ML20209J323

Insp Rept 50-312/87-11 on 870323-0403.Deviation Noted: Departure from Util Commitment to Revise Surveillance Procedures to Require Documentation of Calibr Data for Instrumentation

ML20209J323
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	04/16/1987
From:	Ang W, Johnston K, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209J261	List: ML20209J257 ML20209J280 ML20209J323
References
TASK-2.D.1, TASK-TM 50-312-87-11, IEIN-85-045, IEIN-85-45, NUDOCS 8705040260
Download: ML20209J323 (16)

See also: IR 05000312/1987011

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-312/87-11

Docket No. 50-312

License No. DPR-54

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Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

P. O. Box 15830

Sacramento, California 95813

Facility Name: Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)

Inspection Conduct : Mar 23 1987 t April 3, 1987

Inspected by: 1 h/ ~ h

Date Signed'

K/P ng, Pro' - spector

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K.U ston, R

, W) -

Y-lh-h

Date Signed

pMnspector,DiabloCanyon

Approved by: h/ h ~k7

L\ Miller, Chiepoject Section 2 Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on March 23, 1987 to April 3, 1987 (Report No. 50-312/87-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection by a region based inspector

and a resident inspector of licensee action on previously identified

inspector items, ticensee Event Reports, and I. E. Information Notices.

Inspection procedures 30703, 25015, 37703, 37701, 92700, 92701, 92702, and

90712 were covered during this inspection.

Results: In the areas inspected, one deviation from a SMUD commitment to

revise surveillance procedures to require documentation of calibration data

for all instrumentation was identified (paragraph 4.D.).

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DETAILS

1. Personnel Contacted

• W. Bibb, Restart Implementation Manager

• B. Croley, Plant Manager

• B. Day, Deputy Plant Manager

• S. Knight, QA Manager

D. Army, Nuclear Maintenance Manager

• R. Ashley, Licensing Manager-

• R. Little, Licensing Supervisor

• T. Shewski, Quality Engineer

• T. Martin, HVAC Engineer

• J. Janus, HVAC Engineer

• G. Blackburn, SRTP Engineer

• J. Robertson, Nuclear Licensing Engineer

J. Field, SRTP Director

M. Basu, Principal Electrical Engineer

L. Pully, Piping Supervisor Engineer

J. Gaor, Principal Mechanical Engineer

R. Deguch, Principal Civil Engineer

R. Powers, Supervisory Nuclear Engineer

R. Gupta, System Engineer

S. Wallsfry, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer

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C. Loveall, PM Supervisory Mechanic

R. Colombo, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance

• A. D'Angelo, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended the exit meetings.

The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contract

personnel during the inspection. This included plant staff-engineers,

technicians, administrative and clerical assistants.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

A. (0 pen) Violation 86-22-02, Storage of QA Records in Vault

The licensee's response and corrective action for violation 86-22-02

had been previously inspected and inspection findings were

documented in Inspection Report 50-312/87-01. The violation was

left open due to the licensee's response that all QA records would

not be in qualified storage until 1989 and due to the lack of

licensee records to show the adequacy of its corrective action for

the violation.

The NRC inspector met with the QA Manager during this inspection and

reiterated the unacceptability of the licensee's QA records storage

being in continued noncompliance with' Rancho Seco QA Procedure 18,

Revision 2, and NQA-1, Supplement 17 S-1, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix

"B", Criterion XVII.

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The QA' Manager stated.thatiseveral storage'fa'cil'ities hid.been.

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evaluated.since'the last inspection but none had been determined to

, be, acceptable to date. However, the QA Manager, committed to revise

the licensee response.to the violation and committed that the QA

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Lrecords.would be'. stored in-accordance with QA. Procedure <18 by-

restart. Pending further inspection 1to. verify licensee compliance

with its QA Procedures for s'torage of quality: records,-Violation

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86-22-02 was left open.' '

' No'new violations or deviations'were , identified. ,

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- 3. ' Licensee Action on Region Y Open' Items Regarding Inspection Report

50-312/86-07- and the December 26,-1985 Event

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! A. RV - MO-3-(Closed)

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SMUD - 16d(2)

EDO - Supports-3.b. " '

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Establish the Capability for Control Room Control, Independent of

the ICS, of ADVs, TBVs and AFW Flow Control Valves

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. The licensee's closure report'on open Action Item 3.f.4, 5 was

reviewed by Inspection Report- 50-312/86-07. The licensee's. report

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discussed modifications'to-the atmospheric steam dump' valves (ADVs),

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turbine bypass valves .(TBVs) controls and auxiliary feedwater (AFW)-

flow control valves that would allow control'of the ADVs, TBVs and

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AFW control valves independent of the integrated control ~ system

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(ICS) on loss of ICS power. Inspection Report 86-07 found-the_

r licensee's changes to be satisfactory.' However, Lit left the' restart

issues'open for the following reasons:

(1) The design basis report will be reviewed by NRR and until this.

- review is completed, RV-cannot' conclude it's inspection-

activity. This will be provided for by an NRR-Safety.

n Evaluation Report'.

'(2)- The testing of the modifications remains to be' examined. -This

will be inspected by RV. -

(3) Training in the modifications and associated procedure changes

! is still under review.

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i The NRC inspector reviewed the above noted open issues'and

determined the following:

The design basis report.for the EFIC modification is being

- reviewed by NRR and results of the review will be provided by

l NRR in a Safety Evaluation Report.

Testing of the above noted modifications will be inspected

during future NRC inspections.

• Training is currently in progress and has been inspected

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(Inspection Report 50,312/87-06).

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Based on the above, there is reasonable assurance that the remaining

open issues for this item will be provided for. RV-M0-3 was Closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

B. RV - MA-4 (0 pen)

SMUD - 16c(4)

ED0 - 4a

Verify Operability of Manual Valves and Remote Operated Valves.

Perform Inspections to Assure Integrity of Packing and Verify Proper

Assembly of Manual Operators Including Setting of " Neutral" Position

and Mounting Devices

Inspectiw Report 50-312/86-07 documented NRC inspection of the

licensee's inspection, repair and testing of valve FWS-063 and the

inspection and repair of AFW control valve FV-20527. RV-MA-4 was

left open pending completion of the licensee's post maintenance

testing of the AFW control valve and completion of the licensee's

expanded inspection of manual. valve operability.

The NRC inspector reviewed completed maintenance inspection data f

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report (MIDR) for work request No. 105794 (FV-20527 reassembly) and

inspection plan MM-501, Revision 2. The MIDR documented

satisfactory operational testing of FV-20527, both manually

(handwheel) and by means of the air actuator under-static system

conditions. .The AFW system status report, Revision 1 document,

identifies problem (10) - manual operation of AFW control valves

with flow as a priority 1 item, to be completed prior to restart.

STP 1029 is being written and FV-20527 and FV-20528 will be verified

! to be manually operable under high differential pressure conditions

during AFW system flow testing.

The NRC inspector discussed the licensee's expanded inspection

program for manual valve operability with the Preventive

Maintenance (PM) Supervisor (Mechanical) and with the Nuclear

Maintenance Manager. The Operations Department identified 142

manual valves which were critical for plant operations. The

licensee stated that corrective maintentice had been completed on

all 142 valves. In addition, all 142 valves are currently in the PM

program. The inspector reviewed the scope of the program and

selected a sample of work requests to review the inspections and

corrective action performed on the manual valves. The inspector had

the following concerns regarding the expanded inspection program for

manual valve operability:

(1) The licensee did not appear to have a reviewed and approved

document that lists all manual valves which are critical for

plant operations. The list of 142 valves appears to have been

developed by an informal piece-meal process. This list should

be generated by a formal review process and should be reviewed

and approved by appropriate levels of management.

(2) The inspections of the valves appear to have been performed by

maintenance personnel. Many valves appear to have been

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'g accepted as-is or accepted with. minor, lubrication' corrective

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action. ._No signoffs.for individual valve acceptabilit'y appears

.to have been performed. . A majority of the. valves, appear _to: '

have been accepted with no-QC inspection. , ,

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In addition to the expanded program for-Lveri,fying operability-of

. manual valves critical.to plant operations,5the licensee had' .

~ initiated.a PM program for all manually operated valves. AP. 650,

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Revision 5, PM Program, Enclosure 6.12, provides a manual valve PM

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selection criteria.- Enclosure 6.12~ categorizes manual valves

briefly as.follows:

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Category 1 -

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Valves are identified as being mandatory for inclusion into a

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PM Program. _ These are valves that are required for a safe

controlled shutdown of the plant, maintenance of the plant.

within the shutdown window, placing of the plant in cold

shutdown and maintaining it there, and also to mitigate the

consequences of a radiological release.

I < Category 2

Group ^A: Valves are identified as being mandatory _for

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inclusion into a PM Program. These valves are in QA Class I-

l systems which are required for a safe controlled shutdown of

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the plant, maintenance of the plant within the shutdown window,-

placing the plant.in cold shutdown and maintaining'it there,-

and also to mitigate the consequences of radiological release.

? The licensee has identified all Category 1 valves and stated that

corrective maintenance had been performed on Category 1 valves. In

addition, Category 1 valves will be included in the_PM Program prior

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to restart. However, the licensee.further stated-that corrective

maintenance will not be performed on all Category 2A valves nor

identified and entered into the PM Program prior to restart. The

inspector discussed with the maintenance manager the apparent need

for a rationale for nonperformance of corrective maintenance on-

Category 2A valves prior to restart.

Pending resolution of- the inspector concerns regarding the expanded

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inspection program for operability of manual valves critical to

i plant operaticr. and resolution of inspector concerns regarding the

' corrective and preventative maintenance for Category 2A valves,

RV-MA-4 was left open.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspector Items

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A. (Closed) Followup-Item 84-19-05, Maintenance History

i Followup Item 84-19-05 noted a lack of a program for following

- maintenance history to assess the adequacy of the maintenance-

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-program, to identify repetitive failuies and to identify' design

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AP 650, Revision 5,' Preventative Maintenance-(PM) Program,.was- '

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reviewed an'd' discussed 'with!the PM Supervisor (Mechanical).

_ -Paragraph _5.7:of AP-650, Revision 5, contain's requirements for

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maintaining.a PM_ history file _and for developing a trend analysis -

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a' file. .The PM Supervisor stated that Revision 6 to AP 650,~ currently

w in the licensee'ssreview and approval process; would provide .

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additional details regarding review and maintenance of.PM Historical -

files. Discussions with_the PM Supervisor indicated,that- .

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implementation of the trend analysis is in process.

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Reviews.of the

procedure and its implementation will be the subject ofifuture NRC-

inspections. Follow-up-Item 84-19-05 was closed.

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No violations"or deviations were identifie'd. ,

B. (Closed) Follow-up-Item 84-19-09,'"J" Inverter Reliability:

During recovery operations following the March 19,.1984 hydrogen

1 explosion, certain problems were experienced with the NNI. circuits- *

served by the "J" inverter.which was providing a reduced voltage

output (90 versus 115 VAC). . Inspection of this inverter by the-

licensee revealed that the degraded performance was the result of 5

one blown fuse, two defective; silicon-controlled rectifiers and.one-

defective diode. 1The licensee believed that failed components

resulted from degraded circuit conditions on both-the load and

supply sides as a result'of the explosion and fire. As corrective' ..

action,Ethe licensee-planned to install- an_ automatic transfer switch.

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to provide an alternate power source for loads normally supplied by'

the "J"_ inverter. Follow-up item 84-19-09 was initiated to follow

the above stated licensee corrective action.-

The NRC inspector determined that ECN A-5112 installed the automatic

transfer switch that provided an' alternate power. source for loads

normally supplied by the "J't inverter. However,'ECN R-0927 has ,

since been issued and is scheduled to be completed prior to restart.

ECN R-0927 deletes -the "S1J" inverter' and the "S1J" inverter

automatic transfer switch. ECN R-0927 provides a'new source for

~both the normal and-alternate power supply for NNI. The new-

alternate and normal NNI power supply. sources will be switched by-

means of an automatic transfer switch'(Bechtel Dwg. E-203 Sh. 100,

' Revision 3 and Sh.-101, Revision 2 - elementary diagram - reactor

auxiliaries). Follow-up iter 84-19-05 was closed.

No violations or deviations were. identified.

C.- -(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 84-31-02 - Review of November 7,

1984' Plant Heatup Events

During a review of three operational problems.that occurred during

the November 7, 1984 heat-up, administrative weaknesses were ,.

observed and identified as Follow-up Item 84-31-02. In response to

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the Follow-up Item,' during the exit interview for that inspection,

the licensee committed to perform the following:

(1) Perform a thorough review of the events to determine the

contributors to the events.

(2) Use the results of the review as training for Control Room

-personnel.

(3) Each Control Room crew will talk over plant status and any

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evolution planned or in progress as soon as possible following

shift change. ,

The licensee had performed a review of the three operational

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problems, determined the contributors to the problems and documented

this review and corrective action in memorandum NOS 87-51 dated

March 16, 1987. The licensee performed a. reasonable review.

Memorandum NOM 87-95 dated March 26,' 1987, requires a, review of the

three operational problems and contributing factors with all. Control

Room personnel.

AP.23.02, Revision 0 (03-06-87 effective date), Shift Turnover,

paragraph 6.5, now requires oncoming Control Room crew members to-

review and understand a shift relief checklist that include the

following items prior to relieving the watch.

(1) Current plant status.

(2) Pertinent testing, procedures, and abnormal lineups / conditions

in progress.

(3) Recent transients or occurrences affecting plant operation.

(4) Liquid or gas releases in progress.

(5) New standing orders or other instructions affecting plant

operations.

i (6) Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation and

associated time limits.

(7) Recent procedure changes.

(8) Clearances / Tests / Cautions / Abnormal Tags restricting normal

operation of Technical Specification required systems or

operating systems.

(9) Major /significant equipment out of service or operating in a

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degraded mode.

(10) Planned or required evolutions.

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In addition, paragraph 6.7 requires oncoming crew members that are

not required for ongoing evolutions to assemble for a crew meeting

where:

The Shift Supervisor should' discuss the content of his Shift

Relief Checklist.

. Changes to plant equipment or operating philosophy since the

crew has last been on watch should be discussed.

Times required to complete evolutions planned for the current

shift and a discussion of major evolution steps should take

place.

Daily work plan items affecting operations should be discussed.

Conflicting information received by various crew members should

be discussed and clarified.

Based on the above noted licensee action, inspector follow-up item

84-31-02 was closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

D. (0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-312/85-23-03. Adequacy of Implementation

of the IST Program Into Procedures

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This item involves: (1) concerns identified in Inspection Report

50-312/85-23, Section-3(a)-(d)-and'(f) concerning the . implementation

of the licensee's IST Program.into surveillance procedures (SPs) and

(2) the licensee's commitment in the response, dated September 3,

1985, to a Notice of Violation to revise all SPs to include the

logging of instrument identification numbers and calibration dates

(with the exception of control room instruments). This inspection

addressed item (2).

In response to Notice of Violation 85-23-02, the licensee committed

to revise all SPs to require the documentation of calibration data

fc/ all instrumentation, other than control room instrumentation,

prior-to January 1, 1987. As of April 3, 1987, the licensee had not

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completed their program to revise SPs and were working with an

inhouse schedule of June 30, 1987. The inspector discussed with

licensee management that regardless of.the reasons for slipping a

schedule date, it is important to keep' track of all commitment

schedules and inform the Region of all commitment schedules and

inform the Region of all commitment changes. The failure to satisfy

a commitment detailed in response.to Notice of Violation 85-23-02 is

considered an apparent Deviation. Any licensee response to this

item should address the licensee's program for tracking commitment

schedules. (Deviation Item 87-11-01, Failure to Meet Commitments

Made in Response to an NOV.)

The licensee's program te revise all SPs included the issuance of

AP.303A, " Writer's Guide for surveillance procedures," which became

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effective on. March'20, 1986,-and was revised in'. September 1986. -The

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' inspector reviewed both the original and revision 1 and confirmed

that although'there are format differences between them, both

~ revisions assure that, if followed, adequate instrumentation

calibration. data would be included in the= surveillance' procedure

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data collection sections. ,

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This item remains open pending the review of licensee action.for

Inspection Report 50-312/85-23, Section 3(a)-(c) and'(f). Section

~3(d) of.that report is currently included in. Unresolved = Item

50-312/86-41-31. .

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E. (Closed) Onresolved Item 85-23-01, Implementation'of IST SER Into-

Surveillance Procedures -4 .

'This item involves three licensee commitments-and NRC contingencies:

regarding ASME Code'Section XI relief requests contained in'the-IST.

program SER of September 25, 1984,- which had not been incorporated

into surveillance procedures. Two concerns involving the full

stroke testing of RCS-001.and,RCS-002 and partial' stroke testing of

CBS-035 and CBS-036 have beenlrecently incorporated into SPs which

will be performed prior to startup.

.The third concern regards bearing temperature measurements of

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centrifugal-pumps without bearing metal or lubricant temperature

instrumentation. The licensee requested relief from ASME Code;

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Section XI, paragraph IWP 4310, which requires yearly temperature

measurement of centrifugal pump bearings. As an alternative, the

-licensee requested permission to use. contact pyrometers. The

September 25, 1984, SER granted relief with the condition that fixed.

bearing temperature measurement locations are specified at the pump _

location for each pump subject to the code and a standard method is

utilized for assuring consistent thermo contract between the'

. pyrometer and the surface at the fixed measurement location. -As of

' April 4,1987, although' yearly tests have been required since

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September 1984, this condition had not'been incorporated into .

procedures. ~This item is also identified in the December 1, 1986,

or February 12, 1987, Augmented Systems Review and Test Program

Inspection (Inspection Report 50-312/86-41) for the Auxiliary

Feedwater pumps and will remain unresolved as part of Unresolved

Item 50-312/86-41-30. Based on the above, Unresolved Item 85-23-01

is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

F. (Closed) Follow-up Item 50-312/84-19-04, Seal Oil Backup Regulator

PDCV-80307

The seal oil system backup regulator valve PDCV-80307 provides a

backup makeup to the hydrogen side drain regulator tank. Prior to

the generator-exciter hydrogen explosion event, PDCV-80307 had been

exhibiting erratic behavior and was valved out. The~1icensee's

plant trip report concluded that "...it is possible that the backup

regulator could have prevented the large hydrogen leak... 0peration

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-with the backup regulator valve out should be minimized, but it does

-not seem warranted to require. unit shutdown or changes to operating

procedures."' The following licensee corrective actions:were

reviewed: ,

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(1) The backup regulator which behaved erratic' ally was replaced and

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verified to be operable prior;to-restart. In addition, the

seal oil system was verified to be in-prop'er working order.

(2). Operations Casualty Procedure C.7, Revision 6, " Generator Seal

Oil System Failure," was revised to. ensure proper hydrogen side

drain regulator tank level is maintained during abnormal seal

oil system cond,itions.

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(3) All operations crews were informed of the Casualty Procedure

changes and how to implement them.

-(4) Cautien and information signs were placed on the drain ,

regulator-tank to emphasize proper operator action during

abnormal conditions.

Based on:the above noted licensee corrective action, Follow-up Item-

84-19-03 was closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

G. (Closed) Follow-up Item 84-19-11, Operator Action Prior to Hydrogen

Explosion Event

Upon review of the March, 1984 hydrogen explosion' event,'the

reviewing NRC inspector noted an apparent miscommunication between

an equipment attendant and the control room operator. The equipment

. attendant reported to the control room on two separate occasions

that the generator seal oil defoaming tank level bullseye-was '"out-

of sight high." However, the operator followed~the action described

in the applicable procedure for defoaming tank level " higher _than

normal, but still in sight." The inspector requested that the

licensee review this occurrence for all possible. lessons to be

' learned in areas of communications, procedures and training and

identified this item as Follow-up Item 84-19-11.

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's

investigation and actions taken in response to this item. The

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licensee issued a licensed operator reading assignment which

summarized the event and noted lessons learned. One of the lessons

learned described was the need for improvement of communications

between the equipment attendants and the control room. The licensee

also revised two operating procedures to incorporate lessons

learned.

The inspector, with the assistance of an equipment attendant, looked

at one of the two bullseyes on the defoaming tank. The bullseye is

in the high pressure turbine dog house, approximately six feet below

. the turbine pedestal. A mirror is positioned adjacent to the

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bullseye since a direct reading is not feasible. The difficulty to

reach and accurately read the bullseye was recommended to be

corrected by operations personnel to a restart recommendation review

panel. However, this recommendation was determined by the panel to

be invalid. The inspector discussed the bullseye with the turbine

generator system engineer emphasizing that a misreading of the

bullseye could lead to an unwarranted shutdown or damage to the

generator. The system engineer inspected the two bullseyes and

concurred with the inspector that design modifications were

warranted and initiated action whereby the need for modifications

would be incorporated as recommendations in the generator's System

Investigation Report. l

Based on the above corrective * actions, this item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

H. (Closed) Follow-up Item 50-312/84-26-01, HPI-A Pump Breaker Out of l

Position

On November 13, 1984, the HPI-A pump failed to start from the

Control Room due to its 4 KV breaker not being properly been racked

in. The breaker which had been racked in by operations was found to

have its manual trip push button depressed mechanically preventing

the breaker from closing. The licensee was in compliance'with their

TS since both the makeup and HPI-B pumps were operable. In

addition, the licensee performed the following corrective action:

(1) A description of this incident was placed in NETWORK, an

industry issues list.

(2) System Operations Procedure A.58 was revised to require that

operators verify the breaker trip button is in the untripped

position after racking in a breaker.

(3) The licensee has committed to train all operations crews on how

to properly rack in a breaker prior to (date).

This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

I. (0 pen) (Unresolved) Item 50-312/85-31-01, Procedures for USAR

Revisions

In inspection report 85-31, the inspector identified that in

Amendment #2 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), the

licensee inadvertently omitted revisions to Section 6.1 related to

modifications made to the HPI system although the changes were

included in Section 9 of Amendment #2. The licensee committed to

review and identify their plans for changing their procedures to

improve the accuracy and timeliness of reports of facility

modifications.

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The inspector reviewed the licensee'.s corrective actions which

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(1) The licensee submitted re' visions to' Amerdment #4 to USAR which .

includes'the modifications to the HPI system.

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(2)- The licensee is in the process of drafting a temporary Nuclear-

Directive which will' guide USAR revisions for July 1987.

(3) The licensee will' create an USAR revision procedure to be used .

for all revisions after 1987. This procedure will include a

schedule for full. review of the USAR on a rotating basis.

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This item will remain ~ open pen 6ng review of the Nuclear Directive.

No violations or deviations were identified.

J. (0 pen) Follow-up Item 50-312/86-17-02, Program to Identify and

Calibrate Instrumentation Needed for Abnormal Operations'

In Inspection Report 86-17, the inspector identified a concern that

there was no formal program to identify and calibrate instruments

which operators might rely on during abnormal plant operations. In

response, the licensee ~ committed to establish a program to identify

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those instruments needed for abnormal operations and to include them

in a master calibration schedule prior to restart.

In follow-up of this item, the licensee reviewed nine Systems

Operations Procedures, each related to safety-related systems.

Instruments requiring calibration were identified and included in

the calibration PM schedule. Since the original commitment was to

identify instrumentation needed for abnormal operations, at the exit

meeting for this inspection the inspector requested that the

licensee. confirm the correlation between the system operations

procedures identified and the emergency and appropriate casualty

procedures or, if confirmation cannot be made, expand the scope of

their investigation.

The closure of this item ,is contingent upon the licensee's response.

No violations or deviations were identified.

K. (0 pen) Follow-up Item 50-312/86-18-07, Fire Suppression Actuation

in the TSC

During the December 26, 1985 event, the fire suppression sprinkler

system in the Technical Support Center armed and drained several

gallons to the floor but did not fully actuate following'the, event.

The inspector noted that since no system or floor drains existed,

there was the potential for serious flooding of the TSC and adjacent

areas should the system actuate.

As corrective action the. licensee has taken two actions:

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(1) A system drain was installed in the TSC. The drain-is designed

such that it would not provide an air intake.

(2) The licensee has hired a contractor to study the effects of

flooding resulting from fire suppression system actuation in

the TSC on safety-related equipment.

This item will remain open until the conclusion of the study

identified in item (2).

L. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-312/86-21-04, Pressurizer EMOV Block

Valve Motor Burnup

On July 9, 1986, the pressurizer EMOV block valve (HV 21505) motor

operator was energized prior to the completion of maintenance

testing and adjustments of the operator limit switches. This

resulted in the motor actuator wiring smoking and required the

replacement of the motor.

Electrical Maintenance (EM), prior to the completion of their shift,

had completed work up to the adjustment of the limit switches. The

following day EM planned to get a test authorization for the valve

to perform the manipulations required to set the limit switches.

However, instead of signing the " released for test" section of the

clearance authorization, which allows valve manipulations, EM signed

the " final release" section. This indicated to operations that all

work had been completed and valve _was available. Subsequently,

operations used the valve in a surveillance procedure. . Since the

limits were not set, the motor did not shut.off when the-valve

reached its seat and therefore burned out. '

As immediate corrective action, the licensee replaced the valve

motor. In addition, the licensee did a visual inspection of the

valve and contacted the manufacturer to confirm that the stress

placed on the valve was within tolerance and that no damage was

incurred.

According to Procedure AP.4A, " Safe Clearance Procedure Danger

Tags," Section G.4, which provides for the " release for test" of

systems on a clearance, the Job Supervisor should sign the " release

for test" portion of the clearance authorization form. Had EM done

this instead of signing the " final release" portion of the

clearance, the valve would not have been available to operations.

This item was identified by the licensee as a failure to follow

procedure. As lasting corrective action, the licensee added a note

to several sections of AP.4A which states, "In all cases, when the

" Final Release" section of the clearance is signed off, that piece

of equipment is returned to the Shift Supervisor." In addition, the

electrical maintenance supervisor instructed the electricians in the

proper use of AP.4A as it applies to test authorizations.

The revisions to AP.4A appears to be sufficient clarification of the

consequences of signing the " final release" section of a clearance.

In addition, the instruction of EM electricians in the proper use of

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AP.4A appear to be adequate corrective action since they;are the

primary users of . test authorizations. This item is closed.

No violations or, deviations were identified.

5. Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events

A. (Closed) LER 50-312/80-23-T0

On April 28, 1980, the licensee reported that they had received

notification from the manufacturer of the licensee's pressurizer

code safety and electromatic valves _ that they would not. provide

representation.regarding the reliability and operation of these

valves for other than saturated steam service. These valves were

intended to pass only saturated steam; however,-events ~ at~other

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utilities have identified situations where water would be the flow

media through these. valves. .

This~ item was identified as a result'of investigations taken'by the

licensee in response to TMI Action Item II.D.1, " Performance'. Testing

of Boiling-Water Reactor and Pressurized Water Reactor. Relief and

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Safety Valves." TheLlicensee's follow-up actions related to this

item are covered in their responses to itemLII.D.1. Since this item

will be. resolved as part of the licensee',s complianceLwith NUREG

0737, LER 80-23 is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

B. (Closed) LER 50-312/84-07-LO

LER 84-07 reported the reactor trip of February 29, 1984, in which

following the removal of "A" RCP at 65% full power and subsequent

feedwater instability, a frequency upset in the California grid

system and an apparent slower than normal automatic response of the

feedwater system led to an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS)

high pressure trip. The frequency upset contributed to_the trip

since a grid frequency correction circuit in the ICS logic tried to

make up for.the reduction in grid frequency by opening up the-

governor valves to increase turbine load. The. operators, who

usually take manual control of the feedwater pump when securing one

RCP, left the feedwater pumps in automatic since the ICS had

, recently been recalibrated_and new feedwater pump speed controllers

installed.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's trip report referenced in the

LER and found the analysis to be comprehensive. Based on

recommendations made in the trip report, the licensee took the

following corrective actions:

(1) All operations. crews received training on discretion in

selecting manual control of major control systems, including

feedwater, during planned maneuvers.

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'(2) -In compiling the trip report a lack of data collection systems

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with sampling times greater than 15 seconds was noted. Since

then the Interim Data Acquisition and display System (IDADS)

has been placed in operation. IDADS'is capable of one second

resolution. As part of the System Status Report, the licensee

plans to assess whether the one second resolution capabilities

is used to sample the desired plant values for reactor trips

and selected transients.

(3) Feedwater pump speed and feedwater regulation valves were

assessed for response speed and ICS tuning was performed in

October and December 1985.

(4) The grid frequency correction circuit was removed since Rancho

-Seco's normal mode of operation with all control rods out makes

it. undesirable to attempt to control grid' frequency.

(5) The trip report recommended that Rancho Seco maintain a grid

frequency chart recorder. To satisfy this recommendation the

licensee now records main generator frequency at one second

intervals using the IDADS.

Based on the above corrective actions, this item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

C. (Closed) LER 85-25-LI

The subject of LER 85-25-LI is the December 26, 1985, RCS

overcooling event. The adequacy of the event analysis was addressed

as event follow-up item RV-E-18 which was closed in Inspection

Report 50-31/86-42. The licensee's corrective actions are

enumerated in the Rancho Seco Action Plan-for Performance

Improvement. A review of the adequacy.of this program will be

completed prior to plant restart.

This item is closed.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

6. IE Notices

A. (Closed) IE Notice 85-45 - Potential Seismic Interaction Involving

the Movable In-Core Flux 11apping System Used in Westinghouse

Designed Plants; Temporary Instruction 2500-16

IE Notice 85-45 identified a potential unreviewed safety question

regarding potential seismic interaction involving the movable

In-Core Flux Mapping System. The licensee had reviewed the IE

Notice and concluded that it was not applicable to Rancho Seco

because it was not a Westinghouse plant.

Subsequent to the NRC inspectors' inquiry regarding the IE Notice, ~

the licensee performed a more detailed review of the Rancho Seco

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In-Core Flux Mapping System. The Nuclear Engineering Supervisor, a

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Principal Civil Engineer and:the Licensing Supervisor informed the

/. NRC inspector'of the following results and reviewed applicable

drawings and. calculations with the_ inspector:.-

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(1)' Rancho Seco has 52. fixed in-core flux mapping detectors that

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are mounted on a reactor building-floor.

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~ (2') TheIn-CoreFluxMa'ppingISystemhasa-movab1eass'emblythat

. allows movementof.one detector at a' time. The' assembly

remains. fixed during3anLentire fuel cycle and'is~only moved.

.between cycles.

(3) Seismic analysis for the movabl'e assembl'y support structure

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were re-evaluated by the licensee and determined to be

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acceptable. >

The licensee documented the above no'ted information in its closure

. package for.IE Notice 85-45. IE Notice 85-45.and TI 2500/16 was

closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.' ' Determination'of Decay Heat Loss'and Alternate Decay Heat Removal Methods

1. .In preparation for its Decay Heat Outage, the licensee prepared and

. issued the following special test procedures (STP).

STP 1011 Revision 3, Determination of Decay Heat Load

STP 1074 Revision 0, Demonstration of Alternate Decay. Removal'

Methods

.The above noted STP's were reviewed in preparation of the test.~ The NRC'

inspector questioned the licensee controls to assure maintenance of

reactor plant boron concentrations. The licensee took-immediate

-corrective action by changing the procedure to require greater frequency

and added sample points for boron concentration monitoring. The

inspector discussed several'other minor procedural comments with the

licensee and obtained licensee verbal clarification. The licensee agreed

to consider the comments to assure clarity of future procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Exit Interview

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The' inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 27 and

April-3, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The

inspector' described'the areas inspected and discussed.in detail the

inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the

licensee. The following new item was identified during this inspection:

Deviation 87-11-01 - Failure to meet commitments made in response to

an Notice of Violation, paragraph 4.0.