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| issue date = 11/20/1978
| issue date = 11/20/1978
| title = Forwards Appl for Amend to Facil Operating Lics#DPR-31 & DPR-41.Proposed Amend Addresses Overpressure Mitigating Sys (Oms).Discusses Limiting Conditions for Oper of Reactor Coolant Sys
| title = Forwards Appl for Amend to Facil Operating Lics#DPR-31 & DPR-41.Proposed Amend Addresses Overpressure Mitigating Sys (Oms).Discusses Limiting Conditions for Oper of Reactor Coolant Sys
| author name = UHRIG R E
| author name = Uhrig R
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| addressee name = STELLO V
| addressee name = Stello V
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR)
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR)
| docket = 05000250, 05000251
| docket = 05000250, 05000251
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:P.O.BOX 013100,'IAMI, FL 33101 yglg>>+/ri vvtx%FLORIDA POWER&LIGHT COMPANY November 20, 1978 L-78-368 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
{{#Wiki_filter:P. O. BOX 013100,'IAMI, FL   33101 yglg>>
Hr.Victor-Stello, Director Division of Operating Reactors U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555.
                                                                                            +/rivvtx%
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY November 20, 1978 L-78-368 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Hr. Victor- Stello, Director Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555


==Dear Hr.Stello:==
==Dear Hr. Stello:==
Re: Turkey Point-Units'and 4 Docket Nos.50-250 and 50-251 Proposed Amendment to Facility 0 eratin Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.30, Florida Power&Light Company submits herewi th three (3)signed originals and forty (40)conformed copies of a request to amend Appendix A of Facility Operating Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41.This submittal is being submitted in response to a July 19, 1978 letter from fir.A.Schwencer of your staff, in accordance with our letter of October 19, 1978.The proposed amendment, which addresses the operability and surveillance of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Overpressure Hi tigating System (OHS), is described below and shown on the accompanying Technical Specification pages bearing the-date of this letter in the right hand corner.Pa e 3.1-1 New Specification 3'..l.a.5 addresses the starting of a reactor coolant pump wnen the reactor coolant system is in the'low temperature RCS overpressure protection range.Pa e 3.14-1 New Specification 3.14 gives the Overpressure Hitigati ng System (OHS)limiting conditions for operation.
Pa e 4.15-1 New Specification 4.15 gives the OHS surveillance requirements.
Pa es B3.1-1 B3.14-1 and B4.15-1 New and revised Bases sections are provided in support of the 0HS.M~~p't'Eh''JLIIIQ,.
~",.<'IjiI'gpg~8~m>0l 6 I PEOPLE..~SERVING PEOPLE Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page Two The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Safety Committee and the Florida Power 8 Light Company Nuclear Review Board.They have concluded that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question.Implementation of the OMS at Turkey Point has proceeded in two phases.Phase I addressed the circuitry needed to add the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)low setpoint feature and associated alarms.Phase II addresses (1)OMS-arming/.
valve-position interlock circuitry and (2)redundant nitrogen supply to the PORV's.Phase I has been completed on both Units 3 and 4.It was our intent to implement Phase II during the refueling outages in 1978, but due to equip-ment procurement delays we have not been able to do so.All of the modifica-tion design work has been completed and all necessary parts are on order.Phase II is scheduled for implementation as soo'n as parts are avai,lable and plant conditions permit.lie expect to.complete Phase I I during the 1979 refuel-ing outages, which are both scheduled for Spring 1979.This, proposed change is being submitted for the convenience of the Comnission.
Accordingly, we have determined that it does not require the payment of a license amendment fee in accordance with 10 CFR 50 part 170.Very truly yours, Robert E.Uhrig Vice President REU/fiAS/cf Attachment cc: Mr.James P.O'Reilly, Region II Robert Lowenstein, Esquire TABXZ OP CO;)TENTS (Continued)
Section 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 4 4.2 4.3 4 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9!O'.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 El cctriczl Systems Stean Power Conversion Systems Radioactive Haterizls Release Liquid Pastes Gaseous Pastes'Cont inerized Pastes Refueling Hiscel3.aneous Radioactive Haterizls Sources Cask.Hzndling Shod: Suopressors (snubbers)
Overpressure Mitigating System SURVKXLI<~~CE REQUX~HTS Operational.Safety Reviee Reactor Coolant System Xn Service Xnspect:ion.
Reactor Coolart System Xntegrity Containment Tests.Xntegrzted..Leakage Pate Test-Post Operational Local Penetration Tests Report of Test Results Xsolztion Valves Residual Heat Removal System Tendon Surveillance End Anchorage Concrete Surveillance Liner Surveillance-Safety Xnjection Emergency Containment Cooling Systems'mergency Contzi'nrent Piltering znd Post Accident Containment Vent Systems Emergency Pover System Periodic Tests Hain Ste~>.Xsolation Valves Auxiliary Peed-ater System Reactivity Pwomalies Environmentz2..Radiation Survey'adioactive.Materials Sources Surveillance Shack Suppressors (snubbers)
Overpressure Mitigating System~Pa e 3+7~1~3 8-3.-3.9-3.'.9-3.3.9-2 3.9-3;3.10-1 3 s 11.~1-3 12 1 3;13-3.3.14-1 fl 1 1 4.2-1 43'1 4-4-2, 4.4-1 f~f!,-1 4.4-2 4 4-3 4 4-3 44 l, f4%4-6 4.4-6 4.5-3.4.6.1 f~.7-.3.4.8-1 4.9-1 4.1O-1..4.12-3 4-13-i 4-.3.4-.1.
4.15-1 5.5.1 5.2 5 3 5.4 6.6.1 6.2.6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7!6 8 6.9 DESIGN PE~TURKS Site Reactor Containment Fuel" Storage AD~EXHISTP~iTXVE CONTROLS Responsibility, Organization Facility Staff Qualifications Training Revie~and Audit Reportzble Occurrence Action Safety Limit Violation Procedures Reporting Requirements 5&1 1 5.1-3.5&2 1 5%3 5.4>3.6.1-3.6-3.6-1, 6-5 6-5 6-S 6-14 6-14 6-14 6-16


===3.0 LINITIN===
Re:  Turkey Point- Units' and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 Proposed Amendment    to Facility 0  eratin  Licenses  DPR-31 and DPR-41 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.30, Florida Power & Light Company submits herewi th three (3) signed originals and forty (40) conformed copies of a request to amend Appendix A of Facility Operating Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41. This submittal is being submitted in response to a July 19, 1978 letter from fir. A. Schwencer of your staff, in accordance with our letter of October 19, 1978.
CON)ITIONS FOR OPEeeATION'.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM A licabilit Applies to the operating st.atus of the Reactor Coolant System.~ob'e tlv e: To specify those limiting conditions for operation of the Reactox Coolant System which must be met to assure safe reactor operation.
The proposed    amendment, which addresses the operability and surveillance of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Overpressure Hi tigating System (OHS),
a.Reactor Coolant Pum s 1.A minimum of ONE pump shall be in operation when the react:or is in power operation, except during low power physics tests.2.A minimum of ONE pump, or ONE Residual Heat Removal Pump, shall be i.n operation during reactor coolant boron concent:ration,reduct:ion.
is described below and shown on the accompanying Technical Specification pages bearing the -date of this letter in the right hand corner.
3.Reactor power shall not exceed 10%of rated power unless at least THO reactor coolant pumps are in operation.
Pa e  3.1-1 New  Specification 3 '..l.a.5 addresses the starting of a reactor coolant pump wnen the reactor coolant system is in the 'low temperature RCS overpressure    protection range.
4.Reactor power shall not exceed 45%of rat:ed power with only two pumps in operation unless the overtemperature AT t:rip setpoint:, K , for two loop operati.on, ha been set at 0.8 5.A reactor coolant pump shall not be started when cold leg temperature is<275'F unless steam gen-erator secondary water temperature is less than 50'F above, t: he RCS temperature (including instrument error).b.Steam Generators l.A minimum of TWO steam generators sh,.ll be operable when the average.coolant temperature is above 350F.c.Pressurizer Safet'alves l.ONE valve shall be operable whenever the head is on the reactor.vessel except during hydrostatic test:s.2.THRFE valves shall be operable when the reactor coolant average temperature i.s above 350F or the reactor is cr'tical.3-1-1 11/20/78 3.14 OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range when the RCS is not vented through at least a 2.20 square inch area.~Ob'ective: To minimize.the possibility of an overpressure transient which could exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.temperature RCS overpressure protection range.2.Valves HOV->'<-843 A, MOV-~-843 B, MOV->'-866 A, and MOV-~-866 B shall be closed in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range.3.If any of the valves in 3.14.2 are found to be open while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within the next 8 hours: a b.c block the corresponding flow path to the reactor vessel, close the valve, or depressurize and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.4.Two pressurizer power operated relief valves shall be operable in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range.a.If one power operated relief valve is inoperable while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within 7 days: (1)restore operability of the power operated relief valve, or (2)depressurize and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.b.If both power operated relief valves are inoperable while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within the next 24 hours: (1)restore operability of at least one power operated relief valve, or (2)depressurize.
Pa e  3.14-1 New  Specification 3. 14 gives the Overpressure Hitigati ng        System (OHS) limiting conditions for operation.
and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.3.14-1 11/20/78 4.15 OVERPRESSVRE MITIGATING SYSTEM Applies to periodic surveillance of the'Overpressure xiii'tigating System.~Ob ective: To demonstrate operability of the Overpressure Mitigating System.1.Within 1 month prior to operation in a condition where the PORV would be required to be operable, the pressurizer power operated relief valve actuation circuitry shall be functionally tested.The functional test need not include actual valve operation.
Pa e  4.15-1 New  Specification 4.15 gives the      OHS surveillance  requirements.
2.Hhile in the low temperature RCS overpxessure protecti.on range, verify daily that no more than one charging pump is operable.3.t&ile in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, verify daily that valves MOV->'-843 A, HQV-+-843 B, MOV-"'-866 A, and HOV->'-866 B are closed.4.While in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, verify weekly that the isolation valve for each operable pressurizer power operated relief valve is open.5.While in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, the pressurizer power operated relief valve actuation circuitry shall.be functionally tested monthly.The functional test need not include actual valve operation..
Pa es  B3.1-1  B3.14-1  and B4.15-1 New and  revised Bases sections are provided in support of the           0HS.
6.Testing shall be in accordance with an approved pump and valve test program.4.15-1 1'1/20/78 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 1.0 erational Com onents The specification requires that a sufficient number of reactor coolant pumps be operating to provide coast down core cooling in the event that a loss of flow occurs.The flow provided will keep DNBR well above 1.30.When the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System is to be reduced the process must be uniform to prevent sudden reactivity changes in the reactor.Mixing of the reactor coolant will be sufficient to maintain a uniform boron concentration if at least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place.The residual heat removal pump will circulate the reactor coolant system volume in approximately one half hour.Each of the pressurizer safety valves is designed to relieve 293,330 lbs.per hr.of saturated steam at the valve set point.Below 350 F and 450 psig in the Reactor Coolant System, the Residual Heat Removal System can remove decay heat and thereby control system temperature and pressure.If no residual heat were removed by any of the means available the amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve lifting, pressure would be less than the capacity of a single valve.Also, two safety valves have capacity gxeatpy than the maximum surge rate resulting from complete loss of load.The 50'F limit on maximum differential between steam, generator secondary water temperature and reactor coolant temperature assures that the pressure transient caused by starting a reactor coolant pump when cold leg temperature is<275,'F can be relieved by operation of one Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV).The 50 F limit iricludes instrument error.2.Pressure/Tem erature Limits All components in the Reactor Coolant System are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes.These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations.
M~ ~ p 't
The various categoxies of load cycles used fox design purposes axe provided in B3.1-4 11/20/78 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM The operability of two PORV's or an RCS vent opening of greater than or equal to 2.20 square inches ensures that the RCS will, be protected from pressure transients which could exceed.the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are<275 F." Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurizat9on when the transient is limited to either (1)the start of an idle RCS with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator<50'F above the RCS cold leg temperature (includes margin for instrument error)or (2)the start of a HPSI pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.B3.14-1 11/20/78 B4.15 BASES FOR SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM The specified testing of the Overpressure Mitigating System (OMS)will verify its operability.
                                'Eh''JLIIIQ,. ~
The capacity of one pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve is sufficient to relieve potential overpressure transients when the RCS is in the low temperature overpressure protection range.Proper functioning of the OMS combined with selected administrative controls will demonstrate the integrity of the system.B4.15-1 STATE OF FLORXDA))COUNTY OF'ADE)ss Robert E.Uhrig, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is a Vice President of Florida Power 6 Light Company, the Licensee herein;That he has executed the foregoing document;that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is.authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.Robert E..Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of l9 78 NOTARY PUBLIC, and for the county of Dade,-State of Florida NOTAI rlJQLID GTAiE Dt'LDGIDA GT tA'GGG WY CO.'~V,.S.OH OV nGS t.V,GCH n', tSaZ Ny commission expires GONG 9 TftGlj MAY.':AAD CON NG AGB;CY}}
IjiI'gpg
                      ~8~m>0l 6 I PEOPLE .. ~ SERVING PEOPLE
 
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page Two The proposed    amendment has been reviewed by the Turkey      Point Plant Nuclear Safety Committee and the Florida Power      8 Light  Company  Nuclear Review Board.
They have concluded    that it does  not involve  an  unreviewed safety question.
Implementation of the OMS at Turkey Point has proceeded in two phases.          Phase I addressed the circuitry needed to add the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) low setpoint feature and associated alarms. Phase II addresses (1) OMS-arming/.
valve-position interlock circuitry and (2) redundant nitrogen supply to the PORV's. Phase I has been completed on both Units 3 and 4.        It was our intent to implement Phase II during the refueling outages in 1978, but due to equip-ment procurement delays we have not been able to do so. All of the modifica-tion design work has been completed and all necessary parts are on order.
Phase II is scheduled for implementation as soo'n as parts are avai,lable and plant conditions permit. lie expect to .complete Phase I I during the 1979 refuel-ing outages, which are both scheduled for Spring 1979.
This, proposed change is being submitted for the convenience of the Comnission.
Accordingly, we have determined that      it  does not require the payment of a license amendment fee in accordance with 10 CFR 50 part 170.
Very  truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President REU/fiAS/cf Attachment cc:  Mr. James  P. O'Reilly, Region  II Robert Lowenstein, Esquire
 
TABXZ OP CO;)TENTS  (Continued)
Section
                                                                          ~Pa  e 3.7        El cctriczl Systems 3+7~1 ~
3.8        Stean Power Conversion Systems 3.9                                                                    3 8-3.-
Radioactive Haterizls Release                              3.9-3.
Liquid Pastes                                                    '.9-3.
Gaseous Pastes
                'Cont inerized Pastes                                    3.9-2 3.10      Refueling                                                    3.9-3 3.11      Hiscel3.aneous Radioactive Haterizls Sources            ;  3.10-1 3.12        Cask .Hzndling                                              3 s 11.~1
                                                                        -3 12 1 3.13      Shod: Suopressors (snubbers)                                3;13-3.
3.14      Overpressure Mitigating System                              3.14-1 SURVKXLI<~~ CE  REQUX~HTS 4          Operational .Safety Reviee                                  fl 1 1 4.2        Reactor Coolant System Xn Service Xnspect:ion.               4.2-1 4.3        Reactor Coolart System Xntegrity                            43'1 4          Containment Tests                                          4-4-2,
                . Xntegrzted..Leakage  Pate Test Post Operational        4.4-1 Local Penetration Tests                                  f~ f!,-1 Report of Test Results                                  4.4-2 Xsolztion Valves                                        4 4-3 Residual Heat Removal System                            4  4-3 Tendon Surveillance                                      44 l, End Anchorage Concrete Surveillance                      f4%4-6 Liner Surveillance-                                      4.4-6 Safety Xnjection                                            4.5-3.
4.6        Emergency Containment Cooling Systems                        4.6. 1
            'mergency Contzi'nrent Piltering znd Post Accident 4.7        Containment Vent Systems                                    f~.7-.3.
4.8        Emergency Pover System Periodic Tests                        4.8-1 4.9        Hain Ste~>.Xsolation Valves                                  4.9-1
      !O'.11 Auxiliary Peed-ater System                                  4.1O-1..
Reactivity Pwomalies 4.12        Environmentz2..Radiation                                    4.12-3 4.13                                  Sources Surveillance Survey'adioactive.Materials 4-13-i 4.14        Shack Suppressors    (snubbers) 4.15        Overpressure Mitigating System                              4-.3.4-.1.
4.15-1
: 5.         DESIGN PE~TURKS 5&1  1 5.1         Site                                                        5.1-3.
5.2        Reactor                                                      5&2 1 5 3        Containment                                                5 %3 5.4        Fuel" Storage 5.4>3.
: 6.          AD~EXHISTP~iTXVE CONTROLS 6.1-3.
6.1        Responsibility,                                             6-3.
6.2        Organization                                                6-1,
.6.3         Facility Staff Qualifications                                6-5 6.4          Training                                                    6-5 6.5          Revie~ and Audit                                            6-S 6.6          Reportzble Occurrence Action                                6-14 6.7          Safety Limit Violation                                      6-14
!6 8          Procedures                                                  6-14 6.9          Reporting Requirements                                      6-16
 
3.0          LINITIN CON)ITIONS  FOR  OPEeeATION'.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM A    licabilit      Applies to the operating st.atus of the Reactor Coolant System.
~ob
    ' e t lv e:    To  specify those limiting conditions for operation of the Reactox Coolant System which must be met to assure safe reactor operation.
: a. Reactor Coolant                Pum s
: 1. A minimum                of ONE pump shall be in operation when                the react:or is in power operation, except during low power physics tests.
: 2. A minimum of ONE pump,                or  ONE Residual Heat Removal Pump, shall be                i.n operation during reactor coolant boron concent:ration,reduct:ion.
: 3. Reactor power shall not exceed 10% of rated power unless at least THO reactor coolant pumps are in operation.
: 4. Reactor power shall not exceed 45% of rat:ed power with only two pumps in operation unless the overtemperature AT t:rip setpoint:, K , for two loop operati.on, ha been set at 0.8
: 5. A  reactor coolant pump shall not be started when cold leg temperature is < 275'F unless steam gen-erator secondary water temperature is less than 50'F above, t:he RCS temperature (including instrument error).
: b. Steam Generators
: l. A minimum of TWO steam generators sh,.ll be operable when the average. coolant temperature is  above 350F.
: c. Pressurizer Safet                  'alves
: l. ONE  valve shall be operable whenever the head is on the               reactor .vessel except during hydrostatic test:s.
: 2. THRFE              valves shall be operable when the reactor coolant average temperature i.s above 350F or the reactor is cr'tical.
11/20/78 3-1-1
 
3.14        OVERPRESSURE  MITIGATING SYSTEM the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range when the RCS  is not vented through at least a 2.20 square inch area.
~Ob 'ective:      To  minimize .the possibility of an overpressure transient which could exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.
temperature    RCS  overpressure protection range.
: 2. Valves  HOV->'<-843  A, MOV-~-843 B, MOV->'-866 A, and MOV-~-866 B shall be closed in the low temperature          RCS  overpressure protection range.
: 3. If any  of the valves in 3.14.2 are found to be open while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within the next 8 hours:
a    block the corresponding flow path to the reactor vessel,
: b. close the valve, or c    depressurize and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.
: 4. Two  pressurizer power operated      relief  valves shall be operable in the   low temperature    RCS overpressure  protection range.
: a. If one  power operated relief valve is inoperable while          in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within 7 days:
(1)   restore operability of the power operated          relief valve, or (2)   depressurize    and  vent the RCS  through an opening with  an area  of at least 2.20 square inches.
: b. If both  power operated relief valves are inoperable while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within the next 24 hours:
(1)   restore operability of at least        one power operated relief valve, or (2)  depressurize. and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.
: 3. 14-1                                 11/20/78
 
4.15        OVERPRESSVRE MITIGATING SYSTEM Applies to periodic surveillance of the'Overpressure        xiii'tigating System.
~Ob ective:       To demonstrate  operability of the Overpressure Mitigating System.
: 1. Within  1 month prior to operation in a condition where the PORV would  be required to be operable, the pressurizer power operated relief valve actuation circuitry shall be functionally tested. The functional test need not include actual valve operation.
: 2. Hhile in the low temperature  RCS overpxessure protecti.on range, verify daily that no  more than one  charging pump is operable.
: 3. t&ile in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, verify daily that valves MOV->'-843 A, HQV-+-843 B, MOV-"'-866 A, and HOV->'-866 B are closed.
: 4. While in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, verify weekly that the isolation valve for each operable pressurizer power operated relief valve is open.
: 5. While in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, the pressurizer power operated relief valve actuation circuitry shall. be functionally tested monthly. The functional test need not include actual valve operation..
: 6. Testing shall be in accordance with an approved pump and valve test program.
: 4. 15-1                            1'1 /20/78
 
BASES FOR  LIMITING CONDITIONS    FOR OPERATION, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
: 1. 0 erational  Com  onents The  specification requires that    a sufficient number of reactor coolant  pumps be  operating to provide coast down core cooling in the event that a loss of flow occurs. The flow provided will keep DNBR well above 1.30. When the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System is to be reduced the process must be uniform to prevent sudden reactivity changes in the reactor.
Mixing of the reactor coolant will be sufficient to maintain a uniform boron concentration      if at least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place. The residual heat removal pump will circulate the reactor coolant system volume in approximately one half hour.
Each  of the pressurizer safety valves is designed to relieve 293,330 lbs. per hr. of saturated steam at the valve set point.
Below 350 F and 450 psig in the Reactor Coolant System, the Residual Heat Removal System can remove decay heat and thereby control system temperature and pressure.        If no residual heat were removed by any of the means available the amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve lifting,pressure would be less than the capacity of a single valve. Also, two safety valves have capacity gxeatpy than the maximum surge rate resulting from complete loss of load.
The  50'F  limit on  maximum  differential between steam, generator secondary water temperature and reactor coolant temperature assures that the pressure transient caused by starting a reactor coolant pump when cold leg temperature is < 275,'F can be relieved by operation of one Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV). The 50 F limit iricludes  instrument error.
: 2. Pressure/Tem    erature Limits All components in    the Reactor Coolant System are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes.      These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations. The various categoxies of load cycles used fox design purposes axe provided in B3.1-4                              11/20/78
 
BASES FOR  LIMITING CONDITIONS  OF OPERATION OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM The  operability of two PORV's or an RCS vent opening of greater than or equal to 2.20 square inches ensures that the RCS will,be protected from pressure transients which could exceed. the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are < 275 F."
Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurizat9on when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCS with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator < 50'F above the RCS cold leg temperature (includes margin for instrument error) or (2) the start of a HPSI pump and its injection into  a water solid  RCS.
B3. 14-1                        11/20/78
 
B4. 15 BASES FOR SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS    OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM The  specified testing of the Overpressure Mitigating System (OMS) will verify its operability. The capacity of one pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve is sufficient to relieve potential overpressure transients when the RCS is in the low temperature overpressure protection range. Proper functioning of the OMS combined with selected administrative controls will demonstrate the integrity of the system.
B4.15-1
 
STATE OF FLORXDA      )
                      )          ss COUNTY  OF'ADE        )
Robert E. Uhrig, being    first duly            sworn, deposes              and says:
That he is a Vice President of Florida Power                          6 Light  Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is. authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.
Robert        E.. Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before            me  this day  of                                              l9 78 NOTARY  PUBLIC,    and for the county of                Dade,
-State of Florida NOTAI  rlJQLID GTAiE Dt'LDGIDA GT  tA'GGG WY CO.'~V,.S .OH OV nGS t.V,GCH  n',
Ny commission  expires  GONG 9 TftGlj MAY.':AAD CON NG    AGB;CY tSaZ}}

Latest revision as of 00:27, 4 February 2020

Forwards Appl for Amend to Facil Operating Lics#DPR-31 & DPR-41.Proposed Amend Addresses Overpressure Mitigating Sys (Oms).Discusses Limiting Conditions for Oper of Reactor Coolant Sys
ML17338A295
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/20/1978
From: Robert E. Uhrig
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Stello V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7811270161
Download: ML17338A295 (11)


Text

P. O. BOX 013100,'IAMI, FL 33101 yglg>>

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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY November 20, 1978 L-78-368 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Hr. Victor- Stello, Director Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Hr. Stello:

Re: Turkey Point- Units' and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 Proposed Amendment to Facility 0 eratin Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.30, Florida Power & Light Company submits herewi th three (3) signed originals and forty (40) conformed copies of a request to amend Appendix A of Facility Operating Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41. This submittal is being submitted in response to a July 19, 1978 letter from fir. A. Schwencer of your staff, in accordance with our letter of October 19, 1978.

The proposed amendment, which addresses the operability and surveillance of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Overpressure Hi tigating System (OHS),

is described below and shown on the accompanying Technical Specification pages bearing the -date of this letter in the right hand corner.

Pa e 3.1-1 New Specification 3 '..l.a.5 addresses the starting of a reactor coolant pump wnen the reactor coolant system is in the 'low temperature RCS overpressure protection range.

Pa e 3.14-1 New Specification 3. 14 gives the Overpressure Hitigati ng System (OHS) limiting conditions for operation.

Pa e 4.15-1 New Specification 4.15 gives the OHS surveillance requirements.

Pa es B3.1-1 B3.14-1 and B4.15-1 New and revised Bases sections are provided in support of the 0HS.

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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page Two The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Safety Committee and the Florida Power 8 Light Company Nuclear Review Board.

They have concluded that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Implementation of the OMS at Turkey Point has proceeded in two phases. Phase I addressed the circuitry needed to add the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) low setpoint feature and associated alarms. Phase II addresses (1) OMS-arming/.

valve-position interlock circuitry and (2) redundant nitrogen supply to the PORV's. Phase I has been completed on both Units 3 and 4. It was our intent to implement Phase II during the refueling outages in 1978, but due to equip-ment procurement delays we have not been able to do so. All of the modifica-tion design work has been completed and all necessary parts are on order.

Phase II is scheduled for implementation as soo'n as parts are avai,lable and plant conditions permit. lie expect to .complete Phase I I during the 1979 refuel-ing outages, which are both scheduled for Spring 1979.

This, proposed change is being submitted for the convenience of the Comnission.

Accordingly, we have determined that it does not require the payment of a license amendment fee in accordance with 10 CFR 50 part 170.

Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President REU/fiAS/cf Attachment cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region II Robert Lowenstein, Esquire

TABXZ OP CO;)TENTS (Continued)

Section

~Pa e 3.7 El cctriczl Systems 3+7~1 ~

3.8 Stean Power Conversion Systems 3.9 3 8-3.-

Radioactive Haterizls Release 3.9-3.

Liquid Pastes '.9-3.

Gaseous Pastes

'Cont inerized Pastes 3.9-2 3.10 Refueling 3.9-3 3.11 Hiscel3.aneous Radioactive Haterizls Sources  ; 3.10-1 3.12 Cask .Hzndling 3 s 11.~1

-3 12 1 3.13 Shod: Suopressors (snubbers) 3;13-3.

3.14 Overpressure Mitigating System 3.14-1 SURVKXLI<~~ CE REQUX~HTS 4 Operational .Safety Reviee fl 1 1 4.2 Reactor Coolant System Xn Service Xnspect:ion. 4.2-1 4.3 Reactor Coolart System Xntegrity 43'1 4 Containment Tests 4-4-2,

. Xntegrzted..Leakage Pate Test Post Operational 4.4-1 Local Penetration Tests f~ f!,-1 Report of Test Results 4.4-2 Xsolztion Valves 4 4-3 Residual Heat Removal System 4 4-3 Tendon Surveillance 44 l, End Anchorage Concrete Surveillance f4%4-6 Liner Surveillance- 4.4-6 Safety Xnjection 4.5-3.

4.6 Emergency Containment Cooling Systems 4.6. 1

'mergency Contzi'nrent Piltering znd Post Accident 4.7 Containment Vent Systems f~.7-.3.

4.8 Emergency Pover System Periodic Tests 4.8-1 4.9 Hain Ste~>.Xsolation Valves 4.9-1

!O'.11 Auxiliary Peed-ater System 4.1O-1..

Reactivity Pwomalies 4.12 Environmentz2..Radiation 4.12-3 4.13 Sources Surveillance Survey'adioactive.Materials 4-13-i 4.14 Shack Suppressors (snubbers) 4.15 Overpressure Mitigating System 4-.3.4-.1.

4.15-1

5. DESIGN PE~TURKS 5&1 1 5.1 Site 5.1-3.

5.2 Reactor 5&2 1 5 3 Containment 5 %3 5.4 Fuel" Storage 5.4>3.

6. AD~EXHISTP~iTXVE CONTROLS 6.1-3.

6.1 Responsibility, 6-3.

6.2 Organization 6-1,

.6.3 Facility Staff Qualifications 6-5 6.4 Training 6-5 6.5 Revie~ and Audit 6-S 6.6 Reportzble Occurrence Action 6-14 6.7 Safety Limit Violation 6-14

!6 8 Procedures 6-14 6.9 Reporting Requirements 6-16

3.0 LINITIN CON)ITIONS FOR OPEeeATION'.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM A licabilit Applies to the operating st.atus of the Reactor Coolant System.

~ob

' e t lv e: To specify those limiting conditions for operation of the Reactox Coolant System which must be met to assure safe reactor operation.

a. Reactor Coolant Pum s
1. A minimum of ONE pump shall be in operation when the react:or is in power operation, except during low power physics tests.
2. A minimum of ONE pump, or ONE Residual Heat Removal Pump, shall be i.n operation during reactor coolant boron concent:ration,reduct:ion.
3. Reactor power shall not exceed 10% of rated power unless at least THO reactor coolant pumps are in operation.
4. Reactor power shall not exceed 45% of rat:ed power with only two pumps in operation unless the overtemperature AT t:rip setpoint:, K , for two loop operati.on, ha been set at 0.8
5. A reactor coolant pump shall not be started when cold leg temperature is < 275'F unless steam gen-erator secondary water temperature is less than 50'F above, t:he RCS temperature (including instrument error).
b. Steam Generators
l. A minimum of TWO steam generators sh,.ll be operable when the average. coolant temperature is above 350F.
c. Pressurizer Safet 'alves
l. ONE valve shall be operable whenever the head is on the reactor .vessel except during hydrostatic test:s.
2. THRFE valves shall be operable when the reactor coolant average temperature i.s above 350F or the reactor is cr'tical.

11/20/78 3-1-1

3.14 OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range when the RCS is not vented through at least a 2.20 square inch area.

~Ob 'ective: To minimize .the possibility of an overpressure transient which could exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.

temperature RCS overpressure protection range.

2. Valves HOV->'<-843 A, MOV-~-843 B, MOV->'-866 A, and MOV-~-866 B shall be closed in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range.
3. If any of the valves in 3.14.2 are found to be open while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within the next 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />s:

a block the corresponding flow path to the reactor vessel,

b. close the valve, or c depressurize and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.
4. Two pressurizer power operated relief valves shall be operable in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range.
a. If one power operated relief valve is inoperable while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within 7 days:

(1) restore operability of the power operated relief valve, or (2) depressurize and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.

b. If both power operated relief valves are inoperable while in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, perform at least one of the following within the next 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s:

(1) restore operability of at least one power operated relief valve, or (2) depressurize. and vent the RCS through an opening with an area of at least 2.20 square inches.

3. 14-1 11/20/78

4.15 OVERPRESSVRE MITIGATING SYSTEM Applies to periodic surveillance of the'Overpressure xiii'tigating System.

~Ob ective: To demonstrate operability of the Overpressure Mitigating System.

1. Within 1 month prior to operation in a condition where the PORV would be required to be operable, the pressurizer power operated relief valve actuation circuitry shall be functionally tested. The functional test need not include actual valve operation.
2. Hhile in the low temperature RCS overpxessure protecti.on range, verify daily that no more than one charging pump is operable.
3. t&ile in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, verify daily that valves MOV->'-843 A, HQV-+-843 B, MOV-"'-866 A, and HOV->'-866 B are closed.
4. While in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, verify weekly that the isolation valve for each operable pressurizer power operated relief valve is open.
5. While in the low temperature RCS overpressure protection range, the pressurizer power operated relief valve actuation circuitry shall. be functionally tested monthly. The functional test need not include actual valve operation..
6. Testing shall be in accordance with an approved pump and valve test program.
4. 15-1 1'1 /20/78

BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

1. 0 erational Com onents The specification requires that a sufficient number of reactor coolant pumps be operating to provide coast down core cooling in the event that a loss of flow occurs. The flow provided will keep DNBR well above 1.30. When the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System is to be reduced the process must be uniform to prevent sudden reactivity changes in the reactor.

Mixing of the reactor coolant will be sufficient to maintain a uniform boron concentration if at least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place. The residual heat removal pump will circulate the reactor coolant system volume in approximately one half hour.

Each of the pressurizer safety valves is designed to relieve 293,330 lbs. per hr. of saturated steam at the valve set point.

Below 350 F and 450 psig in the Reactor Coolant System, the Residual Heat Removal System can remove decay heat and thereby control system temperature and pressure. If no residual heat were removed by any of the means available the amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve lifting,pressure would be less than the capacity of a single valve. Also, two safety valves have capacity gxeatpy than the maximum surge rate resulting from complete loss of load.

The 50'F limit on maximum differential between steam, generator secondary water temperature and reactor coolant temperature assures that the pressure transient caused by starting a reactor coolant pump when cold leg temperature is < 275,'F can be relieved by operation of one Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV). The 50 F limit iricludes instrument error.

2. Pressure/Tem erature Limits All components in the Reactor Coolant System are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes. These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations. The various categoxies of load cycles used fox design purposes axe provided in B3.1-4 11/20/78

BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM The operability of two PORV's or an RCS vent opening of greater than or equal to 2.20 square inches ensures that the RCS will,be protected from pressure transients which could exceed. the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are < 275 F."

Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurizat9on when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCS with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator < 50'F above the RCS cold leg temperature (includes margin for instrument error) or (2) the start of a HPSI pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.

B3. 14-1 11/20/78

B4. 15 BASES FOR SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM The specified testing of the Overpressure Mitigating System (OMS) will verify its operability. The capacity of one pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve is sufficient to relieve potential overpressure transients when the RCS is in the low temperature overpressure protection range. Proper functioning of the OMS combined with selected administrative controls will demonstrate the integrity of the system.

B4.15-1

STATE OF FLORXDA )

) ss COUNTY OF'ADE )

Robert E. Uhrig, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is a Vice President of Florida Power 6 Light Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is. authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.

Robert E.. Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of l9 78 NOTARY PUBLIC, and for the county of Dade,

-State of Florida NOTAI rlJQLID GTAiE Dt'LDGIDA GT tA'GGG WY CO.'~V,.S .OH OV nGS t.V,GCH n',

Ny commission expires GONG 9 TftGlj MAY.':AAD CON NG AGB;CY tSaZ