IR 05000312/1987011

Insp Rept 50-312/87-11 on 870323-0403.Deviation Noted: Departure from Util Commitment to Revise Surveillance Procedures to Require Documentation of Calibr Data for Instrumentation

ML20209J323
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	04/16/1987
From:	Ang W, Johnston K, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209J261	List: ML20209J257 ML20209J280 ML20209J323
References
TASK-2.D.1, TASK-TM 50-312-87-11, IEIN-85-045, IEIN-85-45, NUDOCS 8705040260
Download: ML20209J323 (16)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report N /87-11 Docket N License N DPR-54

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Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name: Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)

Inspection Conduct : Mar 23 1987 t April 3, 1987 Inspected by: 1 h/ ~ h Date Signed'

K/P ng, Pro' - spector s . ston, R

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Y-lh-h Date Signed pMnspector,DiabloCanyon Approved by: h/ h ~k7 L\ Miller, Chiepoject Section 2 Date Signed Summary:

Inspection on March 23, 1987 to April 3, 1987 (Report No. 50-312/87-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection by a region based inspector and a resident inspector of licensee action on previously identified inspector items, ticensee Event Reports, and I. E. Information Notice Inspection procedures 30703, 25015, 37703, 37701, 92700, 92701, 92702, and 90712 were covered during this inspectio Results: In the areas inspected, one deviation from a SMUD commitment to revise surveillance procedures to require documentation of calibration data for all instrumentation was identified (paragraph 4.D.).

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DETAILS Personnel Contacted

• Bibb, Restart Implementation Manager

• B. Croley, Plant Manager

• B. Day, Deputy Plant Manager

• S. Knight, QA Manager D. Army, Nuclear Maintenance Manager

• R. Ashley, Licensing Manager-

• R. Little, Licensing Supervisor

• T. Shewski, Quality Engineer

• T. Martin, HVAC Engineer

• J. Janus, HVAC Engineer

• G. Blackburn, SRTP Engineer

• J. Robertson, Nuclear Licensing Engineer J. Field, SRTP Director M. Basu, Principal Electrical Engineer L. Pully, Piping Supervisor Engineer J. Gaor, Principal Mechanical Engineer R. Deguch, Principal Civil Engineer R. Powers, Supervisory Nuclear Engineer R. Gupta, System Engineer S. Wallsfry, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer

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C. Loveall, PM Supervisory Mechanic R. Colombo, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance

• A. D'Angelo, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended the exit meeting The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contract personnel during the inspectio This included plant staff-engineers, technicians, administrative and clerical assistant . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (0 pen) Violation 86-22-02, Storage of QA Records in Vault The licensee's response and corrective action for violation 86-22-02 had been previously inspected and inspection findings were documented in Inspection Report 50-312/87-01. The violation was left open due to the licensee's response that all QA records would not be in qualified storage until 1989 and due to the lack of licensee records to show the adequacy of its corrective action for the violatio The NRC inspector met with the QA Manager during this inspection and reiterated the unacceptability of the licensee's QA records storage being in continued noncompliance with' Rancho Seco QA Procedure 18, Revision 2, and NQA-1, Supplement 17 S-1, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix

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The QA' Manager stated.thatiseveral storage'fa'cil'ities hid.bee '

evaluated.since'the last inspection but none had been determined to

, be, acceptable to date. However, the QA Manager, committed to revise the licensee response.to the violation and committed that the QA

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Lrecords.would be'. stored in-accordance with QA. Procedure <18 by-restar Pending further inspection 1to. verify licensee compliance with its QA Procedures for s'torage of quality: records,-Violation

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86-22-02 was left open.' '

' No'new violations or deviations'were , identifie ,

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- 3. ' Licensee Action on Region Y Open' Items Regarding Inspection Report

50-312/86-07- and the December 26,-1985 Event

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d-SMUD - 16d(2)

EDO - Supports- " '

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Establish the Capability for Control Room Control, Independent of the ICS, of ADVs, TBVs and AFW Flow Control Valves

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. The licensee's closure report'on open Action Item 3.f.4, 5 was reviewed by Inspection Report- 50-312/86-07. The licensee's. report

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discussed modifications'to-the atmospheric steam dump' valves (ADVs),

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turbine bypass valves .(TBVs) controls and auxiliary feedwater (AFW)-

flow control valves that would allow control'of the ADVs, TBVs and

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AFW control valves independent of the integrated control ~ system

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(ICS) on loss of ICS power. Inspection Report 86-07 found-the_

r licensee's changes to be satisfactory.' However, Lit left the' restart issues'open for the following reasons:

(1) The design basis report will be reviewed by NRR and until thi review is completed, RV-cannot' conclude it's inspection-activit This will be provided for by an NRR-Safety.

n Evaluation Report'.

'(2)- The testing of the modifications remains to be' examined. -This will be inspected by R (3) Training in the modifications and associated procedure changes

! is still under revie '

i The NRC inspector reviewed the above noted open issues'and determined the following:

The design basis report.for the EFIC modification is being

- reviewed by NRR and results of the review will be provided by l NRR in a Safety Evaluation Repor ;

Testing of the above noted modifications will be inspected during future NRC inspection * Training is currently in progress and has been inspected

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(Inspection Report 50,312/87-06).

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, 3 Based on the above, there is reasonable assurance that the remaining open issues for this item will be provided fo RV-M0-3 was Close No violations or deviations were identifie B. RV - MA-4 (0 pen)

SMUD - 16c(4)

ED0 - 4a Verify Operability of Manual Valves and Remote Operated Valve Perform Inspections to Assure Integrity of Packing and Verify Proper Assembly of Manual Operators Including Setting of " Neutral" Position and Mounting Devices Inspectiw Report 50-312/86-07 documented NRC inspection of the licensee's inspection, repair and testing of valve FWS-063 and the inspection and repair of AFW control valve FV-20527. RV-MA-4 was left open pending completion of the licensee's post maintenance testing of the AFW control valve and completion of the licensee's expanded inspection of manual. valve operabilit The NRC inspector reviewed completed maintenance inspection data f

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report (MIDR) for work request No. 105794 (FV-20527 reassembly) and inspection plan MM-501, Revision 2. The MIDR documented satisfactory operational testing of FV-20527, both manually (handwheel) and by means of the air actuator under-static system conditions. .The AFW system status report, Revision 1 document, identifies problem (10) - manual operation of AFW control valves with flow as a priority 1 item, to be completed prior to restar STP 1029 is being written and FV-20527 and FV-20528 will be verified

! to be manually operable under high differential pressure conditions during AFW system flow testin The NRC inspector discussed the licensee's expanded inspection program for manual valve operability with the Preventive Maintenance (PM) Supervisor (Mechanical) and with the Nuclear Maintenance Manager. The Operations Department identified 142 manual valves which were critical for plant operations. The licensee stated that corrective maintentice had been completed on all 142 valve In addition, all 142 valves are currently in the PM progra The inspector reviewed the scope of the program and selected a sample of work requests to review the inspections and corrective action performed on the manual valve The inspector had the following concerns regarding the expanded inspection program for manual valve operability:

(1) The licensee did not appear to have a reviewed and approved document that lists all manual valves which are critical for plant operations. The list of 142 valves appears to have been developed by an informal piece-meal process. This list should be generated by a formal review process and should be reviewed and approved by appropriate levels of managemen (2) The inspections of the valves appear to have been performed by maintenance personnel. Many valves appear to have been

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'g accepted as-is or accepted with. minor, lubrication' corrective

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action. ._No signoffs.for individual valve acceptabilit'y appears

.to have been performed. . A majority of the. valves, appear _to: '

have been accepted with no-QC inspectio , ,

1 . d .. , . -E In addition to the expanded program for-Lveri,fying operability-of

. manual valves critical.to plant operations,5the licensee had' .

~ initiated.a PM program for all manually operated valves. AP. 650,

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Revision 5, PM Program, Enclosure 6.12, provides a manual valve PM

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selection criteria.- Enclosure 6.12~ categorizes manual valves briefly as.follows:

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Category 1 -

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Valves are identified as being mandatory for inclusion into a

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PM Program. _ These are valves that are required for a safe controlled shutdown of the plant, maintenance of the plan within the shutdown window, placing of the plant in cold shutdown and maintaining it there, and also to mitigate the consequences of a radiological release.

I < Category 2 Group ^A: Valves are identified as being mandatory _for

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inclusion into a PM Program. These valves are in QA Class I-l systems which are required for a safe controlled shutdown of

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the plant, maintenance of the plant within the shutdown window,-

placing the plant.in cold shutdown and maintaining'it there,-

and also to mitigate the consequences of radiological release.

? The licensee has identified all Category 1 valves and stated that corrective maintenance had been performed on Category 1 valve In addition, Category 1 valves will be included in the_PM Program prior

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to restar However, the licensee.further stated-that corrective

maintenance will not be performed on all Category 2A valves nor identified and entered into the PM Program prior to restar The inspector discussed with the maintenance manager the apparent need for a rationale for nonperformance of corrective maintenance on-Category 2A valves prior to restar Pending resolution of- the inspector concerns regarding the expanded

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inspection program for operability of manual valves critical to i plant operaticr. and resolution of inspector concerns regarding the

' corrective and preventative maintenance for Category 2A valves, RV-MA-4 was left ope No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspector Items

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- (Closed) Followup-Item 84-19-05, Maintenance History i Followup Item 84-19-05 noted a lack of a program for following

- maintenance history to assess the adequacy of the maintenance-

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-program, to identify repetitive failuies and to identify' design t

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AP 650, Revision 5,' Preventative Maintenance-(PM) Program,.was- '

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reviewed an'd' discussed 'with!the PM Supervisor (Mechanical).

_ -Paragraph _5.7:of AP-650, Revision 5, contain's requirements for m

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maintaining.a PM_ history file _and for developing a trend analysis -

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a' file. .The PM Supervisor stated that Revision 6 to AP 650,~ currently w in the licensee'ssreview and approval process; would provide .

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additional details regarding review and maintenance of.PM Historical -

file Discussions with_the PM Supervisor indicated,that- .

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implementation of the trend analysis is in proces ~

Reviews.of the procedure and its implementation will be the subject ofifuture NRC-inspections. Follow-up-Item 84-19-05 was close No violations"or deviations were identifie' , (Closed) Follow-up-Item 84-19-09,'"J" Inverter Reliability:

During recovery operations following the March 19,.1984 hydrogen 1 explosion, certain problems were experienced with the NNI. circuits- *

served by the "J" inverter.which was providing a reduced voltage output (90 versus 115 VAC). . Inspection of this inverter by the-licensee revealed that the degraded performance was the result of 5 one blown fuse, two defective; silicon-controlled rectifiers and.one-defective diode. 1The licensee believed that failed components resulted from degraded circuit conditions on both-the load and

supply sides as a result'of the explosion and fire. As corrective' ..

action,Ethe licensee-planned to install- an_ automatic transfer switc '

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to provide an alternate power source for loads normally supplied by'

the "J"_ inverter. Follow-up item 84-19-09 was initiated to follow the above stated licensee corrective action.-

The NRC inspector determined that ECN A-5112 installed the automatic transfer switch that provided an' alternate power. source for loads normally supplied by the "J't inverte However,'ECN R-0927 has ,

since been issued and is scheduled to be completed prior to restar ECN R-0927 deletes -the "S1J" inverter' and the "S1J" inverter automatic transfer switch. ECN R-0927 provides a'new source for

~both the normal and-alternate power supply for NNI. The new-alternate and normal NNI power supply. sources will be switched by-means of an automatic transfer switch'(Bechtel Dwg. E-203 Sh. 100,

' Revision 3 and Sh.-101, Revision 2 - elementary diagram - reactor auxiliaries). Follow-up iter 84-19-05 was close No violations or deviations were. identifie C.- -(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 84-31-02 - Review of November 7, 1984' Plant Heatup Events During a review of three operational problems.that occurred during the November 7, 1984 heat-up, administrative weaknesses were ,.

observed and identified as Follow-up Item 84-31-0 In response to

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.. 6 i the Follow-up Item,' during the exit interview for that inspection, the licensee committed to perform the following:

(1) Perform a thorough review of the events to determine the contributors to the event (2) Use the results of the review as training for Control Room-personne (3) Each Control Room crew will talk over plant status and any

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evolution planned or in progress as soon as possible following shift chang ,

The licensee had performed a review of the three operational

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problems, determined the contributors to the problems and documented this review and corrective action in memorandum NOS 87-51 dated March 16, 1987. The licensee performed a. reasonable revie Memorandum NOM 87-95 dated March 26,' 1987, requires a, review of the three operational problems and contributing factors with all. Control Room personne AP.23.02, Revision 0 (03-06-87 effective date), Shift Turnover, paragraph 6.5, now requires oncoming Control Room crew members to-review and understand a shift relief checklist that include the following items prior to relieving the watc (1) Current plant statu (2) Pertinent testing, procedures, and abnormal lineups / conditions in progres (3) Recent transients or occurrences affecting plant operatio (4) Liquid or gas releases in progres (5) New standing orders or other instructions affecting plant operations.

i (6) Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation and associated time limit (7) Recent procedure change (8) Clearances / Tests / Cautions / Abnormal Tags restricting normal operation of Technical Specification required systems or operating system (9) Major /significant equipment out of service or operating in a

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degraded mod (10) Planned or required evolution E  ; l

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. 7 In addition, paragraph 6.7 requires oncoming crew members that are not required for ongoing evolutions to assemble for a crew meeting where:

The Shift Supervisor should' discuss the content of his Shift Relief Checklis *

. Changes to plant equipment or operating philosophy since the crew has last been on watch should be discusse *

Times required to complete evolutions planned for the current shift and a discussion of major evolution steps should take plac *

Daily work plan items affecting operations should be discusse Conflicting information received by various crew members should be discussed and clarifie Based on the above noted licensee action, inspector follow-up item 84-31-02 was close No violations or deviations were identifie D. (0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-312/85-23-0 Adequacy of Implementation of the IST Program Into Procedures

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This item involves: (1) concerns identified in Inspection Report 50-312/85-23, Section-3(a)-(d)-and'(f) concerning the . implementation of the licensee's IST Program.into surveillance procedures (SPs) and (2) the licensee's commitment in the response, dated September 3, 1985, to a Notice of Violation to revise all SPs to include the logging of instrument identification numbers and calibration dates (with the exception of control room instruments). This inspection addressed item (2).

In response to Notice of Violation 85-23-02, the licensee committed to revise all SPs to require the documentation of calibration data fc/ all instrumentation, other than control room instrumentation, prior-to January 1, 198 As of April 3, 1987, the licensee had not

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completed their program to revise SPs and were working with an inhouse schedule of June 30, 198 The inspector discussed with licensee management that regardless of.the reasons for slipping a schedule date, it is important to keep' track of all commitment schedules and inform the Region of all commitment schedules and inform the Region of all commitment changes. The failure to satisfy a commitment detailed in response.to Notice of Violation 85-23-02 is considered an apparent Deviation. Any licensee response to this item should address the licensee's program for tracking commitment schedules. (Deviation Item 87-11-01, Failure to Meet Commitments Made in Response to an NOV.)

The licensee's program te revise all SPs included the issuance of AP.303A, " Writer's Guide for surveillance procedures," which became

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A effective on. March'20, 1986,-and was revised in'. September 1986. -The

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' inspector reviewed both the original and revision 1 and confirmed that although'there are format differences between them, both

~ revisions assure that, if followed, adequate instrumentation calibration. data would be included in the= surveillance' procedure

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data collection section ,

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This item remains open pending the review of licensee action.for Inspection Report 50-312/85-23, Section 3(a)-(c) and'(f). Section

~3(d) of.that report is currently included in. Unresolved = Item 50-312/86-41-3 .

' (Closed) Onresolved Item 85-23-01, Implementation'of IST SER Into-Surveillance Procedures -4 .

'This item involves three licensee commitments-and NRC contingencies:

regarding ASME Code'Section XI relief requests contained in'the-IS program SER of September 25, 1984,- which had not been incorporated into surveillance procedure Two concerns involving the full stroke testing of RCS-001.and,RCS-002 and partial' stroke testing of CBS-035 and CBS-036 have beenlrecently incorporated into SPs which will be performed prior to startu .The third concern regards bearing temperature measurements of

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centrifugal-pumps without bearing metal or lubricant temperature instrumentation. The licensee requested relief from ASME Code;

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Section XI, paragraph IWP 4310, which requires yearly temperature measurement of centrifugal pump bearings. As an alternative, the-licensee requested permission to use. contact pyrometers. The September 25, 1984, SER granted relief with the condition that fixe bearing temperature measurement locations are specified at the pump _

location for each pump subject to the code and a standard method is utilized for assuring consistent thermo contract between the'

. pyrometer and the surface at the fixed measurement location. -As of

' April 4,1987, although' yearly tests have been required since

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September 1984, this condition had not'been incorporated into .

procedures. ~This item is also identified in the December 1, 1986, or February 12, 1987, Augmented Systems Review and Test Program Inspection (Inspection Report 50-312/86-41) for the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps and will remain unresolved as part of Unresolved Item 50-312/86-41-30. Based on the above, Unresolved Item 85-23-01 is close No violations or deviations were identifie (Closed) Follow-up Item 50-312/84-19-04, Seal Oil Backup Regulator PDCV-80307 The seal oil system backup regulator valve PDCV-80307 provides a backup makeup to the hydrogen side drain regulator tank. Prior to the generator-exciter hydrogen explosion event, PDCV-80307 had been exhibiting erratic behavior and was valved out. The~1icensee's plant trip report concluded that "...it is possible that the backup regulator could have prevented the large hydrogen leak... 0peration l

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.- 9-with the backup regulator valve out should be minimized, but it does-not seem warranted to require. unit shutdown or changes to operating procedures."' The following licensee corrective actions:were reviewed: ,

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(1) The backup regulator which behaved erratic' ally was replaced and

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verified to be operable prior;to-restar In addition, the seal oil system was verified to be in-prop'er working orde (2). Operations Casualty Procedure C.7, Revision 6, " Generator Seal Oil System Failure," was revised to. ensure proper hydrogen side drain regulator tank level is maintained during abnormal seal oil system cond,ition ~

(3) All operations crews were informed of the Casualty Procedure changes and how to implement the (4) Cautien and information signs were placed on the drain ,

regulator-tank to emphasize proper operator action during abnormal condition Based on:the above noted licensee corrective action, Follow-up Item-84-19-03 was close No violations or deviations were identifie (Closed) Follow-up Item 84-19-11, Operator Action Prior to Hydrogen Explosion Event Upon review of the March, 1984 hydrogen explosion' event,'the reviewing NRC inspector noted an apparent miscommunication between an equipment attendant and the control room operator. The equipment

. attendant reported to the control room on two separate occasions that the generator seal oil defoaming tank level bullseye-was '"out-of sight high." However, the operator followed~the action described in the applicable procedure for defoaming tank level " higher _than normal, but still in sight." The inspector requested that the licensee review this occurrence for all possible. lessons to be

' learned in areas of communications, procedures and training and identified this item as Follow-up Item 84-19-1 During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation and actions taken in response to this item. The

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licensee issued a licensed operator reading assignment which summarized the event and noted lessons learned. One of the lessons learned described was the need for improvement of communications between the equipment attendants and the control room. The licensee also revised two operating procedures to incorporate lessons learne The inspector, with the assistance of an equipment attendant, looked at one of the two bullseyes on the defoaming tank. The bullseye is in the high pressure turbine dog house, approximately six feet below

. the turbine pedesta A mirror is positioned adjacent to the

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. 10 bullseye since a direct reading is not feasibl The difficulty to reach and accurately read the bullseye was recommended to be corrected by operations personnel to a restart recommendation review panel. However, this recommendation was determined by the panel to be invali The inspector discussed the bullseye with the turbine generator system engineer emphasizing that a misreading of the bullseye could lead to an unwarranted shutdown or damage to the generator. The system engineer inspected the two bullseyes and concurred with the inspector that design modifications were warranted and initiated action whereby the need for modifications would be incorporated as recommendations in the generator's System Investigation Repor l Based on the above corrective * actions, this item is close No violations or deviations were identifie H. (Closed) Follow-up Item 50-312/84-26-01, HPI-A Pump Breaker Out of l Position On November 13, 1984, the HPI-A pump failed to start from the Control Room due to its 4 KV breaker not being properly been racked in. The breaker which had been racked in by operations was found to have its manual trip push button depressed mechanically preventing the breaker from closing. The licensee was in compliance'with their TS since both the makeup and HPI-B pumps were operable. In addition, the licensee performed the following corrective action:

(1) A description of this incident was placed in NETWORK, an industry issues lis (2) System Operations Procedure A.58 was revised to require that operators verify the breaker trip button is in the untripped position after racking in a breake (3) The licensee has committed to train all operations crews on how to properly rack in a breaker prior to (date).

This item is close No violations or deviations were identifie (0 pen) (Unresolved) Item 50-312/85-31-01, Procedures for USAR Revisions In inspection report 85-31, the inspector identified that in Amendment #2 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), the licensee inadvertently omitted revisions to Section 6.1 related to modifications made to the HPI system although the changes were included in Section 9 of Amendment #2. The licensee committed to review and identify their plans for changing their procedures to improve the accuracy and timeliness of reports of facility modification _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The inspector reviewed the licensee'.s corrective actions which include:~ -

(1) The licensee submitted re' visions to' Amerdment #4 to USAR which .

includes'the modifications to the HPI syste '

(2)- The licensee is in the process of drafting a temporary Nuclear-Directive which will' guide USAR revisions for July 198 (3) The licensee will' create an USAR revision procedure to be used .

for all revisions after 1987. This procedure will include a schedule for full. review of the USAR on a rotating basis.

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This item will remain ~ open pen 6ng review of the Nuclear Directiv No violations or deviations were identifie J. (0 pen) Follow-up Item 50-312/86-17-02, Program to Identify and Calibrate Instrumentation Needed for Abnormal Operations'

In Inspection Report 86-17, the inspector identified a concern that there was no formal program to identify and calibrate instruments which operators might rely on during abnormal plant operations. In response, the licensee ~ committed to establish a program to identify

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those instruments needed for abnormal operations and to include them in a master calibration schedule prior to restar In follow-up of this item, the licensee reviewed nine Systems Operations Procedures, each related to safety-related system Instruments requiring calibration were identified and included in the calibration PM schedule. Since the original commitment was to identify instrumentation needed for abnormal operations, at the exit meeting for this inspection the inspector requested that the licensee. confirm the correlation between the system operations procedures identified and the emergency and appropriate casualty procedures or, if confirmation cannot be made, expand the scope of their investigatio The closure of this item ,is contingent upon the licensee's response.

No violations or deviations were identifie K. (0 pen) Follow-up Item 50-312/86-18-07, Fire Suppression Actuation in the TSC During the December 26, 1985 event, the fire suppression sprinkler system in the Technical Support Center armed and drained several gallons to the floor but did not fully actuate following'the, even The inspector noted that since no system or floor drains existed, there was the potential for serious flooding of the TSC and adjacent areas should the system actuat As corrective action the. licensee has taken two actions:

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. 12 (1) A system drain was installed in the TS The drain-is designed such that it would not provide an air intak (2) The licensee has hired a contractor to study the effects of flooding resulting from fire suppression system actuation in the TSC on safety-related equipmen This item will remain open until the conclusion of the study identified in item (2).

L. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-312/86-21-04, Pressurizer EMOV Block Valve Motor Burnup On July 9, 1986, the pressurizer EMOV block valve (HV 21505) motor operator was energized prior to the completion of maintenance testing and adjustments of the operator limit switche This resulted in the motor actuator wiring smoking and required the replacement of the moto Electrical Maintenance (EM), prior to the completion of their shift, had completed work up to the adjustment of the limit switche The following day EM planned to get a test authorization for the valve to perform the manipulations required to set the limit switche However, instead of signing the " released for test" section of the clearance authorization, which allows valve manipulations, EM signed the " final release" section. This indicated to operations that all work had been completed and valve _was availabl Subsequently, operations used the valve in a surveillance procedure. . Since the limits were not set, the motor did not shut.off when the-valve reached its seat and therefore burned ou '

As immediate corrective action, the licensee replaced the valve moto In addition, the licensee did a visual inspection of the valve and contacted the manufacturer to confirm that the stress placed on the valve was within tolerance and that no damage was incurre According to Procedure AP.4A, " Safe Clearance Procedure Danger Tags," Section G.4, which provides for the " release for test" of systems on a clearance, the Job Supervisor should sign the " release for test" portion of the clearance authorization for Had EM done this instead of signing the " final release" portion of the clearance, the valve would not have been available to operation This item was identified by the licensee as a failure to follow procedure. As lasting corrective action, the licensee added a note to several sections of AP.4A which states, "In all cases, when the

" Final Release" section of the clearance is signed off, that piece of equipment is returned to the Shift Supervisor." In addition, the electrical maintenance supervisor instructed the electricians in the proper use of AP.4A as it applies to test authorization The revisions to AP.4A appears to be sufficient clarification of the consequences of signing the " final release" section of a clearanc In addition, the instruction of EM electricians in the proper use of

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. 13 AP.4A appear to be adequate corrective action since they;are the primary users of . test authorizations. This item is close No violations or, deviations were identifie . Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events (Closed) LER 50-312/80-23-T0 On April 28, 1980, the licensee reported that they had received notification from the manufacturer of the licensee's pressurizer code safety and electromatic valves _ that they would not. provide representation.regarding the reliability and operation of these valves for other than saturated steam service. These valves were intended to pass only saturated steam; however,-events ~ at~other

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utilities have identified situations where water would be the flow media through these. valve .

This~ item was identified as a result'of investigations taken'by the licensee in response to TMI Action Item II.D.1, " Performance'. Testing of Boiling-Water Reactor and Pressurized Water Reactor. Relief and

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Safety Valves." TheLlicensee's follow-up actions related to this item are covered in their responses to itemLII.D.1. Since this item will be. resolved as part of the licensee',s complianceLwith NUREG 0737, LER 80-23 is close No violations or deviations were identifie (Closed) LER 50-312/84-07-LO LER 84-07 reported the reactor trip of February 29, 1984, in which following the removal of "A" RCP at 65% full power and subsequent feedwater instability, a frequency upset in the California grid system and an apparent slower than normal automatic response of the feedwater system led to an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS)

high pressure trip. The frequency upset contributed to_the trip since a grid frequency correction circuit in the ICS logic tried to make up for.the reduction in grid frequency by opening up the-governor valves to increase turbine loa The. operators, who usually take manual control of the feedwater pump when securing one RCP, left the feedwater pumps in automatic since the ICS had

, recently been recalibrated_and new feedwater pump speed controllers installe The inspector reviewed the licensee's trip report referenced in the LER and found the analysis to be comprehensiv Based on recommendations made in the trip report, the licensee took the following corrective actions:

(1) All operations. crews received training on discretion in selecting manual control of major control systems, including feedwater, during planned maneuvers.

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'(2) -In compiling the trip report a lack of data collection systems

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with sampling times greater than 15 seconds was noted. Since then the Interim Data Acquisition and display System (IDADS)

has been placed in operation. IDADS'is capable of one second resolution. As part of the System Status Report, the licensee plans to assess whether the one second resolution capabilities is used to sample the desired plant values for reactor trips and selected transient (3) Feedwater pump speed and feedwater regulation valves were assessed for response speed and ICS tuning was performed in October and December 198 (4) The grid frequency correction circuit was removed since Rancho-Seco's normal mode of operation with all control rods out makes it. undesirable to attempt to control grid' frequenc (5) The trip report recommended that Rancho Seco maintain a grid frequency chart recorder. To satisfy this recommendation the licensee now records main generator frequency at one second intervals using the IDAD Based on the above corrective actions, this item is close No violations or deviations were identifie (Closed) LER 85-25-LI The subject of LER 85-25-LI is the December 26, 1985, RCS overcooling event. The adequacy of the event analysis was addressed as event follow-up item RV-E-18 which was closed in Inspection Report 50-31/86-42. The licensee's corrective actions are enumerated in the Rancho Seco Action Plan-for Performance Improvement. A review of the adequacy.of this program will be completed prior to plant restar This item is closed.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . IE Notices (Closed) IE Notice 85-45 - Potential Seismic Interaction Involving the Movable In-Core Flux 11apping System Used in Westinghouse Designed Plants; Temporary Instruction 2500-16 IE Notice 85-45 identified a potential unreviewed safety question regarding potential seismic interaction involving the movable In-Core Flux Mapping System. The licensee had reviewed the IE

Notice and concluded that it was not applicable to Rancho Seco because it was not a Westinghouse plan Subsequent to the NRC inspectors' inquiry regarding the IE Notice, ~

the licensee performed a more detailed review of the Rancho Seco

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In-Core Flux Mapping System. The Nuclear Engineering Supervisor, a

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Principal Civil Engineer and:the Licensing Supervisor informed the

/. NRC inspector'of the following results and reviewed applicable drawings and. calculations with the_ inspector:.-

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(1)' Rancho Seco has 52. fixed in-core flux mapping detectors that

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are mounted on a reactor building-floo ,

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~ (2') TheIn-CoreFluxMa'ppingISystemhasa-movab1eass'emblythat

. allows movementof.one detector at a' time. The' assembly remains. fixed during3anLentire fuel cycle and'is~only move .between cycle (3) Seismic analysis for the movabl'e assembl'y support structure

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were re-evaluated by the licensee and determined to be

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acceptabl >

The licensee documented the above no'ted information in its closure

. package for.IE Notice 85-45. IE Notice 85-45.and TI 2500/16 was close No violations or deviations were identifie .' ' Determination'of Decay Heat Loss'and Alternate Decay Heat Removal Methods

1. .In preparation for its Decay Heat Outage, the licensee prepared and

. issued the following special test procedures (STP).

STP 1011 Revision 3, Determination of Decay Heat Load

STP 1074 Revision 0, Demonstration of Alternate Decay. Removal'

Methods

.The above noted STP's were reviewed in preparation of the test.~ The NRC'

inspector questioned the licensee controls to assure maintenance of reactor plant boron concentrations. The licensee took-immediate-corrective action by changing the procedure to require greater frequency and added sample points for boron concentration monitoring. The inspector discussed several'other minor procedural comments with the licensee and obtained licensee verbal clarification. The licensee agreed to consider the comments to assure clarity of future procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview

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The' inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 27 and April-3, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector' described'the areas inspected and discussed.in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The following new item was identified during this inspection:

Deviation 87-11-01 - Failure to meet commitments made in response to an Notice of Violation, paragraph :