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{{#Wiki_filter:February 13, 2006Paul D. HinnenkampVice President - Operations
{{#Wiki_filter:February 13, 2006
Paul D. Hinnenkamp
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775SUBJECT:RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000458/2005005Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
On December 31, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documentsthe inspection findings which were discussed with you and other members of your staff on
SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
January 4, 2006.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.  
              REPORT 05000458/2005005
Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:
On December 31, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents
the inspection findings which were discussed with you and other members of your staff on
January 4, 2006.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.Based on the results of this inspection, two NRC identified findings and one self-revealingfinding were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low
personnel.
safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that violations are associated withthese findings.   However, because these violations were of very low safety significance and
Based on the results of this inspection, two NRC identified findings and one self-revealing
finding were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low
safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that violations are associated with
these findings. However, because these violations were of very low safety significance and
were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as
were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as
noncited violations, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If youcontest the violations or the significance of the violations, you should provide a response within30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
noncited violations, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, withcopies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611
contest the violations or the significance of the violations, you should provide a response within
Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011-4005; the Director, Office of Enforcement,U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resi dentInspector at the River Bend Station facility.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).  
copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611
Entergy Operations, Inc.-2-Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss themwith you.Sincerely,/RA/Kriss M. Kennedy, ChiefProject Branch C
Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011-4005; the Director, Office of Enforcement,
Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket:   50-458License: NPF-47Enclosures:NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2005005  w/Attachment: Supplemental Informationcc w/enclosure:Senior Vice President and  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
  Chief Operating Officer
Inspector at the River Bend Station facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
Entergy Operations, Inc.                 -2-
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them
with you.
                                        Sincerely,
                                                /RA/
                                        Kriss M. Kennedy, Chief
                                        Project Branch C
                                        Division of Reactor Projects
Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Enclosures:
NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2005005
   w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/enclosure:
Senior Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995Vice President Operations Support
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995General ManagerPlant Operations
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
General Manager
Plant Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA
St. Francisville, LA 70775
70775Director - Nuclear SafetyEntergy Operations, Inc.
Director - Nuclear Safety
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA
St. Francisville, LA 70775
70775
 
Entergy Operations, Inc.-3-Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway
Entergy Operations, Inc.               -3-
Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway
P.O. Box 651
P.O. Box 651
Jackson, MS 39205Winston & Strawn LLP1700 K Street, N.W.
Jackson, MS 39205
Washington, DC 20006-3817Manager - LicensingEntergy Operations, Inc.
Winston & Strawn LLP
1700 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-3817
Manager - Licensing
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA
St. Francisville, LA 70775
70775The Honorable Charles C. Foti, Jr.Attorney General
The Honorable Charles C. Foti, Jr.
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Department of Justice
State of Louisiana
State of Louisiana
P.O. Box 94005
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005H. Anne Plettinger
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
3456 Villa Rose DriveBaton Rouge, LA 70806Burt Babers, PresidentWest Feliciana Parish Police Jury
H. Anne Plettinger
P.O. Box 1921  
3456 Villa Rose Drive
St. Francisville, LA
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
70775Michael E. Henry, State Liaison OfficerDepartment of Environmental Quality
Burt Babers, President
West Feliciana Parish Police Jury
P.O. Box 1921
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Michael E. Henry, State Liaison Officer
Department of Environmental Quality
Permits Division
Permits Division
P.O. Box 4313
P.O. Box 4313
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4313Brian AlmonPublic Utility Commission
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4313
Brian Almon
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
William B. Travis Building
P.O. Box 13326
P.O. Box 13326
1701 North Congress Avenue
1701 North Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78711-3326  
Austin, TX 78711-3326
Entergy Operations, Inc.-4-ChairpersonDenton Field Office  
 
Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness  
Entergy Operations, Inc.           -4-
  and Protection Division
Chairperson
Denton Field Office
Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness
  and Protection Division
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Preparedness Directorate
Preparedness Directorate
Line 82: Line 137:
800 North Loop 288
800 North Loop 288
Federal Regional Center
Federal Regional Center
Denton, TX 76201-3698  
Denton, TX 76201-3698
Entergy Operations, Inc.-5-Electronic distribution by RIV:Regional Administrator (BSM1)DRP Director (ATH)DRS Director (DDC)DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)Senior Resident Inspector (PJA)Branch Chief, DRP/C (KMK)Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (WCW)Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)RITS Coordinator (KEG)DRS STA (DAP)J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)ROPreports
 
RBS Site Secretary (LGD)W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)SUNSI Review Completed: _kmk_ADAMS:   Yes G No           Initials: __kmk__   Publicly Available       
Entergy Operations, Inc.                   -5-
G   Non-Publicly Available    
Electronic distribution by RIV:
G   Sensitive   Non-SensitiveR:\_REACTORS\_RB\2005\RB2005-05RP-PJA.wpdRIV:SRI:DRP/CRI:DRP/CC:DRS/OBC:DRS/EB1C:DRS/PSBPJAlterMOMillerATGodyJClarkMPS
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
hannon T - KMKennedy E - KMKennedy      /RA/       /RA/       /RA/2/     /062/     /062/     /062/     /062/     /06C:DRS/EB2C:DRP/CLJSmithKMKennedy GDReplogle for     /RA/2/13/062/13/06OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone           E=E-mail       F=Fax  
DRP Director (ATH)
Enclosure-1-U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IVDocket:50-458License:NPF-47
DRS Director (DDC)
Report:05000458/2005005
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Licensee:Entergy Operations, Inc.
Senior Resident Inspector (PJA)
Facility:River Bend StationLocation:5485 U.S. Highway 61St. Francisville, LouisianaDates:October 1 through December 31, 2005
Branch Chief, DRP/C (KMK)
Inspectors:P. Alter, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch CM. Miller, Resident Inspector, Project Branch CJ. Keeton, Consultant, Region IV
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (WCW)
P. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Operations Branch
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
G. Johnston, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
L. Ricketson, Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support BranchApproved By:Kriss M. Kennedy, ChiefProject Branch C
DRS STA (DAP)
Division of Reactor Projects  
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
Enclosure-2-TABLE OF CONTENTSSUMMARY OF FINDINGS....................................................3REPORT DETAILS..........................................................5
ROPreports
REACTOR SAFETY.........................................................51R01Adverse Weather Protection
RBS Site Secretary (LGD)
.......................................51R04Equipment Alignment
W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)
.............................................61R05Fire Protection
SUNSI Review Completed: _kmk_ ADAMS: : Yes           G No       Initials: __kmk__
..................................................71R11Licensed Operator Requalification
: Publicly Available      G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive   : Non-Sensitive
...................................81R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control.............101R14Operator Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions..............111R15Operability Evaluations..........................................141R16Operator Work-Arounds.........................................151R17Permanent Plant Modifications....................................151R19Postmaintenance Testing........................................171R22Surveillance Testing............................................181R23Temporary Plant Modifications....................................191EP2Alert and Notification System Testing...............................191EP3Emergency Response Organization Augmentation.....................201EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies.....201EP6Drill Evaluation.................................................21RADIATION SAFETY.......................................................222OS2ALARA Planning and Controls.....................................22OTHER ACTIVITIES........................................................234OA1Performance Indicator Verification..................................234OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems............................234OA3Event Followup................................................264OA6Meetings, Including Exit..........................................27SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION............................................A-1
R:\_REACTORS\_RB\2005\RB2005-05RP-PJA.wpd
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT................................................A-1
RIV:SRI:DRP/C          RI:DRP/C        C:DRS/OB      C:DRS/EB1        C:DRS/PSB
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED...........................A-1LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED..........................................A-2
PJAlter                MOMiller        ATGody        JClark          MPShannon
LIST OF ACRONYMS......................................................A-8  
  T - KMKennedy         E - KMKennedy      /RA/           /RA/             /RA/
Enclosure-3-SUMMARY OF FINDINGSIR 05000458/2005005; 10/01/2005 - 12/31/2005; River Bend Station; Licensed OperatorRequalification, Operator Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions, Permanent PlantModifications.The report covered a 3-month period of routine baseline inspections by resident inspectors andannounced baseline inspections by regional emergency planning, operations, and radiation
2/ /06                2/ /06          2/ /06        2/ /06          2/ /06
protection inspectors. Three Green noncited violations were identified. The significance of
C:DRS/EB2              C:DRP/C
  LJSmith                KMKennedy
  GDReplogle for           /RA/
2/13/06                2/13/06
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY                               T=Telephone     E=E-mail     F=Fax
 
                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                  REGION IV
Docket:     50-458
License:     NPF-47
Report:     05000458/2005005
Licensee:   Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:   River Bend Station
Location:   5485 U.S. Highway 61
            St. Francisville, Louisiana
Dates:       October 1 through December 31, 2005
Inspectors: P. Alter, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch C
            M. Miller, Resident Inspector, Project Branch C
            J. Keeton, Consultant, Region IV
            P. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Operations Branch
            G. Johnston, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch
            L. Ricketson, Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch
Approved By: Kriss M. Kennedy, Chief
            Project Branch C
            Division of Reactor Projects
                                      -1-                               Enclosure
 
                                      TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
REPORT DETAILS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
REACTOR SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
  1R01    Adverse Weather Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
  1R04    Equipment Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
  1R05    Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
  1R11    Licensed Operator Requalification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
  1R13    Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
  1R14    Operator Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
  1R15    Operability Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
  1R16    Operator Work-Arounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
  1R17    Permanent Plant Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
  1R19    Postmaintenance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
  1R22    Surveillance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
  1R23    Temporary Plant Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
  1EP2    Alert and Notification System Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
  1EP3    Emergency Response Organization Augmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
  1EP5    Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies . . . . . 20
  1EP6    Drill Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
RADIATION SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
  2OS2    ALARA Planning and Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
OTHER ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
  4OA1    Performance Indicator Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
  4OA2    Identification and Resolution of Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
  4OA3    Event Followup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
  4OA6    Meetings, Including Exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-8
                                                        -2-                                                         Enclosure
 
                                    SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458/2005005; 10/01/2005 - 12/31/2005; River Bend Station; Licensed Operator
Requalification, Operator Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions, Permanent Plant
Modifications.
The report covered a 3-month period of routine baseline inspections by resident inspectors and
announced baseline inspections by regional emergency planning, operations, and radiation
protection inspectors. Three Green noncited violations were identified. The significance of
most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual
most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process.Findings for which the significance
Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance
determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC
determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC
management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercialnuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3,dated July 2000.A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone: Initiating Events*Green. The NRC identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.4.1.A for thelicensee's failure to shut down one reactor recirculation loop within 2 hours of
management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
determining that jet pump loop flow mismatch was greater than 5 percent whileoperating at greater than 70 percent of rated core flow. On October 31, 2005, theReactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve B hydraulic power unit tripped because of a
nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3,
blown control power fuse, causing Flow Control Valve B to drift open. Operators
dated July 2000.
throttled closed Flow Control Valve A to maintain reactor power at 100 percent, resulting
A.     NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
in a jet pump loop flow mismatch of approximately 8.2 percent. The flow mismatch
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
existed for 4.5 hours. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program as
*       Green. The NRC identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.4.1.A for the
Condition Report CR-RBS-2006-00274. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a moresignificant safety concern. Matched recirculation loop flows is an assumption used in
        licensees failure to shut down one reactor recirculation loop within 2 hours of
the accident analysis for a loss of coolant accident resulting from a loop break. A flow
        determining that jet pump loop flow mismatch was greater than 5 percent while
mismatch could result in core response that is more severe than assumed in the
        operating at greater than 70 percent of rated core flow. On October 31, 2005, the
accident analysis. The significance of this finding could not be evaluated using
        Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve B hydraulic power unit tripped because of a
MC 0609, "Significance Determination Process.Based on management review, the
        blown control power fuse, causing Flow Control Valve B to drift open. Operators
finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the short duration
        throttled closed Flow Control Valve A to maintain reactor power at 100 percent, resulting
of the flow mismatch, 4.5 hours, and the low likelihood of a loss of coolant accident
        in a jet pump loop flow mismatch of approximately 8.2 percent. The flow mismatch
during that time. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element ofhuman performance in that operators failed to implement Technical Specification
        existed for 4.5 hours. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program as
requirements (Section 1R14).Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
        Condition Report CR-RBS-2006-00274.
*Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion  
        The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more
III,Design Control, was identified for the licensee's failure to address the worst case
        significant safety concern. Matched recirculation loop flows is an assumption used in
conditions in the sizing calculation for the reactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust  
        the accident analysis for a loss of coolant accident resulting from a loop break. A flow
Enclosure-4-line vacuum breaker system as part of a plant modification to remove the internals of thereactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust line check valve. As a result, on
        mismatch could result in core response that is more severe than assumed in the
December 10, 2004, when the reactor core isolation cooling system was started andsubsequently shutdown on high reactor water level following a scram and loss of
        accident analysis. The significance of this finding could not be evaluated using
feedwater, the turbine exhaust line filled with water from the suppression pool, causingthe operators to consider t
        MC 0609, Significance Determination Process. Based on management review, the
he system unavailable and complicating their response to theevent. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR-
        finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the short duration
RBS-2005-00724 and reinstalled the turbine exhaust line check valve internals in
        of the flow mismatch, 4.5 hours, and the low likelihood of a loss of coolant accident
February 2005. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systemscornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure
        during that time. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element of
the availability and reliability of the reactor core isolation cooling system, a system thatresponds to initiating events (loss of feedwater and station blackout), to prevent
        human performance in that operators failed to implement Technical Specification
undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination
        requirements (Section 1R14).
Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
significance because it represented a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of
*       Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
system function (Section 1R17).Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
        Design Control, was identified for the licensees failure to address the worst case
*Green. The NRC identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV. B., as a result of inadequate procedures for the implementation of an
        conditions in the sizing calculation for the reactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust
emergency action level. The criteria in Procedure EIP-2-001, "Classification of
                                                  -3-                                     Enclosure
Emergencies," Revision 12, for declaring an Alert emergency action level based on
 
primary coolant leak rate, relied solely on a computer generated leakrate report that
      line vacuum breaker system as part of a plant modification to remove the internals of the
would not be valid under all conditions. The licensee entered this finding into their
      reactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust line check valve. As a result, on
corrective action program as CR-RBS-2005-03078 and issued Standing Order 192, as
      December 10, 2004, when the reactor core isolation cooling system was started and
an interim corrective action, to provide additional criteria to determine whether a primary
      subsequently shutdown on high reactor water level following a scram and loss of
coolant leak rate Alert emergency action level declaration was required.The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the EmergencyPreparedness Cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affects the cornerstone
      feedwater, the turbine exhaust line filled with water from the suppression pool, causing
objective to ensure the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to
      the operators to consider the system unavailable and complicating their response to the
protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The
      event. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR-
inadequate procedure could result in a failure to declare an Alert emergency
      RBS-2005-00724 and reinstalled the turbine exhaust line check valve internals in
classification when required. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency
      February 2005.
Preparedness Significance Determination Process," this finding was determined to be of
      The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems
very low safety significance since it was a failure to comply with a regulatory
      cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure
requirement associated with a risk-significant planning standard that did not result in the
      the availability and reliability of the reactor core isolation cooling system, a system that
loss or degradation of that risk-significant planning standard function (Section 1R11).B.Licensee-Identified Violations
      responds to initiating events (loss of feedwater and station blackout), to prevent
None.  
      undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination
Enclosure-5-REPORT DETAILSSummary of Plant Status
      Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety
  On October 1, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 70 percent to perform a rod sequenceexchange and insert two control rods for planned maintenance. The reactor was returned to
      significance because it represented a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of
100 percent power on October 2, 2005. On October 21, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 63percent to perform power suppression testing for a leaking fuel bundle. The reactor was
      system function (Section 1R17).
returned to 100 percent power on October 23, 2005. On November 5, 2005, reactor power was
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
*     Green. The NRC identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
      Section IV. B., as a result of inadequate procedures for the implementation of an
      emergency action level. The criteria in Procedure EIP-2-001, Classification of
      Emergencies, Revision 12, for declaring an Alert emergency action level based on
      primary coolant leak rate, relied solely on a computer generated leakrate report that
      would not be valid under all conditions. The licensee entered this finding into their
      corrective action program as CR-RBS-2005-03078 and issued Standing Order 192, as
      an interim corrective action, to provide additional criteria to determine whether a primary
      coolant leak rate Alert emergency action level declaration was required.
      The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Emergency
      Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affects the cornerstone
      objective to ensure the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to
      protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The
      inadequate procedure could result in a failure to declare an Alert emergency
      classification when required. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency
      Preparedness Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of
      very low safety significance since it was a failure to comply with a regulatory
      requirement associated with a risk-significant planning standard that did not result in the
      loss or degradation of that risk-significant planning standard function (Section 1R11).
B.   Licensee-Identified Violations
      None.
                                                -4-                                     Enclosure
 
                                        REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
On October 1, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 70 percent to perform a rod sequence
exchange and insert two control rods for planned maintenance. The reactor was returned to
100 percent power on October 2, 2005. On October 21, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 63
percent to perform power suppression testing for a leaking fuel bundle. The reactor was
returned to 100 percent power on October 23, 2005. On November 5, 2005, reactor power was
lowered to 90 percent to adjust the control rod pattern and the reactor was returned to 100
lowered to 90 percent to adjust the control rod pattern and the reactor was returned to 100
percent later that day. On December 2, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 83 percent to
percent later that day. On December 2, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 83 percent to
insert three control rods for planned maintenance. The reactor was returned to 100 percent
insert three control rods for planned maintenance. The reactor was returned to 100 percent
power on December 3, 2005. On December 9, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 58 percent
power on December 3, 2005. On December 9, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 58 percent
to perform a control rod pattern adjustment and conduct turbine valve testing. The reactor was
to perform a control rod pattern adjustment and conduct turbine valve testing. The reactor was
returned to 100 percent power on December 11, 2005. On December 17, 2005, reactor power
returned to 100 percent power on December 11, 2005. On December 17, 2005, reactor power
was lowered to 62 percent to perform power suppression testing for a leaking fuel bundle. The
was lowered to 62 percent to perform power suppression testing for a leaking fuel bundle. The
reactor was returned to 100 percent on December 19, 2005, and remained at 100 percent for
reactor was returned to 100 percent on December 19, 2005, and remained at 100 percent for
the remainder of the inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, EmergencyPreparedness1R01Adverse Weather Protection     b.Inspection ScopeCold Weather PreparationDuring the week of December 5, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the licensee'simplementation of Operations Section Procedure OSP-0043, "Freeze Protection andTemperature Maintenance," Revision 6, to protect mitigating systems from cold weatherconditions. Specifically, the inspectors: (1) verified that risk-significant structures,
the remainder of the inspection period.
systems, and components will remain functional when challenged by cold weatherconditions; (2) verified that cold weather features such as heat tracing and space
1.     REACTOR SAFETY
heaters are operable and monitored; and (3) verified that the cold weather proceduresattachments were being completed for changing temperatures as required by the
        Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
procedure. The inspectors completed one inspection sample.       c.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.  
        Preparedness
Enclosure-6-1R04Equipment Alignment   1.Partial System Walkdowns     a.Inspection Scope
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
  b.   Inspection Scope
        Cold Weather Preparation
        During the week of December 5, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the licensees
        implementation of Operations Section Procedure OSP-0043, Freeze Protection and
        Temperature Maintenance, Revision 6, to protect mitigating systems from cold weather
        conditions. Specifically, the inspectors: (1) verified that risk-significant structures,
        systems, and components will remain functional when challenged by cold weather
        conditions; (2) verified that cold weather features such as heat tracing and space
        heaters are operable and monitored; and (3) verified that the cold weather procedures
        attachments were being completed for changing temperatures as required by the
        procedure. The inspectors completed one inspection sample.
  c.   Findings
        No findings of significance were identified.
                                                -5-                                       Enclosure
 
1R04 Equipment Alignment
1. Partial System Walkdowns
  a. Inspection Scope
     On October 25, 2005, the inspectors walked down residual heat removal Division II
     On October 25, 2005, the inspectors walked down residual heat removal Division II
while residual heat removal Division I was out of service for scheduled maintenance.  
    while residual heat removal Division I was out of service for scheduled maintenance.
On October 26, 2005, the inspectors walked down the piping and valve lineup of the
    On October 26, 2005, the inspectors walked down the piping and valve lineup of the
condensate storage tank, including emergency core cooling system suction and testreturn valves. In each case, the inspectors verified the correct valve and power
    condensate storage tank, including emergency core cooling system suction and test
alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to
    return valves. In each case, the inspectors verified the correct valve and power
    alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to
    the system operating procedures (SOP) and piping and instrument drawings listed
    below and applicable sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The
    inspectors completed two inspection samples.
    *      SOP-0031, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 46
    *      SOP-0008, Condensate Storage, Makeup and Transfer, Revision 16
    *      Piping and Instrument PID 04-03A, Condensate Storage, Makeup and
            Transfer, Revision 13
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
2.  Complete System Walkdown
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors conducted a complete walkdown of the drywell and containment leak
    detection system during the week of June 26, 2005, during a drywell closeout inspection
    and continuing the week of November 20, 2005. The methods of inspection included
    field walkdown, in-office reviews, observation of system operation, and interviews of
    computer engineering, operations, training, and emergency planning personnel. The
    inspectors verified: (1) proper valve and control switch alignments, (2) computer
    program algorithm, (3) power supply lineup, (4) associated support system status, and
    (5) that alarms and indications in the main control room were as specified in the
    following documents:
    *      SOP-0033, Drywell and Containment Leak Detection System, Revision 11
    *      USAR Section 5.2.5.1.1, Detection of Leakage within the Drywell
    *      Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.4.5, RCS Operational Leakage
    The inspectors also verified electrical power requirements, labeling, hangers and
    support installation, and associated support systems status. The walkdowns included
                                              -6-                                    Enclosure
 
    evaluation of system piping and supports to ensure (1) piping and pipe supports did not
    show evidence of damage, (2) hangers were secure, and (3) component foundations
    were not degraded. The inspectors completed one inspection sample.
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant described below to assess:
    (1) the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources; (2) fire
    detection and suppression capabilities; (3) manual firefighting equipment and capability;
    (4) the condition of passive fire protection features, such as, electrical raceway fire
    barrier systems, fire doors, and fire barrier penetrations; and (5) any related
    compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the Pre-Fire Plan/Strategy Book
    during the fire protection inspections. The areas inspected were:
    *      Auxiliary building, 70-foot, RHR Pump B Room, fire Area AB-3, on October 11,
            2005
    *      Auxiliary building, 95-foot, HPCS piping area, fire Area AB-2/Z-2, on October 12,
            2005
    *      Auxiliary building, 95-foot, LPCS panel room, fire Area AB-6/Z33, on October 12,
            2005
    *      Control building, 116-foot, safety-related 125 Vdc switchgear room, fire
            Area C-24, on December 9, 2005
    *      Control building, 116-foot, safety-related Switchgear 1C room, fire Area C-22, on
            December 9, 2005
    *      Control building, 116-foot, safety-related ENB inverter Charger A room, fire
            Area C-18, on December 9, 2005
    The inspectors completed six inspection samples.
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
                                              -7-                                    Enclosure
 
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
  a. Inspection Scope
  .1 Annual Operating Examination Review
    Following the completion of the annual operating examination testing cycle, which ended
    the week of September 23, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of
    the annual individual job performance measure operating tests and simulator operating
    tests administered by the licensee during the operator licensing requalification cycle.
    Eight separate crews participated in simulator operating tests and job performance
    measure operating tests, totaling 52 licensed operators. All of the crews tested passed
    the simulator portion of the annual operating test. Two of the 52 licensed operators
    failed the job performance measure portion and were successfully remediated. These
    results were compared to the thresholds established in MC 0609, Appendix I, Operator
    Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process. The
    inspector completed one inspection sample.
  .2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review
    On November 15, 2005, the inspectors observed simulator training of an operating crew,
    as part of the operator requalification training program, to assess licensed operator
    performance and the training evaluators critique. The inspection included observation
    of high risk licensed operator actions, operator activities associated with the emergency
    plan, and lessons learned from industry and plant experiences. In addition, the
    inspectors compared simulator control panel configurations with the actual control room
    panels for consistency. The simulator examination scenario observed was RSMS-OPS-
    612, Loss of Vacuum/ATWS/Drywell Steam Leak - RPV Flooding, Revision 4. The
    inspectors completed one inspection sample.
  .3 Inadequate Emergency Event Classification Guidance
    On June 10, 2005, the inspectors observed operating crew performance in the simulator
    during annual requalification exam Scenario RSMS-OPS-509, SRV Tailpipe Steam
    Leak Inside The Drywell, Revision 3. The inspectors discussed crew actions and
    emergency planning requirements with the examination evaluators, training
    management, emergency planning coordinators, and operations management. The
    inspectors reviewed the following documents:
    *      EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12
    *      USAR 5.2.5.1.1, Detection of Leakage within the Drywell
    *      Vendor computer manual, VTD-A324-0109, Analog Devices MICROMAC-5000
            Final Draft, Leak Rate Detection PLC Documentation, River Bend Station -
            Reactor Building Sump Systems, Revision 0
                                              -8-                                    Enclosure
 
  *        Training Evaluation and Request, TEAR-RBS-2005-0477, Validating Leakage
            Report, issued August 23, 2005
  *        CR-RBS-2005-03078, Validating Leakage Report, initiated on August 26, 2005
  *        Standing Order Number 192, Drywell Leakage Greater Than 50 gpm EAL
            Guidance, Revision 0, issued November 3, 2005
b. Findings
  Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
  Section IV.B, for inadequate procedures for implementation of an Alert emergency
  action level (EAL).
  Description: On June 10 2005, the inspectors observed operating crew performance in
  the simulator during annual requalification exam Scenario RSMS-OPS-509, SRV
  Tailpipe Steam Leak Inside The Drywell, Revision 3. The inspectors noted that when
  the examination evaluators informed the team that the total drywell leakage report was
  84 gpm, the team declared an Alert based on that report. Procedure EIP-2-001,
  Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12, listed the criteria for an Alert EAL
  classification as Total drywell LEAKAGE greater than 50 gpm.
  Based on their observations in the simulator, the inspectors questioned the ability of the
  leakage computer installed in the plant to accurately calculate total drywell leakage
  under certain conditions. The inspectors analyzed the program run by the drywell
  leakage computer and determined: (1) the drywell leakage computer would not
  calculate total drywell leakage while a drywell sump pump was running; (2) computer
  reports of total drywell leakage printed while a drywell sump pump was running would be
  invalid; and (3) if a drywell high pressure or low reactor vessel level signal was present,
  the valves in the drywell sump pump discharge lines would close, causing the drywell
  sump pumps to run continuously, resulting in an invalid drywell total leakage report. The
  inspectors determined that the indication used by operators to determine if the criteria
  was met for declaring an Alert EAL due to total drywell leakage exceeding 50 gpm would
  not be valid under certain conditions.
  On August 23, 2005, the licensee initiated training evaluation action request TEAR-
  2005-0477 to evaluate this condition to determine what training actions were necessary.
  On August 26, 2005, the licensee initiated CR-RBS-2005-03078 that requested an
  alternate means of determining the primary coolant leak Alert EAL using main control
  room indications. The CR also requested additional training materials and classroom
  instruction to reinforce this change.
  On November 3, 2005, the licensee issued Standing Order 192 that provided additional
  criteria to be used to make the determination of whether a primary coolant leak rate
  Alert EAL declaration was required, without relying solely on the drywell leakage
  computer. The inspectors concluded that Standing Order 192 was an adequate interim
  compensatory measure until the licensee implemented permanent corrective actions.
                                            -9-                                      Enclosure
 
    Analysis: The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved an
    inadequate procedural criteria for declaring an Alert EAL in the event that total drywell
    leakage exceeds 50 gpm under certain conditions. Specifically, computed drywell
    leakrate used by operators to determine if total drywell leakage exceeds 50 gpm may be
    invalid under certain conditions. The finding was more than minor because it is
    associated with the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of procedural
    quality and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the licensee is capable of
    implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the
    event of a radiological emergency. The inadequate procedure could result in a failure to
    declare an Alert emergency classification when required. Using Manual Chapter 0609,
    Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, this
    finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since it was a failure to
    comply with a regulatory requirement associated with a risk-significant planning
    standard that did not result in the loss or degradation of that risk-significant planning
    standard function.
    Enforcement: The failure to provide adequate procedures for implementation of an EAL
    was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., which requires, in part,
    that the licensees emergency plan describe the means to be used for determining the
    impact of the release of radioactive materials including EALs. Because this finding was
    of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action
    program as CR-RBS-2005-03078, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent
    with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2005005-01,
    Inadequate procedure for implementation of an EAL.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors reviewed selected maintenance activities to verify the performance of
    assessments of plant risk related to planned and emergent maintenance work activities.
    The inspectors verified: (1) the adequacy of the risk assessments and the accuracy and
    completeness of the information considered, (2) management of the resultant risk and
    implementation of work controls and risk management actions, and (3) effective control
    of emergent work, including prompt reassessment of resultant plant risk. The inspectors
    completed three inspection samples.
  .1 Risk Assessment and Management of Risk
    On a routine basis, the inspectors verified performance of risk assessments, in
    accordance with administrative Procedure ADM-096, Risk Management Program
    Implementation and On-Line Maintenance Risk Assessment, Revision 04, for planned
    maintenance activities and emergent work involving structures, systems, and
    components within the scope of the maintenance rule. Specific work activities evaluated
    included the following planned and emergent work:
    *      October 23, 2005, Division I residual heat removal and standby service water
            equipment outage
                                              -10-                                      Enclosure
 
      *        November 28, 2005, Division III work week and station blackout diesel generator
              planned maintenance
  .2 Emergent Work Control
      During emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee took actions to minimize
      the probability of initiating events, maintained the functional capability of mitigating
      systems, and maintained barrier integrity. The inspectors also reviewed the emergent
      work activities to ensure the plant was not placed in an unacceptable configuration. The
      specific emergent work activity followed was the cleaning of high voltage insulators in
      the main transformer switchyard with a high pressure spray on October 7, 2005.
  b. Findings
      No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Operator Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions and Events
  c. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors completed the two inspection samples listed below.
  .1  Power Suppression Testing
      The inspectors observed portions of and reviewed control room records for power
      suppression testing conducted during the weekend of October 21, 2005. The inspectors
      reviewed the reactivity control plan, the prejob briefing given in the main control room at
      the beginning of the evolution and during control room operator and reactor engineer
      shift turnover. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the test with the reactor
      engineering representative and shift manager, including the recommendation to insert
      Control Rod 20-45 to suppress power in the vicinity of a potential leaking fuel bundle.
      Finally, the inspectors reviewed the postsuppression test off-gas pretreatment gaseous
      activity levels used to monitor the success of the suppression efforts.
  .2  Trip of Reactor Recirculation (RR) Flow Control Valve (FCV) Hydraulic Power
      Unit (HPU)
      On October 31, 2005, the inspectors observed operator response to a trip of RR FCV B
      HPU. As a result, RR FCV B began to drift open. The operators took action to limit or
      stop the gradual opening of RR FCV B. As RR FCV B continued to open, operators
      throttled closed RR FCV A to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent. These
      actions created an RR jet pump loop flow mismatch of greater than 5 percent requiring
      entry into TS Action 3.4.1.A. The inspectors reviewed the TS requirements for this
      condition and discussed the actions taken by the operators with the operations shift
                                              -11-                                      Enclosure


the system operating procedures (SOP) and piping and instrument drawings listedbelow and applicable sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).  The
  manager and members of plant management team present in the control room at the
inspectors completed two inspection samples.  *SOP-0031, "Residual Heat Removal System," Revision 46
   time. The following documents were reviewed by the inspectors as part of this
*SOP-0008, "Condensate Storage, Makeup and Transfer," Revision 16
  inspection:
*Piping and Instrument PID 04-03A, "Condensate Storage, Makeup andTransfer," Revision 13    b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.  2.Complete System Walkdown    a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted a complete walkdown of the drywell and containment leakdetection system during the week of June 26, 2005, during a drywell closeout inspectionand continuing the week of November 20, 2005.  The methods of inspection included
  C      Main Control Room Logs, October 31, 2005
field walkdown, in-office reviews, observation of system operation, and interviews ofcomputer engineering, operations, training, and emergency planning personnel.  The
  C      CR-RBS-2005-03748, During Filter RCS-FLTR2B replacement, technicians
inspectors verified:  (1) proper valve and control switch alignments, (2) computer
          bumped an electrical cable, causing a trip of the reactor recirculation flow control
program algorithm, (3) power supply lineup, (4) associated support system st
          Valve B hydraulic power unit
atus, and(5) that alarms and indications in the main control room were as specified in the
  C      W0 00075986, Replace grounded connection to Pressure Switch RCS-PDS90B
following documents:*SOP-0033, "Drywell and Containment Leak Detection System," Revision 11*USAR Section 5.2.5.1.1, "Detection of Leakage within the Drywell"*Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.4.5, "RCS Operational Leakage"The inspectors also verified electrical power requirements, labeling, hangers andsupport installation, and associated support systems status.  The walkdowns included
  C      SOP-0003, Reactor Recirculation System, Revision 35
Enclosure-7-evaluation of system piping and supports to ensure (1) piping and pipe supports did notshow evidence of damage, (2) hangers were secure, and (3) component foundations
  C      TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.4.1 and applicable Bases
were not degraded.  The inspectors completed one inspection sample.      b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection    a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant described below to assess: (1) the licensee's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources; (2) fire
i. Findings
detection and suppression capabilities; (3) manual firefighting equipment and capability;(4) the condition of passive fire protection features, such as, electrical raceway fire
  Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1
barrier systems, fire doors, and fire barrier penetrations; and (5) any relatedcompensatory measures.  The inspectors reviewed the Pre-Fire Plan/Strategy Book
  for the licensees failure to restore compliance with LCO 3.4.1 or shut down one RR loop
during the fire protection inspections.  The areas inspected were:
  within 2 hours of determining that RR loop jet pump flow mismatch was greater than
*Auxiliary building, 70-foot, RHR Pump B Room, fire Area AB-3, on October 11, 2005*Auxiliary building, 95-foot, HPCS piping area, fire Area AB-2/Z-2, on October 12, 2005*Auxiliary building, 95-foot, LPCS panel room, fire Area AB-6/Z33, on October 12, 2005*Control building, 116-foot, safety-related 125 Vdc switchgear room, fireArea C-24, on December 9, 2005*Control building, 116-foot, safety-related Switchgear 1C room, fire Area C-22, onDecember 9, 2005
  5 percent while operating at greater than 70 percent of rated core flow.
*Control building, 116-foot, safety-related ENB inverter Charger A room, fireArea C-18, on December 9, 2005The inspectors completed six inspection samples.      b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
  Description: On October 31, 2005, at 2:54 p.m., the RR FCV B HPU tripped. As a
Enclosure-8-1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program    a.Inspection Scope    .1Annual Operating Examination ReviewFollowing the completion of the annual operating examination testing cycle, which endedthe week of September 23, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results ofthe annual individual job performance measure operating tests and simulator operating
  result, RR FCV B began to drift open. The operators took action to limit or stop the
tests administered by the licensee during the operator licensing requalification cycle. Eight separate crews participated in simulator operating tests and job performance
  gradual opening of RR FCV B. As RR FCV B continued to open, operators throttled
measure operating tests, totaling 52 licensed operators.  All of the crews tested passed
  closed RR FCV A to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent.
the simulator portion of the annual operating test.  Two of the 52 licensed operators
  At 3:06 p.m., the operators entered TS LCO Condition 3.4.1.A because the RR loop jet
failed the job performance measure portion and were successfully remediated.  These
  pump flow mismatch exceeded 5 percent with the plant operating at greater than 70
results were compared to the thresholds established in MC 0609, Appendix I, "Operator
  percent rated core flow. The highest flow mismatch was 8.2 percent. TS Action
Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process."  The
  3.4.1.A.1 required the licensee to shut down one recirculation loop with 2 hours.
inspector completed one inspection sample.      .2Resident Inspector Quarterly ReviewOn November 15, 2005, the inspectors observed simulator training of an operating crew,as part of the operator requalification training program, to assess licensed operator
  The licensee issued a work request and began to troubleshoot the HPU trip. At the
performance and the training evaluator's critique.  The inspection included observation
  same time, operators requested that reactor engineers develop a reactivity control plan
of high risk licensed operator actions, operator activities associated with the emergency
  to insert control rods to lower reactor power. This would allow operators to reopen
plan, and lessons learned from industry and plant experiences.  In addition, the
  RR FCV A to reduce the RR jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than the required
inspectors compared simulator control panel configurations with the actual control room
  5 percent.
panels for consistency.  The simulator examination
  At 4:24 p.m., the licensee determined that the cause for the HPU trip was a blown
scenario observed was
  control power fuse. The fuse blew as a result of a grounded wire to a filter high
RSMS-OPS-612, "Loss of Vacuum/ATWS/Drywell Steam Leak - RPV Flooding," Revision 4.  The
  differential pressure switch, which was bumped by maintenance technicians who were
inspectors completed one
  changing the filter cartridge. The inspectors asked the operators and licensee
inspection sample.      .3Inadequate Emergency Event Classification Guidance
  management if they intended to shut down one RR loop or perform the actions
  On June 10, 2005, the inspectors observed operating crew performance in the simulatorduring annual requalification exam Scenario RSMS-OPS-509, "SRV Tailpipe Steam
  necessary to reduce the jet pump flow mismatch to less than 5 percent, as required by
Leak Inside The Drywell," Revision 3.  The inspectors discussed crew actions and
  TS 3.4.1. The licensee responded that they did not want to maneuver the plant and
emergency planning requirements with the examination evaluators, training
  change core conditions, which might exacerbate the existing condition of two leaking
management, emergency planning coordinators, and operations management.  The
  fuel bundles.
inspectors reviewed the following documents:*EIP-2-001, "Classification of Emergencies," Revision 12
                                            -12-                                     Enclosure
*USAR 5.2.5.1.1, "Detection of Leakage within the Drywell"  *Vendor computer manual, VTD-A324-0109, "Analog Devices MICROMAC-5000Final Draft, Leak Rate Detection PLC Documentation, River Bend Station -
 
Reactor Building Sump Systems," Revision 0
At 5:06 p.m., the operators exited TS Action 3.4.1.A without shutting down one RR loop
Enclosure-9-*Training Evaluation and Request, TEAR-RBS-2005-0477, "Validating LeakageReport," issued August 23, 2005*CR-RBS-2005-03078, "Validating Leakage Report," initiated on August 26, 2005
or reducing jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent. Instead they entered
*Standing Order Number 192, "Drywell Leakage Greater Than 50 gpm EALGuidance," Revision 0, issued November 3, 2005    b.FindingsIntroduction:  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.B, for inadequate procedures for implementation of an Alert emergency
TS Action 3.4.1.D.1, which required that the reactor be placed in Mode 3 in 12 hours.
action level (EAL). Description:  On June 10 2005, the inspectors observed operating crew performance inthe simulator during annual requalification exam Scenario RSMS-OPS-509, "SRV
When asked, the operators and licensee management stated that they could commence
Tailpipe Steam Leak Inside The Drywell," Revision 3.  The inspectors noted that when
a plant shutdown within the next 6 hours and still meet the requirement to be in Mode 3
the examination evaluators informed the team that the total drywell leakage report was84 gpm, the team declared an Alert based on that report.  Procedure EIP-2-001,
in 12 hours. They also stated that at the 6-hour point, they would commence the
"Classification of Emergencies," Revision 12, listed the criteria for an Alert EAL
classification as "Total drywell LEAKAGE greater than 50 gpm." Based on their observations in the simulator, the inspectors questioned the ability of theleakage computer installed in the plant to accurately calculate total drywell leakage
under certain conditions.  The inspectors analyzed the program run by the drywell
leakage computer and determined:  (1) the drywell leakage computer would not
calculate total drywell leakage while a drywell sump pump was running; (2) computer
reports of total drywell leakage printed while a drywell sump pump was running would be
invalid; and (3) if a drywell high pressure or low reactor vessel level signal was present,
the valves in the drywell sump pump discharge lines would close, causing the drywell
sump pumps to run continuously, resulting in an invalid drywell total leakage report.  The
inspectors determined that the indication used by operators to determine if the criteriawas met for declaring an Alert EAL due to total drywell leakage exceeding 50 gpm would
not be valid under certain conditions.On August 23, 2005, the licensee initiated training evaluation action request TEAR-2005-0477 to evaluate this condition to determine what training actions were necessary.
On August 26, 2005, the licensee initiated CR-RBS-2005-03078 that requested analternate means of determining the primary coolant leak Alert EAL using main control
room indications.  The CR also requested additional training materials and classroom
instruction to reinforce this change.On November 3, 2005, the licensee issued Standing Order 192 that provided additionalcriteria to be used to make the determination of whether a primary coolant leak rate
Alert EAL declaration was required, without relying solely on the drywell leakage
computer.  The inspectors concluded that Standing Order 192 was an adequate interim
compensatory measure until the licensee implemented permanent corrective actions.
Enclosure-10-Analysis:  The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved aninadequate procedural criteria for declaring an Alert EAL in the event that total drywell
leakage exceeds 50 gpm under certain conditions.  Specifically, computed drywell
leakrate used by operators to determine if total drywell leakage exceeds 50 gpm may be
invalid under certain conditions.  The finding was more than minor because it is
associated with the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of procedural
quality and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the licensee is capable of
implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the
event of a radiological emergency.  The inadequate procedure could result in a failure to
declare an Alert emergency classification when required.  Using Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," this
finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since it was a failure to
comply with a regulatory requirement associated with a risk-significant planning
standard that did not result in the loss or degradation of that risk-significant planningstandard function. Enforcement:  The failure to provide adequate procedures for implementation of an EALwas a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., which requires, in part,
that the licensee's emergency plan describe the means to be used for determining the
impact of the release of radioactive materials including EALs.  Because this finding was
of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee's corrective action
program as CR-RBS-2005-03078, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent
with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy:  NCV 05000458/2005005-01, Inadequate procedure for implementation of an EAL.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control    a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed selected maintenance activities to verify the performance ofassessments of plant risk related to planned and emergent maintenance work activities.
The inspectors verified:  (1) the adequacy of the risk assessments and the accuracy and
completeness of the information considered, (2) management of the resultant risk and
implementation of work controls and risk management actions, and (3) effective control
of emergent work, including prompt reassessment of resultant plant risk.  The inspectors
completed three inspection samples.      .1Risk Assessment and Management of RiskOn a routine basis, the inspectors verified performance of risk assessments, inaccordance with administrative Procedure ADM-096, "Risk Management Program
Implementation and On-Line Maintenance Risk Assessment," Revision 04, for planned
maintenance activities and emergent work involving structures, systems, andcomponents within the scope of the maintenance rule.  Specific work activities evaluated
included the following planned and emergent work:*October 23, 2005, Division I residual heat removal and standby service waterequipment outage
Enclosure-11-*November 28, 2005, Division III work week and station blackout diesel generatorplanned maintenance    .2Emergent Work ControlDuring emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee took actions to minimizethe probability of initiating events, maintained the functional capability of mitigatingsystems, and maintained barrier integrity.  The inspectors also reviewed the emergentwork activities to ensure the plant was not placed in an unacceptable configuration.  The
specific emergent work activity followed was the cleaning of high voltage insulators in
the main transformer switchyard with a high pressure spray on October 7, 2005.    b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R14Operator Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions and Events    c.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors completed the two inspection samples listed below.      .1Power Suppression TestingThe inspectors observed portions of and reviewed control room records for powersuppression testing conducted during the weekend of October 21, 2005.  The inspectors
reviewed the reactivity control plan, the prejob briefing given in the main control room at
the beginning of the evolution and during control room operator and reactor engineer
shift turnover.  The inspectors also reviewed the results of the test with the reactor
engineering representative and shift manager, including the recommendation to insert
Control Rod 20-45 to suppress power in the vicinity of a potential leaking fuel bundle.
Finally, the inspectors reviewed the postsuppression test off-gas pretreatment gaseous
activity levels used to monitor the success of the suppression efforts.   .2Trip of Reactor Recirculation (RR) Flow Control Valve (FCV) Hydraulic PowerUnit (HPU)On October 31, 2005, the inspectors observed operator response to a trip of RR FCV BHPU.  As a result, RR FCV B began to drift open.  The operators took action to limit or
stop the gradual opening of RR FCV B.  As RR FCV B continued to open, operators
throttled closed RR FCV A to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent.  These
actions created an RR jet pump loop flow mismatch of greater than 5 percent requiring
entry into TS Action 3.4.1.A.  The inspectors reviewed the TS requirements for this
condition and discussed the actions taken by the operators with the operations shift
Enclosure-12-manager and members of plant management team present in the control room at thetime.  The following documents were reviewed by the inspectors as part of this
inspection:Main Control Room Logs, October 31, 2005CR-RBS-2005-03748, During Filter RCS-FLTR2B replacement, techniciansbumped an electrical cable, causing a trip of the reactor recirculation flow control
Valve B hydraulic power unitW0 00075986, Replace grounded connection to Pressure Switch RCS-PDS90BSOP-0003, Reactor Recirculation System, Revision 35TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.4.1 and applicable Bases     i.FindingsIntroduction: The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1for the licensee's failure to restore compliance with LCO 3.4.1 or shut down one RR loop
within 2 hours of determining that RR loop jet pump flow mismatch was greater than
5 percent while operating at greater than 70 percent of rated core flow.Description: On October 31, 2005, at 2:54 p.m., the RR FCV B HPU tripped. As aresult, RR FCV B began to drift open. The operators took action to limit or stop the
gradual opening of RR FCV B. As RR FCV B continued to open, operators throttled
closed RR FCV A to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent. At 3:06 p.m., the operators entered TS LCO Condition 3.4.1.A because the RR loop jetpump flow mismatch exceeded 5 percent with the plant operating at greater than 70percent rated core flow. The highest flow mismatch was 8.2 percent. TS Action
3.4.1.A.1 required the licensee to shut down one recirculation loop with 2 hours.The licensee issued a work request and began to troubleshoot the HPU trip. At thesame time, operators requested that reactor engineers develop a reactivity control plan
to insert control rods to lower reactor power. This would allow operators to reopen
RR FCV A to reduce the RR jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than the required
5 percent. At 4:24 p.m., the licensee determined that the cause for the HPU trip was a blowncontrol power fuse. The fuse blew as a result of a grounded wire to a filter high
differential pressure switch, which was bumped by maintenance technicians who were
changing the filter cartridge. The inspectors asked the operators and licensee
management if they intended to shut down one RR loop or perform the actions
necessary to reduce the jet pump flow mismatch to less than 5 percent, as required by
TS 3.4.1. The licensee responded that they did not want to maneuver the plant andchange core conditions, which might exacerbate the existing condition of two leaking
fuel bundles.  
Enclosure-13-At 5:06 p.m., the operators exited TS Action 3.4.1.A without shutting down one RR loopor reducing jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent. Instead they entered
TS Action 3.4.1.D.1, which required that the reactor be placed in Mode 3 in 12 hours. When asked, the operators and licensee management stated that they could commencea plant shutdown within the next 6 hours and still meet the requirement to be in Mode 3in 12 hours. They also stated that at the 6-hour point, they would commence the
shutdown with the reactivity control plan to reduce reactor power by inserting control
shutdown with the reactivity control plan to reduce reactor power by inserting control
rods and open RR FCV A to reduce jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent.  
rods and open RR FCV A to reduce jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent.
If that was successful, they would then exit TS LCO 3.4.1.Subsequently, the repairs were completed to the pressure switch wire, the control powerfuse was replaced, and RR FCV B HPU was restarted. Following a one-hour warmup,
If that was successful, they would then exit TS LCO 3.4.1.
the RR FCV B HPU was returned to service. RR jet pump loop flow was reduced below
Subsequently, the repairs were completed to the pressure switch wire, the control power
5 percent and the licensee exited TS LCO 3.4.1. at 7:36 p.m., 4.5 hours after entry intoTS LCO Condition 3.4.1.A.The inspectors determined that: (1) when the cause of the trip of RR FCV B HPU wasdetermined to be the grounded pressure switch wire, the licensee knew that the time tomake the repairs and return the HPU to service would exceed the 2-hour completion
fuse was replaced, and RR FCV B HPU was restarted. Following a one-hour warmup,
the RR FCV B HPU was returned to service. RR jet pump loop flow was reduced below
5 percent and the licensee exited TS LCO 3.4.1. at 7:36 p.m., 4.5 hours after entry into
TS LCO Condition 3.4.1.A.
The inspectors determined that: (1) when the cause of the trip of RR FCV B HPU was
determined to be the grounded pressure switch wire, the licensee knew that the time to
make the repairs and return the HPU to service would exceed the 2-hour completion
time of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1; and (2) the licensee was capable of restoring RR jet pump
time of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1; and (2) the licensee was capable of restoring RR jet pump
loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent or shutting down one RR loop within the
loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent or shutting down one RR loop within the
2-hour completion time of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1. Analysis: The licensee's failure to restore compliance with TS LCO 3.4.1 or completethe required action of TS 3.4.1.A.1 to shut down one RR loop within 2 hours was aperformance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected,
2-hour completion time of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1.
it would become a more significant safety concern. According to TS LCO 3.4.1 Bases,
Analysis: The licensees failure to restore compliance with TS LCO 3.4.1 or complete
the required action of TS 3.4.1.A.1 to shut down one RR loop within 2 hours was a
performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected,
it would become a more significant safety concern. According to TS LCO 3.4.1 Bases,
the operation of the RR pumps is an initial condition assumed for the design basis loss-
the operation of the RR pumps is an initial condition assumed for the design basis loss-
of-coolant accident (LOCA). During a LOCA caused by a RR loop break, the intact RR
of-coolant accident (LOCA). During a LOCA caused by a RR loop break, the intact RR
loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the accident.  
loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the accident.
The initial core flow decrease is rapid because the RR pump in the broken loop ceases
The initial core flow decrease is rapid because the RR pump in the broken loop ceases
to pump water through the vessel almost immediately. The pump in the intact loop
to pump water through the vessel almost immediately. The pump in the intact loop
coasts down more slowly. This pump coast down governs the core flow response for
coasts down more slowly. This pump coast down governs the core flow response for
the next several seconds until the jet pump suctions are uncovered. The analyses
the next several seconds until the jet pump suctions are uncovered. The analyses
assume that both RR loops are operating at the same flow prior to the LOCA. However,if the LOCA analysis is reviewed for an initial jet pump flow mismatch with the break
assume that both RR loops are operating at the same flow prior to the LOCA. However,
if the LOCA analysis is reviewed for an initial jet pump flow mismatch with the break
assumed to be in the loop with the higher flow, the flow coast down and core response
assumed to be in the loop with the higher flow, the flow coast down and core response
are potentially more severe, since the intact loop starts at a lower flow rate. The significance of this finding could not be evaluated using MC 0609, "SignificanceDetermination Process.Based on management review, the finding was determined to
are potentially more severe, since the intact loop starts at a lower flow rate.
The significance of this finding could not be evaluated using MC 0609, Significance
Determination Process. Based on management review, the finding was determined to
be of very low safety significance based on the short duration of the flow mismatch,
be of very low safety significance based on the short duration of the flow mismatch,
4.5 hours, and the low likelihood of a LOCA during that time. The cause of this finding
4.5 hours, and the low likelihood of a LOCA during that time. The cause of this finding
is related to the cr
is related to the crosscutting element of human performance in that operators failed to
osscutting element of human performance in that operators failed toimplement TS requirements. Enforcement: TS LCO 3.4.1 states that two RR loops shall be in operation withmatched flows when the reactor is in Modes 1 or 2. If RR loop jet pump flow mismatch  
implement TS requirements.
Enclosure-14-is not less than or equal to 5 percent of rated core flow when operating at greater thanor equal to 70 percent of rated core flow (Condition 3.4.1.A), then the licensee must shutdown one RR loop (Required Action A.1) within 2 hours (Completion Time). Contrary to
Enforcement: TS LCO 3.4.1 states that two RR loops shall be in operation with
the above, on October 31 , 2005, 2 hours after RR loop jet pump flow mismatch was
matched flows when the reactor is in Modes 1 or 2. If RR loop jet pump flow mismatch
greater than 5 percent of rated core flow, the licensee exited TS 3.4.1.A.1 withoutshutting down one RR loop or restoring the jet pump flow mismatch to less than
                                        -13-                                   Enclosure
5 percent. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered
 
into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-2006-00274, this violation is
    is not less than or equal to 5 percent of rated core flow when operating at greater than
being treated as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A of the NRC EnforcementPolicy and is identified as NCV 05000458/2005005-02: Failure to complete TS required
    or equal to 70 percent of rated core flow (Condition 3.4.1.A), then the licensee must shut
actions within allowed completion time.1R15Operability Evaluations     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed selected operability determinations on the basis of potentialrisk importance. The selected samples are addressed in the condition reports (CRs)
    down one RR loop (Required Action A.1) within 2 hours (Completion Time). Contrary to
listed below. The inspectors assessed: (1) the accuracy of the evaluations, (2) the use
    the above, on October 31 , 2005, 2 hours after RR loop jet pump flow mismatch was
and control of compensatory measures if needed, and (3) compliance with TS, the
    greater than 5 percent of rated core flow, the licensee exited TS 3.4.1.A.1 without
Technical Requirements Manual, the USAR, and other associated design-basis
    shutting down one RR loop or restoring the jet pump flow mismatch to less than
documents. The inspectors' review included a verification that the operabilitydeterminations were made as specified by Entergy Procedure EN-OP-104, "OperabilityDeterminations," Revision 1. The operability evaluations reviewed were associated with:*CR-RBS-2004-1270, Check valves in primary Containment 113' elevation airlocknot included in the in-service testing program, reviewed on October 11, 2005*CR-RBS-2005-3563, Check valves in primary Containment 113' elevation airlocknot included in the in-service testing procedure, reviewed on October 19, 2005*CR-RBS-2005-3568, In-service test program changed for primary containment113' elevation airlock without changing in-service test procedure, reviewed on
    5 percent. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered
October 19, 2005*CR-RBS-2005-04251, -04252, Safety-related Inverter ENB-INV01B1 frequencyand safety-related instrument Bus VBS-PNL01B voltage out of specification high,
    into the licensees corrective action program as CR-RBS-2006-00274, this violation is
reviewed on December 27, 2005The inspectors completed two inspection samples.       f.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.  
    being treated as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A of the NRC Enforcement
Enclosure-15-1R16Operator Workarounds     a.Inspection ScopeAn operator workaround is defined as a degraded or nonconforming condition thatcomplicates the operation of plant equipment and is compensated for by operatoraction. During the week of November 28, 2005, the inspectors reviewed an operator
    Policy and is identified as NCV 05000458/2005005-02: Failure to complete TS required
workaround which required operators to hold the control switch for throttle valves for at
    actions within allowed completion time.
least 5 seconds after the full closed indication is received. The inspectors interviewed
1R15 Operability Evaluations
operators to determine if they knew specifically which valves were affected and if they
  a. Inspection Scope
were aware of this operational requirement from memory. During the week of December 5, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect ofthe existing operator workarounds on: (1) the reliability, availability, and potential formisoperation of any mitigati
    The inspectors reviewed selected operability determinations on the basis of potential
ng system; (2) whether they could increase the fr equency ofan initiating event; and (3) their effect on the operation of multiple mitigating systems. Inaddition, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds on
    risk importance. The selected samples are addressed in the condition reports (CRs)
the ability of the operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transientsand accidents. The procedures and other documents reviewed by the inspectors were:*Operator Workaround - Control Room Deficiency Program Guidelines,Revision 11
    listed below. The inspectors assessed: (1) the accuracy of the evaluations, (2) the use
    and control of compensatory measures if needed, and (3) compliance with TS, the
*Operator workaround report*Operator burden report
    Technical Requirements Manual, the USAR, and other associated design-basis
*Daily plant status reports
    documents. The inspectors review included a verification that the operability
*Operations shift turnover sheet
    determinations were made as specified by Entergy Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability
*Standing Order Number 190, "Electrically Operated Throttle Valve Operations,"Revision 0The inspectors completed two inspection samples.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R17Permanent Plant Modifications     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed MR96-0063, "Remove Internals of [Reactor Core IsolationCooling Turbine (RCIC) Exhaust Check Valve] E51-VF040," dated September 18, 1996,  
    Determinations, Revision 1. The operability evaluations reviewed were associated with:
Enclosure-16-and the assumptions made with respect to the capability of the RCIC turbine exhaustline vacuum breaker vent line. On December 10, 2004, the RCIC turbine was manually
    *       CR-RBS-2004-1270, Check valves in primary Containment 113' elevation airlock
started and ran for a short period of time before shutting down on high reactor water
              not included in the in-service testing program, reviewed on October 11, 2005
level. The RCIC exhaust line drain trap high level alarm came in and operators
    *       CR-RBS-2005-3563, Check valves in primary Containment 113' elevation airlock
observed water draining from the drain trap for 12 hours. The documents reviewed as
              not included in the in-service testing procedure, reviewed on October 19, 2005
part of this inspection are listed in the attachment. The inspectors completed one
    *       CR-RBS-2005-3568, In-service test program changed for primary containment
inspection sample.       b.FindingsIntroduction: The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to address a full spectrum of designconditions for the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker system as part of a plantmodification to remove the internals of the RCIC turbine exhaust line check valve. As a
              113' elevation airlock without changing in-service test procedure, reviewed on
result, on December 10, 2004, when RCIC was started and subsequently shut down on
              October 19, 2005
high reactor water level following a scram and loss of feedwater, the RCIC exhaust line
    *       CR-RBS-2005-04251, -04252, Safety-related Inverter ENB-INV01B1 frequency
filled with water from the suppression pool, causing the operators to consider RCIC
              and safety-related instrument Bus VBS-PNL01B voltage out of specification high,
unavailable, complicating their response to the event.Description: In September 1996, in response to a request from mechanicalmaintenance, design engineering processed a design change to remove RCIC Turbine
              reviewed on December 27, 2005
Exhaust Check Valve E51-VF040. As part of Modification Request MR-96-0063, an
    The inspectors completed two inspection samples.
evaluation was performed on the adequacy of the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum
  f. Findings
breaker system to prevent the siphoning of suppression pool water into the RCIC turbineexhaust line following a shutdown of the RCIC turbine. During the evaluation it was
    No findings of significance were identified.
determined that the as-built vacuum breaker vent line was not in accordance with the
                                              -14-                                   Enclosure
original design of the vacuum breaker line. A new calculation was performed for the
 
as-built configuration (globe valves and lift check valves versus gate valves and swing
1R16 Operator Workarounds
check valves). The basic assumption used for Calculation PH-056, "RCIC Turbine
  a. Inspection Scope
Exhaust Line Vacuum Breaker Vent Line Sizing Verification," Revision 1A, was that the
    An operator workaround is defined as a degraded or nonconforming condition that
RCIC exhaust line would be at equilibrium conditions when the turbine tripped. Theturbine would run long enough for the exhausted steam and exhaust piping to be at the
    complicates the operation of plant equipment and is compensated for by operator
same temperature and that the only cooling effect would be to ambient. The result was
    action.
that the gradual cooldown of the steam and exhaust piping would cause the formation of
    During the week of November 28, 2005, the inspectors reviewed an operator
a vacuum in approximately 35.5 minutes. The revised sizing calculation showed that theas-built vacuum breaker vent line was capable of relieving a vacuum created in as short
    workaround which required operators to hold the control switch for throttle valves for at
a time as 3.5 minutes.On December 10, 2004, following a reactor scram, RCIC was started to maintain reactorwater level due to the pending loss of all reactor feed pumps. When RCIC Steam to
    least 5 seconds after the full closed indication is received. The inspectors interviewed
Turbine Valve E51-MOV045 stroked full open, it automatically reclosed due to the high
    operators to determine if they knew specifically which valves were affected and if they
reactor water level interlock. It was later determined that steam was admitted to the
    were aware of this operational requirement from memory.
turbine for approximately 11 seconds. As a result, the steam in the exhaust line
    During the week of December 5, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of
condensed more rapidly than assumed and the exhaust line pressure became a vacuum
    the existing operator workarounds on: (1) the reliability, availability, and potential for
within 17 seconds. This rapid pressure reduction overwhelmed the vacuum breaker
    misoperation of any mitigating system; (2) whether they could increase the frequency of
vent line and 84 gallons of suppression pool water was siphoned into the RCIC turbine
    an initiating event; and (3) their effect on the operation of multiple mitigating systems. In
exhaust line.  
    addition, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds on
Enclosure-17-The licensee later determined that the static and dynamic loads on the turbine exhaustline for a restart on the RCIC turbine would be within design limits, although a water
    the ability of the operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients
hammer transient would occur. Based on test data provided by the turbine
    and accidents. The procedures and other documents reviewed by the inspectors were:
manufacturer, the licensee also determined that the turbine would experience no
    *       Operator Workaround - Control Room Deficiency Program Guidelines,
damage and not trip on overspeed if it were to be started with water in its exhaust line.  
              Revision 11
The turbine startup would be slower than normal, but within the assumed values in the
    *       Operator workaround report
safety analysis. The turbine exhaust line check valve internals were reinstalled in
    *       Operator burden report
February 2005.Analysis: The failure to adequately address worst case design conditions in the sizingcalculation for the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker vent line to allow for the
    *       Daily plant status reports
removal of the exhaust line check valve was a performance deficiency. The finding was
    *       Operations shift turnover sheet
more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone
    *       Standing Order Number 190, Electrically Operated Throttle Valve Operations,
attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the
              Revision 0
availability and reliability of the RCIC system, a system that responds to initiating events(loss of feedwater and station blackout), to prevent undesirable consequences. Using
    The inspectors completed two inspection samples.
the MC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding
  b. Findings
was determined to have very low safety significance because it represented a design
    No findings of significance were identified.
deficiency that did not result in a loss of system function. Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part,that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design change control
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Contrary to the
  a. Inspection Scope
above, the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker vent line sizing calculation, used
    The inspectors reviewed MR96-0063, Remove Internals of [Reactor Core Isolation
as part of the modification process to remove the exhaust line check valve, did not take
    Cooling Turbine (RCIC) Exhaust Check Valve] E51-VF040, dated September 18, 1996,
into consideration the most limiting exhaust line conditions. As a result the vacuum
                                              -15-                                     Enclosure
breaker vent line was not capable of preventing the siphoning of suppression pool water
 
into the RCIC Turbine Exhaust line. Because this finding was of very low safety
  and the assumptions made with respect to the capability of the RCIC turbine exhaust
significance and was documented in the licensee's corrective action program as  
  line vacuum breaker vent line. On December 10, 2004, the RCIC turbine was manually
CR-RBS-2005-00724, it is being treated as an NCV in accordance with Section IV. A of
  started and ran for a short period of time before shutting down on high reactor water
the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000458/2005005-03: Inadequate design assumption results in RCIC turbine exhaust header filling with waterfollowing an automatic high water level shutdown.1R19Postmaintenance Testing     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed selected work orders (WO) to ensure that testing activitieswere adequate to verify system operability and functional capability. The inspectors: (1) identified the safety function(s) for each system by reviewing applicable licensingbasis and/or design-basis documents; (2) reviewed each maintenance activity to identify
  level. The RCIC exhaust line drain trap high level alarm came in and operators
which maintenance function(s) may have been affected; (3) reviewed each test
  observed water draining from the drain trap for 12 hours. The documents reviewed as
procedure to verify that the procedure did adequately test the safety function(s) that mayhave been affected by the maintenance activity; (4) reviewed the acceptance criteria in
  part of this inspection are listed in the attachment. The inspectors completed one
the procedure to ensure consistency with information in the applicable licensing basis
  inspection sample.
and/or design-basis documents; and (5) identified that the procedure was properlyreviewed and approved. The eight WOs inspected are listed below:  
b. Findings
Enclosure-18-WO 00063768, replace hydrogen igniter in containment dome, review conductedduring the week of October 31, 2005WO 00075881, replace rod control and informati
  Introduction: The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50,
on system isolation transformer,reviewed during the week of October 31, 2005WO 00074806, rebuild control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit 4833, reviewconducted during the week of December 12, 2005WO 50969759, rebuild control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit 1625, reviewconducted during the week of December 12, 2005WO 00066597, rework Inverter BYS-INV01A to fix blown fuse problem, reviewconducted during the week of December 12, 2005WO 50968926, replace frequency detector board on Inverter ENB-INV01B1,review conducted during the week of December 12, 2005WO 00072137, quarterly inspection and lubrication of the station blackout diesel,review conducted during the week of December 19, 2005WO 50967030, clean, inspect, and lubricate the station blackout diesel, reviewconducted during the week of December 19, 2005The inspectors completed eight inspection samples.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors verified, by witnessing and reviewing test data, that risk-significantsystem and component surveillance tests met TS, USAR, and procedure requirements. The inspectors ensured that surveillance tests demonstrated that the systems were
  Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to address a full spectrum of design
capable of performing their intended safety functions and provided operational
  conditions for the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker system as part of a plant
readiness. The inspectors specifically: (1) evaluated surveillance tests forpreconditioning; (2) evaluated clear acceptance criteria, range, accuracy and current
  modification to remove the internals of the RCIC turbine exhaust line check valve. As a
calibration of test equipment; and (3) verified that equipment was properly restored at
  result, on December 10, 2004, when RCIC was started and subsequently shut down on
the completion of the testing. The inspectors observed and reviewed the following
  high reactor water level following a scram and loss of feedwater, the RCIC exhaust line
surveillance tests and surveillance test procedures (STP):STP-552-4202, "Post Accident Monitoring/Remote Shutdown System -Suppression Pool Water Level Channel Calibration (CMS-LT23B, CMS-ESX23B,
  filled with water from the suppression pool, causing the operators to consider RCIC
CMS-LI23B, CMS-TR40B, CMS-LIX23B)," Revision 9A, performed on
  unavailable, complicating their response to the event.
October 13, 2005  
  Description: In September 1996, in response to a request from mechanical
Enclosure-19-MCP-4303, "Functional Test of Standby Cooling Tower #1 Station BlackoutDivision I Standby Service Water Return Valve and Valve Logic
  maintenance, design engineering processed a design change to remove RCIC Turbine
(SWP-AOV599)," Revision 01A, performed on October 25, 2005STP-552-4502, "Post Accident Monitoring/Remote Shutdown System - DrywellPressure Channel Calibration (CMS-PT2A, CMS-T103, CMS-PR2A),"
  Exhaust Check Valve E51-VF040. As part of Modification Request MR-96-0063, an
Revision 14A, performed on November 28, 2005The inspectors completed three inspection samples.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications     a.Inspection ScopeDuring the week of December 19, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the following temporaryplant modifications: (1) temporary Alteration TA05-0015-00 to supply Division II safety-
  evaluation was performed on the adequacy of the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum
related 120 volt ac electrical distribution Panel SCM-PNL01B from safety-related power
  breaker system to prevent the siphoning of suppression pool water into the RCIC turbine
Supply RPS-XRC10B1 so that repairs to safety-related power Supply SCM-XRC14B1
  exhaust line following a shutdown of the RCIC turbine. During the evaluation it was
could be made; and (2) temporary Alteration TA05-0014-01 to install radiation shielding
  determined that the as-built vacuum breaker vent line was not in accordance with the
in front of standby gas treatment control Panels GTS-PNL28A/B until a permanent
  original design of the vacuum breaker line. A new calculation was performed for the
solution could be installed. This shielding was installed after an equipment qualification
  as-built configuration (globe valves and lift check valves versus gate valves and swing
evaluation showed that the total integrated dose for standby gas treatment Panel GTS-PNL28A/B could exceed qualification doses of internal electrical equipment after the
  check valves). The basic assumption used for Calculation PH-056, RCIC Turbine
annulus mixing system was retired. Specifically, the inspectors: (1) reviewed eachtemporary modification and its associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against  
  Exhaust Line Vacuum Breaker Vent Line Sizing Verification, Revision 1A, was that the
the system'sdesign basis documentation, including the USAR and TS; (2) verified that the installationof the temporary modification was consistent with the modification documents; and
  RCIC exhaust line would be at equilibrium conditions when the turbine tripped. The
(3) reviewed the postinstallation test results to confirm that the actual impact of the
  turbine would run long enough for the exhausted steam and exhaust piping to be at the
temporary modification on SCM-PNL01B and GTS-PNL28A/B had been adequately
  same temperature and that the only cooling effect would be to ambient. The result was
verified. The inspectors completed two inspection samples.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
  that the gradual cooldown of the steam and exhaust piping would cause the formation of
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP2Alert and Notification System Testing     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector discussed with licensee staff the status of offsite siren systems todetermine the adequacy of licensee methods for testing the alert and notificati on syst em
  a vacuum in approximately 35.5 minutes. The revised sizing calculation showed that the
Enclosure-20-in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. The licensee's alert and notificationsystem testing program was compared with criteria in NUREG-0654, "Criteria forPreparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and
  as-built vacuum breaker vent line was capable of relieving a vacuum created in as short
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, Federal Emergency
  a time as 3.5 minutes.
Management Agency (FEMA) Report REP-10, "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and
  On December 10, 2004, following a reactor scram, RCIC was started to maintain reactor
Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," and the licensee's current
  water level due to the pending loss of all reactor feed pumps. When RCIC Steam to
FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report. The inspector alsoreviewed Procedures EPP-2-701, "Prompt Notification System Maintenance and
  Turbine Valve E51-MOV045 stroked full open, it automatically reclosed due to the high
Testing," Revision 18, and EPP-2-401, "Inadvertent Siren Sounding," Revision 7. Theinspector completed one inspection sample.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1EP3Emergency Response Organization Augmentation     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the following documents to determine the licensee's ability tostaff emergency response facilities in accordance with the licensee emergency plan andthe requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.*EIP-2-006, "Notifications," Revision 32*EPP-2-502, "Emergency Communications Equipment Testing," Revision 21
  reactor water level interlock. It was later determined that steam was admitted to the
*Details of 10 staffing augmentation and quarterly pager dr
  turbine for approximately 11 seconds. As a result, the steam in the exhaust line
illsThe inspector completed one inspection sample.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the following documents related to the licensee's correctiveaction program to determine the licensee's ability to identify and correct problems inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E:*Quality assurance audits of the emergency preparedness program conducted in
  condensed more rapidly than assumed and the exhaust line pressure became a vacuum
2003, 2004, and 2005*Four licensee self-assessments
  within 17 seconds. This rapid pressure reduction overwhelmed the vacuum breaker
*Licensee evaluation reports for 11 drills and exercises  
  vent line and 84 gallons of suppression pool water was siphoned into the RCIC turbine
Enclosure-21-*Summaries of 146 corrective actions assigned to the emergency preparednessdepartment between February 2003 and October 2005*Details of 17 selected CRs
  exhaust line.
The licensee's corrective action program was also compared with the requirements ofProcedure EN-LI-102, "Corrective Action Process," Revision 2. The inspector
                                            -16-                                   Enclosure
independently evaluated the emergency operations facility during an October 18, 2005,drill and compared the postdrill critique of licensee performance. The inspectorcompleted one inspection sample.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1EP6Drill Evaluation     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill
 
conducted on October 18,2005, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and
    The licensee later determined that the static and dynamic loads on the turbine exhaust
protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors also
    line for a restart on the RCIC turbine would be within design limits, although a water
evaluated the licensee assessment of classification, notification, and protective actionrecommendation development during the drill in accordance with plant procedures andNRC guidelines. The inspectors also observed the drill evaluator immediate critiques ofthe drill participants classification, notification, and protective action recommendationactivities. The following procedures and documents were reviewed during the
    hammer transient would occur. Based on test data provided by the turbine
assessment:EIP-2-001, "Classification of Emergencies," Revision 13EIP-2-006, "Notifications," Revision 32EIP-2-007, "Protective Action Guidelines Recommendations," Revision 21The inspectors completed one
    manufacturer, the licensee also determined that the turbine would experience no
inspection sample.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.  
    damage and not trip on overspeed if it were to be started with water in its exhaust line.
Enclosure-22-2.RADIATION SAFETYCornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining individual andcollective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The
    The turbine startup would be slower than normal, but within the assumed values in the
inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensee's procedures
    safety analysis. The turbine exhaust line check valve internals were reinstalled in
required by TS as criteria for determining compliance. The inspector interviewed
    February 2005.
licensee personnel and reviewed:*Current 3-year rolling average collective exposure
    Analysis: The failure to adequately address worst case design conditions in the sizing
*Three on-line maintenance work activities scheduled during the inspection periodand associated work activity exposure estimates which were likely to result in the
    calculation for the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker vent line to allow for the
highest personnel collective exposures*Site-specific ALARA procedures
    removal of the exhaust line check valve was a performance deficiency. The finding was
*ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigationrequirements*Intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for anyinconsistencies *Dose rate reduction activities in work planning
    more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone
*Method for adjusting exposure estimates, or replanning work, when unexpectedchanges in scope or emergent work were encountered*Use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions and dose reductionbenefits afforded by shielding*Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during workactivities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas *Self-assessments and audits related to the ALARA program since the lastinspection*Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-upactivities such as initial problem identification, characterization, and trackingThe inspector completed 9 of the required 15 inspection samples and 2 of the optionalinspection samples.  
    attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the
Enclosure-23-    b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES
    availability and reliability of the RCIC system, a system that responds to initiating events
4OA1Performance Indicator VerificationEmergency Preparedness Cornerstone    a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators listed belowfor the period July 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005. The definitions and guidanceof NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revisions 2 and 3, were
    (loss of feedwater and station blackout), to prevent undesirable consequences. Using
used to verify the licensee's basis for reporting each data element in order to verify the
    the MC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding
accuracy of performance indicator data reported during the assessment period. The
    was determined to have very low safety significance because it represented a design
licensee's performance indicator data was also reviewed against the requirements of
    deficiency that did not result in a loss of system function.
Procedure EN-LI-114, "Performance Indicator Process," Revision 0.*Drill and Exercise Performance*Emergency Response Organization Participation
    Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part,
*Alert and Notification System ReliabilityThe inspector reviewed a 100 percent sample of dr
    that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design change control
ill and exercise scenarios, licensedoperator simulator training sessions, notification forms, and attendance and critique
    measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Contrary to the
records associated with training sessions, drills, and exercises conducted during theverification period. The inspector reviewed emergency responder qualification, training,
    above, the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker vent line sizing calculation, used
and drill participation records for 20 key licensee emergency response personnel. Theinspector reviewed procedures for conducting siren testing and a 100 percent sample of
    as part of the modification process to remove the exhaust line check valve, did not take
siren test records. The inspector also interviewed licensee personnel that were
    into consideration the most limiting exhaust line conditions. As a result the vacuum
accountable for collecting and evaluating the performance indicator data.The inspector completed three inspection samples.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems   1.Emergency Preparedness Annual Sample Review    a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed a summary listing of 146 corrective actions assigned to theemergency preparedness department, reviewed 17 CRs in detail, and independently  
    breaker vent line was not capable of preventing the siphoning of suppression pool water
Enclosure-24-assessed the licensee's ability to identify problems associated with an October 18, 2005,integrated drill, in order to assess the licensee's ability to identify and correct problems. The inspector completed one inspection sample.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.   2.ALARA Planning and Controls Annual Sample Review     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's problem identification andresolution processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels,
    into the RCIC Turbine Exhaust line. Because this finding was of very low safety
and radiation worker practices. The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents
    significance and was documented in the licensees corrective action program as
listed in the attachment against the licensee's problem identification and resolution
    CR-RBS-2005-00724, it is being treated as an NCV in accordance with Section IV. A of
program requirements. The inspector completed one inspection sample.       b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.   3.Semiannual Trend Review     a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a 6-month review of the licensee's corrective action programand associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a moresignificant safety issue. The inspector's review was focused on repetitive issues, but
    the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000458/2005005-03:
also considered the results of daily inspector screening of CRs and licensee trending
    Inadequate design assumption results in RCIC turbine exhaust header filling with water
efforts. The inspector's review considered the six month period of July through
    following an automatic high water level shutdown.
December 2005. Inspectors reviewed 76 specific CRs and their associated operabilityevaluations. Operability determinations set the priority for corrective actions to resolve
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing
conditions adverse to quality. The CR numbers are listed in the attachment.The inspectors also evaluated the CRs and the operability determinations against therequirements of the following guidance documents:*Procedure EN-LI-102, "Corrective Action Process," Revision 1
  a. Inspection Scope
*Procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determinations," Revision 1*Procedure OSP-0040, "LCO Tracking and Safety Function DeterminationProgram," Revision 10*MC 9900, "Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments forResolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or
    The inspectors reviewed selected work orders (WO) to ensure that testing activities
Safety," dated September 26, 2005  
    were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability. The inspectors:
Enclosure-25-The inspectors completed one inspection sample.       b.Assessment and ObservationsThere were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors determined that anumber of operability determinations stated that the equipment that was the subject ofthe CR was currently inoperable and being tracked using the LCO Tracking System.  
    (1) identified the safety function(s) for each system by reviewing applicable licensing
The inspectors found that this system was an effective mechanism for resolution of TSLCOs. However, from a corrective action program perspective, there was no closure of
    basis and/or design-basis documents; (2) reviewed each maintenance activity to identify
the condition adverse to quality (system inoperability) or a discussion of the correctiveactions taken to restore the equipment to operable status in the subject CR. In addition,
    which maintenance function(s) may have been affected; (3) reviewed each test
the inspectors observed that a number of operability determinations describedconditions where the system was declared operable but t
    procedure to verify that the procedure did adequately test the safety function(s) that may
he system or a support systemwas in a degraded or nonconforming condition. In some cases, compensatory actions
    have been affected by the maintenance activity; (4) reviewed the acceptance criteria in
were being taken to ensure system operability, but no mechanism was in place toensure that these compensatory measures remained in place until the degraded ornonconforming condition was corrected. The inspectors did not find any examples
    the procedure to ensure consistency with information in the applicable licensing basis
where the nonconforming condition was not corrected within a reasonable period of
    and/or design-basis documents; and (5) identified that the procedure was properly
time.   4.Resident Inspector Annual Sample ReviewThe inspectors completed two inspection samples.
    reviewed and approved. The eight WOs inspected are listed below:
Ultimate Heat Sink Long Term Heat Removal Capacity     c.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed CR-RBS-2002-01243, ultimate heat sink capacity less than the30-day requirement, during the week of November 28, 2005. The inspectors evaluated
                                              -17-                                     Enclosure
the CR against the requirements of the licensee's corrective action program as
 
described in nuclear management manual Procedure LI-102, "Corrective Action
    C      WO 00063768, replace hydrogen igniter in containment dome, review conducted
Process," Revision 4, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.     b. Findings and ObservationsThere were no findings of significance identified. On August 28, 2002, the inspectorsfound: (1) the single failure assumption made for the design of the ultimate heat sink
            during the week of October 31, 2005
was a trip of standby diesel Generator B immediately after a small line break event, with
    C      WO 00075881, replace rod control and information system isolation transformer,
bypass, coincident with a loss-of-offsite power and plant trip, (2) the ultimate heat sink
            reviewed during the week of October 31, 2005
capacity would be less than 30 days if, instead, all ECCS systems worked as designedand no operator actions were taken to secure ECCS, and (3) specific procedures to
    C      WO 00074806, rebuild control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit 4833, review
replenish the ultimate heat sink during a loss-of-offsite power had not been written. In
            conducted during the week of December 12, 2005
response to the inspectors' concerns, the licensee wrote CR-RBS-2002-01243 and took
    C      WO 50969759, rebuild control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit 1625, review
the following corrective actions: (1) revised their procedures to clarify operator actions if
            conducted during the week of December 12, 2005
no single failure occurred and to provide instructions for makeup to the ultimate heat  
    C      WO 00066597, rework Inverter BYS-INV01A to fix blown fuse problem, review
Enclosure-26-sink during a 30-day loss-of-offsite power; and (2) issued license amendment RequestLAR-2001-026, dated March 18, 2003, to revise their TS Bases 3.7, "Standby ServiceWater System and Ultimate Heat Sink," and USAR.Simulator Fidelity Issue Regarding Wide-Range Level Recorders     d.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee in response to NCV 05000458/2004005-02, wide-range reactor water level indication did not respond
            conducted during the week of December 12, 2005
as expected by operators following an unplanned reactor scram. On December 10,
    C      WO 50968926, replace frequency detector board on Inverter ENB-INV01B1,
2004, a failure of a balance of plant instrument bus caused the feedwater regulatingvalves to fail in their 100 percent flow position. Following a reactor scram, the feedwater
            review conducted during the week of December 12, 2005
pumps overfed the reactor and tripped on high reactor water level. The excess
    C      WO 00072137, quarterly inspection and lubrication of the station blackout diesel,
feedwater caused reactor water level to continue to rise after the feed pump trip. The
            review conducted during the week of December 19, 2005
wide-range level recorders' digital output continued to indicate reactor water level
    C      WO 50967030, clean, inspect, and lubricate the station blackout diesel, review
greater than +60 inches, the top end of the wide-range level instruments. The reactoroperators were not aware that the recorders' digital output would continue to increasebeyond +60 inches because the digital readout of wide-range level recorders in the
            conducted during the week of December 19, 2005
simulator stopped at +60 inches. This response caused some confusion and
    The inspectors completed eight inspection samples.
complicated the operators' response to the event. The inspectors reviewed CR-RBS-
  b. Findings
2004-04289, -04295, -04296 and -04299 written by the licensee in response to this
    No findings of significance were identified.
event.     e.Findings and ObservationsThere were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors found that, when adesign change was implemented changing the wide-range reactor water level recorders
1R22 Surveillance Testing
from analog to digital models, the simulator modification made the software for the
  a. Inspection Scope
recorders stop indicating at the top of scale (+60 inches). The digital recorders installed
    The inspectors verified, by witnessing and reviewing test data, that risk-significant
in the control room, however, had no upper limit on the digital indication. On
    system and component surveillance tests met TS, USAR, and procedure requirements.
December 10, 2004, reactor water level rose above the reference leg tap for the level
    The inspectors ensured that surveillance tests demonstrated that the systems were
transmitter and, as the reference leg condensing chamber cooled down, the wide-range
    capable of performing their intended safety functions and provided operational
level transmitters' output continued to increase and the digital indication showed a level
    readiness. The inspectors specifically: (1) evaluated surveillance tests for
as high as +140 inches. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the
    preconditioning; (2) evaluated clear acceptance criteria, range, accuracy and current
licensee and determined that they were reasonable and adequate to correct the
    calibration of test equipment; and (3) verified that equipment was properly restored at
operator knowledge deficiency caused by the simulator fidelity issue. The inspectors
    the completion of the testing. The inspectors observed and reviewed the following
interviewed a cross-section of control room operators and determined that the
    surveillance tests and surveillance test procedures (STP):
phenomena was understood and they understood that any wide-range digital indication
    C      STP-552-4202, "Post Accident Monitoring/Remote Shutdown System -
greater that +60 inches was invalid and not indicative of actual reactor water level.4OA3Event Followup1.(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-458/04-001-00, Automatic Reactor ScramDue to Main Generator Trip Resulting from Switchyard FaultOn August 15, 2004, a transmission tower guy wire failed. This allowed a 230 kVtransmission line structure between Port Hudson and Fancy Point (Line 353) to fall and  
            Suppression Pool Water Level Channel Calibration (CMS-LT23B, CMS-ESX23B,
Enclosure-27-create a ground fault condition on the line. Four breakers in the station switchyard wereslow to open to clear the fault. As a result: (1) Reserve Station Transformer 2 was
            CMS-LI23B, CMS-TR40B, CMS-LIX23B)," Revision 9A, performed on
deenergized, causing a partial loss of off-site power and start of the Division 2
            October 13, 2005
emergency diesel generator; and (2) main transformer protection relays caused a main
                                            -18-                                     Enclosure
generator lockout, which resulted in a generator load reject reactor scram.NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000458/2004005, issued February 14, 2005,documented a Green, self-revealing finding associated with this event for preconditioned
 
speed testing of station switchyard breakers and three similar failures of station
    C        MCP-4303, Functional Test of Standby Cooling Tower #1 Station Blackout
switchyard breakers. The licensee revised the speed testing procedures to avoid
              Division I Standby Service Water Return Valve and Valve Logic
preconditioning the breakers.NRC Supplemental Inspection Report 05000458/2005012, issued October 24, 2005,documented a supplemental inspection performed in accordance with Inspection
              (SWP-AOV599), Revision 01A, performed on October 25, 2005
Procedure 95001. The supplemental inspection was in response to four unplanned
    C        STP-552-4502, "Post Accident Monitoring/Remote Shutdown System - Drywell
reactor scrams that occurred between August 15, 2004, and January 15, 2005. Thelicensee's root cause analysis identified several programmatic changes which were
              Pressure Channel Calibration (CMS-PT2A, CMS-T103, CMS-PR2A),"
incorporated into a switchyard reliability program to improve switchyard maintenancepractices.The inspectors reviewed the LER and the licensee's resolution of identified problemsand determined there were no findings of significance and no other violations of NRC
              Revision 14A, performed on November 28, 2005
requirements. The licensee documented the failed equipment in CR-RBS-2004-02332.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit MeetingsOn October 21, 2005, the inspector presented the emergency preparedness inspectionresults to Mr. J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Planning, and other members of his
    The inspectors completed three inspection samples.
staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary
  b. Findings
information was not provided or examined during the inspection.On November 4, 2005, the inspector presented the licensed operator requalificationprogram inspection results to Mr. Mike Cantrell, Operations Training Supervisor, and
    No findings of significance were identified.
other members of the licensee's management staff. The licensee acknowledged the
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
findings presented. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not
  a. Inspection Scope
provided or examined during the inspection.On December 8, 2005, the inspector presented the ALARA inspection results toMr. R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of his staff who
    During the week of December 19, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the following temporary
acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was
    plant modifications: (1) temporary Alteration TA05-0015-00 to supply Division II safety-
not provided or examined during the inspection.  
    related 120 volt ac electrical distribution Panel SCM-PNL01B from safety-related power
Enclosure-28-On January 4, 2006, the inspectors presented the integrated baseline inspection resultsto Paul Henninkamp, Vice President, Operations, and other members of licensee
    Supply RPS-XRC10B1 so that repairs to safety-related power Supply SCM-XRC14B1
management. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or
    could be made; and (2) temporary Alteration TA05-0014-01 to install radiation shielding
examined during the inspection.ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION  
    in front of standby gas treatment control Panels GTS-PNL28A/B until a permanent
A-1AttachmentSUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATIONKEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicensee PersonnelM. Boyle, Manager, Radiation ProtectionD. Burnett, Superintendent, Chemistry
    solution could be installed. This shielding was installed after an equipment qualification
    evaluation showed that the total integrated dose for standby gas treatment Panel GTS-
    PNL28A/B could exceed qualification doses of internal electrical equipment after the
    annulus mixing system was retired. Specifically, the inspectors: (1) reviewed each
    temporary modification and its associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system's
    design basis documentation, including the USAR and TS; (2) verified that the installation
    of the temporary modification was consistent with the modification documents; and
    (3) reviewed the postinstallation test results to confirm that the actual impact of the
    temporary modification on SCM-PNL01B and GTS-PNL28A/B had been adequately
    verified. The inspectors completed two inspection samples.
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
    Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspector discussed with licensee staff the status of offsite siren systems to
    determine the adequacy of licensee methods for testing the alert and notification system
                                              -19-                                   Enclosure
 
    in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. The licensees alert and notification
    system testing program was compared with criteria in NUREG-0654, Criteria for
    Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and
    Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) Report REP-10, Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and
    Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, and the licensees current
    FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report. The inspector also
    reviewed Procedures EPP-2-701, Prompt Notification System Maintenance and
    Testing, Revision 18, and EPP-2-401, Inadvertent Siren Sounding, Revision 7. The
    inspector completed one inspection sample.
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspector reviewed the following documents to determine the licensees ability to
    staff emergency response facilities in accordance with the licensee emergency plan and
    the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
    *       EIP-2-006, Notifications, Revision 32
    *       EPP-2-502, Emergency Communications Equipment Testing, Revision 21
    *       Details of 10 staffing augmentation and quarterly pager drills
    The inspector completed one inspection sample.
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspector reviewed the following documents related to the licensees corrective
    action program to determine the licensees ability to identify and correct problems in
    accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E:
    *       Quality assurance audits of the emergency preparedness program conducted in
            2003, 2004, and 2005
    *       Four licensee self-assessments
    *       Licensee evaluation reports for 11 drills and exercises
                                            -20-                                     Enclosure
 
    *       Summaries of 146 corrective actions assigned to the emergency preparedness
              department between February 2003 and October 2005
    *       Details of 17 selected CRs
    The licensees corrective action program was also compared with the requirements of
    Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 2. The inspector
    independently evaluated the emergency operations facility during an October 18, 2005,
    drill and compared the postdrill critique of licensee performance. The inspector
    completed one inspection sample.
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on October 18,
    2005, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and
    protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors also
    evaluated the licensee assessment of classification, notification, and protective action
    recommendation development during the drill in accordance with plant procedures and
    NRC guidelines. The inspectors also observed the drill evaluator immediate critiques of
    the drill participants classification, notification, and protective action recommendation
    activities. The following procedures and documents were reviewed during the
    assessment:
    C        EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 13
    C        EIP-2-006, Notifications, Revision 32
    C        EIP-2-007, Protective Action Guidelines Recommendations, Revision 21
    The inspectors completed one inspection sample.
  b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
                                                -21-                                 Enclosure
 
2.   RADIATION SAFETY
      Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspector assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining individual and
      collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The
      inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees procedures
      required by TS as criteria for determining compliance. The inspector interviewed
      licensee personnel and reviewed:
      *       Current 3-year rolling average collective exposure
      *       Three on-line maintenance work activities scheduled during the inspection period
              and associated work activity exposure estimates which were likely to result in the
              highest personnel collective exposures
      *       Site-specific ALARA procedures
      *       ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation
              requirements
      *       Intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any
              inconsistencies
      *       Dose rate reduction activities in work planning
      *       Method for adjusting exposure estimates, or replanning work, when unexpected
              changes in scope or emergent work were encountered
      *       Use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions and dose reduction
              benefits afforded by shielding
      *       Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work
              activities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas
      *       Self-assessments and audits related to the ALARA program since the last
              inspection
      *       Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-up
              activities such as initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking
      The inspector completed 9 of the required 15 inspection samples and 2 of the optional
      inspection samples.
                                                -22-                                     Enclosure
 
     b. Findings
      No findings of significance were identified.
4.     OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
      Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
     a. Inspection Scope
      The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators listed below
      for the period July 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005. The definitions and guidance
      of NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revisions 2 and 3, were
      used to verify the licensees basis for reporting each data element in order to verify the
      accuracy of performance indicator data reported during the assessment period. The
      licensees performance indicator data was also reviewed against the requirements of
      Procedure EN-LI-114, Performance Indicator Process, Revision 0.
      *       Drill and Exercise Performance
      *       Emergency Response Organization Participation
      *       Alert and Notification System Reliability
      The inspector reviewed a 100 percent sample of drill and exercise scenarios, licensed
      operator simulator training sessions, notification forms, and attendance and critique
      records associated with training sessions, drills, and exercises conducted during the
      verification period. The inspector reviewed emergency responder qualification, training,
      and drill participation records for 20 key licensee emergency response personnel. The
      inspector reviewed procedures for conducting siren testing and a 100 percent sample of
      siren test records. The inspector also interviewed licensee personnel that were
      accountable for collecting and evaluating the performance indicator data.
      The inspector completed three inspection samples.
    b. Findings
      No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
  1. Emergency Preparedness Annual Sample Review
     a. Inspection Scope
      The inspector reviewed a summary listing of 146 corrective actions assigned to the
      emergency preparedness department, reviewed 17 CRs in detail, and independently
                                                -23-                                   Enclosure
 
    assessed the licensees ability to identify problems associated with an October 18, 2005,
    integrated drill, in order to assess the licensees ability to identify and correct problems.
    The inspector completed one inspection sample.
b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
2. ALARA Planning and Controls Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
    The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's problem identification and
    resolution processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels,
    and radiation worker practices. The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents
    listed in the attachment against the licensees problem identification and resolution
    program requirements. The inspector completed one inspection sample.
b. Findings
    No findings of significance were identified.
3. Semiannual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors performed a 6-month review of the licensees corrective action program
    and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more
    significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive issues, but
    also considered the results of daily inspector screening of CRs and licensee trending
    efforts. The inspectors review considered the six month period of July through
    December 2005. Inspectors reviewed 76 specific CRs and their associated operability
    evaluations. Operability determinations set the priority for corrective actions to resolve
    conditions adverse to quality. The CR numbers are listed in the attachment.
    The inspectors also evaluated the CRs and the operability determinations against the
    requirements of the following guidance documents:
    *       Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 1
    *       Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determinations, Revision 1
    *       Procedure OSP-0040, LCO Tracking and Safety Function Determination
            Program, Revision 10
    *       MC 9900, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for
            Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or
            Safety, dated September 26, 2005
                                              -24-                                       Enclosure
 
    The inspectors completed one inspection sample.
b. Assessment and Observations
    There were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors determined that a
    number of operability determinations stated that the equipment that was the subject of
    the CR was currently inoperable and being tracked using the LCO Tracking System.
    The inspectors found that this system was an effective mechanism for resolution of TS
    LCOs. However, from a corrective action program perspective, there was no closure of
    the condition adverse to quality (system inoperability) or a discussion of the corrective
    actions taken to restore the equipment to operable status in the subject CR. In addition,
    the inspectors observed that a number of operability determinations described
    conditions where the system was declared operable but the system or a support system
    was in a degraded or nonconforming condition. In some cases, compensatory actions
    were being taken to ensure system operability, but no mechanism was in place to
    ensure that these compensatory measures remained in place until the degraded or
    nonconforming condition was corrected. The inspectors did not find any examples
    where the nonconforming condition was not corrected within a reasonable period of
    time.
4. Resident Inspector Annual Sample Review
    The inspectors completed two inspection samples.
    Ultimate Heat Sink Long Term Heat Removal Capacity
c. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors reviewed CR-RBS-2002-01243, ultimate heat sink capacity less than the
    30-day requirement, during the week of November 28, 2005. The inspectors evaluated
    the CR against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as
    described in nuclear management manual Procedure LI-102, Corrective Action
    Process, Revision 4, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
b. Findings and Observations
    There were no findings of significance identified. On August 28, 2002, the inspectors
    found: (1) the single failure assumption made for the design of the ultimate heat sink
    was a trip of standby diesel Generator B immediately after a small line break event, with
    bypass, coincident with a loss-of-offsite power and plant trip, (2) the ultimate heat sink
    capacity would be less than 30 days if, instead, all ECCS systems worked as designed
    and no operator actions were taken to secure ECCS, and (3) specific procedures to
    replenish the ultimate heat sink during a loss-of-offsite power had not been written. In
    response to the inspectors' concerns, the licensee wrote CR-RBS-2002-01243 and took
    the following corrective actions: (1) revised their procedures to clarify operator actions if
    no single failure occurred and to provide instructions for makeup to the ultimate heat
                                            -25-                                     Enclosure
 
      sink during a 30-day loss-of-offsite power; and (2) issued license amendment Request
      LAR-2001-026, dated March 18, 2003, to revise their TS Bases 3.7, Standby Service
      Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink, and USAR.
      Simulator Fidelity Issue Regarding Wide-Range Level Recorders
  d. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee in response to
      NCV 05000458/2004005-02, wide-range reactor water level indication did not respond
      as expected by operators following an unplanned reactor scram. On December 10,
      2004, a failure of a balance of plant instrument bus caused the feedwater regulating
      valves to fail in their 100 percent flow position. Following a reactor scram, the feedwater
      pumps overfed the reactor and tripped on high reactor water level. The excess
      feedwater caused reactor water level to continue to rise after the feed pump trip. The
      wide-range level recorders' digital output continued to indicate reactor water level
      greater than +60 inches, the top end of the wide-range level instruments. The reactor
      operators were not aware that the recorders digital output would continue to increase
      beyond +60 inches because the digital readout of wide-range level recorders in the
      simulator stopped at +60 inches. This response caused some confusion and
      complicated the operators' response to the event. The inspectors reviewed CR-RBS-
      2004-04289, -04295, -04296 and -04299 written by the licensee in response to this
      event.
  e. Findings and Observations
      There were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors found that, when a
      design change was implemented changing the wide-range reactor water level recorders
      from analog to digital models, the simulator modification made the software for the
      recorders stop indicating at the top of scale (+60 inches). The digital recorders installed
      in the control room, however, had no upper limit on the digital indication. On
      December 10, 2004, reactor water level rose above the reference leg tap for the level
      transmitter and, as the reference leg condensing chamber cooled down, the wide-range
      level transmitters output continued to increase and the digital indication showed a level
      as high as +140 inches. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the
      licensee and determined that they were reasonable and adequate to correct the
      operator knowledge deficiency caused by the simulator fidelity issue. The inspectors
      interviewed a cross-section of control room operators and determined that the
      phenomena was understood and they understood that any wide-range digital indication
      greater that +60 inches was invalid and not indicative of actual reactor water level.
4OA3 Event Followup
1.   (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-458/04-001-00, Automatic Reactor Scram
      Due to Main Generator Trip Resulting from Switchyard Fault
      On August 15, 2004, a transmission tower guy wire failed. This allowed a 230 kV
      transmission line structure between Port Hudson and Fancy Point (Line 353) to fall and
                                              -26-                                   Enclosure
 
    create a ground fault condition on the line. Four breakers in the station switchyard were
    slow to open to clear the fault. As a result: (1) Reserve Station Transformer 2 was
    deenergized, causing a partial loss of off-site power and start of the Division 2
    emergency diesel generator; and (2) main transformer protection relays caused a main
    generator lockout, which resulted in a generator load reject reactor scram.
    NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000458/2004005, issued February 14, 2005,
    documented a Green, self-revealing finding associated with this event for preconditioned
    speed testing of station switchyard breakers and three similar failures of station
    switchyard breakers. The licensee revised the speed testing procedures to avoid
    preconditioning the breakers.
    NRC Supplemental Inspection Report 05000458/2005012, issued October 24, 2005,
    documented a supplemental inspection performed in accordance with Inspection
    Procedure 95001. The supplemental inspection was in response to four unplanned
    reactor scrams that occurred between August 15, 2004, and January 15, 2005. The
    licensees root cause analysis identified several programmatic changes which were
    incorporated into a switchyard reliability program to improve switchyard maintenance
    practices.
    The inspectors reviewed the LER and the licensees resolution of identified problems
    and determined there were no findings of significance and no other violations of NRC
    requirements. The licensee documented the failed equipment in CR-RBS-2004-02332.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
    Exit Meetings
    On October 21, 2005, the inspector presented the emergency preparedness inspection
    results to Mr. J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Planning, and other members of his
    staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary
    information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
    On November 4, 2005, the inspector presented the licensed operator requalification
    program inspection results to Mr. Mike Cantrell, Operations Training Supervisor, and
    other members of the licensees management staff. The licensee acknowledged the
    findings presented. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not
    provided or examined during the inspection.
    On December 8, 2005, the inspector presented the ALARA inspection results to
    Mr. R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of his staff who
    acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was
    not provided or examined during the inspection.
                                              -27-                                   Enclosure
 
    On January 4, 2006, the inspectors presented the integrated baseline inspection results
    to Paul Henninkamp, Vice President, Operations, and other members of licensee
    management. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or
    examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                          -28-                                   Enclosure
 
                              SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
M. Boyle, Manager, Radiation Protection
D. Burnett, Superintendent, Chemistry
M. Cantrell, Operations Training Supervisor
M. Cantrell, Operations Training Supervisor
J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager - Training
J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager - Training
Line 560: Line 1,193:
C. Stafford, Manager, Operations
C. Stafford, Manager, Operations
W. Trudell, Manager, Training and Development
W. Trudell, Manager, Training and Development
D. Vinci, General Manager - Plant OperationsLIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSEDOpened and Closed05000458/2005005-01NCVInadequate procedure for implementation of an EAL05000458/2005005-02NCVFailure to complete TS required actions within allowedcompletion time05000458/2005005-03NCVInadequate design assumption results in RCIC turbineexhaust header filling with water following an automatichigh water level shutdownClosed05000458/2004-001-00LERAutomatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Generator TripResulting from Switchyard Fault  
D. Vinci, General Manager - Plant Operations
A-2AttachmentLIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDThe following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish theobjectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramJob Performance MeasuresRJPM-OPS-052-04, Alternate Control Rod Drive Pumps, August 4, 2005RJPM-OPS-053-03R5, Reset a FCV runback, July 26, 2005
                    LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
RJPM-OPS-109.4, July 26, 2005
Opened and Closed
RJPM-OPS-110-04, Synchronize the Main Generator with the Grid, August 2, 2005
05000458/2005005-01          NCV    Inadequate procedure for implementation of an EAL
RJPM-OPS-256-03R4, Restore level in the SBCT with deepwell pumps, July 26, 2005
05000458/2005005-02          NCV    Failure to complete TS required actions within allowed
RJPM-OPS-309-050, July 19, 2005
                                    completion time
RJPM-OPS-508-04, Restore RPS B Normal Power Supply, August 19, 2005
05000458/2005005-03          NCV    Inadequate design assumption results in RCIC turbine
RJPM-OPS-508-07, Respond to reactor scram with control rods failing to insert,August 2, 2005RJPM-OPS-800-17R1, Vent the CCRD over-piston volume, July 26, 2005RJPM-OPS-05206R2, Control rod operability faulted, July 12, 2005RJPM-OPS-05207R2, Alternate control rod drive pumps (Fuel Bldg), July 12, 2005
                                    exhaust header filling with water following an automatic
RJPM-OPS-05304R, Startup A recirc HPU, July 12, 2005
                                    high water level shutdown
RJPM-OPS-20005R, Perform ATC actions for remote shutdown, August 2, 2005
Closed
RJPM-OPS-20006R5, Perform Attachment 13 UO actions, July 26, 2005
05000458/2004-001-00          LER    Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Generator Trip
ScenariosRSMS-OPS-822, Loss of All Feed Water / RCIC Failure / LOCA, Revision: 00
                                    Resulting from Switchyard Fault
RSMS-OPS-823, APRM Failure /SRV Failure / EHC Failure / ATWS, Revision: 00
                                            A-1                                  Attachment
RSMS-OPS-824, LPRM Failure / Loss of Vacuum with MSIV Closure / ATWS,Revision: 00  
 
A-3AttachmentRSMS-OPS-825, Loss of RPS B / Relief Valve Fails Open / Steam Leak in the DrywellWith Failure of the Drywell, Revision: 00RSMS-OPS-827, Rod Drop / Fuel Failure / RCIC Steam Leak / Partial ATWS,Revision: 00RSMS-OPS-829, Failure Of STX-XS2B / Loss Of Condenser Vacuum / ATWS,Revision: 00RSMS-OPS-830, Inadvertent HPCS Injection and Loss of Stator Cooling, Revision: 00Section 1R17: Permanent Plant ModificationsEvent Notification 41252, Reactor Scram due to Loss of Vital Instrument BusLER 05-458/04-005-01, Unplanned Automatic Scram due to Loss of Non-Vital 120 VoltInstrument Bus, June 22, 2005CR-RBS-2004-04291 RCIC system initiated and subsequently tripped on Level 8CR-RBS-2005-00724 MR96-0063 removed internals from RCIC Turbine Exhaust CheckValve E51-VF040SDRP-P43, System Design Requirements Document, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling,Revision 0SDC-209, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Design Criteria, Revision 0,November 9, 1998SDC-209, Reactor Core Isolation Sooling System Design Criteria, Revision 3,September 27, 2004RBS USAR Section 5.4.6, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Revision 17
                              LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
NUREG-0989, RBS Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements, May 1984 throughOctober 1985GE SIL-30, HPCI/RCIC Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breakers, October 31, 1973
The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the
GS AID-56, HPCI/RCI Turbine Exhaust Check Valve Cycling, August 1985
objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:
VPF-3622-353 (1) - 1, RCIC Turbine Instruction Manual, January 1975 throughMarch 1978MR96-0063, Remove Internals of [RCIC Exhaust Check Valve] E51-VF040,September 18, 1996  
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
A-4AttachmentCR-RBS-1996-1671, Existing plant configuration of RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuumbreaker vent line does not correspond with configuration assumed in Calculation PH-56,
        Job Performance Measures
Revision 0Calculation PH-56, RCIC Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breaker Vent Line SizingVerification, Revision 1A, November 27, 1996Piping and Instrument Drawing PID-27-06A, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System,Revision 42Calculation G13.18.2.0-079, Determination of Quantity of Water Entering RCIC TurbineExhaust Line, May 11, 2005Calculation G13.18.10.2*225, RCIC Fluid Transient Analysis - Water in Turbine ExhaustLine, May 17, 2005ER-RB-2005-0084-000, Replace Check Valve E51-VF040 or Reinstall Internal Parts,February 20, 2005Terry Turbine SAM-12, Terry Wheel Water Slug Test, March 1, 1973Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System TestingRiver Bend Station Emergency Plan, Revision 28River Bend Station Prompt Notification System Design Report, Revision 1,December 2001Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Augmentation TestingEvaluation Reports for Pager and Augmentation Tests conducted:February 10, 2004June 17, 2004
        RJPM-OPS-052-04, Alternate Control Rod Drive Pumps, August 4, 2005
August 24, 2004
        RJPM-OPS-053-03R5, Reset a FCV runback, July 26, 2005
September 23, 2004December 8, 2004January 25, 2005
        RJPM-OPS-109.4, July 26, 2005
March 22, 2005July 25, 2005September 27, 2005Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and DeficienciesProceduresEN-LI-118, "Root Cause Analysis Process," Revision 1EN-LI-119, "Apparent Cause Evaluation Process," Revision 3  
        RJPM-OPS-110-04, Synchronize the Main Generator with the Grid, August 2, 2005
A-5AttachmentQuality AssuranceQuality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2003-RBS-1Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2004-RBS-1
        RJPM-OPS-256-03R4, Restore level in the SBCT with deepwell pumps, July 26, 2005
Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2005-RBS-1Condition ReportsCR-RBS-1999-1316CR-RBS-2003-0586
        RJPM-OPS-309-050, July 19, 2005
CR-RBS-2003-0624
        RJPM-OPS-508-04, Restore RPS B Normal Power Supply, August 19, 2005
CR-RBS-2003-1950
        RJPM-OPS-508-07, Respond to reactor scram with control rods failing to insert,
CR-RBS-2003-1992
        August 2, 2005
CR-RBS-2003-2094
        RJPM-OPS-800-17R1, Vent the CCRD over-piston volume, July 26, 2005
CR-RBS-2003-3050
        RJPM-OPS-05206R2, Control rod operability faulted, July 12, 2005
CR-RBS-2004-1090
        RJPM-OPS-05207R2, Alternate control rod drive pumps (Fuel Bldg), July 12, 2005
CR-RBS-2004-1159CR-RBS-2004-3086CR-RBS-2004-3811
        RJPM-OPS-05304R, Startup A recirc HPU, July 12, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-1433
        RJPM-OPS-20005R, Perform ATC actions for remote shutdown, August 2, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-1602
        RJPM-OPS-20006R5, Perform Attachment 13 UO actions, July 26, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-1632
        Scenarios
CR-RBS-2005-1391
        RSMS-OPS-822, Loss of All Feed Water / RCIC Failure / LOCA, Revision: 00
CR-RBS-2005-2516
        RSMS-OPS-823, APRM Failure /SRV Failure / EHC Failure / ATWS, Revision: 00
CR-RBS-2005-2646Evaluation Reports for Drills conductedSeptember 3, 2003March 2 2004
        RSMS-OPS-824, LPRM Failure / Loss of Vacuum with MSIV Closure / ATWS,
April 20, 2004
        Revision: 00
May 25, 2004
                                            A-2                                Attachment
June 9, 2004
 
July 27, 2004December 1, 2004 (simulator)December 1, 2004 (medical)
      RSMS-OPS-825, Loss of RPS B / Relief Valve Fails Open / Steam Leak in the Drywell
March 24, 2005
      With Failure of the Drywell, Revision: 00
April 19, 2005
      RSMS-OPS-827, Rod Drop / Fuel Failure / RCIC Steam Leak / Partial ATWS,
June 21, 2005Licensee Self-Assessments2004 Evaluated Exercise Pre-AssessmentLO-RLO-2004-00004 CA56, "2004 Long Range ERO Staffing Assessment"
      Revision: 00
2005 Emergency Planning Program Assessment
      RSMS-OPS-829, Failure Of STX-XS2B / Loss Of Condenser Vacuum / ATWS,
Snapshot Assessment of RBS Siren SystemSection 4OA1: Performance Indicator VerificationProceduresEN-EP-201, "Emergency Planning Performance Indicators," Revision 2EPP-2-703, "Performance Indicators," Revision 2
      Revision: 00
EIP-2-001, "Classification of Emergencies," Revision 12
      RSMS-OPS-830, Inadvertent HPCS Injection and Loss of Stator Cooling, Revision: 00
EIP-2-002, "Classification Actions," Revision 24
Section 1R17: Permanent Plant Modifications
EIP-2-006, "Notifications," Revision 32
      Event Notification 41252, Reactor Scram due to Loss of Vital Instrument Bus
EIP-2-007, "Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines," Revision 20
      LER 05-458/04-005-01, Unplanned Automatic Scram due to Loss of Non-Vital 120 Volt
EIP-2-007, "Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines," Revision 21  
      Instrument Bus, June 22, 2005
A-6AttachmentSection 2OS2: ALARA Planning and ControlsCondition ReportsCR-RBS-2005-01472CR-RBS-2005-01474
      CR-RBS-2004-04291 RCIC system initiated and subsequently tripped on Level 8
CR-RBS-2005-02076CR-RBS-2005-02558CR-RBS-2005-03382
      CR-RBS-2005-00724 MR96-0063 removed internals from RCIC Turbine Exhaust Check
CR-RBS-2005-04004Audits and Self-AssessmentsQA-14-2005-RBS-1Quality Assurance Audit of Radiation Protection SnapshotAssessment /Benchmark on: Effectiveness of the RP TAC/TRG  
      Valve E51-VF040
(July 11-13, 2005)QS-2005-RBS-009ALARA Planning and Controls (August 22 throughSeptember 1, 2005)LO#2005-00123Radiation Protection Program (July 11-15, 2005)  
      SDRP-P43, System Design Requirements Document, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling,
Radiation Work Permits2005-1073Change out filter elements LWS-SKD5-F100A2005-1110Clean-up FB 113' cask pool and install cask pool impact limiter
      Revision 0
2005-1310Recirc Flow Control Valve Maintenance ProceduresENS-RP-105Radiation Work Permits, Revision 7RP-110ALARA Program, Revision 2ALARA Committee MinutesAMC 05-01January 11, 2005AMC 05-02January 12, 2005
      SDC-209, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Design Criteria, Revision 0,
AMC 05-03January 17, 2005
      November 9, 1998
AMC 05-11July 14, 2005Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of ProblemsCondition reportsCR-RBS-2005-02444CR-RBS-2005-02481
      SDC-209, Reactor Core Isolation Sooling System Design Criteria, Revision 3,
CR-RBS-2005-02486
      September 27, 2004
CR-RBS-2005-02494
      RBS USAR Section 5.4.6, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Revision 17
CR-RBS-2005-02548
      NUREG-0989, RBS Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements, May 1984 through
CR-RBS-2005-02563CR-RBS-2005-02570CR-RBS-2005-02590
      October 1985
CR-RBS-2005-02605
      GE SIL-30, HPCI/RCIC Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breakers, October 31, 1973
CR-RBS-2005-02621
      GS AID-56, HPCI/RCI Turbine Exhaust Check Valve Cycling, August 1985
CR-RBS-2005-02624
      VPF-3622-353 (1) - 1, RCIC Turbine Instruction Manual, January 1975 through
CR-RBS-2005-02626  
      March 1978
A-7AttachmentCR-RBS-2005-02645CR-RBS-2005-02649
      MR96-0063, Remove Internals of [RCIC Exhaust Check Valve] E51-VF040,
CR-RBS-2005-02659
      September 18, 1996
CR-RBS-2005-02664
                                          A-3                                Attachment
CR-RBS-2005-02686
 
CR-RBS-2005-02693
      CR-RBS-1996-1671, Existing plant configuration of RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum
CR-RBS-2005-02695
      breaker vent line does not correspond with configuration assumed in Calculation PH-56,
CR-RBS-2005-02722
      Revision 0
CR-RBS-2005-02724
      Calculation PH-56, RCIC Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breaker Vent Line Sizing
CR-RBS-2005-02727
      Verification, Revision 1A, November 27, 1996
CR-RBS-2005-02738
      Piping and Instrument Drawing PID-27-06A, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System,
CR-RBS-2005-02754
      Revision 42
CR-RBS-2005-02760
      Calculation G13.18.2.0-079, Determination of Quantity of Water Entering RCIC Turbine
CR-RBS-2005-02767
      Exhaust Line, May 11, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-02768
      Calculation G13.18.10.2*225, RCIC Fluid Transient Analysis - Water in Turbine Exhaust
CR-RBS-2005-03106
      Line, May 17, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-03111
      ER-RB-2005-0084-000, Replace Check Valve E51-VF040 or Reinstall Internal Parts,
CR-RBS-2005-03114
      February 20, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-03125
      Terry Turbine SAM-12, Terry Wheel Water Slug Test, March 1, 1973
CR-RBS-2005-03131
Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Testing
CR-RBS-2005-03138
      River Bend Station Emergency Plan, Revision 28
CR-RBS-2005-03151
      River Bend Station Prompt Notification System Design Report, Revision 1,
CR-RBS-2005-03152
      December 2001
CR-RBS-2005-03165
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing
CR-RBS-2005-03178
      Evaluation Reports for Pager and Augmentation Tests conducted:
CR-RBS-2005-03182
      February 10, 2004           December 8, 2004               July 25, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-03220
      June 17, 2004              January 25, 2005                September 27, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-03242
      August 24, 2004            March 22, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-03265
      September 23, 2004
CR-RBS-2005-03273
Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
CR-RBS-2005-03279
      Procedures
CR-RBS-2005-03443CR-RBS-2005-03446CR-RBS-2005-03471
      EN-LI-118, Root Cause Analysis Process, Revision 1
CR-RBS-2005-03474
      EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 3
CR-RBS-2005-03503
                                          A-4                                Attachment
CR-RBS-2005-03509
 
CR-RBS-2005-03513
      Quality Assurance
CR-RBS-2005-03515
      Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2003-RBS-1
CR-RBS-2005-03554
      Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2004-RBS-1
CR-RBS-2005-03586
      Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2005-RBS-1
CR-RBS-2005-03594
      Condition Reports
CR-RBS-2005-03619
      CR-RBS-1999-1316                            CR-RBS-2004-3086
CR-RBS-2005-03629
      CR-RBS-2003-0586                            CR-RBS-2004-3811
CR-RBS-2005-03645
      CR-RBS-2003-0624                            CR-RBS-2005-1433
CR-RBS-2005-03670
      CR-RBS-2003-1950                            CR-RBS-2005-1602
CR-RBS-2005-03706
      CR-RBS-2003-1992                            CR-RBS-2005-1632
CR-RBS-2005-03728
      CR-RBS-2003-2094                            CR-RBS-2005-1391
CR-RBS-2005-03747
      CR-RBS-2003-3050                            CR-RBS-2005-2516
CR-RBS-2005-03753
      CR-RBS-2004-1090                            CR-RBS-2005-2646
CR-RBS-2005-03787
      CR-RBS-2004-1159
CR-RBS-2005-03831
      Evaluation Reports for Drills conducted
CR-RBS-2005-03847
      September 3, 2003                                  December 1, 2004 (simulator)
CR-RBS-2005-03887
      March 2 2004                                       December 1, 2004 (medical)
CR-RBS-2005-03918
      April 20, 2004                                    March 24, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-03948
      May 25, 2004                                      April 19, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-03969
      June 9, 2004                                      June 21, 2005
CR-RBS-2005-04018
      July 27, 2004
CR-RBS-2005-04064
      Licensee Self-Assessments
CR-RBS-2005-04071
      2004 Evaluated Exercise Pre-Assessment
CR-RBS-2005-04095
      LO-RLO-2004-00004 CA56, 2004 Long Range ERO Staffing Assessment
CR-RBS-2005-04103
      2005 Emergency Planning Program Assessment
CR-RBS-2005-04106
      Snapshot Assessment of RBS Siren System
CR-RBS-2005-04118  
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
A-8AttachmentLIST OF ACRONYMSALARAas low as is reasonably achievable
      Procedures
CFRCode of Federal RegulationsCRcondition report
      EN-EP-201, Emergency Planning Performance Indicators, Revision 2
CR-RBSRiver Bend Station condition report
      EPP-2-703, Performance Indicators, Revision 2
EALemergency action level
      EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12
FEMAFederal Emergency Management Agency
      EIP-2-002, Classification Actions, Revision 24
FCVflow control valve
      EIP-2-006, Notifications, Revision 32
HPUhydraulic power unit
      EIP-2-007, Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines, Revision 20
MCmanual chapter
      EIP-2-007, Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines, Revision 21
LERlicensee event report
                                            A-5                              Attachment
LCOlimiting condition for operation
 
LOCAloss of coolant accident
Section 2OS2: ALARA Planning and Controls
NCVnoncited violation
      Condition Reports
NEINuclear Energy Institute
      CR-RBS-2005-01472                          CR-RBS-2005-02558
NRCU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
      CR-RBS-2005-01474                          CR-RBS-2005-03382
RCICreactor core isolation cooling system
      CR-RBS-2005-02076                          CR-RBS-2005-04004
RCSreactor coolant system
      Audits and Self-Assessments
RRreactor recirculation system
      QA-14-2005-RBS-1    Quality Assurance Audit of Radiation Protection Snapshot
SOPsystem operating proceduresSTPsurveillance test procedure
                          Assessment /Benchmark on: Effectiveness of the RP TAC/TRG
TSTechnical Specification  
                          (July 11-13, 2005)
USARUpdated Safety Analysis Report
      QS-2005-RBS-009      ALARA Planning and Controls (August 22 through
WOwork order
                          September 1, 2005)
      LO#2005-00123        Radiation Protection Program (July 11-15, 2005)
      Radiation Work Permits
      2005-1073    Change out filter elements LWS-SKD5-F100A
      2005-1110    Clean-up FB 113' cask pool and install cask pool impact limiter
      2005-1310    Recirc Flow Control Valve Maintenance
      Procedures
      ENS-RP-105 Radiation Work Permits, Revision 7
      RP-110        ALARA Program, Revision 2
      ALARA Committee Minutes
      AMC 05-01    January 11, 2005
      AMC 05-02    January 12, 2005
      AMC 05-03    January 17, 2005
      AMC 05-11    July 14, 2005
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
      Condition reports
      CR-RBS-2005-02444                                CR-RBS-2005-02570
      CR-RBS-2005-02481                                CR-RBS-2005-02590
      CR-RBS-2005-02486                                CR-RBS-2005-02605
      CR-RBS-2005-02494                                CR-RBS-2005-02621
      CR-RBS-2005-02548                                CR-RBS-2005-02624
      CR-RBS-2005-02563                                CR-RBS-2005-02626
                                          A-6                                Attachment
 
CR-RBS-2005-02645    CR-RBS-2005-03446
CR-RBS-2005-02649    CR-RBS-2005-03471
CR-RBS-2005-02659    CR-RBS-2005-03474
CR-RBS-2005-02664    CR-RBS-2005-03503
CR-RBS-2005-02686    CR-RBS-2005-03509
CR-RBS-2005-02693    CR-RBS-2005-03513
CR-RBS-2005-02695    CR-RBS-2005-03515
CR-RBS-2005-02722    CR-RBS-2005-03554
CR-RBS-2005-02724    CR-RBS-2005-03586
CR-RBS-2005-02727    CR-RBS-2005-03594
CR-RBS-2005-02738    CR-RBS-2005-03619
CR-RBS-2005-02754    CR-RBS-2005-03629
CR-RBS-2005-02760    CR-RBS-2005-03645
CR-RBS-2005-02767    CR-RBS-2005-03670
CR-RBS-2005-02768    CR-RBS-2005-03706
CR-RBS-2005-03106    CR-RBS-2005-03728
CR-RBS-2005-03111    CR-RBS-2005-03747
CR-RBS-2005-03114    CR-RBS-2005-03753
CR-RBS-2005-03125    CR-RBS-2005-03787
CR-RBS-2005-03131    CR-RBS-2005-03831
CR-RBS-2005-03138    CR-RBS-2005-03847
CR-RBS-2005-03151    CR-RBS-2005-03887
CR-RBS-2005-03152    CR-RBS-2005-03918
CR-RBS-2005-03165    CR-RBS-2005-03948
CR-RBS-2005-03178    CR-RBS-2005-03969
CR-RBS-2005-03182    CR-RBS-2005-04018
CR-RBS-2005-03220    CR-RBS-2005-04064
CR-RBS-2005-03242    CR-RBS-2005-04071
CR-RBS-2005-03265    CR-RBS-2005-04095
CR-RBS-2005-03273    CR-RBS-2005-04103
CR-RBS-2005-03279    CR-RBS-2005-04106
CR-RBS-2005-03443    CR-RBS-2005-04118
                  A-7                  Attachment
 
                              LIST OF ACRONYMS
ALARA  as low as is reasonably achievable
CFR    Code of Federal Regulations
CR    condition report
CR-RBS River Bend Station condition report
EAL    emergency action level
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency
FCV    flow control valve
HPU    hydraulic power unit
MC    manual chapter
LER    licensee event report
LCO    limiting condition for operation
LOCA  loss of coolant accident
NCV    noncited violation
NEI    Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RCIC  reactor core isolation cooling system
RCS    reactor coolant system
RR    reactor recirculation system
SOP    system operating procedures
STP    surveillance test procedure
TS    Technical Specification
USAR  Updated Safety Analysis Report
WO    work order
                                      A-8      Attachment
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 23:22, 23 November 2019

IR 05000458-05-005; on 10/01/2005 - 12/31/2005; River Bend Station; Licensed Operator Requalification, Operator Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions, Permanent Plant Modifications
ML060450209
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/13/2006
From: Kennedy K
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C
To: Hinnenkamp P
Entergy Operations
References
IR-05-005
Download: ML060450209 (41)


See also: IR 05000458/2005005

Text

February 13, 2006

Paul D. Hinnenkamp

Vice President - Operations

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000458/2005005

Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:

On December 31, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents

the inspection findings which were discussed with you and other members of your staff on

January 4, 2006.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, two NRC identified findings and one self-revealing

finding were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low

safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that violations are associated with

these findings. However, because these violations were of very low safety significance and

were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as

noncited violations, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you

contest the violations or the significance of the violations, you should provide a response within

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with

copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611

Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011-4005; the Director, Office of Enforcement,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident

Inspector at the River Bend Station facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them

with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kriss M. Kennedy, Chief

Project Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-458

License: NPF-47

Enclosures:

NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2005005

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/enclosure:

Senior Vice President and

Chief Operating Officer

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Vice President

Operations Support

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

General Manager

Plant Operations

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Director - Nuclear Safety

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway

P.O. Box 651

Jackson, MS 39205

Winston & Strawn LLP

1700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006-3817

Manager - Licensing

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

The Honorable Charles C. Foti, Jr.

Attorney General

Department of Justice

State of Louisiana

P.O. Box 94005

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005

H. Anne Plettinger

3456 Villa Rose Drive

Baton Rouge, LA 70806

Burt Babers, President

West Feliciana Parish Police Jury

P.O. Box 1921

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Michael E. Henry, State Liaison Officer

Department of Environmental Quality

Permits Division

P.O. Box 4313

Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4313

Brian Almon

Public Utility Commission

William B. Travis Building

P.O. Box 13326

1701 North Congress Avenue

Austin, TX 78711-3326

Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-

Chairperson

Denton Field Office

Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness

and Protection Division

Office of Infrastructure Protection

Preparedness Directorate

Dept. of Homeland Security

800 North Loop 288

Federal Regional Center

Denton, TX 76201-3698

Entergy Operations, Inc. -5-

Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (BSM1)

DRP Director (ATH)

DRS Director (DDC)

DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)

Senior Resident Inspector (PJA)

Branch Chief, DRP/C (KMK)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (WCW)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)

RITS Coordinator (KEG)

DRS STA (DAP)

J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)

ROPreports

RBS Site Secretary (LGD)

W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)

SUNSI Review Completed: _kmk_ ADAMS: : Yes G No Initials: __kmk__

Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive  : Non-Sensitive

R:\_REACTORS\_RB\2005\RB2005-05RP-PJA.wpd

RIV:SRI:DRP/C RI:DRP/C C:DRS/OB C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/PSB

PJAlter MOMiller ATGody JClark MPShannon

T - KMKennedy E - KMKennedy /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

2/ /06 2/ /06 2/ /06 2/ /06 2/ /06

C:DRS/EB2 C:DRP/C

LJSmith KMKennedy

GDReplogle for /RA/

2/13/06 2/13/06

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket: 50-458

License: NPF-47

Report: 05000458/2005005

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: River Bend Station

Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61

St. Francisville, Louisiana

Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2005

Inspectors: P. Alter, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch C

M. Miller, Resident Inspector, Project Branch C

J. Keeton, Consultant, Region IV

P. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Operations Branch

G. Johnston, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch

L. Ricketson, Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch

Approved By: Kriss M. Kennedy, Chief

Project Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

-1- Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

REPORT DETAILS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

REACTOR SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1R04 Equipment Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1R05 Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1R15 Operability Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1R22 Surveillance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies . . . . . 20

1EP6 Drill Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

RADIATION SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

OTHER ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

4OA3 Event Followup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2

LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-8

-2- Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2005005; 10/01/2005 - 12/31/2005; River Bend Station; Licensed Operator

Requalification, Operator Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions, Permanent Plant

Modifications.

The report covered a 3-month period of routine baseline inspections by resident inspectors and

announced baseline inspections by regional emergency planning, operations, and radiation

protection inspectors. Three Green noncited violations were identified. The significance of

most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance

determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC

management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial

nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3,

dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

licensees failure to shut down one reactor recirculation loop within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of

determining that jet pump loop flow mismatch was greater than 5 percent while

operating at greater than 70 percent of rated core flow. On October 31, 2005, the

Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve B hydraulic power unit tripped because of a

blown control power fuse, causing Flow Control Valve B to drift open. Operators

throttled closed Flow Control Valve A to maintain reactor power at 100 percent, resulting

in a jet pump loop flow mismatch of approximately 8.2 percent. The flow mismatch

existed for 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program as

Condition Report CR-RBS-2006-00274.

The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more

significant safety concern. Matched recirculation loop flows is an assumption used in

the accident analysis for a loss of coolant accident resulting from a loop break. A flow

mismatch could result in core response that is more severe than assumed in the

accident analysis. The significance of this finding could not be evaluated using

MC 0609, Significance Determination Process. Based on management review, the

finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the short duration

of the flow mismatch, 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and the low likelihood of a loss of coolant accident

during that time. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element of

human performance in that operators failed to implement Technical Specification

requirements (Section 1R14).

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Design Control, was identified for the licensees failure to address the worst case

conditions in the sizing calculation for the reactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust

-3- Enclosure

line vacuum breaker system as part of a plant modification to remove the internals of the

reactor core isolation cooling turbine exhaust line check valve. As a result, on

December 10, 2004, when the reactor core isolation cooling system was started and

subsequently shutdown on high reactor water level following a scram and loss of

feedwater, the turbine exhaust line filled with water from the suppression pool, causing

the operators to consider the system unavailable and complicating their response to the

event. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR-

RBS-2005-00724 and reinstalled the turbine exhaust line check valve internals in

February 2005.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure

the availability and reliability of the reactor core isolation cooling system, a system that

responds to initiating events (loss of feedwater and station blackout), to prevent

undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination

Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety

significance because it represented a design deficiency that did not result in a loss of

system function (Section 1R17).

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

Section IV. B., as a result of inadequate procedures for the implementation of an

emergency action level. The criteria in Procedure EIP-2-001, Classification of

Emergencies, Revision 12, for declaring an Alert emergency action level based on

primary coolant leak rate, relied solely on a computer generated leakrate report that

would not be valid under all conditions. The licensee entered this finding into their

corrective action program as CR-RBS-2005-03078 and issued Standing Order 192, as

an interim corrective action, to provide additional criteria to determine whether a primary

coolant leak rate Alert emergency action level declaration was required.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Emergency

Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and affects the cornerstone

objective to ensure the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to

protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The

inadequate procedure could result in a failure to declare an Alert emergency

classification when required. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency

Preparedness Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of

very low safety significance since it was a failure to comply with a regulatory

requirement associated with a risk-significant planning standard that did not result in the

loss or degradation of that risk-significant planning standard function (Section 1R11).

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

-4- Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

On October 1, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 70 percent to perform a rod sequence

exchange and insert two control rods for planned maintenance. The reactor was returned to

100 percent power on October 2, 2005. On October 21, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 63

percent to perform power suppression testing for a leaking fuel bundle. The reactor was

returned to 100 percent power on October 23, 2005. On November 5, 2005, reactor power was

lowered to 90 percent to adjust the control rod pattern and the reactor was returned to 100

percent later that day. On December 2, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 83 percent to

insert three control rods for planned maintenance. The reactor was returned to 100 percent

power on December 3, 2005. On December 9, 2005, reactor power was lowered to 58 percent

to perform a control rod pattern adjustment and conduct turbine valve testing. The reactor was

returned to 100 percent power on December 11, 2005. On December 17, 2005, reactor power

was lowered to 62 percent to perform power suppression testing for a leaking fuel bundle. The

reactor was returned to 100 percent on December 19, 2005, and remained at 100 percent for

the remainder of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

b. Inspection Scope

Cold Weather Preparation

During the week of December 5, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the licensees

implementation of Operations Section Procedure OSP-0043, Freeze Protection and

Temperature Maintenance, Revision 6, to protect mitigating systems from cold weather

conditions. Specifically, the inspectors: (1) verified that risk-significant structures,

systems, and components will remain functional when challenged by cold weather

conditions; (2) verified that cold weather features such as heat tracing and space

heaters are operable and monitored; and (3) verified that the cold weather procedures

attachments were being completed for changing temperatures as required by the

procedure. The inspectors completed one inspection sample.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-5- Enclosure

1R04 Equipment Alignment

1. Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

On October 25, 2005, the inspectors walked down residual heat removal Division II

while residual heat removal Division I was out of service for scheduled maintenance.

On October 26, 2005, the inspectors walked down the piping and valve lineup of the

condensate storage tank, including emergency core cooling system suction and test

return valves. In each case, the inspectors verified the correct valve and power

alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to

the system operating procedures (SOP) and piping and instrument drawings listed

below and applicable sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The

inspectors completed two inspection samples.

  • SOP-0008, Condensate Storage, Makeup and Transfer, Revision 16
  • Piping and Instrument PID 04-03A, Condensate Storage, Makeup and

Transfer, Revision 13

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Complete System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a complete walkdown of the drywell and containment leak

detection system during the week of June 26, 2005, during a drywell closeout inspection

and continuing the week of November 20, 2005. The methods of inspection included

field walkdown, in-office reviews, observation of system operation, and interviews of

computer engineering, operations, training, and emergency planning personnel. The

inspectors verified: (1) proper valve and control switch alignments, (2) computer

program algorithm, (3) power supply lineup, (4) associated support system status, and

(5) that alarms and indications in the main control room were as specified in the

following documents:

  • SOP-0033, Drywell and Containment Leak Detection System, Revision 11
  • USAR Section 5.2.5.1.1, Detection of Leakage within the Drywell

The inspectors also verified electrical power requirements, labeling, hangers and

support installation, and associated support systems status. The walkdowns included

-6- Enclosure

evaluation of system piping and supports to ensure (1) piping and pipe supports did not

show evidence of damage, (2) hangers were secure, and (3) component foundations

were not degraded. The inspectors completed one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant described below to assess:

(1) the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources; (2) fire

detection and suppression capabilities; (3) manual firefighting equipment and capability;

(4) the condition of passive fire protection features, such as, electrical raceway fire

barrier systems, fire doors, and fire barrier penetrations; and (5) any related

compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the Pre-Fire Plan/Strategy Book

during the fire protection inspections. The areas inspected were:

  • Auxiliary building, 70-foot, RHR Pump B Room, fire Area AB-3, on October 11,

2005

  • Auxiliary building, 95-foot, HPCS piping area, fire Area AB-2/Z-2, on October 12,

2005

  • Auxiliary building, 95-foot, LPCS panel room, fire Area AB-6/Z33, on October 12,

2005

  • Control building, 116-foot, safety-related 125 Vdc switchgear room, fire

Area C-24, on December 9, 2005

  • Control building, 116-foot, safety-related Switchgear 1C room, fire Area C-22, on

December 9, 2005

  • Control building, 116-foot, safety-related ENB inverter Charger A room, fire

Area C-18, on December 9, 2005

The inspectors completed six inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-7- Enclosure

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

.1 Annual Operating Examination Review

Following the completion of the annual operating examination testing cycle, which ended

the week of September 23, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of

the annual individual job performance measure operating tests and simulator operating

tests administered by the licensee during the operator licensing requalification cycle.

Eight separate crews participated in simulator operating tests and job performance

measure operating tests, totaling 52 licensed operators. All of the crews tested passed

the simulator portion of the annual operating test. Two of the 52 licensed operators

failed the job performance measure portion and were successfully remediated. These

results were compared to the thresholds established in MC 0609, Appendix I, Operator

Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process. The

inspector completed one inspection sample.

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

On November 15, 2005, the inspectors observed simulator training of an operating crew,

as part of the operator requalification training program, to assess licensed operator

performance and the training evaluators critique. The inspection included observation

of high risk licensed operator actions, operator activities associated with the emergency

plan, and lessons learned from industry and plant experiences. In addition, the

inspectors compared simulator control panel configurations with the actual control room

panels for consistency. The simulator examination scenario observed was RSMS-OPS-

612, Loss of Vacuum/ATWS/Drywell Steam Leak - RPV Flooding, Revision 4. The

inspectors completed one inspection sample.

.3 Inadequate Emergency Event Classification Guidance

On June 10, 2005, the inspectors observed operating crew performance in the simulator

during annual requalification exam Scenario RSMS-OPS-509, SRV Tailpipe Steam

Leak Inside The Drywell, Revision 3. The inspectors discussed crew actions and

emergency planning requirements with the examination evaluators, training

management, emergency planning coordinators, and operations management. The

inspectors reviewed the following documents:

  • EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12
  • USAR 5.2.5.1.1, Detection of Leakage within the Drywell
  • Vendor computer manual, VTD-A324-0109, Analog Devices MICROMAC-5000

Final Draft, Leak Rate Detection PLC Documentation, River Bend Station -

Reactor Building Sump Systems, Revision 0

-8- Enclosure

  • Training Evaluation and Request, TEAR-RBS-2005-0477, Validating Leakage

Report, issued August 23, 2005

  • Standing Order Number 192, Drywell Leakage Greater Than 50 gpm EAL

Guidance, Revision 0, issued November 3, 2005

b. Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.B, for inadequate procedures for implementation of an Alert emergency

action level (EAL).

Description: On June 10 2005, the inspectors observed operating crew performance in

the simulator during annual requalification exam Scenario RSMS-OPS-509, SRV

Tailpipe Steam Leak Inside The Drywell, Revision 3. The inspectors noted that when

the examination evaluators informed the team that the total drywell leakage report was

84 gpm, the team declared an Alert based on that report. Procedure EIP-2-001,

Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12, listed the criteria for an Alert EAL

classification as Total drywell LEAKAGE greater than 50 gpm.

Based on their observations in the simulator, the inspectors questioned the ability of the

leakage computer installed in the plant to accurately calculate total drywell leakage

under certain conditions. The inspectors analyzed the program run by the drywell

leakage computer and determined: (1) the drywell leakage computer would not

calculate total drywell leakage while a drywell sump pump was running; (2) computer

reports of total drywell leakage printed while a drywell sump pump was running would be

invalid; and (3) if a drywell high pressure or low reactor vessel level signal was present,

the valves in the drywell sump pump discharge lines would close, causing the drywell

sump pumps to run continuously, resulting in an invalid drywell total leakage report. The

inspectors determined that the indication used by operators to determine if the criteria

was met for declaring an Alert EAL due to total drywell leakage exceeding 50 gpm would

not be valid under certain conditions.

On August 23, 2005, the licensee initiated training evaluation action request TEAR-

2005-0477 to evaluate this condition to determine what training actions were necessary.

On August 26, 2005, the licensee initiated CR-RBS-2005-03078 that requested an

alternate means of determining the primary coolant leak Alert EAL using main control

room indications. The CR also requested additional training materials and classroom

instruction to reinforce this change.

On November 3, 2005, the licensee issued Standing Order 192 that provided additional

criteria to be used to make the determination of whether a primary coolant leak rate

Alert EAL declaration was required, without relying solely on the drywell leakage

computer. The inspectors concluded that Standing Order 192 was an adequate interim

compensatory measure until the licensee implemented permanent corrective actions.

-9- Enclosure

Analysis: The performance deficiency associated with this finding involved an

inadequate procedural criteria for declaring an Alert EAL in the event that total drywell

leakage exceeds 50 gpm under certain conditions. Specifically, computed drywell

leakrate used by operators to determine if total drywell leakage exceeds 50 gpm may be

invalid under certain conditions. The finding was more than minor because it is

associated with the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of procedural

quality and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the licensee is capable of

implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the

event of a radiological emergency. The inadequate procedure could result in a failure to

declare an Alert emergency classification when required. Using Manual Chapter 0609,

Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, this

finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since it was a failure to

comply with a regulatory requirement associated with a risk-significant planning

standard that did not result in the loss or degradation of that risk-significant planning

standard function.

Enforcement: The failure to provide adequate procedures for implementation of an EAL

was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., which requires, in part,

that the licensees emergency plan describe the means to be used for determining the

impact of the release of radioactive materials including EALs. Because this finding was

of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action

program as CR-RBS-2005-03078, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent

with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2005005-01,

Inadequate procedure for implementation of an EAL.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected maintenance activities to verify the performance of

assessments of plant risk related to planned and emergent maintenance work activities.

The inspectors verified: (1) the adequacy of the risk assessments and the accuracy and

completeness of the information considered, (2) management of the resultant risk and

implementation of work controls and risk management actions, and (3) effective control

of emergent work, including prompt reassessment of resultant plant risk. The inspectors

completed three inspection samples.

.1 Risk Assessment and Management of Risk

On a routine basis, the inspectors verified performance of risk assessments, in

accordance with administrative Procedure ADM-096, Risk Management Program

Implementation and On-Line Maintenance Risk Assessment, Revision 04, for planned

maintenance activities and emergent work involving structures, systems, and

components within the scope of the maintenance rule. Specific work activities evaluated

included the following planned and emergent work:

equipment outage

-10- Enclosure

  • November 28, 2005, Division III work week and station blackout diesel generator

planned maintenance

.2 Emergent Work Control

During emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee took actions to minimize

the probability of initiating events, maintained the functional capability of mitigating

systems, and maintained barrier integrity. The inspectors also reviewed the emergent

work activities to ensure the plant was not placed in an unacceptable configuration. The

specific emergent work activity followed was the cleaning of high voltage insulators in

the main transformer switchyard with a high pressure spray on October 7, 2005.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Operator Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions and Events

c. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed the two inspection samples listed below.

.1 Power Suppression Testing

The inspectors observed portions of and reviewed control room records for power

suppression testing conducted during the weekend of October 21, 2005. The inspectors

reviewed the reactivity control plan, the prejob briefing given in the main control room at

the beginning of the evolution and during control room operator and reactor engineer

shift turnover. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the test with the reactor

engineering representative and shift manager, including the recommendation to insert

Control Rod 20-45 to suppress power in the vicinity of a potential leaking fuel bundle.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed the postsuppression test off-gas pretreatment gaseous

activity levels used to monitor the success of the suppression efforts.

.2 Trip of Reactor Recirculation (RR) Flow Control Valve (FCV) Hydraulic Power

Unit (HPU)

On October 31, 2005, the inspectors observed operator response to a trip of RR FCV B

HPU. As a result, RR FCV B began to drift open. The operators took action to limit or

stop the gradual opening of RR FCV B. As RR FCV B continued to open, operators

throttled closed RR FCV A to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent. These

actions created an RR jet pump loop flow mismatch of greater than 5 percent requiring

entry into TS Action 3.4.1.A. The inspectors reviewed the TS requirements for this

condition and discussed the actions taken by the operators with the operations shift

-11- Enclosure

manager and members of plant management team present in the control room at the

time. The following documents were reviewed by the inspectors as part of this

inspection:

C Main Control Room Logs, October 31, 2005

C CR-RBS-2005-03748, During Filter RCS-FLTR2B replacement, technicians

bumped an electrical cable, causing a trip of the reactor recirculation flow control

Valve B hydraulic power unit

C W0 00075986, Replace grounded connection to Pressure Switch RCS-PDS90B

C SOP-0003, Reactor Recirculation System, Revision 35

C TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.4.1 and applicable Bases

i. Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1

for the licensees failure to restore compliance with LCO 3.4.1 or shut down one RR loop

within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of determining that RR loop jet pump flow mismatch was greater than

5 percent while operating at greater than 70 percent of rated core flow.

Description: On October 31, 2005, at 2:54 p.m., the RR FCV B HPU tripped. As a

result, RR FCV B began to drift open. The operators took action to limit or stop the

gradual opening of RR FCV B. As RR FCV B continued to open, operators throttled

closed RR FCV A to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent.

At 3:06 p.m., the operators entered TS LCO Condition 3.4.1.A because the RR loop jet

pump flow mismatch exceeded 5 percent with the plant operating at greater than 70

percent rated core flow. The highest flow mismatch was 8.2 percent. TS Action

3.4.1.A.1 required the licensee to shut down one recirculation loop with 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

The licensee issued a work request and began to troubleshoot the HPU trip. At the

same time, operators requested that reactor engineers develop a reactivity control plan

to insert control rods to lower reactor power. This would allow operators to reopen

RR FCV A to reduce the RR jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than the required

5 percent.

At 4:24 p.m., the licensee determined that the cause for the HPU trip was a blown

control power fuse. The fuse blew as a result of a grounded wire to a filter high

differential pressure switch, which was bumped by maintenance technicians who were

changing the filter cartridge. The inspectors asked the operators and licensee

management if they intended to shut down one RR loop or perform the actions

necessary to reduce the jet pump flow mismatch to less than 5 percent, as required by

TS 3.4.1. The licensee responded that they did not want to maneuver the plant and

change core conditions, which might exacerbate the existing condition of two leaking

fuel bundles.

-12- Enclosure

At 5:06 p.m., the operators exited TS Action 3.4.1.A without shutting down one RR loop

or reducing jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent. Instead they entered

TS Action 3.4.1.D.1, which required that the reactor be placed in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

When asked, the operators and licensee management stated that they could commence

a plant shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and still meet the requirement to be in Mode 3

in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. They also stated that at the 6-hour point, they would commence the

shutdown with the reactivity control plan to reduce reactor power by inserting control

rods and open RR FCV A to reduce jet pump loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent.

If that was successful, they would then exit TS LCO 3.4.1.

Subsequently, the repairs were completed to the pressure switch wire, the control power

fuse was replaced, and RR FCV B HPU was restarted. Following a one-hour warmup,

the RR FCV B HPU was returned to service. RR jet pump loop flow was reduced below

5 percent and the licensee exited TS LCO 3.4.1. at 7:36 p.m., 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after entry into

TS LCO Condition 3.4.1.A.

The inspectors determined that: (1) when the cause of the trip of RR FCV B HPU was

determined to be the grounded pressure switch wire, the licensee knew that the time to

make the repairs and return the HPU to service would exceed the 2-hour completion

time of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1; and (2) the licensee was capable of restoring RR jet pump

loop flow mismatch to less than 5 percent or shutting down one RR loop within the

2-hour completion time of TS Action 3.4.1.A.1.

Analysis: The licensees failure to restore compliance with TS LCO 3.4.1 or complete

the required action of TS 3.4.1.A.1 to shut down one RR loop within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> was a

performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected,

it would become a more significant safety concern. According to TS LCO 3.4.1 Bases,

the operation of the RR pumps is an initial condition assumed for the design basis loss-

of-coolant accident (LOCA). During a LOCA caused by a RR loop break, the intact RR

loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the accident.

The initial core flow decrease is rapid because the RR pump in the broken loop ceases

to pump water through the vessel almost immediately. The pump in the intact loop

coasts down more slowly. This pump coast down governs the core flow response for

the next several seconds until the jet pump suctions are uncovered. The analyses

assume that both RR loops are operating at the same flow prior to the LOCA. However,

if the LOCA analysis is reviewed for an initial jet pump flow mismatch with the break

assumed to be in the loop with the higher flow, the flow coast down and core response

are potentially more severe, since the intact loop starts at a lower flow rate.

The significance of this finding could not be evaluated using MC 0609, Significance

Determination Process. Based on management review, the finding was determined to

be of very low safety significance based on the short duration of the flow mismatch,

4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and the low likelihood of a LOCA during that time. The cause of this finding

is related to the crosscutting element of human performance in that operators failed to

implement TS requirements.

Enforcement: TS LCO 3.4.1 states that two RR loops shall be in operation with

matched flows when the reactor is in Modes 1 or 2. If RR loop jet pump flow mismatch

-13- Enclosure

is not less than or equal to 5 percent of rated core flow when operating at greater than

or equal to 70 percent of rated core flow (Condition 3.4.1.A), then the licensee must shut

down one RR loop (Required Action A.1) within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (Completion Time). Contrary to

the above, on October 31 , 2005, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after RR loop jet pump flow mismatch was

greater than 5 percent of rated core flow, the licensee exited TS 3.4.1.A.1 without

shutting down one RR loop or restoring the jet pump flow mismatch to less than

5 percent. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered

into the licensees corrective action program as CR-RBS-2006-00274, this violation is

being treated as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A of the NRC Enforcement

Policy and is identified as NCV 05000458/2005005-02: Failure to complete TS required

actions within allowed completion time.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected operability determinations on the basis of potential

risk importance. The selected samples are addressed in the condition reports (CRs)

listed below. The inspectors assessed: (1) the accuracy of the evaluations, (2) the use

and control of compensatory measures if needed, and (3) compliance with TS, the

Technical Requirements Manual, the USAR, and other associated design-basis

documents. The inspectors review included a verification that the operability

determinations were made as specified by Entergy Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability

Determinations, Revision 1. The operability evaluations reviewed were associated with:

not included in the in-service testing program, reviewed on October 11, 2005

not included in the in-service testing procedure, reviewed on October 19, 2005

113' elevation airlock without changing in-service test procedure, reviewed on

October 19, 2005

and safety-related instrument Bus VBS-PNL01B voltage out of specification high,

reviewed on December 27, 2005

The inspectors completed two inspection samples.

f. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-14- Enclosure

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

An operator workaround is defined as a degraded or nonconforming condition that

complicates the operation of plant equipment and is compensated for by operator

action.

During the week of November 28, 2005, the inspectors reviewed an operator

workaround which required operators to hold the control switch for throttle valves for at

least 5 seconds after the full closed indication is received. The inspectors interviewed

operators to determine if they knew specifically which valves were affected and if they

were aware of this operational requirement from memory.

During the week of December 5, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of

the existing operator workarounds on: (1) the reliability, availability, and potential for

misoperation of any mitigating system; (2) whether they could increase the frequency of

an initiating event; and (3) their effect on the operation of multiple mitigating systems. In

addition, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds on

the ability of the operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients

and accidents. The procedures and other documents reviewed by the inspectors were:

  • Operator Workaround - Control Room Deficiency Program Guidelines,

Revision 11

  • Operator workaround report
  • Operator burden report
  • Daily plant status reports
  • Operations shift turnover sheet
  • Standing Order Number 190, Electrically Operated Throttle Valve Operations,

Revision 0

The inspectors completed two inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed MR96-0063, Remove Internals of [Reactor Core Isolation

Cooling Turbine (RCIC) Exhaust Check Valve] E51-VF040, dated September 18, 1996,

-15- Enclosure

and the assumptions made with respect to the capability of the RCIC turbine exhaust

line vacuum breaker vent line. On December 10, 2004, the RCIC turbine was manually

started and ran for a short period of time before shutting down on high reactor water

level. The RCIC exhaust line drain trap high level alarm came in and operators

observed water draining from the drain trap for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The documents reviewed as

part of this inspection are listed in the attachment. The inspectors completed one

inspection sample.

b. Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to address a full spectrum of design

conditions for the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker system as part of a plant

modification to remove the internals of the RCIC turbine exhaust line check valve. As a

result, on December 10, 2004, when RCIC was started and subsequently shut down on

high reactor water level following a scram and loss of feedwater, the RCIC exhaust line

filled with water from the suppression pool, causing the operators to consider RCIC

unavailable, complicating their response to the event.

Description: In September 1996, in response to a request from mechanical

maintenance, design engineering processed a design change to remove RCIC Turbine

Exhaust Check Valve E51-VF040. As part of Modification Request MR-96-0063, an

evaluation was performed on the adequacy of the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum

breaker system to prevent the siphoning of suppression pool water into the RCIC turbine

exhaust line following a shutdown of the RCIC turbine. During the evaluation it was

determined that the as-built vacuum breaker vent line was not in accordance with the

original design of the vacuum breaker line. A new calculation was performed for the

as-built configuration (globe valves and lift check valves versus gate valves and swing

check valves). The basic assumption used for Calculation PH-056, RCIC Turbine

Exhaust Line Vacuum Breaker Vent Line Sizing Verification, Revision 1A, was that the

RCIC exhaust line would be at equilibrium conditions when the turbine tripped. The

turbine would run long enough for the exhausted steam and exhaust piping to be at the

same temperature and that the only cooling effect would be to ambient. The result was

that the gradual cooldown of the steam and exhaust piping would cause the formation of

a vacuum in approximately 35.5 minutes. The revised sizing calculation showed that the

as-built vacuum breaker vent line was capable of relieving a vacuum created in as short

a time as 3.5 minutes.

On December 10, 2004, following a reactor scram, RCIC was started to maintain reactor

water level due to the pending loss of all reactor feed pumps. When RCIC Steam to

Turbine Valve E51-MOV045 stroked full open, it automatically reclosed due to the high

reactor water level interlock. It was later determined that steam was admitted to the

turbine for approximately 11 seconds. As a result, the steam in the exhaust line

condensed more rapidly than assumed and the exhaust line pressure became a vacuum

within 17 seconds. This rapid pressure reduction overwhelmed the vacuum breaker

vent line and 84 gallons of suppression pool water was siphoned into the RCIC turbine

exhaust line.

-16- Enclosure

The licensee later determined that the static and dynamic loads on the turbine exhaust

line for a restart on the RCIC turbine would be within design limits, although a water

hammer transient would occur. Based on test data provided by the turbine

manufacturer, the licensee also determined that the turbine would experience no

damage and not trip on overspeed if it were to be started with water in its exhaust line.

The turbine startup would be slower than normal, but within the assumed values in the

safety analysis. The turbine exhaust line check valve internals were reinstalled in

February 2005.

Analysis: The failure to adequately address worst case design conditions in the sizing

calculation for the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker vent line to allow for the

removal of the exhaust line check valve was a performance deficiency. The finding was

more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone

attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the

availability and reliability of the RCIC system, a system that responds to initiating events

(loss of feedwater and station blackout), to prevent undesirable consequences. Using

the MC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding

was determined to have very low safety significance because it represented a design

deficiency that did not result in a loss of system function.

Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part,

that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design change control

measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Contrary to the

above, the RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker vent line sizing calculation, used

as part of the modification process to remove the exhaust line check valve, did not take

into consideration the most limiting exhaust line conditions. As a result the vacuum

breaker vent line was not capable of preventing the siphoning of suppression pool water

into the RCIC Turbine Exhaust line. Because this finding was of very low safety

significance and was documented in the licensees corrective action program as

CR-RBS-2005-00724, it is being treated as an NCV in accordance with Section IV. A of

the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000458/2005005-03:

Inadequate design assumption results in RCIC turbine exhaust header filling with water

following an automatic high water level shutdown.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected work orders (WO) to ensure that testing activities

were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability. The inspectors:

(1) identified the safety function(s) for each system by reviewing applicable licensing

basis and/or design-basis documents; (2) reviewed each maintenance activity to identify

which maintenance function(s) may have been affected; (3) reviewed each test

procedure to verify that the procedure did adequately test the safety function(s) that may

have been affected by the maintenance activity; (4) reviewed the acceptance criteria in

the procedure to ensure consistency with information in the applicable licensing basis

and/or design-basis documents; and (5) identified that the procedure was properly

reviewed and approved. The eight WOs inspected are listed below:

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C WO 00063768, replace hydrogen igniter in containment dome, review conducted

during the week of October 31, 2005

C WO 00075881, replace rod control and information system isolation transformer,

reviewed during the week of October 31, 2005

C WO 00074806, rebuild control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit 4833, review

conducted during the week of December 12, 2005

C WO 50969759, rebuild control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit 1625, review

conducted during the week of December 12, 2005

C WO 00066597, rework Inverter BYS-INV01A to fix blown fuse problem, review

conducted during the week of December 12, 2005

C WO 50968926, replace frequency detector board on Inverter ENB-INV01B1,

review conducted during the week of December 12, 2005

C WO 00072137, quarterly inspection and lubrication of the station blackout diesel,

review conducted during the week of December 19, 2005

C WO 50967030, clean, inspect, and lubricate the station blackout diesel, review

conducted during the week of December 19, 2005

The inspectors completed eight inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified, by witnessing and reviewing test data, that risk-significant

system and component surveillance tests met TS, USAR, and procedure requirements.

The inspectors ensured that surveillance tests demonstrated that the systems were

capable of performing their intended safety functions and provided operational

readiness. The inspectors specifically: (1) evaluated surveillance tests for

preconditioning; (2) evaluated clear acceptance criteria, range, accuracy and current

calibration of test equipment; and (3) verified that equipment was properly restored at

the completion of the testing. The inspectors observed and reviewed the following

surveillance tests and surveillance test procedures (STP):

C STP-552-4202, "Post Accident Monitoring/Remote Shutdown System -

Suppression Pool Water Level Channel Calibration (CMS-LT23B, CMS-ESX23B,

CMS-LI23B, CMS-TR40B, CMS-LIX23B)," Revision 9A, performed on

October 13, 2005

-18- Enclosure

C MCP-4303, Functional Test of Standby Cooling Tower #1 Station Blackout

Division I Standby Service Water Return Valve and Valve Logic

(SWP-AOV599), Revision 01A, performed on October 25, 2005

C STP-552-4502, "Post Accident Monitoring/Remote Shutdown System - Drywell

Pressure Channel Calibration (CMS-PT2A, CMS-T103, CMS-PR2A),"

Revision 14A, performed on November 28, 2005

The inspectors completed three inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of December 19, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the following temporary

plant modifications: (1) temporary Alteration TA05-0015-00 to supply Division II safety-

related 120 volt ac electrical distribution Panel SCM-PNL01B from safety-related power

Supply RPS-XRC10B1 so that repairs to safety-related power Supply SCM-XRC14B1

could be made; and (2) temporary Alteration TA05-0014-01 to install radiation shielding

in front of standby gas treatment control Panels GTS-PNL28A/B until a permanent

solution could be installed. This shielding was installed after an equipment qualification

evaluation showed that the total integrated dose for standby gas treatment Panel GTS-

PNL28A/B could exceed qualification doses of internal electrical equipment after the

annulus mixing system was retired. Specifically, the inspectors: (1) reviewed each

temporary modification and its associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system's

design basis documentation, including the USAR and TS; (2) verified that the installation

of the temporary modification was consistent with the modification documents; and

(3) reviewed the postinstallation test results to confirm that the actual impact of the

temporary modification on SCM-PNL01B and GTS-PNL28A/B had been adequately

verified. The inspectors completed two inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector discussed with licensee staff the status of offsite siren systems to

determine the adequacy of licensee methods for testing the alert and notification system

-19- Enclosure

in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. The licensees alert and notification

system testing program was compared with criteria in NUREG-0654, Criteria for

Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and

Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) Report REP-10, Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and

Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, and the licensees current

FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report. The inspector also

reviewed Procedures EPP-2-701, Prompt Notification System Maintenance and

Testing, Revision 18, and EPP-2-401, Inadvertent Siren Sounding, Revision 7. The

inspector completed one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following documents to determine the licensees ability to

staff emergency response facilities in accordance with the licensee emergency plan and

the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.

  • EIP-2-006, Notifications, Revision 32
  • EPP-2-502, Emergency Communications Equipment Testing, Revision 21
  • Details of 10 staffing augmentation and quarterly pager drills

The inspector completed one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following documents related to the licensees corrective

action program to determine the licensees ability to identify and correct problems in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E:

2003, 2004, and 2005

  • Four licensee self-assessments
  • Licensee evaluation reports for 11 drills and exercises

-20- Enclosure

department between February 2003 and October 2005

  • Details of 17 selected CRs

The licensees corrective action program was also compared with the requirements of

Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 2. The inspector

independently evaluated the emergency operations facility during an October 18, 2005,

drill and compared the postdrill critique of licensee performance. The inspector

completed one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on October 18,

2005, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and

protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors also

evaluated the licensee assessment of classification, notification, and protective action

recommendation development during the drill in accordance with plant procedures and

NRC guidelines. The inspectors also observed the drill evaluator immediate critiques of

the drill participants classification, notification, and protective action recommendation

activities. The following procedures and documents were reviewed during the

assessment:

C EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 13

C EIP-2-006, Notifications, Revision 32

C EIP-2-007, Protective Action Guidelines Recommendations, Revision 21

The inspectors completed one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

-21- Enclosure

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining individual and

collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The

inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees procedures

required by TS as criteria for determining compliance. The inspector interviewed

licensee personnel and reviewed:

  • Current 3-year rolling average collective exposure
  • Three on-line maintenance work activities scheduled during the inspection period

and associated work activity exposure estimates which were likely to result in the

highest personnel collective exposures

  • Site-specific ALARA procedures
  • ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation

requirements

  • Intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any

inconsistencies

  • Dose rate reduction activities in work planning
  • Method for adjusting exposure estimates, or replanning work, when unexpected

changes in scope or emergent work were encountered

  • Use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions and dose reduction

benefits afforded by shielding

  • Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work

activities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas

  • Self-assessments and audits related to the ALARA program since the last

inspection

  • Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-up

activities such as initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking

The inspector completed 9 of the required 15 inspection samples and 2 of the optional

inspection samples.

-22- Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators listed below

for the period July 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005. The definitions and guidance

of NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revisions 2 and 3, were

used to verify the licensees basis for reporting each data element in order to verify the

accuracy of performance indicator data reported during the assessment period. The

licensees performance indicator data was also reviewed against the requirements of

Procedure EN-LI-114, Performance Indicator Process, Revision 0.

  • Drill and Exercise Performance
  • Emergency Response Organization Participation
  • Alert and Notification System Reliability

The inspector reviewed a 100 percent sample of drill and exercise scenarios, licensed

operator simulator training sessions, notification forms, and attendance and critique

records associated with training sessions, drills, and exercises conducted during the

verification period. The inspector reviewed emergency responder qualification, training,

and drill participation records for 20 key licensee emergency response personnel. The

inspector reviewed procedures for conducting siren testing and a 100 percent sample of

siren test records. The inspector also interviewed licensee personnel that were

accountable for collecting and evaluating the performance indicator data.

The inspector completed three inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

1. Emergency Preparedness Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed a summary listing of 146 corrective actions assigned to the

emergency preparedness department, reviewed 17 CRs in detail, and independently

-23- Enclosure

assessed the licensees ability to identify problems associated with an October 18, 2005,

integrated drill, in order to assess the licensees ability to identify and correct problems.

The inspector completed one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. ALARA Planning and Controls Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's problem identification and

resolution processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels,

and radiation worker practices. The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents

listed in the attachment against the licensees problem identification and resolution

program requirements. The inspector completed one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a 6-month review of the licensees corrective action program

and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more

significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive issues, but

also considered the results of daily inspector screening of CRs and licensee trending

efforts. The inspectors review considered the six month period of July through

December 2005. Inspectors reviewed 76 specific CRs and their associated operability

evaluations. Operability determinations set the priority for corrective actions to resolve

conditions adverse to quality. The CR numbers are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors also evaluated the CRs and the operability determinations against the

requirements of the following guidance documents:

  • Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 1
  • Procedure OSP-0040, LCO Tracking and Safety Function Determination

Program, Revision 10

Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or

Safety, dated September 26, 2005

-24- Enclosure

The inspectors completed one inspection sample.

b. Assessment and Observations

There were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors determined that a

number of operability determinations stated that the equipment that was the subject of

the CR was currently inoperable and being tracked using the LCO Tracking System.

The inspectors found that this system was an effective mechanism for resolution of TS

LCOs. However, from a corrective action program perspective, there was no closure of

the condition adverse to quality (system inoperability) or a discussion of the corrective

actions taken to restore the equipment to operable status in the subject CR. In addition,

the inspectors observed that a number of operability determinations described

conditions where the system was declared operable but the system or a support system

was in a degraded or nonconforming condition. In some cases, compensatory actions

were being taken to ensure system operability, but no mechanism was in place to

ensure that these compensatory measures remained in place until the degraded or

nonconforming condition was corrected. The inspectors did not find any examples

where the nonconforming condition was not corrected within a reasonable period of

time.

4. Resident Inspector Annual Sample Review

The inspectors completed two inspection samples.

Ultimate Heat Sink Long Term Heat Removal Capacity

c. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed CR-RBS-2002-01243, ultimate heat sink capacity less than the

30-day requirement, during the week of November 28, 2005. The inspectors evaluated

the CR against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as

described in nuclear management manual Procedure LI-102, Corrective Action

Process, Revision 4, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

b. Findings and Observations

There were no findings of significance identified. On August 28, 2002, the inspectors

found: (1) the single failure assumption made for the design of the ultimate heat sink

was a trip of standby diesel Generator B immediately after a small line break event, with

bypass, coincident with a loss-of-offsite power and plant trip, (2) the ultimate heat sink

capacity would be less than 30 days if, instead, all ECCS systems worked as designed

and no operator actions were taken to secure ECCS, and (3) specific procedures to

replenish the ultimate heat sink during a loss-of-offsite power had not been written. In

response to the inspectors' concerns, the licensee wrote CR-RBS-2002-01243 and took

the following corrective actions: (1) revised their procedures to clarify operator actions if

no single failure occurred and to provide instructions for makeup to the ultimate heat

-25- Enclosure

sink during a 30-day loss-of-offsite power; and (2) issued license amendment Request

LAR-2001-026, dated March 18, 2003, to revise their TS Bases 3.7, Standby Service

Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink, and USAR.

Simulator Fidelity Issue Regarding Wide-Range Level Recorders

d. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee in response to

NCV 05000458/2004005-02, wide-range reactor water level indication did not respond

as expected by operators following an unplanned reactor scram. On December 10,

2004, a failure of a balance of plant instrument bus caused the feedwater regulating

valves to fail in their 100 percent flow position. Following a reactor scram, the feedwater

pumps overfed the reactor and tripped on high reactor water level. The excess

feedwater caused reactor water level to continue to rise after the feed pump trip. The

wide-range level recorders' digital output continued to indicate reactor water level

greater than +60 inches, the top end of the wide-range level instruments. The reactor

operators were not aware that the recorders digital output would continue to increase

beyond +60 inches because the digital readout of wide-range level recorders in the

simulator stopped at +60 inches. This response caused some confusion and

complicated the operators' response to the event. The inspectors reviewed CR-RBS-

2004-04289, -04295, -04296 and -04299 written by the licensee in response to this

event.

e. Findings and Observations

There were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors found that, when a

design change was implemented changing the wide-range reactor water level recorders

from analog to digital models, the simulator modification made the software for the

recorders stop indicating at the top of scale (+60 inches). The digital recorders installed

in the control room, however, had no upper limit on the digital indication. On

December 10, 2004, reactor water level rose above the reference leg tap for the level

transmitter and, as the reference leg condensing chamber cooled down, the wide-range

level transmitters output continued to increase and the digital indication showed a level

as high as +140 inches. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the

licensee and determined that they were reasonable and adequate to correct the

operator knowledge deficiency caused by the simulator fidelity issue. The inspectors

interviewed a cross-section of control room operators and determined that the

phenomena was understood and they understood that any wide-range digital indication

greater that +60 inches was invalid and not indicative of actual reactor water level.

4OA3 Event Followup

1. (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-458/04-001-00, Automatic Reactor Scram

Due to Main Generator Trip Resulting from Switchyard Fault

On August 15, 2004, a transmission tower guy wire failed. This allowed a 230 kV

transmission line structure between Port Hudson and Fancy Point (Line 353) to fall and

-26- Enclosure

create a ground fault condition on the line. Four breakers in the station switchyard were

slow to open to clear the fault. As a result: (1) Reserve Station Transformer 2 was

deenergized, causing a partial loss of off-site power and start of the Division 2

emergency diesel generator; and (2) main transformer protection relays caused a main

generator lockout, which resulted in a generator load reject reactor scram.

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000458/2004005, issued February 14, 2005,

documented a Green, self-revealing finding associated with this event for preconditioned

speed testing of station switchyard breakers and three similar failures of station

switchyard breakers. The licensee revised the speed testing procedures to avoid

preconditioning the breakers.

NRC Supplemental Inspection Report 05000458/2005012, issued October 24, 2005,

documented a supplemental inspection performed in accordance with Inspection

Procedure 95001. The supplemental inspection was in response to four unplanned

reactor scrams that occurred between August 15, 2004, and January 15, 2005. The

licensees root cause analysis identified several programmatic changes which were

incorporated into a switchyard reliability program to improve switchyard maintenance

practices.

The inspectors reviewed the LER and the licensees resolution of identified problems

and determined there were no findings of significance and no other violations of NRC

requirements. The licensee documented the failed equipment in CR-RBS-2004-02332.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meetings

On October 21, 2005, the inspector presented the emergency preparedness inspection

results to Mr. J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Planning, and other members of his

staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary

information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

On November 4, 2005, the inspector presented the licensed operator requalification

program inspection results to Mr. Mike Cantrell, Operations Training Supervisor, and

other members of the licensees management staff. The licensee acknowledged the

findings presented. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not

provided or examined during the inspection.

On December 8, 2005, the inspector presented the ALARA inspection results to

Mr. R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of his staff who

acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was

not provided or examined during the inspection.

-27- Enclosure

On January 4, 2006, the inspectors presented the integrated baseline inspection results

to Paul Henninkamp, Vice President, Operations, and other members of licensee

management. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or

examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

-28- Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Boyle, Manager, Radiation Protection

D. Burnett, Superintendent, Chemistry

M. Cantrell, Operations Training Supervisor

J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager - Training

T. Coleman, Manager, Planning and Scheduling/Outage

M. Davis, Acting Manager, Radiation Protection

C. Forpahl, Manager, Corrective Actions

H. Goodman, Director, Engineering

P. Hinnenkamp, Vice President - Operations

B. Houston, Manager, Plant Maintenance

G. Huston, Assistant Operations Manager - Shift

R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Planning

D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing

J. Maher, Superintendent, Reactor Engineering

W. Mashburn, Manager, Design Engineering

P. Russell, Manager, System Engineering

C. Stafford, Manager, Operations

W. Trudell, Manager, Training and Development

D. Vinci, General Manager - Plant Operations

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000458/2005005-01 NCV Inadequate procedure for implementation of an EAL

05000458/2005005-02 NCV Failure to complete TS required actions within allowed

completion time

05000458/2005005-03 NCV Inadequate design assumption results in RCIC turbine

exhaust header filling with water following an automatic

high water level shutdown

Closed

05000458/2004-001-00 LER Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Main Generator Trip

Resulting from Switchyard Fault

A-1 Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the

objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Job Performance Measures

RJPM-OPS-052-04, Alternate Control Rod Drive Pumps, August 4, 2005

RJPM-OPS-053-03R5, Reset a FCV runback, July 26, 2005

RJPM-OPS-109.4, July 26, 2005

RJPM-OPS-110-04, Synchronize the Main Generator with the Grid, August 2, 2005

RJPM-OPS-256-03R4, Restore level in the SBCT with deepwell pumps, July 26, 2005

RJPM-OPS-309-050, July 19, 2005

RJPM-OPS-508-04, Restore RPS B Normal Power Supply, August 19, 2005

RJPM-OPS-508-07, Respond to reactor scram with control rods failing to insert,

August 2, 2005

RJPM-OPS-800-17R1, Vent the CCRD over-piston volume, July 26, 2005

RJPM-OPS-05206R2, Control rod operability faulted, July 12, 2005

RJPM-OPS-05207R2, Alternate control rod drive pumps (Fuel Bldg), July 12, 2005

RJPM-OPS-05304R, Startup A recirc HPU, July 12, 2005

RJPM-OPS-20005R, Perform ATC actions for remote shutdown, August 2, 2005

RJPM-OPS-20006R5, Perform Attachment 13 UO actions, July 26, 2005

Scenarios

RSMS-OPS-822, Loss of All Feed Water / RCIC Failure / LOCA, Revision: 00

RSMS-OPS-823, APRM Failure /SRV Failure / EHC Failure / ATWS, Revision: 00

RSMS-OPS-824, LPRM Failure / Loss of Vacuum with MSIV Closure / ATWS,

Revision: 00

A-2 Attachment

RSMS-OPS-825, Loss of RPS B / Relief Valve Fails Open / Steam Leak in the Drywell

With Failure of the Drywell, Revision: 00

RSMS-OPS-827, Rod Drop / Fuel Failure / RCIC Steam Leak / Partial ATWS,

Revision: 00

RSMS-OPS-829, Failure Of STX-XS2B / Loss Of Condenser Vacuum / ATWS,

Revision: 00

RSMS-OPS-830, Inadvertent HPCS Injection and Loss of Stator Cooling, Revision: 00

Section 1R17: Permanent Plant Modifications

Event Notification 41252, Reactor Scram due to Loss of Vital Instrument Bus

LER 05-458/04-005-01, Unplanned Automatic Scram due to Loss of Non-Vital 120 Volt

Instrument Bus, June 22, 2005

CR-RBS-2004-04291 RCIC system initiated and subsequently tripped on Level 8

CR-RBS-2005-00724 MR96-0063 removed internals from RCIC Turbine Exhaust Check

Valve E51-VF040

SDRP-P43, System Design Requirements Document, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling,

Revision 0

SDC-209, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Design Criteria, Revision 0,

November 9, 1998

SDC-209, Reactor Core Isolation Sooling System Design Criteria, Revision 3,

September 27, 2004

RBS USAR Section 5.4.6, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Revision 17

NUREG-0989, RBS Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements, May 1984 through

October 1985

GE SIL-30, HPCI/RCIC Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breakers, October 31, 1973

GS AID-56, HPCI/RCI Turbine Exhaust Check Valve Cycling, August 1985

VPF-3622-353 (1) - 1, RCIC Turbine Instruction Manual, January 1975 through

March 1978

MR96-0063, Remove Internals of [RCIC Exhaust Check Valve] E51-VF040,

September 18, 1996

A-3 Attachment

CR-RBS-1996-1671, Existing plant configuration of RCIC turbine exhaust line vacuum

breaker vent line does not correspond with configuration assumed in Calculation PH-56,

Revision 0

Calculation PH-56, RCIC Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breaker Vent Line Sizing

Verification, Revision 1A, November 27, 1996

Piping and Instrument Drawing PID-27-06A, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System,

Revision 42

Calculation G13.18.2.0-079, Determination of Quantity of Water Entering RCIC Turbine

Exhaust Line, May 11, 2005

Calculation G13.18.10.2*225, RCIC Fluid Transient Analysis - Water in Turbine Exhaust

Line, May 17, 2005

ER-RB-2005-0084-000, Replace Check Valve E51-VF040 or Reinstall Internal Parts,

February 20, 2005

Terry Turbine SAM-12, Terry Wheel Water Slug Test, March 1, 1973

Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Testing

River Bend Station Emergency Plan, Revision 28

River Bend Station Prompt Notification System Design Report, Revision 1,

December 2001

Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing

Evaluation Reports for Pager and Augmentation Tests conducted:

February 10, 2004 December 8, 2004 July 25, 2005

June 17, 2004 January 25, 2005 September 27, 2005

August 24, 2004 March 22, 2005

September 23, 2004

Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

Procedures

EN-LI-118, Root Cause Analysis Process, Revision 1

EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 3

A-4 Attachment

Quality Assurance

Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2003-RBS-1

Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2004-RBS-1

Quality Assurance Audit Report, QA-7-2005-RBS-1

Condition Reports

CR-RBS-1999-1316 CR-RBS-2004-3086

CR-RBS-2003-0586 CR-RBS-2004-3811

CR-RBS-2003-0624 CR-RBS-2005-1433

CR-RBS-2003-1950 CR-RBS-2005-1602

CR-RBS-2003-1992 CR-RBS-2005-1632

CR-RBS-2003-2094 CR-RBS-2005-1391

CR-RBS-2003-3050 CR-RBS-2005-2516

CR-RBS-2004-1090 CR-RBS-2005-2646

CR-RBS-2004-1159

Evaluation Reports for Drills conducted

September 3, 2003 December 1, 2004 (simulator)

March 2 2004 December 1, 2004 (medical)

April 20, 2004 March 24, 2005

May 25, 2004 April 19, 2005

June 9, 2004 June 21, 2005

July 27, 2004

Licensee Self-Assessments

2004 Evaluated Exercise Pre-Assessment

LO-RLO-2004-00004 CA56, 2004 Long Range ERO Staffing Assessment

2005 Emergency Planning Program Assessment

Snapshot Assessment of RBS Siren System

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

EN-EP-201, Emergency Planning Performance Indicators, Revision 2

EPP-2-703, Performance Indicators, Revision 2

EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12

EIP-2-002, Classification Actions, Revision 24

EIP-2-006, Notifications, Revision 32

EIP-2-007, Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines, Revision 20

EIP-2-007, Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines, Revision 21

A-5 Attachment

Section 2OS2: ALARA Planning and Controls

Condition Reports

CR-RBS-2005-01472 CR-RBS-2005-02558

CR-RBS-2005-01474 CR-RBS-2005-03382

CR-RBS-2005-02076 CR-RBS-2005-04004

Audits and Self-Assessments

QA-14-2005-RBS-1 Quality Assurance Audit of Radiation Protection Snapshot

Assessment /Benchmark on: Effectiveness of the RP TAC/TRG

(July 11-13, 2005)

QS-2005-RBS-009 ALARA Planning and Controls (August 22 through

September 1, 2005)

LO#2005-00123 Radiation Protection Program (July 11-15, 2005)

Radiation Work Permits

2005-1073 Change out filter elements LWS-SKD5-F100A

2005-1110 Clean-up FB 113' cask pool and install cask pool impact limiter

2005-1310 Recirc Flow Control Valve Maintenance

Procedures

ENS-RP-105 Radiation Work Permits, Revision 7

RP-110 ALARA Program, Revision 2

ALARA Committee Minutes

AMC 05-01 January 11, 2005

AMC 05-02 January 12, 2005

AMC 05-03 January 17, 2005

AMC 05-11 July 14, 2005

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Condition reports

CR-RBS-2005-02444 CR-RBS-2005-02570

CR-RBS-2005-02481 CR-RBS-2005-02590

CR-RBS-2005-02486 CR-RBS-2005-02605

CR-RBS-2005-02494 CR-RBS-2005-02621

CR-RBS-2005-02548 CR-RBS-2005-02624

CR-RBS-2005-02563 CR-RBS-2005-02626

A-6 Attachment

CR-RBS-2005-02645 CR-RBS-2005-03446

CR-RBS-2005-02649 CR-RBS-2005-03471

CR-RBS-2005-02659 CR-RBS-2005-03474

CR-RBS-2005-02664 CR-RBS-2005-03503

CR-RBS-2005-02686 CR-RBS-2005-03509

CR-RBS-2005-02693 CR-RBS-2005-03513

CR-RBS-2005-02695 CR-RBS-2005-03515

CR-RBS-2005-02722 CR-RBS-2005-03554

CR-RBS-2005-02724 CR-RBS-2005-03586

CR-RBS-2005-02727 CR-RBS-2005-03594

CR-RBS-2005-02738 CR-RBS-2005-03619

CR-RBS-2005-02754 CR-RBS-2005-03629

CR-RBS-2005-02760 CR-RBS-2005-03645

CR-RBS-2005-02767 CR-RBS-2005-03670

CR-RBS-2005-02768 CR-RBS-2005-03706

CR-RBS-2005-03106 CR-RBS-2005-03728

CR-RBS-2005-03111 CR-RBS-2005-03747

CR-RBS-2005-03114 CR-RBS-2005-03753

CR-RBS-2005-03125 CR-RBS-2005-03787

CR-RBS-2005-03131 CR-RBS-2005-03831

CR-RBS-2005-03138 CR-RBS-2005-03847

CR-RBS-2005-03151 CR-RBS-2005-03887

CR-RBS-2005-03152 CR-RBS-2005-03918

CR-RBS-2005-03165 CR-RBS-2005-03948

CR-RBS-2005-03178 CR-RBS-2005-03969

CR-RBS-2005-03182 CR-RBS-2005-04018

CR-RBS-2005-03220 CR-RBS-2005-04064

CR-RBS-2005-03242 CR-RBS-2005-04071

CR-RBS-2005-03265 CR-RBS-2005-04095

CR-RBS-2005-03273 CR-RBS-2005-04103

CR-RBS-2005-03279 CR-RBS-2005-04106

CR-RBS-2005-03443 CR-RBS-2005-04118

A-7 Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR condition report

CR-RBS River Bend Station condition report

EAL emergency action level

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FCV flow control valve

HPU hydraulic power unit

MC manual chapter

LER licensee event report

LCO limiting condition for operation

LOCA loss of coolant accident

NCV noncited violation

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

RCIC reactor core isolation cooling system

RCS reactor coolant system

RR reactor recirculation system

SOP system operating procedures

STP surveillance test procedure

TS Technical Specification

USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

WO work order

A-8 Attachment