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| {{#Wiki_filter:REGULAT ACCESSION NBR: 7912200508 FACIL:50 250 Turkey Point 50 251 Turkey Point AUTH INANE AUfHOR A uHRIG,R;E; Florida P REeIP.NAME REC IP IKN SCHRENCERiA | | {{#Wiki_filter:REGULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDS) |
| ~Opera'ti INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDS)DOC~DATE: 79/12/13 NOTARIZED:
| | ACCESSION NBR: 7912200508 DOC ~ DATE: 79/12/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOC KK,T FACIL:50 250 Turkey Point Plant~ Unit 3p Florida Power and Light C 050 50 251 Turkey Point Plantg Unit Ar Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH INANE AUfHOR A FFILI AT ION uHRIG,R;E; Florida P ower rr Light Co ~ |
| NO Plant~Unit 3p Florida Power and Light C Plantg Unit Ar Florida Power and Light C FFILI AT ION ower rr Light Co~T AFFILIATION ng Reactors Branch 1 DOC KK,T 050 05000251 | | REeIP. NAME REC IP IKN T AFFILIATION SCHRENCERiA ~ Opera'ti ng Reactors Branch 1 |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| Forwards info requested by NRC 781128 1 tr re analyses evaluations performed to resolve containment pur'ge issue, Results of valve integrity eva,luation anticipated by June 1980','ISTRIBUTION CODEo A034S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR | | Forwards info requested by NRC 781128 tr re analyses 1 evaluations performed to resolve containment pur'ge issue, Results of valve integrity eva,luation anticipated by June 1980','ISTRIBUTION CODEo A034S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ~ ENCL~ SIZEe TI L : Containment urg>ng N OT r=A ES ~~ >>~>>>>>>>>>>~>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>eereat>>>>>>>>ecto>>>>mes>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>~swee+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>wteeawea~ |
| ~ENCL~SIZEe TI L: Containment urg>ng N ES r=A~OT ES~>>~>>>>>>>>>>~>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>eereat>>>>>>>>ecto>>>>mes>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>~swee+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>wteeawea~ | | RECIP IKNT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAgE- 'Ef TR ENCL ID CODE/NAME. LTTR ENCL ACTION; 05 BC +R~ WI 7 7 INTERNAL vi REG 1 1 0?. NRC PDR 1 1 1 IKE 2 2 14 TA/EDO 1 i5 CORE PERF BR 1 1 17 ENGR BR i i i8 ANZAC 8FTY BR 1 1, 19 PL'ANT SYS BR 1 20 EEB i 21. EFLT TAT SYS i 2? BRINKMAN 1 .?3 0 8HUM 1 24 K REEVES 1 EXTERNAL: 03 LPDR 1, '1 04 NSIC 25 ACRS 16 16 1'OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED ~ LTTR 39 ENCL 39 |
| RECIP IKNT COPIES ID CODE/NAgE- | |
| 'Ef TR ENCL ACTION;05 BC+R~W I 7 7*RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME. | |
| LTTR ENCL INTERNAL vi 1 i5 i8 20 2?24 EXTERNAL: 03 25 REG IKE CORE PERF BR ANZAC 8FTY BR EEB BRINKMAN K REEVES LPDR ACRS 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1, i 1 1 1,'1 16 16 0?.NRC PDR 14 TA/EDO 17 ENGR BR 19 PL'ANT SYS BR 21.EFLT TAT SYS.?3 0 8HUM 04 NSIC 1 1 1 i i 1 i 1 1'OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED~LTTR 39 ENCL 39 0 P.O.BOX 529100, MIAMI, FL 33152+pig~fA ssA FLORIDA POWER (IL LIGHT COMPANY December 13, 1979 L-79-346 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
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| Mr.A.Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch¹1 Division of Operating Reactors U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555
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| ==Dear Mr.Schwencer:==
| | 0 P.O. BOX 529100, MIAMI, FL 33152 |
| | +pig~ |
| | fAssA FLORIDA POWER (IL LIGHT COMPANY December 13, 1979 L-79-346 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch ¹1 Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 |
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| Re: Turkey Point Units 3 8 4 Docket Nos.50-250 8(50-251 Containment Pur e | | ==Dear Mr. Schwencer:== |
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| | Re: Turkey Point Units 3 8 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 8( 50-251 Containment Pur e |
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| ==References:== | | ==References:== |
| | (1) NRC letter dated August 28, 1979 from A. Schwencer to R. E. Uhrig (applicable to Docket Nos. 50-250 8 50-251) |
| | (2) NRC letter dated September 27, 1979 from Darrell G. Eisenhut to All Light Hater Reactors (3) NRC letter dated October 23, 1979 from A. Schwencer to R. E. Uhrig (applicable to Docket Nos. |
| | 50-250 8( 50-251) |
| | In response to your letter of November 28, 1978, several analyses/evaluations have been performed in an effort to resolve the containment purge issue. A description of this effort, which is responsive to references (1) through (3), |
| | is given below. contains Westinghouse Electric Corporation's evaluation of the effect of containment purgi ng on the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) performance. The evaluation indicates that the effect of purge operation upon the calculated pellet cladding temperature is small. |
| | An assessment of the incremental increase in radiological dose caused by containment purging during the initiation of a postulated Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA) is presented in Attachment 2. The results clearly indicate the anticipated total LOCA dose to be well within the limits of 10 CFR 100. |
| | A table of postulated containment purge valve failure modes is presented in . The unique scheme using double solenoid valves for the control air provides the assurance of purge valve closure in addition to the second valve in series. contains a response to the Reference (1) request for infonaation. |
| | In order to demonstrate purge valve integrity and operability when subjected o~ |
| | to LOCA conditions, the valve manufacturer (Henry Pratt Company) has been 5 |
| | ~exes 00 <<8'EOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear R or Regulation Page 2 contracted to perform the necessary analyses. The results of the analyses are anticipated by June 1980. However, for the interim period, FPL, in consultation with Henry Pratt Company, has determined that satisfactory operability under accident transient conditions is expected when the purge valve opening is limited. A plant change/modification is being processed to. |
| | implement a purge valve modification restricting the valve openi ng to a maximum of 50 degrees. |
| | In addition, the containment purge system was previously evaluated with respect to I&E Bulletins 79-01 and 79-01A. The FPL response concerning the qualification of class 1E electrical equipment was sent to you on July 3, 1979 (L-79-182). As indicated then, the investigation for data identified problems relating to qualification documentation generic to the nuclear industry. |
| | Those that apply to containment purging at the Turkey Point plant concern ASCO solenoid valves. The July 3, 1979 submittal provides justification for continued operation (section 3.3-6) until replacement solenoid valves (which have been ordered) can be installed. |
| | In conclusion, Florida Power & Light Company intends to operate the containment purge system in compliance with our letter of June 8, 1979, a commitment to limit our combined contai nment purges for Turkey which'ontained Point Units 3 and 4 during power operation (>25 power) to 200 hours per year for the site (200 hours total for both units), until such time as the 50 degree modification is implemented. The effect of purging on ECCS performance and radiological dose has been shown to be minimal. The results of the valve integrity evaluation, to be performed by the valve vendor, are expected to be available by June, 1980. |
| | We will keep you informed of our progress in this matter. |
| | f Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems & Technology REU/MAS/cph Attachments (4) cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Region II Harold Reis, Esquire |
| | |
| | ECCS f Per ox~ar e Evaluation |
| | .According to Branch Technical Posi'tion CSB6-4, evaluation of a containment purge. |
| | system design should include "an analysis of the reduction in containment pressure resulting from the partial loss of contairment atmospnere during the accident for ECCS backpressure determination". Such an analysis has been performed for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 based on the containment conditions defined in the limiting FAC analysis case (DECLG break, C = 0.4) assuming 22~ |
| | tube plugging using the modified February, 1978 Mestinnghouse Evaluate'ion Model.- |
| | The containment isolation signal received in that analysis will initiate valve closure shortly after inception of the LOCA. The plant purge systems utilized during reactor operation consist of two lines, one 48 inches in diameter and one 54 inches in diameter. They are conservatively represented in this compu-tation as follows: |
| | : l. A 5 second isolation valve closure time is assumed. Credit is taken for the reduction in effective f1ow area which occurs whi'le the valve is in the process of closing. The flow area is reduced linear'ly with time as the valve position moves from fully open to fully closed. |
| | : 2. The frictional resistance associated with duct entrance and exit losses, filters. ductwork bends and skin friction has not been considered. |
| | : 3. Ho fan coastdown effects are considered. |
| | : 4. Ho inertia is considered. Steady state flow out the purge system ducts is established immediately at the time of the LOCA. |
| | A mixture of steam and air will exha~yt from the containm nt through the purge . |
| | ljnes during the time that the isolation valves remain open. The effect of. |
| | the composition of the gas being exhausted on containment pressure has been bounded by investigating the two extreme cases. air alone and steam alone. |
| | Mithin several seconds of the inception of the LOCA. containment pressure will have increased to the point that critical flow will occur in the purge lines. |
| | To conservatively bound the calculated containment gas mixture exhausted throuoh the purge lines, critical flow rates of steam and air were calculated during the C - 0.4 DECLG break transient, Using these flowrates critical flow was D |
| | conservatively assumed to be in effect from time zero.. Eouation (4.18 in I |
| | Reference (1), was employed to calculate the cr tical flow rate of air tnrou h the Turkey Point purge lines. |
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| (1)NRC letter dated August 28, 1979 from A.Schwencer to R.E.Uhrig (applicable to Docket Nos.50-250 8 50-251)(2)NRC letter dated September 27, 1979 from Darrell G.Eisenhut to All Light Hater Reactors (3)NRC letter dated October 23, 1979 from A.Schwencer to R.E.Uhrig (applicable to Docket Nos.50-250 8(50-251)In response to your letter of November 28, 1978, several analyses/evaluations have been performed in an effort to resolve the containment purge issue.A description of this effort, which is responsive to references (1)through (3), is given below.Attachment 1 contains Westinghouse Electric Corporation's evaluation of the effect of containment purgi ng on the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)performance.
| | Figure 14 of Reference (2) was apolied to compute the critical flow rate of steam through the purge lines'. The total mass released during the tim period that, the valves are presumed open is conservatively calculated as 11299 lbs. air or 8588 lbs. |
| The evaluation indicates that the effect of purge operation upon the calculated pellet cladding temperature is small.An assessment of the incremental increase in radiological dose caused by containment purging during the initiation of a postulated Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA)is presented in Attachment 2.The results clearly indicate the anticipated total LOCA dose to be well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.A table of postulated containment purge valve failure modes is presented in Attachment 3.The unique scheme using double solenoid valves for the control air provides the assurance of purge valve closure in addition to the second valve in series.Attachment 4 contains a response to the Reference (1)request for infonaation.
| | steam. The containment pressure reduction resulting from this loss of air is computed to be 1.84 psi; the pressure reduction associated with the loss of steam is 2.36'si. |
| o~In order to demonstrate purge valve integrity and operability when subjected to LOCA conditions, the valve manufacturer (Henry Pratt Company)has been 5~exes 00<<8'EOPLE...
| | The most recent ECCS performance analysis executed for Turkey Point resulted in a calculated peak clad temperature (PCT) of 2161 F at a peaking factor of 1.89. The effect 'of containment pressure upon the calcuated PCT of a plant whose PCT is computed'o occur during FLECHT cooling (i.e. flooding rate greater than 1 inch per second) is typically 5 F/psi. Applying this backpressure sensitivity factor t'o Turkey Point indicates the calculated PCT will continue to exhibit margin to 2200 F'for the limiting containment pressure reduction of 2.36 psi. Overall, the effect of purge operation upon the calculated PCT is small, and the most recent Turkey Point ECCS performan'ce analysis provides an appropriate basis for operation at an F value of 1.89 with no restrictions on the operation of the containment purge system. |
| SERVING PEOPLE Office of Nuclear R or Regulation Page 2 contracted to perform the necessary analyses.The results of the analyses are anticipated by June 1980.However, for the interim period, FPL, in consultation with Henry Pratt Company, has determined that satisfactory operability under accident transient conditions is expected when the purge valve opening is limited.A plant change/modification is being processed to.implement a purge valve modification restricting the valve openi ng to a maximum of 50 degrees.In addition, the containment purge system was previously evaluated with respect to I&E Bulletins 79-01 and 79-01A.The FPL response concerning the qualification of class 1E electrical equipment was sent to you on July 3, 1979 (L-79-182).
| |
| As indicated then, the investigation for data identified problems relating to qualification documentation generic to the nuclear industry.Those that apply to containment purging at the Turkey Point plant concern ASCO solenoid valves.The July 3, 1979 submittal provides justification for continued operation (section 3.3-6)until replacement solenoid valves (which have been ordered)can be installed.
| |
| In conclusion, Florida Power&Light Company intends to operate the containment purge system in compliance with our letter of June 8, 1979, which'ontained a commitment to limit our combined contai nment purges for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 during power operation (>25 power)to 200 hours per year for the site (200 hours total for both units), until such time as the 50 degree modification is implemented.
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| The effect of purging on ECCS performance and radiological dose has been shown to be minimal.The results of the valve integrity evaluation, to be performed by the valve vendor, are expected to be available by June, 1980.We will keep you informed of our progress in this matter.f Very truly yours, Robert E.Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems&Technology REU/MAS/cph Attachments (4)cc: Mr.J.P.O'Reilly, Region II Harold Reis, Esquire ECCS Per f ox~ar e Evaluation.According to Branch Technical Posi'tion CSB6-4, evaluation of a containment purge.system design should include"an analysis of the reduction in containment pressure resulting from the partial loss of contairment atmospnere during the accident for ECCS backpressure determination".
| |
| Such an analysis has been performed for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 based on the containment conditions defined in the limiting FAC analysis case (DECLG break, C=0.4)assuming 22~tube plugging using the modified February, 1978 Mestinnghouse Evaluate'ion Model.-The containment isolation signal received in that analysis will initiate valve closure shortly after inception of the LOCA.The plant purge systems utilized during reactor operation consist of two lines, one 48 inches in diameter and one 54 inches in diameter.They are conservatively represented in this compu-tation as follows: l.A 5 second isolation valve closure time is assumed.Credit is taken for the reduction in effective f1ow area which occurs whi'le the valve is in the process of closing.The flow area is reduced linear'ly with time as the valve position moves from fully open to fully closed.2.The frictional resistance associated with duct entrance and exit losses, filters.ductwork bends and skin friction has not been considered.
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| 3.Ho fan coastdown effects are considered.
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| 4.Ho inertia is considered.
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| Steady state flow out the purge system ducts is established immediately at the time of the LOCA.A mixture of steam and air will exha~yt from the containm nt through the purge.ljnes during the time that the isolation valves remain open.The effect of.the composition of the gas being exhausted on containment pressure has been bounded by investigating the two extreme cases.air alone and steam alone.Mithin several seconds of the inception of the LOCA.containment pressure will have increased to the point that critical flow will occur in the purge lines.To conservatively bound the calculated containment gas mixture exhausted throuoh the purge lines, critical flow rates of steam and air were calculated during the C-0.4 DECLG break transient, Using these flowrates critical flow was D conservatively assumed to be in effect from time zero..Eouation (4.18 in I Reference (1), was employed to calculate the cr tical flow rate of air tnrou h the Turkey Point purge lines.
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| Figure 14 of Reference (2)was apolied to compute the critical flow rate of steam through the purge lines'.The total mass released during the tim period that, the valves are presumed open is conservatively calculated as 11299 lbs.air or 8588 lbs.steam.The containment pressure reduction resulting from this loss of air is computed to be 1.84 psi;the pressure reduction associated with the loss of steam is 2.36'si.The most recent ECCS performance analysis executed for Turkey Point resulted in a calculated peak clad temperature (PCT)of 2161 F at a peaking factor of 1.89.The effect'of containment pressure upon the calcuated PCT of a plant whose PCT is computed'o occur during FLECHT cooling (i.e.flooding rate greater than 1 inch per second)is typically 5 F/psi.Applying this backpressure sensitivity factor t'o Turkey Point indicates the calculated PCT will continue to exhibit margin to 2200 F'for the limiting containment pressure reduction of 2.36 psi.Overall, the effect of purge operation upon the calculated PCT is small, and the most recent Turkey Point ECCS performan'ce analysis provides an appropriate basis for operation at an F value of 1.89 with no restrictions on the operation of the containment purge system. | |
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| ==REFERENCES:== | | ==REFERENCES:== |
| | : 1) Shapiro, A. H.. The Dynamics and Thermodynamics of Compressible Fluid Flow. |
| | ~ |
| | Volume 1, p. 85. |
| | : 2. 1967 ASNE Steam Tables, p. 301. |
| | |
| | At tachme>>t Page One |
| | ~Raddolo ical Assessment oi Containment Pur e The radiological doses due to a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) were originally presented in Section 14.3.5 of the FSAR. The original FSAR analyses assumed there was no containment purging occurring at the onset of the accident. A new evaluation was performed to determine the incremental radiological dose at the site boundary and low population zone assuming the purge valves are fully open when the accident initiates and close upon receipt of signal as designed. These incremental doses, when added to those presented in the FSAR, provide a maximum set of doses f'r a LOCA with containment purge. The results of this evaluation are presented in the following tab3 es: |
| | THYROID DOSE (rem) |
| | Location LOCA Increment due Total To Pur in Site boundary 93 10 103 (0-2 hour) |
| | Low Population Zone 9 10 (0-2 hour) |
| | Mhole Body (rem) |
| | Site boundary (0-2 hour) 3.1 .002 3.1 Low Population Zone .4 .0002 .4 (0-2 hour) |
| | The major assumptions which were used in the evaluation of the incremental dose are listed below: |
| | : 1. The containment purge valves- are closed 5 seconds after the containrfknt high pressure signal is transmitted. There is a 2.7 second delay before the increased containment pressure is detected which results in a total of 7.7 seconds for valve closure (8 seconds was conservatively assumed) . |
| | : 2. Radioactive releases. via the purge valves during 'closure is from the Reactor Coolant System only. |
| | '3. The primary coolant iodine activity corresponds to the maximum limi't of 30 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent which is specified in the Turkey Point License. |
| | |
| | At aehmunt, 2 Page Two |
| | : 4. It is conservatively assumed during the initial 8 seconds that 50% of the blowdown (worst FSAR case) from the break flashes and becomes homogeneously mixed in the containment atmosphere. All of the iodine in the flashed steam is assumed to become airborne. |
| | : 5. The flow through the purge valves is .assumed to be a mixture of steam and water. Frictionless flow through the valves is assumed. |
| | : 6. FSAR meteorology is assumed. |
| | : 7. Standard TID 14844 methodology was used to calculate the incremental doses. |
| | The results clearly indicate that the anticipated dose caused by a LOCA with containment purging at the onset of the accident is well within the limits of 10 CFR 100. |
| | :t tacllm.'-.n t 3 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE S INGLE FAILURE ANALYS IS TABLE COMPONENT FAILURE MODE RESULTS Main Valve or Fails to close or 2nd purge air valve in series Operator fails to seat or signal will'provide the required to close not received. isolation. |
| | Instrument Air Failure of air. Purge air valves are closed by Supply to the spring, air is NOT required for Operator closure. |
| | Solenoid Valve Fails to operate Two solenoid valves in series (i.e., does NOT are used, thus 2nd solenoid isolate the operator valve would isolate air cylinder from air supply and dump operator air. |
| | supply and does NOT Further back-up is provided provide air bleed off by the 2nd purge air valve for the cylinder). in series. |
| | |
| | Attachnent 4 la) The non-seismic duct work, which has the opening" covered by expanded metal face plates ox by grilles and dampe s, provi.de limiei",d protection inside the cont:ainment against only low density debris sue" as foil insulation, paper, or rags. go missile protection is provM. d for duct woxk. |
| | lb) Ho safety xeIated equipment is located in the flow stream beyond the outboard purge isolation valves, at the supply or exhaust: penetrations. |
| | At Turkey 'Point the outboard valves axe outdoors. The safety related structuxes beyond the valves have been designed against tornado missiles as described in the PSAR, Section 5E.2. |
| | lc) . The purge valves are listed among the five. types of penet:rations to |
| | ~ |
| | be given local leak detection tests at not less t:han 50 psig, using pressure decay, soap bubble, halogen detection, or equivalent methods, at each refueling (See, PSAR, Section 15, Technical Specificat:ion 4.4.2). |
| | 'he stated acceptance, criteria is that the sum of all local leak rate tests'shall not exceed 60 percent of the total containment allowable leak rat:e. PS&.'Figure 14.3.4-.2 indicates no pressure transient in excess of 50 psig fo- double ended, 6 squaxe feet, 3 square feet, and 0.5 square. feet pressure spectrum of potential breaks, against which |
| | , the valves must close. Valve leakage is only applicable to a closed (zero flow)'valve. For release prior to closure see response to 7.d below>> |
| | The total release thxough the containment purge system assuming |
| | 'initially fully open valves, .single valve failure, and conservat:ive low friction high flow rates, has been calculated for the spectrum of break sizes illustrated in PSAR Pigure 14.3.4-2,,titled "Contain- |
| | 'ent Pressgre Transients". The results of the calculation show that the 0.5 ft break resulted in less total release than the double ended break, taking into account t:he longer time scale due to slower pressure rise. Hence, the double ended break remains the worse c"'e for total release through the cont:ainment purge system. Plass xelease for the double ended break is less than t:he 17,000 lb. figure which was used in the dose calculations. Realistic valve flow calculations has resulted in a further mass flow reduct:ion to less than 9,000 lbs. |
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| 1)Shapiro, A.H..The Dynamics and Thermodynamics of Compressible Fluid Flow.~Volume 1, p.85.2.1967 ASNE Steam Tables, p.301.
| | STATE OF FLORIDA ) |
| At tachme>>t Page One~Raddolo ical Assessment oi Containment Pur e The radiological doses due to a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)were originally presented in Section 14.3.5 of the FSAR.The original FSAR analyses assumed there was no containment purging occurring at the onset of the accident.A new evaluation was performed to determine the incremental radiological dose at the site boundary and low population zone assuming the purge valves are fully open when the accident initiates and close upon receipt of signal as designed.These incremental doses, when added to those presented in the FSAR, provide a maximum set of doses f'r a LOCA with containment purge.The results of this evaluation are presented in the following tab3 es: THYROID DOSE (rem)Location LOCA Increment due To Pur in Total Site boundary-(0-2 hour)93 10 103 Low Population Zone-(0-2 hour)9 10 Mhole Body (rem)Site boundary-(0-2 hour)Low Population Zone-(0-2 hour)3.1.4.002.0002 3.1.4 The major assumptions which were used in the evaluation of the incremental dose are listed below: 1.The containment purge valves-are closed 5 seconds after the containrfknt high pressure signal is transmitted.
| | ) ss. |
| There is a 2.7 second delay before the increased containment pressure is detected which results in a total of 7.7 seconds for valve closure (8 seconds was conservatively assumed).2.Radioactive releases.via the purge valves during'closure is from the Reactor Coolant System only.'3.The primary coolant iodine activity corresponds to the maximum limi't of 30 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent which is specified in the Turkey Point License.
| | COUNTY OF DADE ) |
| At aehmunt, 2 Page Two 4.It is conservatively assumed during the initial 8 seconds that 50%of the blowdown (worst FSAR case)from the break flashes and becomes homogeneously mixed in the containment atmosphere.
| | Robert E. Uhrig', being first duly sworn, deposes and says: |
| All of the iodine in the flashed steam is assumed to become airborne.5.The flow through the purge valves is.assumed to be a mixture of steam and water.Frictionless flow through the valves is assumed.6.FSAR meteorology is assumed.7.Standard TID 14844 methodology was used to calculate the incremental doses.The results clearly indicate that the anticipated dose caused by a LOCA with containment purging at the onset of the accident is well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.
| | That he is a Vice President of Florida Power 6 Light, Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee. |
| : tacllm.'-.n t 3 t CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE S INGLE FAILURE ANALY S IS TABLE COMPONENT FAILURE MODE RESULTS Main Valve or Operator Fails to close or fails to seat or signal to close not received.2nd purge air valve in series will'provide the required isolation.
| | Robert E. Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me this Wo'l day of 19~ rr NOTAR PUBLIC, in a d for the county of Dade, State of Florida Notary Public, State of Florida at Large My Commission Expires May 5, it98t Bonded thru Maynard Bonding Agency My commission expires:}} |
| Instrument Air Supply to the Operator Failure of air.Purge air valves are closed by spring, air is NOT required for closure.Solenoid Valve Fails to operate (i.e., does NOT isolate the operator cylinder from air supply and does NOT provide air bleed off for the cylinder).
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| Two solenoid valves in series are used, thus 2nd solenoid valve would isolate air supply and dump operator air.Further back-up is provided by the 2nd purge air valve in series.
| |
| Attachnent 4 la)The non-seismic duct work, which has the opening" covered by expanded metal face plates ox by grilles and dampe s, provi.de limiei",d protection inside the cont:ainment against only low density debris sue" as foil insulation, paper, or rags.go missile protection is provM.d for duct woxk.lb)Ho safety xeIated equipment is located in the flow stream beyond the outboard purge isolation valves, at the supply or exhaust: penetrations.
| |
| At Turkey'Point the outboard valves axe outdoors.The safety related structuxes beyond the valves have been designed against tornado missiles as described in the PSAR, Section 5E.2.lc).The purge valves are listed among the five.types of penet:rations to~be given local leak detection tests at not less t:han 50 psig, using pressure decay, soap bubble, halogen detection, or equivalent methods, at each refueling (See, PSAR, Section 15, Technical Specificat:ion 4.4.2).'he stated acceptance, criteria is that the sum of all local leak rate tests'shall not exceed 60 percent of the total containment allowable leak rat:e.PS&.'Figure 14.3.4-.2 indicates no pressure transient in excess of 50 psig fo-double ended, 6 squaxe feet, 3 square feet, and 0.5 square.feet pressure spectrum of potential breaks, against which , the valves must close.Valve leakage is only applicable to a closed (zero flow)'valve.
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| For release prior to closure see response to 7.d below>>The total release thxough the containment purge system assuming'initially fully open valves,.single valve failure, and conservat:ive low friction high flow rates, has been calculated for the spectrum of break sizes illustrated in PSAR Pigure 14.3.4-2,,titled"Contain-'ent Pressgre Transients".
| |
| The results of the calculation show that the 0.5 ft break resulted in less total release than the double ended break, taking into account t: he longer time scale due to slower pressure*rise.Hence, the double ended break remains the worse c"'e for total release through the cont:ainment purge system.Plass xelease for the double ended break is less than t: he 17,000 lb.figure which was used in the dose calculations.
| |
| Realistic valve flow calculations has resulted in a further mass flow reduct:ion to less than 9,000 lbs.
| |
| COUNTY OF DADE STATE OF FLORIDA)))ss.Robert E.Uhrig', being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is a Vice President of Florida Power 6 Light, Company, the Licensee herein;That he has executed the foregoing document;that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.Robert E.Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me this Wo'l day of 19~rr NOTAR PUBLIC, in a d for the county of Dade, State of Florida Notary Public, State of Florida at Large My Commission Expires May 5, it98t Bonded thru Maynard Bonding Agency My commission expires:}} | |
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML17355A4601999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Revs to 0-EPIP-1102, 0-EPIP-1212,0-EPIP-20110,0-EPIP-20111,0-EPIP-20132, 0-EPIP-20133 & 0-EPIP-20201,per 10CFR50.54(q) & 10CFR50, App E.Epip 0-EPIP-20107,has Been Deleted ML17355A4301999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 16 of Updated Fsar.Info Accurately Reflects Plant Changes Made Since Previous Submittal.Rev Incorporates Changes Completed Between 971015 & 990408.Summary of Accuracy Review Changes & Instructions,Included ML17355A4461999-10-0404 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Commitment to Perform Periodic Testing of Critical Welds & Parts on Special Lifting Devices IAW NUREG-0612.Use of Ae Technology Will Provide Same Level of Testing Quality as Did NDE Methods Noted in ANSI Std L-99-208, Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included ML17355A4291999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Telcon Questions Re License Amend Request Dtd 990727,proposing Amend on one-time Basis to Modify TS 3.8.1.1 & TS 3.4.3 & 3.5.2 to Extend Allowed Outage Time for EDG from 72 H to 7 Days ML20212M1601999-09-28028 September 1999 Refers to 990908 Engineering Meeting Conducted at NRC Region II to Discuss Engineering Issues at Lucie & Turkey Point Facilities.List of Attendees & Copy of Presentation Handout Encl ML17355A4251999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536 in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams, Issued 990820 ML17355A4111999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Thermo-Lag Upgrades for Fire Zones 47,54,113, 114,115,116,118,119,120 & 143 Completed on 990726,per GL 92-08 ML17355A4131999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 20 Re Requirement to Perform Exams as Required by IWL-2524 & IWL-2525,Table IWL-2500-1 for Exempt Tendon Insp,Per Recent Discussions with NRC ML17355A4141999-09-0202 September 1999 Documents That Util Has No Concerns or Challenges Related to site-specific Written Exam Administered at Plant on 990830 ML17355A4041999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Info to Support Assessment of Potential Risks Associated with Proposed Civil Aircraft Operations at Former Homestead Air Force Base to FP&L Turkey Point Nuclear Facility Units 3 & 4 ML17355A4071999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That FPL Has Completed Review of Info Listed in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 & Found Listed Discrepancies,Re Closure of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity. ML17355A4061999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Semiannual FFD Performance Rept for Period of Jan- June 1999,for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4.List of Events Reported & Summary of Mgt Actions Taken,Included ML17355A4001999-08-20020 August 1999 Informs That on 990722,util Determined Blind Specimen Submitted to Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs on 990721,was Reported Back with Unsatisfactory Results.Attachment 1 Is Summary of Investigation of Unsatisfactory Performance ML17355A3941999-07-27027 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for FY00 & FY01 ML17355A3871999-07-16016 July 1999 Provides Supplement to FP&L Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants ML17355A3851999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs That Pages Missing from 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, Contain Info Unrelated to ODCM- Specified Sampling & Were Not Included as Part of Rept ML17355A3711999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Revised EPIPs 0-EPIP-20201, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training & 0-EPIP-20126, Off-Site Dose Calculations. with Summary of Changes ML17355A3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Turkey Point,Unit 4 ISI Rept. Listed Repts Are Encl.No Eddy Current Exams Scheduled for Unit 4 Steam Generators ML17355A3661999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Florida Power & Light Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999.Encl I Includes Summary of Changes Made to Topical QA Rept Since 1998 ML17355A3571999-06-28028 June 1999 Informs That Util Voluntarily Reporting Facility Readiness as Outlined in Suppl 1 to GL 98-01.Encl Is Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 3 & 4,reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness ML17355A3521999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990415 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. ML17355A3491999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Summary of Corrective Actions Implemented by FPL Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions. ML17355A3441999-05-27027 May 1999 Modifies FPLs Consent to Confirmatory Order to Reflect Resolution of Four Issues Identified as Pending in L-99-031 ML17355A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests Waiver of 520 Hours (13 Wks) Required Parallel Watchstanding in Control Room Prior to License Application Submittal for W Conley ML17355A2921999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards Rev 35 to Turkey Point EP & Revised EPIP 0-EPIP-20101, Duties of EC, Per Requirements of 10CFR50, App E & 10CFR50.54(q).Summary of Changes,Encl.Implementation Date for Both Documents Was 990330 ML20205M0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Eighth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Records.App Q & R Records Encl & Being Made Available in PDR ML17355A2891999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Relief Request 20, Exempt Tendon Insp, Requesting Relief from ASME Section XI Code,1992 Edition,Paragraph IWL-2521.1(c) Which Requires That Each Exempted Tendon Be Examined IAW IWL-2524 & IWL-2525.Approval Needed by 991001 ML17355A2861999-04-0505 April 1999 Forwards COLR for Turkey Point Unit 4,Cycle 18,IAW TS 6.9.1.7 ML17336A0681999-04-0101 April 1999 Expresses Support for FP&L Request for Waiver of Applicable Review Fees Upon FP&L Submittal of an Application for License Renewal for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2751999-03-25025 March 1999 Informs NRC & Staff of Fp&Ls Plans to Submit License Renewal Application for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 by End of Dec 2000 ML17355A2641999-03-19019 March 1999 Requests Changes to FPL Official Service List for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Add s Franzone & Remove G Hollinger from All Correspondence ML17355A2651999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-Dec 1998 & Rev 7 to ODCM for Gaseous & Liquid Effluents from Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4. ML17355A2621999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards Special Rept as Result of Turkey Point Unit 3 End-of-Cycle 16 ISI of SG Tubes.Rept Summarizes Results of SG Tube ISI ML17355A2631999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards FPL Decommissioning Fund Status Repts for St Lucie, Units 1 & 2 & Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Rept for St Lucie, Unit 2 Provides Status of Decommissioning Funds for All Three Owners of That Unit ML20204C6991999-03-10010 March 1999 Requests Amend to Turkey Point PSP to Modify Requirement to Post Security Officers to Provide Continuous Observation of Entire PA Perimeter in Event of Security Computer Failure. Change to Security Force Staffing Level Also Requested ML17355A2451999-03-0909 March 1999 Submits Info on FPL Current Levels of Nuclear Property Insurance,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML17355A2501999-03-0808 March 1999 Informs That Licensee Reviewed NRC 990228 Ltr Issuing Exemption Requested Re Fire Rating of Raceway Fire Barriers in Open Turbine Bldg.Tabulated Summary of Util Comments & Marked Copy of NRC Ltr & SER Encl ML17355A2441999-03-0101 March 1999 Provides Update to Util Written Notices,Dtd 961120 & 970627 of Claim Involving Alleged Bodily Injury Arising Out of or in Connection with Use of Radioactive Matl at Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2431999-02-25025 February 1999 Informs That FPL Does Not Have Any Candidates from Turkey Point Scheduled to Participate in 990407,Generic Fundamentals Examination (GFE) ML17355A2301999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Semiannual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Period of 980701-981231 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2361999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Tabulation of 1998 Occupational Exposure Data for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4,per TS 6.9.1.2.a.Reactor Coolant Specific Activity Limits of 100/E-bar Mci Per Gram of Gross Radioactivity Were Not Exceeded During 1998 L-99-042, Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17355A2341999-02-18018 February 1999 Provides Response to RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of Crdm/ CEDM Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations. ML17355A2231999-02-0808 February 1999 Informs That Util Will Comply with Commitment with Respect to Units 3 & 4,in Response to Ja Zwolinski 990129 Ltr.Util Also Agrees to Incorporate Commitment Into Confirmatory Order Modifying License Effective Immediately Upon Issuance ML17355A2031999-01-29029 January 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Recovery Plan. Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan ML17355A2171999-01-20020 January 1999 Forwards Listed ISI Repts for Turkey Point Unit 3,in Accordance with Provisions of ASME Code,Section XI ML17354B2241999-01-0606 January 1999 Forwards Annual 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Changes To,Or Errors Discovered in ECCS Evaluation Models,Or in Application of Such Models That Effect Peak Clad Temp Calculation ML17354B2081998-12-15015 December 1998 Informs That Fpl,In Cooperation with State of Fl & County Emergency Response Agencies,Will Conduct Exercise of Turkey Point Radiological Emergency Plan on 990210.Scenario Package Forwarded to Emergency Preparedness Section Chief,Region II ML17354B2091998-12-15015 December 1998 Forwards Price Anderson Guarantees Annual Financial Rept,Per 10CFR140.21.Exhibit 1 Submitted to Satisfy Annual Financial Reporting Requirement of 10CFR50.71(b) 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML17355A4601999-10-26026 October 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Revs to 0-EPIP-1102, 0-EPIP-1212,0-EPIP-20110,0-EPIP-20111,0-EPIP-20132, 0-EPIP-20133 & 0-EPIP-20201,per 10CFR50.54(q) & 10CFR50, App E.Epip 0-EPIP-20107,has Been Deleted ML17355A4301999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 16 of Updated Fsar.Info Accurately Reflects Plant Changes Made Since Previous Submittal.Rev Incorporates Changes Completed Between 971015 & 990408.Summary of Accuracy Review Changes & Instructions,Included ML17355A4461999-10-0404 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Commitment to Perform Periodic Testing of Critical Welds & Parts on Special Lifting Devices IAW NUREG-0612.Use of Ae Technology Will Provide Same Level of Testing Quality as Did NDE Methods Noted in ANSI Std L-99-208, Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period Covering 971014-990408. Summary of PORV Actuations & Results of Plants SG Tube Insp,Which Occurred During That Time Included ML17355A4291999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Telcon Questions Re License Amend Request Dtd 990727,proposing Amend on one-time Basis to Modify TS 3.8.1.1 & TS 3.4.3 & 3.5.2 to Extend Allowed Outage Time for EDG from 72 H to 7 Days ML17355A4251999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536 in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams, Issued 990820 ML17355A4111999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Thermo-Lag Upgrades for Fire Zones 47,54,113, 114,115,116,118,119,120 & 143 Completed on 990726,per GL 92-08 ML17355A4131999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request 20 Re Requirement to Perform Exams as Required by IWL-2524 & IWL-2525,Table IWL-2500-1 for Exempt Tendon Insp,Per Recent Discussions with NRC ML17355A4141999-09-0202 September 1999 Documents That Util Has No Concerns or Challenges Related to site-specific Written Exam Administered at Plant on 990830 ML17355A4041999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Info to Support Assessment of Potential Risks Associated with Proposed Civil Aircraft Operations at Former Homestead Air Force Base to FP&L Turkey Point Nuclear Facility Units 3 & 4 ML17355A4071999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That FPL Has Completed Review of Info Listed in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 & Found Listed Discrepancies,Re Closure of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity. ML17355A4061999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Semiannual FFD Performance Rept for Period of Jan- June 1999,for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4.List of Events Reported & Summary of Mgt Actions Taken,Included ML17355A4001999-08-20020 August 1999 Informs That on 990722,util Determined Blind Specimen Submitted to Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs on 990721,was Reported Back with Unsatisfactory Results.Attachment 1 Is Summary of Investigation of Unsatisfactory Performance ML17355A3941999-07-27027 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for FY00 & FY01 ML17355A3871999-07-16016 July 1999 Provides Supplement to FP&L Response to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants ML17355A3851999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs That Pages Missing from 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, Contain Info Unrelated to ODCM- Specified Sampling & Were Not Included as Part of Rept ML17355A3711999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Revised EPIPs 0-EPIP-20201, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness - Radiological Emergency Plan Training & 0-EPIP-20126, Off-Site Dose Calculations. with Summary of Changes ML17355A3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Turkey Point,Unit 4 ISI Rept. Listed Repts Are Encl.No Eddy Current Exams Scheduled for Unit 4 Steam Generators ML17355A3661999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Florida Power & Light Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999.Encl I Includes Summary of Changes Made to Topical QA Rept Since 1998 ML17355A3571999-06-28028 June 1999 Informs That Util Voluntarily Reporting Facility Readiness as Outlined in Suppl 1 to GL 98-01.Encl Is Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Units 3 & 4,reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness ML17355A3521999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990415 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. ML17355A3491999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Summary of Corrective Actions Implemented by FPL Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions. ML17355A3441999-05-27027 May 1999 Modifies FPLs Consent to Confirmatory Order to Reflect Resolution of Four Issues Identified as Pending in L-99-031 ML17355A3451999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests Waiver of 520 Hours (13 Wks) Required Parallel Watchstanding in Control Room Prior to License Application Submittal for W Conley ML17355A2921999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards Rev 35 to Turkey Point EP & Revised EPIP 0-EPIP-20101, Duties of EC, Per Requirements of 10CFR50, App E & 10CFR50.54(q).Summary of Changes,Encl.Implementation Date for Both Documents Was 990330 ML17355A2891999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Relief Request 20, Exempt Tendon Insp, Requesting Relief from ASME Section XI Code,1992 Edition,Paragraph IWL-2521.1(c) Which Requires That Each Exempted Tendon Be Examined IAW IWL-2524 & IWL-2525.Approval Needed by 991001 ML17355A2861999-04-0505 April 1999 Forwards COLR for Turkey Point Unit 4,Cycle 18,IAW TS 6.9.1.7 ML17336A0681999-04-0101 April 1999 Expresses Support for FP&L Request for Waiver of Applicable Review Fees Upon FP&L Submittal of an Application for License Renewal for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2751999-03-25025 March 1999 Informs NRC & Staff of Fp&Ls Plans to Submit License Renewal Application for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 by End of Dec 2000 ML17355A2641999-03-19019 March 1999 Requests Changes to FPL Official Service List for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Add s Franzone & Remove G Hollinger from All Correspondence ML17355A2651999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-Dec 1998 & Rev 7 to ODCM for Gaseous & Liquid Effluents from Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4. ML17355A2621999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards Special Rept as Result of Turkey Point Unit 3 End-of-Cycle 16 ISI of SG Tubes.Rept Summarizes Results of SG Tube ISI ML17355A2631999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards FPL Decommissioning Fund Status Repts for St Lucie, Units 1 & 2 & Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4.Rept for St Lucie, Unit 2 Provides Status of Decommissioning Funds for All Three Owners of That Unit ML20204C6991999-03-10010 March 1999 Requests Amend to Turkey Point PSP to Modify Requirement to Post Security Officers to Provide Continuous Observation of Entire PA Perimeter in Event of Security Computer Failure. Change to Security Force Staffing Level Also Requested ML17355A2451999-03-0909 March 1999 Submits Info on FPL Current Levels of Nuclear Property Insurance,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML17355A2501999-03-0808 March 1999 Informs That Licensee Reviewed NRC 990228 Ltr Issuing Exemption Requested Re Fire Rating of Raceway Fire Barriers in Open Turbine Bldg.Tabulated Summary of Util Comments & Marked Copy of NRC Ltr & SER Encl ML17355A2441999-03-0101 March 1999 Provides Update to Util Written Notices,Dtd 961120 & 970627 of Claim Involving Alleged Bodily Injury Arising Out of or in Connection with Use of Radioactive Matl at Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2431999-02-25025 February 1999 Informs That FPL Does Not Have Any Candidates from Turkey Point Scheduled to Participate in 990407,Generic Fundamentals Examination (GFE) ML17355A2341999-02-18018 February 1999 Provides Response to RAI Re GL 97-01, Degradation of Crdm/ CEDM Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations. L-99-042, Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Rev 13 to Turkey Point Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Util Determined That Rev Does Not Decrease Safeguards Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17355A2361999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Tabulation of 1998 Occupational Exposure Data for Turkey Point,Units 3 & 4,per TS 6.9.1.2.a.Reactor Coolant Specific Activity Limits of 100/E-bar Mci Per Gram of Gross Radioactivity Were Not Exceeded During 1998 ML17355A2301999-02-18018 February 1999 Forwards Semiannual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Period of 980701-981231 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17355A2231999-02-0808 February 1999 Informs That Util Will Comply with Commitment with Respect to Units 3 & 4,in Response to Ja Zwolinski 990129 Ltr.Util Also Agrees to Incorporate Commitment Into Confirmatory Order Modifying License Effective Immediately Upon Issuance ML17355A2031999-01-29029 January 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Recovery Plan. Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan ML17355A2171999-01-20020 January 1999 Forwards Listed ISI Repts for Turkey Point Unit 3,in Accordance with Provisions of ASME Code,Section XI ML17354B2241999-01-0606 January 1999 Forwards Annual 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Changes To,Or Errors Discovered in ECCS Evaluation Models,Or in Application of Such Models That Effect Peak Clad Temp Calculation ML17354B2081998-12-15015 December 1998 Informs That Fpl,In Cooperation with State of Fl & County Emergency Response Agencies,Will Conduct Exercise of Turkey Point Radiological Emergency Plan on 990210.Scenario Package Forwarded to Emergency Preparedness Section Chief,Region II ML17354B2091998-12-15015 December 1998 Forwards Price Anderson Guarantees Annual Financial Rept,Per 10CFR140.21.Exhibit 1 Submitted to Satisfy Annual Financial Reporting Requirement of 10CFR50.71(b) ML17354B2061998-12-0909 December 1998 Informs That Request for Exemption Specified in Section II.B.3 Will Not Be Needed Re Fire Rating of Raceway Fire Barriers in Open Turbine Bldg ML17354B1981998-11-25025 November 1998 Forwards Scope & Objective for 1999 Plant Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise.Objectives Developed in Conjunction with State & Local Govts.Exercise Scheduled for 990210 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML17348A5661990-09-14014 September 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-07, Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule. ML17348A5461990-09-0707 September 1990 Forwards 1990 Inservice Insp Refueling Outage Summary Rept of NDE Activities 900206-0404 First Refueling Outage Second Period Second Insp Interval. ML17348A5501990-09-0707 September 1990 Forwards Jul 1990 Integrated Schedule Regulatory Rept for Facilities ML17348A5521990-09-0606 September 1990 Forwards Matrix of Changes to Emergency Power Sys That Affect Revised Tech Specs Issued on 900828.Matrix Sent for Info & to Assist in NRC Review of No Significant Hazards Rept for Revised Tech Specs ML17348A5431990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Objectives for 901108 Emergency Plan Exercise. Exercise Will Involve Participation by Local Emergency Response Agencies & State Emergency Response Personnel & Will Not Be Evaluated by FEMA ML17348A5361990-08-27027 August 1990 Forwards Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept,Jan-June 1990 & Health Physics Procedure HP-48, Process Control Program for Dewatering Radwaste Liners. ML17348A5171990-08-24024 August 1990 Forwards Ref Matl in Preparation for Operator License Exams Scheduled for Wk of 901029,per NRC 900628 Request ML17348A5041990-08-17017 August 1990 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for Jan-June 1990 ML17348A5051990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1990 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & Revise Rept for June 1990 for Unit 3 ML20059B0111990-08-14014 August 1990 Requests That Encl Intervenor Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal to Docketing & Svcs Branch Re Tech Spec Replacement Hearing Be Provided.Motion Inadvertently Omitted in Svc of Request on 900813 ML17348A4971990-08-10010 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-250/90-18 & 50-251/90-18.Corrective Actions:Unit Stabilized in Mode 3, Operating Surveillance Procedures 3/4-OSP-089 Revised & Event Response Team Formed ML17348A4701990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Rept Detailing Investigative Analysis of Unsatisfactory Blind Specimen Results,Identification of Causes & Corrective Actions Taken by Lab to Prevent Recurrence,Per Unsatisfactory Performance Testing L-90-282, Forwards Rev 23 to Physical Security Plan.Plan Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21 & 2.790)1990-07-25025 July 1990 Forwards Rev 23 to Physical Security Plan.Plan Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21 & 2.790) ML17348A4281990-07-25025 July 1990 Forwards Decommissioning Financial Assurance Repts for Plants,Per 10CFR50.33(k) & 50.75(b) ML17348A4691990-07-23023 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info on Emergency Power Sys Enhancement Project Re Load Sequencer,Programmable Logic Controllers & Implementation of Sys in Plant,Per NRC 900705 Request ML17348A4191990-07-20020 July 1990 Advises That Comments on NRC Safety Evaluation Re Implementation of Station Blackout Rule Will Be Provided by 900921 ML17348A4201990-07-20020 July 1990 Forwards Revised No Significant Hazards Determination for Proposed Tech Specs 1.17 & 3.0.5 & Bases,Per 890605 Ltr ML17348A4141990-07-20020 July 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-250/90-14 & 50-251/90-14.Corrective Actions:Breakers Closed,Returning Monitoring Sys to Operable Level & Briefings Held to Explain Rvlms Sys Theory to Operations Control Room Personnel ML17348A4171990-07-19019 July 1990 Forwards May 1990 Integrated Schedule Regulatory Rept for Plant ML17348A4121990-07-18018 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. ML17348A4251990-07-17017 July 1990 Withdraws 900207 & 0424 Proposed Changes to Tech Specs Re Util Nuclear Review Board Composition IR 05000250/19900131990-07-16016 July 1990 Provides Info Re Plant Implementation of 10CFR50.44 & NUREG- 0737,Item II.E.4.1 Re Hydrogen Recombiners,Per 900518 Meeting & Insp Repts 50-250/90-13 & 50-251/90-13.Agreement Re Use of External Recombiners Will Be Reactivated ML20055G8641990-07-16016 July 1990 Informs ASLB That Petitioners Ref to Several Telephone Contacts Between J Butler & M Gutman,Of ATI Career Training Inst Is Inadvertent Misstatement & Should Be Changed to Telephone Contact. W/Certificate of Svc ML17348A4161990-07-16016 July 1990 Responds to Commitment Re Reverse Testing of Containment Isolation Valves Per Insp Repts 50-250/90-13 & 50-251/90-13. Corrective Action Plan Addresses Penetrations 16 & 53 for Unit 3 Only & Penetrations 11,47,54A & 54B for Both Units ML17348A4151990-07-16016 July 1990 Provides Info Re Plant Implementation of 10CFR50.44 & NUREG- 0737,Item II.E.4.1 Re Hydrogen Recombiners,Per 900518 Meeting & Insp Repts 50-250/90-13 & 50-251/90-13.Agreement Re Use of External Recombiners Will Be Reactivated ML17348A4041990-07-12012 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Responses to NRC Questions on Piping Codes Used for Emergency Power Sys Enhancement Project ML17348A3921990-07-12012 July 1990 Summarizes Facility Performance Since Last SALP Evaluation Period Which Ended 890731.Util Pursued Aggressive self- Assessment Program,Including Significant Internal or Outside Assessments in Areas of Operator Performance & EOPs L-90-261, Forwards Rev 7 to Guard Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld1990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards Rev 7 to Guard Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld L-90-259, Forwards Rev 22 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a)(3))1990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards Rev 22 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a)(3)) ML17348A4321990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards Rev 8 to Updated FSAR for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4. Rev Includes Activities Completed Between 890123 & 900122. Rept of Changes for Jul 1989 Through June 1990 Will Be Provided by 900901 ML17348A3941990-07-0909 July 1990 Forwards Requested Addl Info Re Emergency Power Sys Enhancement Project.Specific Detailed Changes Will Be Made to Procedures to Address Mods Affecting Equipment Relied Upon for Safe Shutdown ML17348A3881990-07-0505 July 1990 Requests Audit of NRC Records to Independently Verify Reasonableness of Charges Assessed Against Util,Per 10CFR170 Svcs ML17348A4311990-07-0505 July 1990 Documents Written & Verbal Request of Region II Personnel for Temporary Waiver of Compliance of Tech Spec 3.4.2.b.1 Re Allowable Out of Svc Time for One Emergency Containment Cooler from 24 H to 72 Hr W/Addl Reasons ML17348A3851990-07-0303 July 1990 Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-250/90-08 & 50-251/90-08.Corrective Actions:Training Dept Increased Emphasis on Radiological Postings in Radiation Worker Training ML17348A3711990-07-0303 July 1990 Responds to NRC 900524 Request for Addl Info on Emergency Power Sys Enhancement Project ML17348A3671990-07-0303 July 1990 Confirms Util Intentions Not to Operate Beyond Refueling Outage That Represents Last Outage Re NRC Bulletin 89-001 ML17348A3841990-06-29029 June 1990 Forwards LER 90-11 on 900609 Re hi-hi Steam Generator Water Level Turbine Trip & Subsequent Reactor Trip Due to Failure of Switch in Feedwater Valve Controller Hand/Auto Station. W/O Encl ML17348A3601990-06-29029 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-04, Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs. Test Procedures Developed & Under Mgt Review Reflecting Revised Inservice Testing Program ML17348A3621990-06-28028 June 1990 Notifies That Senior Operator License SOP-20177-2 Will Be Terminated,Effective 900731 ML17348A3651990-06-28028 June 1990 Advises That Completion of safety-related motor-operated Valve Testing & Surveillance Will Be Completed by June 1990, Per Generic Ltr 89-10 Requirements ML17348A3591990-06-27027 June 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-250/90-09 & 50-251/90-09.Corrective Actions:Specialist Counselled on Importance of Stopping Procedure When Steps Conflict W/ Condition of Plant & Procedure Use Guidelines Reviewed ML17348A3641990-06-27027 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/ Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. ML17348A3861990-06-27027 June 1990 Advises That New Date for Submittal of Response to Insp Repts 50-250/90-09 & 50-251/90-09 Is 900702 ML17348A3551990-06-21021 June 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-010, Nonconforming Molded Case Circuit Breakers. Five Untraceable Circuit Breakers Installed in Unit 3 safety-related Sys.All Five Breakers Replaced W/Traceable Breakers ML20055D9201990-06-20020 June 1990 Advises That Sp Frantz Will Represent Licensee in Argument Scheduled for 900710.Certificate of Svc Encl ML17348A3181990-06-19019 June 1990 Forwards Final Rept of Inservice Insp NDE of Unisolable Piping Sys & Components for Potential Thermal Stress Effects for Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, Per NRC Bulletin 88-008 ML17348A2981990-06-12012 June 1990 Forwards Rev 16 to Topical QA Rept. ML17348A2871990-06-0808 June 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor/Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Design. Bolt Replacement Performed ML17348A2861990-06-0808 June 1990 Advises That Info Re Operating History of Select Fuel Assemblies Sent to ORNL Between 900419 & 26,per 900510 Request ML17348A2781990-06-0404 June 1990 Forwards Emergency Power Sys Enhancement Project Repts, Reflecting Current Design Info 1990-09-07
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REGULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 7912200508 DOC ~ DATE: 79/12/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOC KK,T FACIL:50 250 Turkey Point Plant~ Unit 3p Florida Power and Light C 050 50 251 Turkey Point Plantg Unit Ar Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH INANE AUfHOR A FFILI AT ION uHRIG,R;E; Florida P ower rr Light Co ~
REeIP. NAME REC IP IKN T AFFILIATION SCHRENCERiA ~ Opera'ti ng Reactors Branch 1
SUBJECT:
Forwards info requested by NRC 781128 tr re analyses 1 evaluations performed to resolve containment pur'ge issue, Results of valve integrity eva,luation anticipated by June 1980','ISTRIBUTION CODEo A034S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ~ ENCL~ SIZEe TI L : Containment urg>ng N OT r=A ES ~~ >>~>>>>>>>>>>~>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>eereat>>>>>>>>ecto>>>>mes>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>~swee+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>wteeawea~
RECIP IKNT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAgE- 'Ef TR ENCL ID CODE/NAME. LTTR ENCL ACTION; 05 BC +R~ WI 7 7 INTERNAL vi REG 1 1 0?. NRC PDR 1 1 1 IKE 2 2 14 TA/EDO 1 i5 CORE PERF BR 1 1 17 ENGR BR i i i8 ANZAC 8FTY BR 1 1, 19 PL'ANT SYS BR 1 20 EEB i 21. EFLT TAT SYS i 2? BRINKMAN 1 .?3 0 8HUM 1 24 K REEVES 1 EXTERNAL: 03 LPDR 1, '1 04 NSIC 25 ACRS 16 16 1'OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED ~ LTTR 39 ENCL 39
0 P.O. BOX 529100, MIAMI, FL 33152
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fAssA FLORIDA POWER (IL LIGHT COMPANY December 13, 1979 L-79-346 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch ¹1 Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
Re: Turkey Point Units 3 8 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 8( 50-251 Containment Pur e
References:
(1) NRC letter dated August 28, 1979 from A. Schwencer to R. E. Uhrig (applicable to Docket Nos. 50-250 8 50-251)
(2) NRC letter dated September 27, 1979 from Darrell G. Eisenhut to All Light Hater Reactors (3) NRC letter dated October 23, 1979 from A. Schwencer to R. E. Uhrig (applicable to Docket Nos.
50-250 8( 50-251)
In response to your letter of November 28, 1978, several analyses/evaluations have been performed in an effort to resolve the containment purge issue. A description of this effort, which is responsive to references (1) through (3),
is given below. contains Westinghouse Electric Corporation's evaluation of the effect of containment purgi ng on the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) performance. The evaluation indicates that the effect of purge operation upon the calculated pellet cladding temperature is small.
An assessment of the incremental increase in radiological dose caused by containment purging during the initiation of a postulated Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA) is presented in Attachment 2. The results clearly indicate the anticipated total LOCA dose to be well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.
A table of postulated containment purge valve failure modes is presented in . The unique scheme using double solenoid valves for the control air provides the assurance of purge valve closure in addition to the second valve in series. contains a response to the Reference (1) request for infonaation.
In order to demonstrate purge valve integrity and operability when subjected o~
to LOCA conditions, the valve manufacturer (Henry Pratt Company) has been 5
~exes 00 <<8'EOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE
Office of Nuclear R or Regulation Page 2 contracted to perform the necessary analyses. The results of the analyses are anticipated by June 1980. However, for the interim period, FPL, in consultation with Henry Pratt Company, has determined that satisfactory operability under accident transient conditions is expected when the purge valve opening is limited. A plant change/modification is being processed to.
implement a purge valve modification restricting the valve openi ng to a maximum of 50 degrees.
In addition, the containment purge system was previously evaluated with respect to I&E Bulletins 79-01 and 79-01A. The FPL response concerning the qualification of class 1E electrical equipment was sent to you on July 3, 1979 (L-79-182). As indicated then, the investigation for data identified problems relating to qualification documentation generic to the nuclear industry.
Those that apply to containment purging at the Turkey Point plant concern ASCO solenoid valves. The July 3, 1979 submittal provides justification for continued operation (section 3.3-6) until replacement solenoid valves (which have been ordered) can be installed.
In conclusion, Florida Power & Light Company intends to operate the containment purge system in compliance with our letter of June 8, 1979, a commitment to limit our combined contai nment purges for Turkey which'ontained Point Units 3 and 4 during power operation (>25 power) to 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> per year for the site (200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> total for both units), until such time as the 50 degree modification is implemented. The effect of purging on ECCS performance and radiological dose has been shown to be minimal. The results of the valve integrity evaluation, to be performed by the valve vendor, are expected to be available by June, 1980.
We will keep you informed of our progress in this matter.
f Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems & Technology REU/MAS/cph Attachments (4) cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Region II Harold Reis, Esquire
ECCS f Per ox~ar e Evaluation
.According to Branch Technical Posi'tion CSB6-4, evaluation of a containment purge.
system design should include "an analysis of the reduction in containment pressure resulting from the partial loss of contairment atmospnere during the accident for ECCS backpressure determination". Such an analysis has been performed for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 based on the containment conditions defined in the limiting FAC analysis case (DECLG break, C = 0.4) assuming 22~
tube plugging using the modified February, 1978 Mestinnghouse Evaluate'ion Model.-
The containment isolation signal received in that analysis will initiate valve closure shortly after inception of the LOCA. The plant purge systems utilized during reactor operation consist of two lines, one 48 inches in diameter and one 54 inches in diameter. They are conservatively represented in this compu-tation as follows:
- l. A 5 second isolation valve closure time is assumed. Credit is taken for the reduction in effective f1ow area which occurs whi'le the valve is in the process of closing. The flow area is reduced linear'ly with time as the valve position moves from fully open to fully closed.
- 2. The frictional resistance associated with duct entrance and exit losses, filters. ductwork bends and skin friction has not been considered.
- 3. Ho fan coastdown effects are considered.
- 4. Ho inertia is considered. Steady state flow out the purge system ducts is established immediately at the time of the LOCA.
A mixture of steam and air will exha~yt from the containm nt through the purge .
ljnes during the time that the isolation valves remain open. The effect of.
the composition of the gas being exhausted on containment pressure has been bounded by investigating the two extreme cases. air alone and steam alone.
Mithin several seconds of the inception of the LOCA. containment pressure will have increased to the point that critical flow will occur in the purge lines.
To conservatively bound the calculated containment gas mixture exhausted throuoh the purge lines, critical flow rates of steam and air were calculated during the C - 0.4 DECLG break transient, Using these flowrates critical flow was D
conservatively assumed to be in effect from time zero.. Eouation (4.18 in I
Reference (1), was employed to calculate the cr tical flow rate of air tnrou h the Turkey Point purge lines.
Figure 14 of Reference (2) was apolied to compute the critical flow rate of steam through the purge lines'. The total mass released during the tim period that, the valves are presumed open is conservatively calculated as 11299 lbs. air or 8588 lbs.
steam. The containment pressure reduction resulting from this loss of air is computed to be 1.84 psi; the pressure reduction associated with the loss of steam is 2.36'si.
The most recent ECCS performance analysis executed for Turkey Point resulted in a calculated peak clad temperature (PCT) of 2161 F at a peaking factor of 1.89. The effect 'of containment pressure upon the calcuated PCT of a plant whose PCT is computed'o occur during FLECHT cooling (i.e. flooding rate greater than 1 inch per second) is typically 5 F/psi. Applying this backpressure sensitivity factor t'o Turkey Point indicates the calculated PCT will continue to exhibit margin to 2200 F'for the limiting containment pressure reduction of 2.36 psi. Overall, the effect of purge operation upon the calculated PCT is small, and the most recent Turkey Point ECCS performan'ce analysis provides an appropriate basis for operation at an F value of 1.89 with no restrictions on the operation of the containment purge system.
REFERENCES:
- 1) Shapiro, A. H.. The Dynamics and Thermodynamics of Compressible Fluid Flow.
~
Volume 1, p. 85.
- 2. 1967 ASNE Steam Tables, p. 301.
At tachme>>t Page One
~Raddolo ical Assessment oi Containment Pur e The radiological doses due to a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) were originally presented in Section 14.3.5 of the FSAR. The original FSAR analyses assumed there was no containment purging occurring at the onset of the accident. A new evaluation was performed to determine the incremental radiological dose at the site boundary and low population zone assuming the purge valves are fully open when the accident initiates and close upon receipt of signal as designed. These incremental doses, when added to those presented in the FSAR, provide a maximum set of doses f'r a LOCA with containment purge. The results of this evaluation are presented in the following tab3 es:
THYROID DOSE (rem)
Location LOCA Increment due Total To Pur in Site boundary 93 10 103 (0-2 hour)
Low Population Zone 9 10 (0-2 hour)
Mhole Body (rem)
Site boundary (0-2 hour) 3.1 .002 3.1 Low Population Zone .4 .0002 .4 (0-2 hour)
The major assumptions which were used in the evaluation of the incremental dose are listed below:
- 1. The containment purge valves- are closed 5 seconds after the containrfknt high pressure signal is transmitted. There is a 2.7 second delay before the increased containment pressure is detected which results in a total of 7.7 seconds for valve closure (8 seconds was conservatively assumed) .
- 2. Radioactive releases. via the purge valves during 'closure is from the Reactor Coolant System only.
'3. The primary coolant iodine activity corresponds to the maximum limi't of 30 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent which is specified in the Turkey Point License.
At aehmunt, 2 Page Two
- 4. It is conservatively assumed during the initial 8 seconds that 50% of the blowdown (worst FSAR case) from the break flashes and becomes homogeneously mixed in the containment atmosphere. All of the iodine in the flashed steam is assumed to become airborne.
- 5. The flow through the purge valves is .assumed to be a mixture of steam and water. Frictionless flow through the valves is assumed.
- 6. FSAR meteorology is assumed.
- 7. Standard TID 14844 methodology was used to calculate the incremental doses.
The results clearly indicate that the anticipated dose caused by a LOCA with containment purging at the onset of the accident is well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.
- t tacllm.'-.n t 3 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE S INGLE FAILURE ANALYS IS TABLE COMPONENT FAILURE MODE RESULTS Main Valve or Fails to close or 2nd purge air valve in series Operator fails to seat or signal will'provide the required to close not received. isolation.
Instrument Air Failure of air. Purge air valves are closed by Supply to the spring, air is NOT required for Operator closure.
Solenoid Valve Fails to operate Two solenoid valves in series (i.e., does NOT are used, thus 2nd solenoid isolate the operator valve would isolate air cylinder from air supply and dump operator air.
supply and does NOT Further back-up is provided provide air bleed off by the 2nd purge air valve for the cylinder). in series.
Attachnent 4 la) The non-seismic duct work, which has the opening" covered by expanded metal face plates ox by grilles and dampe s, provi.de limiei",d protection inside the cont:ainment against only low density debris sue" as foil insulation, paper, or rags. go missile protection is provM. d for duct woxk.
lb) Ho safety xeIated equipment is located in the flow stream beyond the outboard purge isolation valves, at the supply or exhaust: penetrations.
At Turkey 'Point the outboard valves axe outdoors. The safety related structuxes beyond the valves have been designed against tornado missiles as described in the PSAR, Section 5E.2.
lc) . The purge valves are listed among the five. types of penet:rations to
~
be given local leak detection tests at not less t:han 50 psig, using pressure decay, soap bubble, halogen detection, or equivalent methods, at each refueling (See, PSAR, Section 15, Technical Specificat:ion 4.4.2).
'he stated acceptance, criteria is that the sum of all local leak rate tests'shall not exceed 60 percent of the total containment allowable leak rat:e. PS&.'Figure 14.3.4-.2 indicates no pressure transient in excess of 50 psig fo- double ended, 6 squaxe feet, 3 square feet, and 0.5 square. feet pressure spectrum of potential breaks, against which
, the valves must close. Valve leakage is only applicable to a closed (zero flow)'valve. For release prior to closure see response to 7.d below>>
The total release thxough the containment purge system assuming
'initially fully open valves, .single valve failure, and conservat:ive low friction high flow rates, has been calculated for the spectrum of break sizes illustrated in PSAR Pigure 14.3.4-2,,titled "Contain-
'ent Pressgre Transients". The results of the calculation show that the 0.5 ft break resulted in less total release than the double ended break, taking into account t:he longer time scale due to slower pressure rise. Hence, the double ended break remains the worse c"'e for total release through the cont:ainment purge system. Plass xelease for the double ended break is less than t:he 17,000 lb. figure which was used in the dose calculations. Realistic valve flow calculations has resulted in a further mass flow reduct:ion to less than 9,000 lbs.
STATE OF FLORIDA )
) ss.
COUNTY OF DADE )
Robert E. Uhrig', being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is a Vice President of Florida Power 6 Light, Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.
Robert E. Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me this Wo'l day of 19~ rr NOTAR PUBLIC, in a d for the county of Dade, State of Florida Notary Public, State of Florida at Large My Commission Expires May 5, it98t Bonded thru Maynard Bonding Agency My commission expires: