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{{#Wiki_filter:Jul. 03, 2014 Page 1 of 2 MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2014-33659 USER INFORMATION:
{{#Wiki_filter:Jul. 03,  2014 Page      1    of  2 MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2014-33659 USER INFORMATION:
GERLACH*ROSEY M EMPL#:028401 CA#: 0363 Address: NUCSA2 Phone#: 254-3194 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:
GERLACH*ROSEY M          EMPL#:028401    CA#:  0363 Address: NUCSA2 Phone#:  254-3194 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:
TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 07/03/2014 LOCATION:
TO:    GERLACH*ROSEY M        07/03/2014 LOCATION:  USNRC FROM:  NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)
USNRC FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU. HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL.
THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU. HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL. WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL, ENSURE THE UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL. TOOLS FROM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF ERRORS.
WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL, ENSURE THE UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL. TOOLS FROM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF ERRORS.ATTENTION: "REPLACE" directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no TOC will be issued with the updated material.TSBI -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/25/2014
ATTENTION:  "REPLACE"  directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no TOC will be issued with the updated material.
TSBI - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS    DATE: 04/25/2014 ADD    MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS    DATE: 07/02/2014 CATEGORY:  DOCUMENTS  TYPE: TSBI
                                                                                          -ul
 
Jul. 03, 2014 Page      2    of  2 0
ID:  TEXT 3.6.1.3 REMOVE:    REV:10 ADD:    REV: 11 CATEGORY:  DOCUMENTS  TYPE: TSB1 ID:  TEXT LOES ADD:    REV: 117 REMOVE:    REV:116 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS    TYPE: TSB1 ID:  TEXT TOC REMOVE:    REV:22 ADD:    REV: 23 ANY DISCREPANCIES WITH THE MATERIAL PROVIDED,  CONTACT DCS @ X3107 OR X3136 FOR ASSISTANCE. UPDATES FOR HARDCOPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 3 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES. PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN  YOUR NIMS  INBOX UPON COMPLETION OF UPDATES. FOR ELECTRONIC  MANUAL USERS, ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX.
 
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:        TSBI Manual
 
==Title:=
The RHR Shutdown Cooling return line containment penetrations
The RHR Shutdown Cooling return line containment penetrations
{X-13A(B)}are provided with a normally closed gate valve{HV-151F015A(B)}
{X-13A(B)}are provided with a normally closed gate valve
and a normally open globe valve{HV-151F017A(B)}
{HV-151F015A(B)} and a normally open globe valve
outside containment and a testable check valve {HV-151F050A(B)}
{HV-151F017A(B)} outside containment and a testable check valve {HV-151F050A(B)} with a normally closed parallel air operated globe valve {HV-151F122A(B)} inside containment. The gate valve is manually opened and automatically isolates upon a containment isolation signal from the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System or RPV low level 3 when the RHR System is operated in the Shutdown Cooling Mode only. The LPCI subsystem is an operational mode of the RHR System and uses the same injection lines to the RPV as the Shutdown Cooling Mode.
with a normally closed parallel air operated globe valve {HV-151F122A(B)}
The design of these containment penetrations is unique in that some valves are containment isolation valves while others perform the function of pressure isolation valves. In order to meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage testing requirements, the HV-1 51 F01 5A(B) and the closed system outside containment are the only barriers tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. Since these containment penetrations {X-13A and X-13B} include a containment isolation valve outside containment that is tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements and a closed system outside containment that meets the requirements of USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 (September 1975), paragraph 11.3.e, the containment isolation provisions for these penetrations provide an acceptable alternative to the explicit requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.
inside containment.
Containment penetrations X-13A(B) are also high/low pressure system interfaces. In order to meet the requirements to have two (2) isolation valves between the high pressure and low pressure systems, the HV-151F050A(B), HV-151F122A(B), and HV-1 51 F01 5A(B) valves are used to meet this requirement and are tested in accordance with the pressure test program.
The gate valve is manually opened and automatically isolates upon a containment isolation signal from the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System or RPV low level 3 when the RHR System is operated in the Shutdown Cooling Mode only. The LPCI subsystem is an operational mode of the RHR System and uses the same injection lines to the RPV as the Shutdown Cooling Mode.The design of these containment penetrations is unique in that some valves are containment isolation valves while others perform the function of pressure isolation valves. In order to meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage testing requirements, the HV-1 51 F01 5A(B) and the closed system outside containment are the only barriers tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. Since these containment penetrations  
(continued)
{X-13A and X-13B} include a containment isolation valve outside containment that is tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements and a closed system outside containment that meets the requirements of USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 (September 1975), paragraph 11.3.e, the containment isolation provisions for these penetrations provide an acceptable alternative to the explicit requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.Containment penetrations X-13A(B) are also high/low pressure system interfaces.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1             TS / B 3.6-15b                               Revision 2
In order to meet the requirements to have two (2) isolation valves between the high pressure and low pressure systems, the HV-151F050A(B), HV-151F122A(B), and HV-1 51 F01 5A(B) valves are used to meet this requirement and are tested in accordance with the pressure test program.(continued)
 
SUSQUEHANNA  
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE           The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related SAFETY ANALYSES     to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-15b Revision 2 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related SAFETY ANALYSES to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents.
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within primary containment are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) and secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs are minimized. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) for a MSLB outside primary containment is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis. The safety analyses assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation.
As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment.
Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within primary containment are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation.
This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) and secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs are minimized.
The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) for a MSLB outside primary containment is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint.
The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis.
The safety analyses assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation.
Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.
Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.
The DE3A analysis assumes that within the required isolation time leakage is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage rate, LK.The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.The primary containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3 except as permitted under Note 2 of SR 3.6.1.3.1.
The DE3A analysis assumes that within the required isolation time leakage is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage rate, LK.
In this case, the single failure criterion remains applicable to the primary containment purge valve (continued)
The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.
SUSQUEHANNA  
The primary containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3 except as permitted under Note 2 of SR 3.6.1.3.1. In this case, the single failure criterion remains applicable to the primary containment purge valve (continued)
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-16 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE due to failure in the control circuit associated with each SAFETYANALYSES valve. The primary containment purge valve design (continued) precludes a single failure from compromising the primary containment boundary as long as the system is operated in accordance with this LCO.Both H 2 0 2 Analyzer PCIVs may not be able to close given a single failure in the control circuitry of the valves. The single failure* is caused by a "hot short' in the cables/raceway to the PCIVs that causes both PCIVs for a given penetration to remain open or to open when required to be closed. This failure is required to be considered in accordance with IEEE-279 as discussed in FSAR Section 7.3.2a. However, the single failure criterion for containment isolation of the H 2 02 Analyzer penetrations is satisfied by virtue of the combination of the associated PCIVs and the closed system formed by the H 2 0 2 Analyzer piping system as discussed in the BACKGROUND section above.The closed system boundary between PASS and the H 2 0 2 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-12361, SV-12365, SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369).
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1               TS / B 3.6-16                                 Revision 2
The closed system is not fully qualified to the guidance of Reference 6 in that the closed system boundary valves between the H 2 0 2 system and PASS are not powered from a Class I E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, the use of these valves is considered to have no risk significance.
 
This exemption to the requirement of Reference 6 for the closed system boundary is documented in License Amendment No. 195.PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 2)LCO PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary, or in the case of SCBL valves limit leakage from the primary containment.
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE           due to failure in the control circuit associated with each SAFETYANALYSES       valve. The primary containment purge valve design (continued)         precludes a single failure from compromising the primary containment boundary as long as the system is operated in accordance with this LCO.
The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA.The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1 and Table B 3.6.1.3-2.(continued)
Both H 20 2 Analyzer PCIVs may not be able to close given a single failure in the control circuitry of the valves. The single failure* is caused by a "hot short' in the cables/raceway to the PCIVs that causes both PCIVs for a given penetration to remain open or to open when required to be closed. This failure is required to be considered in accordance with IEEE-279 as discussed in FSAR Section 7.3.2a. However, the single failure criterion for containment isolation of the H202 Analyzer penetrations is satisfied by virtue of the combination of the associated PCIVs and the closed system formed by the H20 2 Analyzer piping system as discussed in the BACKGROUND section above.
SUSQUEHANNA  
The closed system boundary between PASS and the H20 2 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-12361, SV-12365, SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369). The closed system is not fully qualified to the guidance of Reference 6 in that the closed system boundary valves between the H20 2 system and PASS are not powered from a Class I E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, the use of these valves is considered to have no risk significance. This exemption to the requirement of Reference 6 for the closed system boundary is documented in License Amendment No. 195.
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-17 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES LCO (continued)
PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 2)
The normally closed PCIVs, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, are considered OPERABLE Wien manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves are in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1.
LCO                 PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary, or in the case of SCBL valves limit leakage from the primary containment.
Leak rate testing of the secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table 3.6.1.3-2 is permitted in Modes 1, 2 & 3 as described in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containment bypass valves, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements.
The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA.
Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment.
The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1 and Table B 3.6.1.3-2.
In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be (continued)
(continued)
UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-17a Revision 1 SUSQUEHANNA-[
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1               TS / B 3.6-17                                   Revision 2
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABILITY OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are (continued) not required to be closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown.
 
These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES LCO (continued) The normally closed PCIVs, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, are considered OPERABLE Wien manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves are in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
Leak rate testing of the secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table 3.6.1.3-2 is permitted in Modes 1, 2 & 3 as described in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.
Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containment bypass valves, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded.
This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be (continued)
Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA-[ UNIT 1                 TS / B 3.6-17a                               Revision 1
SUSQUEHANNA  
 
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-18 Revision 0 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated.
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABILITY       OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are (continued)         not required to be closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown. These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation."
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment.
(This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)
The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time (8 hours for main steam lines). The Completion'Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation.
ACTIONS             The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.
Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.(continued)
The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.
SUSQUEHANNA  
A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, (continued)
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-19 Revision 0 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A. 1 and A.2 (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1             TS / B 3.6-18                                 Revision 0
Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H 2 0 2 Analyzer penetrations.
 
For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H 2 0 2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS         A.1 and A.2 (continued) the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time (8 hours for main steam lines). The Completion'Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.B._1 With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour.The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de--activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.Condition B is modified by a Note-indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H 2 0 2 Analyzer penetrations.
For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H1-2 0 2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path (continued)
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA  
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1                 TS / B 3.6-19                                 Revision 0
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-20 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) must be isolated.
 
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration.
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS             A. 1 and A.2 (continued)
Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference  
Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H20 2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.
: 6. For conditions where the PCIV and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply. For the Excess Flow Check Valves (EFCV), the Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations.
Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C. 1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.
B._1 With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour.
The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs and the H 2 0 2 Analyzer Penetration.
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de--activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.
Conditions A, B and D provide the appropriate Required Actions.Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.
Condition B is modified by a Note-indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H1-2 0 2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.(continued)
C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA  
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1               TS / B 3.6-20                                 Revision 1
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-21 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
 
With one or more H 2 0 2 Analyzer penetrations with one or both PCIVs inoperable, the inoperable valve(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated.
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS             C.1 and C.2 (continued) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 6. For conditions where the PCIV and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply. For the Excess Flow Check Valves (EFCV), the Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C. 1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected.
Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs and the H20 2 Analyzer Penetration. Conditions A, B and D provide the appropriate Required Actions.
by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration.
Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
Required Action D.1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours is reasonable considering the unique design of the H 2 0 2 Analyzer penetrations.
(continued)
The containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. In addition, the Completion Time of 72 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1             TS / B 3.6-21                                   Revision 2
The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.When an H 2 0 2 Analyzer penetration PCIV is to be closed and deactivated in accordance with Condition D, this must be accomplished by pulling the fuse for the power supply, and either deterrninating the power cables at the solenoid valve, or jumpering of the power side of the solenoid to ground.The OPERABILITY requirements for the closed system are discussed in.Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4.In the event that either one or both of the PCIVs and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply.(continued)
 
SUSQUEHANNA  
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS             D.1 and D.2 (continued)
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-22 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
With one or more H20 2 Analyzer penetrations with one or both PCIVs inoperable, the inoperable valve(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected. by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action D.1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours is reasonable considering the unique design of the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. The containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. In addition, the Completion Time of 72 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to the H 2 Q 2 Analyzer penetrations.
When an H20 2 Analyzer penetration PCIV is to be closed and deactivated in accordance with Condition D, this must be accomplished by pulling the fuse for the power supply, and either deterrninating the power cables at the solenoid valve, or jumpering of the power side of the solenoid to ground.
E. 1 With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met.Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment function.F. 1 In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed, except as controlled by SR 3.6.1.3.1 so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.G.1 and G.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach'the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.(continued)
The OPERABILITY requirements for the closed system are discussed in.Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4.
SUSQUEHANNA  
In the event that either one or both of the PCIVs and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply.
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-22a Revision 0 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued)
(continued)
If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended or valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge! valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1               TS / B 3.6-22                                 Revision 1
If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is also modified by Note 1, stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves, or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the purge valves closing. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open. The SR is modified by Note 2 stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The vent and purge valves.are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for (continued)
 
SUSQUEHANNA  
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS             D.1 and D.2 (continued)
-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-23 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)
Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to the H2Q2 Analyzer penetrations.
E. 1 With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met.
Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment function.
F. 1 In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed, except as controlled by SR 3.6.1.3.1 so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.
G.1 and G.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach'the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1             TS / B 3.6-22a                               Revision 0
 
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS             H.1 and H.2 (continued)
If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended or valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.
SURVEILLANCE         SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge! valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is also modified by Note 1, stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves, or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the purge valves closing. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open. The SR is modified by Note 2 stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The vent and purge valves.are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1             TS / B 3.6-23                                   Revision 1
 
PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE         SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.2.
REQUIREMENTS limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.2.
SR 3.6.1.3.2 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind.flange that is located outside pnmary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
SR 3.6.1.3.2 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind.flange that is located outside pnmary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.
Rather, it involves
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for PCIVs outside primary containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the PCIVs are in the correct positions.
Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper

Latest revision as of 05:18, 5 December 2019

Technical Specification Bases, Manual
ML14196A040
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SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBI Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date: 07/02/2014 Procedure Name Rev Issue Date Change ID Change Number TEXT LOES 117 07/02/2014

Title:

LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS TEXT TOC 23 07/02/2014

Title:

TABLE OF CONTENTS TEXT 2.1.1 5 05/06/2009

Title:

SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS TEXT 2.1.2 1 10/04/2007

Title:

SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) PRESSURE S TEXT 3.0 3 08/20/2009

Title:

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY TEXT 3.1.1 1 04/18/2006

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

TEXT 3.1.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS REACTIVITY ANOMALIES TEXT 3.1.3 2 01/19/2009

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY TEXT 3.1.4 4 01/30/2009

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES TEXT 3.1.5 1 07/06/2005

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS TEXT 3.1.6 3 02/24/2014

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL Report Date: 07/03/14 Pagel Page I of of 8

.8 Report Date: 07/03/14

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB1 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.1.7 3 04/23/2008

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM TEXT 3.1.8 3 05/06/2009

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.1 2 04/23/2008

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)

TEXT 3.2.2 3 05/06/2009

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

TEXT 3.2.3 2 04/23/2008

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)

TEXT 3.3.1.1 6 02/24/2014

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.1.2 2 01/19/2009

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 4 02/24/2014

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 2 04/05/2010

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 9 02/28/2013

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 1 04/18/2005

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.1 2 02/24/2014

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION Page 2 of .8 Report Date: 07/03/14

SSES MANUiTAL

. Manual Name: TSBI Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 3 08/20/2009

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.1 7 03/31/2014

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.2 4 09/01/2010

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.7.1 2 10/27/2008

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1 2 12/17/2007

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 4 04/27/2010

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 3 10/23/2013

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RCS SAFETY RELIEF VALVES S/RVS TEXT 3.4.4 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE Report Date: 07/03/14 Page3 Page 3 of of 8_8 Report Date: 07/03/14

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.4.5 1 01/16/2006

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.6 4 02/19/2014

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 2 10/04/2007

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 2 03/28/2013

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

- HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.9 1 03/28/2013

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYST6

- COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.10 3 04/23/2008

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS TEXT 3.4.11 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.1 3 02/24/2014

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM ECCS - OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM ECCS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.5.3 3 02/24/2014

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)

SYSTEM RCIC SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.1.1 5 02/24/2014

Title:

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 1 04/23/2008

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK Report Date: 07/03/14 Page44 Page of of 8

.8 Report Date: 07/03/14

SSES MANUYAL

. , Manual Name: TSBI Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.1.3 11 07/02/2014

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)

TEXT 3.6.1.4 1 04/23/2008

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3.6.1.5 1 10/05/2005

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.1.6 0 11/15/2002

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 2 04/23/2008

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.2.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 1 01/16/2006

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL C( OOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 0 11/15/2002

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL S] PRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 1 04/18/2005

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.3.3 1 02/28/2013

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 10 04/25/2014

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Pae f8RprtDt:0/31 Page 5 of 8 Report Date: 07/03/14

SSES MANUJAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.4.2 9 04/25/2014

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)

TEXT 3.6.4.3 4 09/21/2006

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.1 4 04/05/2010

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)

TEXT 3.7.2 2 02/11/2009

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 1 01/08/2010

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM TEXT 3. 7.4 0 11/15/2002 0

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3 .7.5 1 10/04/2007

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3.7.6 2 04/23/2008

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3. 7.7 1 10/04/2007

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7.8 0 04/23/2008

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS TEXT 3. 8.1 7 02/24/2014

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3,8.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN Report Date: 07/03/14 Pages Page 6 of of 88 Report Date: 07/03/14

SSES MANUAL

.* Manual Name: TSBI Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3. 8.3 4 10/23/2013

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL, LUBE OIL, AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 3 01/19/2009

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 1 12/14/2006

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.8.6 1 12/14/2006

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS TEXT 3.8.7 1 10/05/2005

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.8 0 11/15/2002

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING ( PERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 1 09/01/2010

Title:

REFUELING C9PERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING C9PERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION TEXT 3.9.4 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING C3PERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION TEXT 3.9.5 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING C3PERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 1 10/04/2007

Title:

REFUELING CPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVEL m

Report Date: 07/03/14 Page77 Page of 8

.~ Report Date: 07/03/14

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB1 Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.9.7 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.8 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.1 1 01/23/2008

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION TEXT 3.10.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 0 11/15/2002

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.4 0 11/15/2002

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.5 0 11/15/2002

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.6 0 11/15/2002

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 1 04/18/2006

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 1 04/12/2006

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Report Date: 07/03/14 Page88 Page of of 8 8 Report Date: 07/03/14

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Revision TOC Table of Contents 23 B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS BASES Page B 2.0-1 0 Page TS / B 2.0-2 3 Page TS / B 2.0-3 5 Page TS / B 2.0-4 3 Page TS / B 2.0-5 5 Page TS / B 2.0-6 1 Pages TS / B 2.0-7 through TS / B 2.0-9 1 B 3.0 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASES Page TS / B 3.0-1 1 Pages TS / B 3.0-2 through TS / B 3.0-4 0 Pages TS / B 3.0-5 through TS / B 3.0-7 1 Page TS / B 3.0-8 3 Pages TS / B 3.0-9 through TS / B 3.0-11 2 Page TS / B 3.0-1 la 0 Page TS / B 3.0-12 1 Pages TS / B 3.0-13 through TS / B 3.0-15 2 Pages TS / B 3.0-16 and TS / B 3.0-17 0 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL BASES Pages B 3.1-1 through B 3.1-4 0 Page TS / B 3.1-5 1 Pages TS / B 3.1-6 and TS / B 3.1-7 2 Pages B 3.1-8 through B 3.1-13 0 Page TS / B 3.1-14 1 Page B 3.1-15 0 Page TS / B 3.1-16 1 Pages B 3.1-17 through B 3.1-19 0 Pages TS / B 3.1-20 and TS / B 3.1-21 1 Page TS / B 3.1-22 0 Page TS / B 3.1-23 1 Page TS / B 3.1-24 0 Pages TS / B 3.1-25 through TS / B 3.1-27 1 Page TS / B 3.1-28 2 Page TS / B 3.1-29 1 Pages B 3.1-30 through B 3.1-33 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-34 through TS / B 3.3-36 1 Page TS / B 3.1-37 2 Page TS / B 3.1-38 3 Pages TS / B 3.1-39 and TS / B 3.1-40 2 Page TS / B 3.1-40a 0 Pages TS / B 3.1-41 and TS / B 3.1-42 2 TS/B LOES-1 Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT

- UNIT 11 TS / B LOES-1 Revision 117

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Section Title Revision Page TS / B 3.1.43 1 Page TS / B 3.1-44 0 Page TS / B 3.1-45 3 Pages TS / B 3.1-46 through TS / B 3.1-49 1 Page TS / B 3.1-50 0 Page TS / B 3.1-51 3 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES Page TS / B 3.2-1 2 Pages TS / B 3.2-2 and TS / B 3.2-3 3 Pages TS / B 3.2-4 and TS / B 3.2-5 2 Page TS / B 3.2-6 3 Page B 3.2-7 1 Pages TS / B 3.2-8 and TS / B 3.2-9 3 Page TS / B 3.2.10 2 Page TS / B 3.2-11 3 Page TS / B 3.2-12 1 Page TS / B 3.2-13 2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Pages TS / B 3.3-1 through TS / B 3.3-4 1 Page TS / B 3.3-5 2 Page TS / B 3.3-6 1 Page TS / B 3.3-7 3 Page TS / B 3.3-7a 1 Page TS / B 3.3-8 5 Pages TS / B 3.3-9 through TS / B 3.3-12 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-12a 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-12b and TS / B 3.3-12c 0 Page TS / B 3.3-13 1 Page TS / B 3.3-14 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-15 and TS / B 3.3-16 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-17 and TS / B 3.3-18 4 Page TS / B 3.3-19 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-20 through TS / B 3.3-22 2 Page TS / B 3.3-22a 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-23 and TS / B 3.3-24 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-24a and TS / B 3.3-24b 0 Page TS / B 3.3-25 3 Page TS / B 3.3-26 2 Page TS / B 3.3-27 1 Page TS / B 3.3-28 3 Page TS / B 3.3-29 4 Page TS / B 3.3-30 3 Page TS / B 3.3-30a 0 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B LOES-2 Revision 117

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Section Title Revision Page TS / B 3.3-31 4 Page TS / B 3.3-32 5 Pages TS / B 3.3-32a 0 Page TS / B 3.3-32b 1 Page TS / B 3.3-33 5 Page TS / B 3.3-33a 0 Page TS / B 3.3-34 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-35 and TS / B 3.3-36 2.

Pages TS / B 3.3-37 and TS / B 3.3-38 1 Page TS / B 3.3-39 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-40 through TS / B 3.3-43 1 Page TS / B 3.3-44 4 Pages TS / B 3.3-44a and TS / B 3.3-44b 0 Page TS / B 3.3-45 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-45a and TS / B 3.3-45b 0 Page TS / B 3.3-46 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-47 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-48 through TS / B 3.3-51 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-52 and TS / B 3.3-53 2 Page TS / B 3-3-53a 0 Page TS / B 3.3-54 5 Page TS / B 3.3-55 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-56 and TS / B 3.3-57 1 Page TS / B 3.3-58 0 Page TS / B 3.3-59 1 Page TS / B 3.3-60 0 Page TS / B 3.3-61 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-62 and TS / B 3.3-63 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-64 and TS / B 3.3-65 2 Page TS / B 3.3-66 4 Page TS / B 3.3-67 3 Page TS / B 3.3-68 4 Page TS / B 3.3-69 5 Pages TS / B 3.3-70 4 Page TS / B 3.3-71 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-72 and TS / B 3.3-73 2 Page TS / B 3.3-74 3 Page TS / B 3.3-75 2 Page TS / B 3.3-75a 6 Page TS / B 3.3-75b 7 Page TS / B 3.3-75c 6 Pages B 3.3-76 through B 3.3-77 0

.Page TS / B 3.3-78 1 LOES-3 Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA -

UNIT 11 TS I/ BB LOES-3 TS Revision 117

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Section Title Revision Pages B 3.3-79 through B 3.3-81 0 Page TS / B 3.3-82 2 Page B 3.3-83 0 Pages B 3.3-84 and B 3.3-85 1 Page B 3.3-86 0 Page B 3.3-87 1 Page B 3.3-88 0 Page B 3.3-89 1 Page TS / B 3.3-90 1 Page B 3.3-91 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-92 through TS / B 3.3-100 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-101 through TS / B 3.3-103 0 Page TS / B 3.3-104 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-105 arid TS / B 3.3-106 0 Page TS / B 3.3-107 1 Page TS / B 3.3-108 0 Page TS / B 3.3-109 1 Pages TS/B 3.3-110 arid TS/B 3.3-111 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-112 and TS / B 3.3-112a 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-113 through TS / B 3.3-115 1 Page TS / B 3.3-116 3 Page TS / B 3.3-117 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-118 through TS / B 3.3-122 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-123 arid TS / B 3.3-124 1 Page TS / B 3.3-124a 0 Page TS / B 3.3-125 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-126 and TS / B 3.3-127 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-128 through TS/ B 3.3-130 0 Page TS / B 3.3-131 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-132 through TS / B 3.3-134 0 Pages B 3.3-135 through B 3.3-137 0 Page TS / B 3.3-138 1 Pages B 3.3-139 through B 3.3-149 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-150 and TS / B 3.3-151 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-152 through TS / B 3.3-154 2 Page TS / B 3.3-155 1 Pages TS /.B 3.3-156 through TS / B 3.3-158 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-159 and TS / B 3.3-160 1 Page TS / B 3.3-161 2 Page TS / B 3.3-162 1 Page TS / B 3.3-163 2 Page TS / B 3.3-164 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-165 through TS / B 3.3-167 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B LOES-4 Revision 117

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Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.3-168 and TS / B 3.3-169 1 Page TS / B 3.3-170 3 Page TS / B 3.3-171 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-172 through TS / B 3.3-177 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-178 and TS / B 3.3-179 2 Page TS / B 3.3-179a 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-179b and TS / B 3.3-179c 0 Page TS / B 3.3-180 1 Page TS / B 3.3-181 3 Page TS / B 3.3-182 1 Page TS / B 3.3-183 2 Page TS / B 3.3-184 1 Page TS / B 3.3-185 4 Page TS / B 3.3-186 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-187 and TS / B 3.3-188 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-189 through TS / B 3.3-191 1 Page TS / B 3.3-192 0 Page TS / B 3.3-193 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-194 and TS / B 3.3-195 0 Page TS I B 3.3-196 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-197 through TS / B 3.3-204 0 Page TS / B 3.3-205 1 Pages B 3.3-206 through B 3.3-209 0 Page TS / B 3.3-210 1 Pages B 3.3-211 through B 3.3-219 0 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES Pages B 3.4-1 and B 3.4-2 0 Pages TS / B 3.4-3 and Page TS / B 3.4-4 4 Page TS / B 3.4-5 3 Pages TS / B 3.4-6 through TS / B 3.4-9 2 Page TS / B 3.4-10 1 Pages TS / 3.4-11 and TS / B 3.4-12 0 Page TS / B 3.4-13 2 Page TS / B 3.4-14 1 Page TS / B 3.4-15 2 Pages TS / B 3.4-16 and TS / B 3.4-17 4 Page TS / B 3.4-18 2 Pages B 3.4-19 through B 3.4-27 0 Pages TS / B 3.4-28 and TS / B 3.4-29 1 Page TS / B 3.4-30 2 Page TS / B 3.4-31 1 Pages TS / B 3.4-32 and TS / B 3.4-33 2 Page TS / B 3.4-34 1 Page TS / B 3.4-34a 0 TSIBLOES-5 Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA -

UNIT I1 TS / B LOES-5 Revision 117

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Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.4-35 and TS / B 3.4-36 1 Page TS / B 3.4-37 2 Page TS / B 3.4-38 1 Pages B 3.4-39 and B 3.4-40 0 Page TS / B 3.4-41 2 Pages TS / B 3.4-42 through TS / B 3.4-45 0 Page TS / B 3.4-46 1 Pages TS B 3.4-47 and TS / B 3.4-48 0 Page TS / B 3.4-49 3 Page TS / B 3.4-50 1 Page TS / B 3.4-51 3 Page TS / B 3.4-52 2 Page TS / B 3.4-53 1 Pages TS / B 3.4-54 through TS / B 3.4-56 .2 Page TS / B 3.4-57 3 Pages TS / B 3.4-58 through TS / B 3.4-60 1 B 3.5 ECCS AND RCIC BASES Pages B 3.5-1 and B 3.5-2 0 Page TS / B 3.5-3 3 Page TS / B 3.5-4 1 Page TS / B 3.5-5 2 Page TS / B 3.5-6 1 Pages B 3.5-7 through B 3.5-10 0 Page TS / B 3.5-11 1 Page TS / B 3.5-12 0 Page TS / B 3.5-13 2 Pages TS / B 3.5-14 and TS / B 3.5-15 0 Page TS / B 3.5-16 1 Page TS / B 3.5-17 2 Page TS / B 3.5-18 1 Pages B 3.5-19 through B 3.5-24 0 Page TS / B 3.5-25 1 Page TS / B 3.5-26 and TS / B 3.5-27 2 Page TS / B 3.5-28 0 Page TS / B 3.5-29 1 Pages TS / B 3.5-30 and TS / B 3.5-31 0 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES Page TS / B 3.6-1 2 Page TS / B 3.6-1a 3 Page TS / B 3.6-2 4 Page TS / B 3.6-3 3 Page TS / B 3.6-4 4 Pages TS / B 3.6-5 and TS / B 3.6-6 3 Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT

- UNIT 1I TS B LOES-6 TS I/ B LOES-6 Revision 117

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Section Title Revision Page TS / B 3.6-6a 2 Page TS / B 3.6-6b 4 Page TS / B 3.6-6c 0 Page B 3.6-7 0 Page B 3.6-8 1 Pages B 3.6-9 through B 3.6-14 0 Page TS / B 3.6-15 3 Page TS / B 3.6-15a 0 Page TS / B 3.6-15b 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-16 and TS / B 3.6-17 2 Page TS / B 3.6-17a 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-18 and TS / B 3.6-19 0 Page TS / B 3.6-20 1 Page TS / B 3.6-21 2 Page TS / B 3.6-22 1 Page TS / B 3.6-22a 0 Page TS / B 3.6-23 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-24 and TS / B 3.6-25 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-26 and TS / B 3.6-27 2 Page TS / B 3.6-28 7 Page TS / B 3.6-29 2 Page TS / B 3.6-30 1 Page TS / B 3.6-31 3 Pages TS / B 3.6-32 and TS / B 3.6-33 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-34 and TS / B 3.6-35 0 Page TS / B 3.6-36 1 Page TS / B 3.6-37 0 Page TS / B 3.6-38 3 Page TS / B 3.6-39 2 Page TS / B 3.6-40 6 Page TS / B 3.6-40a 1 Page B 3.6-41 1 Pages B 3.6-42 and B 3.6-43 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-44 and TS / B 3.6-45 1 Page TS / B 3.6-46 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-47 through TS / B 3.6-51 1 Page TS / B 3.6-52 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-53 through TS / B 3.6-56 0 Page TS / B 3.6-57 1 Page TS / 3.6-58 2 Pages B 3.6-59 through B 3.6-63 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-64 and TS / B 3.6-65 1 Pages B 3.6-66 through B 3.6-69 0 TS I/ B Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 1 TS B LOES-7 LOES-7 Revision 117

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OFEFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.6-70 through TS / B 3.6-75 1 Pages B 3.6-76 and B 3.6-77 0 Page TS / B 3.6-78 1 Pages B 3.6-79 and B 3.3.6-80 0 Page TS / B 3.6-81 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-82 and TS / B 3.6-83 0 Page TS / B 3.6-84 4 Page TS / B 3.6-85 2 Page TS / B 3.6-86 4 Pages TS / B 3.6-87 through TS / B 3.6-88a 2 Page TS / B 3.6-89 6 Page TS / B 3.6-90 3 Page TS / B 3.6-90a 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-91 and TS / B 3.6-92 3 Page TS / B 3.6-93 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-94 through TS / B 3.6-96 1 Page TS / B 3.6-97 2 Page TS / B 3.6-98 1 Page TS / B 3.6-99 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-100 and TS / B 3.6-100a 6 Page TS / B 3.6-100b 4 Page TS / B 3.6-100c 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-101 and TS / B 3.6-102 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-103 and TS / B 3.6-104 2 Page TS / B 3.6-105 3 Page TS / B 3.6-106 2 Page TS / B 3.6-107 3 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES Pages TS / B 3.7-1 3 Page TS / B 3.7-2 4 Pages TS / B 3.7-3 through TS / B 3.7-5 3 Page TS / B 3.7-5a 1 Page TS / B 3.7-6 3 Page TS / B 3.7-6a 2 Page TS / B 3.7-6b 1 Page TS / B 3.7-6c 2 Page TS / B 3.7-7 3 Page TS / B 3.7-8 2 Pages TS / B 3.7-9 through TS / B 3.7-11 1 Pages TS / B 3.7-12 and TS / B 3.7-13 2 Pages TS / B 3.7-14 through TS / B 3.7-18 3 Page TS / B 3.7-18a 1 Pages TS / B 3.7-18b through TS I B 3.7-18e 0 LOES-8 I LOES-8

-UNITI/ BB Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1SUSQUEHANNA TS TS Revision 117

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Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.7-19 through TS I B 3.7-23 1 Page TS / B 3.7-24 1 Pages TS / B 3.7-25 and TS / B 3.7-26 0 Pages TS / B 3.7-27 through TS / B 3.7-29 5 Page TS / B 3.7-30 2 Page TS / B 3.7-31 1 Page TS / B 3.7-32 0 Page TS / B 3.7-33 1 Pages TS / B 3.7-34 through TS / B 3.7-37 0 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES Page TS / B 3.8-1 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-2 and TS / B 3.8-3 2 Page TS / B 3.8-4 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-4a and TS / B 3.8-4b 0 Page TS / B 3.8-5 5 Page TS I B 3.8-6 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-7 through TS/B 3.8-8 2 Page TS / B 3.8-9 4 Page TS / B 3.8-10 3 Pages TS/B 3.8-11 and TS/B 3.8-17 2 Page TS / B 3.8-18 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-19 through TS / B 3.8-21 2 Pages TS / B 3.8-22 and TS / B 3.8-23 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-24 through TS / B 3.8-30 2 Pages TS / B 3.8-31 and TS / B 3.8-32 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-33 through TS / B 3.8-37 2 Pages B 3.8-38 through B 3.8-44 0 Page TS / B 3.8-45 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-46 through TS / B 3.8-48 0 Pages TS / B 3.8-49 and TS / B 3.8-50 3 Page TS / B 3.8-51 1 Page TS / B 3.8-52 0 Page TS / B 3.8-53 1 Pages TS / B 3.8-54 through TS / B 3.8-57 2 Pages TS / B 3.8-58 through TS / B 3.8-61 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-62 and TS / B 3.8-63 5 Page TS / B 3.8-64 4 Page TS / B 3.8-65 5 Pages TS / B 3.8-66 through TS / B 3.8-77 1 Pages TS / B 3.8-77A through TS / B 3.8-77C 0 Pages B 3.8-78 through B 3.8-80 0 Page TS / B 3.8-81 1 Pages B 3.8-82 through B 3.8-90 0 TSIBLOES-9 Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA-UNITi SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B LOES-9 Revision 117

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Section Title Revision B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES Pages TS / B 3.9-1 and TS-/ B 3.9-1a 1 Pages TS / B 3.9-2 through TS / B 3.9-5 1 Pages TS / B 3.9-6 through TS / B 3.9-8 0 Pages B 3.9-9 through B 3.9-18 0 Pages TS / B 3.9-19 through TS / B 3.9-21 1 Pages B 3.9-22 through B 3.9-30 0 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASES Page TS / B 3.10-1 2 Pages TS / B 3.10-2 through TS / B 3.10-5 1 Pages B 3.10-6 through B 3.10-31 0 Page TS / B 3.10-32 2 Page B 3.10-33 0 Page TS / B 3.10-34 1 Pages B 3.10-35 and B 3.10-36 0 Page TS / B 3.10-37 1 Page TS / B 3.10-38 2 Revision 117 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 SUSQUEHANNA TS - B1LOES-lO

// B TSUNIT LOES-10 Revision 117

TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES) 132.0 SA FETY LIM ITS (SLs) ............................................................................ TS/B 2.0-1 E2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs ................................................................ TS/B2.0-1 B2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ........................... TS/B2.0-7 E3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY ........ TS/B3.0-1 B3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .................................................... B3.1-1 33.1.1 Shutdown Margin (SDM) ............................ B3.1-1 33.1.2 R eactivity Anom alies ...................................................................... B3.1-8 B3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY ............................................................ B3.1-13 13.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times ........................................................ TS/B3.1-22 B3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators ............................................ TS/B3.1-29 B3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control .................................................................. TS/B3.1-34 B3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System ...................................... TS/B3.1-39 B3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves .......... TS/B3.1-47 B3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS ................................................... TS/B3.2-1 133.2.1 Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) ........ TS/B3.2-1 83.2.2 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) ..................................... TS/B3.2-5 83.2.3 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) ....................................... TS/B3.2-10 B3.3 INSTRUMENTATION ..................................................................... TS/B3.3-1 B3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation ................... TS/13.3-1 B3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation ......................... TS/B3.3-35 B3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation ........................................... TS/B3.3-44 133.3.2.2 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrum entation ................................................................... TS/1B 3.3-55 B3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation .................... TS/B3.3-64 83.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System ............................................................. B3.3-76 B3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

Instru m entation ......................................................................... B 3.3-81 133.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Re.circulation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation .............................. TS/B133-92 13.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrum entation ................................................................... TS/B 3.3-1 01 83.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrum entation ......................................................................... B3.3-135 83.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ........................ TS/B3.3-147 B3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ................... TS/B3.3-180 B3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS)

System Instrumentation ...................................................... TS/B3.3-192 (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B TOC - 1 Revision 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

B3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation ....................................... TS/B3.3-205 B3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring ................................... B3.3-213 B3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ........................................... TS/B3.4-1 B3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating ................................................... TS/B3.4-1 B3.4.2 Jet P um ps ................................................................................ TS/B3.4-10 B3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs) .................................................... TS/B3.4-15 B3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE .......................................................... B3.4-19 B3.4.5 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ................................. B3.4-24 B3.4.6 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation .................................. TS/B3.4-30 B3.4.7 RCS Specific Activity ............................................................... TS/B3.4-35 B3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown ........................................................... B3.4-39 B3.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown ................................................... TS/B3.4-44 B3.4.10 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits ........................... TS/B3.4-49 B3.4.1 1 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure ................................................ TS/B3.4-58 B3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM .................................. B3.5-1 B3.5.1 ECCS - Operating ......................................................................... B3.5-1 B3.5.2 ECCS - Shutdown ......................................................................... B3.5-19 B3.5.3 RCIC System ........................................................................... TS/B3.5-25 B3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ........................................................... TS/B3.6-1 B3.6.1.1 Primary Containment ................................................................. TS/B3.6-1 B3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock ........................................................ B3.6-7 B3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ......................... TS/B3.6-15 B3.6.1.4 Containment Pressure .................................................................... B3.6-41 B3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ........................................................... TS/B3.6-44 B3.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ................ TS/B3.6-47 B3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature .................................. TS/B3.6-53 B3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level ....................................................... B3.6-59 B3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool C oo ling ..................................................................................... B3 .6-6 2 B3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray ................ B3.6-66 B3.6.3.1 Not Used ................................................................................. TS/B3.6-70 B3.6.3.2 Drywell Air Flow System ................................................................. B3.6-76 B3.6.3.3 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration ............................ TS/B3.6-81 B3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment ........................................................... TS/B3.6-84 B3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) .................... TS/B3.6-91 B3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System ................................... TS/B3.6-101 (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B TOC - 2 Revision 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

B3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ......................................................................... TS/B3.7-1 B3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ...................................... TS/B3.7-1 B3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System ................................ TS/B3.7-7 B3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System............................................................. TS/B3.7-12 B3.7.4 Control Room Floor Cooling System ........................................ TS/B3.7-19 B3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas ........................................................... TS/B3.7-24 B3.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System ................................................... TS/B3.7-27 B3.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ................... TS/B3.7-31 B3.7.8 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System .............................. TS/B3.7-34 B3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM ...................... TS/B3.8-1 B3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating .......................................................... TS/B3.8-1 B3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ................................................................ B3.8-38 B3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air ................................ TS/B3.8-45 B3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating .......................................................... TS/B3.8-54 B3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown .......................................................... TS/B3.8-66 B3.8.6 Battery Parameters .................................................................. TS/B3.8-71 B3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating ................................................... B3.8-78 B3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown ................................................... B3.8-86 B3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS .......................................................... TS/B3.9-1 B3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks ................................................ TS/B3.9-1 B3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock ..................................... TS/B3.9-5 B3.9.3 C ontrol Rod Position ...................................................................... B3.9-9 B3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication ...................................................... B3.9-12 B3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY- Refueling ......................................... B3.9-16 B3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level ........................... TS/B3.9-19 B3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level ........................ B3.9-22 B3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level ......................... B3.9-26 B3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS ............................................................... TS/B3.10-1 B3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation ............... TS/B3.10-1 B3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing ........................................... B3.10-6 B3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown ............................. B3.10-11 B3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown ........................... B3.10-16 B3.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling ................... B3.10-21 B3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling .................................. B3.10-26 B3.10.7 Control Rod Testing - Operating .................................................... B3.10-29 B3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test- Refueling ............................. B3.10-33 TSBI Text TOC 6/12/14 Revision 23 UNIT I1 TS / B TOO -3 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA -

TS / B TOC - 3 Revision 23

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

BASES BACKGROUND The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, including secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) to within limits. Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be, consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.

The OPERABILITY requirements for PCIVs help ensure that an adequate primary containment boundary is maintained, during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment.

Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that primary containment function assumed in the safety analyses will be maintained. For PCIVs, the primary containment isolation function is that the valve must be able to close (automatically or manually) and/or remain closed, and maintain leakage within that assumed in the DBA LOCA Dose Analysis. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. The OPERABILITY requirements for closed systems are discussed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system.

For each division of H20 2 Analyzers, the lines, up to and including the first normally closed valves within the H20 2 Analyzer panels, are extensions of primary containment (i.e., closed system), and are required to be leak rate tested in (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-15 Revision 3

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. The H 2 02 (continued) Analyzer closed system boundary is identified in the Leakage Rate Test Program. The closed system boundary consists of those components, piping, tubing, fittings, and valves, which meet the guidance of Reference 6. The closed system provides a secondary barrier in the event of a single failure of the PCIVs, as described below. The closed system boundary between PASS and the H20 2 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-12361, SV-12365, SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369). These solenoid operated isolation valves do not fully meet the guidance of Reference 6 for closed system boundary valves in that they are not powered from a Class 1 E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, operating these valves as closed system boundary valves is not risk significant. These valves also form the end of the Seismic Category I boundary between the systems. These process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves; are normally closed and are required to be leak rate tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program as part of the closed system for the H20 2 Analyzer system. These valves are "closed system boundary valves" and may be opened under administrative control, as delineated in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. Opening of these valves to permit testing of PASS in Modes 1, 2, and 3 is permitted in accordance with TRO 3.6.4.

Each H20 2 Analyzer Sampling line penetrating primary containment has two PCIVs, located just outside primary containment. While two PCIVs are provided on each line, a single active failure of a relay in the control circuitry for these valves, could result in both valves failing to close or failing to remain closed. Furthermore, a single failure (a hot short in the common raceway to all the valves) could simultaneously affect all of the PCIVs within a H20 2 Analyzer division. Therefore, the containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. For situations where one or both PCIVs. are inoperable, the ACTIONS to be taken are similar to the ACTIONS for a single PCIV backed by a closed system.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-15a Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND The drywell vent and purge lines are 24 inches in diameter; (continued) the suppression chamber vent and purge lines are 18 inches in diameter. The containment purge valves are normally maintained closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure the primary containment boundary is maintained. The outboard isolation valves have 2 inch bypass lines around them for use during normal reactor operation.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling return line containment penetrations

{X-13A(B)}are provided with a normally closed gate valve

{HV-151F015A(B)} and a normally open globe valve

{HV-151F017A(B)} outside containment and a testable check valve {HV-151F050A(B)} with a normally closed parallel air operated globe valve {HV-151F122A(B)} inside containment. The gate valve is manually opened and automatically isolates upon a containment isolation signal from the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System or RPV low level 3 when the RHR System is operated in the Shutdown Cooling Mode only. The LPCI subsystem is an operational mode of the RHR System and uses the same injection lines to the RPV as the Shutdown Cooling Mode.

The design of these containment penetrations is unique in that some valves are containment isolation valves while others perform the function of pressure isolation valves. In order to meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage testing requirements, the HV-1 51 F01 5A(B) and the closed system outside containment are the only barriers tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. Since these containment penetrations {X-13A and X-13B} include a containment isolation valve outside containment that is tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements and a closed system outside containment that meets the requirements of USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 (September 1975), paragraph 11.3.e, the containment isolation provisions for these penetrations provide an acceptable alternative to the explicit requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.

Containment penetrations X-13A(B) are also high/low pressure system interfaces. In order to meet the requirements to have two (2) isolation valves between the high pressure and low pressure systems, the HV-151F050A(B), HV-151F122A(B), and HV-1 51 F01 5A(B) valves are used to meet this requirement and are tested in accordance with the pressure test program.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-15b Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related SAFETY ANALYSES to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within primary containment are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) and secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs are minimized. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) for a MSLB outside primary containment is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis. The safety analyses assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation.

Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.

The DE3A analysis assumes that within the required isolation time leakage is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage rate, LK.

The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.

The primary containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3 except as permitted under Note 2 of SR 3.6.1.3.1. In this case, the single failure criterion remains applicable to the primary containment purge valve (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-16 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE due to failure in the control circuit associated with each SAFETYANALYSES valve. The primary containment purge valve design (continued) precludes a single failure from compromising the primary containment boundary as long as the system is operated in accordance with this LCO.

Both H 20 2 Analyzer PCIVs may not be able to close given a single failure in the control circuitry of the valves. The single failure* is caused by a "hot short' in the cables/raceway to the PCIVs that causes both PCIVs for a given penetration to remain open or to open when required to be closed. This failure is required to be considered in accordance with IEEE-279 as discussed in FSAR Section 7.3.2a. However, the single failure criterion for containment isolation of the H202 Analyzer penetrations is satisfied by virtue of the combination of the associated PCIVs and the closed system formed by the H20 2 Analyzer piping system as discussed in the BACKGROUND section above.

The closed system boundary between PASS and the H20 2 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-12361, SV-12365, SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369). The closed system is not fully qualified to the guidance of Reference 6 in that the closed system boundary valves between the H20 2 system and PASS are not powered from a Class I E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, the use of these valves is considered to have no risk significance. This exemption to the requirement of Reference 6 for the closed system boundary is documented in License Amendment No. 195.

PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 2)

LCO PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary, or in the case of SCBL valves limit leakage from the primary containment.

The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA.

The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1 and Table B 3.6.1.3-2.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-17 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES LCO (continued) The normally closed PCIVs, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, are considered OPERABLE Wien manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves are in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1.

Leak rate testing of the secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table 3.6.1.3-2 is permitted in Modes 1, 2 & 3 as described in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containment bypass valves, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.

This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-[ UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-17a Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABILITY OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are (continued) not required to be closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown. These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation."

(This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-18 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for main steam lines). The Completion'Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-19 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A. 1 and A.2 (continued)

Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H20 2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

B._1 With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de--activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note-indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H1-2 0 2 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.

C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-20 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 6. For conditions where the PCIV and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply. For the Excess Flow Check Valves (EFCV), the Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C. 1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs and the H20 2 Analyzer Penetration. Conditions A, B and D provide the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-21 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)

With one or more H20 2 Analyzer penetrations with one or both PCIVs inoperable, the inoperable valve(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected. by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action D.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the unique design of the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. The containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. In addition, the Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

When an H20 2 Analyzer penetration PCIV is to be closed and deactivated in accordance with Condition D, this must be accomplished by pulling the fuse for the power supply, and either deterrninating the power cables at the solenoid valve, or jumpering of the power side of the solenoid to ground.

The OPERABILITY requirements for the closed system are discussed in.Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4.

In the event that either one or both of the PCIVs and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-22 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)

Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to the H2Q2 Analyzer penetrations.

E. 1 With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met.

Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment function.

F. 1 In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed, except as controlled by SR 3.6.1.3.1 so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.

G.1 and G.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach'the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-22a Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued)

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended or valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge! valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is also modified by Note 1, stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves, or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the purge valves closing. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open. The SR is modified by Note 2 stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The vent and purge valves.are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-23 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.2.

SR 3.6.1.3.2 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind.flange that is located outside pnmary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for PCIVs outside primary containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the PCIVs are in the correct positions.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

SR 3.6.1.3.3 This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-24 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For PCIVs inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these PCIVs are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing. Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-25 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued)

,REQUIREMENTS full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.7. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the Final Safety Analyses Report. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.6 For primary containment purge valves with resilient seals, the Appendix J Leakage Rate Test Interval of 24 months is sufficient.

The acceptance criteria for these valves is defined in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, 5.5.12.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary containment purge! valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite radiological release is within limits.

At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are not required to meet any specific leakage criteria.

SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within regulatory limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-26 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that some of these Surveillances be performed only during a unit outage since isolation of penetrations could eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt the normal operation of some critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.9 This SR requires a demonstration that a representative sample of reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves (EFCV) are OPERABLE by verifying that the valve actuates to check flow on a simulated instrument line break. As defined in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.5 (Reference 4), the conditions under which an EFCV will isolate, simulated instrument line break, are at flow rates, which develop a differential pressure of between 3 psid and 10 psid.

This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform its design function to check flow. No specific valve leakage limits are specified because no specific leakage limits are defined in the FSAR. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform some of these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The representative sample consists of an approximate equal number of EFCVs such that each EFCV is tested at least once every 10 years (nominal). The nominal 10 year interval is based on other performance-based testing programs, such as Inservice Testing (snubbers) and Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. In addition, the EFCVs in the sample are representative of the various plant configurations, models, sizes and operating environments. This ensures that any potential common problems with a specific type or application of EFCV is detected at the earliest possible time. EFCV failures will be evaluated to determine if additional testing in that test interval is warranted to ensure overall reliability and that failures to isolate are very infrequent. Therefore, testing of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint (Reference 7).

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-27 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

SR 3.6.1.3.11 This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations of Reference 4 are met. The secondary containment leakage pathways and Frequency are defined by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria.

A note is added to this SR, which states that these valves are only required to meet this leakage limit in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the other MODES, the Reactor Coolant System is not pressurized and specific primary containment leakage limits are not required.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be < 100 scfh for any one MSIV and < 300 scfh for total leakage through the MSIVs combined With the Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valve, HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valve and the RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valve. The MSIVs can be tested at either > Pt (24.3 psig) or P, (48.6 psig). Main Steam Line Drain Isolation, HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves, are tested at P, (48.6 psig). A note is added to this SR, which states that these valves are only required to meet this leakage limit in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

In the other conditions, the Reactor Coolant System is not pressurized and specific primary containment leakage limits are not required. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-28 Revision 7

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.13 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the calculation assumptions of Reference 2 are met. The acceptance criteria for the combined leakage of all hydrostatically tested lines is 3.3 gpm when tested at 1.1 Pa, (53.46 psig). The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test Frequency required by the Primary Containment Leakage Testing Program.

As noted in Table B 3.6.1.3-1, PCIVs associated with this SR are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber. These valves are tested in accordance with the IST Program. Therefore, these valves leakage is not included as containment leakage.

This SR has been modified by a Note that states that these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required. In some instances, the valves are required to be capable of automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. However, specific leakage limits are not applicable in these other MODES or conditions.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 15.

2. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
4. FSAR, Section 6.2.
5. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,"

March 1988.

6. Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, Rev. 1, September 1975
7. NEDO-32977-A, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation," June 2000.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-29 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 1 of 11)

Isolation Signal Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve LC MaximUm Isolation (M3.im.6FsuctiondNo.

_______________________________________________________ ______________ Time_(Seconds))

Containment 1-57-193 (d) ILRT Manual N/A ktmospheric 1-57-194 (d) ILRT Manual N/A Control HV-15703 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15704 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15705 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15711 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15713 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15714 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15721 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15722 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15723 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15724 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15725 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)

HV-15766 (a) Suppression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (30)

HV-15768 (a) Suppression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (30)

SV-157100 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157100 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-1 57101 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157101 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157102 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157102 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-1 57103 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157103 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157104 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157105 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157106 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157107 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Syst SV-157,34 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15734 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15736 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15736 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d ISV-15737 Nitrogen Makeup I Automatic Valve I 2.b, 2.d, 2.e SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-30 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 2 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Containment SV-1 5738 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e Atmospheric SV-1 5740 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Control SV-15740 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (continued) SV-15742 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-1 5742 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15750 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15750 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15752 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15752 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-1 5767 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e SV-1 5774 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15774 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15776 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-1 5776 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15780 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-15780 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-1 5782 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-1 5782 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-1 5789 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e Containment 1-26-072 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check N/A Instrument Gas 1-26-074 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check N/A 1-26-152 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check N/A 1-26-154 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check N/A 1-26-164 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check N/A HV-12603 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (20)

SV-1 2605 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d SV-12651 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d SV-1 2654 A Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated N/A SV-1 2654 B Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated N/A SV-12661 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-1 2671 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Core Spray HV-1 52F001 A (b)(c) CS Suction Valve Power Operated N/A HV-152F001 B (b)(c) CS Suction Valve Power Operated N/A HV-152F005 A CS Injection Power Operated N/A HV-152F005 B CS Injection Valve Power Operated N/A HV-152F006 A CS Injection Valve Air Operated Check N/A Valve HV-152F006 B CS Injection Valve Air Operated Check N/A Valve HV-152F01 5 A (b)(c) CS Test Valve Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (80)

HV-1 52F01 5 B (b)(c) CS Test Valve Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (80)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-31 Revision 3

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 3 of 11)

Isolation Signal Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Core Spray HV-152F031 A (b)(c) CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated N/A (continued) HV-152F031 B (b)(c) CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated N/A HV-152F037 A CS Injection Power Operated N/A (Air)

HV-152F037 B CS Injection Power Operated N/A (Air)

XV-152F01 BA Core Spray Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-152F018 B Core Spray Excess Flow Check N/A Valve HPCI 1-55-038 (d) HPCI Injection Valve Manual N/A 155F046 (b)(c)(d) HPCI Minimum Flow Check Valve Manual Check N/A 155F049 (a)(d) HPCI Turbine Exhaust Valve Manual Check N/A HV-155F002 HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (50)

HV-155F003 HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (50)

HV-155F006 HPCI Injection Valve Power Operated N/A HV-155F012 (b)(c) HPCI Minimum Flow Valve Power Operated N/A HV-155F042 (b)(c) HPCI Suction Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (115)

HV-155F066 (a) HPCI Turbine Exhaust Valve Power Operated N/A HV-155F075 HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Automatic Valve 3.b, 3.d (15)

Valve HV-155F079 HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Automatic Valve 3.b, 3.d (15)

Valve HV-155F100 HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c,. 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (6)

XV-155F024 A HPCI Valve Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-155F024 B HPCI Valve Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-155F024 C HPCI Valve Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-155F024 D HPCI Valve Excess Flow Check N/A Valve Liquid Radwaste HV-16108 Al Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

Collection HV-16108 A2 Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-16116 Al Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-16116 A2 Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

Demin Water 1-41-017 (d) Dernineralized Water Manual N/A 1-41-018 (d) Dernineralized Water Manual N/A Nuclear Boiler 141 F010 A (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A 141 F010 B (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-32 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 4 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Nuclear Boiler 141 F039 A (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A (continued) 141 F039 B (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A 141818 A (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A 141818 B (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check N/A HV-141 F016 MSL Drain Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (10)

HV-141 FO19 MSL Drain Isolation Valve Automatic Valve 1.a, 1ib, 1.c, 1.d, i.e (15)

HV-141F022 A MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, i.e (5)

HV-141F022 B MSIV Automatic Valve l.a, 1b, 1.c, i.d, i.e (5)

HV-141 F022 C MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, i.d, 1.e

.(5)

HV-141 F022 D MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, i.e (5)

HV-141F028 A MSIV Automatic Valve l.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, i.e (5)

HV-141 F028 B MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141 F028 C MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, i.c, 1.d, i.e (5)

HV-141 F028 D MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)

HV-141 F032 A Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated N/A Check HV-141 F032 B Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated N/A Check KV-141F009 Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-141F070 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-141 F070 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve

)'V-141 F070 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-141 F070 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve X'V-141 F071 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-141 F071 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve K'V-141 F071 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-141 F071 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-33 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 5 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Nuclear Boiler XV-1 41 F072 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A (continued) Valve XV-1 41 F072 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141 F072 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141 F072 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 41 F073 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141 F073 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141 F073 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-141 F073 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check N/A Valve Nuclear Boiler XV-14201 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Vessel Valve Instrumentation XV-1 4202 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F041 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F043 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 42F043 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F045 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F045 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 42F047 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F047 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F051 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F051 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F051 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142FO51 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F053 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F053 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-34 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 6 of 11)

Isolation Signal Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Nuclear Boiler XV-142F053 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Vessel Valve Instrumentation XV-142F053 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A (continued) Valve XV-142F055 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F057 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 42F059 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Eicess Flow Check N/A.

Valve XV-142F059 E Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 F Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 G Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 H Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 L Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 M Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 N Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 P Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 R Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 S Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 T Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-142F059 U Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve K(V-1 42F061 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check N/A Valve RBCCW HV-11313 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

HV-11314 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

HV-1 1345 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

HV-1 1346 RBCCW J Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-35 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 7 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

RCIC 1-49-020 (d) RCIC INJECTION Manual N/A 149F021 (b)(c)(d) RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Manual Check N/A 149F028 (a)(d) RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Manual Check N/A 149F040 (a)(d) RCIC Turbine Exhaust Manual Check N/A FV-149F019 (b)(c) RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated N/A HV-149F007 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (20)

HV-149F008 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (20)

HV-149F013 RC:IC Injection Power Operated N/A HV-149F031 .(b)(c) RCIC Suction Power Operated N/A HV-149FO59 (a) RCIC Turbine Exhaust Power Operated N/A HV-149F060 (a) RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Power Operated NIA HV-149F062 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 4.b, 4.d (10)

HV-149F084 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 4.b, 4.d (10)

HV-149F088 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (12)

XV-149F044 A RCIC Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-149F044 B RCIC Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-149F044 C RCIC Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-149FO44 D RCIC Excess Flow Check NIA Valve RB Chilled HV-18781 Al RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

Water System HV-18781 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

HV-18781 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

HV-18781 82 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)

HV-18782 Al RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18782 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18782 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18782 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12)

HV-18791 Al RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18791 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18791 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18791 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)

HV-18792 Al RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

HV-1 8792 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

HV-18792 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

HV-18792 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8)

Reactor 143F013 A (d) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check N/A Recirculation 143F013 B (d) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check N/A SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-36 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 8 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve NValve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Reactor IXV-143F003 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Recirculation Valve (continued) KV-143FOO3 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-143FOO4 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-143FOO4 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve X'V-143FOO9 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F009 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-143FOO9 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve

'V-143FO09 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F010 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F010 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F010 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F010 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 43F01 1 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F01 1 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F01 1 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F011 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 43F01 2 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F012 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A

_Valve XV-143F012 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F012 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve KV-143F017 A Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F017 B Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow Check N/A IValve KV-143F040 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-37 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 9 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO.3.3.6.1 Function No.

Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Ma3imum stion Plant System (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Reactor XV-143F040 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Recirculation Valve (continued) XV-143F040 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F040 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F057 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-143F057 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check N/A Valve HV-143F019 Reactor Coolant Sample Automatic Valve 2.b (9)

HV-143F020 Reactor Coolant Sample Automatic Valve 2.b (2)

Residual Heat HV-151 F004 A (b)(c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A Removal HV-151 F004 B (b)(c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A HV-151 F004 C (b)(c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A HV-1 51 F004 D (b)(c) RH R - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A HV-151 F007 A (b)(c) RHR-Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated N/A HV-151 F007 B (b)(c) RHR-Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated N/A HV-151 F008 RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction Automatic Valve 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52)

HV-151 F009 RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction Automatic Valve 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52)

HV-151 F01I A (b)(d) RHR-Suppression Pool Manual N/A Cooling/Spray HV-151 F01I B (b)(d) RHR-Suppression Pool Manual N/A Cooling/Spray HV-151 F015 A (f) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection HV-151 F015 B (f) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection HV-151F016 A (b) RHR - Drywell Spray Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

HV-151 F016 B (b) RHR - Drywell Spray Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

HV-151 F022 RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve 2.d, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (30)

HV-151 F023 RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve 2.d, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (20)

HV-151 F028 A (b) RHR - Suppression Pool Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

Cooling/Spray HV-151 F028 B (b) RHR - Suppression Pool Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90)

Cooling/Spray HV-151 F050 A (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Air Operated Check N/A Retum/LPCI Injection Valve Valve HV-151 F050 B (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Air Operated Check N/A Retum/LPCI Injection Valve Valve HV-151 F103 A (b) RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated N/A HV-1 51 F1 03 B (b) RH R Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated N/A SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-38 Revision 3

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 10 of 11)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Residual Heat HV-151 F122 A (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Removal Return/LPCI Injection Valve (Air)

(continued) HV-151 F122 B (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection Valve (Air)

PSV-1 5106 A (b)(d) RH R - Relief Valve Discharge Relief Valve N/A PSV-1 5106 B (b)(d) RHR - Relief Valve Discharge Relief Valve N/A PSV-151F126 (d) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction Relief Valve N/A XV-15109 A RHR Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-15109 B RHR Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 5109 C RHIR Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-1 5109 D RI-R Excess Flow Check N/A Valve RWCU HV-144FO01 (a) RVWCU Suction Automatic Valve 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.f, 5.g (30)

HV-144FO04 (a) RWCU Suction Automatic Valve 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5. e, 5.f, 5.g (30)

XV-14411 A RWCU Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-14411 B RVVCU Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-14411 C RWCU Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-14411 D RWCU Excess Flow Check N/A Valve XV-144F046 RWCU Excess Flow Check N/A Valve HV-14182 A RWCU Return Isolation Valve Power Operated N/A HV-14182 B RWCU Return Isolation Valve Power Operated N/A SLCS 148F007 (a)(d) SLCS Manual Check N/A HV-148F006 (a) SLCS Power Operated N/A Check Valve TIP System C51-J004 A (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves N/A Valve)

C51-J004 B (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves N/A Valve)

C51-J004 C (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves N/A Valve)

C51-J004 D (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves N/A Valve)

C51-J004 E (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves N/A Valve)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-39 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 11 of 11)

Isolation Signal Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

TIP System C51-J004 A (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

(continued) Valve)

C51-J004 B (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

C51-J004 C (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

C51-JO04 D (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

C51-J004 E (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)

Valve)

(a) Isolation barrier remains water filled or a water seal remains in the line post-LOCA, isolation valve is tested with water. Isolation valve leakage is not included in 0.60 La total Type B and C tests.

(b) Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program. This footnote does not apply to valve 155F046 (HPCI) when the associated PCIV, HV155F012 is closed and deactivated. Similarly, this footnote does not apply to valve 149F021 (RCIC) when it's associated PCIV, FV149F019 is closed and deactivated.

(c) Containment Isolation Valves are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber. Refer to the IST Program.

(d) LCO 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation," Table 3.3.3.1-1, Function 6, does not apply since these are relief valves, check valves, manual valves or deactivated and closed.

(e) The containment isolation barriers for the penetration associated with this valve consists of two PCIVs and a closed system. The closed system provides a redundant isolation boundary for both PCIVs, and its integrity is required to be verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.

(f) Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.

(g) These valves are not required to be 10 CFR 50, Appendix J tested since the HV-151 F015A(B) valves and a closed system form the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J boundary. These valves form a high/low pressure interface and are pressure tested in accordance with the pressure test program.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-40 Revision 6

PPL Rev. 11 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-2 Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage Isolation Valves (Not PCIVs)

(Page 1 of 1)

Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.

Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))

Residual Heat HV-151F040 RHR - RADWASTE LINE lB ISO Automatic Valve 2.a, 2.d (45)

Removal VLV HV-151 F049 RHR - RADWASTE LINE OB ISO Automatic Valve 2.a, 2.d (20)

VLV 1-51-136 RHR - COND TRANSFER OB SCBL Check Valve N/A CHECK VALVE 1-51-137 RHR - COND TRANSFER lB SCBL Check Valve N/A CHECK VALVE SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.6-40a Revision 1

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