ML19332F906

LER 89-008-00:on 891113,containment Integrity Not Maintained for Approx 30 S.Caused by Personnel in That Inner Door Was Left Blocked Open.Personnel Counseled & Interim Administrative Controls established.W/891213 Ltr

ML19332F906
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/13/1989
From:	Hairston W, Dennis Morey ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-008-03, LER-89-8-3, NUDOCS 8912190289
Download: ML19332F906 (4)

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r Alabama Power Company 40 Irwerness Center Parkw:y Pos Ottice Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Telephone COS 868-5581 W. G. Hairston,111

'l. $ontor Vice President nociear op ranons . AlabamaPower t*e soutWn ekttrc sprein 10CFR50.73 I December 13, 1989 Docket No. 50-348 i

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C. 20555 Dear Sir Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Licensee Event Report No. LER 89-008-00 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Licensee Event Report No. LER 89-008-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, W.] W V. G. Hairston, III VGH,III/JARimd 12.51 Enclosure

cci Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. G. F. Maxwell ,

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8912190289 891213

.PDR .ADOCK 05000348 S PDC. l

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I At approximately 2005 on 11-13-89, with the unit in Mode 3 (Hot l Standby), containment integrity was not maintained for approximately

l. 30 seconds when the containment personnel hatch outer door was opened while the inner door was open.

This event was caused by personnel error in that (1) the inner door was left blocked open by maintenance personnel and (2) a Health Physics technician manually operated the airlock outer door without properly l

determining the status of the airlock inner door.

The personnel involved in this event have been counseled.

FNP has established interim administrative controls and long term controls vill be established to prevent improper operation of the l airlock whenever containment integrity is required. Further, a sign has been posted on the airlock to require Shift Supervisor approval prior to manual operation of the airlock.

NRC Form 300 46491

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% mary of Event j

l. At approximately 2005 on 11-13-89, with the unit in Mode 3 (Hot Standby),  ;

! containment (NH] integrity was not maintained for approximately 30 seconds when the J containment personnel hatch outer door was opened while the inner door was open.

Description of Event l

At approximately 1930 on 11-13-89, five maintenance personnel and a Health Physics technician entered containment to perform maintenance. They loaded the items needed for the job on a dolly and rolled the dolly to the personnel hatch. A  ;

portable ramp was used to facilitate work. The inner door was left open with the ramp in a position which prevented door closure.

At approximately 2005, two Instrumentation and controls technicians and another Health Physics technician attempted to make a containetnt entry to perform unrelated maintenance. When they arrived, they saw that three red lights were  ;

illuminated, indicating that the inner door was open. After vaiting several minutes while making several unsuccessful attempts to contact the personnel inside containment, they attempted to close the inner door electrically with the ,

push button. ,

They noted the handvheel for the inner door rotated in the closed direction and the mechanical indicator for the inner door moved to the closed position. In addition, the lights for the latch and vent valve indicated that the door was closed.

However, they saw the light for the inner door indicated that the door was still open. They then attempted to verify that the inner door was closed by using the handwheel. Some resistance was felt and they stopped this attempt to manually verifv that the door was closed. The outer door still vould not open electrically due to the open indication on the inner door. Since the mechanical position indicator indicated closed for the inner door and the latch light shoved the door closed, they then decided to open the outer door manually and did so without difficulty.

Upon entering the airlock, they saw that the inner door was blocked open ,

approximately eight inches with the ramp. They then immediately closed the outer door and opened the inner door to remove the ramp. The total time both doors vere open is estimated to be 30 seconds.

Cause of Event This event was caused by personnel error in that (1) the inner door was left blocked open by maintenance personnel and (2) a Health Physics technician manually operated the airlock outer door without properly determining the status of the airlock inner door.

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Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 o p,,ololol 3;4;8 8,9 _ q0;8 _ 0; C Og 3 0, Og 2 ruto . w. mci an.un Cause of Event (Continued)

Design changes were implemented in 1985 on both units to provide an improved containment airlock door operating system. The system is designed for electrical operation of the doors but also allows for manual operation when necesnry. There are three push button stations for airlock operations one on the Auxiliary Building side of the airlock, one on the containment. side of the airlock, and one station inside the airlock. The Auxiliary Building, station has indicator lights to shov the sequence of door opening and closing.

The design change also added an electric interlock that prevents the door from being opened electrically if the opposite door is not closed. When the Health Physics technician manually operated the door, this design change feature was bypassed. There is also a mechanical interlock to prevent both doors from being open at the same time. The outer door opened due to excessive freedom in the operating mechanism.

Reportability Analysis and Safety Assessment This event is reportable as an event that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant's principal safety barriers being degraded and as an event that alone could have prevented containment from controlling the release of radioactive material.

Vestinghouse has reviewed this incident and concluded that the offsite doser from any of the applicable accident scenarios in Mode 3 vould have remained well within the guidelines of 10CFR100.

Corrective Action The personnel involved have been counseled.

The mechanical interlock assemblies vill be inspected for proper adjustment in conjunction with the next airlock surveillance testing.

FNP has established interim administrative controls and long term controls vill be established to prevent improper operation of the airlock whenever containment

, integrity is required.

Additional Information No components failed during this event. l

! This event vould have had increased safety consequences had it occurred at power due to t.he potential for loss of clad integrity as a result of several design basis accidents.

No similar LERs have been submitted by FNP.

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