon completion of repairs and
satisfactory performance of Surveillance Test STS BG-100A, " Centrifugal
Charging-System ' A' Train Inservice Pump Test" CCP was declared operable.
-
There was some confusion in declaring CCP-A operable because, at shif t
-turnover, the oncoming shift had been told it was operable. However, at
approximately 2000 CDT it was determined that the equipment out-of-service
log still showed that the pump was inoperable, that there was no supervi-
sory operator log entry stating CCP-A was operable, and the Surveillance
Procedure STS BG-100A, " Centrifugal Charging System 'A' Train Inservice
Pump Test," which verified pump operability after repairs, could not be
located. At approximately 2030 CDT, the applicable copy of STS BG-100A
was located. It had been completed except for system restoration'.
STS BG-100A was completed and CCP-A declared operable at 2030 CDT.
However, in performing the restoration, a caution in the procedure
was misinterpreted and CCP-A Discharge Valve BG-8485A was left in
the shut position. This makes CCP-A inoperable.
On August 31,1985, at 2200 CDT, the auxiliary building watch
determined that the valve was in the wrong position and it was
innediately returned to the correct open position, thus returning
CCP-A to operable status.
This series of. events had allowed CCP-A to be inoperable for
97-hours in lieu of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by the above-mentioned TS.
,
This failure to perform the actions specified by Technical
Specifications is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-01)
The licensee immediately initiated an evaluation of the event.
The results of this evaluation were,that procedures STS BG-100A
and STS BG-100B (surveillance of CCP-B) were expeditiously revised
(September 10,1985) to clarify the required valve position for the
current plant operating mode. Shift supervisors have been
reinstructed in the administrative procedural requirement for
post-test review of completed surveillances by the shift supervisor,
and the licensee event report was n.ade required reading for all
operations personnel.
c. Review of Licensee Defect / Deficiency Report 85-110
'
Defect / Deficiency Report 85-110 documented the following violation
of Technical Specifications:
During the time period from 0700 through 1459 on August 13, 1985,
hourly air temperature readings.inside containment were not
recorded by operating personnel. Technical Specifications.
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__ _ _ - _ _ __ - ___ - _ - _ - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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paragraph 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b) requires hourly air
temperature readings or an inspection at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ;
whenever the Zone 201 fire detector is out of. service. {
The licensee's evaluation of this report determined that since a
health physics technicia_n, who was also a member of the fire
brigade and a qualified fire watch, had entered the containment '
within the 8-hour time limit, the intent of TS 3.3.3.8 had been
satisfied.
Action Statement (b) to TS 3.3.3.8 states that when the fire
detection instrument for Fire Detection Zone 201 is inoperable
(which was the case), a fire watch patrol must be established and
Zone 201 inspected at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or the containment
air temperature must be monitored at least once per hour at the
locations listed in TS 4.6.1.5.
Since TS 3.3.3.8 specifically states that a fire patrol be
established, the NRC inspector determined that the health physics
technician's presence in containment did not meet the intent of the
TS even though he was qualified. He did not have prior knowledge
that he was on a fire watch or that a specific fire zone was to be
inspected because the fire detection instrumentation was
inoperable. Based on this interpretation, this failure to perform
the actions delineated in TS 3.3.3.8.b within the specified time is
an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-03)
i
{ 9. Fire Protection / Housekeeping
,
a. Conditions Observed During Plant Tours
During plant tours, the NRC inspectors observed the conditions in
the auxiliary building which were not in compliance with the fire
protection and housekeeping practices delineated in Administrative
Procedures ADM 13-103, Revision 4, " Control of Combustible
Materials," and ADM 01-034, Revision 7, " Housekeeping and
Cleanliness Control." Specific NRC inspector findings are
discussed below:
. Nineteen cardboard boxes were stored and unattended in the
north end of the auxiliary building on the 2026' level. The
NRC inspector determined that the volume of these combustible
boxes exceeded the allowable limit of (at or below) 10 cubic
feet and 100 pounds, without having a combustible materials
permit as required by ADM 13-103. ,
. ADM 01-034 requires that oily wiping rags be stored in
noncombustible containers when not in use; that rags, paper,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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and other debris be placed in suitable waste containers; that
combustible waste material be disposed of at least once per
working shift in noncombustible covered waste receptacles; and
that oily rags and waste be disposed of in portable metal
waste cans with a self-closing cover. However, the conditions
identified below existad in excess of I day in violation of
one or more of the above requirements:
. A metal trash container (flapper lid type) located in
Room 1509 on the 2047' level and adjacent to main steam
isolation valve AB HV-20 was overflowing with combustible
trash to the extent that the flapper lid was being held
open by the trash and a paper towel was on the floor
beside the trash container.
. On the 1974' level adjacent to Column AJ-A6 in
c north-south corridor on east side of building a trash
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately half
full of mostly combustible material. ,
s
.
In Room 1412 on the 2026' level and adjacent to main
feedwater isolation valve AE FV-041, approximately 20 oil
soaked rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot in size) were
laying on the floor.
.
On the 2026' level adjacent to Column AJ-A13, a trash
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately
two-thirds full of mostly combustible material.
. On the 2000' level adjacent to Column A13 at the south
,
end of the north-south corridor, an unattended pile of
approximately 10 rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot)
was on the floor beside an overturned maintenance cart.
. On the 2047' level adjacent to Column AJ-A9, a trasil I
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately
three-fourths full of mostly combustible material. .
1
The NRC inspectors discussed general housekeeping and fire
,
protection practices with appropriate licensee personnel. The
above examples of failure to comply with fire protection and
housekeeping requirements as delineated in administrative
procedures is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-05)
b. Fire Drill
On September 13, 1985, the NRC inspector observed a fire drill and
attended the following critique. The simulated fire was in an
electrical load center located in the turbine building. Fire
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and other debris be placed in suitable waste containers; that
combustible waste material be disposed of at least once per
' working shift in noncombustible covered waste receptacles; and
-that oily rags and waste be disposed of'in portable metal
waste cans with a self-closing cover. Ilowever, the conditions
identified below existed in excess of 1 day in violation of
tf one or more of the above requirements:
._
A metal trash container (flapper lid type) located in
Room 1509 on the 2047' level and adjacent to main steam
isolation valve AB HV-20 was overflowing with combustible
trash to the extent that the flapper lid was being held
-
open by the trash and a paper towel was on the floor
beside the trash container.
.
On the 1974' level adjacent to Column AJ-A6 in
north-south corridor on east side of building a trash
.,
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately-half
'
full of mostly combustible material. ,
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.
.
In Room 1412 on the 2026' level and adjacent to main
feedwater isolation valve AE FV-041, approximately 20 011
." soaked rags (approximately'1 foot by 1 foot in size):were
. laying on the floor.
p.
.
On the 2026' level adjacent to Column AJ-A13,.a trash
barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximat'ely
two-thirds full of mostly combustible material.
,
,
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'
.
On the 2000' level adjacent to Column A13 at.the. south.
-,
end of the north-south corridor, an unattended pile of
'
7 approximately 10 rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot)
,
was on the floor beside an overturned maintenance cart.
.
On the 2047' level adjacent to Column AJ-A9, a trash
barrel (50 gallon open' top drum) was approximately
. '.
three-fourths full of mostly combustible material. .
'
The NRC inspectors discussed general-housekeeping and fire
protection practices with appropriate licensee personnel. The
above examples of failure to comply with fire protection and
housekeeping requirements as delineated in administrative
procedures is an: apparent violation. (50-482/8535-05)
b. Fire Drill
On September 13,-1985, the NRC inspector observed a fire drill and i
'
attended the following critique. The simulated fire was in an
electrical load center located in the turbine building. Fire
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brigade members' responded promptly to the fire equipment lockers,
donned appropriate fire protective clothing, checked personal
equipment, obtained backup equipment as necessary, and proceeded to
the simulated fire. Applicable procedures were used and the fire
brigade members and other onshift personnel responded in a
professional. manner..
10. Monthly' Maintenance Observation
The NRC inspectors observed maintenance activities performed on
safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities
were. conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical
Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The
following elements were considered by the NRC inspectors during the
observation and/or review of the maintenance activities:
. Limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were met and, where
applicable, redundant components were operable.
. Activities complied with adequate administrative controls.
. Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were
used.
. Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and
technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations)
were made available when appropriate.
.
. Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certified.
. Required radiological contrcls were irylemented.
. Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate.
. Required alignments and surveillances to verify post maintenance
operability were performad.
. Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when
appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work
activities.
<
Salected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work
vequest(WR)listedbelowwereobservedand/orrelateddocumentation
reviewed by the NRC inspectors:
. WR No. 91703-85, Valve AE-FC 540, 'D' Steam Generator Main Feed
. Regulator Valve, failed shut. Failed power supply
card in control cabinet was replaced.
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WR No. 07127-85: Rework Limitorque Operator and Perform Scheduled
Maintenance on Valve AL-HV 009, Auxiliary
Feedwater to Steam Generator 'B' Control Valve.
'
.
WR No. 0752-85: Rework Limitorque Operator and Perform Scheduled
Maintenance on Valve AL-HV 035, Condensate Storage
Tank to Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump ' A'.
.
WR No. 91635-85: Valve AL-V002 did not return to fully closed
position during surveillance testing-condition
investigated and repaired. ,
. WR No. 09724-85:
.
Valve AL-V009, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
-Pump 'A' Suction Check Valve from Essential
Service Water, did not close when manually
. opened.
No violations or deviations were identified.
-
11. Monthly Surveillance Observation
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of
surveillance testing and/or they reviewed completed surseillance test
procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in
accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC
inspectors considered the following items while inspecting surveillance
activities:
. Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance
with an approved procedure.
. The surveillance procedure conforms to TS requirements.
. Required test instrumentation was calibrated.
. Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were
satisfied.
.
Test ata va., accurate and complete. The NRC inspectors performed
independent calculations of selected test data to verify their
accuracy.
. The performance of the surveillance procedure confonned to
applicable administrative procedures.
. The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and
the test results met the required limits.
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Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed
below:
. STS RE-008, Revision 1, Target Flux Difference Determination
. STS RE-004, Revision 2, Shutdown Margin Determination
. STS RE-002, Revision 2, Determination of Estimated Critical
Position
. STS BB-004, Revision 2, RCS Water Inventory Balance
. STS AL-101. Revision 3, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 'A'-
Inservice Pump Test
NRC inspector observations are discussed below:
During a surveillance beh conducted on August 30, 1985, the NRC
inspector observed a worker walk across a step-off pad into a posted
potentially contaminated area, the coolant charging pump 'A' room,
without donning the protective clothing required by Radiation Work
Permit 85-0143, which had been implemented to specify the radiological
requirements for working in the area. The worker realized his mistake
and immediately frisked himself at a frisking station in the corridor
outside the room. The worker subsequently notified health physics of
what had occurred and a health physics technician swiped the affected
area. Health physics personnel documented the incident on a Notice of
'
Radiological Work Practice Violation and discussed it with the worker.
l The failure to follow radiological requirements for working in a posted
potentially contaminated area is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-02)
12. Allegation Followup
a. Flooding in Chemistry Hot Lab
In NRC Inspection Report 50-482/85-26, the NRC inspector reported
the details of an allegation related to rainwater entering the
chemistry hot lab. The NRC inspector reported that the licensee
had sealed the electrical conduit that the water was getting into
the lab through. The licensee had also performed a satisfactory
leak test of the hot lab and determined that the leak had been
fixed. However, during a heavy rainstorm on August 22, 1985, ,
rainwater again flowed into the chemistry hot lab. During the
rainstorm on August 22, 1985, rainwater flowed into the chemistry
het lab via two paths. One path was through electrical conduit on
the east wall of the lab in the same area that had previously
leaked; the other path was under a door between the chemistry hot
.
lab and a corridor on the west wall of the hot lab.
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Water entered the hot lab through the corduit that had previously
leaked and also from a conduit which vas providing a flow path for
water from the outside to enter a stairwall on the west side of the
chemistry water lab and then flow along the floor and under the
door of the hot lab. The licensee has determined that one of the
conduit seals previously installed failed. The licensee has
initiated paperwork to seal the flow paths for rainwater entering
the chemistry hot lab. This is an open item pending completion of
the work necessary to ensure that rainwater does not enter the
chemistry hot lab. (50-482/8535-06)
b. Allegation Concerning Disposal of Weld Rod Material
On September-26, 1985, at approximately 8:00 a.m., an unidentified
individual ~ called the NRC resident inspector's trailer and made the
following allegation:
"They cut up a bunch of weld rods and threw them in a trash
dumpster to try to cover something up. The dumpster is' located in ' ^-
the northwest corner of the facility, adjacent to the small .
electrical maintenance building. The last load was put in the
dumpster on September 25, 1985, at about 4:30 p.m." The alleger,
who did not want to identify himself, stated he heard instructions
to remove all tags and make sure nobody knew about it. The alleger
contended the weld rod material was being disposed of to cover
something up, but he did not know what was being covered up. The
alleger also stated that it was a KG&E employee directing General
Electric personnel to durnp the rods in the dumpster.
The NRC resident inspectors located the trash dumpster and verified
there was weld rod material in it. There appeared to be
approximately 2 cubic feet of weld rod material in the dumpster.
All the coated rod had been bent and the bare wire weld material
had been cut into shorter than normal (36") lengths. The NRC
inspectors took samples of the welding material from the dumpster
and asked cognizant licensee personnel to provide them with
information related to the disposition of the welding material in
the dumpster.
Licensee personnel investigated the disposed of-wcld material and
determined that the material was excess from a General Electric
tool r om that was being dismantled in the turbine building. As a
part of the disposal process, the weld rod electrodes had ueen bent,
the tags had been removed from the bare wire welding material, and
it had been cut into short lengths. The welding material was
subsequently taken to the county land fill during routine trash
removal from the site.
The NRC inspectors could not relate one above incident to any type
of cover up or wrongdoing and, therefore, this allegation is closed.
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13. Plant Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
The following excerpts from NUREG-0737 and Supplement 5 to the Wolf
Creek Safety Evaluation Report, respectively, provide background
information on the SPDS and SAS systems.
"In accordance with Task Action Plan 1.D.2, Plant Safety Parameter
Display Console (NUREG-0660), each applicant and licensee shall install
a SPDS that will display to operating personnel a minimum set of
parameters which define the safety status of the plant. This can be
attained through continuoJs indications of direct and derived variables
as necessary to assess plant safety status."
"The SNUPPS SPDS conceptual design and prototype was the Safety
Assessment System (SAS). The SAS was based on a design developed
jointly by a group of Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system (NSSS)
utilities of which the SNUPPS utilities were members. SAS provides a
centralized, flexible, computer-based data and display system to assist
control room personnel in evaluating the safety status of the plant.
The highest level graphical display format contains a minimum set of key
plant variables representative of the plant's safety status, and these
constitute the SPDS. In addition, there are critical safety function
display formats, accident identification display formats, and process
variable trend display formats within the library of the display
system."
During an audit review, the licensee described the method used to derive m
the overall program to validate the SPDS variable set. As part of the
validation program, the licensee has committed to exercise the SPDS for
a number of scenarios. On September 30 and October 1, 1985, the NRC
inspector attended a briefing and training session given to the
operators on the functions and capabilities of the SPDS and SAS and then
observed selected portions of the licensee's exercise scenarios .hich
utilized licensed operators from the Callaway Nuclear Plant on the Wolf
Creek simulator.
The test scenarios observed were " Loss of Main Feedwater" and " Severe
Accident (LOCA with inadequate core cooling and fuel damage)." The NRC
inspector verified that each scenario was randomly selected without
advance operator knowledge of which scenario was next and that only the
SPDS portioa of the SAS was utilized by the operators.
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Security
The NRC inspectors verified the physical security plan wa3 being
implemented by selected observation of the following items:
. The security organization is properly manned and the security
personnel are capable of performing their assigned functions.
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. Persons within the protected area (PA) display their identification
badges, when in vital areas are properly authorized and, when
required, are properly escorted.
. Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or
controlled within the PA.
. Persons and packages are properly cleared and checked before entry
into the PA is permitted.
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. The effectiveness of the security program is maintained when
security equipment failure or impairment requires compensatory
measures to be employed.
. Response to threats or alarms, or discovery of a condition that
appears to require additional precautions is consistent with
procedures and the physical security plan.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Plant Tours
At various times during the course of the inspection period the NRC
inspecters conducted general tours of the reactor building, auxiliary
building, radwaste building, fuel handling building, control building,
turbine building, essential service water building, and the secured area
surrounding the buildings. During the tours, the NRC inspector observed
housekeeping practict.s, fire protectian barriers and equipment,
maintenance on equipment, and discussed various subjects with licensee
personnel.
Selected NRC inspector findings are discussed in appropriate paragraphs
of this inspection report.
Selected NRC inspector findings are discussed below:
During a tour of the auxiliary building on September 26, 1985, the NRC
inspector observed the following:
, . Flexible Conduit 1U1276, running between rigid conduit mounted on
the room wall and Terminal TV-AB05 mounted on MSIV AB HV-20, was
tied with a plastic stay strap to an air line (approximately
3/4-inch diameter) going to the same valve.
. Flexible Conduit 1U1279, going to MSIV AB HV-17, was tied with a
plastic stay strap to the conduit connector (at the valve) for
conduit IU1277.
By reviewing the design drawing (E-IR8900, Re01sion 3. " Raceway Notes,
Symbols, and Details") which delineates the acceptable methods for
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- ' installation of flexible conduit, the NRC inspector determined that the
.use of stay straps to tie off these conduits was not in accordance with.
' ' - - the drawing. Tying off these flexible conduits with plastic stay
' '
, - straps in the manner described is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-04)
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16. Exit Meeting
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The~NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the' scope and
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findings of this inspection on October 4, 1985. The licensee
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, . acknowledged the findings.
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