ML19325D494

LER 89-004-00:on 890616,determined That Calculations Were Not Available to Demonstrate That Svc Water Sys Capable of Supplying Design Flow to safety-related Loads Under Scenario of Seismic event.W/891017 Ltr

ML19325D494
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/17/1989
From:	Hairston W, Dennis Morey ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-004-01, LER-89-4-1, NUDOCS 8910240257
Download: ML19325D494 (5)

Text

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• Alabare

• Power Company

, 40 inv6 vss Comer Parks'y Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone 705 066 5!,81 W. Q. Heireton, til Senior Vice Pre sident ggggg Nuclear Operatir>ns the saathom electrc system 10 CFR 50.73 October 17. 1989 Docket No. 50-348 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C. 20555 Dear Sir Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 LJcensee Event Report No. LER 89-004-00 Joseph H. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Licensee Event Report No. LER 89-004-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73.

If you have any questions, please advise.

i Respectfully s ted,

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l V. G. Hairston, III VGH,III/JARamd 8.33 Enclosure cc Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. G. F. Maxwell l

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Potential Design Inadequacy in the Service Vater System -

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On June 16, 1989, during a Self-Initiated Safety System Assessment (SSSA) of the Service Vater System, it was determined that calculations t vere not available to demonstrate that the service water system was capable of rupplying design flov to safety related loads under the I

l scenario of zn LOSP, a seismic event, or combination of these two j events and that those scenarios may be more limiting than the assumed ,

design condition for the service water system.

The original design assumed the LOCA vith LOSP vould be the bounding scenario for d' other postulated events. The LOCA vith LOSP event generates an St signal, isolating major non-safety rel3ted loads on the service water r stem.

l The LOSP, seismic, or combination LOSP/ seismic events postulated by the SS5A vould not result in the automatic isolation of major non-=afety related service water loads and therefore may represent e more limiting design condition for the system.

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Plant and System Identifications i

Vestinghou1e - Pressurized Vater Reactor Energy Industry Identification System coder are identified in the text as l IXX). '

i Summary of Event  !

t On June 16, 1989, during a self-Initiated Safety System Assessment (SSSA) of the Service Vater System [BI), it was determined that calculations were not availabic to demonstrate that the service water system was capable of  ;

supplying design flow to safety related loads under the scenario of an LOSP, a seismic event, or combination of these two events. The SSSA team  !

discovered that these scenarios may be more limiting than the assumed design condition for the service water system.

The original design assumed the LOCA vith LOSP vould be the bounding scenario for all other postulated events. The LOCA vith LOSP event -

generates an SI signal, isolating major non-safety related service water loads. ,

H The LOSP, seismic, or combination LOSP/ Seismic events postulated by the SSSA l

' vould not result in the autor.atic isolation of major non-safety related service water loads and therefore may represent a more limiting design ,

condition for the system. '

Background Information l ,

l i In 1988, Alabama Power Company made the decision to conduct a self-initiated safety system assessment. The purpose of the assessment was to evaluate i

the ef fectiveness of the existing Configuration Management program for Farley Nuclear Plant. A detailed SSSA plan was developed which delineated

• the methodology for conducting the assessment, including the means for addressing SSSA.

operability and reportability concerns identified during the  ;

June 19-23,A team of 10 personnel coniucted the SSSA on May 22-26, June 5-9, and 1989, i

Description of Event

! i on June 16, 1989 based on the SSSA team documented finding, it was determined that a potential problem with the system capability for supplying design flow to safety related loads under the scenario of an LOSP, seismic event, or combination LOSP and seismic event existed. On June 16, revisions to operatti.c procedores vere implemented to isolate significant non-safety related loads upon from a seismic ev(nt.indication of an LOSP or a major lice break resulting These compensatory measures are being implemented until further evalu0tien and analysis can be conducted.

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Cause of Event j The original Service Water system design assumed the LOCA vith LOSF event ,

would be the bounding oesign condition for the system. Tbs cause of this  ;

i event was that the original assumption appears to be in error. No l

documented evidence could be found to demonstrate that the original design assumption was a more limiting design condition than the scenarios i

identified by the SSSA. j Reportabili,ty Analysis and Safety Assessment When the potential concern with the service water flov balance was i identified in June, prompt actions were taken to establish interim compensatory measures and the NEC resident inspector was notified.

The service water system was considered operable based on the establishment of interim compensatory measures, j l

i In June when the flow balance concern was ra'. sed, reportability of the event was addressed. At that time, available flov balance calculations did not conclusively show that inadequate flow rates to safety related ,

components would occur during an LOSP and/or seismic event. Tnus, it was  ;

determined that there was no known condition which constituted a reportable condition. Upon completi n of the service water flow balance model development, reportability would again be evaluated. The model is I currently scheduled for c.c.ipletion in February 1990. I l In September 1989, Alabre 1 Power Company briefed NRC Region II management on the status of the SSL program. Based on discussions with the staff,

! Mabama Power Company decided to submit a voluntary report concerning the

potential flow inadequacy.

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Corractive Action In June 1989, when the SFSA team notified Farley Nuclear Plant of the potential l' flow balance concern, interim compensatory measures were taken. These measures vere implemented priot to co'rpletion of the SSSA. The measures consisted of revising plant procedures to require operator actions to isolate the turbine r building and other major non-safety related loads upon indication of an 14SP or a  !

major line break resulting from a seismic event. A1.1 on-shift licensed personnel vere ir. formed of the potential concern via Operatiers Night Orders. A subsequent training notice was issued to all licensed personnel noting the  :

procedure changes implemented as interim compensatory actions and other concerns and procedure changes resulting from the SSSA. In September 1989, during a  :

review of the SSSA corrective action status, several of the operations procedures  ;

I vere further revised to provide additional guidance to the operators. i A flow balance model is currently being developed such that the LOSP and/or seismic events can be accurately and quantitatively analyzed to demonstrate adequate flov vill exist to all safety related components. The model is still in the development stage vitti verification of inputs being performed and actual '

field flow measuremer , planned to validate the model versus the current field conditions. The model is scheduled for completion by Februar* 1990.

Based on the results of the service water S$$A, Alabama Pov t Company performed a ,

mini-SSSA on the component cooling vater (CCV) system (which was focused on '

assessing the design of the CCW system). No significant design analysis weaknesses i vare found. In addition, Alabama Power Company Intends to continue ito SSSA program '

, to review other selected safety systems during the next three to five years.

T % refore, a program is in place to correct service water issues and to evaluate the 1 original design assumptions for other safety systems, i 1 '

Adi'!. fonal Informatien No components failed during this event.

4 No similar 1.F.Rs have been submitted by farley Nuclear PJant. '

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