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APS Supplement to the Seismic Walkdown Report Requested by the NRC Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force.
	ML14126A636
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/30/2014
From:	Mims D; Arizona Public Service Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14126A645	List: ML14126A636;
References
	102-06868-DCM/MAM/PJH WCAP-17681-NP, Supple. 1, Rev. 0
	Download: ML14126A636 (117)
	v • d • e

10 CFR 50.54(f)

~) aps DWIGHT C. MIMS Senior Vice President, Nuclear Regu latory & Oversight Pa lo Verde Nuclear Generating St ati on P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072 Mall Station 7605 102-06868-DCM/ MAM/PJH Tel 623 393 5403 April 30, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pi ke Rockville, MD 20852

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of t he Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012

2. NRC Letter, Endorsement Of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Draft Report 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance," dated May 31, 2012

3. APS Letter 102-06626, Seismic Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54( f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and

9. 3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated November 27, 2012 4 . NRC Letter, Staff Assessment of the Seismic Wa/kdown Reports Supporting Implementation of Near- Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-lchi Nuclear Power Plant, dated April 11, 20 14

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 APS Supplement to the Seismic Walkdown Report Requested by the NRC Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident On March 12, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to Arizona Public Service {APS). Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains specific Requested Actions, Requested Information, and Required Responses associated with Seismic Recommendation 2.3.

For Seismic Recommendation 2.3, Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 states that within 180 days of NRC endorsement of the walkdown guidance (Reference 2), each addressee will submit its final response for the requested information, including a list of any areas that are A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway

Comanche Peak

Dl.ablo Canyon

Palo Verde

Wolf Creek

ENCLOSURE APPENDICES A and B CONTAIN UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED 102-06868-DCM/MAM/PJH ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission APS Supplement to the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report Page 2 unable to be inspected due to inaccessibility and a schedule for when the walkdown will be completed.

On November 27, 2012, APS provided the PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report (Reference 3) in response to the request of Reference 1 for Seismic Recommendation 2.3. In that submittal, APS noted that some components were inaccessible for inspection during the initial seismic walkdown and other components required additional inspection.

As a result, APS committed to provide a supplement to the PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report that contains the supplemental seismic walkdown and seismic licensing basis evaluation results. The supplemental seismic walkdowns include both seismic walkdowns of equipment and area walk-bys.

The enclosure to this letter provides the results of the supplemental seismic walkdowns of inaccessible components and components related to question 4.20 of the frequently asked seismic questions, which addressed interior inspections of electrical cabinets. In addition, the enclosure provides the results of seismic licensing basis evaluations related to the supplemental seismic walkdowns. This submittal completes the Seismic Walkdown Report for PVNGS Unit 3, as addressed in Reference 4.

Appendices A and B of the enclosure contain security-related information. Therefore, APS is requesting that those appendices be withheld from public disclosure.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter.

Should you have any questions concerning the content of this letter, please contact Mark McGhee, Department Leader Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393- 4972.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on il-f:Jj;}

Sincerely, Lc.~t~

Enclosure:

Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 - Supplemental Information DCM/MAM/PJ H ENCLOSURE APPENDICES A and B CONTAIN UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED

ENCLOSURE, APPENDICES A and B CONTAIN UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED 102- 06868-DCM/MAM/PJH ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission APS Supplement to the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report Page 3 cc: E. J. Leeds NRC Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation M. L. Dapas NRC Region IV Regional Administrator J. K. Rankin NRC NRR Project Manager A. E. George NRC NRR Project Manager M.A. Brown NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS N. DiFrancesco NRC NRR/JLD Project Manager UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED

ENCLOSURE, APPENDICES A and B CONTAIN UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED ENCLOSURE Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 - Supplemental Information UPON SEPARATION THIS PAGE IS DECONTROLLED

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain ~~~~~--

Upon separation this page is deconlrolled Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 April201 4 Revision 0 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 - Supplemental Information (8) Westinghouse

Enclosure Appendices A and B conlainJIIIIIIIIII*IIIll*lll*********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3- Supplemental Information Rolando Perez

Risk Applications & Methods II Walter Djordjevic Seismic Walkdown Peer Review Team Leader April2014 Reviewer: Derek Seaman*

Risk Applications & Methods II Reviewer: Chris Wandell Senior Consulting Engineer, Arizona Public Service Approved: Dan Sadlon

Manager, Risk Applications & Methods II

Electronically approved records are authenticated in the electronic document management system.

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separatJon this page Is decontrolled REVISION LOG Rev. Date Revision Description Rev.O 4/2014 Supplement 1 includes the main body ofWCAP-17681-NP, Rev. 0 (Reference 48, "Executive Summary" through "References") and new or revised content in the appendices that address the conduct and results of the follow-on walkdown activities performed prior to and during refueling outage 3Rl7. Revision bars are used in the main body to easily identify the updates. With the exception of Appendices A and B, revision bars are utilized in the appendices to identify the updates relative to the corresponding appendices of WCAP-17681-NP, Rev. 0. Note that Appendices A and B consist of the completed checklists resulting from the follow-on walkdowns only. Editorial and formatting corrections relative to WCAP-17681 -NP, Rev. 0 are not identified with individual revision bars in this document.

(

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Endosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separat1on thiS page IS <lecontrolle<l Executive Summary Following the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) established the Near-Term Task Force (NITF) in response to Commission direction. The NITF made several recommendations, some of which are related to improving the protection of nuclear power plants against natural phenomena. With Recommendation 2.3 (Rec 2.3), the NITF recommended the NRC require licensees to perform seismic and flooding walkdowns to identify and address vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of hazard protection features.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), that requests information from all power reactor licensees related to NITF Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3. For the seismic aspect of Rec 2.3, licensees are required to perform Seismic Walkdowns to verify the current plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis, verify the adequacy of current strategies and maintenance plans, and identify and address degraded. non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions. This report contains the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) response for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 3 to the request for information related to the seismic aspects of NITF Rec 2.3, as addressed in of the NRC letter.

The original version of this WCAP report summarizes the results from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed from August 6 through August 13, 2012. Supplement 1 incorporates the results from the additional walkdowns performed on April 6, 2013, and during refueling outage 3R17, on October 13,2013.

To establish a consistent methodology for performance of the Seismic Walkdowns, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), in conjunction with the industry, developed guidance in EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286. This guidance was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The Seismic Walkdowns conducted at PVNGS Unit 3 conform to the requirements of the EPRI Technical Report.

Consistent with the guidance, the following topics are addressed in this PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown report:

1. Seismic Licensing Basis for Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)

2. Personnel Qualifications

3. Process used for selection ofSSCs

4. Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

5. Licensing Basis Evaluations

6. Peer Review

7. IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report The required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed for accessible equipment in PVNGS Unit 3 during the period from August 6 through August 13, 2012, while the plant was operating in Mode 1. Inaccessible equipment (contairunent building and energized high-voltage equipment) are identified in the PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report and walkdowns were conducted on April6, 2013, and during refueling outage 3Rl7, on October 13, 2013. Also during 3Rl7, supplemental inspections of electrical cabinets were performed in accordance with the NRC response to industry frequently asked question 4.20. In addition, Area Walk-Bys were completed, as required, during these follow-on activities. Documentation of these additional inspections and the related evaluations is provided in this supplement report.

The following information identities the requests in the 50.54(f) Jetter (in italics) followed by a swnmary of the APS response:

a. Information on the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B containJIIIIIIII!!IIIJ.IIJI!IJ.IIIIII********

Upon separat1on this page is decontrolled ii The PVNGS current Seismic Licensing Basis (seismic codes, standards, and methods) is documented in report Section 1 and was used to inform the Seismic Walkdown licensing basis evaluations. *

b. Information related to the implementation ofthe walkdown process.

The approach used to implement the Seismic Walkdown process at PVNGS conforms to the guidance of EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286. Report Sections 3 through 5 provide detailed descriptions of how the walkdown process was implemented at PVNGS.

c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including any seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings) identified by the IPEEE and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them (including their completion dates).

No plant-specific seismic vulnerabilities were identified at PVNGS Unit 3 by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program. The results of the IPEEE program are described in report Section 7.

d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision, 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the co"ective action program.

The summary of the key fmdings of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys is provided in report Section 4. The licensing basis evaluations of potentially adverse seismic conditions and their resolutions are described in detail in Section 5 and Appendix D of this report. A total of 28 licensing basis evaluations have been satisfactorily closed and nine open evaluations have been entered into the PVNGS Corrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution. Items entered into the CAP are annotated in Appendix D. None of these identified conditions prevent the equipment from performing the intended safety functions during or after a design basis seismic event. Results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are documented on EPRI TR-1025286 checklists in report Appendices A and B, respectively.

e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.

There are no planned or newly installed protection or mitigation features that resulted from the implementation of the Seismic Walkdown guidance at PVNGS. However, one potentially adverse seismic condition that was identified during the Seismic Walkdowns resulted in action being taken to restore seismic design margin. Bookcases installed near the control boards in the Unit 3 Control Room were removed. The condition related to this change would not have prevented safety-related equipment from performing its intended safety function during or after a design basis seismic event; the change was implemented to restore seismic design margin.

f Results..and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.

The peer review process performed at PVNGS confirmed and informed the selection of SSCs process, provided real-time feedback to the Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) during WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices Aand Bcontain iiiiJ***************

Upon separation this page is decontrolled iii performance of the walkdowns, and confrrmed that the licensing basis evaluations carefully compared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basis documentation. Details of the peer reviewer activities are described in report Section 6.

In summary, PVNGS Unit 3 equipment that was inspected and evaluated for the Seismic Walkdown process, including initial and s upplemental inspections and related licensing basis evaluations, was determined to be capable of performing intended safety functions during and after a design basis seismic event and the site monitoring and maintenance procedures were determined to be adequate. Follow-on activities to complete the remaining aspects of this process were completed as described in this supplemental report. Therefore, the required NTTF 2.3 walkdown activities have been successfully completed for PVNGS Unit 3 in accordance with the EPRI Guidance document and the intent of to the NRC 50.54(f) letter has been satisfied.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We wish to acknowledge the following contributors to the effort.

Mike Powell- Arizona Public Service (Director Fukushima Response)

Chris Wandell -Arizona Public Service Justin Wood - Arizona Public Service Winston Borrero - Arizona Public Service Randall "Gene" Eimar- Arizona Public Service Jonathon Lucero - Arizona Public Service Nick Reidenbach - Arizona Public Service Derek Morris - Arizona Public Service Mark Meyer- Arizona Public Service Nathan Hadwick -Arizona Public Service Jose "Angel" Delgadillo - Arizona Public Service Michael Crib bins - Westinghouse Electric Company Rolando Perez- Westinghouse Electric Company Derek Seaman - Westinghouse Electric Company Gary Douglas - Westinghouse Electric Company Joe Somsel - Westinghouse Electric Company Paul Karavoussianis - Stevenson & Associates Walter Djordjevic - Stevenson & Associates Hunter Young- Stevenson & Associates Timothy Nealon - Stevenson & Associates Andrew Masiunas - Stevenson & Associates Cory figliolini- Stevenson & Associates WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices Aand B c o n t a i n * * * * * * *

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Definition AFAS Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal AF Auxiliary Feedwater AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System AHU Air Handling Unit APS Arizona Public Service ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AUX Auxiliary Building AWC Area Walk-By Checklist CAP Corrective Action Program CE Combustion Engineering CF Containment Function CH Chemical and Volume Control CLB Current Licensing Basis CP Containment Purge CST Condensate Storage Tank CT Condensate Transfer and Storage CTMT Containment CTRL Control Building eves Chemical and Volume Control System DBM Design Basis Manual DCM Design Criteria Manual OF Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer DG Diesel Generator DHR Decay Heat Removal EAHU Essential Air Handling Unit EC HVAC Essential Chilled Water EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EQCF Equipment Qualification Control Form EQID Equipment Identification EW Essential Cooling Water FAQ Frequently Asked Question(s)

FCR Field Change Request GA Service Gas GR Gaseous Radwaste HA HVAC Auxiliary Building HC HVAC Containment Building HD HVAC Diesel Generator Building HJ HVAC Control Building HPSI High Pressure Safety Injection HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Endosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled vi Acron:tm Definition lA Instrument and Service Air IC Reactor Coolant Inventory Control IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISRS In-Structure Response Spectra MCC Motor Control Center MOV Motor-Operated Valve MSSS Main Steam Support Structure NCR Non-Conformance Reports NQR Non-Quality Related NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System NTIF Near-Term Task Force OBE Operating Basis Earthquake P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PB Class IE 4.16 kv Power PC Reactor Coolant Pressure Control PE Class 1E Standby Generation PG Class IE 480v Power Switchgear PGD Project General Design Criteria PH Class 1E 480v Power Motor Control Center PK Class IE 125 VDC PN Class IE Instrument Power PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PVAR Palo Verde Action Request (Corrective Action Program)

PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station RAS Re-circulation Actuation Signal RAW Risk Achievement Worth RC Reactivity Control or Reactor Coolant RCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary RCS Reactor Coolant System RD Radioactive Waste Drain RLE Review Level Earthquake RM Main Control Board ROB Rule of the Box RWT Refueling Water Tank S&A Stevenson & Associates SA Engineered Safety F~;1tures Actuation System SB Reactor Protection SC-1 Seismic Category I soc Shutdown Cooling WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled vii Acronym Definition SDOC Vendor/Supplier Document SFP Spent Fuel Pool SG Main Steam SI Safety Injection sov Solenoid-Operated Valve SP Essential Spray Ponds SPRA Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment SQUG Seismic Qualification Utility Group SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List swc Seismic Walkdown Checklist SWE Seismic Walkdown Engineer SWEL Seismic Walkdown Equipment List SWG Seismic Walkdown Guidance (EPRI TR-1025286)

SWMS Site Work Management System SWT Seismic Walkdown Team UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UHS Ultimate Heat Sink ZA Auxiliary Building

ZG Diesel Generator Building ZJ Control Building WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 Apri12014

Enclosure Appendices Aand B contain * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled viii TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS .......................................................................... :.............. .................. 1-1 1.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA ............................................................................... 1-l 1.2 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT............................................................. l-1

2. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS .................................................................................................... 2-l 2.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PERSONNEL ............................................................................. 2-l 2.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS ................................................................................... 2- 1 2.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEWERS .......................................................................................... 2-3 2.4 JPEEE REVIEWERS ................................................................................................................ 2-3 2.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM ............................................................................................................. 2-3

3. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS ............................................ 3-1 3.1 SELECTION PROCESS

SUMMARY

....... .-................... ........................................................... 3-1 3.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS ......................... 3-4 3.2.1 Base List 1 .................................................................................................................... 3-9 3.2.2 SWEL 1 ........................................................................................................................ 3-9 3.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEMS ..................................................................... 3-10 3.3.1 Base List 2 ........... ................... .................................................................................... 3-12 3.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down ..................................................................................................... 3-12 3.3.3 SWEL 2 ...................................................................................................................... 3-12 3.4 fNACCESSIBLE ITEMS ........................................................................................................ 3-13

4. SEISMIC WALKDOWNSANDAREA WALK-BYS ........................................................................ 4-I

4.1 BACKGROUND

....................................................................................................................... 4-l 4.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISMIC WALKDOWNS .................................................................... 4-2 4.3 WALKDOWN RESULTS ......................................................................................................... 4-3

5. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS ............................................................................................... 5-l

6. PEER REVIEW................................................................................................................................... 6-1

6.1 INTRODUCTION

............................................................................................................ ......... 6-1 6.2 PEER REVIEW- SELECTION OF SSCS ............................................................................... 6-2 6.2.1 Purpose ......................................................................................................................... 6-2 6.2.2 Peer Review Activity - Selection of SSCs ................................................................... 6-2 6.2.3 Peer Review Findings - Selection of SSCs .................................................................. 6-3 6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments - Selection of SSCs .................................. ...... 6-5 6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review- Selection ofSSCs.......................................................... 6-5 6.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ........................................................................................................................... 6-5 6.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS ............................................................. 6-11 6.5 REVIEW SUBMITTAL REPORT .......................................................................................... 6-12

7. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES .............................................................................................................. 7-1

8. REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 8-l WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B conlain * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation lhls page Is decontrolled ix APPENDIX A -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCS) ...................................................... A-1 APPENDIX B -AREA )VALK-BY CHECKLISTS (AWCS) ................................................................. B-1 APPENDIX C -PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS ................................................................................... C-1 APPENDIX D -LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

SUMMARY

................................................... D-1 APPENDIX E - QUALIFICATIONS ..................................................................................................... E-1 APPENDIX F - PVNGS UNIT 3 SWELREPORT ................................................................................. F-1 APPENDIX G - SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES ............................................................................. G-1 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 Apri12014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contai n * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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LIST OF TABLES Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type" ..................:.............. 3-6 Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute........ 3-7 Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number" ............. 3-8 Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (Temperature)" ......... 3-9 Table 3-5: PVNGS-3 Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdown ................................. 3-13 Table 3-6: PVNGS-3 FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections ...................................................................... 3-14 Table 3-7: PVNGS-3 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage 3RI7 ......................................................... 3-15 Table 3-8: PVNGS-3 Items Completed During the April6, 2013, Inspection ....................................................... 3-16 Table 6-l : SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 3......................... 6-6 Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 3 .................................................... 6-11 Table G-1 : PVNGS-3 Base List ! ............................................................................................................................ G-1 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL I ................................................................................................................................ G-2 Table G-3: PVNGS-3 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2) .............................................................. G-14 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and Bc o n t a i n * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

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1. SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS This report is applicable to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3.

The licensing basis for Seismic Category I (SC-1) equipment at PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 is defined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR, Reference 32) Section 3.7 and is supported by summary seismic design criteria defmed in Design Criteria Manual

Project General Design Criteria (DCM-PGD, Reference 42) Section 1.3.2. Site design ground motion response spectra for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) are provided in UFSAR Figures 3.7*1 and 3.7*2, as well as UFSAR Sections 3.9.2.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10, and adhere to Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 43). Damping values for SC-1 equipment are listed in UFSAR Table 3.7-1 and conform to Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 44).

As defined in UFSAR Section 2.5, the SSE is based on the postulated occurrence of a magnitude 8.0 earthquake located 72 miles from the site. Through use of attenuation curves, extrapolation of response spectra, and analysis of intensity data, 0.2g is considered a conservative representation of the severity of horizontal and vertical vibratory ground motion for the SSE. For additional conservatism, the seismic analysis of all Category I structures was performed utilizing a 0.25g SSE. Figures 3.7-1 through 3.7-4 of the UFSAR show the horizontal and vertical design response spectra corresponding to the SSE and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE), respectively.

1.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA A time-history analysis was used to develop in-structure response spectra (lSRS) for buildings housing SC-I equipment. Modeling techniques such as the selection of the minimum number of mass points, number of dynamic degrees of freedom per mass point, and torsional effects, are described in Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A (Reference 51). The seismic input was defined in terms of the free* field acceleration time history and the soil-structure interaction parameters. The structural damping values used were per Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 44). Soil damping characteristics were modified to account for strain levels. Design basis ISRS are plotted in DBM-C5 (Reference 53) Appendix A.

1.2 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT SC-I equipment is classified according to Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design. Classification (Reference 45), and is discussed in UFSAR Section 3.2 (Reference 32) and in DCM-PGD Section 1.4.3 (Reference 42), which states:

Category I structures, systems, and components are those that are important to safety and designed to remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). These structures, systems, and components are those necessary to assure:

The integrity ofthe reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).

The capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition.

The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences ofaccidents that could result

.. in potential offsite exposures.

Per UFSAR Section 3.10.2, SC-1 electrical equipment within the Bechtel scope of supply was qualified per Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 344-75 (Reference 46). This standard is comprehensive and similar to current requirements for nuclear safety-related components. Per UFSAR WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I RevisionO PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separat1on this page is decontrolled Page 1-2 Section 3.10.5, SC-I electrical equipment within the Combustion Engineering scope of supply wa5 qualified per IEEE Std 344-71 (Reference 41) plus the additional requirements listed. With the additional requirements, the qualification criteria and methods are similar to those of IEEE Std 344-75 (Reference 46). For qualification by testing, per application of the preceding criteria, much of the electrical equipment was subject to shake table testing. The required test levels were typically based on the in-structure response spectra discussed above.

Per Section 3.9.2.2 of the UFSAR, analytical methods without testing were employed to qualify Seismic Category I mechanical equipment such as piping, ductwork, tanks and vessels, heat exchangers, filters, and pumps. Qualification for mechanical components with mechanisms that must change position in order to perform the safety-related function was performed by test or a combination of test and analysis as per the IEEE Std 344-1975 requirements and UFSAR Sections 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10. These components include American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and non-ASME items such as valves with actuators and their appurtenances as well as check valves, relief valves, fans, chillers, air handling units, and various skid-supplied devices.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-1

2. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 2.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PERSONNEL The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) development was performed by Westinghouse personnel, Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman. Resumes are provided in Appendix E. PVNGS Operations (Gene Eimar, Shift Manager and Angel Delgadillo, Senior Auxiliary Operator) provided verification of safety function selections. PVNGS Engineering (Chris Wandell, Winston Borrero) provided technical input to screening and selection of equipment. PVNGS System Engineering input was provided by performing a review of System Health Reports.

Rolando Perez - Mr. Perez is the Technical Leader for the Palo Verde Unit 3 SWEL development activity in the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and Major Projects Division. Rolando has over 15 years of experience in Westinghouse and over 35 years of experience in the .nuclear safety area. Rolando has worked for Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering (CE) as a Training Engineer, Transient Analyst, and Setpoint Analyst. Rolando has conducted lectures on reactor core physics, health physics, fluid systems, protection systems, and plant operational concepts. In 2009 Rolando expanded his expertise to include CE-designed plants that employ digital-based reactor trip and monitoring systems ("CE digital plants").

Derek Seaman - Mr. Seaman is a member of the Palo Verde Unit 3 SWEL development team in the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and Major Projects Division. Derek has over 6 years of experience in Westinghouse in the nuclear engineering area Derek has rotated through various plant outage positions including reload engineering analyses and project management of fuel reload campaigns. Derek has evaluated power increase proposals from a safety analysis perspective and has designed and implemented quality assurance systems in the nuclear engineering area.

Chris J. Wandell, P.E. - Mr. Wandell is a Senior Consulting Civil Engineer in the Palo Verde Nuclear Design Engineering Department. Chris is a Professional Civil Engineer with over 30 years of experience in the design, analysis, and modification of Seismic Category I pipe supports, electrical raceway supports, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) supports, instrument supports, and steel and concrete structures. His experience also includes Class 1E Seismic Equipment Qualification. Mr. Wandell is Palo Verde's structural and seismic subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

Winston G. Borrero - Mr. Borrero is a Senior Consulting Mechanical Engineer in the Palo Verde Nuclear Design Engineering Department. Winston has over 30 years of experience in the design and construction of Nuclear Plants having worked for Bechtel, Stone & Webster and Sargent & Lundy Engineers at various nuclear sites. Areas of expertise include stress analysis, fracture mechanics and fatigue analysis, seismic and environmental qualification of equipment, and bolted joint analysis. Mr. Borrero is Palo Verde's bolted joint and fatigue stress analysis subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

2.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS The Seismic Walkdown team (SWT) consisted of Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) from Stevenson and Associates (S&A). S&A is recognized as a leading seismic consultant to the nuclear industry and as a regular contributor to the advancement of earthquake engineering knowledge through funded research WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page2-2 projects. The professional staff has expertise and capabilities in earthquake engineering, structural dynamics, and structural design. S&A has performed seismic evaluations of US nuclear power plants, using either Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) or Seismic Margin Assessments, to address US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events (IPEEE) for over 35 US and European plants. S&A conducted seismic PRA analyses for all of the US Army depots that are demilitarizing their stores of nerve gas ordnance.

The SWT for PVNGS Unit 3, consisting of Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A, conducted the initial walkdowns performed August 6 through August 13, 2012, and the supplemental walkdowns performed October 13, 2013, during refueling outage 3R17. For the supplemental walkdowns performed April 6, 2013, the S WT consisted of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini of S&A (Resumes are provided in Appendix E). Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero led the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as the interface with plant operators. Other PVNGS professional staff provided support and guidance and these persons are acknowledged within this report. The Stevenson & Associates Seismic Walkdown Engineers were accompanied by at least one of the following PVNGS qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers: Chris Wandell, Nicholas Reidenbach, Wmston Borrero, Justin Wood, Derek ~orri s, and Mark Meyer. The PVNGS engineers (along with the Auxiliary Operator team member) provided walkdown oversight relative to expected conduct in the plant (Nuclear, Radiological and Industrial Safety),

compliance with NRC-Approved EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (TR-1025286), PVNGS procedural compliance (inclusive of CAP), and insight into Licensing Basis issues.

Hunter Young. P.E. - Mr. Young is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in the dynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He has managed and led Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. Mr. Young has performed the seismic analyses of braced steel frames, concrete foundations, masonry walls, large storage tanks, and electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage. In addition, Mr. Young has executed the walkdown and analysis of tank structures and their associated leak path piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic events using manual and finite element methods. Mr. Young has a Master of Engineering in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Notre Dame. He is a licensed P.E. (civil) in California and has completed the 5-day Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown training course.

Timothy Nealon - Mr. Nealon is an Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in the dynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He has participated in Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. In addition, Mr. Nealon has conducted walkdowns and analysis of tank structures and their associated leakpath piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic events using various methods. Furthermore, he has been trained and has conducted NTTF 2.3 Fukushima response Seismic Walkdowns at multiple nuclear stations. Mr. Nealon has a Master of Science in Structural Engineering and a Bachelor of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the University at Buffalo. Mr. Nealon has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.

Cozy Figliolini - Mr. Figliolini is a Staff Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office. He has planned and performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. Mr. Figliolini has conducted seismic analyses of electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage, storage tanks, and civil structures including containment. Mr. Figliolini has a Joint Master of Science, Structural Engineering & Mechanics from the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh and a Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute. He is regiStered as an E.l.T. in Massachusetts. Mr. Figliolini has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separat1on tn1s page IS decontrolled Page2-3 2.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEWERS The Licensing Basis Reviewers for PVNGS Unit 3 consisted of Hunter Young, Timothy Nealon, and Cory Figliolini from the SWT. Their qualifications are provided under Section 2.2. Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero participated in the development of the licensing basis evaluations and provided technical bases for Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments for potentially adverse seismic conditions which were entered into the Corrective Action Program.

2.4 IPEEE REVIEWERS The IPEEE Reviewers consisted of a combination of the Equipment Selection Personnel and the SWT.

Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (qualifications listed in Appendix E) identified equipment subject to IPEEE enhancements for incorporation in SWEL I. Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A (qualifications listed in Section 2.2) performed the identification of actions taken to eliminate or reduce the IPEEE vulnerabilities previously identified. Jonathan Lucero, Engineer Sr. PRA from PVNGS, contributed to the IPEEE review.

Jonathan L. Lucero - Mr. Lucero is a Senior Engineer in the Palo Verde Probabilistic Risk Assessment Department. Jonathan has over 10 years of engineering experience in foundation design, structural dynamics, and uncertainty analysis. His experience also includes multidisciplinary applications, generalized information theory and fuzzy logic. Mr. Lucero is Palo Verde's seismic PRA subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's Education of Risk Professionals Program and Seismic PRA training course.

2.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM The peer reviewers for PVNGS Unit 3 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas of Westinghouse. Mr. Djordjevic is also designated the peer review Team Leader. Neither was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process as to maintain their independence from the project. Mr.

Djordjevic is an advanced-degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience and has been trained as a Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, and Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE). Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with IS years of nuclear engineering experience and I 0 years of aerospace engineering experience. Resumes are provided in Appendix E. Mr. Djordjevic led the seismic peer review activities and Mr. Douglas led the SWEL selection peer review. All peer review activities were performed by both engineers.

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3. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1. SELECTION PROCESS

SUMMARY

This section describes the process used by Westinghouse to select the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that were included in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 (PVNGS-3)

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The process described in Section 3 (Selection of SSCs) of EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was used as guidance to develop the PVNGS-3 SWEL. The following steps from the integrated project schedule outline this process of SWEL selection:

Project Kickoff Meeting Obtain customer inputs Retrieve original Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE- full-scope Seismic Margin Assessment) documentation- basis for Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Base List I Review current Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database Retrieve containment function equipment Retrieve modifications since the IPEEE Retrieve recently modified/upgraded equipment information Retrieve seismic vulnerabilities from Corrective Action Program (CAP)

Retrieve System Health Reports Retrieve spent fuel pool (SFP) SC-1 equipment (piping and instrumentation drawings, Design Basis Manuals, and Training Manual)- basis for SSEL Baselist 2 Assemble preliminary Safe Shutdown Equipment List (i.e., Base List 1)

Perform Screen #l, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)

Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)

Perform Screen #3, Safety Function Support Assemble preliminary SSEL (Base List 2)

Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)

Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)

Site visit to confirm preliminary SSEL Finalize SSEL Select S WEL l Perform Screen #4 System variety Equipment type variety Environment variety Risk importance considerations Equipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects)

IPEEE Seismic Vulnerability fmdings Sample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Select SWEL 2 (spent fuel pool related items)

Perform Screen #3 System variety Equipment type variety Environment variety WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-2 Equipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects)

Sample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Perform Screen #4 rapid drain-down assessment Confirm SWEL with Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)

Obtain PVNGS-3 Operations approval of SWEL SWEL Peer Review Per the guidance provided in Section 2 of Reference 1, PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff members participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided input and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel collecting the data associated with the equipment considered. The exchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the PVNGS staff members included:

Review of the IPEEE and PRA list of components was performed by the Westinghouse and PVNGS team to correct discrepancies in classification, errors in equipment identification (EQID),

omissions, risk categorization, etc.

Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

A presentation held on July 17, 2012, to discuss Westinghouse's methodology for SWEL selection.

Verification of equipment information through PVNGS's Site Work Management System (SWMS) (Reference 2).

Provide risk importance data derived from the PVNGS Internal Events Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model (Reference 33).

Assist in identifying and categorizing the different operating environment types existing at the plant.

Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that have the potential to be relevant to the SWEL.

Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment with operational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) Database for review of CAP and modifications against seismic equipment.

Provide System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals (DBMs) for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

SWEL Peer Review and approval of the SSCs selected for the Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys (see Appendix F).

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-3 Meetings were conducted from June 26, 2012, through June 29, 2012, to perform a Pre-Job Brief of the project and to conduct working sessions with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff members with the goal of achieving confirmation of at least 80% of the SWEL and to identify items for follow-up.

The agenda followed during the meetings included:

Pre-Job Brief of the SWEL selection project

Discuss high-level approach to SWEL Development

Review of preliminary Base List l for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #4 Sample Selection attributes o Select the SWEL I items o Identify items for follow-up

Review of preliminary Base List 2 for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #3 Sample selection attributes o Select the SWEL 2 items o Identify items for follow-up

Identify any unit-to-unit considerations

Summarize results

Summary post-job briefing A second meeting was held on July 17, 2012, to provide a presentation summarizing the Westinghouse/PVNGS team' s selection methodology and conduct a second working session with PVNGS staff members to further refine the SWEL.

The following personnel participated in these working sessions:

Attendee Company Position Chris Wandell APS Senior Consulting Engineer (Civil)

Winston Borrero APS Senior Consulting Engineer (Mechanical)

Justin Wood APS Engineer (Modifications)

Jose (Angel) Delgadillo APS Auxiliary Operator Randall (Gene) Eimar APS Operations Shift Manager Rolando Perez Westinghouse SWEL Development Lead (participated remotely via WebEx 1)

Derek Seaman Westinghouse SWEL Developer Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1, SSCs were selected in the following two groups:

SWEL 1 - A sample of items that safely shutdown the reactor and maintain containment integrity.

SWEL 2 - A sample of spent fuel pool (SFP) related items, including items that could result in a rapid drain-down of the SFP.

The SWELs from these two groups were combined into a single SWEL for use during the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

The following sections discuss how the PVNGS-3 SWEL selection process has met the objectives of the guidance of Reference l, particularly as it relates to incorporating the appropriate variety of classes of WebEx is a trademark or registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.

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Page 3-4 equipment, environments, primary and secondary systems, new and replacement equipment, and other elements discussed in Section 3 of Reference I.

3.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS The five safety functions include the four safe shutdown functions (reactor reactivity control, reactor coolant pressure control, reactor coolant inventory control, and decay heat removal, which includes the ultimate heat sink), plus the containment functions.

The IPEEE (Reference 3) Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) was used as the starting point for compiling a list (Base List 1) of the SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 1 selection process. A list consisting of 979 SSCs was assembled based on the following tables documented in Appendix 3.A of Reference 3:

Table 3A-l - Reactor Protection System SSEL (36 items)

Table 3A Support Systems SSEL (403 items)

Table 3A Required Instrumentation SSEL (72 items)

Table 3A Primary Auxiliary feedwater SSEL (70 items)

Table JA Secondary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (59 items)

Table 3A Atmospheric Dump Valves SSEL (72 items)

Table 3A Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray SSEL (42 items)

Table 3A Shutdown Cooling System SSEL (84 items)

Table JA High Pressure Safety Injection SSEL (89 items)

Table 3A High Pressure Recirculation SSEL (52 items)

A review of the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database (Reference 34) was then performed to expand the equipment list. Seismic Category I (SC-I) equipment that was considered in the SPRA, but not included in the IPEEE tables, was identified and added to the equipment list, resulting in a total equipment count of 1236 items.

Since the IPEEE applies to the three PVNGS Units, general EQIDs were used in the SSEL tables (i.e., the EQIDs presented therein do not show the Unit number, which is normally indicated by the first character of the EQID). In contrast, in the SPRA database, much of the equipment was identified by using the Unit 1 designation. Therefore, all EQIDs in the list were converted to the Unit 3 designation.

Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference I, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCs associated with the safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity must include the following four screens:

Screen #I - Seismic Category 1:

The purpose of Screen #1 is to restrict the scope of SSCs in the SWEL to those that are classified as SC-I. This is intended to comply with the request in the NRC 50.54(£) letter (Reference 50),

under the "Requested Actions" section, to "verify current plant configuration with the current license basis."

Out of 1236 SSCs initially considered, 1119 wer,e retained by Screen # 1 and subsequently passed to Screen #2.

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Screen #2 - Equipment or Systems:

The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis. The types of SSCs that are excluded consist of SC-I Structures, Containment Penetrations, and SC-1 Piping Systems.

Manual valves, check valves, flow orifices, fire dampers, and relief valves were also excluded in accordance with the guidance, since they are either considered in-line components or equipment that is regularly inspected.

Out of 1119 items coming in from Screen # 1, 775 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed to Screen #3.

Screen #3 - Support for the 5 Safety Functions:

The purpose of Screen #3 is to filter out the SSCs that do not support at least one of the following safety functions:

o Reactor reactivity control o Reactor coolant pressure control o Reactor coolant inventory control o Decay heat removal, including the ultimate heat sink o Containment function The safety functions supported by each SSC exiting Screen #2 were determined in consultation with PVNGS staff members (Shift Manager/Auxiliary Operator) during the ftrst set of meetings.

Out of 775 items coming in from Screen #2, 412 were retained by Screen #3 and subsequently passed to Screen #4. The list of equipment from Screen #3, entering Screen #4, is defmed as Base List I.

Screen #4 - Sample Considerations:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to narrow the Base List I candidate items to those of most significance. The PVNGS-3 SWEL I contains 1242 representative items from each of the following sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systems:

The PVNGS-3 Base List I equipment was categorized based on the third and fourth characters of their EQIDs, which identifies the plant system. There were 3 1 system categories contained in Base List I. Table 3-1 shows how these system categories were represented in SWEL 1.

The original SWEL 1 consisted of 125 items. One item was removed (3MCHEEOI) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. See discussion in Section 3.4.

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Page 3-6 Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type" Number of Items Number of Items System Type Defmitioo in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 AF Auxiliary Feedwater 14 8 CH Chemical and Volume Control 29 9*

CP Containment PuT2e 4 1 CT Condensate Transfer and Storage 3 I DF Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer 1 0 DG Diesel Generator 14 3 EC Essential Chilled Water 8 4 EW Essential Cooling Water 8 3 GA Service Gas I 0 GR Gaseous Radwaste 2 I HA HV AC Auxiliary Buildin~ 4 I HC HVAC Containment Building 12 6 HD HV AC Diesel Generator Building 4 2 HJ HVAC Control Building 21 II lA Instrument and Service Air 1 I PB Class IE 4.16 kv Power 3 I PE Class IE Standby Generation 2 I PG Class IE 480v Power Switchgear 6 3 PH Class IE 480v Power Motor Control Center 8 4 PK Class IE 125 VDC 20 9 PN Class l E Instrument Power 12 6 RC Reactor Coolant 16 8 RD Radioactive Waste Drain 2 I RM Main Control Board 30 8 SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation System 11 I SB Reactor Protection 14 I SG Main Steam 40 7 SI Safety Injection 101 20 SP Essential Spray Ponds 4 2 ZA Auxiliary Building 6 0 ZJ Control Building II l

Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I System Type.

Note that the OF (Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer), GA (Service Gas), and ZA (Auxiliary Building) systems are not represented because the equipment types covered by each system are already well represented.

o Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications):

Major new and replacement equipment were identified through a review of either:

I) Section 8 (System Design History) or 2) Section 11 (Change History), of a selection of the major system DBMs (References 4 through 30). Recent modifications were assessed through consultation with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff members.

Additionally, System Health Reports were reviewed to ensure that recent modifications were captured and examined for potential impact. The participating PVNGS Operations staff members were asked to provide any information they felt the System Health Reports may not have touched upon. This was to address any recent modifications where I) weight and/or the location of the center of gravity of the replacement are significantly WCAP- I7681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-7 different, or 2) design of the mounting and anchorage of the replacement is significantly different than the original, or 3) items within the zone ofi.nfluence had to be reinstalled.

Based on this sampling consideration, 38 Base List I items were identified as having major new or replacement modifications. Of these, the 15 items shown in Table 3-2 were represented in SWEL I.

Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on tbe "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute Walkdowo Major New or Replacement Item Description Eoulpmeot ~u~meot Modif~eatloos II 3JAF8UV0034 SG-EOIA isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See Reference 4, p. 104.

Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See 12 3JAf8UV0035 SG*EOI 8 isolation valve Reference 4, p. 104.

14 3JAFCUV0036 SG-EO I A isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See Reference ~p_. 104.

so 3MDG8F03 DG "8" air intalce filter Modified hangers. See Reference 6, p. 104.

liS 3EP88S04 4.16 kV bus S04 Addition of relays. See Reference 6 , p. 101 222 3JSG8UV01 30 SG-EOIA isolation valve Lock nut screw ~aced See Reference 29,_1). 154 223 3JSGBUVO 135 SG-E018 isolation valve Lock nut screw replaced See Reference 29 . p, 154 Relocated the motor operated valve from outside the RC loop I long-tenn recirc/SDC bioshield wall to the inside near the hot leg nozzle to 272 3JSIAUV0651 valve eliminate flow induced vibration in the line. See Reference 30, p. 248.

303 3MSI8POJ LPSI pump "8" LPSI pump shaft and mechanical seal retrofit. See Reference 30, p. 246.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and minitlow isolating 310 3JSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and mi.nitlow isolating 312 3JSIBUV0626 RC loop 28 isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor operated actuators. See Reference 30._p, 250.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 313 3JSIBUV0636 RC loop I A isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor ()~rated actuators. See Reference 30.J). 250.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and minitlow isolating 314 3JSIBUV0646 RC loop I 8 isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

319 3JSIBUV6S6 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valve Added pressure relieving spring check valves. See Reference 30 ~ 248.

HPSI pump "8" recirc iso (closes on Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 321 3JSIBUV667 valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the RAS) motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

o A variety of types of equipment:

The Base List 1 items were each assigned to one of the 22 classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of Reference I. Table 3-3 shows how these classes were represented in S WEL I. Two classes, compressors and motor generators, were not represented because there are no SC-I equipment in these categories. Additionally, the transformers that are SC-I were considered part of the larger equipment typically represented as switchgear or motor control centers (MCCs). Thu$, this classification is not individually represented in SWEL I.

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Upon separatlon this page is decontrolled Page 3-8 Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number" Number ofltems Equipment Type Number of Items Description Selected for Number in Base List 1 SWELl 0 Miscellaneous 13 6 I Motor Control Centers 13 6 2 Low-Voltage Switch~ear 12 4 3 Medium-Voltage Switchgear 2 I 4 Transfonners 0 0 5 Horizontal Pumps ll 5 6 Vertical Pumps 8 4 7 Fluid-Operated Valves 23 10 g Motor~rated Valves Solenoid-Operated Valves 11 5 31 9 Fans g 4 10 Air Handlers 10 4 II Chillers 2 1 12 Air Compressors 0 0 13 Motor Generators 0 0 14 Distribution Panels 41 5 15 Batteries on Racks 4 2 16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 12 5 17 Engine Generators 2 l 18 Instruments on Racks 74 16 19 Temperature Sensors 3 2 20 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 39 9 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 20 8*

Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Equipment Type Number.

o A variety of environments:

Since the site is located in a dry environment, typical of a desert climate, it was decided to identify the equipment operating environments based on its location either "inside" (i.e., inside an equipment room) or "outside" (i.e., outdoors) and based on the nonnal maximum design temperature of the corresponding equipment environment. These design temperatures were detennined from a review of Appendix A of the Equipment Qualification Program Manual (Reference 31) and Section 9.4 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 32). Based on this review, seven categories of equipment operating environments were identified. Table 3-4 shows how these equipment operating environments were represented in SWEL 1.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon Page 3-9 Table 3-4: Sort oftbe Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (femperature)"

Temperature Number of Items Number ofltems (oF) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 80 142 (All inside) 47 (All inside) 104 150 (All inside) 43 (All inside) 113 8 (2 inside and 6 outside) 3 (All outside) 120 62 (All inside) 16 * (All inside) 122 4 (All outside)_ 2 (All outside) 124 18 (All inside) 5 (All inside) 140 28 (All inside) 8 (All inside)

Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Environment list.

o Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program:

Based on a review of the IPEEE report (Reference 3), there were no Unit 3 seismic vulnerabilities identified. However, the IPEEE report states that a limited number of actions were taken to improve plant seismic capacity; no specific actions other than a Unit 3 example were provided, e.g., the anchorage on the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in Unit 3 was improved to reduce the possibility that the cabinets would be impacted during a seismic event.

The following additional considerations were factored into the SWEL I selection process:

o Numerical measures of risk importance:

The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) derived from the Internal Events PRA model (Reference 33) was compiled for the Base List I items to determine potentially risk-significant SSCs. Items with a RAW value greater than 2 were considered of "high" risk importance. There were 70 items of high risk importance in Base List I; 26 were selected for SWEL l.

o Protected train restrictions during the walkdown week:

The protected train schedules [PVNGS "Work Week Schedule") during the PVNGS-3 walkdown dates (from August 6, 2012, through August 10, 2012) were reviewed so that inaccessible items could be identified and deferred from SWEL I. Of the 125 items selected for SWEL I, one (I) item was inaccessible due to protected train restrictions (see Appendix G, Table G-2, Item 101). Item 101 was subsequently walked down during PVNGS refueling outage 3RI7 and its respective checklist is located in Appendix A.

3.2.1 Base List 1 The list of equipment retained by Screen #3 (and subsequently entering Screen #4) is defined as Base List I and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-1.

3.2.2 SWELl The list of equipment retained by Screen #4 is defined as SWEL I and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-2.

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Upon separation thiS page Is decontrolled Page 3-10 3.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEMS The starting point for compiling a list of the SFP-related SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 2 selection process was a review of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System DBM (DBM PC; Reference 35) and its associated drawings (References 36 through 40). This review identified fifteen SC- J components.

Eleven additional components were later identified (during the first set of meetings) based on a system review.

Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCs associated with the SFP includes the following four screens:

Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:

The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #1 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #I ofSWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #I is to limit the items to those that have a seismic licensing basis.

All SSCs initially considered for SWEL 2 (26 items) were passed from Screen #I to Screen #2.

Screen #2 - Equipment or Systems:

The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #2 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #2 of SWEL 1. Screen #2 considers only those items associated with the SFP that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process. The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis.

Of the 26 items retained by Screen # 1, 6 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed on to Screen #3.

Screen #3 - Sample Considerations:

The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2.

The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #3 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #4 of SWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #3 is to narrow the Base List 2 candidate items to those of most significance, considering the following sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systems o Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications) o A variety of types of equipment o A variety of environments Since there were only six items associated with the SFP, all items contained in Base List 2 were selected for input to SWEL 2.

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Page 3-11

Screen #4 - Rapid Drain-Down:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to identify items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly. Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the SSCs considered are not limited to SC-I items. Any items identified as having the potential for rapidly draining the SFP should be considered.

The Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1) specifies the following on page 3-8:

"Determine whether there are SFP penetrations below about 10 feet above the top ofthe fuel assemblies. If there are no such penetrations, then no rapid drain-down items would be added to SWEL 2."

UFSAR (Reference 32) Section 9.1.3.3.1.1.1, pages 9.1-35 and 9.1-36, states the following:

"If a pipe break were to occur in the Seismic Category Uquality portion of the system, pool cooling could be lost. However, the event would be se/f-limiling as all pipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water levels for spent fuel shielding of 10 fi as required by Regulatory Guide 1.1 3. All pipes extending down into the pool have siphon breaker holes at or above the minimum required water level. Under these conditions, sufficient time (longer than 30 minutes) is available to isolate the break and recover the minimum level required for start ofthe pool cooling system. If the spent fuel pool clean up system is aligned with the refueling pool (drain valves), administrative procedures are in place to identify, locale and isolate a pipe break within the containment in a timely manner."

The first two sentences of this UFSAR excerpt deal with the possibility of losing SFP water inventory following a pipe break. The next two sentences deal with how quickly the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System can be restored following a pipe break and are not pertinent to rapid drain-down.

Based on this documentation, there are no rapid drain-down items for input to SWEL 2.

A review of the SFP and its relationship to the adjacent fuel transfer canal and cask load pit was conducted to ensure that a rapid drain-down could not occur via a loss of gate seal integrity. A system review showed that the bottom of the fuel transfer canal gate and cask load pit gate invert are 3-1/2 inches below the top of the spent fuel racks. Although a loss of these gate seals would result in flooding of the cask load pit and the fuel transfer canal, it would not result in a water level less than 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. This is due to the relatively small volume of the fuel transfer canal and cask load pit. The fuel transfer tube within the fuel transfer canal was also considered since it provides an isolation path to the reactor cavity. The fuel transfer tube seal, canal isolation valve PPCNV118, and quick-operating closure device MPCEMOIA are SC-1 items considered part of the SFP structure assessed by analysis and periodic inspections and were therefore excluded from SWEL 2. Drainage from the cask load pit to the decontamination pit would be limited because the bottom of the decontamination gate invert is 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. Although a rapid drain-down threat associated with the gate seal system was not found, the instrument air supply system to tlie SFP gate was included in the Area Walk-By.

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-12 3.3.1 Base List 2 The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2 and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3.

3.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down SWEL 2 is augmented by the equipment that could potentially cause the SFP to drain rapidly (the equipment retained by Screen #4). As discussed earlier, there are no rapid drain-down items for input to the PVNGS-3 SWEL 2.

3.3.3 SWELl SWEL 2 is defined as the list of equipment retained by Screen #3 plus the equipment retained by Screen

4. As discussed earlier, Screen #3 was not utilized because all 6 items contained in Base List 2 were selected for input into SWEL 2. In addition, there was no equipment associated with rapid drain-down.

Therefore, SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2 (summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3).

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Upon separation this page Is decontrolled Page 3-13 3.4 INACCESSffiLE ITEMS The equipment items that were inaccessible during the scheduled PVNGS-3 at-power walkdown dates (from August 6, 2012, through August 10, 2012) are identified in Table 3-5. The guidance allows for items to be deferred to a later date if inspection poses a safety concern. Items with electrical safety challenges or items within containment were deferred to ensure safety when inspecting. The items in Table 3-5 were subsequently walked down prior to and during PVNGS refueling outage 3R 17.

Table 3-S: PVNGS-3 Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdown SWELl Walkdown Equipment Item Description Equipment Location Number 13 3MCHEEOl Regenerative heat exchanger C1MT 14 3JCHEHV0239 Charging line to reactor coolant loop 2A isolation globe valve C1MT 19 3JCPBUV0005A Containment power access purge supply isolation butterfly damper C1MT 35 3JHCBUV0044 Dischar~e sarnpliJ!& from.RU-1 containment isolation valve C1MT 36 3JHCBUV0047 Inlet sampling to RU-1 containment isolation valve C1MT 53 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL 55 3EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL 56 3EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL 77 3JRCBHVOI05 Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to reactor drain tank globe valve C1MT 78 3JRCBHV0108 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank_&lobe valve C1MT 79 3JRCBPTO I028 Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS) C1MT 80 3JRCBPTI04 SOC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 83 3JRCDPT106 SOC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 84 3JRCN1El01 Pressurizer temperature CTMT 100 3JSGCLTlll3C SG-EOIA WR level(required for AFAS) CTMT 101 3JSIAUV0651 RC loop I long-term recirc!SDC valve CTMT 107 3JSmPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump CTMT 108 3JSIBUV0614 Safety injection tank 2A discharge isolation globe valve CTMT 110 3JSmUV0624 Safety injection tank 28 discharge isolation globe valve CTMT 119 3JSINPT391 HPSI long-term recirc loop I pressure xmtr CTMT Item 3MCHEEOI was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. For radiological safety considerations, it was decided to remove this component from SWEL I. A new item was not selected to replace this item for the following reasons:

This item belongs to system type CH. The removaJ of this item reduced the number of CH items in SWEL I from 10 to 9 (see Table 3-1), which is still a good representation of this system type.

This item was not identified as having major new or replacement modifications (see Table 3-2).

Therefore, the removal of this item from SWEL I had no effect on the representation of equipment having major new or replacement modifications.

3MCHEEOI belongs to equipment type 21. The removal of this item from SWEL I reduced the number of type 21 items from 9 to 8 (see Table 3-3), which is still a good representation of the equipment type.

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3MCHEEOI is assigned a maximum environment temperature of 120°F. The removal of this item reduced the number of "120°F items" in SWEL 1 from 17 to 16 (see Table 3-4), which is still a good representation of the environment temperature type. *

3MCHEEO I is not a risk-significant SSC. Therefore, the removal of this item from SWEL I had no effect on the representation of high-risk-importance items in SWEL I.

Following the completion of the Unit 3 at-power walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 18 electrical cabinets per F AQ 4.20 were conducted during the follow-on walkdowns. The list of electrical cabinets that require supplemental inspection is included in Table 3-6.

Table 3-6: PVNGS.3 FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections SWEL 1 Walkdown Equipment Description Item Equipment Location Number 57 3EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL 58 3EPHBM32 480V MCCM32 CTRL 59 3EPHBM34 480VMCCM34 AUX 60 3EPHBM36 480VMCCM36 AUX 61 3EPHBM38 480V MCCM38 AUX 3EPKBD22 (ROB to 62 LC 34 conttol power CTRL 3EPKBM42) 64 3EPKBH 12 Battery charger "B" CTRL 65 3EPKBM42 DC power to TCB l control circuit CTRL 3EPKCD23 ' (ROB to 66 DC distribution panel D23 CTRL 3EPKCM43) 68 3EPKCM43 4 DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL 69 3EPKCN43 Inverter for shutdown cooling isolation valve 3JSICUV653 CTRL Inverter for 3JSIDUV654 shutdown cooling B return inside 70 3EPKDN44 CTRL containment isolation valve 71 3EPNBD26 Power to PPS "B" instrumentation CTRL 72 3EPNBNI2 DC/AC inverter "B" CTRL 75 3EPNCN13 DCIAC inverter "C" CTRL 93 3JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX 123 3JSABCO I B Train ESFAS relay cabinets CTRL 125 3JZJBE01 Remote shutdown panel CTRL 3

3EPKCD23 was inaccessible during 3RI7 and was therefore replaced with 3EPKDD24, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

4 3EPKCM43 was inaccessible during 3Rl7 and was therefore replaced with 3EPKDM44, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 420.

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-15 The inaccessible equipment walkdowns perfonned during refueling outage 3R 17 are summarized in Table 3-7. Since Train C was protected during refueling outage 3R17, Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpardrom Train D. Table 3-7 indicates equipment substitutions.

Table 3-7: PVNGs-3 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage 3R17 SWELl Walkdown Equipment Item Description Equipment Location Number 14 3JCHEHV0239 Charging line to reactor coolant loop 2A isolation_g_lobe valve CTMT 19 3JCPBUV0005A Containment power access purge supply isolation butterfly damper CTMT 35 3JHCBUV0044 Discharge sampJinA from RU-1 containment isolation valve CTMT 36 3JHCBUV0047 Inlet sampling to RU-1 containment isolation valve CTMT 53 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL 55 3EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL 56 3EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL 57 3EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL 58 3EPHBM32 480V MCCM32 CTRL 59 3EPHBM34 480V MCCM34 AUX 60 3EPHBM36 480V MCCM36 AUX 61 3EPHBM38 480VMCCM38 AUX 62 3EPKBD22 LC 34 control power CTRL 65 3EPKBM42 DC power to TCBl control circuit CTRL 3EPKCD23 was inaccessible during 3Rl7 and was 66 therefore replaced DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL with 3EPKDD24, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

3EPKCM43 was inaccessible during 3RI7 and was 68 therefore replaced DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL with 3EPKDM44, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to reactor drain tank globe 77 3JRCBHVO I 05 CTMT valve 78 3JRCBHVOI08 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe valve CTMT 79 3JRCBPTOI02B Przr press ure {required for RPS/SIAS) CTMT 80 3JRCBPTI04 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 83 3JRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 84 3JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature CTMT 100 3JSGCLTlii3C SG-EOIA WR level (required for AFAS) CTMT 101 3JSIAUV0651 RC loop I loJ!g-term recirc/SDC valve CTMT 107 3JSIBPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump CTMT 108 3JSIBUV0614 Safety injection tank 2A dischar_ge isolation globe valve CTMT 110 3JSIBUV0624 Safety injection tank 28 discharge isolation globe valve CTMT 119 3JSINPD91 HPSI lon~*term recirc loop_l_pJessure xmtr CTMT WCAP-17681 -NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separat1on tn1s page IS decontrollecl Page 3-16 The equipment that was inspected on April 6, 2013, prior to refueling outage 3R17, is identified in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8: PVNGS-3 Items Completed During tbe April 6, 2013, Inspection SWELl Walkdown Equipment Item Description Equipment Location Number 64 3EPKBHI2 Battery charger "B" CTRL Inverter for shutdown cooling isolation 69 3EPKCN43 CTRL valve 3JSICUV653 Inverter for 3JSIDUV654 shutdown 70 3EPKDN44 cooling 8 return inside containment CTRL isolation valve 71 3EPNBD26 Power to PPS "B" instrumentation CTRL 72 3EPNBNI2 DC/AC inverter "B" CTRL 75 3EPNCNI3 DC/AC inverter "C" CTRL 93 3JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX 123 3JSABCOI B Train ESFAS relay cabinets CTRL 125 3JZffiEOI Remote shutdown panel CTRL All required and supplemental inspections are complete. Inspection results are documented on the corresponding Seismic Walkdown checklist in Appendix A.

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4. SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS

4.1 BACKGROUND

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were perfonned in accordance with the requirements of Section 4 ofEPRl TR-1025286 (Reference 1). The walkdowns were conducted by the SWT, consisting of the two SWEs mentioned in Section 2.2. Members of PVNGS Operations and Engineering provided support during all walkdowns. The SWEs utilized engineering judgment based upon experience and training indicated in Section 2.2, supplemented by existing current licensing basis (CLB) plant documentation and analyses, where applicable, to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions. For items on the SWEL, these potential seismic conditions included any adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic spatial interactions, or other adverse seismic conditions. The results of the walkdown and any pertinent observations were documented for each item on the SWEL using the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) included in Appendix A. In addition to potentially adverse seismic conditions, observations described in the SWCs include those that, after discussion between the SWEs, were detennined to be adequate.

Area Walk-Bys were conducted by the SWT in each area of the plant that contained an item on the SWEL. The Area Walk-Bys identified potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item (up to a maximum radius of 35 ft from the component). The area examinations identified: I) adverse anchorage conditions, 2) degraded equipment in the area,

3) potential seismic spatial interactions, 4) adverse cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting,

5) potential flooding/spray or frre hazards, and 6) other adverse housekeeping conditions. The results of the walk-bys and any pertinent observations were documented for each inspected area using Area Walk-By Checklists (A WCs), which are included in Appendix B. Observations described on the A WCs include potentially adverse seismic conditions as well as conditions that were discussed and detennined to be adequate at that time.

The SWT was assisted by other individuals present on the walkdown, including PVNGS Operations and Engineering personnel. The SWT for PVNGS Unit 3 consisted of Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A. For supplemental walkdowns during refueling outage 3RI7, the SWT consisted of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini. Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero Jed the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as the interface with plant operators. Additional PVNGS staff facilitated access to equipment and provided additional infonnation regarding plant procedures and functions of SWEL items. In addition, these individuals assisted in identifying nearby equipment and systems that could cause adverse seismic interaction. Any issue that could not be resolved by consensus of the SWEs during the walkdowns was identified as a potentially adverse seismic condition on the SWC or A WC (as applicable). The conditions identified were evaluated with respect to the CLB. These Licensing Basis Evaluations are listed and described in Appendix D.

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-2 4.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISMIC WALKDOWNS In preparation for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, ~ SWT obtained the SWEL and selected 50% of the items (excluding line-mounted equipment) for anchorage configuration verification. A total of 79 components were identified as potential anchorage verification candidates and 42 were randomly chosen to fulfill the 50% anchorage configuration verification requirement. The selection was adjusted to consider equipment of interest identified by PVNGS, including items that had recent modifications or anchorage changes. PVNGS design drawings, seismic qualification calculations, and vendor/supplier documents (SDOCs) were reviewed and later taken to the field to verify as-installed configurations were consistent with the CLB established by these documents. The SWT also obtained PVNGS equipment layout drawings to establish a detailed walkdown schedule.

To prepare for observations involving potential interaction with masonry block walls, the SWT reviewed the equipment layout drawings associated with the SWEL and located masonry walls in proximity. The Control Building 74 ft, 100 ft, and 140 ft elevations, in addition to the Auxiliary Building sub-100 ft elevations, were found to have bloc~ walls adjacent to SWEL items and Area Walk-By items. J'he SWT obtained and reviewed calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120 (Reference 60) for Control Building masonry walls and 13-CC-ZA-0125 (Reference 61) for Auxiliary Building masonry walls. The calculations,]ndicate that all in-scope walls were designed and analyzed to not collapse under SSE accelerations, which enabled the SWT to conclude that the SWEL items were free of seismic spatial interaction due to a postulated masonry block wall collapse. The SWT assessed SWEL and Area Walk-By equipment for seismic spatial interaction due to differential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls.

In anticipation of potential flooding/spray interaction hazards due to threaded fire piping, the SWT obtained fire suppression diagrams provided within the IPEEE Report (Reference 3). These diagrams were later used in the field for Area Walk-Bys to determine whether threaded fire piping, where present, was normally wet or pre-actuated and dry. Preliminary review of the fi re suppression diagrams indicated that areas with threaded fire piping are generally pre-activated sprinkler systems and therefore are normally dry, thus precluding potential flooding/spray interaction hazards. However, the SWT was cognizant of exceptions where threaded piping could be normally wet. For these cases, the SWT would look for long spans with flexible supports, which may lead to excessive threaded joint rotation and potential spray.

Additional current licensing basis documentation obtained and reviewed to support the walkdowns included: the in-structure floor response spectra for the SSE (DBM-C5, Reference 53), structural damping criteria per UFSAR Table 3.7- l (Reference 32), the PVNGS scaffolding procedure and installation specifications (30DP-9WP11 and 13-CN-0380, References 54 and 55), the PVNGS housekeeping procedure (30DP-OWMI2, Reference 56), the PVNGS transient material details and analyses (1 3-A-ZYD-0034 and 13-CC-ZZ-0309, References 57 and 58), the PVNGS lighting details (13-E-ZAL-001 1, Reference 59), and the control room ceiling qualification (Log No. 13-10407-A216-12, Reference 65).

The PVNGS IPEEE Report (Reference 3) was also obtained and reviewed. This document is discussed in further detail in Section 7.

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Upon separation th1s page is decontrolled Page 4*3 4.3 WALKDOWN RESULTS The SWT conducted the initial Seismic Walkdowns for Unit 3 at PVNGS August 6, 2012, through August 9, 2012. For components not originally inspected due to having either inaccessible internal anchorages, being located inside containment, or requiring additional interior inspection related to FAQ 4.20, additional walkdowns were conducted during follow-on inspections performed on April 6, 2013, and on October 13, 2013, during refueling outage 3Rl7. When walkdown activities identified potentially adverse seismic conditions, licensing basis evaluations were performed and are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D. Appendix D provides additional information on the resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of each of these conditions. Detailed walkdown results are provided on the SWCs and A WCs in Appendices A and B, respectively. A summary of initial walkdown statistics follows:

A total of 132 SWEL components were walked down and 59 Area Walk-Bys were performed.

Six items listed on the SWEL (3EPKBD22, 3EPKDD24, 3EPKCD23, 3JRMBB02, 3JRMBB04, and 3JRMCB05) were child components contained within parent SWEL components. These child components are referred to as "Rule of the Box" (ROB) items, for which the walkdown observations are identical to those of the parent item.

Eighteen ( 18) SWEL components were electrical cabinets whose interiors were not completely examined dwing the initial walkdowns. Following the completion of the at-power Seismic Walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified under FAQ 4.20 a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 18 electrical cabinets occurred on April 6, 2013, and October 13, 2013. The list of electrical cabinets requiring supplemental inspection per FAQ 4.20 is included in Section 3.4. Two (2) SWEL electrical cabinets originally inspected during at-power walkdowns were inaccessible during the supplemental inspections due to the plant protected train (3EPKCD23 and 3EPKCM43). To fulfill the recommendations ofFAQ 4.20, sister components for these cabinets on the opposite train were fully inspected-including the cabinet interiors-and documented on SWCs.

One-hundred-four (104) components and 50 Area Walk-Bys were resolved in the field as having no potentially adverse seismic concerns. Two Area Walk-Bys were confirmed in the field to have potentially adverse seismic concerns involving seismic housekeeping.

Thirty-seven (37) observations for twenty-eight (28) SWEL components and eight (8) Area Walk-Bys could not be readily resolved in the field by the consensus of the SWEs and were considered potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation. It is important to note that some SWEL components or Area Walk-Bys may have multiple potentially adverse conditions that involve anchorage, spatial interaction, or other adverse concerns. Twenty-three (23) of the 37 observations requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; ten (1 0) involved potential seismic spatial interaction concerns; two involved other potentially adverse concerns; and two involved spray/flooding hazards. Twenty-eight (28) of the 37 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet the current seismic licensing basis. Nine (9) conditions could not be readily resolved per the Licensing Basis Evaluation process and were entered into the CAP. All 37 Licensing Basis Evaluation items are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D, which includes additional information on the current status of potentially non-conforming conditions.

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End osure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page Is decontrolled Page 4-4 Summaries of Seismic Walkdown observations follow:

Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions While inspecting anchorages for SWEL equipment and in-scope Area Walk-By equipment, the SWT noted 23 cases where as-installed configurations could not be verified by the PVNGS documentation brought in the field (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations). Discrepancies included: exceeded bolt projection lengths, varying equipment pad thicknesses for mechanical components, varying weld patterns for electrical equipment, and varying anchorage spacing. Detailed descriptions of these discrepancies are also indicated in Appendix D. To a limited extent, Field Change Requests (FCRs) and Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) associated with the anchorage documentation that could verify the as-installed configurations were reviewed as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

No potentially degraded anchorage conditions were observed in the field that required further evaluation.

The SWT observed no indications of reinforcement yielding and no signs of excessive corrosion for in-scope safety-related equipment. All cracks observed were noted to be hairline or small cracks (less than 0.03 inch) as defined in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 47).

Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions The SWT noted 10 observations for SWEL components or areas where equipment had potential adverse seismic *Spatial interactions that required further evaluation. Nine observations involved potential equipment spatial interaction with nearby permanent equipment due to potentially insufficient clearances.

Electrical components with potentially insufficient clearances to pennanent equipment included MCC 3EPHBM32, cabinets 3JESACOI I 3JZJBC02A (refer to A WC CTRL Outer Horseshoe), MCC 3EPKCM43, MCC 3EPKDM44 (refer to AWC CTRL J-109), 1/V Converters 3JSBBC02A and 3JSBCC02A, and junction box 3EZAAAKJKRJOI (refer to A WC AUX A-A02). All nine interaction concerns due to potentially insufficient clearances were documented for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations.

One Area Walk-By involved potential adverse seismic spatial interactions due to overhead items. In the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Room of the Fuel Building, the SWT observed safety-related components in the area within the zone of influence of large, flat panel lighting mounted overhead should they fail in a seismic event. Documentation detailing the anchorage of these lights was sought as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The SWT inspected overhead piping and distribution systems including cable trays and found them well-anchored and ruggedly supported throughout the unit. Large fire extinguishers on small hooks that could possibly uplift and fall were found throughout the unit, but no safety-related equipment items were within fire extinguisher zone of influence. Overhead lighting was also noted to be rugged in all areas with sensitive equipment, particularly the Control Building. Where equipment is less sensitive to impact, several instances of lighting fixtures supported by S-hooks with disengaged or missing setscrews were observed. The SWT judged all cases not to be hazardous to safety-related equipment, but the conditions were noted and documented in the CAP.

All attached lines and piping to SWEL equipment were inspected and readily concluded to have adequate flexibility in the field.

As noted in Section 4.2, all SWEL components and Area Walk-By equipment within the zone of influence of masonry block walls were evaluated prior to walkdowns not to be impact hazards due to WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-5 collapse per existing calculations. No seismic spatial interaction hazards due to differential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls were observed during the walkdowns.

All scaffolding encountered by the SWT was found to be adequately braced and anchored in addition to having sufficient clearances to safety-related equipment in accordance with station procedures.

Several housekeeping issues were discovered within the unit. Two housekeeping issues were confirmed as found in the field by the SWT to be potentially adverse seismic conditions. On the 100ft. elevation of the Fuel Building near the air handlers, the SWT observed a tall Radiation Protection vacuum on unlocked wheels secured to safety-related junction box 3EZF1ABKKJOI. The concern was that the combined rocking and sliding mode could potentially damage the safety-related junction box and its conduit. The condition was corrected immediately by Operations and documented under Palo Verde Action Request (PVAR) 4225114. On the 140ft elevation of the Control Building, the SWT also observed a rolling step ladder chained off to the west wall but with enough slack to contact cabinets 3JSAAC04 and 3JSDACOS. Operations corrected the condition immediately and PVAR 4218227 was generated. Housekeeping issues that were found in violation of the housekeeping procedure (Reference

56) were entered into the CAP.

Detailed descriptions of all potentially adverse seismic spatial interaction concerns are provided in Appendix D.

Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions The SWT observed an apparent modification to the DC Room "B" Emergency AHU (3MHJBZ04) where a PIOOO Unistrut member was welded off the AHU to support an NQR component. Verification is required to determine whether the modification reconciled the configuration so as not to invalidate the individual AHU seismic qualification. In addition, the SWT observed a door middle hinge pin not engaged with the lower half of the hinge on load center 3EPGBL34, which was corrected immediately and documented under PVAR 4465161. These observations were documented for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations. SWT did not note any other degraded conditions, missing equipment fasteners, or irregular mountings on equipment.

Potential Flooding/Spray Hazards The SWT was cognizant of potential spray and flooding hazards particularly from threaded fire piping.

Overhead fire piping was generally found to be welded and ruggedly supported (no rod hung piping) at short and regular intervals. Areas that had threaded piping were either confirmed to be pre-activated and therefore normally dry or have adequate rigid support spacing so as to preclude excessive joint rotation.

Two Area Walk-Bys were observed by the SWT to have potential spray hazards that required additional review as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations. The Area Walk-By for the "B" Diesel Generator Room (refer to A WC DG G-1 04) was observed to have DS piping within the zone of influence of heavy heaters and lights overhead should they fall during a seismic event. The Area Walk-By associated with Reactor Trip Breaker "8" (refer to AWC AUX A-227) was observed to have large air handlers on vibration mounts. The concern is that the AHUs could fall off their mounts, allowing their pipe connections to break, flood the area, and open the reactor trip breakers.

Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit 3 by the SWT. This included no observations of hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored shelves, or unlocked cabinets; and no adverse natural gas or hydrogen lines. No hydrogen or oxygen tanks were observed in the vicinity of SWEL equipment during the Area Walk-Bys.

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-6 Non-NTTF 2.3 Related Observations The SWT (including PVNGS Operator and Engineering SWEs) were also cognizant of issues not necessarily pertaining to the seismic qualification of safety-related equipment. The SWT noted conditions such as:

Broken/missing floor grating clips

Missing or partially-engaged set-screws on pendant lighting S-hooks

Missing confined space sign

Oil reservoir cap on valve cannot be tightened

Phone enclosure missing door

Door handles not aligned properly Non-NJ'TF 2.3 observations were recorded on the SWCs/AWCs and entered into the PVNGS CAP.

Many of these conditions were also corrected on-the-spot by the Operations member of the SWT. None of these observations (by definition) represented potentially adverse seismic conditions - fasteners were located on non-seismic components; lighting and loose or unsecured items were not within the zone of influence of any soft targets.

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Enclosure Appendices Aand Bcontain*****************

Upon separation this page Is decontrolled Page 5-l S. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS The 37 potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation identified in either the equipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys as discussed in Section 4 were evaluated with respect to their seismic licensing basis. As indicated in Section 4.3, 23 of the 37 items requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; 10 involved potential seismic spatial interaction concerns; two involved other potentially adverse seismic concerns; and two involved spray/flooding hazards. These potentially adverse conditions are included in Appendix D, along with their dispositions. Twenty-eight (28) of the 37 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. The nine (9) potentially adverse seismic conditions that could not readily be shown to meet the current seismic licensing basis were entered into the site's Corrective Action Program (CAP). For each of the items that fell into this category, the PVAR number is included in the disposition text, which is shown in Appendix D. Additional information pertaining to the current resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of these items is included in Appendix D.

General methodologies adopted by the Licensing Basis Reviewers listed in Section 2.3 for addressing the observations noted in Section 4 are summarized in the following subsections.

Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions For the anchorage observations noted in Section 4 that involved discrepancies between the as-installed configurations and the anchorage documentation (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations) taken into the field, the Licensing Basis Reviewers collected and reviewed FCRs and NCRs for updates to the field documents that represent the Current Licensing Basis (CLB). Sixteen (16) as-installed anchorage configurations were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. Seven (7) as-installed anchorage configurations for SWEL components 3EPKBHI2, 3EPKBM42, 3JHCBPT0351B, 3JHCDPT0351D, 3JSGBPT0306, 3JSINPT391, and 3MEWBPOI could not be readily shown to reflect CLB documentation, and therefore were entered into the CAP and indicated as potentially non-conforming conditions by the listing of"No" under Question 5 of the SWCs.

Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions Observations involving the possibility of insufficient clearances between safety-related components were generally resolved by estimating relative displacement from the in-structure response spectra of Reference

53. Given equipment anchorage and spatial configuration, the Licensing Basis Reviewers determined lower-bound estimates of component frequencies. These frequency estimates along with the appropriate damping values from UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Reference 32) were used to obtain spectral accelerations.

Component displacement was then estimated by the following formula (Reference 63):

so *386.4 i~

d=SF* s (lU. 2.ni Where SF= modal shape factor (1.6 for cantilever)

Sa = spectral acceleration (g) from response spectra (J) = fundamental frequency (Hz)

If the combinations of component displacements under SSE loadings did not exceed the gap noted in the walkdown, the gap was noted as sufficient to preclude impact.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 5-2 In some instances, licensing basis evaluations of potential spatial interactions were resolved by inspection of installation details.

Nine of the potential spatial interaction concerns were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis.

SWEL component 3EPHBM32 could not be readily shown to be adequate, and therefore was entered into the CAP and indicated as potentially non-conforming conditions by the listing of "No" under Question 5 of the SWCs.

Evaluations of Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions One identified Licensing Basis Evaluation pertaining to other adverse seismic conditions involving the apparent modification to the DC Room "B" Emergency AHU (3MHJBZ04) could not be readily shown through documentation to reconcile the individual equipment seismic qualification, and therefore was entered into the CAP and indicated as a potentially non-conforming condition by the listing as a "No" under Question 11 of the swe.

The compartment door to load center 3EPGBL34 with a middle hinge pin not engaged with the lower half of the hinge was determined not to be an adverse seismic concern given that the hinge pin was still effective at the upper half of the hinge and moreover that there is no vibration-sensitive equipment on the door.

Evaluations of Potential Flooding/Spray Hazards Potential flooding/spray hazards noted during the walkdown were evaluated by a combination of further documentation review and reassessment of photographs and walkdown information. Of particular note, the vibration-mounted AHUs in proximity to the reactor trip breakers on the 120 ft elevation of the Auxiliary Building were determined to pose no spray or flood hazard to the reactor trip breakers. Per PVNGS, potential impacts of flooding/spray hazards are mitigated by the enclosed protective cabinets (designed as drip-proof per SDOC N001-1303-00057 (Reference 65)), which house the reactor trip breakers and the distance from the AHUs. All potential flooding/spray hazards were resolved.

Evaluations of Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced ftre interactions were noted for Unit 3 by the SWT; therefore, there are no Licensing Basis Evaluations.

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6. PEER REVIEW

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This section documents the independent peer review for the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)

Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns performed by Stevenson & Associates (S&A) for Unit 3 of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). The peer review addresses the following activities:

Review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)

Review of a sample of the checkJists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

Review of any licensing basis evaluations

Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP)

Review of the final and supplement submittal reports The peer reviewers for Palo Verde Unit 3 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas of Westinghouse. Mr. Djordjevic is designated the peer review Team Leader and participated in all peer review activities as the seismic subject matter expert. Mr. Douglas participated in all peer review activities and led the SWEL selection peer review as the SWEL selection subject matter expert. Neither peer reviewer was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process. Mr. Djordjevic is an advanced degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience. He has received Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) training. Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15 years of nuclear engineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience. Resumes are provided in Appendix E.

The peer review ofthe SWEL development began on July 25, 2012 and was completed on July 28, 2012.

All fmdings noted on the SWEL Peer Review Checklist were resolved. The completed SWEL Peer Review Checklist is found in Appendix C. The results of the SWEL development peer review are discussed in Section 6.2.

The peer review of the Seismic Walkdown inspection started on July 25, 2012, with a peer check of the actual walkdowns for Unit 2. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas joined the walkdown team for a portion of the day's planned walkdowns to observe the conduct of walkdowns and adherence to the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (SWG) (Reference I). No additional peer review site visits were made for the Unit 3 walkdown as the same procedures were implemented and a similar suite of SWEL equipment was inspected as selected for PVNGS Unit 2. The required interviews were conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team on August 24, 2012, after review of a sample of the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown CheckJists (SWC) and Area Walk-By CheckJists (A WC) to ascertain the quality and procedural compliance with the SWG. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young on November 14, 2013, to review the SWCs and A WCs completed during the follow-on walkdowns. The discussion of the results of these sample SWC and AWC reviews are provided in Section 6.3.

The results of the peer review of licensing basis evaluations are provided in Section 6.4. These assessments and their outcomes were also discussed with the SWE inspection team on August 24, 2012, and November 14, 2013. The peer reviewers reviewed the 37 licensing basis evaluations and found the WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain* * * * * * * * * * * * -

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-2 final determinations made by the SWEs to be correctly performed, and also concurred with the conclusions for the 9 items that were not readily determined to meet current licensing basis, which were placed in the corrective action program.

6.2 PEER REVIEW- SELECTION OF SSCs 6.2.1 Purpose The purpose of this section is to describe the process used to perform the peer review of the selected SSCs that were included in the SWEL.

6.2.2 Peer Review Activity - Selection of SSCs The guidance in EPRl Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Wa/kdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference I), Section 3: Selection ofSSCs was used as the basis for this review.

This peer review was based on reviews of the spreadsheets utilized by the SWEL developers to generate the Base Lists and Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists.

Peer review was also based on interviews with the following individuals who were directly responsible for development of the SWEL:

o Rolando Perez (Westinghouse) o Derek Seaman (Westinghouse) o Chris Wandell (Palo Verde Engineering) o Winston Borrero (Palo Verde Engineering)

This peer review utilized the Seismic Walkdown Guidance checklist shown in Reference I Appendix F:

Checklist for Peer Review of SSC Selection.

For SWEL 1 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:

Verification that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions:

o Reactivity Control (RC) o Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (PC) o Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (IC) o Decay Heat Removal (DHR); Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) o Containment Function (CF)

Verification that the SSCs selected include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

o Various types of systems o Major new and replacement equipment o Various types of equipment WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and Bc o n t a i n * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-3 o Various environments o Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE program o Risk insight consideration For SWEL 2 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:

Verification that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added to SWEL 2.

Verification that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related items that were not included in SWEL 2.

6.2.3 Peer Review Findings- Selection of SSCs This peer review found that the process for selecting SSCs that were added to the SWEL complied with the process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. SWEL 1 selections totaled 124 items and SWEL 2 selections totaled six items.

The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perfonn the five safety functions. The bases for items selected to SWEL I were the IPEEE Report, Appendix 3.2 (Reference 3), which listed safe shutdown equipment from each redundant train of the systems supporting the five safety functions, and Seismic Category I items from the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database. A breakdown of the safety functions represented by the SWEL I selections follows:

Reactivity control - 38 SWEL selections support this function Pressure control-79 SWEL selections support this function Inventory control - 52 SWEL selections support this function Decay heat removal/ultimate heat sink - 89 SWEL selections support this function Containment function - 21 SWEL selections support this function The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected to SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the required sample selection attributes. A breakdown of the sample selection attributes represented by the SWEL I selections follows:

Twenty-eight (28) of 31 Base List systems were represented in the SWEL I list. The peer reviewers recommended that equipment from two unrepresented systems be added to the SWEL list. Components from the remaining unrepresented systems were component types that were adequately represented by other system selections. Since all five safety functions are also adequately represented by the SWEL, the peer review team concluded that the "various types of systems" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

Fifteen (15) of 38 major new or replacement items were represented in the SWEL I list. The sources for these items were Design Basis Manuals for the systems supporting the five safety functions. Several of the new or replacement items involved a change to a group of similar items, and at least one item was selected from each group to represent the change. The peer review team concluded that the "major new and replacement equipment" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented. During review of the submittal report, a revision to the SWEL was needed to correct an error to this sample consideration attribute in the spreadsheet that was used to track. and implement the SWEL selection process. This error did not result in a change to the WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page6-4 Base List or SWEL selections; it increased the number of major new or replacement items represented in the SWEL I list. The peer reviewers verified that the Seismic Walkdown Guidance requirements for this sample consideration attribute were maintained.

Twenty (20) of 22 types of equipment were represented in the SWEL 1 list. The equipment types not represented were "compressors" and "motor-generator sets." The site does not have safety-related equipment in these equipment types. Equipment type "transfonner" is a subcomponent to equipment type "switchgear." The peer review team concluded that the "various types of equipment" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

All environments were represented in the SWEL I list. *The Palo Verde Units are located in a dry environment; therefore environment classification was based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Since at least one item was selected from each environment classification the peer review team concluded that the "various environments" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

No items were added to the SWEL 1 list based on findings of the IPEEE program; however emphasis was placed on the inspection of bookcases near the Main Control Board during Area Walk-Bys because action had been taken to improve the seismic capacity of the bookcases.

Twenty-six (26) of 70 risk-significant items were represented in the SWEL list. Risk insights were applied from the Seismic PRA and Internal Events models to the selection of items to the SWEL. The peer review team concluded that the "risk insights" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

The peer reviewers verified that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added to SWEL2.

Spent fuel pool related items considered were based on a review of design basis manual descriptions, piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, and a system review using the Site Work Management System (SWMS). All items that screened into Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2.

The peer reviewers verified that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related items that were not included in SWEL 2.

The justification for screening out spent fuel pool related items was reviewed and found to be supported by the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference I). Components in-line with Seismic Category I piping were screened out. No rapid drain-down items were included in SWEL 2. This conclusion was supported by a review of the UFSAR (Reference 32) which detennined that all pipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ft above top of fuel assemblies. All pipes extending down into the pool have siphon breaker holes that~ at or above the minimum required water level of 10ft above top of fuel assemblies. All items that screened in to Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2; therefore the peer review team concluded that appropriate justification was documented.

The completed peer review checklist in Appendix C documents the peer review results.

The SWEL was revised during the follow-on walkdowns to remove component 3MCHEEOI, and to replace two (2) protected Train C components with corresponding Train D components which were readily accessible. This change reduced the number of SWEL 1 items from 125 to 124. The component was removed because it was located in a locked high-radiation area It was not necessary to replace 3MCHEEOI with a similar equipment type since the sampling selection attributes remained adequately represented by multiple items on the SWEL. The replacement of Train C components with corresponding Train D components is acceptable per the guidance requirements. The Peer Review Team reviewed these WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement] RevisionO PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon '"'n*""""Mi Page 6-5 SWEL changes and verified that all sampling selection attributes remained adequately represented on the SWEL.

6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments- Selection of SSCs The peer review comments documented in the peer review checklist in Appendix C were resolved in a timely manner and improved the Seismic Walkdown process as summarized in the following:

Additional SWEL selections from systems SA and ZJ were recommended; this enhanced the system variety represented on the SWEL.

Adding an Area Walk-By of the SFP to evaluate interactions of equipment with the SFP transfer gates and inflatable seal equipment was recommended; this enhanced the walkdown effort.

The enhancements and editorial corrections made to the Unit 2 SWEL report were incorporated into the Unit 3 SWEL report prior to this peer review; this improved report clarity.

Provided clarification that OF system items will be adequately evaluated by the DG system SWEL walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; this provided for clarity in the report.

6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review - Selection of SSCs This peer review concluded that the process for selecting SSCs to be included in the Seismic Walkdown equipment list complied with the process outlined in Reference I, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. It is further concluded that the SWEL sufficiently represents a variety of the required sampling of plant Seismic Category I safe shutdown equipment to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter (Reference 50).

6.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS A site visit was made on July 25, 2012, by Messrs. Walter Djordjevic and Mr. Gary L. Douglas to perform the peer review ofthe Seismic Walkdown team's inspection of Unit 2 equipment. This allowed constructive feedback to be provided to the walkdown team in the field for subsequent application in the Unit I and Unit 3 walkdowns. A final review of the SWCs and A WCs was performed on August 23 and 24, 2012, after which an interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team in accordance with the SWG requirements. The SWE trained walkdown engineers were Messrs. Hunter A. Young and Timothy S. Nealon. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs.

Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young in accordance with the SWG requirements on November 14,2013.

Table 6-1 lists the SWC and A WC samples which represent 24% of the SWC and 20% of the A WC populations, respectively. The sample includes the equipment inspected during the peer review and other equipment items from other classes to introduce diversity to the sampling procedure.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contaln-"lliJI!IIIIIII!*III**

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page6-6 Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Uoit3 Equipment Equipment (GIP) Walkdown Item Observations Identification Class Two issues: 2 dowels on N end not installed and bolt projection is 5.75" max vs. 5.25" required.

Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Regarding dowels, the as-installed configuration was Emergency Diesel verified against CLB 3EPEBG02 17 Generator B documentation. Regarding bolt projection, due to combined tolerance of bolt placement, concrete fmishing, and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" discrepancy of bolt projection is determined to be acceptable.

One issue with 3/8" clearance with cable tray. Licensing Basis Evaluation determined that seismic displacement exceeds the 3/8" gap requirement; thus the 3EPHBM32 potentially adverse concern 480VMCCM32 cannot be readily determined to be acceptable. A more accurate frequency estimate may yield an acceptable displacement less than the as-found gap. PV AR 4293351 generated to resolve the issue 3EPKBF12 15 DC Battery "B" No comment Licensing Basis Evaluation Inverter for shutdown inspection ofE054-00047 3EPKCN43 16 cooling isolation valve confirms that the as-installed 3JSICUV653 configuration satisfies the vendor requirements.

Verified that Drawing J3.J.

3JAFBFT0041B 18 AFW Instrument Rack ZZS-157 applies to this equipment.

Anchorage is presumed to be plug-welded like others per documents; it appears that weld was grinded flush with steel and painted.

120 V vital ac voltage Licensing Basis Evaluation:

3EPNBV26 0 SDOC EI05-00011 (Ref. 65) regulator "B" indicates that the vendor-provided channels have

.. mounting holes. Since the holes are absent in the field, the SWT concludes that the holes are filled with plug welds.

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Page6-7 T able 6-l : SWC andAWC Peer ReVJew I ~rom se1sm1c

. Samp1es . . wa lkdown I nspect1on f,or umt. 3 3JAFCUV0036 8 SG-EO IA Isolation Valve No comments RWT MOV suction 3JCHEHVOS36 8 No comments isolation valve Drawing detail calls for "all -

around" 1/8 fillet weld with column flanges. Only top and bottom is provided.

Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Containment pressure 3JHCBPT0351B 18 As-installed configuration instrument rack could not readily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVAR 4275 118 generated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

Containment pressure 3JHCDPT0352D 18 No comment instrument rack Containment pressure 3JRCBPTOI02B 18 No comment instrument rack No comments - seismic Main Control Board 3JRMBBOI 20 interactions noted and properly Section BOI addressed B Train ESFAS Relay 3JSABCOI 14 No comment Cabinets 7 Atmospheric Dump Valve 3JSGBHVO 178 No comment HV-178 3JSGBUV0130 7 SG-EO I A Isolation Valve No comment HPSI Recirc Train B Scaffold well supported - no 3JSIBPSVOI66 7 Pressure Relief Valve issues Sl Tank 28 Discharge 3JSIBUV0624 8 No comment Isolation Globe Valve RC Loop 2A LPSI 3JSIBUV61 5 8 No comment Isolation Valve No comments - seismic 3JZJBE01 20 Remote Shutdown Panel interactions noted and properly addressed No comments - seismic 3MCHETOI 21 Refueling Water Tank interactions noted and properly addressed Bolts have 11 -112" max projection from base slab vs.

11 " requirement on drawing.

3MECBEOI II Essential Chiller B Licensing basis evaluation determined that they are acceptable as found.

3MEWBTOI 21 EW "B" Sur~e Tank No comment Maximum projection of 4-1/2" recorded in field versus 4" Fuel Bldg Air Handling required per drawing.

3MHFBJO I 10 Licensing basis evaluation Unit determined that they are acceptable as found.

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Endosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation thiS page Is decontrolle<l Page 6-8 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review I. Compartment 3EPGBL34C I door middle hinge pin not engaged with the lower half of the hinge. Licensing basis evaluation detennined that 3EPGBL34 2 480 V LC34 bus condition is acceptable as found .

2. Also noted door hinge pin in 3GPGBL34B4 is sitting high All-around are to provided between the Unistrut members and the steel column flanges. Only the outsides of the flanges are welded in field.

Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration HPSI long-term recirc loop 3JSINPT391 18 could not be readily verified I pressure xmtr against CLB documentation.

PVAR 4275 118 updated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

GIP Class (8) for this item on the SWC is incorrect; changed to GIP Class in3EPKDM44 and is therefore R.O.B.

component. No comments-3EPKDD24 14 DC distribution panel 024 prior observation noted in SWC for 3EPKDM44 is properly addressed.

Recommend removing ladder photograph intended to show open cabinet door, or add a 3EPBBS04 3 4.16 kV bus S04 clarifying statement of the outage condition. Photograph removed.

Internal inspection. No 3EPHBM36 480VMCCM36 comments.

Internal inspection. No 3EPKBHI2 16 Battery charger "B" comments.

Noted threaded fire with Victaulic couplings but Area: Aux, 100', A-116 frequently s upported. No issue. Externally braced masonry wall also noted. No issue.

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Upon separation thls page is decontrolled Page 6-9 Table 6-l: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspect1on for Unit 3 Large AHU on vibration mounts is approximately 15' N of reactor trip switchgear. The concern is that the AHUs could Area: Aux, 120', A-227 lose lateral supports causing water lines to break and flood the are~. Follow-up detennined that potential impacts of flooding/spray hazards are mitigated by drip-proof enclosed protective cabinets, which house the reactor trip breakers.

Area: Aux, 52' A-CIS No comment Area: Aux 88' A-AO I No comment Noted eyewash I shower adjacent to battery rack in SE comer with threaded piping.

Area: Control,1 00', J-110 Pipe is low mass and well-supported so as to preclude excessive joint rotation. No spray hazard.

1/16" gap between cabinets ZJB-C02A and ESA-COI in E-W direction. ZJB-C02A is 32" wide in direction of motion considered and is judged to be very stiff. Licensing Basis Evaluation: Per PVNGS PRA Group, review of CN-RAM-12-015, spatial interaction due to a seismic event between the two cabinets 3JZJBC02A and 3JESAC01 results in acceptable relay chatter. Therefore, seismic gap is acceptable. No adverse condition.

Noted ftre extinguishers that may uplift off of small hook.

'No safety-related targets with in fall range. Bookcase in S corridorS ofRMN-BOl is anchored to the stud wall. Judged to be of no interaction concern.

Temporary instrument rack (approximately 400lbs) on wheels I" East of QSPD Channel B. East 2 wheels of rack are tied off with nylon rope (WO# 3733934). Rack is approximately 70"H x 24"x24". Concern is if rack can Area: Control, 140', Outer Horseshoe overturn and impact adjacent cabinets SAA-COl or SGB-COI. Rack was immediately tied off at top and the QSPD cabinet was confinned to be out of service at the time.

Potential hazard was corrected on the spot.

Temporary tool cart is well tied off with nylon rope to printer cart that is heavily bolted into slab. No hazard.

Noted rolling step ladder chained off to W wall but has enough slack to impact cabinets SAA-C04 and SDA-COS.

Could impact safety-function of cabinets. Notified control room. Corrected on the spot.

Peer Review Team advised thaJ the SWC must cite the interaction question as a 'No' given thaJ in the 'as found' situation it was a real seismic interaction concern. The condition report should indicate the problem {as found) and note that the condition has been.fixed by relocating the ladder.

No comments - seismic interactions noted and properly Area: DG, 120', G-108 addressed WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I . Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-10 T a ble 6 1: SWC and AWC Peer ReVJew . Samptes I firom sis e m1c . walkdown nspect on fior u. DJt 3 Noted scaffolding on E wall by pool. Scaffolding is well-braced but legs not anchored. Friction judged sufficient so that lower legs do not kick out. PVNGS Engineers confinned not a procedural violation. Good clearance provided near seal tubing on N wall.

Area: Fuel Bldg, 140' SFP Proximity Told SWE team to read scaffolding and housekeeping procedure as a practice.

Noted upright ladder against S wall that was tied off but could still ovenum and damage NQR conduit No adverse concern but notified PVNGS: PV AR 4225 I 16 documents the condition.

No comments - seismic interactions noted and properly

Area: MSSS, 80', C-A09 addressed Area : CTMT, 100 3JCHEHV239 Proximity No comments Area : CTMT, 120, Pressurizer Cube No comments Area: CTMT, 87, 3JHCBUV0044/3>>>CBUV0047/3JSIBPSV 189 No comments Proximity WCAP-1 768 1-NP, Supplement l RevisionO PVNGS-3 April 2014

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page6-11 6.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS Appendix D provides a list of the potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the Unit 3 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys and how they were addressed. If a PVAR was generated, it is referenced in Appendix D. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas conducted interviews with the SWE inspection team on August 23, 2012, and November 14, 2013, to discuss the issues identified to determine if, in the opinion of the peer reviewers, any of them potentially challenged the current licensing basis of the plant.

As noted in Section 5, there were 37 potentially adverse seismic conditions identified in either the equipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys requiring evaluation with respect to their seismic licensing basis. Not all potentially adverse conditions were resolved. The peer reviewers performed a review of all completed licensing basis evaluations and the walkdown team's decisions for entering these potentially adverse seismic conditions into the plant's CAP. Twenty-eight (28) of the licensing basis evaluations determined that the potentially adverse conditions were ultimately found to be in compliance with the current licensing basis. Of the remaining 9 potentially adverse se ismic conditions that were entered into the plant's CAP, 7 involved difficulty in verifying the as-built anchorage configuration with plant documentation, one (1) involved potential interactions between an MCC and cable tray and between a pair of control panels, and one (1) involved seismic qualification of modified equipment. The peer reviews of Sections 4.3 and 5, and Appendix D led the peer reviewers to conclude that the licensing basis evaluations carefully compared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basis documentation in order to assess configuration compliance with the Palo Verde design basis, and the decisions for entering conditions into the plant's CAP complied with the expectations of the SWG.

CAP Status Review The peer reviewers performed a review of the status of items that were entered into the plant's CAP as a result of the Seismic Walkdowns (see Table 6-2). This supplement submittal report was found to appropriately reflect these updates.

Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 3 CAP Item CAP Status PVAR 4225114 Area: FUEL 100' near air handlers, tall Radiation Action completed. Condition Protection vacuum on unlocked wheels secured to corrected.

safety-related junction box 3EZFIABKKJOI PV AR 4218227 Area: Controll40' rolling step ladder chained otT to Action completed. Verified no contact the west wall with enough slack to contact cabinets with sensitive equipment.

3JSAAC04 and 3JSDAC05 PV AR 4465161 Door middle hinge pin not engaged with the lower half Action completed. Condition of the hinge on load center 3EPGBL34 corrected.

PV AR 4293351 3EPHBM32 seismic displacement exceeds the 3/8" gap Evaluated as no impact on seismic requirement capability and no operability impact.

CMWO 4293566 issued to trim/remove cable tray end.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page6-12 Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 3 CAP Item CAP Status PV AR 4275118 3EPKBH12 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation. evaluated against vendor requirements. EDC 2013-00471 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-EOO I to enhance documentation.

PVAR4275118 3EPKBM42 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation. evaluated in existing calculation 13-CC-ZQ-EOOI.

PVAR4275118 3JHCBPT0351B anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation. capability and no operability impact.

EDC 2013-00471 will updateDwg 13-J-010-0105/0106 to enhance documentation.

PV AR 4275118 3JHCBPT0351D anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation. capability and no operability impact.

EDC 2013-00471 will update Dwg 13-J-0 ID-0 I 05/0 I 06 to enhance documentation.

PVAR4275118 3JSGBPT0306 anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation. capability and no operability impact.

EDC 20 13-00471 will update Dwg 13-J-ZZS-0165/13-J-OID-0173 to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4275118 3MEWBPOI anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation. capability and no operability impact.

EDC 2013-00471 will update Dwg 13-C-ZAS-012l/024l to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4275118 3MHJBZ04 verification to determine whether apparent Evaluated as no impact on seismic modification reconciled individual AHU seismic capability and no operability impact.

qualification. EDC 2013-00471 will update AHU seismic qualification to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4275 118 3JSINPT0391 anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated as no impact on seismic readily verified against CLB documentation. capability and no operability impact.

EDC 2013-00471 will update Dwg 13-J-0 ID-0 119 to enhance documentation.

6.5 REVIEW SUBMITTAL REPORT The entire final submittal report has been reviewed by Messrs. W. Djordjevic and G. Douglas and found to meet the requirements of the EPRI TR-1025286- Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). The update submittal report has been reviewed by Messrs. W. Djordjevic and G. L. Douglas and found to meet the requirements of EPRI TR-1025286 - Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1).

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Endosure Appendices A and 8 contain Upon separat1on thiS page IS Clecontrolleel Page 7-l

7. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES A summary of IPEEE vulnerabilities is available in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events report (Reference 3). Per Reference 3, no seismic vulnerabilities were determined to exist at PVNGS-3 and no significant changes to plant design were required in order to demonstrate the ability to mitigate the Review Level Earthquake (RLE). All observations identified from the IPEEE walkdowns were resolved prior to issuing of the IPEEE report on June 1, 1995.

Table 4-1 ofPVNGS CORR 94-001-506 (Reference 62) had documented items to review for the Seismic IPEEE prescreening and walkdown of all three units; and Table 3-4 of Reference 3 summarized the resolution of these original walkdown concerns. The IPEEE report (Reference 3) concluded that all components have capacities exceeding the 0.3g peak ground acceleration of the RLE. However, action was taken to improve the seismic capacity of the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in the Unit 3 Control Room. The existing anchorage was determined to be marginal, and additional anchorage was provided prior to issuing of the IPEEE report to resolve the concern.

As noted in Section 4.2, the SWT reviewed the IPEEE report prior to conducting walkdowns. Similar observations noted in the IPEEE report regarding the Control Room bookcases were also noted for review during these walkdowns. The SWT reviewed Detail 35 of 13-A-ZYD-0034 (Reference 57), which specifies 23 metal screws fastening the bookcases in all three units to the metal stud wall. The SWT and licensing basis reviewers determined that, although the as-installed anchorage for the Unit 3 bookcase did not comply with this detail, the demand forces were adequately low to preclude failure; therefore, no adverse spatial interaction was identified. As a result of this observation, PVAR 4214832 was generated and PVNGS removed these bookcases from the zone of influence of the main control boards in all three units.

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8. REFERENCES I. EPRI Technical Report I 025286, Seismic Walkdowit Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Tenn Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012

2. Drawing 13-1-ZZI-OOOl.ROlt, "Site Work Management System (SWMS) Equipment Database."

3. CORR 102-03407, "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - IPEEE."

4. Design Basis Manual DBM AF, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," Revision 22.

5. Design Basis Manual DBM CH, "Chemical and Volume Control System," Revision 21.

6. Design Basis Manual DBM DF/DGIPE, "Diesel Generator, Class IE Standby Generation, Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System," Revision 23.

7. Design Basis Manual DBM EC, "Essential Chilled Water System," Revision 13.

8. Design Basis Manual DBM EW, "Essential Cooling Water System," Revision 23.

9. Design Basis Manual DBM FW, "Feedwater System," Revision 13.

10. Design Basis Manual DBM HA, "Auxiliary Building HVAC System," Revision 17.

11. Design Basis Manual D~M HC, "Containment Building HVAC System," Revision 9.

12. Design Basis Manual DBM HD, "HVAC- Diesel Generator Building," Revision 12.

13. Design Basis Manual DBM HP, "Containment Hydrogen Control System," Revision 13.

14. Design Basis Manual DBM MA, "Main Generation System," Revision 8.

15. Design Basis Manual DBM NA, "13.8 kV AC Non-Class IE Power System," Revision 10.

16. Design Basis Manual DBM NC, "Nuclear Cooling Water System," Revision 19.

17. Design Basis Manual DBM NE, "Station Blackout Topical," Revision 18.

18. Design Basis Manual DBM PB, "Class IE 4.16 kV Power System," Revision 13.

19. Design Basis Manual DBM PG, "Class IE 480 V AC Power Switchgear System," Revision 11.

20. Design Basis Manual DBM PH, "Class IE 480V Power- MCC," Revision 11.

21. Design Basis Manual DBM PK, "Class IE 125 VDC Power System," Revision 17.

22. Design Basis Manual DBM PN, "Class IE Instrument AC Power System," Revision 10.

23. Design Basis Manual DBM QD, "Emergency Lighting System," Revision 10.

24. Design Basis Manual DBM RC, "Reactor Coolant System," Revision 29.

25. Design Basis Manual DBM SA, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," Revision 16.

26. Design Basis Manual DBM SB, "Reactor Protection System," Revision 18.

27. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-FWCS, "feedwater Control System," Revision 6.

28. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-SBCS, "Stearn Bypass Control System," Revision 6.

29. Design Basis Manual DBM SG, "Main Stearn," Revision 31.

30. Design Basis Manual DBM Sl, "Safety Injection System," Revision 33.

31 . Equipment Qualification (EQ) Files EQDF EQ-PM, Equipment Qualification Program Manual, Revision 21.

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-2

32. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units I, 2, and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 16B, August 2012.

33 . Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-11-0 I 9, "Validation of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Conversion for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station," September 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2)~ Revision 0.

34. Interim Version of the Westinghouse Seismic PRA Database (Microsoft Access database file "APS-SPRA.mdb," dated August 22, 2012).

35. Design Basis Manual DBM PC "Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 18.

36. Drawing Number 03-M-PCP-000 I, "P & I Diagram, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System,"

Revision 27.

37. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0501, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric," Revision 2.

38. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0502, "Fuel Building Isometric Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 0.

39. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0503, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric," Revision 0.

40. Drawing Number 03-P-PCF-0504, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric," Revision 0.

41 . Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-71, "Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

42. Design Criteria Manual DCM-PGD, "Project General Design Criteria," Revision 24.

43. Regulatory Guide 1.60, "Design Response Spectra for Seismic Des ign of Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision I , December 1973.

44. Regulatory Guide 1.61, "Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision 0, October 1973.

45. Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," Revision I , August 1973.

46. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-75, "Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

47. EPRI Report NP-6041-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision I)," Revis ion 1.

48. WCAP-17681-NP, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3," Revision 0, November 2012.

49. Not used.

50. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3 : Seismic."

51. Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A, Rev. 3, "Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants," November 1974.

52. Not used.

53. Design Basis Manual DBM-C5, "Seismic Topical," Revision 4.

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Upon separation this page Is decontrolled Page 8-3

54. Procedure 30DP-9WP1 I, "Scaffolding Instructions," Revision 24.

55. Specification 13-CN-0380, "Installation Specification for Seismic Cat IX and Non-Seismic Scaffolding," Revision 20.

56. Procedure 30DP-OWM12, "Housekeeping," Revision 20.

57. Drawing 13-A-ZYD-0034, "Transient Material Restraint Details," Revision 20.

58. Calculation 13-CC-ZZ-0309, "Transient Material Analysis," Revision 5.

59. Drawing 13-E-ZAL-0011, "Lighting Fixture Mounting," Revision 31.

60. Calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120, "Concrete Block Walls," Revision 5.

61. Calculation 13-CC-ZA-0125, "Auxiliary Building Non-Bearing Non-Shear Walls," Revision 2.

62. Correspondence 94-001-506, "Transmittal of Report Prescreening and Walkdown ofPVNGS for Seismic IPEEE."

63. "Dynamics of Structures, Theory and Application to Earthquake Engineering," Anil K . Chopra, University of California at Berkeley.

64. Not used.

65. PVNGS Documents used for Anchorage Configuration Verification and Licensing Basis Evaluations a Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-EOO 1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation- Electrical Equipment," Revision 5.

b. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-1001, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation- Control Equipment," Revision 6.

c. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-MOO l, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation -

Mechanical Equipment," Revision 8.

d. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-0001, "Civil-Structural Generator Notes," Revision 24.

e. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-0011, "Anchor Bolt Schedule and Details," Revision 9.

f. Drawing Number 13-C-SPS-0376, "Nuclear Service Spray Ponds Sections and Details Sht 1," Revision 11.

g. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0240, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 1," Revision 10.

h. Not used.

i. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0241, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 2," Revision 9.

j. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0242, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 3," Revision 11.

k. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0243, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 4," Revision 13.

I. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0245, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 5," Revision 8.

m. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0703, "MSSS Concrete Sections and Details," Revision 8.

n. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0705, "MSSS Floor Inserts and Penetrations," Revision 20.

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o. Drawing Number 13-C-ZFS-0187, "FuelBuilding Concrete Sections & Details,"

Revision II.

p. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0110, "Diesel Generator Building Diesel Generator Foundation Plan Sections and Details," Revision 5.

q. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0116, "Diesel Generator Building Concrete Section and Details Sht 2," Revision 7. .

r. Drawing Number 13-J-OID-0173, "MSSS Building Iso Sensing Line SGA-PT308, 315; SBG-PT301, 321," Revision 6.

s. Drawing Number 13-J-040-01 18, "MSSS ISO AFA-FT-40A and AFB-FT-41A Sensing Lines," Revision 2.

t. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0157, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for 12"W x 24"H Plate with Unistrut," Revision 6.

u. Log Number 13-10407-A216-12, "Wyle Job No. 44815 - Seismic Test of Compact Ceiling Light Module and an Incandescent Light Module," Revision A.

v. SDOC Number E051-00047, "Qualification Report for Class IE Battery Charger,"

Revision 10.

w. SDOC Number E054-0070, "Class IE Inverter IEEE 323 and 324 Qualification Report," Revision 7.

x. SDOC Number El05-000ll, "Outline Line Voltage Regulator 2SKVA," Revision 17.

y. SDOC Number EN050B-A000l5, "General Arrangement 28-Cell Battery Rack Sht. 3,"

Revision 5.

z. SDOC Number MS98-01433, "Mounting and Wiring Detail for Q Class HVAC Instruments," Revision 21.

aa. Drawing Number 13-E-ZAL-0011, "Lighting Fixture Mounting Detail Sheet 1,"

Revision 32.

bb. Drawing Number 13-E-ZFL-0001, "Fuel Handling Building Lighting &

Communications El. 100ft, & El. 120ft, Level 1&2," Revision 14.

cc. Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) 095-0038, "Restraints for Aux. Relay Cabinets."

dd. SDOC Number NOOI-0502-00322, "Bridge Assembly SFHM V-CE-14439, 3-22-81,"

Revision 4.

ee. SDOC Number NOOI-0502-00326, "Trolly Hoist Assy SFHM V-CE-14439,3-22-81,"

Revision 6.

ff. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZG-0070, "Diesel Generator Building Equipment Supports," Revision 6.

gg. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0143, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for 12"w x18"h Plate with Unistrut," Revision 7.

hh. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0 I02, "Control Building Area Jl D Concrete and Steel Plans for El. 74' and 100'," Revision 10.

ii. Drawing Number 13-C-SPS-0385, "Nuclear Service Spray Sect & Otis Sht 7,"

Revision 4.

jj. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-01 10, "Auxiliary Building AreaADA,B,C & D Plan At EI40'-0"," Revision 17.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-5 kk. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0122, "Auxiliary Bldg Area ABD Plan At El70ft-Oin,"

Revision 18.

II. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0138, "Aux Bldg Area AID Plan At E1100ft-Oin,"

Revision 20.

mm. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0145, ~Auxiliary BldgAreaA2C Plan At El120ft-Oin,"

Revision 10.

nn. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0700, "Mn Stm Support Struct Cone Plan Area C1E,C2E,C3E&C4E," Revision 11.

oo. Drawing Number 13-C-ZFS-0100, "Fuel Bldg Area FIA & FIB Plan @ El 100',"

Revision 17.

pp. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 00, "Diesel Generator Building Plans At El 100'-0" &

115"-0"," Revision 15.

qq. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0102, "Diesel Generator Bldg Area G3A&G4A Plans At El 131 ft-Oin & El 146ft-Oin," Revision I 0.

rr. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-0116, "Diesel Generator Bldg Cone Sects & Dtls Sht.2,"

~evision 7.

ss. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-01 00, "Control Bldg Area JAA & B Plan At El 74ft-Oin,"

Revision 18.

tt. Drawing Number 13-J-010-0105, "Aux Bldg TSO HCB-PT-351B, 352B & 353B Sensing Line," Revision 6.

uu. Drawing Number 13-J-010-0106, "Sensing Lines For HCD-PT-351D & 3520 Aux Bldg," Revision 4.

vv. Drawing Number 13-J-04D-0117, "MSSS Bldg ISO Sensing Lines AFA-FT-40B, AFB-FT-41B," Revision 3.

ww. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0160, "Instrument Mounting Assembly Rosemount Transmitter Model 1152, 1153 Packed & 3051 (Below Line)," Revision 7.

xx. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0 165, "lnstr Mtg Ass Rosemount Transmitter Model 1152,53 Packed (Below Line)," Revision 7.

yy. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0137, "Aux Bldg Area A1C Plan At E1100ft-Oin,"

Revision 16.

zz. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0581, "Control Bldg Mise Steel Platforms & Otis Sht.2,"

Revision 7.

aaa. Drawing Number 13-P-ZYC-0099, "SSR Equpmt Bldg & Nuc Serv Spray Pond PMP House HVAC & Hanger Plan & Sections," Revision 2.

bbb. SDOC Number EN050B-A00005, "General Arrangement 32 Cell Battery Rack Sht.1,"

Revision 2.

ccc. SDOC Number EN050B-A00006, "General Arrangement 28-Cell Battery Pack Sht.l,"

Revision 2.

ddd. SDOC Number EN050B-A00030, "Battery Room Layout Unit 3 Room B," Revision 4.

eee. SDOC Number EN050B-A00013, "General Arrangement 32-Cell Battery Rack Sht.J,"

Revision 4.

fff SDOC Number M721A-00092, "HDA-AOl Assy/Outline," Revision 9.

ggg. SDOC Number E054-00047, "Installation Drawing Inverter 253-1-101 SHT.1,"

Revision 6 WCAP- 17681-NP, Supplement l Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain. . . . . . .

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-6 hhh. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0191, "Control Building Plans And Details Sht. 2,"

Revision 8 iii. Drawing Number 03-E-ZGL-000 I, "Diesel Generator Bldg. Lighting &

Communications Plan At El. 100'-0" and 115'-0"," Revision 6 jjj. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-015, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment- Model Development," November 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).

kkk. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-022, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment - Quantification," December 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).

Ill. SDOC EOIS-02803, "Seismic Simulation Test Program on a IC7700 MCC," Revision 3.

mmm.SDOC Number NOOI-1303-00057, "Std Spec Reac Brkr Swtgr System Com Ltr Log 66,72," Revision 3.

non. Drawing Number 13-J-OID-119, "Containment Bldg Isometric SIB-PT-391 Sensing Line," Revision 3.

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. Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page Is decontrolled Page C-1 APPENDIX C - PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS There was no change to this appendix. The SWEL Peer Review Checklist can be found in Appendix C of Reference 48 (Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3").

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation th1s page IS decontrolled Page D-1 APPENDIX D- LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

SUMMARY

Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued)s Status' Dowell per Dltlll G oi13-C- nl* Y l.lcenlkW Bills ~on: ........... doMis, lllll*tiOft ollJ.C-ZGS-lJD (W. &5) .... not ZGS-0110 (W. IS) IIIII., 1l1*'-t photos,..... that the dOMis lnltlllld- 5-3/4. .,. 2*1n clllmelllr wllh en *"liP It c:enlllr. 11111 rwflec:ts the

conr.nuon. ._.II

........ proJedlon not.cl on ..... ...._bolts

- l/c-. Verify fowld conc.m. .... -bolt thetllfole. no ..._.. ..IC:horlle prajedlon, due to comb~~ led tdlllftCII ol bait plaoatMI~ CDIICietl flnllhlnr. Ifill tleld m-UFIIMnt b¥ SWf, wMdw'QI 1J2* dlscreplncy of bolt projKtion .. .......,.. to be IQllptlble.

documentdon IUOURts for sse meets tun11nt 1c:en11nt buls.

diso"epllldes.

3EPHBM32 480VMCCM32 Noted approx. 3/8" 4293351 N Licensing Basis Evaluation: Per SDOC E018*02803 (Ref. 65), MCC clearance on E side of MCC front-to-back frequency is 6 Hz with a spectral acceleration from to separately supported the 100' elevation at 4% damping of 1.23g (= 1.1g

sqrt(5%/4%)).

cable tray. Evaluate MCC Using a modal shape factor of 1.6 for cantilever action, t he upper frequency in transverse bound displacement is calculated to be 0.53". This exceeds the 3/8" direction and determine gap requirement; thus the potent ially adverse concern cannot be whether clearance is readily determined to be acceptable.

adequat e so as to preclude i mpact. APS reports that PVAR indicates the use of 7% damping and an SSE anchored to a 0.20G PGA results in a displacement less than 3/8" ;

therefore no adverse seismic condition exists.

APS reports this is a non-conforming condition . An Operability Determination concluded that the SSC remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that this is a non-conforming condition. Condition will be corrected by trimming end of cable tray to increase clearance (refer to EWR 4377344).

5 PVAR denotes Palo Verde Action Request which is the entry document for the PVNGS corrective action program.

6 NITF Status denotes conclusions of LBE for the condition. Y- Condition was found to confonn to the Current Licensing Basis. N- Condition is either a Non-Confonning Condition or a Potential Non-Confonning Condition (ifPVAR resolution is on-going)

WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Page D-2 Item EQID Item Description Problem Descript.i on PVARNo. {If NTTF Resolution Issued) 5 Status' Ncad IPPfOII. 2. stltd1 4275118 N Llc;ensq 8uls ~: Sheet 149 of 13-CC*ZQ-£01 (Ref. 65) weld (1 pp) 4. o.c. ** lndlaltes the required weld pattern of 6 no. 1W filet welds ~ In oppOIId to dnwlnl- lenlth wherus the a~lcullltlon on the followlnt sheet lndatad &* continuous consetWtlvely c:hlclcs for 6 no. 1/4* welds 3* In lenlth. Therefore, weld at SE embed piN. the ......,_lied meets SSE requirements

shown In the mlcu'-tlon Verify whether a.a but does not reflect the *required" condition per Sheet 149. PYAR documentation KCOUnts for 4275118 pneratecl by PYNGS to Hdress.

the dlscrepency.

SWC lndiCII~s - AH!Stded weld meets vendor requirements; no IICMrse seismic condition exists.

APS reports this Is

poiMtiM non-confonnlnt condition. An Openbllty eet.nnn.t~on concluded that the sse retMined aper.ble.

SupplemenUI Report ....,.._: APS reports that this Is not

non-conformlnl CICIIIdnlon, but does Identify

documentMion discrepM1cy. EDC 2013-00471 wll updMa c.lculatlon 13-CC*ZQ-£01 to correct document dlscrepMcy.

3EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control As-installed configuration 4275118 N Ucensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration could not circuit could not be verified against readily be verified against CLB documentation. PVAR 4275118 CLB configuration indicated generated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

in 13-CC-ZQ-E01. Verify extended channels and APS reports that PVAR indicates as-found extended channels and welds from E end. welds on east end are bounded by configuration analyzed in calculation 13-CC-ZQ-E001 page 102; therefore no adverse seismic condition exists.

APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition.

Operability Determination concluded that the SSC remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that this is not a non-conforming condition, but does identify a documentation discrepancy. EDC 2013-00471 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-E01 to correct document discrepancy.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain~~~~****************

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-3 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (If NTTF Resolution issued) 5 Status' JEJIKCMU DC power to TC81 control 1) Notal approac. 1/#t n/a Y 1) l.lcensq Basis Evaluation: Inspection of SSE vertical floor circuit c:leerwa between verttc.l response spectra at thne elevMiollllndlcatellow ZPAs (both 1t.ms Uniltrut tny support considered rflld In ¥Wtlall diNctlon) ht will result In I'ICifllinel suspended from 120' and dltplac:erMnts ...a.t~ve10 the 1/4" pp. sse ..-a~nnt ~

tapofMCC. basis.

2) Also, 1-1/2" deMwa ncad betwel!n muonry 2) l.lcensq luis Evlluatlon: . . . . . . . the ciMnnce 10 the

~onW..Uand masonry well, the 1*1/2" pp II bounded by -'viii of a smaller MCC. Verify whether both pp shown 10 be acceptable for AWC CTRl ~109. No adverse

.Jil!![!!!!!..!a!!!.adequate. se1sm1c: condition exists. sse meets curnnt balls.

3EPKCN43 Inverter for shutdown 13-CC-ZQ-EOl shows 8" n/a y Ucensing Basis Evaluation: Sheet 172 of 13-CC-ZQ-EOl indicates cooling isolation valve fillets on fronts and backs of that 3-E-PKC-N43 and 3-E-PKD-N44 were Installed per the original 3JSICUV653 tube sections. 7-1/4" vendor requirement shown on SDOC E054-00047 (Ref. 65).

provided. Check ClB Inspection of SDOC EOS4-00047 confirms that the as-installed documents to determine if configuration satisfies the vendor requirements. SSC meets current deviation is accounted. licensing basis.

Inverter For 3JSIDUV654 u.cc-ZQ-£01 shows a* n/a y LansintBuls Evaluation: Sheet 172 of 13-CC-ZQ-£011ndlcates Shutdown CoollniB filets on fronts and backs of that H-PKC-N43 and H-PKD-N44 were Installed per the orJa1na1 Return Inside tube secdons. 7-1/4" vendor~ shown on SOOC !054-00047. Inspection of Containment Isolation pravlded. Checlc Q.8 SDOC E054-00047 confirms that the as-Installed conflpntlon Valve documents 10 determine If utlsfles the v.ndor requi.......a sse meets current licensln8 deviation Is accounted. basis.

3EPNBV26 120 Vvital ac voltage Drawing calls for plug welds n/a y Ucensing Basis Evaluation: SDOC E105-00011 (Ref. 65) indicates regulator "B" or alternate fillet pattern. that the vendor-provided channels have mounting holes. Since the Cannot be verified from holes are absent in the field, the SWT concludes that the holes are visual inspection, but it is filled with plug welds. SSC meets current licensing basis.

presumed that plug welds were grinded flush and painted. Verification required.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain. . I!!IIIIIJ!!IJ!!II!IIIIJIIII*********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-4 Item EQID Item Desalption Problem Description PVAR No. (If NTTF Resolution issued) 5 Status6 1 JEPNCNU DC/AC Inverter *c- ~weld pfttem Is n/1 y IJcensinl Basis Evllulltlon: Sheet 172 cfC.lculdan lKC*ZQ-£01 different from tNt lndates thlt 3EPNCN13 wu Instilled per the "ffeed tnstallltion*

Indicated on 13-CC*ZQ-£01. shown. Inspection ofSOOC E054-00047, however, confirms tNt Vertfy whether devlltlon the IS-Instilled conllpr'ltlon IN1dles the v.ndor requirement noted on a-built Is shown llld not the "ffeed lnstddon* dmwlnl shown on Sheet 172.

doc:urneraclln a.a Therefore, the lftChorltp c:onftpmlon meets llcenslni documents. JWqUinlments, but It Is recommended tNt PVNGS updnts Sheet 172 cf 13-CC-ZQ-£01 to reflect the IICtullllt-bullt COIIdltlon. Note tNt PVAR 4220252 W81 ......... by PVNGS to liPd* 13-CC..ZO.

E01 to correct minor document chcreplndes. APS reports this Is not

non-c:onforrnln condition, but does Identify

minor documentltlon deflclenty. sse meets current ~~censq buls.

Supplemenal Report Updm: APS ,..,arts tNt this Is not 1 non-COitfoillliltl condition, but does Identify. docurnent.uon dlscrep~ncy. EDC 2013-00471 wtl updlte C.lculetlon J.3.CC*ZO.E01 to c:orTeCt document dlscreplnsy.

3EPNDV28 120 V vital ac voltage Drawing calls for plug welds n/a y Licensing Basis Evaluation: SDOC ElOS-00011 indicates that the regulator "0" or alternate fillet pattern. vendor-provided channels have mounting holes. Since the holes Cannot be verified from are absent in the field, the SWT concludes that the holes are filled visual inspection, but it is w ith plug welds. sse meets current licensing basis.

presumed that plug welds were grinded flush and painted. Verify from required.

SJAFBFT00411 Auxlllery ~flOW 13-J.lZS-157 inctlJ..J.ZZS. nl* v Ucenslfll Basis EV8Iultion: Inspection cf 13-J-040.0117 (Ref. 65) 160 (Refs. 65) . . . In field ll'ldic:.tM that 13-J.ZZS.0157 Detllll applies I I the llansecl do not Indicate whether Mtchorlp c:onflturdon. The IHIItlllld contlpratlon 11tlsfles they lfiPiv to the requ~remen~s cf U-J.ZlS-0157. No ~aue. sse meets current 1WIIF'T00418. Veflflcdon ~baiL WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement l Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and Upon B contain*--~~~ ~~~*~~***********

... is decontrolled separation this page Page 0-5 Item EQIO Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued) s Status6 3JHCBPT03.S18 Containment pressure 13-J-01D-0105 (Ref. 65) 4275118 N licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration could not detail calls for "all-around" readily be verified against CLB documentation. PVAR 4275118 1/8" fillet weld at cont act generated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

with column flanges. Only top and bottom is provided. APS reports that PVAR indicates as-found weld capacity is 7400 lbs Verify whether FCRs or which exceeds the equipment load; therefore no adverse seismic NCRs document deviation. condition exists.

APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition. An Operability Determination concluded that the sse remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that this is a non-conforming condition. EDC 2013-00471 will update Drawing 13-J-010-0105 to reflect as-found configuration.

JJHCDPT0351D Containment pressure 13-J.01[).()105 cleWII Qlls 4275118 N 1JcensinC luis Evlluatlon: As lnstlllled c:onfltumlon could not for .....round" 1/8. fillet reedlly be verllled lplnst Cl8 doc:urnentMion. PVM 4275111 weld It axltKt wtth .....-cl to reconcile the c:onflturdon dlscrepMicy.

column tt.nps. Only top nl bottom Is provided. AI'S reports that PVM (......... wortc) lndlaltes ..-found weld v.wy whether FCRs or c:apKity Is 7400 lbs which . . . . . the equipment lolld;........,.

NCRs document deNtlon. no ICMne sellmlc conditiOn eldlll.

AIS reports this Is 1 paCentlll non-confOi 1111111 clondltlon. An Operability Oetennk~Rton conduded that the sse relllllllld Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: liPS reports thlt this Is

non-confonnlnc condition. EDC 2013-00471 wll upd.a. Drewin113-J-010.0105 to reflect IS-found <<i!!!!I:!I!!W.!S!!L.._ _ _ _ __

3JHJBTIC0124 Control room temp Verify approximately 3/16" n/a y licensing Basis Evaluation: Mounting plate connection verified per indicating controller filled welds, 4" long top and Detail 3 on 13-C-ZJ$-0581 (Ref. 65); sse meets current licensing bottom to tube steel into basis.

wall.

WCAP- 17681-NP, Supplement l Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Endosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation thiS page IS decontrolled Page D-6 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVARNo. (If NTTF Resolution Issued) 5 Status*

Noted~l/r n/1 y IJcenslntBisls ~: Both Unls1rut (suspended from 160') lnCI i verticil clearence between MCC (anchored on 140') are rtplln vertical dlredlon. ZPAs of 0.791 P1000 Unlstrut mount.d on and 0.901 for the 140' and 160' alemlons, raspectMiy, yield a top of Clblnet and maximum relative clllplacement of o.o15* (* (0.791 + 0.901)*386.4 I lnclepetldent Unlstrut (2*p1*33 Hz)A2 ). Therefore the 1/r pp llsufllclent; not an support suspended from adverse seismic C:OIIdltiOI'i. S5C meets current bnsl111 basis.

160' elevdon. Verify whether cleanlnce Is 3JSBCC02A 1/V converter SWT observed a similar n/a y Licensing Basis Evaluat ion: Both Unistrut (suspended from 160') and concern as cabinet MCC (anchored on 140') are rigid in vertical direction. ZPAs of 0.79g 3JSBBC02A with and 0.90g for the 140' and 160' elevations, respectively, yield a approximat ely 3/16" maximum relative displacement of 0.015" (=(0.79g + 0.90g)* 386.4 I between Unistrut on top (2*pi

33 Hz}"2 ). Therefore the 3/16" gap is sufficient; not an and the suspended Unistrut adverse seismic condition. sse meets current licensing basis.

from 160' elevation. Verify if clearance is adequate.

Instrument air line 13-J-ZZS.0165 (Ref. 65) calls 4275118 N Ucenslnc Basis Evaluation: At-Installed c:onflluretion could not J)NSSUre transmitter for 11/2. stitch welds It 3. readily be vertfted aplnst CLB documentation. P'VAR 4275111 o.c. Al-lnlallecl pnerated to reconcile the conflturation dlsCfti*ICY.

conflalntlon e. 21/2. APS reports 1hlt P'VAR (l'lllted wortc) lndat.s as-found weld welds It HCh end, top and capacity Is 11,600 Ill which UCftdl the equipment loecl; tNrelore bclttom. YertfV whether CL8 no...,._ Mlsmlc calllltlon ec1sts.

doc:umlnbttlon ICXOUntS for APS reports 1hls is a potMtlal non-conformlnl condltlciiL An cleNIIan. Operability Detennll..aan c:onduded 1hlt the S5C rernelned Operable.

3MAFBP01 AFpump"B" Not ed bolt on NE side has 4 n/a y Licensing Basis Evaluation: Due to combined tolerance of bolt 1/2" projection instead of placement, concret e finishing, and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" indicated maximum discrepancy of bolt projection is determined to be acceptable; sse projection of 4". Verify meets current licensing basis.

w hetherCLB documentation accounts for deviat ion.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April201 4

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain* * * * *

I I ! ! I I I J I J I I I ! ! I J * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-7 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (If NTTF Resolution issued) 5 Status 6 JMCHIP01 CbuJiu& pump 2 Verify .nchor bolt n/* y Ucensll'll Basis Evaluation: Further review of 13<-ZAS-0241 Detail 1 mulmum projection of 4- (Ref. 65) Indicates an anchor bolt T.O.S. of 101'-o" with a ped T.O.C.

3/r from top of ped ** of 100'-r. TheNfore, the mulmum proJection Is 4* from top of adequate. ~*~* 3/8. d~screp~rKy 1s judpd ~ &Mn typlcel1/_r tolerance on both the COIIUw.. llab ftnllh and bolt~ In addltloMI to 111* meuurement error; sse meets current 11cens1nt bMis.

3MECBE01 Essential chiller "B" Bolts have 111/2" max n/a y Ucensing Basis Eva luation: Due to combined tolerance of bolt projection from base slab placement, concrete finishing. and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" versus the 11" requirement discrepancy of bolt projection is determined to be acceptable; sse indicated on the drawing. meets current licensing basis.

Verify whether CLB documentation accounts for the deviation.

JMECIP01 Crculltil'll water pump nl* y Ucensinc Basis Evaluation: Detail 2 of 13-C-ZJS.0191 (Ref. 65)

a* c:onflrms thR the as-Installed c:onflauration found In the field matches theW; SSC meets current llcwnslnc buls.

3MEWBE01 EW "B" heat exchanger n/a y Ucensing Basis Evaluation: Due to combined tolerance of bolt placement, concrete finishing, and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" 1/2" required on sliding discrepancy of bolt projection is determined to be acceptable; sse saddle bolts and 102'- 10 meets current licensing basis.

3/4" on fixed saddle bolts.

Verify whether CLB documentation accounts for deviation.

WCAP- 17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain. I I J I I

I I J J

I J t i J I I * * * * * * * *

Upon separation thiS page IS decontrolled PageD-8 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTIF Resolution issued} 5 Status'

~MEWIP01 EWpump *a* SWT oblenled pletes 4275118 N ~Balls Evllutlon: As-illltlllled c:onflpratlon could not welcMd eround the motor rudlly be vertfled aplnst Cl8 cJocum.ntdon. PYM 4275118 MChar bolls. Verify ...,.,.... to reconcile the c:onflprltlon dlscrepMcy.

whether welded plates

..-ound motor anchor bolts APS reports that PYAit (related wort) lncllcMes aHound plas do ereiiCCICIUnMd for In Cl8 not physlallly lntlrKt wfttt/or fWie MY aclvene .tfec:t on the doc:unleiUtlon. anchor bolts or their mpaclty; therefore no....,.,_ Mlsmlc COIIdltlon exists.

APS reports thills

pcMndll noft<lonlonnllll concllloiL An o.,..M~~ty Determ~net~on conc:luded that the sse ....~nee~

ep.rable.

SupplemenUI Report Updete: APS reports that the _.found conftturetlon Is not 1 non-confornmt condition. Further .......n:h confirms that the as-found mountl.. plate confllumlons meet the wrrent bnsinl basis as ldlli *tilled In Section G af Draw1f1113-C-4 .

3MHFBJ01 Fuel Building AHU Maximum projection of 4- n/a y Ucensing Basis Evaluation: Due to combined tolerance of bolt 1/2" recorded in field versus placement, concrete finishing, and field measurement by SWT, 1/2" 4" requirement from discrepancy of bolt projection is determined to be acceptable; sse drawing. Verify if CLB docs meets current licensing basis.

account for deviation.

JMIUBZ04 DC room "B" EAHU SWT observed NQR Unlstrut 4275118 N llcenslfll Basis EvaluM!on: Recondllatlon Of AHU equipment mounted off af AHU. qualification due to modlfbtlon could not be readily obtained.

Vertflcdol* required to PVAR 4275118 pnerated by PVNGS to resolve the Issue.

determine whether IPPirent modification APS reports that PYAR (rellted work) lndlaas that the loldln&

reconc:llecllndlvldual AHU reac:wd by the NQR Unlstrut and transferred to the AHU Is seismic quallllcatlon. necllllble r.latM to the lodli reslstad by the AHU Itself; thelwfore no...,... Mllmlc condition exists.

APS reports this Is a P<<**ltiiii'IOIH:OI1fonnl11 condition. An Operability o.t.rm~n~t~on c:onc:ludld that the sse .....,..,..

Operable.

SUpplemental Report Updete: APS reports that this Is I ~

COIWfounq condition. EDC 2013-G0471 will upd8W Equipment Qualtflcatlon reconl to reflect . .found cont!pntlon.

WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and Upon B contain _Ill******************

separation this page is decontrolled PageD-9 Item EQID Item Desaiption Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTIF Resolution issued} 5 Status' 3MHSBJ01 Spray pond pump house Inadequate anchorage n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration verified per exhaust fan "B" documentation taken into inspection of 13-C-SPS-0385 (Ref. 65); sse meets current licensing field. Verify 1/2" bolts, 1- basis.

3/4" long at 6 places into W8 sections.

A-Z27Roam AREA WALK BY SWT oblerwci*P AHU on 0/* v Ucenslnc Buts Ew~uM~on: Per PVNGS. potentiellmpllctl of vlbmlon mounts. The floodlncl.-.v t.urds.,. mltlpted by the endoMcl PI olKtlve coram Is thR If not a~blnets (desfllled u drip-proof per SDOC NOOl-1303-00057 (Ref.

Miequn.ly desflned for Ml 65)), which house the ruc:tor trtp breakers n the dlance from SSE event. the AHU the AHUs. All ~I floodlnc /spray Nlzerds were resolved. The

nchcnae could t.H *nd conflcuration meets current lans!ncbllsls.

a~use Mtlr lines to rupture

.nd flood/.-.v the room.

Verify whether a.rp AHU on vltntlon mounts poses tlood/sp~~y haunt to T

A-A02 Room AREA WALK BY SWT observed NQR Header n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: Reinspection of photographs show s that 3PCHNVM28 having 3PCHNVM 28 is closely supported so that only differential anchor approximately 3/16" to movement between the containment shell and the Auxiliary conduit for safety-related J- building w ould lead to differential displacement between the box 3EZAAAKRJ01. M28 is header and junction box. Given their deep foundation embedments supported approximately and stiff concrete structures, the gap is conclu ded to be accept able.

10' W at the Auxiliary No adverse seismic condition exists. The configuration meets building and approximately current licensing basis.

10' E at Containment.

Verify whether M28 movement due to differential support motion could Impact safety-related conduit.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April20 14

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Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-10 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. (if NTTF Resolution issued) 5 Status' G-1041oom AREA WALK BY Observed DS pipl"' on E n/1 Y Ucensl"' Blsls Evlluatlon: ..._, vertfled M Sels c.t IX per and W walls under llrp Cllculatlon 13-CC*ZG-0070 (Ref. 65) and Is therefore no lrurec:tlon heaters and ll&hts. Verify hazard; sse meets current 11cens1nt basis. Diesel Generator lllhtlnl these objects are securely plan 03-E-ZGL.OOOl (Ref. 65) lndlc:Mes thet the lllht fixture Is lldlol eel to pw:lude filii mounted per o.t.lll d 13-E-lAL.CJ011 (Ref. 65). 1hls . . .

end potentllllne rupture spec:lftes *1/4* kwlk bolt rnoum.d junction bole thlt supports

that would result In spqy 3/4* conduit stwn. GMn thlt these fllsteners have ccnslderlbty h8urd. more CIIPidtY thin the demand dthe lllhts under-"*

udtltlon, the c:annect1on Is ductile lnd there Is no lmplc:t/flll hazard; no ldverse seismic condition e111sts. The c:onflpf'ltlon meets cumnt llcenslnc balls.

J-108Room AREA WALK BY SWT presumes that n/a Y Ucensing Basis Evaluation: SOOC £105-00011 indicates that the 3EPNCV27 is plug welded to vendor-provi ded channels have mounting holes. Since the holes embeds but not readily are absent in the field, the SWT concludes that the holes are filled apparent due to possible with plug welds; SSC meets current licensing basis.

grinding and painting.

Verification required.

J-109Roam AREA WALK BY SWT observed 3EPKDM44 n/1 Y Ucensl"' Blsls Evlluetlon: Dlspllcement d both block waH 1nd with IPPf'CIICimetel3/l. MCC are cHul8ted U11nt SSE floor raporwe spectra Md clurlnce to east 1111sonry lilllnicaly summed. For MCC;. Dempq, IHI Freq., 0.7fil (Se Mil ~bolt. Verify It 100' ell¥.), lnd 1.6 moct.l shape flctar for cantilever.,. UHd.

whether clarlnce Is For the block Willi; 9Hz hq. (st.t A14 of 13-CC-ZJ-120, Ref. 60),

~ o.npq per u.cc-zJ.120, o.&OI (1¥1 of S.11t 100' lnd 120' elevdons),lnd L3 modllsMpe fld!Orfor ,............. a..n ...

used. The *II** sum of dllpllcemeniJ Is then 0.21"

(*1.6*0.~316.4/Cz*pl*a Hz)A2 + u-o.--.ut(2*pa*t Hz)AZ

0.211n). Since the ....lnlc sum (c,oiRI lldve) of--IMntl Is._. thin the minimum pp of 3/r, there Is no lmpect '-'I; no

~cMne se1sm1c condition e1111t1. sse meets currw~t bnslnt bells.

WCAP-17681 -NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain *~~~~~~~~~!ll!l!llllll*********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-1 1 Item EQIO Item Descri pti on Problem Description PVAR No. (If NTTF Resolution l ssued) 5 Status' Out.et' Horseshoe AREA WALK BY Noted 1/16" gap between n/a Y Ucensing Basis Evaluation: Per PVNGS PRA Group, review of CN-3JZJBC02A and 3JESAC01 in RAM-12-Q15 (Palo Verde Probabilistic Risk Assessment- Model east-west direction. Development, Ref. 65), spatial interaction due to a seismic event 3JZJBC02A is 32" wide In between the two cabinets 3JZJBC02A and 3JESAC01 results In direction of motion and has acceptable relay chatter. Therefore, seismic gap is not required for rugged external steel frame. seismic licensing basis of cabinets. No adverse condition; sse meets Verify gap as adequate. current licensing basis.

Supplement al Report Update: APS reports that this condition will be corrected by removing a protruding bolt to Increase clearance (refer to EWR 4377344).

AREA WAUC BY Vdy wMther the Spent n/1 y t.lc:llnsq . . . Ev81u8tion: Spn Fuel Handlnt MediN Fuel Pool HMdllnl MKhlne 3MZFNM03 SDOCs N001-G502-40322 end N001-G502-oo326 (IW.

(3MZFNM03) hes support 65) indbte thet uplift Is ..ast.d by lllll'ftbers on the hlndllnl deslped to prevent uplift mKhlne thet enpplfOCMI on the INide of the rell. 111eNfore, off of trKics. there 1s no owertwn~n~ Mnnl: sse meets current ~een~~,. balls.

SFP Cooling AREA WALK BY Observed large flat panel n/a y Ucensing Basis Evaluation: Per 13-E-ZFL-0001 (Ref. 65) and Oetail1 Room lighting suspend from single of 13-E-ZAL-0011, lights are mounted to the ceiling with 1/4" Hilti vertically cantilevered rod Kwik Bolts. Given that these fasteners have considerably more above potentially soft capacity than the demand of the lights under seismic excitation, the targets of safety-related connection is ductile and there is no impact/fall hazard; not an equipment. Verification i s adverse seismic condition. The configuration meets current required to determine licensing basis.

whether connections of lighting are adequate so as to predude impact.

410 v LC34 bus Compertment 3EPG8l.34Cl n/a y uc.ns1n1 Blsls Evllultlon: GMn thet the '*Ill pin was still door middle .... pin not effKIM. the upper helfcl the .... end morecMr thet there Is

...... wllhthe-- hllf no vlllmloi,.....IIIIM .._.lpmeftton the door, It Is Judlld tMt the olthe '*"'*CometH on as-found COidtlan . . nat ... ...,... ..... concern. sse..,...

1he spot. Unit not In . . . . Cl8. Noll tMt P'VM44f5161MIIIIIIIf'dldtD documlnttlwt It the tlnle; .....,.., COIICIIIIon.,. CIDI'NC:tld on the IPQt. sse meet~ cunwd llclll'*'l melntlnlncl CNWI warldnt bull.

blfcn end clurtnt Inspection. unknown whether plnciiMIITII" prior or durlnc rnalrUnlra.

WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contaln J I I I . I I I I I I I I I I I I I ! ! I * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-12 ltemEQID Item Description Problem Description PVARNo. (If NTTF Resolution issued) 5 Status' 3JSINPT391 HPSI Iong-term reclrc loop Per 13-J-010*0119 (Ref. 65), 4275118 N Licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration could not be 1 pressure JCmtr all-around welds are to be readily verified against CLB documentation. PVAR 4275118 updated provided between the to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

Unlstrut members and the steel column flanges. Only APS reports that this Is a non-conforming condition. EDC 2013-the outsides of the flanges 00471 will update Drawing 13-J-010-0119 to reflect as-found are welded in field . Verify configuration.

configuration meets CLB documentation.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Page E-1 APPENDIX E - QUALIFICATIONS This appendix contains only the qualifications of new personnel involved with the Seismic Walkdowns perfonned onApril6, 2013, and on October 13, 2013, during refueling outage 3R17. The qualifications of personnel involved with the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from August 6 through August 13, 2012, can be found in Appendix E of Reference 48 ("Near-Tenn Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3").

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain~~~~~~""~!!!!!IJ~!!!!I********

Upon separation ltlis page Is decontrolled Page E-2 CORY T. FIGLIOLINI, E.LT.

EDUCATION 2009-2010 University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland. United Kingdom University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh. Scotland, United Kingdom Join/ Master ofScience, Structural Engineering & Mechanics (M.Sc.)

2004 - 2009 Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts Bachelor ofScience, Civil and Environmental Engineering (BSCE)

REGISTRATION AND AFFILIATIONS Engineer in Training, Massachusetts, Certificate No. 22279 PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES Structural analysis and design of steel, concrete, and masonry structures using IBC and UBC Dynamic analysis of structures for seismic, vibration, blast, fluid, and wind loads Competed 5-day SQUG training course for walkdown and fragility analysis of nuclear facilities and their components Completed 5-day ASME Power Piping Design and Fabrication training course Risk and hazard analysis Construction support and inspection PROFESSIONAL HISTORY 201 0 - Present Stevenson and Associates, Goodyear, Arizona Engineer PROJECT EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

Seismic Fragility Projects Mr. Figliolini has planned and performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. On these projects, he has walked down both Safety Related and non-Safety Related structures, systems and components in all areas of the power block. Mr.

Figliolini has conducted seismic analyses of electrical and mechanical equipment anchorages, storage tanks, and civil structures including containment.

Security Projects Mr. Figliolini has performed structural modifications to existing structures for hardened alarm stations and security related equipment supports. He has performed blast analyses to determine the vulnerability of security structures.

Piping Projects Mr. Figliolini has worked on Safety Related piping analyses and modifications which include assessment and conversion of piping analysis models, screening and review of piping supports, and modifications to piping supports.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Certificate offlcliievement

%is is to Certify tliat c:..:.*.:::.::~2~*.~~!~~:~~i .*..i::::::..!!:: ')!

lias Compfeted tfze SQVq Wa{~down Screening andSeismic f£va{uation riraining Course Jfe{([(])ate Ju{y 11 .thru 15, .2071 CJ_,;~ Phtl Gazda .

SteYeMon&

Ass~~tes .. p.

~

P. Brown *** * *. * * ;

iiiSirllctur io/...,c. insuuctor C~y SQU(i lns11uctor

~~

I. !i.

N -*

oo

_c

~0

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-1 APPENDIX F - PVNGS UNIT 3 SWEL REPORT This appendix is attached to reflect the changes made in Revision 2 of the SWEL transmittal associated with the 3R17 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed on April 6, 2013, and afterwards on October 13, 2013. Please see the "Revision History" on page F-3 for a complete explanation. The Revision 0 SWEL transmittal for the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from August 6 through August 13, 2012, can be found in Appendix F of Reference 48 (Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3").

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contai

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-2 (8Westinghouse Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Revision 2 In Response to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 3

~a-....4 f1~

Rolando Perez

'¥'-'

u Pers~l Lead Equipment Selection 1 ate oerek Seaman ..k ,.~

Equipment Selection Personnel Eimar Randall:Rand* o;g;rany stgncd byEimar, Date I II G(Z34606)

ON: cn-fimar, Randall G(Z34606)

G(z34606) ( .

Date: 2013.11.12 08:58:1 0 -07'00' Randall Elmar Station Operations Date PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 I VVCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain* * * * * * * * * * * * * -

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Revision History Revision 0 of this document provides the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) developed prior to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) At-Power ..

Seismic Walkdowns performed between Monday, August 6th, 2012 and Friday, August 10th, 2012. The SWEL contained a total of 131 components (125 SWEL 1 & 6 SWEL 2).

Revision 1 of this document updates the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" column of the SWEL 1 table include in Attachment 1 and Table 3-2 of Attachment 3 .

The information related to "Major New or Replacement Equipment" was revised as a result of an error found in the Microsoft Exce~ spreadsheet that was used track and implement the SWEL selection process. This error did not result in a change to the Base List or SWEL data.

Revision 2 of this document revises the SWEL 1 table provided in Attachment 1 to document changes required for the additional walkdowns performed on April 6 , 2013, and on October 13, 2013, during refueling outage 3R 17:

1. Train C was inaccessible during refueling outage 3R17. Therefore , the following Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D, which were selected from Base List 1 :

3EPKCD23 was substituted with sister component 3EPKDD24.

3EPKCM43 was substituted with sister component 3EPKDM44.

These components were inspected to fulfill Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 4.20 regarding the supplemental inspection of electrical cabinets .

These substitutions did not affect the number of SWEL items and since the replacements were performed with equipment of the same type, the revised SWEL 1 still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance. That is, component type, along with other attributes, remains adequately represented on the SWEL.

2. SWEL 1 Item 13 (3MCHEE01) was removed for radiological safety considerations.

3MCHEE01 was identified as inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. A new item was not selected to replace 3MCHEE01 since the resulting equipment list still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance. That is, all attributes remain adequately represented on the SWEL.

In addition, Revision 2 corrects minor typographical errors found in the equipment descriptions.

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Eq uipment List November 11, 20 13 Page 2 WCAP-17681 -NP. Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B c o n t a i n J I * * * * * * * * * * * * -

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-4 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 Nm Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List CSWEL)

A listing of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that will be inspected during the walkdown , the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), has been prepared in advance of the walkdown effort.

The selection of SSCs process described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 {Reference 1}, was utilized to develop the SWEL for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3.

The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items:

- SWEL 1 (Attachment 1) is a sample of items to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity

!* SWEL 2 (Attachment 2) is a list of spent fuel pool related items APS Operations and Design Engineering Staff Members participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided inputs and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel to find the data associated with the equipment considered. The interchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the APS Staff Members included:

Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

Verification of equipment information through APS's SWMS Database system.

Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that might be relevant to the SWELs.

Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment with operational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

Provided System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

Details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL have been provided to APS in the form of a formal presentation, given on July 18, 2012.

Additionally, details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL are provided in the "Selection of SSCs" section of the Submittal Report.

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 3 WCAP-17681-NP. Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-5 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 References

1) EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.

Attachments

1) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 1

2) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 2

3) SWEL Sort Tables PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11,2013 Page4 WCAP- 17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and ~p~~n~~~aratron this page is decontrolled Page F-6 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1- SWEll Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 3 Screen 114 Sample Considerations Screen Environment Screen#3 SWEL Walkdown lf1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new rremp, "f) IPEEE Walkdown Item Description Building (SC*l (Regular Equipment System or (I for Deferred to Comment.s Equipment Function vulnerability Number Ucensing Inspections?) Class Type replacement ,.Inside-or Outage?

Support) enhancement?

Basis?) equipment? Ofor

outside*)

Operations noted engineered lnst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to the 1 3JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feedwater fiow MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR AF No 140(1) No No (18) MSSS. This should be examined by area walk by.

Operations noted engineered lnst. Rack s<affolding was recently added to the 2 3JAF8FT00418 Auxiliary feedwater Aow MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR AF No 140 (1) No No (18) MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineered scaffolding was recently added to the 3 3JAF8HV0030 SG*EOlA reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104 (I) No No M SSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineered scaffolding was recently added to the 4 3JAF8HV0031 SG* E018 reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR MOV(8) AF No 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walk by.

Operations noted engineered Horz. Pump scaffolding was recently added to the s 3MAFBP01 AFpump"8" MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR (5)

AF No 104(1) No No M SSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineered scaffolding was recently added to the 6 3JAF8UV00l4 SG*EOlA Isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV(8) AF Yes 104 (I} No No MSSS. This should be examined by area waikby.

Operations noted engineered

~caffoldlng was recently added to the 7 3JAF8UV0035 SG-EOlB isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PCOHR MOV(8) AF Yes 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineered scaffolding was recently added to the 8 3JAFCUV0036 SG*EOlA isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR MOV(S) AF Yes 104(1) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walk by.

9 3JCH8HV0530 RWT outlet to 51train "8" AUX Yes Yes RC IC DHR MOV(S CH No 104 (1) No No Horz. Pump 10 3MCHBP01 Charging pump 2 AUX Ye~ Yes RC PCIC CH No 104 (I) No No (S)

Train 8 For Charging lnst. Rack 11 3JCHBPSL0218 Pump 3MCHEP01 Suction AUX Yes Yes RC IC CH No 104(1) No No (18)

Line Pressure Switch RWT level(required for lnst. Rack 12 3JCHCLT0203C YARD Yes Yes DHR CH No 113 (0) No No RAS) (18)

~

RegeAeFa*i~ e t:lea*

~ ~

~

~ IIG

'"=eer Ql N& ~ N& This it em was removed from SWEll.

Charging Line To Reactor

1,4 3JCHEHV0239 Coolant Loop 2A Isolation CTMT Yes Yes RCIC POV(7) CH No 120(1) No Yes Globe Valve PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 5 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplemenl 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 Apri12014

Enclosure Appendices A and 8 containiiiii** IIJI!IIIIIIIIJI**********

Upon separation this page Is decontrolled Page F-7 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 3 Screen 114 Sample Considerations Screen Environment Screen 113 SWEL Ill Screen 112 Major new (Temp,

F) Walkdown Walkdown (Safely IPEEE Item Description Building (SC-1 (Regular Equipment System or (I for Deferred to Comments Equipment Function vulnerability Number Licensing Inspections 7) Class Type replacement "Inside"or Outage?

Suppart) enhancement 7 Basis?) equipment? Ofor "Outside")

RWT suction I so (falls 15 3JCHEHV0532 AUX Yes Yes RCPC POV(7) CH No 104 (I) No No open on loss of air) 16 3JCHEHV0536 RWT suction Isolation AUX Yes Yes RCPC MOV(8) CH No 104 (I) No No Horz. Pump 17 3MCHEP01 Charging pump 3 AUX Yes Yes RC PCIC CH No 104 (I) No No (S)

RWT (refueling water RC PCIC 18 3MCHET01 Yard Yes Yes Tank (21) CH No 113(0) No No tank) DHR Containment Power Access Purge Supply 19 3JCPBWOOOSA CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV(8) CP No 120(1) No Yes Isolation Butterfly Damper CST (condensate storage 20 3MCT£T01 Yard Yes Yes PCDHR Tank (21) CT No 113(0) No No tank)

DG *a* air Intake RC PCIC 21 3MDGBF03 DG Yes Yes Other (O) DG Yes 140(1) No No structure DHR RC PCIC 22 3MDGBX01A Starting air accumulator DG Yes Yes Tank (21) DG No 140(1) No No DHR RC PCIC 23 3MDGBX01B Starting air accumulator OG Yes Yes Tank (21) DG No 140 (1) No No DHR RC PCIC 24 3MECBE01 Essential chiller *a* CTRL Yes Yes Chlllet(ll) EC No 80(1) No No DHR Circulating water pump RC PCIC Horz Pump 25 3MECBP01 CTRL Yes Yes EC No 80(1) No No "B" DHR (S)

RC PCIC 26 3MECBT01 EC expansion tank "8" CTRL Yes Yes Tank (21) EC No 80(1) No No DHR Control room "8" EAHU 27 3JECBTV0030 CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV(7) EC No 80 (1) No No now feR valve Heat 28 3MEWBE0l EW "B" heat exchanger AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Exchanger EW No 104 (I) No No (21)

Horz Pump 29 3MEWBP01 EWpump"B" AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR EW No 104 (I) No No (S) 30 3MEWBT01 EW " B" surge tank AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Tank (21) EW No 104 (I) No No (lLRT) RDT/GASSUrge 31 3JGRBUV0002 Header Isolation Valve AUX Yes Yes CF SOV(8) GR No 104 (I) No No (Outside Containment)

Although Train "A" , the AHU's are of greater Importance due to cascading AFWpumproom "A" 32 3MHAA204 AUX Yes Yes PC iC DHR AHU (10) HA No 104 (I) No Yes Tech Specs. HAAZOII was selected as a EAHU representitive piece of equipment for the new interpretation of Tech Specs.

lnst. Rack 33 3JHC8PT0351B Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No No (18) lnst. Rack 34 3JHCBPT0352B Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No No (18)

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismi c Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 6 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B c o n t a i n i i i i J I ! I I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-8 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEll Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 3 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Environment Screen 113 SWEL N1 Screen *2 Major new {Temp, "F) Walkdown Walkdown (Safety IPEEE Item Description Building (SC

1 (Regular Equipment System or (Ifor Deferred to Comments Equipment Function vulnerability Number Licensing Inspections?) Class Type replacement #lnsJde~~'or Outage?

Support) enhancement?

Basis?) equipment? Ofor "Outside")

Discharge Sampling From 35 3JHCBUV0044 RU*1 Containment CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV(8) HC No 120 (I) No Yes Isolation Valve Inlet Sampling To RU*1 36 3JHCBUV004 7 Containment Isolation CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV(8) HC No 120(1) No Yes Valve lnst. Rack 37 3JHCDPT03S1D Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No NO (18) lnst. Rack 38 3JHCDPT0352D Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes Cf HC No 104 (I) No No (18) 39 3MHDBA01 OG "8" room EAHU fan OG Yes Yes PCIC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140(1) No No OG "s* room essential 40 3MHDBJ01 OG Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (1) No No eJ<haust fan Control room EAHU (fan, 41 3MHJ8F04 CTRL Yes Yes PCIC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(1) No No filters and HX)

DC room " D'" essential 42 3MHJ8J01A CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(1) No No exhaust fan DC room II au essential 43 3MHJBJ01B CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(1) No No exhaust fan 44 3MHJBM02 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV(8) HJ No 80(1) No No 4S 3MHJBM03 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV(8) HJ No 80(1) NO No 46 3MHJ8M31 Air-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV(7) HJ No 80(1) No No Air-operated DC room "8" 47 3MHJ8MS8 CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV(7) HJ No 80(1) No No isolation Air-operated computer 48 3MHJBM67 CTRL Yes Yes PCIC DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(1) No No room DP Control room temp Temp 49 3JHJBTIC0124 CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR HJ NO 80(1) No No indicating controller Sensor (19)

ESF switchgear room " 8" so 3MHJBZ03 EAHU CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HJ NO 80(1) No No 51 3MHJBZ04 oc room *a* EAHU CTRL Yes Yes PCIC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(1) No No Instrument Air Supply This component has a history of failure 52 3JIAAUV0002 Containment lsolat.ion AUX Yes Yes Cf SOV(8) lA No 104(1) No Yes resulting in a plant trip Gate Valve RC PC IC Med. Volt 53 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus 504 CTRL Yes Yes PB Yes 80(1) No No DHRCF SWGR(3)

Emergency diesel RC PC IC Eng. Gen.

54 3EPEBG02 Yes Yes PE 140(1) No No generator **a* OG DHR (171 No Low Volt.

55 3£PGBL32 480 v LC32 bus CTRL Yes Yes RCPC DHR PG No 80(1) NO No SWGR (2)

Low Volt 56 3EPGBL34 480 v LC34 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PG No 80(1) No NO SWGR(2)

Low Volt.

57 3EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PG No 80(1) No No SWGR(2) 58 3EPHBM32 480V MCCM32 CTRL Yes Yes RCPC DHR MCC(l) PH No 80(1) No No 59 3EPHBM34 480VMCCM34 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC(l ) PH No 104(1) No No PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013

Page 7 WCAP-1 7681-NP, Supplement1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B containJIIIIII!IJIII!IIIII**********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-9 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seism ic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear St ation- Unit 3 Scr~n *4 Sample Considerations Screen Environment Screen n SWEL *1 saeen *2 Major new (Temp, *f) Walkdown Walkdown (Safety IPEEE Item Description Building (SC-1 (Regular EQuipment Syst em or (I for Deferred to Comments EQuipment Function vulnerability Number Ucensing Inspections?) Oass Type replacement "Inside"or Outage?

Support) enhancement?

Basis?) eQuipment? Ofor "Outside")

60 3EPHBM36 480 VMCCM36 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC(1) PH No 104 (I) No No 61 3EPHBM38 480V MCC M38 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC(1) PH No 104(1) No No Dlst Panel 62 3EPK8D22 l C 34 control power CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(1) No No (14)

Battery 63 3EPKBF,12 DC battery "8" CTRl Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(1) No No Rack (15)

Battery Chg 64 3EPKBH12 Battery charger *a* CTRl Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(1) No No (16)

DC power to TCB1 control 65 3EPKBM42 CTRL Yes Yes RCPC MCC(1) PK No 80(1) No No circuit Dist Panel 66 3EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 CTRl Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(1) No No (14)

Battery 67 3EPKCF13 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(1) No No Rack (15)

DC power to TCB1 control 68 3EPKOM44 CTRl Yes Yes RCPC MCC(1) PK No 80 (1) No No circuit Inverter For Shutdown Inverter 69 3EPKCN43 Cooling Isolation Valve CTRl Yes Yes DHR PK No 80{1) No No (16) 3JSICUV653 Inverter For 3JSIDUV6S4 Shutdown Cooling B Inverter 70 3EPKDN44 Return Inside CTRl Yes Yes CF PK No 80(1) No No (16)

Containment Isolation Valve Pow er to PPS "8" RCPCIC Oist Panel 71 3EPNBD26 CTRL Yes Yes PN No 80 {1) No No Instrumentation DHR (14)

PC IC DHR Inverter 72 3EPNBN12 DC/AC Inverter "8" CTRl Yes Yes PN No 80{1) No No CF (16) 120 v vital ac voltage PC IC DHR 73 3EPNBV26 regulator *a*

CTRL Yes Yes CF Other(O) PN No 80(1) NO No 74 3EPNCD27 Power to PPS *c* CTRL Yes Yes RCPC IC Dist Panel PN No 80(1) No No instrumentation DHR (14)

PC IC DHR Inverter 75 3EPNCN13 DC/AC inverter "C" CTRL Yes Yes PN No 80(1) No No CF (16) 120 V vital ac voltage PC IC DHR 76 3EPNDV28 CTRL Yes Yes Other (0) PN No 80(1) No No regulator "D" CF Pressurizer and Reactor vessel Head vent To 77 3JRCBHV010S CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV(8) RC No 120(1) No Yes Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Pressurizer vent To 78 3JRCBHV0108 Reactor Drain Tank Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV(S) RC No 120(1) No Yes Valve Pm pressure (reQuired lnst. Rack 79 3JRCBPT01028 CTMT Yes Yes PC RC No 120(1) No Yes for RPS/SIAS) (18)

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 8 WCAP-17681 -NP. Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April201 4

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-10 Seismic Walkdow n Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic W alkdow n Attachment 1 - SWEll Palo Verde Nuclear Stat ion :...unit 3 Scr een 114 Sample Consi derations Screen EMironment Screen 113 SWEL Ill Screen 112 Major new (Temp. *F) Walkdown Walkdown (Safety IPEEE Item Description Building (SC*l (Regular Equipment Syst em or (I for Deferred to Comments Equipment FunctiOn vulnerability Number Ucenslng Inspections?) Oass Type replacement "Inside"or Outage?

Support) enhancement?

Basis?) equipment? Ofor "Outside")

80 3JRCBPT104 soc RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR lnst. Rack RC No 120 (I) No Yes Interlock (18) lnst. Rack 81 3JSBIIC02A 1/V con*erter CTRL Yes Yes OHR RC No 80(1) No No

_(18) lnst. Rack 82 3JSBCC02A 1/V converter CTRL Yes Yes OHR RC No 80(1) No No (18)

SOC RCS pressure lnst. Rack 83 3JRCDPT106 CTMT Yes Yes OHR RC No 120(1) No Yes interlock (18)

Temp 1!4 3JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature CTMT Yes Yes PC RC No 120(1) No Yes Sensor (19)

When choosing containment isolatiOn Isolation Containment vat.es that exist for both inside and 85 3JRDBUV0024 Radwaste SUmp Outlet AUX Yes Yes CF MOV(8) RD No 104 (I) No No outside containment, outside was Isolation Gate Vallie chosen.

ContJol 86 3JRMBB02 RWT ievel CTRL Yes Yes IC RM No 80(1) No No Panel (20)

Control 87 3JRMBB04 RCS temperature CTRL Yes Yes RC RM No 80(1) No NO Panel (20)

Control 88 3JRMBBOS Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF RM No 80(1) No No Panel (20)

Control 89 3JRMBB06 Auxiliary feedwater flow CTRL Yes Yes PCDHR RM No 80(1) No No Panel (20)

Control 90 3JRMCBOS Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF RM No 80(1) No No Panel (20)

SOHX A outlet Control 91 3JRMNB02 CTRL Yes Yes DHR RM No 80(1) No No temperature Panel (20)

Control 92 3JRMNB04 Pressurizer temperature CTRL Yes Yes PC RM No 80(1) No No Panel (20)

Breaker 93 3JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker " 8" AUX Yes Yes RCPC SB NO 104(1) NO No Panel (2)

Operations noted engineered Atmospheric dump valve scaffolding was recently added to the 94 3JSGBHV0178 MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR POV(7) SG No 124 (I) No No HV*178 MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineered Atmospheric dump valve scaffolding was recently added to the 95 3JSGBHV0185 MSSS Yes Yes PCOHR POV(7) SG No 124 (I) No No HV* lSS MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineered Instrument air line lnst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to the 96 3JSGBPT0306 MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR SG No 104(1) No No pressure transmitter (18) MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

OperatiOns noted engineered scaffol ding was recently added to the 97 3JSGBPV0306B N2 supply solenoid valve MSSS Yes Yes PCOHR SOV(8) SG No 124 (I) No No M SSS. ThiS should be examined by area walk by.

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 9 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain~,,~~~~~~~~**********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-11 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Environment Screen *3 SWEL Ill Screen *2 Major new (Temp, *Ft Walkdown Walkdown (Safety IPEEE Item Description Building (SC-1 (Regular Equipment System or (I for Deferred to Comments Equipment Function vulnerability Number Ucenslng Inspections?t Class Type replacement ,.I ns ide~or Outage?

SupportI enhancement?

Basis?) equipment? Ofor

outside"t Operations noted engineered scaffolding was reantfy added to the 98 3JSG8UV0130 SG*EOlA isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR POV(7t SG Yes 124 (II No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walk by.

Operations noted engineered scaffolding was recently added to the 99 3JSG8UV0135 SG-E018 isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR POV(71 SG Yes 124 (0 No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

SG*EOlA WR level lnst. Rack 100 3JSGCLTIU3C CONT Yes Yes PC DHR SG No 120 (11 No No (required for AFASI (18)

This item is being specifically walked RC loop 1 long term 101 3JSIAUV065 1 CTM T Yes Yes ICDHR MOV(8) 51 Yes 120(1) No Yes down due to its significance in plant recirc/SDC valve history (pipe vibration I .

Heat 102 3M51BE01 SDHX "8" AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger 51 No 104(0 No No (21)

Vert. Pump 103 3MSIBPOI LPSI pump "8" AUX Yes Yes DHR Sl Yes 104 (1) No No (6)

Containment Spray Pump Vert. Pump The CS pump was selected for 104 3MSIBP03 AUX Yes Yes CF Sl No 104 (1) No No 8 (6) walkdown per ops/engineering request.

HPSI Long Term 105 3J518PSV0166 Recirculation Train 8 AUX Yes Yes PC DHR Other(O) Sl No 104(1) No No Pressure Relief Valve HPSI train "B" injection to 106 3JS18PSV0409 AUX Yes Yes ICDHR Other (0) Sl No 104 (1) No No EDT relief RC loop 2 LTOP relief to 107 3JSI8PSV189 CTMT Yes Yes DHR Other (0) 51 No 120(1) No Yes sump Safety Injection Tank 2A 108 3JS18UV0614 Discharge Isolation Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV(8) Sl No 120(1) No Yes Valve 109 3JSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A Isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (S) Sl Yes 104(1) No No Safety Injection Tank 28 110 3JSI8UV0624 Discharge Isolation Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV(8) Sl No 120(1) No Yes Valve 111 3JSIBUV0626 RC loop 28 isolation valve AUX Yes Yes ICOHR MOV(8) 51 Yes 104(1) No No 112 3JSI8UV0636 RC loop 1A Isolation v alve AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MOV(8) Sl Yes 104(1) No No 113 3JSf8UV0646 RC loop 18 isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV(8) Sl Yes 104(1) No No Containment Spray Pump Recirculation To Refueling 114 3JSI8UV0665 AUX Yes Yes CF MOV(8) Sl No 104(1) No No Water Tank Train 8 Globe Valve RC loop lA LPSI isolation 115 3JSIBUV615 AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV(8) Sl No 104(1) No No valve RC loop 2 soc isolation 116 3JS18UV656 AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) 51 Yes 104(1) No No valve PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 10 WCAP-17681-NP. Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and Upon B contain*~~***!IJII!I!III!II**********

separation this page is decontrolled Page F-12 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1- SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Environment Screen 113 SWEL Ill Screen 112 Major new (Temp, 'F) WalkdOwn Walkdown (Safety IPEEE Item Description Building (SC- 1 (R~ular Equipment System or (I for Deferred to Comments Equipment Function vulnerability Number licensing Inspections?) Class Type replacement " lnside"or Outage?

Suppon) enhancement?

Basis?) equipment? Ofor "Outside*)

HPSI pump " B" recirc iso 117 3JSI8UV667 AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MOV(II) Sl Yes 104(1) No No (closes on RAS) 118 3JSIBUV676 SUMP isolation valve AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MOV(B) Sf No 104 (I) No No Non Oass Power however kept in list HPSt long term retire loop tnst. Rack 119 3JSINPT391 CTMT Yes Yes ICDHR Sl No 120 (f) No Yes because of pressure boundary 1 pressure xmtr (18) considerations.

Vert. Pump 120 3MSP8P01 Spray pond pump " B" SP Yes Yes PC DHR UHS SP No 122(0) NO No (6)

Spray pond pump house Selected per cps/engineering request 121 3MHSBJ01 SP Yes Yes PC DHR UHS AHU (6) SP No 122(0) No No eKhaust fan "'8" due to the environmental conditions Main Control Board The bookshelves next to RMA, RMB, Control 122 3JRMB801 Section 801 Electrical CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR RM No 80(1) No No RMC, RMD and RMNB01 where Panel (20)

Systems anchored as an IPEEE enhancement B Train ESFAS Relay Dist. Panel 123 3JSABC01 CTRL Yes Yes RC SA No 80(1) No No Cabinets (14) 124 3JSIAUV0672 A Train CS Injection MOV AUX Yes Yes CF MOV(8) St No 104 (I) No Yes Repetitive MRFF on valve RC PCIC Control 125 . 3JZJBE01 Remote ShutdOwn Panel CTRL Yes Yes ZJ No 80(1) No NO DHR Panel (20)

The total number of SWEL l 1tems 1s 124 instead of 125 because 1tem 13 (3MCHEE01) was removed. The 1tem numbers tn the f1rst column of th1s table were not adJusted to make 1t eas1er to compare the items listed herein to those in previous revisions of this document.

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 11 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Enclosure Appendioes A and B contain Upon separation this page is decontrolled PageF-13 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 2- SWEL 2 Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 SO"RRIl SWEl Scrft:n 112 hsod*t.cl Walltdown Equipment System (Seism"IC Item DIKription lviklins (~ wid! RApid Commtnt Number Equipment Class Type Ucans*a In?) ~iftdown?

Basis?)

1 3MPCAP01 Fuel pool cooli:nc pump 1 pp PC Fuel 8uildi111 Yes YltS No 2 3MPCAE01 Fuel pool cooline he1t txdll .,-1 IIX PC futiBuildq YIS Yes No 3 3MPCBI'Ol Fwl pool coormc pump 2 pp PC fu ** Buildin& Yes YltS No 4 lMPCB£01 Fuel 11001 coor~~~~: hut .xc~~....,. 2 HX PC Fu*l Buildinl Yes YH No 5 3MHFA101 Fuel 8uilclin1 AHU AHU HF Fu*l Builod"lfll Yes YltS No 3MHFBJ01 Fwl Builclinc AHU AHU HF fu ** Buil d"q Yes YltS No PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 20 13 Page 12 WCAP-17681 -NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contai n J I

I * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separat1on this page Is decontrolled Page F-14 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 3 Table 3-1 : Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "System Type" (Note: The OF (Tank), GA (SOV) and ZA (Dist. Panels) systems are not represented due to the equipment types covered by each system are already well represented.)

Number of Items Number of Items Number of Items Number of Items .

System Type System Type in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 AF 14 8 PE 2 1 CH 29 9 PG 6 3 CP 4 1 PH 8 4 CT 3 1 PK 20 9 OF 1 0 PN 12 6 DG 14 3 RC 16 8 EC 8 4 RD 2 1 EW 8 3 RM 30 8 GA 1 0 SA 11 1 GR 2 1 SB 14 1 HA 4 1 SG 40 7 HC 12 6 Sl 101 20 HD 4 2 SP 4 2 HJ 21 11 ZA 6 0 lA 1 1 ZJ 11 1 PB 3 1 PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 13 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 ' April 2014

Enclosure Appendices A a.nd B contain Upon ""n::miiinn Page F-15 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3- SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 3 Table 3-2: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Major new or replacement equipment" (Of the 412 items comprising Base List 1, 38 items were identified as "Major new or replacement equipment."

The following 15 items were selected for SWEL 1.)

Walkdown Item Description Equipment 115 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 11 3JAFBUV0034 SG-E01A isolation valve 12 3JAFBUV0035 SG-EOlB isolation valve 14 3JAFCUV0036 SG-E01A isolation valve 272 3JSIAUV0651 RC loop 11ong term recirc/SDC valve 313 3JSIBUV0636 RC loop 1A isolation valve 312 3JSIBUV0626 RC loop 28 isolation valve so 3MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake structure 222 3JSGBUV0130 SG-E01A isolation valve 223 3JSGBUV0135 SG-EOlB isolation valve 321 3JSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on RAS) 303 3MSIBP01 LPSI pump "B" 310 3JSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A Isolation valve 314 3JSIBUV0646 RC loop 18 Isolation valve 319 3JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SOC isolation valve PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 14 WCAP-17681-NP. Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 Apri12014

Page F-16 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3- SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Equipment Type" (Note: Equipment type 4 (transformers) are not mentioned as they are part of larger parent equipment (i.e.

switchgear, load centers). Additionally, EO type 12 (Air Compressors) and 13 (Motor Generators) are not included as Palo Verde does not have any safety related equipment in this category.)

Equipment Type Number of Items Number of Items Descript ion Number in Base list 1 Selected for SWEL 1 0 Miscellaneous 13 6 1 Motor Control Centers 13 6 2 Low Voltage Switchgear 12 4 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear 2 1 4 Tran sformers 0 0 5 Horizontal Pumps 11 5 6 Vertical Pumps 8 4 7 Fluid Operated Valves 23 10 8 Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 115 31 9 Fans 8 4 10 Air Handlers 10 4 11 Chillers 2 1 12 Air Compressors 0 0 13 Motor Generators 0 0 14 Distribution Panels 41 5 15 Batteries on Racks 4 2 16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 12 5 17 Engine Generators 2 1 18 Instruments on Racks 74 16 19 Temperature Sensors 3 2 20 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 39 9 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers (GIP Section 7) 20 8 PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 15 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 RevisionO PVNGS-3 April 201 4

Page F-17 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 3 Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Environment (Temperature)"

(Since the PVNGS Units are located in a dry environment, it was decided to classify the environments based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Temperature values were determined from a review of the EQ DBM and the UFSAR.)

Temperature Number of Items Number of Items (oF} in Base list 1 Selected for SWEll 80 142 (All inside} 47 (All inside) 104 150 (All inside) 43 (All inside) 113 8 (2 Inside and 6 outside) 3 (All outside) 120 62 (All inside) 16 (All inside) 122 4 (All outside) 2 (All outside) 124 18 (All inside) 5 (All inside) 140 2.8 (All inside) 8 (All inside}

PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 16 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain . . !IJIJIJ.IIJIIIIIIIJIJI!IIJ********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled

~age F-1?

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3- SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 3 Table 3-5: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and the Availability of the Associated Train Base Walkdown Is the Train List 1 Description RAW Equipment Unavailable?

Item 45 3MCTET01 CST (condensate st orage tank) 30500 No 40 3MCHET01 RWT (refueling water tank) 56.89 No 138 3EPKBF12 DC battery " 8" 9.34 No 115 3EPBBS04 4.16 kV b us 504 9.32 No 10 3MAFBP01 AFpump"B" 6.44 No 122 3EPGBL34 480 V l C34 bus 4.92 No 129 3EPHBM34 480VMCCM34 4.92 No 121 3EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus 4.81 No 131 3EPHBM38 480V MCCM38 4.74 No 336 3MSP8P01 Spray pond pump "8" low Risk No 324 3JSIBUV676 SUMP isolation valve l ow Risk No 123 3EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus Low Risk No 130 3EPHBM36 480VMCCM36 low Risk No 89 3MHD8A01 DG "B" room EAHU fan Low Risk No 90 3MHDBJ01 DG "B" room essential exhaust fan Low Risk No 128 3EPHBM 32 480V MCCM32 Low Risk No 37 3JCHEHV0532 RWT suction iso (fails open on loss of ai r) low Risk No 307 3JSIBPSV0409 HPSI train "B" injection to EDT relief low Risk No 67 3MEWBP01 EW pump "B low Risk No 68 3MEWBT01 EW "B" surge tank Low Risk No 25 3JCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to Sl train "B" low Risk No 321 3JSIBUV667 HPSI pump " B" recirc iso (closes on RAS) low Risk No 66 3MEWBE01 EW " B" heat exch anger low Risk No 283 3MSIBE01 SDHX "B" Low Risk No PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 17 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 RevisionO PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-19 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTIF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 3 Base Walkdown Is the Train List 1 Description RAW Equipment Unavailable?

Item 117 3EPEBG02 Emergency diesel generator "B" Low Risk No 306 3JSIBPSV0166 HPSilong Term Recirculation Train B Pressure Relief Valve low Risk No 60 3JECBTV0030 Control room "B" EAHU flow reg valve Low Risk No 101 3MHJBF04 Control room EAHU (fan, filters and HX) low Risk No 309 3JSIBUV0614 Safety Injection Tank 2A Discharge Isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No 57 3MECBE01 Essential chiller "B" Low Risk No 58 3MECBP01 Circulating water pump "B" Low Risk No 311 3JSIBUV0624 Safety Injection Tank 28 Discharg~ isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No 8 3JAFBHV0030 SG-E01A reg valve Low Risk No 9 3JAFBHV0031 SG-E01B reg valve Low Risk No 11 3JAFBUV0034 SG-EOlA isolation valve Low Risk No 12 3JAFBUV0035 SG-E01B isolation valve Low Risk No 14 3JAFCUV0036 SG-E01A isolation valve Low Risk No 38 3JCHEHV0536 RWT suction isolation Low Risk No 315 3JSIBUV0665 Containment Spray Pump Recirculation To Refueling Water Tank Train B Globe Valve Low Risk No 143 3EPKCF13 DC battery "C" Low Risk No 308 3JSIBPSV189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump Low Risk No 272 3JSIAUV0651 RC loop l long term recirc/SDC valve Low Risk Yes 313 3JSIBUV0636 RC loop 1A isolation valve Low Risk No 27 3MCHBP01 Charging pump 2 Low Risk No 146 3EPKCN43 Inverter For Shutdown Cooling Isolat ion Valve 3JSICUV653 Low Risk No 151 3EPKDN44 Inverter For 3JSIDUV654 Shutdown Cooling B Return Inside Containment Isolation Valve Low Risk No 213 3JSGBHV0178 Atmospheric dump valve HV-178 Low Risk No 214 3JSGBHV0185 Atmospheric dump valve HV-185 Low Risk No 303 3MSIBP01 LPSI pump "8" Low Risk No 305 3MSIBP03 Containment Spray Pump B Low Risk No 310 3JSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A isolation valve Low Risk No PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 18 WCAP-17681 -NP. Supplement 1 RevisionO PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon Page F-20 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3- SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Base Walkdown Is the Train List 1 Description RAW Equipment Unavailable?

Item 312 3JSIBUV0626 RC loop 28 isolation valve Low Risk No 314 3JSIBUV0646 RC loop 18 isolation valve low Risk No 316 3JSIBUV615 RC loop 2A lPSI isolation valve low Risk No 319 3JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SOC isolation valve low Risk No 338 3MHSBJ01 Sp_ray pond pump house exhaust fan "B" Not Modeled in t he PRA No 6 3JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in t he PRA No 7 3JAFBFT0041B Auxiliary feedwater flow Not M odeled in the PRA No 29 3JCHBPSL0218 Train B For Charging Pump 3MCHEP01 Suction line Pressure Switch Not Modeled in the PRA No 32 3JCHClT0203C RWT level (required for RAS) Not Modeled in t he PRA No 35 3JCHEHV0239 Charging Line To Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Isolation Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 39 3MCHEP01 Charging pump 3 Not Modeled in the PRA No 42 3JCPBUVOOOSA Containment Power Access Purge Supply Isolation Butterfly Damper Not Modeled in the PRA No so 3MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake structure Not M odeled in the PRA No 51 3MDGBX01A Starting air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No 52 3MDGBX01B Startil!g air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No 59 3MECBT01 EC expansion tank "B Not Modeled in the PRA No 70 3JGRBUV0002 (LLRT) ROT/GAS Surge Header Isolation Valve (Outside Containment) Not Modeled in the PRA No 73 3MHAAZ04 AFW pump room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA Yes .

79 3JHCBPT0351B Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 80 3JHCBPT0352B Containment pressu re Not Modeled in the PRA No 81 3JHCBUV0044 Discharge Sampling From RU-1 Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 82 3JHCBUV0047 Inlet Sampling To RU-1 Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 85 3JHCOPT03510 Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 86 3JHCDPT0352D Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 102 3MHJBJ01A DC room "D" essentia l exhaust fan Not Modeled In the PRA No 103 3MHJBJ01B DC room "B" essentia l exhaust fa n Not Modeled in the PRA No 104 3MHJBM02 m otor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 19 WCAP-17681 -NP. Supplement1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Page F-21 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 2 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3- SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Base Walkdown Is the Train Ustl Description RAW Equipment Unavailable?

Item 105 3MHJBM03 motor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No 106 3MHJBM31 Air-operated damper Not Modeled in t he PRA No 107 3MHJBM58 Air-operated DC room "B" isolation Not Modeled in the PRA No 108 3MHJBM67 Air-operated computer room OP Not Modeled in t he PRA No 109 3JHJBTIC0124 Control room temp ind icating controller Not Modeled in the PRA No 110 3MHJBZ03 ESF switchgear room " B" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No 111 3MHJBZ04 DC room "B" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No 112 3JIAAUV0002 Instrument Air Supply Containment Isolation Gate Valve Not Modeled in the PRA Yes 137 3EPKB022 LC 34 control power Not Modeled in the PRA No 139 3EPKBH1 2 Battery charger B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 141 3EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control circuit Not Modeled in the PRA No 147 3EPK0024 DC distribution panel 024 Not Modeled in the PRA No 150 3EPKOM44 DC power to TCB1 control circu it Not Modeled in the PRA No 155 3EPNB026 Power to PPS "B" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No 156 3EPNBN12 OC/AC inverter "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 157 3EPNBV26 120 V vital ac voltage regulator " B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 158 3EPNC027 Power to PPS "C" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No 159 3EPNCN13 OC/AC inverter "C" Not Modeled in the PRA No 163 3EPNOV28 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "0" Not Modeled in the PRA No 167 3JRCBHV0105 Pressurizer and Reactor Vessel Head Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 168 3JRCBHV0108 Pressurizer Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 170 3JRCBPT0102B Pnr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No 171 3JRCBPT104 SOC RCS pressure interlock Not Modeled in the PRA No 172 3JSBBC02A 1/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No 175 3JSBCC02A 1/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No 177 3JRCOPT106 SOC RCS pressure interlock Not Modeled in the PRA No 179 3JRCNTE101 Pressurizer t emperature Not Modeled in the PRA No PVNGS Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List November 11, 2013 Page 20 WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contalni ! I J I I I I I I I I ! I l l

l l l * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-2.2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment list, Rev. 2 NITF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdow n Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station- Unit 3 Base Walkdown Is the Tra in list 1 Descript ion RAW Equipment Unavailable?

Item 181 3JRDBUV0024 Isolation Containment Radwaste Sump Outlet Isolat ion Gate Valve Not M odeled in the PRA No 186 3JRM BB02 RWT ievel Not M odeled in the PRA No 187 3JRMBB04 RCS temperature Not M odeled in the PRA No 188 3JRMBB05 Cont ain ment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 189 3JRMBB06 Auxi liary feedwater flow Not Modeled in t he PRA No 190 3JRMCB05 Cont ain ment pressure Not Modeled in t he PRA No 192 3JRMNB02 SDHX A outlet temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No 193 3JRMNB04 Pressurizer temperatu re Not Modeled in the PRA Nq 195 3JSBBC03 Reactor t rip breaker "B" Not Modeled in t he PRA No 219 3JSGBPT0306 Instrument air line pressure transmitter Not M odeled in t he PRA No 221 3JSGBPV0306B N2 supply solenoid valve Not M odeled in the PRA No 222 3JSGBUV0130 SG-EOlA isolation valve Not M odeled in t he PRA No 223 3JSGBUV0135 SG-E01B isolation valve Not M odeled in the PRA No 228 3JSGCLT1113C SG-E01A WR level (required for AFAS) Not Model ed in the PRA No 334 3JSINPT391 HPSI long term recirc loop 1 pressure xmtr Not Modeled in the PRA No 355 3JRMBB01 Main Cont rol Board Section B01 Electrical Systems Not Modeled in the PRA No 374 3JSABC01 B Train ESFAS Relay Cabinets Not Modeled in t he PRA No 392 3JSIAUV0672 A Trai n CS Injection MOV Not Modeled in the PRA Yes 409 3JZJBE01 Remote Shutdown Panel Not Modeled in t he PRA No PVNGS Unit 3 Sei smic Walkdow n Equipment List November 11, 20 13 Page 2 1 WCAP-17681 -NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS*3 April 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B Upon ....n,rnur.nn Page G-1 APPENDIX G - SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES There were no changes to the equipment selected for Base List I (Table G-1 ). One item was removed from SWEL I (Table G-2) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area and two Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D because they were inaccessible during refueling outage 3Rl7. These changes are discussed in Section 3.4.

There were no changes to Base List 2 and SWEL 2.

Table G-1: PVNGS-3 Base List I (Refer to Table G-1 of Reference 48, "Near-Tenn Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3")

WCAP- 1768 1-NP, Supplement! Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separat1on tillS page IS decontrolled PageG-2 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Sueen #4 Sample_Considerations Screea Screen Enviroomeat SWEL #I Screeo #2 113 Major new Temp., °F IPEEE Walkdown Wa lkdown Description Building (SC- I (Regular (Safety IIem Equipment System or (I for " Inside" vuloerability Deferred to Equipment Licensing Inspections?) Function Number Class Type replacemeot or eobaocement Outage?

Basis?) Support) eq uipment? Ofor ?

"Outside")

Aux iliary Jnst. Rack I 3JAFBFT0041A MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR ( 18) AF No 140(1) No No feedwater Oow Auxil iary lnst. Rack 140 (I) 2 3JAFBFT0041 B MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR AF No No No feedwater Oow ( 18)

SG-EOIA 3 3JAFBHV0030 MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR MOV (8) AF No 104 (l) No No regulating valve SG-EOIB 4 3JAFBHV003 1 regulating valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104 (I) No No Afpump *a* MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR Horz. 104 (I) 5 3MAFBPOI Pump (5) AF No No No SG-EOI A isolation 6 3JAFBUV0034 valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR MOV(8) AF Yes 104 (I) No No SG-EOIB isolation MSSS Yes PCDHR MOV (8) 104 (I) 7 3JAFBUV0035 valve Yes AF Yes No No SG-EO IA isolation 8 3JAFCUV0036 MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (I) No No valve RWT outlet to Sl RC IC 9 3JCHBHVOS30 AUX Yes Yes MOV (8) CH No 104 (I) No No train *a* DHR RCPC Horz.

10 3MCHBPOI Charging pump 2 AUX Yes Yes CH No 104 (I) No No IC Pump(S)

Train B For Charging Pump lnst. Rack II 3JCHBPSL0218 3MCHEPOI AUX Yes Yes RCIC (18)

CH No 104 (I) No No Suction Line Pressure Switch RWT ievel lnst. Rack 12 3JCHCLT0203C YARD Yes Yes DHR CH No 113 (0) No No (required for RAS) ( 18)

WCAP-1 7681-NP, Supplement l Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separation thts page is decontrolled PageG-3 Table G-2: PVNG~3 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Consldentioas

&rten Serten Enviroomeot SWEL #I Screen#2 #3 Major new Temp., °F IPEEE Walkdown Walkdown IIem Description Building (SC-I (ReguJar (Safety Equlpmeat System or (I for " Inside" vulnerability Deferred to Equipment lospeclions?)

Number Liceosiog Function Class Type replacement or enllancement Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? oror ?

"Outside")

ntG~IOQI (Tbls hem was Heel removed from RegeReRll:ive l!eat H SWEL I in this eK~I!Mger

~ ¥es ¥es ~ lOneI!!lAger bW We ~ We ¥es report. See ~

Section 3.4.)

Charging Line To Reactor Coolant POV (7) 14 3JCHEifV0239 CfMT Yes Yes RCIC CH No 120 (I) No Yes Loop 2A Isolation Globe Valve RWT suction iso IS 3JCHEifV0532 (fails open on loss AUX Yes Yes RCPC POV (7) CH No 104 (I) No No of air)

RWTsuction 16 3JCHEHV0536 AUX Yes Yes RCPC MOV (8) CH No 104 (I) No No isolation Charging pump 3 Yes RCPC Hon. 104 (1) 17 3MCHEPOI AUX Yes IC Pump (5) CH No No .No RWT (refueling RC PC 18 3MCHETOI Yard Yes Yes Tank (21) CH No 113 (0) No No water tank) ICDHR Containment power access 19 3JCPBUV0005A purge supply CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV (8) CP No 120 (I) No Yes isolation butterfly damper CST (condensate 20 3MCTETOI Yard Yes Yes PCDHR Tank (21) CT No 113 (0) No No storage tank)

DG *a" air intake RC PC 21 3MDGBF03 DG Yes Yes Other (0) DG Yes 140 (I) No No filter IC DHR Starting air Yes RCPC Tank (21) 140 (I) 22 3MDGBXOIA DG Yes ICDHR DG No No No accumulator Starting air RCPC 23 3MDGBXOIB DG Yes Yes Tank (21) DG No 140(1) No No accumulator ICDHR Essential chiller RCPC 24 3MECBEOI "B" CTRL Yes Yes Chiller (I I) EC No 80 (I) No No ICDHR WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and 8 contain * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled PageG-4 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Screen 1#4 S.mple Considerations Screen Screen Environment SWEL ' #I Screen #1 #3 Walkdown Walkdown Major new Temp., °F IPEEE Item Destriptioo Building {SC* I (Regular (S.ftty Equipment System or (I for "loside" vulotrlbUlty Deferred to Equipment Jllumbtr Lite using Inspections?) Function Clw Type replacement or enbancemeot Ontage?

S.sis?) Support) equipment? oror !

"Oucslde")

Circulating water Yes Yes RCPC HorzPump No 80(1) 25 3MECBPOI pump *e* CTRL ICDHR (5) EC No No EC expansion tank Yes RCPC Tank(2l) 26 3MECBTOI CTRL Yes EC No 80 (I) No No

s* ICDHR Control room *s* ..

Yes PC IC 27 3JECBTV0030 EAHUflow CTRL Yes POV(7) EC No 80(1) No No regulating valve DHR EW *a* heat PC IC Heat 28 3MEWBEOI AUX Yes Yes Exchanger EW No 104 (I) No No exchanger DHR (21)

PCIC HorzPump 29 3MEWBPOI EWpump "B" AUX Yes Yes EW No 104 (I) No No DHR (5)

EW *a* surge Yes Yes PC IC Tank(21) EW No 104 (I) 30 3MEWBTOI tank AUX DHR No No (LLRT)

ROT/GAS Surge 31 3JGRBUV0002 Header Isolation AUX Yes Yes Cf sov (8) GR No 104 (I) No No Valve (Outside Containment)

AFW pump room PCIC 32 3MHAAZ04 "A" EAHU AUX Yes Yes AHU (1 0) HA No 104 (I) No Yes DHR Containment lnst. Rack 33 3JHCBl'T0351 B AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No No pressure ( 18)

Containment Yes Ins!. Rack 34 3JHCBPT0352B pressure AUX Yes Cf (18) HC No 104 (I) No No Discharge Sampling From 35 3JHCBUV0044 RU-t Containment CTMT Yes Yes CF sov (8) HC No 120 (I) No Yes Isolation Valve WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement l Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 20 14

Enclosure Appendices A and B containii!I.IIIIIIIJI!!IIIIIIIIJI!***********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-5 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Screen 114 Sample Coasideradons Screen Screen Eovlroomeot SWEL I#I Scrteo 112 N3 Major new Temp., °F IPEEE Walkdowo Walkdown (Regular Item Description Building (SC-I (Safely Equipmeat System or (I ror " laside" vuloenbUily Deferred to EquipllltDI lnspettlons?)

Number Lkenslng Function CIISS Type replacement or enbaocemeot Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? oror ?

"Outside")

Inlet Sampling To 36 3JHCBUV0047 RU-1 Containment CTMT Yes Yes CF sov (8) HC No 120 (I) No Yes Isolation Valve Containment AUX Yes Yes CF lnst. Rack 37 3JHCDPT035 1D pressure (1 8) HC No 104 (I) No No Containment lnst. Rack 38 3JHCDPT0352D AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (l) No No pressure (1 8) 39 3MHDBAOI oo *e* room DG Yes Yes PC IC Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No No EAHUfan DHR DG "B" room PCIC 40 3MHDBJOI essential exhaust DG Yes Yes Fan (9) HD No 140 (1) No No fan DHR Control room PC IC 41 3MHJBF04 EAHU (fan, filters CTRL Yes Yes AHU (1 0) HJ No 80 (I) No No and HX) DHR DC room *o*

Yes PC IC 42 3MHJBJOIA essential exhaust CTRL Yes Fan (9) HJ No 80 (I) No No fan DHR DC room *s*

PC IC 43 3MHJBJO IB essential exhaust CTRL Yes Yes Fan(9) HJ No 80 (I) No No DHR fan motor-operated PCIC 44 3MHJBM02 CTRL Yes Yes MOV (8) HJ No 80(1) No No damper DHR motor-operated PC IC 45 3MHJBM03 damper CfRL Yes Yes MOV (8) HJ No 80(1) No No DHR Pneumatic damper PCIC 46 3MHJBM31 CTRL Yes Yes POV (7) HJ No 80 (I) No No DHR Pneumatic DC PC IC 47 3MHJBM58 CfRL Yes Yes POV (7) HJ No 80 (1) No No room "B" isolation DHR WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Endosure Appendices A and B contain* * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled PageG-6 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Scr<<n #4 Sample ConsideratioDJ Screen Screen Environment SWEL #I Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp,. °F IPEEE Walkdown Walkdown (Regula r (Sifety Item Description Building (SC-I Equipment System or (I for "Inside" vulnerability Dderrtd Co Equipment IDJpections?)

Number Llcenshag Function Class Type replacement or enbancemeat Outage!

Basis?) Support) equipment? oror ?

"Outside")

Pnewnatic PC IC 48 3MHJBM67 CTRL Yes Yes POV (7) HJ No 80 (I) No No computer room DP DHR Control room temp indicating Yes Yes PCIC Temp 80 (I) 49 3JHJBTICO I 24 CTRL DHR Sensor ( 19) HJ No No No controller ESF switchgear PC IC 50 3MHJBZ03 room *s* EAHU CTRL Yes Yes AHU (1 0) HJ No 80 (I) No No DHR DC room *s* PC IC AHU(IO) 51 3MHJBZ04 CTRL Yes Yes HJ No 80 (I) No No EAHU DHR Instrurnent Air Supply 5:Z 3JIAAUV0002 Containment AUX Yes Yes CF s o v (8) lA No 104 (I) No Yes Isolation Gate Valve RCPC

4. 16 kV bus S04 Yes IC DHR Med. Volt 53 3EPBBS04 CTRL Yes SWGR(3) PB Yes 80 (I) No No CF Emergency diesel RCPC Eng. Gen.

54 3EPEBG02 genera1or *s* DG Yes Yes IC DHR (17) PE No 140 (I) No No RCPC Low Volt.

ss 3EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL Yes Yes DHR SWGR (2) PG No 80 (I) No No RC PC Low Volt.

56 3EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL Yes Yes PG No 80 (I) No No DHR SWGR(2)

RC PC Low Volt.

57 3EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes Yes PG No 80 (I) No No DHR SWGR(2) 480VMCCM32 RCPC 58 3EPHBM32 CTRL Yes Yes MCC(l) PH No 80 (1) No No DHR WCAP- 17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B containJIIIIIIJIIIIIIIIIJIIIIIIIJIIIJIIIII**********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled PageG-7 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Scrteo 114 Sample Coosideratloos Scrteo S<reen Euvironmeat SW£L #I Screen 112 113 Major new Temp., °F IPEEE Walkdowo Walkdowa (Regullr (Safety Item Description Building (SC-I Equipment System or (I for "Inside" vulaerabillty Deferred to Equipment Iospectioos?) Fuactioa Number Licensing Class Type replacement or eobaocemeot Outage?

Basis?) Support) eqllipmeot? Ofor ?

"Outside")

RCPC 59 3EPHBM34 480V MCCM34 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC (I) PH No 104 (I) No No RCPC 60 3EPHBM36 480VMCCM36 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC(l) PH No 104 (I) No No RCPC 61 JEPHBM38 480VMCCM38 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC(I) PH No 104 (l) No No LC 34 control Yes RCPC Dist Panel 62 3EPKBD22 CTRL Yes PK No 80 (I) No No power DHR ( 14)

RCPC Battery *** No 63 3EPKBF12 DC battery "B" CTRL Yes Yes PK No 80 (I) No DHR Rack (15)

Battery

,. n charger Yes RCPC Battery 64 3EPKBHI2 CTRL Yes PK No 80 (I) No No 8 DHR Chg(l6)

DC power to 65 3EPKBM42 TCB I control CTRL Yes Yes RCPC MCC (l) PK No 80 (I) No No circuit 3EPKDD24 DC distribution RCPC DistPanel 66 (substitute for CTRL Yes Yes PK No 80 (I) No No panel 024 DHR ( 14) 3EPKCD23)

RCPC Battery 61 3EPKCFJ3 DC battery *c* CTRL Yes Yes PK No 80 (I) No No DHR Rack (15) 3EPKDM44 DC power to 68 (substitute for TCB I control CTRL Yes Yes RCPC MCC (1) PK No 80 (I) No No 3EPKCM43) circuit Inverter for shutdown cooling l.nverter 69 3EPKCN43 CTRL Yes Yes DHR PK No 80 (I) No No isolation valve ( 16) 3JSICUV653 WCAP- I 768 1-NP, Supplement I RevisionO PVNGS-3 April 2014

PageG-8 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen Eovironmeot SWEL #I Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp., °F IPEEE Walkdown Walkdowo (Regular (Safety Item Description Building (SC-I Equipment System or (I for " Inside" vulnerability Deferred to Equipment Licensing Inspections?) Function Number Class Type replacement or cobanccmeot Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? Ofor ?

"OIIIside")

Jnvener For 3JSIDUV6S4 .. ..

Shutdown Cooling Inverter 70 3EPKDN44 CTRL Yes Yes CF PK No 80 (I) No No B Return Inside ( 16)

Containment Isolation Valve Power to PPS "B

RC PC Dist Panel 71 3EPNBD26 CTRL Yes Yes ICDHR (14) PN No 80 (I) No No instrumentation DC/AC invener PCJC Inverter 3EPNBNI2 CTRL Yes Yes PN No 80 (I) No No 72 *s* DHRCF ( 16) 120 V vital ac PCIC 73 3EPNBV26 voltage regulator CTRL Yes Yes DHRCF Other (0) PN No 80 (I) No No

s*

Power to PPS *c* RCPC Dist Panel 74 3EPNCD27 instrumentation CTRL Yes Yes ICDHR (14) PN No 80 (I) No No DC/AC invener Yes PCIC Inverter 75 3EPNCNI3 *c* CTRL Yes DHRCF ( 16) PN No 80 (I) No No 120 V vital ac PCIC 76 3EPNDV28 voltage regulator CTRL Yes Yes Other (0) PN No 80 (I) No No DHRCF "D"

Pressurizer and Reactor Vessel 77 3JRCBHVOIOS Head Vent To CTMT Yes Yes PC sov (8) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Pressurizer Vent 78 3JRCBHV0108 To Reactor Drain CTMT Yes Yes PC sov (8) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Tank Globe Valve Pnr pressure 3JRCBPT0102B (required for CTMT Yes Yes lnst. Rack 120 (I) 79 PC ( 18) RC No No Yes RPSISIAS)

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 Apri l 20 14

Enclosure Appendices Aand Bc o n t a i n * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Upon separation this page is decontrolled PageG-9 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL I

~rteo #4 Sa mole Coosidualions S<reen ~reen Environment SWEL Ill Screen Ill 113 Major new TemP-> °F IPEEE Walkdown Walkdowu Item Descriptioo Buildiag (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equlpmeot System or (I for "Inside" vulnerability Deferred to Equipment Inspec:tloos?)

Number Lkeoslng Fuoc:tioo Class Type replac:emeot or enbancement Outa~? .

Basis?) Support) equipment? Ofor ?

"Outside")

SOC RCS pressure lnst Rack 80 3JRCBPTI04 CTMT Yes Yes DHR RC No 120 (I) No Yes interlock (18)

Yes Inst Rack 81 3JSBBC02A IN converter CTRL Yes DHR RC No 80 (I) No No (1 8)

IN converter Yes Yes lnst. Rack 82 3JSBCC02A CTRL DHR (18) RC No 80 (I) No No SOC RCS pressure lnst. Rack 83 3JRCDPTI06 CTMT Yes Yes DHR RC No 120 (I) No Yes interlock ( 18)

Pressurizer Temp 84 3JRCNTEIOI temperature CTMT Yes Yes PC RC No 120 (I) No Yes Sensor (1 9)

Isolation Containment 85 3JRDBUV0024 Radwaste Surnp AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 104 (I) No No Outlet Isolation Gate Valve 86 3JRMBB02 RWTievel CTRL Yes Yes IC Control 80 (I)

Panel (20) RM No No No Control 87 3JRMBB04 RCS temperature CTRL Yes Yes RC RM No 80 (I) No No Panel (20)

Containment Control 88 3JRMBB05 CTRL Yes Yes CF RM No 80(1) No No pressure Panel (20)

Auxilial)' Yes Control 89 3JRMBB06 feedwater flow CTRL Yes PCDHR RM No 80(1) No No Panel (20)

Containment Control 90 3JRMCB05 CTRL Yes Yes CF RM No 80 (I) No No pressure Panel (20)

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 ' April2014

B containJI!I.IIIIIIIJIIIIIIIliJIII***********

Enclosure Appendices A and Upon separatton lhts page is decontrolled PageG-10 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL I Screen 1#4 Sample Coasideratioos Screen Screen Eaviroameot SWEL Ill Screen 112 113 Majoraew Temp., °F IPEEE Walkdowa Walkdowa (Regula r (Safety Item Destriptloa BuUdiaa (SC - I Equipment System or (I for "laside" vulnera bility Dderredto Equipment lospectioas?) Fuaelioa Number Lleenslaa Class Type replacement or eo~ancemtot Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? O for ?

"Outside")

91 SDHX A outlet CTRL Yes Yes DHR Control RM No 80 (1) No 3JRMNB02 temperature Panel (20) No Pressurizer CTRL Yes Yes PC Control RM No 80 (I) No 92 3JRMNB04 temperature Panel (20) No Reactor trip Yes Breaker 104 (I) 93 3JSBBC03 AUX Yes RCPC Panel (2) SB No No No breaker "8" Atmospheric 94 3JSGBHV0178 dump valve HV- MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR P0V(7) SG No 124 (I) No No 178 Atrnospheric 95 3JSGBHVOI85 dump valve HV- MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV(7) SG No 124 (I) No No 185 Instrument air line presswe Yes lnst Rack 104 (I) 96 3JSGBPT0306 MSSS Yes PCDHR (18) SG No No No transmitter N2supply 97 3JSGBPV0306B solenoid valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR sov (8) SG No 124 (I) No No SG-EOIA isolation 98 3JSGBUV0130 MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124 (I) No No valve SG-EO IB isolation 99 3JSGBUV0135 valve MSSS Yes Yes PCDHR POV (7) so Yes 124 (I) No No SG-EOIA WR lnst. Rack 100 3JSGCLT l ti3C level (required for CONT Yes Yes PCDH R (18) so No 120 (I) No No AFAS)

RC loop I long-101 3JSIAUV0651 term recirc/SDC CTMT Yes Yes ICDHR MOV(8) Sl Yes 120(1) No Yes valve WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April 20 14

Enclosure Appendices A and B containi!I!IIIIIII(IIII.III!IJiliJIIIII**********

Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-Il Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Screen 114 Sample Coasideratiou.s Screen Screen Eavlronmeot SWEL #I Screen #2 113 Major new Temp., °F IPEEE Walkdown Walkdown Buildiog (SC- I (Safety Item Description {Rf&Uiar Equipment System or (I for "Inside" vulnerability Deferred to Equipment Littnsiog Inspections?) Fuottion Number Class Type replacement or enhancement Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? Ofor ?

"Outside")

Heat 102 3MSIBEOI SDHX "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger Sl No 104 (I) No No (21)

LPSI pump "B* AUX Yes Yes Ven. Pump Sl Yes 104 (I}

103 3MSIBP01 DHR (6) No No Containment Yen. Pump 104 3MSIBP03 AUX Yes Yes CF Sl No 104 (I) No No Spray PumpB (6)

HPSI Long-Term Recirculation AUX Yes Yes Other (0) Sl No I04 (I) 105 3JSIBPSV0166 Train B Pressure PCDHR No No Relief Valve HPSI train "B" 106 3JSIBPSV0409 injection to EDT AUX Yes Yes ICDHR Other (0) Sl No 104 (I) No No relief RC loop 2 LTOP 107 3JSIBPSVI89 CTMT Yes Yes DHR Other (0) Sl No 120 (I) No Yes relief to sump Safety lnjection Tank2A 108 3JSIBUV0614 Discharge CTMT Yes Yes RCJC MOV(8) SI No 120 (1) No Yes Isolation Globe Valve RCloop2A AUX Yes Yes 104 (I) 109 3JSIBUV0616 isolation valve ICDHR MOV (8) Sl Yes No No Safety lnjection ..

Tank2B 110 3JSIBUV0624 Discharge CTMT Yes Yes RCIC MOV (8) Sl No 120 (I) No Yes Isolation Globe Valve RC loop 2B Il l 3JSIBUV0626 AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MOV(8) Sl Yes 104 (1} No No isolation valve RC loop l A 112 3JSIBUV0636 isolation valve AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MOV (8) Sl Yes 104 (I) No No WCAP-1768 1-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Upon separat1on tn1s page 1s aecontrolleel Page G- 12 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL 1 Scnea 114 Sample Considerations Screen Screen Environment SWEL #I Screen #2 113 Major new Temp., °F lPEEE Walkdown Walkdown Description Building (SC-I (Regular (Safety Item Equipmcat S)'Jttm or (I for "uside" vulnerability Deferred to Equipment Licusing laspections?) Fuaction Outage?

Number Class Type replacement or enbaacement Basis?) Support) eqllipment? 0 for ?

"Outside")

RC loop IB AUX Yes Yes ICDHR M0V(8) Sl Yes 104 (I) 113 3JS!BUV0646 isolation valve No .No Containment Spray Pump 114 3JS!BUV0665 Recirculation To AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) Sl No 104 (I) No No Refueling Water Tank Train B Globe Valve RC loop 2A LPSI 115 3JS!BUV615 AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) Sl No 104 (I) No No isolation valve RCioop2SDC 116 3JS1BUV656 AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) Sl Yes 104 (I) No No isolation valve HPSI pump *a*

117 3JS!BUV667 recirc iso (closes AUX Yes Yes ICDHR MOV (8) Sf Yes 104 (I) No No onRAS)

Sump isolation Yes MOV (8) Sf 104 (I) 118 3JSIBUV676 valve AUX Yes ICDHR No No No HPSIIong-term lnst. Rack 119 3JSINPT391 recirc loop I CTMT Yes Yes ICDH.R SI No 120 (T) No Yes

( 18) pressure xmtr Spray pond pump PCDHR Yen. Pump 120 3MSPBP01 SP Yes Yes SP No 122 (0) No No

a* UHS (6)

Spray pond pump PCDHR 122 (0) 121 3MHSBJ01 house exhaust fan SP Yes Yes AHU (6) SP No No No

a* UHS Mai.n Control PCIC Control 80 (I}

122 3JRMBB01 Board Section BOl CTRL Yes Yes Panel (20) RM No No No Electrical Systems DHR B Train ESFAS Dist. Panel 80 (I) 123 3JSABCOI Relay Cabinets CTRL Yes Yes RC (14) SA No No No A Train CS 124 3JSIAUV0672 AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) Sl No 104 (I) No Yes Injection MOV WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

Enclosure Appendices A and ~p'!n~~~aratlon iispage is decontrolled PageG-13 Table G-2: PVNGS-3 SWEL I Screea #4 Sample Coosidentioas Screen Screen Eoviroament SWEL #I Screen #2 #3 Major new Temp.,°F lPEEE Walkdowa Walkdown Item Destriplloo Building (SC-1 (Regular (Safety Equipment System or (I for "laside" vulnerability Deferred to Equipment Number Lieeasiag IDSpections?) Fuatlioo a ass Type replacement or eobantement Outage?

Basis?) Support) eqaipmeal? Ofor ?

"Outside")

Remote Shutdown RCPC Control 125 I 3JZJBEOI CTRL Yes Yes ZJ No 80 (I) No No Panel ICDHR Panel (20)

The total number ofSWEL 1 items is 124 instead of 125 because item 13 (3MCHEEOI) was removed (see discussion in Section 3.4). The item numbers in the first column of this table were not adjusted to make it easier to compare the items to those in Table G-2 of Reference 48.

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

PageG-14 Table G-3: PVNGS-3 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base.List 2)

(Refer to Table G-3 ofReference 48, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3")

WCAP-17681-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-3 April2014

ML14126A636: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 21:28, 5 February 2020

Contents

Text

References:

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY

4.1 BACKGROUND

6.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

4.1 BACKGROUND

6.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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ML14126A636: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 21:28, 5 February 2020

Text

References:

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY

4.1 BACKGROUND

6.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

4.1 BACKGROUND

6.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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