ML20137X727

Insp Rept 50-482/85-35 on 850901-1004.Violations Noted: Failure to Follow Radiation Work Procedural Requirements, Failure to Implement Fire Watch & Flexible Conduit Not Installed in Accordance W/Design Drawings

ML20137X727
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/25/1985
From:	Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137X701	List: ML20137X698 ML20137X727
References
50-482-85-35, NUDOCS 8512100611
Download: ML20137X727 (19)

See also: IR 05000482/1985035

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APPENDIX A

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/85-35 License: NPF-42

Dockut: 50-482

Licensee: - Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)

Post Office Box 208

Wichita, Kansas 67201

Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas

Inspection Conducted: September 1 to October 4, 1985

~ Inspectors b $2Ymem e& /0/.;?f/85

d. E. Cummins, Senior Reactor Inspector, Date

Operations

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b h!_ ss d /o/.Ls/85

. B. L. Bartlett, Resident Reactor Inspector, Date '

Operations

Approved:  ?  ![ *

/o/ds/F#

D. M. Hunnicutt, Acting Chief, Project Date'

Section B, Reactor Projects Branch -

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted September 1 to October 4,1985 (Report 50-482/85-35)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status;

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followup on previously_ identified items; operational safety verification;

engineered safety features system walkdown; startup test data review; onsite

followup of events; onsite followup of written repor_ts of nonroutine events;

fire protection / housekeeping; monthly maintenance observation; monthly

surveillance observation; allegation followup; plant safety parameter display

system; security; and plant tours. The inspection involved 248

inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 38 inspector-hours

onsite during offshifts.

8512100611 851125

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Results: Within the 14 areas inspected, five violations were identified

(failure to follow radiation work procedural requirements, par.11; violation

of Technical Specification - fire zone, par. 8C; flexible conduit not installed

in accordance with design drawings, par.15; failure to control combustible

materials in accordance with administrative procedures, par. 9A; and review

of LER 85-063-00, Technical Specifications violation, par. 8B). One open

item is identified (flooding in chemistry het lab, par. 12A).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

G. L. Koester, Vice President-Nuclear

C. C. Mason, Director-Nuclear Operations

• F. T.-Rhodes, Plant Superintendent

• M. G. Williams, Supt. of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative

Services

0. L. Maynard, Licensing Supervisor

• H. K. Chernoff, Licensing

• K. Peterson, Licensing

• G. J. Pendergrass, Licensing Engineer

• J. A. Zell, Operations Superintendent

• A. S. Mah, Supt. of Training

• G. D. Boyer, Supt. of Technical Support'

• C. E. Parry, Supt. of Quality Systems Engineering

• M. Nichols% Supt. of Plant Support

W. B. Norton, Reactor Engineering Supervisor

J. J. Johnson, Chief of Security

.R. Hoyt, Emergency Plan Supervisor

• C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist

• J. L. Blackwell, Fire Protection Coordinator ,

• D. L. Reed, Lead Engineer, ISEG

• J. Ives, Site Health Physicist

• C. Rice, Health Physics Operations Supervisor

• D. Walsh, Maintenance Service Supervisor

The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff

during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.

• Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on

October 4, 1985.

2. Plant Status

On September 3, 1985, Wolf Creek Generating Station, having met the

necessary regulatory and state requirements, went into commercial

operation.

3. Followup on Previously Identified Items

(Closed)OpenItem(50-482/8508-02): ASME Sections III and XI Training

for Superintendent of Maintenance.

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This item tracked the licensee's commitment made in Letters KMLNRC

82-165'and KMLNRC 85-017 to provide additional training for the

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< Superintendent of Maintenance in the areas of ASME Code Sections III and

XI. 'The NRC verified by review of training records and a course

description that ;.he Superintendent of Maintenance attended training

sessions in the ASME Code Sections III and XI. This item is closed.

(Closed)OpenItem(50-482/8508-01): Baseline Inspection of Selected

Electrical Cables'in Containment.

This open item tracked the licensee's implementation of a surveillance

program of seleWd safety-related cables installed inside containment

to detect cable inf/Jlation degradation. Work Request 03933-85 documents

the baseline inspection and was completed on March 26, 1985. The NRC

inspector verified that the surveillance inspection of these cables was

included in the Managed Maintenance Program for inspection every five-

. 5 years. This item is closed.

' - (Closed)'Open Item (50-482/8460-02): Prccedural Control of a Hazardous

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.. Cleaning Sol vent.

Maintenance Procedure MPM-M7:1Q-02 referenced for use a hazardous

cleaning solvent, but did not reference existing administrative

procedures that controlled its use. The NRC inspector verified by.

review of Procedure MPM-M711Q-02 that the subject cleaning solvent had

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been deleted from the procedure. The licensee's maintenance training

program includes training on general type procedures such as the use and

- control of cleaning solvents. Therefore, these procedures are not

. always referenced in work performance type procedures. This item is

closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-482/8460-01): Inadequate Documentation in

Maintenance Procedures.

The licensee reviewed and rewrote (as necessary) all safety-related and

special scoped maintenance procedures to insure they contained adequate

documentation of work activities. The NRC inspector reviewed a random

sample of the affected maintenance procedures and verified that they

contained verification signoffs and data recording requirements to

adequately document work activities delineated in the procedures. The

NRC inspector reviewed the following maintenance procedures:

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MPE E017Q-04, Revision 4, Circuit Breaker Test for AKR-50 and

AKR-30 Electrically Operated Breakers

. MPE E050-03, Rev h ion 2, Inspection of Lead-Calcium Batterias

During Outage

. MPE M766Q-01, Revision 2, Bi-Weekly Rod Drive Motor Generator Set,

A/C Power Supply System Generator

Inspection

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.. MPE M766Q-03, Revision 3, Reactor Trip Switchgear Breaker

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. MPM M021Q-02, . Revision 2, Auxiliary Feedwater . Pump Turbine

-Inspection

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LThis item is closed.-

4. , Operational Safety Verification

The NRC ' inspectors verified that the-facility is being operated safely

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_and:in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation'of

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-licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions

E* with 1.icenseeEpersonnel,iindependent verification of safety system

c- ' status and . limiting conditions for. operatic 7s, 'and reviewing _ facility

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- records.. The NRC inspectors, by observation and direct -interview,

-verified the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance

with-the security plan.

The NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of the safety injection

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-system and the coolant charging system by observing valve positions,

electrical breaker positions, and control. room indication. The NRC.

. . inspectors. also visually inspected components for leakage, physical

J. damage, and any other impairmerit that could prevent them from performing-

" their designed function.

No violations or deviations wens identified.

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5. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Walkdown

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c The NRC inspectors verified the operability of ESF systems by Walking - '

down selected accessible portions of the systems. The NRC inspectors?

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. verified valves and electrical circuit breakers were in the required'

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position, powerfwas available,.and valves were locked where required. ,

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=The NRC inspectors also inspected system ' components for damage or other ,

conditions that might degrade system performance. The ESF systems ^

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l listed-below were walked down during this~ inspection report period:

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1  !- N. , . Auxiliary Feedwater System ,

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.  : Class -1E Electrical Switchgear

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V y -Red Train Yellow Train

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i NB01 4160.V AC NG02 480'V AC

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. NG01 480 V AC' NG04 480 V AC

L NG03 480;V AC. NB02-4160 V AC

fx. .MCC NG01A MCC NG02A

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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~6. Startup Test Data Review

,, The NRC inspectors reviewed completed power ascension test' procedures.

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The following items were considered in this review: ,

c .. Verification that all test changes,' including deletions,1were

xc approved, reviewed, and incorporated properly.

. Verification that all test deficiencies were resolved in accordance

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with the appropriate procedures.

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Verification that deficiencies which. constitute a reportable

i occurrence as defined by Technical Specifications (TS) have been

properly recorded.

. Verification that the as-run copy of the completed test data

package was properly completed.

. Verification that the test summary and evaluation were completed in -

accordance with procedure.

. Verification that the test results were properly approved.

The following test data packages were reviewed by the NRC inspectors:

. SU7-S016, Revision 3, " Test Sequence at 100% Power," dated 7/13/85

. SU7-0011, Revision 1, " Plant Trip From 100% Power," dated 8/27/85

. SU7-SE02.10, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Nuclear

Instrumentation," dated 8/8/85

. 507-0010.2, Revision 1, "Large Load Reduction-100% Power,"

dated 8/8/85

. SU7-SE03.3, Revision ~1, " Axial Flux Difference Instrumentation

-Calibration," dated 8/12/85

. SPE BB06.1, Revision 0, "RTD/TC Cross Calibration," dated 5/19/85

. SU7-SE02.9, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Nuclear

Instrumentation," dated 7/23/85

. SU7-SF06.6, Revision 1, " Operational Alignment of Process

Temp 6rature Instrumentation," dated 8/8/85

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. SU7-SF07.5, Revision 1, "Startup Adjustments of Reactor Control

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System," dated 8/2/85

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. SU7-SC03.7, Revision 1, " Thermal Power and Statepoint Data

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Collection at 98% Power," dated 8/1/85

. SU7-SC03.8, Revision 1, " Thermal Power and Statepoint Data

Collection at 100% Power," dated 8/2/85

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. SU7-S008, Revision 3, "Startup Test Program Reference Document,"

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dated 1/27/85 ,

. 5U7-0907.2, Revision 2, " Plant Performance Test," dated 6/12/85 '

. SU7-009.3, Revision 1, " Load Swing Tests 100% Power," dated 7/2/85

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~ No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. Onsite Followup of Events

The NRC inspectors performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that

occurred during this report period. The NRC inspectors (when available)

observed control room personnel response, observed instrumentation

indicators of reactor plant parameters, reviewed logs and computer

printouts, and discussed the event with cognizant personnel. The NRC

inspector verified the licensee had responded to the event in accordance

with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required

in a timely fashion.

Engineered safety feature actuations that occurred during the report

period are listed in the table below. The NRC inspector will review the

license event report (LER) for each of these events and will report any

findings in NRC inspection reports.

Date Event * Plant Status Cause

9/2/85 CRVIS 3 Failed component in

chlorine monitor

9/2/85 RxTrip 2 LO-L0 S/G level

9/5/85 RxTrip 1 Loss of EHC pressure

9/14/85 CRVIS 1 Broken detector tape

9/23/85 RxTrip 1 LO-L0 S/G level

~* Event

CRVIS - control room ventilation isolation signal

RxTrip - reactor trip

S/G - steam generator

EHC - Electro hydraulic control

No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events

a. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors performed

followup on selected Wolf Creek LERs. The LERs were reviewed to

ensure:

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The corrective action stated in the report has been properly

completed.

. Responses to the events were adequate.

. Respanses to the events met license conditions, commitments,

or other applicable regulatory requirements.

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The information contained in the report satisfied applicable

reporting requirements.

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. That any generic issues were identified.

. The report conformed to the guidelines contained in NUREG-1022

and Supplements 1 and 2.

The NRC inspectors reviewed the following LERs:

50-482/85-006-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-FBVIS and CRVIS"

50-482/85-007-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-CRVIS"

50-482/85-008-00 "ESF Actuation-CPIS and CRVIS"

50-482/85-009-00 "ESF Actuation-CPIS, FBVIS, and CRVIS"

50-482/85-010-01 " Sprinkler Out of Service Without Fire Watch"

50-482/85-011-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS"

50-482/85-012-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-Safety Injection (SI)"

50-482/85-013-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS"

50-482/85-014-00 "ESF Actuation-CRVIS"

50-482/85-019-00 " Inadvertent ESF Actuation-AFAS and SGBSIS"

50-482/85-020-00 "ESF Actuation-FWIS and Turbine Trip"

50-482/85-021-00 "ESF Actuation-SI and MSLIS"

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50.482/85-022-00"ESFAckuation-SIandMSLIS"

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-50-482/85-023-00"ESFActu$ tion-ReactorTripandFWIS"

ESF engineered safety. featuresj

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FBVIS-' fuel;buiIdingventilationisolationsignal

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, CRVIS L control room ventilation isolation signa.1

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.CPIS '- containment purge isolation signal. '

AFAS - auxiliary feedwater actuation signal

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SGBSIB - steam generator blowdown system isolation signal

FWIS - main feedwater. isolation signal

MSLIS - main steamline isolation signal ,

Selected NRC inspector' comments are noted below:

.. In LER No'. 50-482/85-006-00 and 50-482/85-007-00, the

licensee comitted to include these LERs in the I&C personnel

required reading. On October 2, 1985, the NRC inspector

verified through inspections of training files that the LERs

had been included as a part of required reading and.that ISC

personnel had signed off as having read them; however, even

though the inspection was 5 months after the issuance of

the LER, there were~still some personnel who had not signed

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off.. Plant' management should consider setting a time limit

for finishing required reading.

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. In comparing NUREG-1022 and its supplements.to the LERs listed

above, the NRC inspector observed that the early LERs'were not-

written to the: highest quality which could be expected but that as

, the LER preparers and reviewers gained in experience the quality

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b. ~ Review'of LER'85-063-00, Technical "pecifications (TS) Violation -

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Centrifugal Charging Pump 'A'

L LER 85-063-00. documented that centrifugal charging pump 'A' (CCP-A)

L :had been-out-of-service in excess of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by TS 3.1.2.4

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and 3.5.2 Action Statements. The following chronological sequence of

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Specifications.

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On August 27, 1985, at approximately 2112 CDT, CCP-A was taken out of

service for maintenance. At that time, CCP-A was declared inoperable

and TS 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 Action Statements were entered which required

CCP-A to be returned to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

On August 30,1985, at 2030 CDT, upon completion of repairs and

satisfactory performance of Surveillance Test STS BG-100A, " Centrifugal

Charging-System ' A' Train Inservice Pump Test" CCP was declared operable.

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There was some confusion in declaring CCP-A operable because, at shif t

-turnover, the oncoming shift had been told it was operable. However, at

approximately 2000 CDT it was determined that the equipment out-of-service

log still showed that the pump was inoperable, that there was no supervi-

sory operator log entry stating CCP-A was operable, and the Surveillance

Procedure STS BG-100A, " Centrifugal Charging System 'A' Train Inservice

Pump Test," which verified pump operability after repairs, could not be

located. At approximately 2030 CDT, the applicable copy of STS BG-100A

was located. It had been completed except for system restoration'.

STS BG-100A was completed and CCP-A declared operable at 2030 CDT.

However, in performing the restoration, a caution in the procedure

was misinterpreted and CCP-A Discharge Valve BG-8485A was left in

the shut position. This makes CCP-A inoperable.

On August 31,1985, at 2200 CDT, the auxiliary building watch

determined that the valve was in the wrong position and it was

innediately returned to the correct open position, thus returning

CCP-A to operable status.

This series of. events had allowed CCP-A to be inoperable for

97-hours in lieu of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by the above-mentioned TS.

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This failure to perform the actions specified by Technical

Specifications is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-01)

The licensee immediately initiated an evaluation of the event.

The results of this evaluation were,that procedures STS BG-100A

and STS BG-100B (surveillance of CCP-B) were expeditiously revised

(September 10,1985) to clarify the required valve position for the

current plant operating mode. Shift supervisors have been

reinstructed in the administrative procedural requirement for

post-test review of completed surveillances by the shift supervisor,

and the licensee event report was n.ade required reading for all

operations personnel.

c. Review of Licensee Defect / Deficiency Report 85-110

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Defect / Deficiency Report 85-110 documented the following violation

of Technical Specifications:

During the time period from 0700 through 1459 on August 13, 1985,

hourly air temperature readings.inside containment were not

recorded by operating personnel. Technical Specifications.

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paragraph 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b) requires hourly air

temperature readings or an inspection at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />  ;

whenever the Zone 201 fire detector is out of. service. {

The licensee's evaluation of this report determined that since a

health physics technicia_n, who was also a member of the fire

brigade and a qualified fire watch, had entered the containment '

within the 8-hour time limit, the intent of TS 3.3.3.8 had been

satisfied.

Action Statement (b) to TS 3.3.3.8 states that when the fire

detection instrument for Fire Detection Zone 201 is inoperable

(which was the case), a fire watch patrol must be established and

Zone 201 inspected at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or the containment

air temperature must be monitored at least once per hour at the

locations listed in TS 4.6.1.5.

Since TS 3.3.3.8 specifically states that a fire patrol be

established, the NRC inspector determined that the health physics

technician's presence in containment did not meet the intent of the

TS even though he was qualified. He did not have prior knowledge

that he was on a fire watch or that a specific fire zone was to be

inspected because the fire detection instrumentation was

inoperable. Based on this interpretation, this failure to perform

the actions delineated in TS 3.3.3.8.b within the specified time is

an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-03)

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{ 9. Fire Protection / Housekeeping

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a. Conditions Observed During Plant Tours

During plant tours, the NRC inspectors observed the conditions in

the auxiliary building which were not in compliance with the fire

protection and housekeeping practices delineated in Administrative

Procedures ADM 13-103, Revision 4, " Control of Combustible

Materials," and ADM 01-034, Revision 7, " Housekeeping and

Cleanliness Control." Specific NRC inspector findings are

discussed below:

. Nineteen cardboard boxes were stored and unattended in the

north end of the auxiliary building on the 2026' level. The

NRC inspector determined that the volume of these combustible

boxes exceeded the allowable limit of (at or below) 10 cubic

feet and 100 pounds, without having a combustible materials

permit as required by ADM 13-103. ,

. ADM 01-034 requires that oily wiping rags be stored in

noncombustible containers when not in use; that rags, paper,

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and other debris be placed in suitable waste containers; that

combustible waste material be disposed of at least once per

working shift in noncombustible covered waste receptacles; and

that oily rags and waste be disposed of in portable metal

waste cans with a self-closing cover. However, the conditions

identified below existad in excess of I day in violation of

one or more of the above requirements:

. A metal trash container (flapper lid type) located in

Room 1509 on the 2047' level and adjacent to main steam

isolation valve AB HV-20 was overflowing with combustible

trash to the extent that the flapper lid was being held

open by the trash and a paper towel was on the floor

beside the trash container.

. On the 1974' level adjacent to Column AJ-A6 in

c north-south corridor on east side of building a trash

barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately half

full of mostly combustible material. ,

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In Room 1412 on the 2026' level and adjacent to main

feedwater isolation valve AE FV-041, approximately 20 oil

soaked rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot in size) were

laying on the floor.

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On the 2026' level adjacent to Column AJ-A13, a trash

barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately

two-thirds full of mostly combustible material.

. On the 2000' level adjacent to Column A13 at the south

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end of the north-south corridor, an unattended pile of

approximately 10 rags (approximately 1 foot by 1 foot)

was on the floor beside an overturned maintenance cart.

. On the 2047' level adjacent to Column AJ-A9, a trasil I

barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately

three-fourths full of mostly combustible material. .

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The NRC inspectors discussed general housekeeping and fire

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protection practices with appropriate licensee personnel. The

above examples of failure to comply with fire protection and

housekeeping requirements as delineated in administrative

procedures is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-05)

b. Fire Drill

On September 13, 1985, the NRC inspector observed a fire drill and

attended the following critique. The simulated fire was in an

electrical load center located in the turbine building. Fire

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and other debris be placed in suitable waste containers; that

combustible waste material be disposed of at least once per

' working shift in noncombustible covered waste receptacles; and

-that oily rags and waste be disposed of'in portable metal

waste cans with a self-closing cover. Ilowever, the conditions

identified below existed in excess of 1 day in violation of

tf one or more of the above requirements:

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A metal trash container (flapper lid type) located in

Room 1509 on the 2047' level and adjacent to main steam

isolation valve AB HV-20 was overflowing with combustible

trash to the extent that the flapper lid was being held

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open by the trash and a paper towel was on the floor

beside the trash container.

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On the 1974' level adjacent to Column AJ-A6 in

north-south corridor on east side of building a trash

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barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximately-half

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full of mostly combustible material. ,

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In Room 1412 on the 2026' level and adjacent to main

feedwater isolation valve AE FV-041, approximately 20 011

." soaked rags (approximately'1 foot by 1 foot in size):were

. laying on the floor.

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On the 2026' level adjacent to Column AJ-A13,.a trash

barrel (50 gallon open top drum) was approximat'ely

two-thirds full of mostly combustible material.

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On the 2000' level adjacent to Column A13 at.the. south.

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end of the north-south corridor, an unattended pile of

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was on the floor beside an overturned maintenance cart.

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On the 2047' level adjacent to Column AJ-A9, a trash

barrel (50 gallon open' top drum) was approximately

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three-fourths full of mostly combustible material. .

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The NRC inspectors discussed general-housekeeping and fire

protection practices with appropriate licensee personnel. The

above examples of failure to comply with fire protection and

housekeeping requirements as delineated in administrative

procedures is an: apparent violation. (50-482/8535-05)

b. Fire Drill

On September 13,-1985, the NRC inspector observed a fire drill and i

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attended the following critique. The simulated fire was in an

electrical load center located in the turbine building. Fire

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brigade members' responded promptly to the fire equipment lockers,

donned appropriate fire protective clothing, checked personal

equipment, obtained backup equipment as necessary, and proceeded to

the simulated fire. Applicable procedures were used and the fire

brigade members and other onshift personnel responded in a

professional. manner..

10. Monthly' Maintenance Observation

The NRC inspectors observed maintenance activities performed on

safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities

were. conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical

Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The

following elements were considered by the NRC inspectors during the

observation and/or review of the maintenance activities:

. Limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were met and, where

applicable, redundant components were operable.

. Activities complied with adequate administrative controls.

. Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were

used.

. Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and

technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations)

were made available when appropriate.

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. Replacement parts and materials being used were properly certified.

. Required radiological contrcls were irylemented.

. Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate.

. Required alignments and surveillances to verify post maintenance

operability were performad.

. Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when

appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work

activities.

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Salected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work

vequest(WR)listedbelowwereobservedand/orrelateddocumentation

reviewed by the NRC inspectors:

. WR No. 91703-85, Valve AE-FC 540, 'D' Steam Generator Main Feed

. Regulator Valve, failed shut. Failed power supply

card in control cabinet was replaced.

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WR No. 07127-85: Rework Limitorque Operator and Perform Scheduled

Maintenance on Valve AL-HV 009, Auxiliary

Feedwater to Steam Generator 'B' Control Valve.

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WR No. 0752-85: Rework Limitorque Operator and Perform Scheduled

Maintenance on Valve AL-HV 035, Condensate Storage

Tank to Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump ' A'.

.

WR No. 91635-85: Valve AL-V002 did not return to fully closed

position during surveillance testing-condition

investigated and repaired. ,

. WR No. 09724-85:

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Valve AL-V009, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater

-Pump 'A' Suction Check Valve from Essential

Service Water, did not close when manually

. opened.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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11. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of

surveillance testing and/or they reviewed completed surseillance test

procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in

accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC

inspectors considered the following items while inspecting surveillance

activities:

. Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance

with an approved procedure.

. The surveillance procedure conforms to TS requirements.

. Required test instrumentation was calibrated.

. Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation were

satisfied.

.

Test ata va., accurate and complete. The NRC inspectors performed

independent calculations of selected test data to verify their

accuracy.

. The performance of the surveillance procedure confonned to

applicable administrative procedures.

. The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and

the test results met the required limits.

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Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed

below:

. STS RE-008, Revision 1, Target Flux Difference Determination

. STS RE-004, Revision 2, Shutdown Margin Determination

. STS RE-002, Revision 2, Determination of Estimated Critical

Position

. STS BB-004, Revision 2, RCS Water Inventory Balance

. STS AL-101. Revision 3, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 'A'-

Inservice Pump Test

NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

During a surveillance beh conducted on August 30, 1985, the NRC

inspector observed a worker walk across a step-off pad into a posted

potentially contaminated area, the coolant charging pump 'A' room,

without donning the protective clothing required by Radiation Work

Permit 85-0143, which had been implemented to specify the radiological

requirements for working in the area. The worker realized his mistake

and immediately frisked himself at a frisking station in the corridor

outside the room. The worker subsequently notified health physics of

what had occurred and a health physics technician swiped the affected

area. Health physics personnel documented the incident on a Notice of

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Radiological Work Practice Violation and discussed it with the worker.

l The failure to follow radiological requirements for working in a posted

potentially contaminated area is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-02)

12. Allegation Followup

a. Flooding in Chemistry Hot Lab

In NRC Inspection Report 50-482/85-26, the NRC inspector reported

the details of an allegation related to rainwater entering the

chemistry hot lab. The NRC inspector reported that the licensee

had sealed the electrical conduit that the water was getting into

the lab through. The licensee had also performed a satisfactory

leak test of the hot lab and determined that the leak had been

fixed. However, during a heavy rainstorm on August 22, 1985, ,

rainwater again flowed into the chemistry hot lab. During the

rainstorm on August 22, 1985, rainwater flowed into the chemistry

het lab via two paths. One path was through electrical conduit on

the east wall of the lab in the same area that had previously

leaked; the other path was under a door between the chemistry hot

.

lab and a corridor on the west wall of the hot lab.

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Water entered the hot lab through the corduit that had previously

leaked and also from a conduit which vas providing a flow path for

water from the outside to enter a stairwall on the west side of the

chemistry water lab and then flow along the floor and under the

door of the hot lab. The licensee has determined that one of the

conduit seals previously installed failed. The licensee has

initiated paperwork to seal the flow paths for rainwater entering

the chemistry hot lab. This is an open item pending completion of

the work necessary to ensure that rainwater does not enter the

chemistry hot lab. (50-482/8535-06)

b. Allegation Concerning Disposal of Weld Rod Material

On September-26, 1985, at approximately 8:00 a.m., an unidentified

individual ~ called the NRC resident inspector's trailer and made the

following allegation:

"They cut up a bunch of weld rods and threw them in a trash

dumpster to try to cover something up. The dumpster is' located in ' ^-

the northwest corner of the facility, adjacent to the small .

electrical maintenance building. The last load was put in the

dumpster on September 25, 1985, at about 4:30 p.m." The alleger,

who did not want to identify himself, stated he heard instructions

to remove all tags and make sure nobody knew about it. The alleger

contended the weld rod material was being disposed of to cover

something up, but he did not know what was being covered up. The

alleger also stated that it was a KG&E employee directing General

Electric personnel to durnp the rods in the dumpster.

The NRC resident inspectors located the trash dumpster and verified

there was weld rod material in it. There appeared to be

approximately 2 cubic feet of weld rod material in the dumpster.

All the coated rod had been bent and the bare wire weld material

had been cut into shorter than normal (36") lengths. The NRC

inspectors took samples of the welding material from the dumpster

and asked cognizant licensee personnel to provide them with

information related to the disposition of the welding material in

the dumpster.

Licensee personnel investigated the disposed of-wcld material and

determined that the material was excess from a General Electric

tool r om that was being dismantled in the turbine building. As a

part of the disposal process, the weld rod electrodes had ueen bent,

the tags had been removed from the bare wire welding material, and

it had been cut into short lengths. The welding material was

subsequently taken to the county land fill during routine trash

removal from the site.

The NRC inspectors could not relate one above incident to any type

of cover up or wrongdoing and, therefore, this allegation is closed.

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13. Plant Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

The following excerpts from NUREG-0737 and Supplement 5 to the Wolf

Creek Safety Evaluation Report, respectively, provide background

information on the SPDS and SAS systems.

"In accordance with Task Action Plan 1.D.2, Plant Safety Parameter

Display Console (NUREG-0660), each applicant and licensee shall install

a SPDS that will display to operating personnel a minimum set of

parameters which define the safety status of the plant. This can be

attained through continuoJs indications of direct and derived variables

as necessary to assess plant safety status."

"The SNUPPS SPDS conceptual design and prototype was the Safety

Assessment System (SAS). The SAS was based on a design developed

jointly by a group of Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system (NSSS)

utilities of which the SNUPPS utilities were members. SAS provides a

centralized, flexible, computer-based data and display system to assist

control room personnel in evaluating the safety status of the plant.

The highest level graphical display format contains a minimum set of key

plant variables representative of the plant's safety status, and these

constitute the SPDS. In addition, there are critical safety function

display formats, accident identification display formats, and process

variable trend display formats within the library of the display

system."

During an audit review, the licensee described the method used to derive m

the overall program to validate the SPDS variable set. As part of the

validation program, the licensee has committed to exercise the SPDS for

a number of scenarios. On September 30 and October 1, 1985, the NRC

inspector attended a briefing and training session given to the

operators on the functions and capabilities of the SPDS and SAS and then

observed selected portions of the licensee's exercise scenarios .hich

utilized licensed operators from the Callaway Nuclear Plant on the Wolf

Creek simulator.

The test scenarios observed were " Loss of Main Feedwater" and " Severe

Accident (LOCA with inadequate core cooling and fuel damage)." The NRC

inspector verified that each scenario was randomly selected without

advance operator knowledge of which scenario was next and that only the

SPDS portioa of the SAS was utilized by the operators.

,

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Security

The NRC inspectors verified the physical security plan wa3 being

implemented by selected observation of the following items:

. The security organization is properly manned and the security

personnel are capable of performing their assigned functions.

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. Persons within the protected area (PA) display their identification

badges, when in vital areas are properly authorized and, when

required, are properly escorted.

. Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or

controlled within the PA.

. Persons and packages are properly cleared and checked before entry

into the PA is permitted.

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. The effectiveness of the security program is maintained when

security equipment failure or impairment requires compensatory

measures to be employed.

. Response to threats or alarms, or discovery of a condition that

appears to require additional precautions is consistent with

procedures and the physical security plan.

No violations or deviations were identified.

15. Plant Tours

At various times during the course of the inspection period the NRC

inspecters conducted general tours of the reactor building, auxiliary

building, radwaste building, fuel handling building, control building,

turbine building, essential service water building, and the secured area

surrounding the buildings. During the tours, the NRC inspector observed

housekeeping practict.s, fire protectian barriers and equipment,

maintenance on equipment, and discussed various subjects with licensee

personnel.

Selected NRC inspector findings are discussed in appropriate paragraphs

of this inspection report.

Selected NRC inspector findings are discussed below:

During a tour of the auxiliary building on September 26, 1985, the NRC

inspector observed the following:

, . Flexible Conduit 1U1276, running between rigid conduit mounted on

the room wall and Terminal TV-AB05 mounted on MSIV AB HV-20, was

tied with a plastic stay strap to an air line (approximately

3/4-inch diameter) going to the same valve.

. Flexible Conduit 1U1279, going to MSIV AB HV-17, was tied with a

plastic stay strap to the conduit connector (at the valve) for

conduit IU1277.

By reviewing the design drawing (E-IR8900, Re01sion 3. " Raceway Notes,

Symbols, and Details") which delineates the acceptable methods for

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- ' installation of flexible conduit, the NRC inspector determined that the

.use of stay straps to tie off these conduits was not in accordance with.

' ' - - the drawing. Tying off these flexible conduits with plastic stay

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, - straps in the manner described is an apparent violation. (50-482/8535-04)

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16. Exit Meeting

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The~NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the' scope and

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findings of this inspection on October 4, 1985. The licensee

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