ML20012C303

LER 90-001-00:on 900213,fire Watch Not Established within Required Time Period Due to Personnel Error.Administrative Procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.4 Revised & Personnel Retrained on requirements.W/900313 Ltr

ML20012C303
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	03/13/1990
From:	Hairston W, Dennis Morey ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-001, LER-90-1, NUDOCS 9003210009
Download: ML20012C303 (4)

Text

..

lp* , g Alabama Power Company 40 inverness Center Parkwey

. Post Offee Box 1295

. Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 066-5581 W, Q. Hairston, lli Senior Vice President

!. Nuclear Operations AlabamaPower -

March 13. 1990 e sswneerresystem tr -

10CFR50.73 Docket No. 50-348  ;

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 -

Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1-Licensee Event Report No. LER 90-001-00 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Licensee Event Report No. LER 90-001-00  !

is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,  !

y).p.^

f4 hu V. G. Hairston, III VGH,III/JARimd 8.61 )

Enclosure I cci Mr. S. D. Ebneter l Mr. G. F. Maxwell ]

i 9003210009 900313 PDR ADOCK 05000348 l 6 _ .

PDC f 1 i

i L

7a g.gf M n. U..,,UCa.i m UuTor.,Co .oh moyt, oM, ,,o. ,m,,,,

x,,nt .,wm ESTIMATEo SURDEN Pt2 RESPoNst TO CoMPtY Iff7H THl$

E"!?MENTs'Uo*?n'o"Nls "Ro"tN E#ih'e'ToL'M($'",i LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

O!Ut3"s'M"'i'a"=,"as',f'!s fo! ""AJat"*

M'MLAo'si"I 4EEe"T%fsNo'T'on#E3 C F ACILITv 88AME 11) DOCKET NUnaBE R (2) PAGE GI Jeseph M. Farley - Unit 1 o i s ; o , o , o ;3 [+ y 3jopp p TITLt to)

Fire Vatch Not Esteblished Within The Required Time Period Due To Personnel Error EVINT DATB (S) LER NuesetR 46) REPORT DAf t (7) OTHER F ACILifit$ INVOLVED tel l MONTH oav YtAR vt 4R #gM ; *ff,0 uoNTH oAv vtAR * *Citiv v anets oocET NUustRisi 0!sjololog l l.

~ ~

0 l2 1% 90 9l0 0l0l1 Oj0 0.j3, ll3 9l 0 o,5,o,o,o, , ,

OPERAf tesO THl4 RSPORT BE SUOMITTED PUR$L' ANT TO THE RLQutREMENTS OF 10 CFR l- (ChecA ene or morer e the tone.sner (til "00' #5 s0 ment 1 #0 meig 60.ni.iuH.i 7 3.71 > >

R M 405(aH1Hil DO 38(eH11 90.73teH2Hel 73.716el

,iel uoo = = HiHa x ==eHei

• n >=H.u

_ g,H3;smg;,

70 40Stolt1Hdil g 50.73tell2Hil 60.73talt2HvillHAl Jif6Al 30 406teH1 Hew) 80.73tal(2Ha R73:eH2HvillHel s

30.405(aH1Het 00 734elGHds) 90 73telGHal LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THi$ LER lit) l' NAME TitEPHONE NUMBER ARE A CoDL D. N. Morey, General Manager-Nuclear Plant  ? l0 Q 8 9; 91 - l 5 1115 l6 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPCNENT 7 ALLURE DESCRISED IN THIS RIPoRT 113)

CAust sv TtM Couro.>t Nt "jyX' AC. agyal,aji' '

CAust sv Tle coMroNENT "jyW'Ae Rgymy,A,egt i I I I I I I I i i i i i I $

1 1 I I I I I l .I i l i I I '

SUPPLEMENT AL .IEPORT tRPECTED 114) MONTH DAv vtAR SUOMIS$1oN TES (19 yes. cornsvete EXPtCT(O SUOnt!S5 TON DA TC) ko l l l ASSTR ACT (&dmst to 7400 apaces. d e , apprownefery rehsen senede mese typewnteen fanssi (161 L

At 1035 on 02-13-90, it was recognized that a continuous fire watch required by Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 was not being performed. Pre-action fire protection system (FPS) 1A-62 had been isolated at 0859 on 02-13-90 so that maintenance'could be performed on~the clapper valve. 'When FPS 1A-62 is inoperable, Techaical Specification 3.7.11.2 requires that, within one hour, a continuous fire atch be established in room 190 (Auxiliary Feedvater Pumps Cable

= Area). The required firs watch was established at 1054 on 02-13-90.

This event was caused by cognitive personnel errors in that:

1. The Shift Foreman - Inspecting involved did not consider the need for establishing a fire watch.

2. The Shift Supervisor and Plant Operator assumed that the fire watch had already been established and did not verify the correctness of their assumption.

FNP-0 -SOP-0.4 (Fire Protection Program Adhiinistrative Procedure) has been revised. This revision requires verification that the required fire watch has been established prior to removing a fire protection system from service for more than one hour. All Operations personnel vill be trained on this requirement. In addition, all Operations personnel vill be retrained on the proper use of turnover sheets for documentation of special condition information. Also, personnel involved in this event have been counseled.

- NRC Perm See 1649)

efR PORMactA U.S.tLUCLI A3 LE AULATORY COMules10N txPIXt$ 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) '8,'s";U#dugEJ',",00',';?>"",,'

, .#7# ,T{','J'!

TEXT CONTINUATION 1,7.'"/A';',t'ZM 0"?',MUe"l'TA!? U'".' "Mf"f!

E < Wi','a".'Ji".*a*3,a'!=il?"i4M 0?,1?

UF MANAOf MENT AND DVDGET, WASHINGTON,DC 20603.

, ActLITY fsAMS 11) DOCKET NUMSSR (2) LER NUMBER 40) PA06 (31

%e -

$' MOP.*, ' -

%*.?:

Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 opo ojo 3l4 8 9l 0 -

0 l0 l1 -

0p 0l2 cr 0l3 ftXT W mes, esses e menest use sehseens/ NRC #en JUSA's/ (th Plant and System Identification Vestinghouse - Pressurized Vater Reactor Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as [XX).

Summary of Event

.: At 1035 on 02-13-90, it was recognized that a continuous fire watch required by ,

l Technical Specification'3.7.11.2 was not being performed. Pre-action fire protection system (FPS) 1A-62 [KP] had been isolated at 0859 on 02-13-90 so that maintenance could be performed on the clapper valve. When FPS 1A-62 is inoperable, Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 requires that, within one hour, a continuous. fire watch be established in room 190 (Auxiliary Feedvater' Pumps Cable Area). The required fire watch was established at 1054 on 02-13-90.

B Description of Event On 02-13-90, the unit was operating at approximately 100 percent power. It was.

-desired to perform maintenance on the clapper valve associated with pre-action FPS sprinkler system 1A-62. This maintenance required the isolation valve for 1A-62 to be closed which rendered the FPS for 1A-62 inoperable. When FPS 1A-62 is inoperable, Technical Specification 3.7.11.2 requires that, within one hour, a continuous fire watch be established in room 190 (Auxiliary Feedvater Pumps Cable Area).

A Tagging Operations Order (TOO) for this work was written by the Shift Foreman -

p Inspecting (SFI) on night shift. The night shift SFI recognized that a fire watch j

was required. He folded the T00 and wrote a note on the back of the TOO to remind the oncoming SFI of the fire watch requirement. The night shift SFI did not include'the fire vatch requirement on his turnover sheet. The day shift SFI <

determined that the TOO was adequate and noted that the night shift SFI had signed the T00.- >

Because the TOO had been signed by the night shift SFI, the day shift SFI did not l -consider fire watch requirements nor did he see the note. He gave the TOO to the li Shift Supervisor (SS). The SS saw the note and assumed that the fire vatch had E already been established. .The SS approved the TOO and forwarded it to the Plant Operator. ~The Plant Operator saw the note and assumed that the fire watch had been established. The T00 was forwarded to a Systems Operator who closed the isolation valve ^for 1A-62 at 0859.

-Subsequently, at 1035 on 02-13-90, the Systems Operator called the Shift Foremen

,0perating (SFO) to discuss a problem encountered while closing the isolation valve for FPS 1A-62. The SFO had not been aware that 1A-62 was inoperable. The SFO recognized.-that a fire watch was needed and established the required fire watch at 1054 on 02-13-90.

. NRC Penn 30SA (689)

eo=M sesA > uaxvctaAusivuf. v commission exmts mom LICENSEE EVENT REPERT (LER) L5Zt'Mo',f"c80','c%0'5?"unT' . CMn',' ignV,"n'!

^

TEXT CONTINUATION CJ"',"4'n%'M20 *E"f',"all,'c'n,'MS"' OfRA P APE Rwo of U TION J t'3 IC OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,thASHING TON, DC 3. 206.0 F AcaLITY esAME (1) doc 8Lt1 NUMSER (2) LI A NUMSER 16) PAGE13) naa "b'?.P." "'#.W Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 o;g;gjogog g3 4;8 9;0 _

O0l gg _

0 0 0 g3 op 0; 3 g TexTw = mmw e = w ac w 3m unn

.Cause of Event This event was caused by cognitive personnel error in that:

1. The SFI involv9d ttid Get consider the need for establishing a fire watch.

2. The SS and Plant Operator assumed tLnt the fire watch had already been established and did not verify the u rrectness of their as',smp t ion. ,

! Reportability Analysis and Safety Assessment l

I This event is reportable because the continuous fire watch required by Technical i Specification 3.7.11.2 was not established within the one hour _ requirement.

Although the continuous fire watch was not performed, an hourly fire watch patrol was performed in the affected area..

Smoke detectors in the affected area vere operable and would have alerted

_ personnel of a fire in the area.

The'inoperability of FPS 1A-62 had no effect on plant operation. No fire occurred ,.

during the time that this FPS was inoperable. The health and safety of the public' were not affected by this event.

Corrective Action j FNP-0-SOP-0.4 (Fire Protection Program Administrative Procedure) has been revised. This revision requires verification that the required fire watch has been established prior to removing a fire protection system from service for more than one hour. All Operations personnel vill be trained on this  !

requirement. In addition, all Operations personnel vill be retrained on the ,

proper use of turnover-sheets for documentation of special condition '

l information. Also, the SFIs, SS, and Plant Operator involved in this event l- have been counseled.

1 Additional Information l No components failed during this event.

This event would not have been more severe if it had occurred under different operating conditions. I The following LERs involved personnel errors by the Shift Foreman in the establishing.and maintaining of fire watches:

Unit 1: LERs 84-013-00, 84-015-00, 84-022-00, 86-013-00, 87-006-00, 88-004-00 Unit 2 (Docket Number 05000364): LERs 84-007-00, 85-007-00, 85-013-00, 88-004-00, 88-005-00 NRC Form 30BA (649) ,

c , .