ML20203G432

Forwards Util 860218 Response to Western Reserve Alliance 860204 Petition Under 10CFR2.206 Re State of Oh 860131 Earthquake,Integrity of Plant Qa/Qc Program & Util Compliance w/10CFR140

ML20203G432
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	02/19/1986
From:	Kaplan A CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20203G426	List: IR 05000440/1986007 ML20203G421 ML20203G432
References
NUDOCS 8604290069
Download: ML20203G432 (2)

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s P.O. SOX s7 e PERMY. OMeO 44041 e TELEPHONE (sts) s5s-3737 e ADDRESS.10 CENTER ROAD Serving The Best location in the Nation Al Kaplan PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WICE PRES 3 DENT teUCLEAR oPERATONS DfVISION February 19, 1986 PY-CE1/01E-0171 L Mr. James G. Esppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Ill. 60137 Perry Nuclear Power Plant

.. Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Response to Western Reserve Alliance 10 CFR 2.206 Petition

Dear Mr. Esppler:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company's February 18, 1986 response to the petition filed by Western Reserve Alliance ("WRA") with the NRC Commissioners on February 4, 1986, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. WRA's petition raised issues relating to (1) the January 31, 1986 Ohio earthquake; (2) the integrity of the Perry Quality Assurar.ce/ Quality Control Program, based on allegations est forth in WRA's Petition; and (3)

CEI's compliance with 10 CFR Part 140 in light of the proposed affiliation of CEI and The Toledo Edison Company ("TE").

The enclosed response demonstrates that WRA's Petition fails to meet the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 2.206 and of the Commission's Statement of Policy: Handling of Late Allegations, 50 Fed. Reg. 11030 (1985). WRA's assertions regarding the' January 31, 1986 earthquake are not supported by any technical justification, and are without merit, as diecussed in the attached response and in CEI's Seismic Event Evaluation (February 1986). Similarly. WRA raised no facts that would support its generalised assertions about CEI's ability to comply with 10 CFR Part 140. Finally, CEI has conducted detailed reviews of the 48 allegations set forth in WRA's Petition. As discussed in our response, the allegations are not timely, and fail to raise material or new

• safety issues requiring further review.

8604290069 860422 PDR ADOCK 05000440 0 PDR

James G. Esppler February 19, 1986 PY-CEI/01E-0171 L To summarise, CEI has reviewed WRA's Petition la detail. The enclosed response demonstrates that WRA's Petition is without basis and does not raise safety issues. My staff and I are available to discuss any aspect of this matter with you and your staff.

Very truly ours A. Kaplan Vice President Nuclear Operations Division Enclosures AK:nj e ec: J. Grobe h

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wanav w.ei.Asse coct February 18, 1986 Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino commissioner James K. Asselstine U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.'C. 20555 Re: The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2)

Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-441

Dear Commissioners:

This letter is in response to the February 4, 1985 peti-tion of Mr. Donald L. Schlemmer, submitted on behalf of Western hoserve Alliance ("WRA") pursuant to 10 C.F.R. l 2.206, regard-iny the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (" Perry"). WRA's Petition requests the NRC to take the following actions:

1. Require the complete and permanent closure of the Perry nuclear plants because of the Perry plants' inadequate seismic design.

CEI and the NRC set the standards for the Perry plants' ability to withstand gravita-tional forces well-below the actual gravi-tational forces that the plants are being subjected to d.tring actual earthquakes.

This was clearly demonstrated during the earthquake of January 31, 1986.

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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 2

2. Require an independent design and construc-tion verification program (IDVCP) to assess the integrity of the Perry One and Perry Two site quality assurance (QA) programs and its implementation because the Cleveland Illuminating Company [ sic] (CEI) and its contractors have failed to imple-ment an acceptable design and construction program for the Perry One and Perry Two nuclear plants that meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B.

3. Review the Application before the Securi-ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Cen-terior Energy Corporation (CEC) (formerly which seeks, by its North Holding the application, Company),

SEC s approval to acquire all of the outstanding shares of the Clevelant' Flectric Illuminating Company (CEI) and Toledo Edison (TE), Ohio corpora-

'tions, and approval of the related mergers by which the transactions will be effectu-ated."

For the reasons discussed below, WRA's 5 2.206 Petition is without basis and should be denied in all respects.

I. Section 2.206 Rectirements WRA's Petition is filed under i 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. Section 2.206 permits any person to file a re-quest for the NRC Staff 1/ to institute a proceeding pursuant to i i 2.202 to modify, suspend or revoke a license,.or for such 1/ Section 2.206 provides for requests to be " addressed to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the Director, Office of Inspec-tion and Enforcement, as appropriate." See 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206(a). Thus, WRA's Petition should not have been addressed to NRC Commissioners in the first instance.

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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 3 other action as may be proper. 10 C.F.R. I 2.206(a). Section 2.206(a) states that "[t]he requests shall specify the action requested and set forth the facts that constitute the basis for the request." Id. (emphasis added). l i

As demonstrated below, WRA's Petition is grounded on  ;

unsupported, unspecified assertions. The Petition fails to set  ;

forth " facts that constitute the basis for the request," as re- .

quired by 10 C.F.R. I 2.206. Nor does the Petition provide a basis to believe that there are violations of Commission reg-ulations, potentially hazardous conditions, or other facts which would constitute sufficient grounds for the Staff to in-stitute a 5 2.202 proceeding.

Further, petitions filed pursuant to i 2.206 which are grounded on late-filed allegations are governed by the Commis- 1 sion's Statement of Policy: Handling of Late Allegations, 50  !

Fed. Reg. 11030 (1985). See Union Electric Company (Callaway

Plant, Unit 1), DD-85-7, 21 N.R.C. 1552 (1985). As discussed below, WRA's late-filed allegations, set forth in Section III of the Petition, were not promptly raised.2/ The allegations j raise issues that "are not material to any licensing decision ,

e or which on their face or after initial inquiry are determined to be frivolous or too vague or general in nature to provide l sufficient information for the staff to investigate,"3/ as well ,

j as issues that are not "new in the sense of raising a matter  !

I' not previously considered or tending to corroborate previously received but not yet resolved allegations."4/ Thus, WRA's t

2/ See 50 Fed. Reg. at 11031.

l 3/ Id. See Attachment 1, Exhibit A, items 1=14, 18-22, i i 24-28, 30, 32-33, 35, 38-39, 41-47 (raising frivolous, vague or l general allegations without sufficient information to investi-l gate); items 23, 29, 34, 37 (raising commercial or other issues l

! unrelated to licensing).

I 4/ Id. Seeissues Attachment 1, Exhibit A, items 15-17, 31, 36, 40, that were previously investigated and re-48 (raisir solved by EI and the NRC).  :

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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 4 allegations are neither material nor new, as defined by the Commission's Statement of Policy, and therefore do not merit further review.

Even if the Staff were to apply the screening criteria for further review of new and material issues, set forth in the Statement of Policy, for the reasone discussed below and in Attachment 1 hereto, the allegations are not " correct," under screening criterion No. 1.5/ Similarly, for the reasons set forth in CEI's responses to WRA's allegations, WRA has failed to raise a significant safety concern. Accordingly, there is no basis for the Staff to give " prompt consideration of the al-legation recognizing the public interest in avoiding undue delay," under screening criterion No. 2 of the Policy State-ment. 6/ ,

Thus, for the reasons set forth in this latter, WRA has failed to satisfy the applicable Commission regulations and Policy Statement governing i 2.206 petitions and late-filed al-legations.

5/ Under screening criterion No. 1 of the Statement of Poli-cy, the Staff is to assess "[t]he likelihood that the allega-tion is correct, taking into consideration all available information including the apparent level of knowledge, exper-time and reliability of the individual submitting the allega-tion in terms of the allegation submitted and the possible ex-istence of more credible contrary information." 50 Fed. Reg.

at 11031. WRA's bare, unsupported, unsworn allegations do not l

even attempt to establish the level of knowledge, expertise and i reliability of the individual submitting the allegations. As

( discussed below, WRA's failure to submit timely its allegations further calls into question its credibility in raising allega-tions at this late date. The extensive CEI and NRC information

• available, as identified in the attached affidavit of Timothy A. Boss, constitutes "more credible contrary information," id.,

demonstrating that WRA's allegations are not correct.

6/ 50 Fed. Reg. at 11032.

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SHAw, PITTMAN. PoTTs & Tnowenicot

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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 5 II. Seismic Design WRA makes a number of unsupported claims with respect to an earthquake that occurred in the vicinity of the Perry Plant on January 31, 1986. WRA asserts the following:

1. The Perry plants were designed to withstand extremely minimal gravitational forces (.15). The earthquake of January 31, 1986 subjected the Perry plants to substantially greater gravitational forces than the plants were designed to withstand (.19; .23; .25).

2. The epicenter of the January 31, 1985 (sic] earth-quake was extremely close to the Perry nuclear plants. ,,

3. The Perry plant site is literally on a fault line.

4. CEI filled the fault line with cement and said it was a glacial scar.

5. CEI built the plant at this dangerous location over the objections of consumer groups who raised the earthquake and fault line issue most vigorously.

6. A fault line can move at any time no matter how new or old.

7. Because of the vibration and ground acceleration, the soil conditions at the Perry site subject the plant to greater degrees of gravitational forces than would occur in other parts of the world.

Petition at 4 n.2. The Petition also contains the following statement:

The Perry nuclear plants are built on a fault line that WRA contends is not a glacial scar. WRA contends that there will be more earthquakes of a greater magnitude.

The epicenters of these quakes may be even closer to the Perry plants. The current i

,_.c CHAW. PITTMAN, PoTTs 8. Tmowsmioot

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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 6 delay in determining what the devices are that measure the gravitional forces is in-dicative of the shoddy attitude with which CEI. constructed these plants. The current reports that these devices can only be read and interpreted by the vendors is most dis-turbing. Also, the delay in getting this information makes a reasonable person highly suspicious of the credibility of both CEI and the NRC.

Petition at 6. The Petition contains no technical support of justification for these assertions, which are without basis.

CEI and its geological, seismological, structural and equipment consultants ha'e v completed a detailed analysis of the

January 31, 1986 earthquake, including an analysis of the in-

pact of the earthquake on Perry plant structures and components and on the design capability of the Plant. A copy of CEI's report on the results of its reviews has been filed with the NRC Staff and placed on the Perry docket. See Seismic Event Evaluation Report, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Docket Nos.

50-440; 50-441, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (February 1986) (" Seismic Event Evaluation"). CEI orally presented its findings to the NRC Staff on February 11, 1986, and to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on February 12 and 13.

As set forth in CEI's Seismic Event Evaluation, the earth-quake I.

1) did not adversely affect the plant structures, systems or components,

! 2) was within the design capability of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, and (3) does not change the licensing basis or

.' conclusions regarding the site geolo-i gy, seismology or design basis earth-quake.

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SHAw, PITTMAN. PoTTs 6 TRowsRIDGE

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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986

? Page 7 Seismic Event Evaluation at i 1.0, As discussed in CEI's report, the earthquake was of smaller magnitude (4.96, based on USGS data) and intensity (VI, based on preliminary evaluation of survey data) than the postulated earthquake used as the basis for the plant's seismic design (intensity 5.3 + .5 and magnitude VII). The many safety and non-safety related systems which were operating or energized at the time of the earthquake responded in accordance with this design. Extensive plant

< walkdowns and inspections revealed no structural or equipnent damage. And while certain recorded response spectra exceeded the design response spectra in the high frequency range, ex-coedances are expected given the analytical methods of Regula-tory Guide 1.60 and are of no engineering significance.

WRA's alleged " fault line" on ohe Ferry site that CEI

" filled in . . . with cument and said it was a glacial scar" was examined in detail both at the construction permit stage and at the operating license stage. During the site excava-tion, CEI discovered and reported to the NRC geologic anomalies consisting of a series of minor folds and shallow faults.

Based on thorough examination, CEI, the NRC Staff, and geolo-gists from the USGS and the Corps of Engineers unanimously con-cluded that these geologic structures were nontactonic and are unrelated to any

deep-seated crustal origin. Therefore, we

conclude that these features pose no safety threat to the facility.

i Supp. 3 to the NRC Staff Safety Evaluation (November 1975).

l The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board agreed, finding that the geologic anomalies (a) are non-tectonic in origin, (b)'are the result of glacial activity, and (c) cannot be expected to cause earthquakes.

?

! Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power

- Plant), ALAB-449, 6 N.R.C. 884 (1977). The Staff has restated

• this conclusion in the operating license stage Safety Evalua-

tion report, NUREG-0887 (May 1982) at 2 2-23. The January l

31 earthquake provides nothing which would change this i

i

SHAw, PITTMAN. POTTs & TmowsmlDGE AL. __Z Chairman Nurzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts ,

Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal i Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 i Page 8 conclusion. Certainly, WRA has pointed to no basis for challenging the scientific and technical opinions reached by  !

CEI, its consultants, the NRC Staff, the USGS, the Corps of En- ,

gineers and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board.7/

III. Integrity of the Perry Quality Assurance Program WRA's last-minute allegations regarding the Perry con-struction quality assurance / quality control ("QA/QC") program (Petition at 6-11) are untimely and without any basis. Section III of the Petition states that it contains "a list of allega-tions and documentation!/ given to GAP 9/ by various whis-tieblowers through the course of its investigations regarding l the Perry plants." Petition ac 6 (emphasis added). Thus, WRA does not even attempt.to demonstrate that it has satisfied its duty under the Commissich's Statement of Policy to bring its i

7/ See Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill

[

l Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), DD-79-21, 10 N.R.C.

717, 719 n.3 (1979) (parties must be prevented from using 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 procedures as a vehicle for reconsideration of f

issues previously decided).

f g/ Applicants obtained a copy of WRA's Petition after reading about it in Ohio newspapers and requesting a copy from Mr.

Schlemmer and from the NRC Staff. Applicants received copies l of Mr. Schlemmer's letter from Mr. Schlemmer and from the l

Staff. The copies received contain no " documentation" other than Mr. Schlemmer's 11-page letter. Although the letter contains references to " affidavits" (Petition at 7) and to

" documentation" submitted by the Government Accountability l Project (" GAP") (Petition at 4 n.1), Applicants have no knowl-l edge concerning any such affidavits or documentation.

l 9/ The Petition states that " CAP has been advising and as-l sisting WRA in regard to dealing with the numerous allegations made by the large number of whistleblowers that contacted WRA,"

and that GAP is playing "the lead role . . . in investigating l

r and submitting the allegations and documentation regarding the Perry site." Petition at 4 & n.1.

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Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 9 purported safety concerns "promptly to the attention of the applicant or licensee," or "directly to the NRC."10/ Nor are the allegations " specific and documented to the fullest extent possible,"11/ as the Policy Statement requires. Indeed, as noted above, many of the allegations are so vague as to pre-clude any but the most general response.

Last year, after reading press reports discussing allega-tions by Mr. Schlemmer, CEI's " Call For Quality" Ombudsman 12/

wrote to Mr. Schlemmer on CEI 1985, to request details con-Julys9,Ombudsman carning the allegations. stressed the impor-tance of examining the claimed defects in the construction of the plant, and emphasized that it was not necessary for WRA to idantify the individuals who may have provided information to WRA. See Attachment I and Exhibit "C" hereto. Mr. Schlemmer and Ms. Billie Pirner Ga'rde of GAP responded to the Ombudsman's letter but refused to supply further details. See Attachment 1, Exhibits "D" and "E". The Ombudsman made a second request to Mr. Schlemmer and Ms. Garde for information (see Attachment 1, Exhibit "F" hereto), but received no response.

10/ 50 Fed. Reg. at 11031.

11/ Id.

12/ CEI's Call for Quality program, instituted in 1984, en-courages workers to contact the Perry Plant ombudsman on a con-fidential basis if the workers are aware of any conditions which they believe might affect the safety of the plant. See Attachment "1" and Exhibit "F" hereto (Affidavit and letter of Timothy A. Boss). The Call For Quality Program was instituted prior to the Commission's official endorsement of such programs in Statement of Policy: Handling of Late Allegations. See 50 Fed. Reg. at 11031 n.1. ("The Commission encourages the estab-lishment of programs by utilities for the purpose of identi-fying and resolving allegations affecting safety in a timely manner as design and construction of a nuclear facility pro-coeds.")

4 SMAw. PITTMAN. PoTTs & TRowsRIDGE Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 10 Thus, the timing of WRA's Petition is highly suspect and seems to be little more than a thinly disguised attempt to delay fuel load. Since WRA and GAP have apparently known of allegations concerning the Perry construction program for some time, there is no justification for their failure to have dis-closed any concerns to CEI and the Commission prior to the com-plation of construction, so that CEI and the NRC could have in-vestigated the concerns and taken any necessary corrective action. Such considerations are the basis for the Commission's requirement in its Statement of Policy that allegations be promptly disclosed to the applicant or to the NRC.13/

The WRA/ GAP excuse for failing to disclose safety concerns to CEI, i.e., that management cannot be trusted to respond in good faith to safety conc, erns, see Attachment 1, Exhibits D and E, is unsupported by facts supplied by WRA in its Petition and is belied by the record of management responsiveness and con-corn for quality at Perry. Moreover, the Atomic Safety and Li-consing Board, after hearing extensive testimony on CEI's qual-ity assurance program, concluded that the program "has prevented, and will continue to prevent, unsafe conditions at

the plant."14/ This well-founded conclusion contradicts WRA's unsupported allegations concerning CEI's management of hte QA/QC program at Perry.

' For these reasons, and for the reasons discussed in Sec-tion I of this letter, and in Attachment 1 and Exhibit A i hereto, the allegations in WRA's Petition (1) are not timely; i (2) fail to raise material or new issues; and (3) are incor-I rect, and fail to raise safety issues. Thus, contrary to WRA's assertion at pages 1, 5 of the Petition, there is no basis for i the Staff to require a further design and construction re-l view 15/ to assess the integrity of the Perry QA/QC program.

l 13/ 50 Fed. Rev. at 11031 & n.1.

• i

! 14/ See LBP-83-77, 18 N.R.C. 1365 (1983), affirmed ALAB-802, j 21 N.R.C. 490 (1985).

15/ See Attachment 1, Exhibit A, items 1, 2, 21-22, 38, 41, 43 discussing examples of the extensive, multi-layered CEI and NRC (Continued next page) i i-

SHAw. PITTMAN. PoTTs 6. TaowsmiooE

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c =oac Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal

-Commissioner.Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 11 IV. 10 CFR Part 140 The third part of WRA's letter requests NRC to review the application pending before the Securities and Exchange Commis-sion to permit the formation of a holding company (Centerior Energy Corporation) which will own all the common stock of CEI and The Toledo Edison Company (TE). WRA argues without support that the proposed application between CEI and TE "will result in the violation of 10 CFR Part 140."

CEI has kept the NRC Staff fully informed as to the pro-posed CEI-TE affiliation. By letters dated August 14, 1985, November 13, 1985, January 8, 1986, January 31, 1986 and February 13, 1986, we.have forwarded to the NRC the relevant CEI and TE filings with'the SEC. By letter to the NRC Staff dated December 20, 1985, CEI further explained how the proposed affiliation would affect the management of the Perry plant.

WRA's allegations lack both specifica and an awareness of

• the requirements of 10 CFR Part 140. These regulations re-quire, for an operating nuclear power reactor, that the licensee maintain $160 million in financial protection plus secondary financial protection in the form of private liability

. insurance available under an industry retrospective rating plan i providing for deferred premiums. CEI has in force liability insurance policies (American Nuclear Insurers Policy No. NF 291 and Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters Policy No. MF 124) which provide for $160 million in financial protection.

l An indemnity agreement with the NRC (No. B-98) was issued on March 7, 1985 and will be amended on the date the operating license is issued. CEI has also submitted to the NRC Certifi-cates of Insurance for deferred premiums under. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association / Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters Master Policy No. 1. This insurance provides an (Continued) inspections which have been carried out, and which have con-firmed the adequacy of the Perry QA/QC program; see also ASLB and ALAB decisions cited at n.14 supra.

CMAw. PITTMAN, PoTTs & TRowsmioor

. _. n -- ca.m - e Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 12 aggregate of $30 million per event in the event that utilities are unable to meet deferred premium obligations. CEI, and the co-owners of the Perry Plant, will also submit to NRC the cer-tified financial statements provided for by 10 CFR S 140.21(e),

as CEI and Toledo Edison have annually done with respect to the Davis-Besse plant.

There is simply no relationship between the proposed CEI-TE affiliation and compliance with Part 140. Of course, TE as the operating licensee for the Davis-Besse facility is also meeting the same Part 140 requirementa.

In connection with WRA's Part 140 allegations, it is worth recalling that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion, has already considered an earlier petition under 10 CFR S 2.206 which claimed that the Perry co-owners were not finan-cially qualified. The Director denied the petition. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), DD-85-14, 22 N.R.C. 635 (1985). The Director's Deci-sion explicitly noted that the proposed affiliation would not alter the Staff's conclusion on financial qualifications. The Director stated:

The Staff is aware that CEI and TE are con-sidering a merger. That fact does not alter the analyses set forth in this Deci-sion of the Perry Licensees' financial qualifications. One stated purpose of the possible merger is to strengthen the com-bined financial position of CEI and TE.

22 N.R.C. at 641 n.3. WRA has provided no information to the contrary.MereInspeculation language that applies equally here, the Director that financial pressures will under-held:

mine the safety of licensed activities is not enough." 22 N.R.C. at 637. WRA has not even shown " mere speculation."

8

l SHAw, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE I

Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Commissioner James K. Asselstine Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.

February 18, 1986 Page 13 VI. Conclusion For the reasons set forth in this letter and in the Attachment and Exhibits hereto, WRA's Petition should be de-nied.

Respectfully submitted, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge By: ffW -

4Mh004 Jay E. $ 1 berg, P.C.' /

Harry HI Glasspiegel Counsel for The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, for itself and as Agent for the Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, and The Toledo Edison Company

. (Applicants)

Enclosures cc: 'H Uold R. Denton (Director, NRC Office of Reactor Regulation)

James G. Ke.ppler' (NRC Regional Administrator, .

~

Region III)

Chief, NRC Docketing and -

Service Branch s

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ATTACHMENT 1 1

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ATTACHMENT 1 February 18, 1986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Planc, )

Unita 1 and 2) )

AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY A. BOSS County of Lake ) ,

a ss:

State of Ohio )

Timothy A. Boss, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. I, Timothy A. Boss, am Supervisor, Quality Audit Unit, and Corporate Ombudsman at The Perry Nuclear Power Plant. I an employed by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI"). My business address is Perry Nuclear Power Plant, 10 Center Road, Perry, Ohio 44081.

2. As the Supervisor of the Quality Audit Unit, I am responsible for pro-viding a system of planned and periodic internal audits to assure proper imple-mentation of the Quality Assurance program, policy, procedures, and instructions both for construction and operations. I an also responsible for periodically evaluating and reporting to CEI senior management the status and adequacy of the

, Quality Assurance program. As Corporate Ombudsman. I am responsible for imple-menting and administering CEI's Call for Quality program. The Call for Quality m . 8 8 jO won ~ror @f

s Program, which was instituted by CEI in 1984, is in addition to the quality as-surance/ quality control programa instituted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B of the NRC's regulations. Call for Quality provides an additional program through which CEI can receive quality concerns in confidence, investi-gate their merit, document findings, assure resolution of any quality related problems, and provide feedback to the concerned party.

3. I have reviewed the letter to the NRC Commissioners from Donald L.

Schlemmer of Western Reserve Alliance ("WRA"), dated February 4, 1986, which was filed as a petition pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 2.206 (" Petition"). Responses to the 48 items contained in Section III, pages 7-11, of the Petition have been prepared under my supervision. The responses are contained in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. I am familiar with the contents of the responses in Exhibit A, and have reviewed the various Perry and NRC inspection documents referenced in the response. Many of the a'll'egations raised in WRA's Petition are too vague or general in nature to provide sufficient information for CEI to investigate. CEI has responded to these allegations with information that appears to CEI to be relevant to the general issue raised. Other allegations raise commercial or other issues which have no apparent relationship to safety. The remaining alle-gations raise matters which have already been fully investigated and resolved by CEI and the NRC. Thus, for the reasons set forth in Exhibit A WRA's allega-tions raise no safety issues that have not already been fully addressed and re-solved by CEI and the NRC. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and in Exhibit A attached hereto, and believe the information set forth to be true and correct.

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4. I have previously attempted to obtain from Mr. Schlemmer his knowledge of any safety concerns with the Ferry Plant. In a newspaper article dated June 15,1985 (Exhibit "B" hereto), Mr. Schlenuser claimed that he had learned of var-ious safety problema at Ferry. I wrote to Mr. Schlemmer on July 9,1985, and asked that he provide me with information on these matters so that their signif-icance could be investigated. (Exhibit "C" hereto). I stressed to Mr.

Schlemmer that he need not identify the workers who may have provided in-formation to him, so long as the information about the claimed defect was spe-cific enough to permit CEI to adequately investigate whether the defect was present. Mr. Schlemmer and Ms. Billie Firner Carde of the Covernment Account-ability Project (" CAP") each wrote back in response to my letter, refusing to provide the information requested (Exhibits "D" and "E" hereto). I made a sec-ond request to Mr. Schlemmer and Ms. Carde on September 6, 1985 (Exhibit "F")

but received no response.

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EXHIBIT A RESPONSES OF THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. TO ITEMS IN WESTERN RESERVE ALLIANCE S 2.206 PETITION DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1986 DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 1986 1

ITEM #1 With regard to NRC regulations, the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

Environmental Safety Report (Safety Evaluation Report) NREG 88.7 [ sic]

which was made specifically for Ferry and 10 CFR 50: workers allege there has been less than the previous coezitment on the part of CEI.

RESPONSE

The design, construction, testing, and operation features and programs for the Ferry Nuclear Power Plant are described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). These include detailed descriptions of plant specific items as well as descriptions of the degree of compliance with nationally recognized codes and standards.

CEI has procedures and programs to ensure that activities are performed as described in the FSAR. Adherence to these procedures and programs is monitored by periodic audits and surveillances.

Implementation of the FSAR is additionally confirmed by a program of periodic NRC inspections of both the activities and of the documentation at Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. These NRC inspections also include detailed examinations and assessments of the management controls and quality assurance program. These periodic inspections cover all aspects of design, construction, testing, operations, and quality assurance.

The NRC has conducted additional' inspections and audits to verify CEI compliance with regulatory requirements. Among these are:

i

1. Construction Assessment Team Inspection

2. Independent Design Inspection

( 3. Instrumentation and Controls Branch Audit j 4. Fire Protection Assessment

5. Equipment Qualificatica Audit

6. Emergency Plan Evaluation There inspections and audits are performed in addition to the routine inspections by NRC Resident Inspectors and Region III.

l l

This multi-level system of inspections and evaluations provides assurance l that CEI is complying with its commitments to the NRC.

ITEM #2 CEI made commitment for radiation waste management system (SER). Workers allege that in fact there exists no real quality system. no quality program.

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RESPONSE

FSAR Chapter 11 and portions of Chapter 3 describe the radioactive waste system and the basis for design and construction. These documents describe the radioactive waste system including the requirements for quality assurance during construction and testing. The FSAR discusses CEI's implementation of nationally re:ognised codes and standards such as the American National Standards Institute ' Power Piping" standard and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers " Boiler and Pressure Vesser Code".

Quality assurance for pressure vessels piping, valves and storage tanks is i fully governed by the ASME. ANSI and other codes listed in FSAR. These codes specify the requirements for in-process and post welding inspection and testing. The ASME code and the ANSI standard describe construction, inspection and testing techniques which result in high quality systems.

These codes and standards utilize a multi-faceted approach to quality assurance placing emphasis on conservative design and process control. In addition. the quality program was implemented through approved construction and welding procedures, welder testing and certification, and specified welding techniques. These aspects of the quality program are supplemented by inspections and testing.

Management, administrative and quality controls ensured compliance with code methods and that quality was built into the system. The quality assurance requirements have been implemented at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. For example, the inspection prcgram for the Liquid Radioactive Waste System (G-50) included over 1.300 surveillance inspections that identified and corrected any, construction deficiencies.

Following completion of construction, the integrity of the systems' pressure boundary was verified by hydrostatic test or in-service leak test

> and pneumatic proof testing in accordance with code requirements. Finally, the systems are subjected to rigorous and comprobensive preoperational testing as described in FSAR Chapter 14. These tests verify the design and operability of the systems.

ITEM #3 CEI led the NRC to believe CEI was committed to Regulatory Guide 1.143.

l The NRC was led to believe that CEI was committed to this plan in its

! entirety. Workers allege that there was only random QC at best. There are I many welds that would not meet code requirements.

RESPONSE

l CEI has defined degree of conformance of the radweste system to Regulatory l Guide 1.143 with the exception noted in FSAR Table 1.8. CEI's quality classification for the radweste system was specified in FSAR Table 3.2-1 .

XVIII. The subject of conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.143 was discussed between CEI and the NRC in correspondence between April 2.1985 and July

24. 1985. FSAR Table 1.8 was amended in September 1965 to clarify CEI's position and this arendment was reviewed and approved by the NRC.

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A consprehensive quality assurance program for the radweste system in compliance with applicable codes and standards was implemented as described

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in response to item 2. 5 The R.edweste System welds are in compliance with the applicable codes.

There are no indications of a breakdown of any part of the quality 6-assurance program related to the radwaste system. 4

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~4 IIIM #4 4 W

Workers allege that the above conditions have been permitted because CEI i has fraudulently classified the waste management system. Workers say the Y class system that CEI has designated for the vaste management system is not -

in compliance with FSAR commitments. This impropriety has been committed m

~2 by CEI deliberately to avoid safety requirements workers allege.

RESPONSE 7 e

The design construction, quality inspections and testing of the Y

radioactive waste system were conducted to ensure that the system meets the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and complies with the descriptions in the FSAR .

including: M-9

1) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.26. " Quality Group Classifications jh

< and Standards for Water . Steam , and Radioactive-Weste Containing g Components for Nuclear Power Plants" (FSAR Table 1.8); and. ]

2) Implementation of the design specified in FSAR Chapter 11 and the %l design criteris including industry codes and standards listed in FSAR Table 3.2-1 XVIII; and

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3) Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.143, " Design Guidance for . j Radioactive Waste Management Systems. Structures, and Components Installed in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" with the Y exceptions and clarifications noted in FSAR Table 1.8;

4) Implementation of the comprehansive program of preoperational testing P described in YSAR Chapter 14. is k

ITEM #5 y;

p CEI committed itself to the 1979 regulatory guides. Under these guides they scy not have to build Class 3 section or specification but they are (j

supposed to have a particular QC/QA program. Workers allege they do not have such programs in these areas. ,

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l RESPONSE )

CEI assumes that this item continues to relate to the radweste system. m statement that ASME Class III may not be applicable is correct. As described in FSAR Table 1.8 and Table 3.2-1. the radweste system was built in compliance with Quality Group D criteria as identified in Regulatory Guide 1.26 and also the requirements of Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.143 (which identify applicable codes and standards). CEI's compliance with the  !

quality assurance portions of these references is discussed in response to items 1. 2. 3. and 4 and 21.

ITEM #6 In these areas welds have been installed below standard and there is a bad

' valve probles, workers allege.

RESPONSE

Requirements applicable to the radweste system are outlined in Table I of Reguistory Guide 1.143 and Table I of Regulatory Guide 1.26 and FSAR Table 3.2-1 IVIII. N methods used to verify the acceptability of welds are clearly established in national codes and standards referenced in the Regulatory Guides (e.g. 331.1. ASME). N methods prescribed in these

codes were implemented and the results documented. b re is no indication that any radweste system welds are below standard.

Operability of the radweste isystem, including valves, is verified during preoperational testing. Preoperational testing of the liquid radweste system was witnessed by quality assurance as described in Surveillance Report 85-171. All test deficiencies, including problems with valve operability, were documented, evaluated, and corrected in accordance with the quality assurance program.

ITEM #7 Every weld that was bad on every valve that was not up to par was thus classified by CEI as a non-safety ites. Under this classification of non-safety ites it really meant no QA.

RESPONSE

CEI does not downgrade systems or portions of systems due to a parts inability to function as designed. Defective welds or valves are repaired or replaced to meet their intended function for both safety and non-safety systems. There is no basis in this item that welds or valves were declassified to non-safety because they were bad. Welds in non-safety systems are in corpliance with applicable codes and standards.

- - . . - - - - . - _ _ . . . . - . ~ . . - - - . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - _ - - -- .-

ITEM #8 There were many problems with the hydrostatic tests.

RESPONSE

Rydrostatic testing is performed by personnel certified in accordance with American National Standards Institute requirements. Hydrostatic tests are performed using detailed and approved procedures which conform to the applicable codes and standards and good engineering practices. Hydrostatic tests have been witnessed by quality assurance personnel and the results are documented. Any unsuccessful tests are repeated following the completion of the required repairs.

There is no indication that hydrostatic tests were not performed or performed improperly.

ITEM #9 CEI did not even have state inspectors in regard to these tests.

RESPONSE

l Hydrostatic and pneumatic proof tests performed under ASME Section III are witnessed by an Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) as required by the ASE Code. In these cases, an Ohio State Inspector is not required to witness the test. Proof tests performed under ANSI Standard B31.1 were witnessed by an inspector who is certified by the State of Ohio and, the results were documented and reported to the State Authority. CEI ensures these inspections are performed through the use of procedure FA 1007 " State Pressure Piping Inspection Program". Quality assurance document reviews at the completion of testing ensure that test results are not accepted unless the test was witnessed by the ANI or Ohio State Inspector, as appropriate.

ITEM #10 l

There are problems with the G.50 system. This is the liquid red [ sic]

waste system. Workers allege that the way the system is currently set up radioscrivity will be put into Lake Erie. (How much? Unanalyzed by ,

CEI ...) )

RESPONSE

During the preoperational test program. newly constructed piping systems, including the liquid radweste system, were flushed to remove dirt prior to piscing the system in operation. During the flushing of The liquid radweste system, a temporary drain line was used to discharge flush water into Lake Erie. The flush water is clean water and does not contain '

radioactive material of any kind. CEI consulted with the Ohio Environments 1 Protecticn Agency and received their concurrence prior to the discharge of this flush water.

The temporary flushing connection on the liquid radweste system was removed at the completion of the flushing program and the flushing drain connection has been sealed with a blank flange. There is no potential that this connection will represent a discharge path for radioactive material once the system is placed in operation.

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ITEM #11 By law it should be acted in the FSAR any time theca is a lessening of ,,

CEI's commitment to NRC rules. CEI has made several changes to its commitment to the NRC rules but they have not reported them in the FSAR.

RESPONSE

CEI informs the NRC of changes in design and methods used to meet regulatory requirements. This notification is made through letters and meetings with the staff and documented in FSAR amendments. These changes to the design and methods are a normal and espected part of the operating license application process, as prescribed in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54a; 10 CFR 50.71e). Changes are subject to the NRC review, comment and approval process prior to receipt of the operating license. This information exchange continues after receipt of the operating license as required by 10 CFR 50.59.

The NRC also performs audits and inspections to ensure that FSAR requirements are being implemented as outlined in response to Itea #1.

ITEM #12 CEI said they would have a system of alarms that would go off in the rod (sic] waste room control and the main control room at the same time.

Although CEI made the commitment to the NRC. CEI decided not to have the dual system of alarms installed as promised. CEI never reported this change in their plans to the NRC. This is a lesser commitment than was originally told to the NRC.

RES?ONSE l

An earlier version of the FSAR did indicate that there would be a dual alars in the redweste control root and the " amin control room". ~

Changes-l were subsequently made and appropriately documented to eliminate the dual '

I alarm for the reasons stated below.

l Many redwaste system conditions, including routine 5.hanges in pump and tank status, causa alars indications. The alarm wculd annunciate in the Radweste Control Room and as a generic radweste system alarm in the " main control roon". The generic alara had been installed because it was

( originally not intended to require continuous manning of the Radwaste

Ccatrol Room. It was later determined that the duplicate generic slars in the " main control room" could distract Plant Operators.from their primary function without any ccepensating increase in safety or efficiency.

Moreover. CEI decided that Radweste Control Room would be manned 24 'murs a day by trained and qualified operators. These operators monitor and respond to all indicatices and alares coming from radweste systems and report to the operators in the " main control room". Therefore, the duplicate alara in the " main control room" was removed by an approved design change. This design change was included in Amendment 20 to the FSAR (11.2.7.12) in July 1985.

ITEM #13 1

CEI mentioned in the FSAR its plans to deal with beta and gamma radiation.

- Subsequently CEI changed its plans to include only gamma radiation. CEI never reported this subsequent change in the FSAR.

RESPONSE

Perry Nuclear Power Plant is designed and CEI has programs to accommodate both beta and gamma radiation. CEI did not change its plans for dealing with both types of radiation.

The radiation protection design aspects of the plant and the Health Physics Program controls including access controls, radiation monitoring. personnel dosimetry, and worker training have been evaluated by the NRC and found in compliance with regulatory requirements as stated in the Safety Evaluation Report and in Inspection Reports 85027 and 85068 dated August 29. 1985. and November 1.1985. respectively.

ITEM #14 In the containment building, regarding steel penetration and pipes, the welds are cracked.

RESPONSI A comprehensive program of inspection and testing and, where necessary.

repairs followed by re-inspection and re-testing has ensured that containment penetration welds are satisfactory. Welds for sealed penetration pipe assemblies have had 100% contractor / vendor quality control inspection and testing. As a minimum, inspection and tests includedt visual inspection. leak testing. and either liquid penetrant, magnetic particle ultrasonic or radiographic testing. Additionally these welds have had tests witnessed by the Authorized Nuclear Inspector in accordance with ASME Section III. The CEI Quality Assurance Program supplemented these controls through vendor surveillance and field inspections.

The program for welding, inspecting and testing of containment penetrations is covered by the ASME code. CEI has verified that required inspections and tests were performed by the contractor. nis has been verified through a review of contractor installation documentation and the CEI and ANI review of the ASME N-5/N-3 documentation packages.

During the inspection and testing of the flued head structures in sealed containment penetrations, some welds were suspected of having cracks. His potential deficiency was reported to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) on July 31, 1985 as Deficiency Analysis Report 250. Subsequent inspectione determined that there were no cracked welds on the flued head structures. The NRC was informed of this finding by letter on October 22. 1985. (FY-CEI/OIE 0121L). This issue was revi'ewed by the NRC and closed in Inspecticn Report 85072. dated December 6. 1985.

ITEM #15 Boots around the penetrations were redesigned to expand a little more some of the penetrations so in and out at an angle. N pressure is going through the penetrations and this is the only seal. W re are plastic seals around the penetrations. If the plastic boot around the penetration fails, the system could belch and radiation could go out. This is true because even though there is negative pressure, the system could still belch. Also it is possible that in some cases there may not be negative pressure. If this were to occur, radiation would just leak out. Most nuclear plants use metal boots, but CEI uses plastic because it is faster, workers allege. These are in the containment vessel.

RESPONSE

Nylon reinforced silicone rubber seal ' boots" are used to seal the penetrations where the safety relief valve discharge lines penetrate the drywell wall. m dryvell wall is completely inside the containment and drywell wall seals are not a direct path for the release of radioactive asterial to the environment. In contrast containment penetration seal boots, including those at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, are typically made of steel because they do represent a potential leakage path to the environment.

The drywell penetration seal boots did fail during the drywell Structural Integrity Test and prevented drywell pressurisation to the required 30 PSIG. The boot failure was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) on August .6. ,1985 as Deficiency Analysis Report 251. N boot failure was subsequently determined not to represent a significant design deficiency. Without any seal boots installed, the total leakage of air through the affected drywell penetrations would be substantially less than the amount permitted by the design basis.

De drywell penetration seal boots have been radesigned to prevent permanent creasing and the new boots have been installed. The drywell was prassurized to 30 PSIG and the structural integrity test was successfully completed, nis issue was reviewed by the NRC and closed in Inspection Report 86002, dated February 4,1986.

ITEM #16 Workers allege dresser valves are a fiasco (rod [ sic] waste system). This can be seen by looking at DAR 2.12 [ sic) . These are vent valves and drain valves to drain radiation. (Some of these valves are already 10 years old.) Workers allege that the design of the valve is not.any good. The rework program of CEI reworked 100 of these valves. They put the redesigned valves through a test. It is called an in-service leak rate test. Many of the redesigned valves failed the test. These are sus 11 bore valves.

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RESPONSE -E;;

Deficiencies with the operation of Dresser diaphragm valves were identified by CEI during the preoperational test program. The cause of Dresser Valve j jamming was diagnosed as insufficient clearance between the disc cap and -

disc guide. This deficiency was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 M CFR 50.55(e) on October 29. 1984 as Deficiency Analysis Report 212. The __

valves were reworked to correct this problem but retesting revealed that ""

the smallest size Dresser Valves still experienced jamming. This jammi!q was traced to undersized disc springs and appropriate corrective action was y taken. This issue was reviewed by the NRC and was closed during Inspection 85089 which was completed December 18, 1985. i ITEM #17 -!

Workers allege that the Borg-Warner valves (rod [ sic] waste system) are _5i causing a lot of trouble. This can be seen on DAR 2.13 [ sic). (Some of q these valves are already 10 years old.) The X-rays of the valves do not g match up with the valves (compared with what is currently installed). -

Later they found they would not open or close properly. These valves would not work except when they were in a vertical position. They were designed to work in the horizontal position but they did not work in that position. --j Some of these valves are 20 inches in diameter.

RESPONSE

3-"

This item combines two separate issues related to Borg Warner Valves. One a issue is that radiographs "do not match up with the valves (compared with j what is currently installed)". The other issue is DAR 213 which dealt with valve operability. E The first issue was the subject of DAR 141 which was reported to the NRC on April 18, 1984. During the comparison of site generated radiographs with 3 those supplies by Borg Warner, three discrepancies were identified. One j valve was found to have been machined af ter it had been radiographed. Two ,

other valves were found to have identification markers interchanged. iss Initially, the radiographs did not appear to match up with the installed 2 valves. After an in depth investigation. CEI concluded that these were the i only discrepancies where radiographs did not match up. This issue was 3]1 reviewed by the NRC and closed in Inspection Report 84-06 dated May 18 -j 1984. q Deficiencies with the operation of Borg Warner Gate valves were identified g by CEI during the preoperational test program and reported to the NRC as _M_

DAR 213 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Several different sizes and -in models of Borg Warner gate valves experienced jarming when installed  ;

horizontally as discussed in the DAR. Internal inspections of valves of 9 each size and model nur.ber revealed the cause of the jarming to be E improperly sized or positioned guide rails. A comprehensive program of -

repairs and retesting was perforced and this issue was reviewed with the 2 NRC and closed in Inspection Report 85080 dated Deceeber 2. 1985. 4 4

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l ITEM #18 l

l CEI has on occasion used nonconformance reports to make design changes, as l

opposed to the appropriate design change request forms. An ASME experienced engineer should be able to find many examples of such situations.

RESPONSE

The use of nonconformance reports are in accordance with CEI's Quality l Assurance Program requirements. As each portion of the plant is constructed, it is checked by inspectors and any differences between the (

design drawing and the installed item are documented on a nonconformance report. These reports can be dispositioned ast use as ist rework repair; or scrap. Rework and scrap dispositions result in restoring the installed item to the original design requirement. Dispositions of "use as is" and

" repair" result in final conditions which are different from the original design. Before approving these dispositions, each is evaluated by engineering to ensure that the proposed as built condition meets the required design criteria. When changes are acceptable to the engineer he signs the nonconformance report to indicate his approval. Consequently, these nonconfermance reports become design change documents and are described as such in project procedures.

ITEM i19 Men in certain unions that have been tied to corruption or organised crime activity have tried to prolong their jobs by sabotaging many items at the Perry plants.

RESPONS_E here have been no known instances of aabotage at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Moreover, there are safeguards to ensure that sabotage would not remain undetected. The construction and permanent security program as well as the comprehensive inspection and testing progras eliminate the potential j that construction phase sabotage could affect safe operation of the plant.

l Prior to loading nuclear fuel, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant is subjected to a comprehensive preoperational test program, nis program includes detailed visual inspections and operational tests which ensure that systems, equipment and components are operating properly. In the early stages of this test program. CEI implemented a comprehensive security program which limited access to completed areas of the plant (and later the entire plant) to those personnel who did not complete an employee screening program. This screening program, includes a background investigation.

Additional assurance that sabotage would be detected and not result in unsafe conditions is provided through the ongoing surveillance and periodic test program. This program tests the operation of safety and many non-safety syster.s ireediately prior to the systems being placed in operation.

-10.

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9 ITEM #20 During the ILRT [ sic) test CEI was trying to get up to 30 lbs. PSI yet they could not even make 12 or 15. CEI did not know where the leaks were. .

RESPONSE

CEI assumes this item refers to the drywell Structural Integrity Test and not the containment ILRT (Integrated Leak Rate Test) since the ILRT was performed at a pressure of 11.3 PSIG.

The drywell was pressurised to 30 PSIG and the structural integrity test was successfully completed.

ITEM #21 Workers allege while working at Perry Nuclear Power Plant they have seen smoking of marijuana and drinking of intoxicants.

RESPONSR CEI has always maintained a strict policy at the Ferry Nuclear Iover Plant regarding the possession of illegal drugs and alcohol which is stated in the Ferry Nuclear Power Plant Employee's Randbook. Any person found possessing alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs is turned over to site security and subjected to immediate disciplinary action, usually dismissal.

In the past seven years, approximately 29 individuals have been permaneutly dismissed from the site for*' alcohol abuse and approximately 18 more have been dismissed for drug abuse or possession within the plant property.

In preparation for fuel load. CEI has taken additional steps to ensure its strict policies regarding illegal drugs and alcohol are enforced. These steps are described by the folicwing progrant

1) Frior to receiving unescorted access to the plant, both CEI and non-CEI employees must undergo a personnel screening process which verifies an applicant's trustworthiners and reliability to perform his job duties within a nuclear power plant.

2) Supervisors are trained to detect aberrant behavior and are continually watching for changes in behavior or attitudes which may be the result of drug or alcohol abuse.

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3) A trained dog is used to perform periodic checks of the plant for illegal narcotics.

4) CEI performs daily checks of lunch boxes and other p'ackages in order to prevent the introduction of drugs and alcohol onto the Perry Plant Site.

If an individual's performance were impaired due to drugs or alcohol CEI's comprehensive programs of surveillances, inspections and testing of safety related and non-safety equipment would provide a high degree of assurance that work performed by such a person would be detected and corrected.

=

CEI's confidence in this program is based upon the concept of defense in

- depth. All vital work must be performed using very detailed procedures E which receive multiple engineering and quality assurance reviews. During performance of the work, there is close quality surveillance of the entire E_ activity which, among other things, ensures coepidance with these

- procedures. Each critical step in the work procedure is identified as a F hold point and the workman cannot proceed past a hold point until his work is inspected by quality assurance personnel. Work is re-inspected when the

=. task is completed. Prior to being tested, detailed reviews are performed by Test Engineers and Technicians to ensure equipment conforms to every aspect of the design drawing. Every piece of equipment is checked far t proper calibration and operation during Initial Check-out and Run-In 3

f- Testing. Then, every system is subjected to a comprehensive preoperational or acceptance test to ensure conformance with design criteria and proper g

7 operation. Finally, before being declared operational and periodically throughout the life of the plant. systems are subjected to surveillance or periodic tests which reconfiru proper operation. Each stage of the defense in depth process is subjected to quality assurance surveillance and quality control inspections. Management controls such as independent verification

. are also applied to many steps in this process. This program assures

detection and correction of any work that does not meet the applicable

- specifications and requirements.

I h-1 I_ TEM #22

% Workers allege they have seen welders taking tests illegally at the Power i site. with no supervisica.

RESPONSE

E -

k-CEI takes numerous steps as discussed below to ensure the validity of welding tests and the qualification of the velders. Additional assurance n is provided by welding code rsquiranents for in process and post process inspections and finally by a program for the proof testing of welds.

I* Throughcut the construction process, all welders were subject to randon inspections while performing field activities. From these randen g inspections, all welders are subject to immediate retest if their workmanship is considered questionable. These randon inspections were in h addition to code requirements for in process and post process inspections of welds. All safety related welding activities have been 100% visually inspected and accepted by certified inspectors. Additioenlly, safety class pressure boundary welds have received welding code specified nondestructive testing (NDE). The type of NDE required by the various codes is dependent upon the type and service of the weld.

At the time of the NRC's Construction Assessment Team Audit in 1983, contractor programs required the velder candidates to read and sign test documentation and to sign in and out of the welding test. Supervision of this program was provided by Contractor Engineering /QC personnel. The test shops were also subject to CEI surveillances and audits. Based upon a recommendation by the Construction Assessment Team for additional controls.

CEI implemented a " photo badge" system for all contractors. Implementation of this system required that the welder candidates exhibit to the Test Director a signed, picture identification prior to being allowed to test.

A I J i n

Tbc NRC recalved alicgoticna c:rly in 1985 rescrdies told:r qualification tests. See allegation RIII-85-A-0065. This allegation was found to be unsubstantiated, and was closed by the NRC in Inspection Report 85023 dated May 20, 1985.

i*

ITEM #23 Workers allege they have seen contractors overloading jobs, while many workers just sat around for days doing nothing.

RESPONSE

Allegations about worker productivity do not relate to the quality of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. This is a commercial item and does not raise any safety issues.

However. CEI has always maintained a close scrutiny of contractor activities, using CEI staa teams which coordinated work in all parts of the plant. The high level of activity required careful planning and close supervision to minimize overcrowded conditions. With various contractors performing work in confined areas overloading was not overlooked or tolerated. CEI's Contract Administration Section also required daily activity reports from the contractors and additional people could not be employed without justification. CEI's strong management commitment and involvement during the construction phase has maintained programs and direction which has provided for productivity at standard and above standard rates.

ITEM #24 Workers allege they have been approached by members of I,ocal 744 and " asked if I wanted some cocaine."

RESPONSE

This item is addressed in the response to Item 21.

ITEM #25 Workers allege they turned the above information over to the FBI and have heard nothing since.

RESPONSE

No response to this item is possible by CEI. -

ITEM #26 Workers allege they saw men who " stayed loaded on cocaine the whole job".

RESPONSE

'this item was addressed in the response to Item 21.

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YTEM#27 The workers allege that foresen knew about men being stoned on cocaine because the men "did not hide it." Yet there is no evidence that the forenen did anything at all in this regard.

RESPONSE

This item is addressed in the response to Ites 21.

ITEM #28 Workers allege that uncertified welders would use the names of certified welders on welding jobs when the certified welders were not even on the site. The foreman at the plant site were the ones who approved and encouraged such activity.

RESPONSE

As part of the weld fit up process required for safety-related welding. the certification of the welder is checked against a certification metrix. The welder cannot proceed if he is not certified for the welding process specified in the work package. Additionally, while a welder is performing the weld. quality assurance personnel monitor various welding parameters including identification of the certified welder.

Additionally as discussed in the response to Item #22. throughout the L construction process, all welders were subject to random inspections while performing field activities.- From these randon inspections, all welders are subject to immediate retest if their workmanship is considered questionable. These random inspections were in addition to code requirements for in process and post process inspections of welds. All safety related welding activities have been 1001 visually inspected and accepted by certified inspectors. Additionally, safety class pressure boundary welds have received welding code specified nondestructive testing j OCE) . The type of NDE required by the various codes is dependent upon the type and service of the weld.

ITEM #29 40.000 tons of reinforcement rod was wrongly ordered and then sent to the scrap yard by truck.

RESPONSE

This is a commercial issue and does not raise any safety issues.

CEI purchased rebar for specific installations and each bar was bent in ,

accordance with design requirements. In order to determine the placement location of asch bar. the building. elevation, and bar number was assigned to each piece of rebar. In 1981. 15 tons of rebar was scrapped because of design changes, damage, or loss of identification tags which prevented CEI from identifying the location in which the bar was supposed to be placed.

When this reber was scrapped, it was sold in accordance with CEI's program for scrap metal.

ITEM #30_

Insulation - 500 penetrations were installed wrong. Sleeves should have been put on before insulation. Now this insulation will break up from the pipes moving back and forth.

RESPONSE

This allegation appears to be about radiation and fire barrier seals in b

pipe openings through walls. Generally these openings are filled with a c- silicone foam or high density elastomer. In cases where pipe movement is anticipated to be greater than the ability of the material to flex, a penetration sleeve is installed around the pipe. The sleeve provides a J space for the pipe to move freely without damaging the barrier material.

Z" he original engineering design requirements for penetration sleeves was

= based on pipe movement of an unsupported pipe. Subsequently, cases were identified by Engineering in which piping was anchored in place or

_ otherwise had movement restricted. Engineering evaluated these situations L on a case-by-case basis. Based upon this analysis, the design requirements 1 were changed in October 1985 to eliminate the penetration sleeves where pipe movement was restricted. Thus, there are numerous cases where sleeves

' are not required to be installed.

E ITEM #31 Portions of the containment vessel are now susceptible [ sic] because the sprinkler system came on for undisclosed, accidental, or unknown reasons.

RESPONSE

Inadvertent operation of the containment spray system during preoperational testing was identified and investigated by CEI as documented in Condition

= Report 85-027. De CEI investigation and the subsequent NRC review included a comprehensive inspection to identify equipment damage resulting g- from this event.

I EK g The minimal amount of equipment damage resulting from this event was c- documented and corrected. This event was reviewed by the NRC and closed in Inspection Report 85056 dated October 17, 1985.

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R g ITEM #32 fover outage in the plant caused evacuation end cause of the outage is h

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RESPONSE -

r From time to time during construction and preoperational testing, isolated F

electrical outages have occurred which may have prevented or interrupted work in specific areas of the plant. Emergency systems are installed to assure that lighting is available for the operation of the plant and for E entry / exit to and fror. the plant when normal lighting systems are not Z operable. When normal lighting systems fail to operate, it is normal y practice to evacuate non-essential personnel from the specific areas y invcived until the normal lighting systems are restored.

=

7 Unplanned outages have been evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine y

the cause of the outage.

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l ITEM #33 The quality of the paint job at the plant site is not uniform. In some areas of the plant the paint is already starting to come of f. One can see this on the equipment hatch at the top of the unit. Other paint should -

have been taken off but was not.

RESPONSE

The requirements for applying nuclear coatings are described in the engineering specification provided to the painting contractor. The specifications and implementing procedures also indicate the requirements for QC inspections. These inspections verify that various requirements including uniform thickness is in accordance with the pre-established requirements. Instances of coatings coming off in limited areas are identified on nonconformance reports and are corrected.

Costing deficiencies on the equipment hatch were identified on December 26, 1985. and documented on nonconformance report CQCS 444. These deficiencies have been corrected and the nonconformance report has been closed.

The Perry Nuclear Plant also has a maintenance program which will be used throughout the life of the plant to identify and correct deterioration of paint including nuclear coatings.

ITEM #34 CEI negotiations with unions were in part responsible for bad feelings between unions. Situation arose where carpenters were supposed to give orders to laborers. This resulted in no one bringing cut boards to the appropriate local. Thus CEI had to perLit the union to go back to their old way of doing things. This type of management caused waste, confusion, bad feeling, and a lack of concentration on meetit.g health and safety standards.

RESPONSE

This item raises commercial issues and does not raise nuciaar safety issues.

The only negotistion between CEI and building trade unions did not occur until late 1984, when the plant was virtually complete. These negotiations were conducted at the international level of the union and did not affect the day-to-day activities at the job site.

Carpenter helpers are laborers whose jcb is to assist the carpenters in the erection and dismantling of scaffold. These laborers have a foreman, but routinely accept direction from the carpenters they are employed to assist.

Without this close cooperation, which has existed for many years throughout the country, scaffolding could not be ef ficiently erected utilizing the existing agreement between the Carpenters' Union and the Laborers' Union.

CEI has not taken any action which adversely affected the working relationships between trades at the Ferry Nuclear Power Plant.

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ITEM #35 Local 744 of the Boilermakers hired unqualified men uader the direction of i Louis Jewels. president of the local, to work at the Ferry plant. They were paid journeyman wages but should have been paid apprentice wages.

Numerous workers have stated that this occurred because of corruption in Local 744 and the International. Numerous workers have stated that vast sections of the plant do not meet NRC standards because of this activity.

RESPONSE

The extensive quality assurance programs, welder testing and the defense in depth concept of performing work at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant assure that work is completed in accordance with applicable specifications and requirements. See responses to items 21 and 22.

The quality programs utilized by the contractors assure that practices which would adversely affect the quality of the plant would be quickly detected. As an example, welders, including Boilermakers, must pass certification tests in order to be employed by a contractor to perform welding. The union has no control over these tests because they are conducted by the contractor. After testing, all work performed by craf tsmen is inspected by qualified, certified quality assurance personnel who are also independent from the union. These quality prograss ensure that the work meets NRC standards.

ITEM #36 ,

A lot of voids existed in the bioshield wall. These were fixed. but not properly.

RESPONSE

CEI reported the presence of voids in the bioshield to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) on December 1.1981. N analysis and corrective actions are documented on Deviation Analysis Report 074.

Methods approved by Engineeries were developed to locate the voids in the bioshield wall and high density material was used to make the repairs.

Each lot of the material used fr r filling the void was tested for density prior to being released te cae field. In addition, the grout material used in the repair was tested prior to installation. These actions were sufficient to ensure that voide in the bioshield were detected and properly repaired. This item was reviewed by the NRC and clowed out in Inspection Report 84002, dated March 27, 1984. .

ITEM #37 Stealing is very widespread at the Perry plant. Even CEI personnel are involved.

,. RESPONSE m it is a commercial issue. CEI's strict policy on theft is stated in the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Employee's Randbook. Def t of any sort from the project is grounds for immediate dismissal and denial of any future access to the plant. Within the last seven years, fifteen (15) individuals have been denied permanent access from the plant due to thef t. To prevent stealing at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant security personnel perform inspections of lunch boxes, briefcases, and any other packages being removed from the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Thus. Perry Nuclear Power Plant of ficials have implemented strong measures to prevent this type of activity on plant property.

ITEM #38 The standard procedure regarding the way welding is done and inspected at Perry is not compliance with current NRC code.

RESPONSE

N re is no " current NRC Code" for welding. B rough the Code of Pederal gd Regulations, the NRC endorses the nationally recognized codes which govern 4 weiding such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. The American National Standards Institute, and The American Welding Society. CEI described its compliance with these codes as they apply to different parts of the plant in PSAR Chapter 3.

The NRC evaluates CEI's program of management, administrative and quality controls to ensure they are sufficient to ensure compliance with these codes. In addition, organiza'tions such as the ASME perform detailed reviews of contractors' programs for code implementation prior to certifying the contractor to perform work under the ASME code. The process used to award the ASME "N" stamp involves a thorough review of the controls the contractor will use to ensure requirements are fully implemented. CEI employs agents such as Hartford Steam Boiler to review code compliance programs for acceptability and monitor compliance using authorized inspectors.

These provisions, along with the quality assurance program described in response to earlier items, ensure that CEI is in complisuce with appropriate welding codes.

ITEM #39 There were irregularities in the welding tests that were given at Perry.

Indications are that some men took the test for other men who were unqualified. Some men took a , welding test that took a day, while ,others were permitted to take as long as a week.

RESPONSI This item is addressed in part in the response to Item 22.

The time allowed for tests depends on the type of welding techniques being used. Some tests take longer to complete than others. For instance, the test for a 3/8" socket veld would take approximately four hours, while a 8" heavy wall weld may take as long as a week. Other parameters which affect the length of the test include: type of process. position, and equipment availability.

'ITEN #40 The polar crane in Unit I rides on a support beam above the reactor. The beam that the wheels of the polar crane ride on is defective. The beam that the track sits on is defective. This beam came into the plant in sections. The welds that were made in the plant are good welds. The welds on the beam that were made outside the plant or fabricated by vendors are bed. Thus the rail that the polar crane rides on is defective.

RESPONSE

On October 29, 1979, the Unit 1 Polar Crane Boz Girder (PCBG) welds were rejected on Nonconformance Report 17-136 for various visual defects. M During the repair of these defects a small number of subsurface defects 1 were uncovered and corrected.

In the second half of 1981 linear indications indicating a lack of fusion were uncovered in the Unit 2 PCBGs. CEI reported this deficiency to the NRC In accordance with 10 CFR 50.35(e) on February 26, 1982 as Deficiency Analysis Report 71. An engineering evaltation concluded that the lack of fusion problem was limited to the Unit 2 PCBGs. The basis for this conclusion was that the Unit 1 PCBCs were f abricated using welding ..

parameters allowing heat input in the upper ranges of the welding procedure which. assured fusion. In contrast, the Unit 2 PCBCs were welded at temperatures in the lower ranges which resulted in the lack of fusion observed in the Unit 2 beams.

To aonfirm this conclusion. CEI had informatio'nal Ultrasonic Examination -

(UT) performed on three (3) successive girder sections (2 different drawing types) on the same major ittength welds in Unit 1 as were tested in Unit 2.

The results of the UT test confirmed the conclusions of the engineering evaluation that the lack of fusion discontinuity was limited to the Unit 2 PCBG.

The NRC reviewed the corrective actions for the PCBGs and closed both Unit 1 and Unit 2 concerns in Inspection Reports 50-440/82-06 (DETP) and 50-041/82-06 (DEIT) dated July 2.1982. This concern was further reviewed by the NRC as documented in Inspection Report 50-440/85070 dated January 9 1986.

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ITEM #41 QC inspectors were harassed and intimidated in an attempt to get them not to report QC violations.

RESPONSE ,

Throughout the Perry Project CEI management has encouraged the reporting o; all QC concerns. This policy was expressed through procedures, indoctrination and training. written and posted notices to workers, and other types of coesunication which emphasize the importance of reporting any safety concerns either to CEI or to the NRC. CEI takes quick action to investigste any inspector concerns of potential violations of procedures or other requirements. To further ensure that quality assurance concerns are being addressed. CEI instituted a " Call for Quality" program in June 1984 19-

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Thic progrca, chich is in additica to QA/QC program requiremento. Providse

= all employees with an additional pechanism to discuss concerns on a E confidential basis. The " Call for Quality" program has investigated all 2

concerns and has not identified any case in which a QC inspector was discouraged from reporting QC concerns.

=

1 ITEM #42 This harassment and intimidation of QC inspectors took piece and affected the quality of inspection at the diesel generators of Unit 1. Unit 2. and the 620 Central complex.

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. RESPONSE Several allegations were investigated in response to a Motion to Reopen the Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) Issue 3 record which was filed by

! Chio Citizens for Responsible Energy (OCRE) on November 30. 1983. Some of the allegations related to inspection of equipment in the areas of the t Unit 1 and 2 diesel generators and the 620' alevation of the Control Complex. .

~ The results of CEI's investigation are discussed in detail in the Applicant's Response to the Motion to Roopen dated December 19, 1983. As indicated in the Applicant's response. CEI and the Contractor determined that the allegations were unfounded. The motion was dismissed by the ASLB g by memorandum and order dated January 20.1984. (LP3-84-3,19 NRC 282 5 (1984)).

t After receiving this ites. the " Call for Quality" Ombudewan interviewed QC inspectors who have performed inspections in the area of the Diesel Generators. The inspectors interviews

d stated that thsv knew of no cases in which they were asked to accept substandard work and that they received adequate management support to resolve identified safety deficiencies.

CEI is not aware of any basis for the allegation described in this item. CEI ensures that all nonconformances are properly documented and that worker concerns are reported as described in response to Item 41.

ITTM #43 The main control room suffered from a serious lack in terms of number of QC inspectors for the job. Due to the shortage of QC inspectors, the verification work that should have been done (regarding all electrical work power modulators, and instrumentation) was not done in the main control room. '

RESPONSE

The only concern identified by CEI that appears to be related was addressed in August 1984 In response to an allegation the NRC reviewed the adequacy of Control Roon inspection activities. An iten of noncompliance 8400701 was issued because the inspection reports issued prior to 1983 covering activities in the Control Room did not specifically state which activities were inspected nor the secpe of activity. An evaluation was performed and re-inspections were cenducted as required to resolve discrepancies. A CEI audit of reports issued since 19E3 indicated that the reports did contain adequate detail regarding activities inspected and the scope of activity.

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ites of noncompliance was closed by NRC Region III as documented in Inspection Report 85032 dated June 19. 1985.

The CEI Quality Assurance Program has strict management and administrative -

controls which ensure that all required quality inspections are performed and documented. In addition. CEI has always used a system of hold points in work packages which require "in process" inspections. Review of Control Room documentation by the Nuclear Quality Assurance Department assures that all control room inspections have been performed.

ITEM #44 Due to overwork, the two QC inspectors were not allowed to see the computer room at elevation 638. The program was just not set up to deal with this.

RESPONSE

The computer room located on tha 638' elevation of the Control Complex is non-safety and falls outside the scope of the contractor Quality Control program. Although the contractor QA progrra is not required to perform inspections in this area, non-safety installations are inspected by the CEI Construction Quality Section.

There are no safety issues relative to this item.

I ITEM #45 ,, ,

There are problems with emergency service water regarding pecker heads terminations. The vendor side is different from the Gilbert drawings. The rotation for the motor is opposite to industry drawings.- The rotation for the motor is 99-100% different from Gilbert drawings. Workers say they feel it is 100% because they have never seen one that was correct. The concern of the workers is that they feel this situation could cause them to run backwards and "you would have a hot reactor."

RESPONSE

l The direction of rotation of three phase induction notors depends upon the l

phase sequence of the power cables to the motor. It is not practical to mark the phase sequence on power cables or motor leads. Therefore, standard industrial practice is to connect the power leads to the motor and l check the direction of the rotation of the motor. If the direction of rotation is incorrect, the power supply is disconnected and reconnected in the correct phase sequence. CEI performed this standard, practice for l

installing three phase induction motors, including the emergency service l water pump motor, during the Initial Checkout and Run-in Testing.

l Following this installation test, the power leads (Gilbert side) and motor leads (vendor side) are marked and the drawings are revised to reflect the installed condition. Additional assurance that pumps are rotating in the correct direction is obtained during preoperational testing. During this testing, the performance characteristics of the pumps are checked against l

performance data supplied by the pump manufacturer. This process would quickly identify a pucp which rotated backwards.

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ITEM #46 In the containment vessel there are numerous and serious cracks in the first 60 feet of stainless steel clad. b re are cracks in the other parts ,

of the stainless steel clad, but the first 60 feet of the lower portion is entremely bad. This would be in the area of #1 ring and #2 ring, h re are "a los of cracks in the double bar around the first ring, the bottom of it."

RESPONSI CRI's responses to items 2.14, 21. and 22 discuss how problems such as ,

those described in this allegation would be prevented or appropriately detected and corrected.

I CEI assumes that the item relates to Deviation Analysis Reports 37 and 92.  ;

DAR 37 pertains to sensitisation of stainless steel cladding in the supression pool. DAR 92 concerns welds in the containment vessel. CEI reported these items to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). DAR 37 and 92 were reviewed by the NRC and closed respectively in Inspection Reports 85035 dated July 2.1985 and 83032 dated November 10. 1983.

ITEM #47 h welds in the fuel pools are bad. Do tests here. Look at the welds.

They are bad.

RESPONSE .-

CEI's response to items 2.14, 21. and 22 also apply to this response.

h fuel pool welds were designed, performed, inspected and tested in accordance with design requirements and the applicable welding codes. Fuel pool welds were inspected by liquid penetrant tests. After erection and initial inspection, the leak chase channels were subjected to a pressure test. The balance of the welds are subjected to vacuum box test. The final indication that the welds are acceptable is when the fuel pool is filled and the leak chase system is checked for water. W re was no 1

indication during the performance of these inspections and tests that these welds are deficient.

l ITEM #48 l

N question was raised: "Why did they fix the bad crane gridder (sic] in Unit 2 but not in Unit 17" It is alleged that the Unit'1, crane gridder

[ sic) is bad.

RESPONSE

This item was addressed in the response to Item 40.

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I 5ATUR'OAY, June 15, lies 3 .

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j Lake County .

l Nuke workers question plant safety they*mreputable" taaested der spese parts," Det asesi By DOUG K0ERNER Responding to 1

i Staff Writer Fuelrods delivered to plant anegaoems.Sh-sa.Schlenteer's et

+ one of the targent puany meters anytingWage parte e so.ean.deydyment,s

.ande,ds .,

l N0HTH PEftitY Vit i As.E - The PERRY - The Perry Nuclear Power Plant received the 23rd of 25 la the dryusen area,whch tsleeded

• Sise end to hosth test l prcudent of westiin He>crwe fuel rod sh9sments yesterday seersing. The leal two slupements are s la the contasessent behleng heles wasdelayedamselbbetsenet the

l. Allunce. a Cicssleenitumf ants es pected le be delimed arst week, accordag le plant ainclais, the reacter vessel, faeled sheet a Ilre,whishiaveleed etaEsteng.and i nuclear group. sant yc>terday wme "As seen as time rods m reedved they are h ler any damage mienth ageand was replaced.The 80- the meter talbre. lissever, R wan

! Persy Notscar Punce 1%nt worherm that saay have accurred during transportaties," said Wimasa King. feet high, f.ees horsepower seeler, templeted macesselley Walmeeday

! have miermed him of various Cleveland ElectricImingCo. was replaced. alW. *'lle's pt sehd4 ate in-l esgulpment ocfctta, wme savelvsag The fuel rods edt he stared untal all are recieved, then the process of .Whether wartaalles arela eIIset formaties."

! potentialsalesy hasards leadmgthe reacterwillbegin. is asi sagaineast, she said. Egelp- .These are aaamberof erases at ~

A Cleveland Electne illuminating sment la flaed er replaced to any he plant site and mens ese separted l The nuclear power plant is espected le he is aparaties late this year Co. spokeswoman. EhsabrCi Shaw, case, she said. The plant has been ishavesafety defects.

seed the allegations by Donald t ' " 3fl 3888-Y j under cemetructionIer le years,and Regardag hea==ar's amusees.

Schlemamer contana no vahdety.

"This is a met leesurpriang tactic " a substamttai asseunt of pge was cut involves increastag the temperature assae warranties mayerhave safety espired, Show em sold l she said. defects shorteemings and reweided raadessly, met by weld leaheest 548degress.

l ehe saad.

• FWty percent of the selengen a

• Aay pipeculling er weteng obligatedleladers CEIer to NRC.

CEI is the majority oener of the ha tones,asrequiredby the Nuclear aseded le resmove and replace to "If a worker has a essears, try l " Image"cramels detective.

C14 bellies nuclear plant, which CEI Regulatory Cesamasues Shaw called Schltamer's anator was dame peuporty. "I ces should reauy repast u." '

l plans testart uplaie this ycar.

• E; W, some of which is statements "gdhe a laundry list." hasicaty say what he said is laae- But Shaw said some westers may Sctdeansmer, who as based sa defective,is besag eldamed frees the  !

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Ucshingles. D.C., said plant Z;mmer plant. That plant, located She pelated out that h is curate. k wts done properly. Iset amanher assashingefisteaseas.

wrong der "Gan) AP worterstoldhepa: e . east of Casciamati en the Olue River, levolved with apetvate greeg known . H is anselled dadaW if by gaelity agdpment assuranen."

was (Government AcceestI 'ly l was to be a nasclear power plant but as the Government As==addmy

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• A 35les meter la the drywen Projoet, which has allempted to trem lhe Zimmer plast, Pt&.Al mahas apolet tennehisese area near the reacter hermed and 1sbeingcenvertedteceat hermeeg ause R was designed is he a prgyle est,"

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• A heat test is the drywell area bisek haming of star emelser ahead two weeks age.'Ine meter had pressertaed-water reacter and

• Teatern Reserse Amasse has set o seves. year warranty that had that caused a Are last aiensk ces. piania, llaues to be attempted us. Of Westers Reserve Amanes, a Perry is a homaggator reseter, W.,ted the NBC abent the espired. 0ter plant esysipament alas basempireewarranslam successfully, and the cause of me self4eserted stilit essenmer anew said. "I base se have lashed ausgottees,Sshiammarssid, afo reeth and remove the meter, failure casset he dound. The test gresy, h said, des {Gdsk at other plaats het_ home been Article f rom Lake County Telegraph n Y

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p o sox or e Panav OMc 44oet e Tatapwows saisi ase-avar e Acomess to cawram nono 1 TPlS Servrng The Best location in the Nation PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT July 3,1985 Mr. Donald L. Schlemmer c/o Western Deserve Alliance 19916 Ma polia Drive '

Cleveland, GI 44196 5

Dear Mr. schlemmer:

Darious press reports within the last few weeks have gacted you as stating that p had knowledge of potential safety hazards at the Perry helaar Power Plant.

Because of our comitsent to the public health and safety, we investigate all allegations of potential safety problems and encourage all workers on site to identify such problems. -

The news reports of your.statenants provided few details concerning your allegations. So that we can obtain the information needed to fully exandne the claimed defects in the construction of the plant, please contact se as soon as possible. It is not necessary that you disclose the identity of workers who say have provided information to you, so long as the inforsation about the

. claimed defect is specific enough that we may adequately investigate whether such a defect is present.

Very truly yours, Yr _h 4

• h_v T. A. Boss, . _ 7 --m j Call for ity (216) 259-3737, ext. 5348 or (216) 259-2642

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EXHIBIT D Western Reserva Alliance 10916 Magnolia Drive Cleveland, Ohio 44106

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July 17, 1985

! Mr. T. A. Boss c/o Mr. Jay silberg shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1801 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. T. A. Boss:

Thank you for your letter of July 9, 1985, in which you requested that the Western Reserve Alliance (WRA) contact you as-soon as possible so that the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) can obtain the information to fully examine the claimed defects in the construction of the Perry nuclear plants.

A number of years.ago, the Western Reserve Alliance was contacted by a number'of whistleblowers from the Perry nuclear i plants. Since that time the number of whistleblowers has grown.

The workers have come from a number of different unions and many are in non-union capacities.

Due to the number of whistleblowers and the scope of their allegations, the Western Reserve Alliance began to work closely with the nationally recognized whistleblower organization, the Government Accountability Project (GAP). The reason we did this was to offer these individuals access to protection of this organization whose scope and nature is to help whistleblowers.

The structure of WRA differs from the Government Accountability Project.

We have turned the letter you sent to us over to the offices of GAP. It is GAP who will respond to your letter.

We could point out numerous interesting facts to you, but we will only mention a few. The reason for stating these are to show some of the reasons we are somewhat skeptical in regards to your sincerity. In response to an extensive article in the Lake County News Herald on Sunday, January 9, 1983, regarding men with ties to organized crime who were working or had worked at the Perry plants, CEI spokesman J. Lee Bailey said, "We see no long-term threat to safety."

1

we can tell you Mr. Bailey is wrong.

1. Additional organized union corruption at the Perry plants s were revealed in the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources' staff report on union corruption. (See, Chairman's 72-page staff report, July 30, 1984).

Witnesses have reported to us that CEI representatives received copies of WRA's testimony around midday at the Ohio Subcommittee Hearings on Emergency plans at the Perry Nuclear Plant which were held at Lakeland Community College (near the Perry plants) on July 9,1985; the same day that you sent us two letters (one to Cleveland and one to Washington) which you mailed from Perry, Ohio. The WRA testimony dealt extensively with l organized crime activity at the Perry plants.

On June 15, 1985, in the Painesville Telegraph, a CEI spokesperson tried to discredit the WRA by saying we were not l " reputable." It seems strange that CEI would a few weeks later i ask this unreputable group for information about CEI's Perry plants.

I Stranger still, in the same article, the CEI spokesperson tried to discredit workers' allegations and WRA by telling the public that the allegations could not be true because the Zimmer -

nuclear plant was designed to be a pressurized water reactor and Perry is a boiling water' reactor. This CEI statement, of course, is falso and both are boiling water reactors.

Instead of going on to write volumes on why one should be l

skeptical about the sincerity of CEI, we have turned this letter i over to GAP who will respond to you.

Sincerely, fo~rsold f . be.k$Mwmlut Donald L. Schlemmer Western Reserve Alliance G

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• EXHIBIT E GOVEluG4ENT ACCOUNTABluTY PROJECT 1555 Connecncur Awnue, N.W., Suite 202 Wct;r,wwi. D.C. 20036 July 17, 19s5 F

Mr. T. A. Boss I c/o Mr. Jay Silberg Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge i

1801 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 i

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Dear Mr. T. A. Boss:

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! We are writing to you because we have been asked to respond

[ to a letter you sent to the Western Reserve Alliance (WRA) dated c July 9, 1985. The Government Accountability Project (GAP) has been working with WRA for almost two years now because of a

quantity of whistleblowers which have contacted that utility a consumer group. We and they believe it would be best for the a

protection sent to WRA.

of the whistleblowers if we respond to the letter you Y

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E Your letter and public comments by your spokespersons in recent news accounts raise a number of concerns. I am glad that

[ you made efforts to raise them with consumer utilicy groups j$

directly and through the public media. I agree with your appa-

• i rent view that issues you raised are of definite public concern t and require open and public discussion.

Since 1975 the Government Accountability Project has pro-vided legal and other assistance to those who " blow the whistle" F en fraud, waste, mismanagement and health and safety standards.

5 During that time we have developed a methodology that might vary 6

in particular circumstances, but which nevertheless remains fairly consistent.

t First and foremost, we do not dictate for those who bring I information to us, how that information will be used or where it j will be taken. Those decisions are made solely by these who have J obtained the information. If we are not willing to abide by the b conditions imposed by the whistleblower, we will decline to use

} the information in any way.

In those cases where we are actually legally representing the potential whistleblower, we often have greater latitude in 2

deciding how to proceed. But, we are ethically bound to protect s

the client and to keep his or her interests very much in our mind.

E Thus, the major factor weighing upon our discussions and y

other deliberations about what to do about and where to go with sensitive information about problems is your reputation among L workers at the Perry plants. If employens are afraid to risk g going through the internal channels of CEI or the NRC, then we would indeed risk our own credi,bility by encouraging employees to g " walk the plank." If we decide to legally represent the person E

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who brings information forward, we would violate our own profes-sional ethics by advising the client to use defective internal channels.

Furthermore, unless I have sufficient evidence that an "open door" is truly open or an office to deal with problems does not

- view the whistleblower as "the problem," I will not advise employees to pursue those internal procedures. I also would want to know beforehand that the problems raised by the potential whistleblower would most likely be dealt with appropriately.

I Frankly, the Western Reserve Alliance has indicated to us that you do not really have an "open door" policy. Please do not think that we have made any determination about your quality assurance complaint procedures or systems. Unfortunately, at

! this point we do not know enough about your organization to make a valid judgment. Some employees have expressed doubts to us.

To allay their skepticism and our own reservations, we would need i

to hear from the employees who have tested your allegation procedures.

In fact, we would like to continue this dialogue with you and respectfully request that you allow us to speak with those who have reported problems to you publicly and openly through your system. If the only employees to use the procedure are ones* ,

who have done so anonymously, we would appreciate very much if you would somehow convey to them our desire to speak with them anonymously about the allegations procedures and their experi- ,

ences with them. Meanwhile, we hope you will give us some infor-nation about the types of complaints that have come through your

! allegation channels and what the final disposition of alleged problems have been.

The numerous reports of organized crime activity at the Perry plants are most disturbing. Also, you should know that recently we have started to receive more contacts from whistle-blowers from the Perry plants on direct basis. ,

WRA contacted GAP about two years ago. At the time were were heavily involved in many cases around the country, especi-ally the Midland nuclear plant and the Zimmer nuclear plant. We were not able to take on a full investigation of the Perry plants. We agreed at that time to train a legal intern. Since that time Donald L. Schlemmer has served in thht capacity regard-  ;

ing the Perry plants. . i Thank you in advance for your consideration of our requests.

Certainly we look forward to the possibility of working with you.

Sincerely, Billie Pirner Garde Citizens Clinic Director

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EXHIBIT F p o som s7 e meant. omo uost e vns**ows mei ase star e Aoomass.1o CANTER meAo Sereng The Rest location on the Nation PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT September 6, 1985 Donald L. schleeper c/o metam menerve Alliance 19916 lia Drive Cleve , m 44106 Dost Mr. Schlemmer:

Thank you for your letter of &ly 17,1985, in response to my letter of kly 9, 1985.

I am sure that you would agree that it is to everyone's benefit if unsafe conditions that say exist at the perry mclear Power Plant be identified and corrected at the earliest time. It is for that reason that Cleveland Electric 111minating Company instituted its " Call for @elity' program more than a year ago.

The Tall for Cpality" program encourages workers to ocntact us on a confidential basis if they are aware of any conditions which they believe say

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affect the safety of the: plant. The contact sey be nede through the " Call for tality" hotline, foras witch are available at security poets, or by personally talking with the Perry Plant cebudsman. Exit interviews are alco being conducted. Werkers contacting the " Call for @ality" program need not identify themselves. anwever, if the worker does provide his name, the onbudenen will report back to him the results of the investigation.

The " Call for Quality

• organisation is a separate group directed by the @ality Audit tmit k pervisor. It is independent of both the construction and operational gelity organizations. The " Call for @ality* program handles all concems brought to it on a confidential basis, in order to protect the identity of all those using the program and to encourage those Who might otherwise be reluctant to bring their concerns forward.

Mile it is certainly possible that there rey be see wrkers who for one reason or another do not wish to ccesunicate their concerns to us directly, it serves no useful purpose for those concerns to be withheld irom the ' Call for

@ality" program. As I stated in ny letter to you, we are only interested in 2; identifying any potential problers, and not in the identity of the workers who '

may have brought those potential problems to the attention of Wester Reserve ..

Alliance. We will deal with all concerns in an appropriate sanner. But even if screene should believe that a ococern he or she has brought to us has not been dealt with appropriately, nothing will have been lost by disclosing the substance of the concern to the " Call.for @ality' program.

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,,,-d Withholding inforestion identifM safet*> onncerns frcat those who are in a

( position to correct them can an',y result h plants that may be less safe than they otherwise udght be. If you have been informed of concems dich may affect the safe operation of the Perry Plant, I would strongly urge that they be identified to the T.all fer Gaality" program or to the lac at the earliest possible time.

Dery truly yours, a= L : -

h:_n_

T. A. Bose call for Qaality (216) 25F3737, est. 5348 or (216) 259-2647  :

ect tillie Pirner Garde, Esquire Goverrment Accountability Prom IS$$ connectiaat Avenue, N. W.

I aulte 292

Mashington,DC 29536 4k i

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