ML14134A184

04/30/2014 Summary of Public Meeting to Discuss an Apparent Violation Identified at Wolf Creek Generating Station

ML14134A184
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	05/14/2014
From:	Haire M S Plant Support Branch-1
To:	Heflin A C Wolf Creek
P. Elkmann
References
Download: ML14134A184 (16)

Text

May 14, 2014 Mr. Adam C. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS AN APPARENT VIOLATION IDENTIFIED AT WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

Dear Mr. Heflin,

On April 30, 2014, members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff met with representatives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation at the Region IV office in Arlington, Texas, to discuss an apparent violation identified at Wolf Creek Generating Station. The apparent violation concerned the accuracy of the licand was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000482/2013502 (ADAMS ML14092A618). The licensee presented its perspective on the circumstances of the violation and the safety significance. The list of attendees and enclosed. made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To receive a summary of future meetings and other plant-specific e-mail distributions, you must subscribe to the Operating Reactor Correspondence electronic distribution for this plant via http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-region.html. Once subscribed, if you wish to discontinue receiving electronic distribution, you may unsubscribe at any time by visiting the same web address above. Sincerely, /RA/ V.Gaddy for Mark S. Haire, Chief Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees 2. WCNOC Presentation Slides

SUNSI Review MSH By: Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available MSH Non-Publicly Available Keyword: OFFICE DRS/PSB1 DRP/PBB DRP/PBB DRS/PSB1 ACES DRP/CPBB DRS/CPSB1 NAME P. Elkmann C. Peabody D. Proulx G. Guerra R. Browder MHaire/VGaddy SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 5/6/14 5/8/14 5/6/14 5/8/14 5/7/14 5/7/14 5/9/14 Enclosure 1 List of Attendees NRC Mr. S. Reynolds, Deputy Regional Administrator Ms. K. Fuller, Regional Counsel Mr. J. Clark, Acting Division Director, Division of Reactor Safety Mr. T. Pruett, Deputy Division Director, Division of Reactor Projects Mr. M. Haire, Branch Chief, Plant Support Branch 1, Division of Reactor Safety Mr. N. O Ms. V. Campbell, Branch Chief, Allegation and Enforcement Branch Mr. R. Kahler, Branch Chief, DPR, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Mr. P. Elkmann, Senior Inspector, Plant Support Branch 1, Division of Reactor Safety Mr. C. Peabody, Senior Resident Inspector, Branch B, Division of Reactor Projects Mr. S. LaVie, Senior Specialist, DPR, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Mr. D. Proulx, Senior Project Engineer, Branch B, Division of Reactor Projects Mr. J. Wray, Senior Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement Mr. G. Guerra, Inspector, Plant Support Branch 1, Division of Reactor Safety Ms. R. Browder, Senior Enforcement Specialist, Allegation and Enforcement Branch Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Mr. R. Smith, Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. M. Westman, Manager, Regulatory Affairs Mr. T. East, Superintendent, Emergency Planning Mr. W. Ketchum, Supervisor, Engineering Mr. W. Muilenburg, Supervisor, Licensing M. D. Michel, Instructor, Chemistry Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

Regulatory Conference Inspection Report 05000482/2013-502 Preliminary White Finding Enclosure 2 Wolf Creek Representatives

• Russell Smith - Site Vice President

• Mike Westman - Manager Regulatory Affairs

• Timothy East - Superintendent EP

• Bill Muilenburg - Supervisor Licensing

• Bill Ketchum - Supervisor Engineer

• Dan Michel - Instructor II Enclosure 2 NRC's Preliminary finding

• An apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) was identified involving the failure to maintain adequate methods for assessing the actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency between September 2012 and November 2013, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9).

• The inaccurate calculation was corrected on February 25, 2014.

• The inspectors determined the failure to maintain a Dose Assessment Process capable of providing a technically adequate estimate of offsite dose. This issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action system as Condition Report 2013-0076247. Enclosure 2 Root Cause Evaluation Findings

• ROOT CAUSE - Information Systems (IS) procedures and guidance did not require comprehensive verification and validation for risk significant software.

• CONTRIBUTING CAUSE 1 - Less than adequate EP oversight of risk significant drill-identified issues.

• Also determined the EDCP Containment Spray Filtration Toggle was not functional.

• Determined the EDCP deficiencies were introduced with Version 3.6 issued in February 2003. Enclosure 2 Key Corrective Actions

• Improve Emergency Planning ownership of risk significant issues.

• Improve Computer Software verification and validation (V&V).

• EDCP was corrected and issued February 25, 2014 including both filter factor and containment spray toggles. Enclosure 2 EDCP Field Team Data 11Other Event Trees Calculated Value SGTR Rad Mon Unit Vent & RWVent Rad Mon DBA Meteorology EAL Enclosure 2 Vent Rad Monitor Detail (normal mode) Enclosure 2 Vent Rad Monitor Detail (accident mode)

Enclosure 2 Affect of the Deficiencies

• Iodine concentration can be overestimated by a factor of ten

• However, concentration is not the only input to calculating dose

• The EDCP deficiencies affect the dose

• Containment Spray operation > 30 minutes

• Unit Vent is in accident mode with operable HEPA

• In these cases, the Iodine concentration is determined using an Iodine to Noble Gas ratio

• So, the result is dependent upon the Noble Gas concentration rather than the iodine concentration Enclosure 2 Affect of the Deficiencies (cont.)

• The ten Design Basis Accidents in EDCP were reviewed to determine the significance of the deficiencies. o LOCA and Fuel Handling Accident o No credible scenarios for combining deficiencies Containment Spray TEDE Factor CDE Factor LOCA 1.5 1.5 Unit Vent Filtration TEDE Factor CDE Factor Fuel Handling Acc. 1.0 1.1 LOCA 3.0 3.8 Enclosure 2 Summary

• EAL decision making was unaffected by these deficiencies o In order to have a dose assessment large enough to cause an EAL declaration, plant conditions will drive declarations o EDCP calculations lag plant conditions

• PAR decision making was unaffected by these deficiencies o Initial PARs are plant condition based o Dose assessment is used for follow-up PARs or to prove initial PARs

• One of five EDCP calculation methods was affected with the largest impact involving a LOCA o Had this event actually occurred, a GE would have been declared based on plant conditions and a corresponding plant condition PAR evacuating 0-2 miles around and 10 miles downwind would be made o The EDCP deficiencies would not have any impact because they would not have been used to develop these PARs Enclosure 2 Wolf Creek Closing Remarks Russell Smith - Site Vice President & CNOO

Enclosure 2 Acronym list

• EP - Emergency Planning

• EDCP - Emergency Dose Calculation Program

• HEPA - High Efficiency Particulate Air

• LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident

• TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent

• CDE - Committed Dose Equivalent

• EAL - Emergency Action Level

• PAR - Protective Action Recommendation

• GE - General Emergency

• CNOO - Chief Nuclear Operating Officer Enclosure 2