IR 05000424/2013003

IR 05000424-13-003, 05000425-13-003, 04/01/2013 - 06/30/2013, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report

ML13210A312
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	07/29/2013
From:	Frank Ehrhardt NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Tynan T Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-13-003
Download: ML13210A312 (29)

Text

UNITED STATES uly 29, 2013

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2013003 AND 05000425/2013003

Dear Mr. Tynan:

On June 30, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on July 23, 2013, with Mr. J. Thomas and other members of your staff.

The inspection(s) examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with the 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000424, 05000425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000424/2013003 and 05000425/2013003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report Nos.: 05000424/2013003 and 05000425/2013003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: April 01, 2013 through June 30, 2013 Inspectors: M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector T. Chandler, Resident Inspector M. Speck, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP5, 4OA1, 4OA6)

D. Berkshire, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP5, 4OA1, 4OA6)

Approved by: Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000424/2013-003, 05000425/2013-003; 04/01/2013 - 06/30/2013; Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Integrated Inspection Report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by two resident inspectors, two emergency preparedness inspectors, and one senior project engineer. No findings were identified during this inspection period. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process revision 4.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near full rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in Mode 3, coming out of refueling outage 2R16. The Unit 2 startup was performed on April 2, and the plant attained full RTP on April 5. The unit was shut down on June 1 to replace degrading shaft seals on reactor coolant pumps 3 & 4. The unit was restarted on June 8, and attained full RTP on June 9. Unit 2 operated at or near full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power System

The inspectors reviewed the material condition of offsite and onsite alternate AC power systems (including switchyard and transformers) by performing a walk down of the switchyard, reviewing outstanding work orders, and assessing corrective actions for any degraded conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

.2 Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the stations adverse weather procedures written for extreme high temperatures. The inspectors verified that weather related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been corrected prior to the onset of seasonal extremes. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures before the onset of seasonal extreme weather conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors evaluated the following risk-significant systems:

• Unit 2 solid state reactor protection system (SSPS)

• Unit 1 main generator excitation system

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Walkdown

The inspectors verified that critical portions of selected risk-significant systems were correctly aligned. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system/train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors selected the following four systems/trains to inspect:

• Unit 2 train A & B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems while the train C turbine-driven AFW pump was out of service due to a planned maintenance outage

• Unit 1 train A emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the Unit 1 train B EDG was out of service due to a planned maintenance outage

• Unit 2 train A & C AFW systems while the Train B motor-driven AFW system was out of service due to a planned maintenance outage

• Unit 1 train B spent fuel pool cooling and purification system while the train A system was out of service due to a planned maintenance outage

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Inspection

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:

(1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources,

(2) fire detection systems, (3)water-based fire suppression systems,

(4) gaseous fire suppression systems,

(5) manual firefighting equipment and capability

(6) passive fire protection features, (7)compensatory measures and fire watches, and

(8) issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors toured the following five fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 2 EDG fuel oil storage tank building, fire zones 165 and 166

• Unit 1 and 2 rod control switchgear rooms, fire zones 59, 68, 69, and 75

• Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) pump rooms, fire zones 4, 5, 9, and 10

• Unit 2 containment building, fire zones 140A, 140B, 140C, and 140E

• Unit 2 safety injection (SI) and auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW) pump rooms, fire zones 26B, 30, 31, 32, and 33

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

.1 Internal Flooding

The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the areas listed below that contain risk significant structures, systems, and components susceptible to flooding. The inspectors verified plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood protection barriers and drain systems. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly addressing issues using their corrective action program.

Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 ACCW and component cooling water (CCW) pump rooms

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification:

The inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario administered to an operating crew conducted in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training program.

The inspectors assessed licensed operator performance, the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators, the quality of any post-scenario critique, any follow-up actions taken by the facility licensee, and the performance of the simulator. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (Licensed Operator Performance):

The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room on April 2, during the reactor startup following the 2R16 refueling outage. Inspectors observed licensed operator performance to assess the following:

• Use of plant procedures

• Control board manipulations

• Communications between crew members

• Use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms

• Use of human error prevention techniques

• Documentation of activities

• Management and supervision Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the two issues listed below in order to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the Maintenance Rule (MR) (10 CFR 50.65). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records in order to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspectors also interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.

• CR 351658, Unplanned LCO: Intermediate Range NI 2N-36 failure

• CR 530916, Unit 1 SG loops 2 and 3 do not indicate steam flow

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Week of April 22: maintenance outage on the 1B EDG concurrent with maintenance activities on the supply breakers for the B train NSCW cooling tower fans

• Week of April 29: unplanned inoperability of the 2B EDG after it failed its monthly surveillance test

• Week of May 27: maintenance outage on the 2B motor-driven AFW system concurrent with high-risk work being performed in the high-voltage switchyard.

• Week of June 3: Unit 2 maintenance outage to replace the seals on reactor coolant pumps 3&4

• Week of June 10: unplanned inoperability of the 1B SI pump due to troubleshooting accumulator leakage

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the six operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and updated final safety analysis report to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• CR 627516, Void identified during the performance of 50085-C and 14460-2 at 21208X4052

• CR 632670, 14802B-2 NSCW Pump #2 Response Time Test Failure

• CR 615437, Unit 2 reactor coolant pump number 3 seal injection flow pegged high

• CR 618139, Unit 2, 2BD1 125 VDC ground

• CR 648248, Calculational error impacts EAL set point values for RS1 and RG1

• CR 654111, Line upstream of AFW check valve 2-1302-U4-113 is hot to the touch

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the plant modifications listed below did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system operability and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Temporary modification SNC493725 - installation of roller supports to the Unit 2, loop 3 main feedwater regulating valve positioned feedback bracket to mitigate vibration

• Temporary modification SNC376986 - installation of accelerometers on the RHR bypass lines in order to gather vibration data to aid in the determination of stress conditions on the RCS piping

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the seven maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:

acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing; and test documentation was properly evaluated. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Maintenance Work Order (MWO) SNC367324 - 2C TDAFW 2PD15180A AFW TURB STM IN channel calibration

• MWOs SNC376951 - repair fuel oil pump reducer leak, repair/torque bolt at intercooler, prime fuel oil header, SNC350823 - replace load sensor, and SNC124891 - replace K10, VR1, & VR2 relays

• MWOs SNC134996 - 2B ESF chilled water - complete motor PM, change oil, and SNC137702 - 2B ESF chilled water - calibrate/replace 162 Agastat relay

• MWOs SNC459186 - change inboard bearing oil, and SNC493526 - swap pump breaker

• MWOs SNC 128306 - 1A control building (CB) ESF chiller transmitter replacement and SNC 125851, 1A CB ESF chiller channel calibration T-4170

• MWO SNC 620857, troubleshooting results for 2HV-9001A

• MWO SNC493676 - 2FV-5154 failed stroke time

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the inspection activities described below for the Unit 2 refueling outage (2R16) that ended on April 7, 2013. The inspectors verified that the licensee: 1) considered risk in developing the outage schedule 2) controlled plant configuration in accordance with administrative risk reduction methodologies, 3)developed work schedules to manage fatigue, 4) developed mitigation strategies for loss of key safety functions, and 5) adhered to operating license and technical specification requirements. Additionally, inspectors verified that safety-related and risk significant structures, systems, and components not accessible during power operations were maintained in an operable condition.

• Observed heat up and startup activities to verify that TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant conditions. Reactor coolant system (RCS) integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage calculations and containment integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment penetrations and containment isolation valves Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with outage activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the seven surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met Technical Specification and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Routine Surveillance Tests

• 24751-1 Rev. 23, Steam Generator Level (Narrow Range) Protection Channel I 1L-529 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration

• 14980B-1 Rev. 24.1, Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test

• 14609-2 Rev. 21, SSPS Slave Relay K601 Train B Test Safety Injection

• 24802-1 Rev. 18, Steam Pressure Loop 1 (Protection IV) 1P-516 Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration In-Service Tests (IST)

• 14825-2 Rev. 93, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, 2HV-9001A Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection

• 14905-1 Rev. 67.6, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)

• 14905-2 Rev. 51.6, RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing and maintaining the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5) and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, were also used as a reference.

The inspectors interviewed personnel responsible for system performance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the alert and notification system on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection was reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System.

The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria.

Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues, the completeness and effectiveness of corrective actions, and to determine if issues were recurring. The licensees post-event after action reports, self-assessments, and audits were reviewed to assess the licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. Inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q) change process, personnel training, and selected evaluations of Emergency Preparedness document revisions to assess adequacy. The inspectors toured facilities and reviewed equipment and facility maintenance records to assess licensees adequacy in maintaining them. The inspectors observed licensee staff demonstrate the capabilities of selected radiation monitoring instrumentation to adequately support Emergency Action Level (EAL) declarations.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114.05, Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness. The applicable planning standards, related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, and 10 CFR 50.54(q) and

(t) were used as reference criteria.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the maintenance of emergency preparedness on a biennial basis.

b. Findings

Introduction:

The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) concerning the capabilities of the main steam line radiation monitors to provide threshold values used to declare a General Emergency under RG1 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, as described in the licensees NRC-approved EAL scheme.

Description:

The inspectors reviewed licensee corrective action item CR 564168. In December, 2012, the licensee determined that main steam line radiation monitor (RE-13119 through 13122) may not be able to provide indications of 3.1E+5 uCi/cc which is the threshold value specified for declaring a general emergency. It is not a current safety concern as alternate means of declaring a general emergency exists and additional compensatory measures were put in place however the licensee had not completed their evaluation of the instruments capabilities. Inspectors concluded that a review of the licensees completed evaluation is necessary to determine if the issue constitutes a violation of regulatory requirements. Having accurate EAL threshold values are part of the Risk-Significant Planning Standards (RSPS) under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). This issue is identified as URI 05000424 and 05000425/2013003-01, Ability of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors to Provide Threshold Values for EAL RG1.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on May 15, 2013.

The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and/or technical support center to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against inspection criteria established in the licensees procedures. Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the corrective action program.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Barrier Integrity Cornerstone

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the PIs listed below. To verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station, the inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between April 1, 2012, and March 31, 2013, for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspections verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors also confirmed the PIs were calculated correctly. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity

• Reactor Coolant System Leakage

.2 Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals relative to the PIs listed below for the period January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, were used to confirm the reporting basis for each data element.

• Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)

• Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (ERO)

• Alert and Notification System Reliability (ANS)

For the specified review period, the inspector examined data reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records.

The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The inspectors also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting and evaluating the PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection satisfied three inspection samples for PI verification on an annual basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Routine Review

The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program in order to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed daily condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.

.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the six month period of October 2012 to March 2013 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared their results with the results contained in the licensees trend documents. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents which were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Operator Work-Around Annual Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the licensees operator work-around, operator burden, and control room deficiency lists for the station in effect on May 31, 2013 to verify that the licensee identified operator workarounds at an appropriate threshold and entered them in the corrective action program. The inspectors verified that the licensee identified the full extent of issues, performed appropriate evaluations, and planned appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory actions and their cumulative effects on plant operation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

.1 Unit 1 Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) April 4, 2013 (Event Notification 48880)

On April 4, 2013, at 0632 the Unit 1 control room received a fire alarm from the Unit 1 control building. A non-licensed operator was dispatched to investigate. Approximately six minutes later the system operator reported to the Unit 1 control room that a small flame was visible inside computer inverter 1ND3I1 located in control building room A33.

The control room dispatched the Vogtle fire brigade in accordance with fire response procedures. At 0647 a NOUE was declared due to a fire in the control building for greater than 15 minutes. At 0651 the Vogtle fire brigade captain reported that the fire had been extinguished. At 0745 the Vogtle emergency director terminated the NOUE.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees classification and notifications to the NRC and state/county governments. The inspectors verified the licensee classified the event in accordance with site emergency action level procedures. The inspectors also verified the event was reported as required by 10 CFR Part 50.72.

.2 Unit 2 Forced Outage June 1, 2013

On June 1, 2013, at 0441, Unit 2 conducted a normal shutdown and cool down to replace the shaft seals for RCPs 3&4. RCPs 3&4 were shutdown soon after the reactor was tripped, which forced the operators to depressurize the plant using auxiliary pressurizer sprays and by cycling backup heaters. The inspectors observed the Unit shutdown and cooldown. The inspectors verified that the licensee: 1) considered risk in developing the outage schedule 2) controlled plant configuration in accordance with administrative risk reduction methodologies, 3) developed work schedules to manage fatigue, 4) developed mitigation strategies for loss of key safety functions, and 5)adhered to operating license and technical specification requirements. Additionally, inspectors verified that safety-related and risk significant structures, systems, and components not accessible during power operations were maintained in an operable condition. The inspectors also observed the unit heat up and reactor startup conducted on June 8.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

a. Exit Meeting On July 23, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Thomas and other members of plant staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

R. Brown, Training Manager

R. Collins, Chemistry Manager

G. Saxon, Plant Manager

K. Dyar, Security Manager

G. Gunn, Licensing

M. Johnson, Health Physics Manager

J. Thomas, Operations Director

J. Robinson, Engineering Programs Manager

S. Swanson, Site Support Manager

T. Tynan, Site Vice-President

T. Thompson, Systems Engineering Manager

F. Pournia, Engineering Director

NRC personnel

M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector

T. Chandler, Resident Inspector

F. Ehrhardt, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED AND CLOSED OPEN AND CLOSED None OPENED 005000424, 425/2013003-01 URI Ability of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors to Provide Threshold Values for EAL RG1 (Section 1EP5)

CLOSED None