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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML112660544
| number = ML113540744
| issue date = 09/23/2011
| issue date = 12/20/2011
| title = IR 05000302-11-501, on June 27, 2011, through August 4, 2011, Crystal River Unit 3 - NRC Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report, Preliminary White Finding
| title = Final Significance Determination of a White Finding, Notice of Violation, and Assessment Follow-up Letter (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302-11-501)
| author name = Munday J T
| author name = Mccree V
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/ORA
| addressee name = Franke J A
| addressee name = Franke J
| addressee affiliation = Florida Power Corp, Progress Energy Florida, Inc
| addressee affiliation = Progress Energy Florida, Inc
| docket = 05000302
| docket = 05000302
| license number = DPR-072
| license number = DPR-072
Line 12: Line 12:
| case reference number = EA-11-208
| case reference number = EA-11-208
| document report number = IR-11-501
| document report number = IR-11-501
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| document type = Notice of Violation, Letter
| page count = 16
| page count = 9
}}
}}


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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES ecember 20, 2011
[[Issue date::September 23, 2011]]


EA-11-208 Mr. Jon Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B) 15760 W. Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708
==SUBJECT:==
 
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000302/2011501)
SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION REPORT 05000302/2011501; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING


==Dear Mr. Franke:==
==Dear Mr. Franke:==
On August 4, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Emergency Preparedness inspection at your Crystal River Unit 3. The inspection included on-site inspection on June 27, 2011, through July 1, 2011, and periodic in-office inspection through August 4, 2011. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 4, 2011, and September 14, 2011, with you and other members of your staff.
This letter provides you the final significance determination of the preliminary White finding discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2011501, dated September 23, 2011. The finding involved a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Specifically on June 27, 2011, you identified that Crystal River Unit 3 emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) 1.4 (General Emergency - Gaseous Effluents) contained instrument classification threshold values that were beyond the specified effluent radiation monitors capability to accurately indicate.
 
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
 
This report documents a licensee-identified finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance. As described in Section 1EP4 of this report, a finding was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Specifically on June 27, 2011, you identified that Crystal River Unit 3's emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) 1.4 (General Emergency - Gaseous Effluents) contained instrument classification threshold values that were beyond the specified effluent radiation monitors' capabilities to accurately indicate. The inability to classify a general emergency using these instruments is an apparent violation of the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) associated with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). This finding was assessed based on the best information available, using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP).
 
In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, we intend to complete our evaluation using the best available information and issue our final determination of safety significance within 90 days of the date of this letter. The Significance Determination Process encourages an open dialogue between NRC and licensee staff, however, the dialogue should not impact the timeliness of the NRC's final determination. Before we make a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to: (1) present your perspectives on the facts and assumptions used by the NRC to arrive at the findings and their significance at a regulatory conference; or (2) submit your position on the findings to the NRC in writing. If you request a regulatory conference, it should be held within approximately 30 days of the receipt of this letter, and we FPC 2 encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a regulatory conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press release to announce the conference. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of the receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a regulatory conference or submit a written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final Significance Determination Process conclusion, in that by not doing either, you fail to meet the appeal requirements stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation sections of Attachment 2 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.
 
Please contact Mr. Brian Bonser at (404) 997-4653 within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision and you will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter. Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no notice of violation is being issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
Sincerely,/ RA / H. Christensen for J. Munday Joel Munday, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000302/2011501
 
===w/Attachment:===
Supplemental Information cc w/encl.: (See page 3)
FPC 2 encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a regulatory conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press release to announce the conference. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of the receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a regulatory conference or submit a written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final Significance Determination Process conclusion, in that by not doing either, you fail to meet the appeal requirements stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation sections of Attachment 2 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.
 
Please contact Mr. Brian Bonser at (404) 997-4653 within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision and you will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
 
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no notice of violation is being issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
Sincerely,/RA/ H. Christensen for J. Munday Joel Munday, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000302/2011501
 
===w/Attachment:===
Supplemental Information cc w/encl.: (See page 3)
Distribution w/encl: C. Evans, RII EICS (Part 72 Only)
L. Douglas, RII EICS (Linda Douglas) S. Sparks, RII S. Coken, NSIR L. Casey, OE OE Mail (email address if applicable)
RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMCrystal River Resource *See previous concurrence page X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVE ADAMS: X Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: ML112660544 X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE X FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII: DRS/PSB1 RII: DRS/PSB1 RII: DRP/BR3 RII: EICS RII: DRS SIGNATURE RA RA RA RA RA/HC For JM NAME M. SPECK B. BONSER D. RICH S. SPARKS J. MUNDAY DATE 09/20/2011 09/20/2011 09/20/2011 09/22/2011 09/23/2011 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRSII\PSB1\EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS\CRYSTAL RIVER\CR3 2011-501 REPORT SEPT 15 2011 REV1.DOC FPC 3 cc w/encl: Kelvin Henderson General Manager Nuclear Fleet Operations Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Brian C. McCabe Manager, Nuclear Oversight Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Terry D. Hobbs (Acting) Plant General Manager Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Electronic Mail Distribution Stephen J. Cahill Director - Engineering Nuclear Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Electronic Mail Distribution R. Alexander Glenn General Counsel Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Jeffrey R. Swartz Director Site Operations Crystal River Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Donna B. Alexander Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (interim) Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Thomas Sapporito Consulting Associate (Public Correspondence Only) Post Office Box 8413 Jupiter, FL 33468 William A. Passetti Chief Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Department of Health Electronic Mail Distribution Daniel R. Westcott Supervisor Licensing & Regulatory Programs Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B) Electronic Mail Distribution Joseph W. Donahue Vice President Nuclear Oversight Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Jack E. Huegel Manager, Nuclear Oversight Crystal River Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution David T. Conley Senior Counsel Legal Department Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Mark Rigsby Manager, Support Services - Nuclear Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Electronic Mail Distribution Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant U.S. NRC 6745 N Tallahassee Rd Crystal River, FL 34428 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Bryan Koon Director Florida Division of Emergency Management Electronic Mail Distribution Chairman Board of County Commissioners Citrus County 110 N. Apopka Avenue Inverness, FL 36250 Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos.: 05000302
 
License Nos.: DPR-72
 
Report No.: 05000302/2011501
 
Licensee: Progress Energy (Florida Power Corporation)
 
Facility: Crystal River Unit 3
 
Location: Crystal River, FL
 
Dates: June 27, 2011, through August 4, 2011
 
Inspectors: M. Speck, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector
 
Approved by: B. Bonser, Chief Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
 
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000302/2011501; 06/27/2011 - 08/04/2011; Crystal River Unit 3; Baseline Inspection. The report covered an announced inspection by a regional emergency preparedness inspector and additional in-office inspection. One Apparent Violation (AV) item with potential White safety significance was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."
 
===A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
None 
 
===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
 
===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness===
* TBD. An AV was identified for failure to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which use a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the licensee's emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) 1.4, General Emergency - Gaseous Effluent, specified instrument values that were beyond the limits of the effluent radiation monitors capabilities to accurately measure. This finding was considered more than minor because the licensee is required to be capable of implementing adequate measures to protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency. Regulations require a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases which include facility system and effluent parameters, in use by the licensee and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by the licensee for determination of minimum initial offsite response measures. As a result of having General Emergency EAL threshold values that were beyond the range of the associated effluent radiation monitors, Crystal River Unit 3 personnel may not have been able to perform timely and accurate classification of an emergency based upon an effluent radioactive material release. Emergency response actions directed by the State and local emergency response plans, which rely on information provided by the licensee, could have potentially been delayed. The cause of the finding is related to the human performance cross-cutting element of Decision-making (H.1(a)) for ensuring that risk-significant decisions are made using a systematic process and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews.  (Section 1EP4)
 
=REPORT DETAILS=
 
==REACTOR SAFETY==
 
===Cornerstone:===
Emergency Preparedness  1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector evaluated the adequacy of licensee's methods for testing the Alert and Notification System (ANS) in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, "Alert and Notification System Evaluation". The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5), and its related requirements, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D, were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, was also used as a reference.
 
The inspector reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ANS on a biennial basis.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
1EP3 Emergency Preparedness Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Emergency Response Organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions.
 
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 03, "Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System."  The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related requirements, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
 
The inspector reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis.
 
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
 
1EP4  Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, revision 30 of the Emergency Plan was implemented. The licensee determined that in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes resulted in no decrease in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspector conducted a review of the Emergency Action Level changes and a sampling of the implementing procedure changes made between October 1, 2010, and June 30, 2011, to evaluate for potential decreases in effectiveness of the Plan. However, this review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 04, "Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes."  The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and its related requirements, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
 
The inspector reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.


====b. Findings====
At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on November 7, 2011, to discuss your views on this issue. During the meeting your staff described your assessment of the significance of the finding, and the corrective actions taken to resolve it, including the root cause evaluation of the finding. Your root cause analysis found that establishment of the inappropriate radiation monitor threshold value was due to insufficient procedural guidance for the EAL change process. Contributing causes were found to be failures to validate assumptions and to conduct adequate reviews. Finally, you presented your assessment of the risk associated with this finding and determined it to be Green based on the availability of other means to evaluate gaseous effluent releases and fission-product barrier EALs to declare a timely and accurate General Emergency. You stated that the Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process result should be Green since even with the improper radiation monitor threshold value, the risk-significant planning standard function was not degraded.


=====Introduction:=====
You presented corrective actions related to the effluent radiation monitor threshold value for declaring a General Emergency and the emergency plan change process. The improper EAL threshold value was corrected promptly and you reviewed emergency plan related instruments and equipment to verify they were capable of performing their intended functions, and implemented changes to the emergency plan change review and implementation processes.
An apparent violation (AV) of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) was identified for the failure to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which use a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the licensee's emergency plan General Emergency action level (EAL) 1.4 -Gaseous Effluent - specified mid-range effluent radiation monitor threshold values that were beyond the instruments' indicated ranges. This finding has been preliminarily evaluated as having low to moderate (White) safety significance.  


=====Description:=====
PROGRESS ENERGY  2 A summary of the Regulatory Conference (Accession no. ML11314A255) is available electronically for public inspection from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS), and is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
On June 27, 2011, Crystal River 3 determined that General Emergency EAL 1.4, Gaseous Effluent incorporated classification threshold values of 1700 mrem/hr as read on the mid-range RM-A1 (Auxiliary building), or RM-A2 (Reactor building) radiation monitors, which were greater than the maximum available indication of the instrument (1000 mrem/hr). Licensee immediate actions were to document the issue in their CAP, change the EAL threshold to the previously used value of 1000 mrem/hr, and inform Operations staff and emergency response organization members of the issue and threshold value changes. Further research by the licensee, using a cross-discipline analysis, determined that the instrument was unusable for accurate effluent monitoring and dose assessment for values greater than approximately 2/3 of full-scale (i.e. 600-700 mrem/hr). This condition appears to have been in existence to some extent since the EAL threshold was established in 1999. There have been at least two revisions to the threshold values, including one as recent as June 2010, which provided the licensee opportunities to identify the discrepant thresholds. The last revision established some of the threshold values above the radiation monitors' maximum indicated value. The licensee has since changed the EAL criteria to a different effluent radiation monitor. These discrepant threshold values degraded the licensee's ability to make timely and accurate General Emergency classifications based on gaseous effluent parameters, in that decision-makers would have to rely on other means to classify the event (dose assessments or field monitoring data). The monitors' inaccuracy would also inhibit the licensee's ability to determine the magnitude and to continually assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials. The cause of the finding is related to the human performance cross-cutting element of Decision-making (H.1(a)) for ensuring that risk-significant decisions are made using a systematic process and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews.


=====Analysis:=====
After considering the information developed during the inspection, the information you provided at the regulatory conference, and the additional information you provided following the regulatory conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as White.
The inspector concluded that the failure to maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the regulations and standards, and have a standardized EAL scheme in use based on facility system and effluent parameters for several years prior to June 2011, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of Emergency Response Organization Performance. It impacted the cornerstone objective because it was associated with a program element not meeting 50.47(b) planning standards to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the licensee's ability to declare a General Emergency based on effluent radiation monitor values was degraded. The finding was assessed for significance in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, using the Phase I SDP worksheets for emergency preparedness. It was determined that Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process should be used to provide a deterministic SDP result. This finding was evaluated in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, and is preliminarily determined to be a finding of low to moderate safety significance (White) because there was a degraded risk-significant planning standard function.


Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B states, "FAILURE TO COMPLY means that a program is noncompliant with a REGULATORY REQUIREMENT."  The inspector determined the licensee was noncompliant with 10 CFR 50.54(q), 50.47(b)(4), and App. E, section IV.B in that the Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent Emergency Action Level contained General Emergency classification threshold values for the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building effluent radiation monitors, which were greater than what the monitor could accurately read. This would require use of other means to determine whether a General Emergency threshold had been exceeded (dose assessment or actual field readings) which could delay the declaration. It also appears that the inability to use the specified mid-range effluent radiation monitors conflicts with the requirements in Appendix E, which include EALs to be based on "in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring."  Since the licensee retained the ability to perform procedurally-driven dose assessments and field surveys, the inspector determined that the inability of the licensee to have all specified means of evaluating whether a General Emergency EAL threshold was exceeded constituted a degraded rather than a failed risk-significant planning standard (RSPS). Using Sheet 1, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process - Failure To Comply" flow chart, a White significance resulted from a degraded, risk-significant planning standard.  
The NRC acknowledges your evaluation of root and contributing causes and agrees that it is likely the fission product barrier degradation EALs would be used to declare a General Emergency prior to meeting the entry conditions for the Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent EALs. The radiological effluent EALs provide classification thresholds for unplanned and/or uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the environment. The basis for the radiological effluent EALs, as described in NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, and endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning And Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors, identifies that they were included to provide diversity and to provide a basis for classifying events that cannot be readily classified on plant conditions alone.


=====Enforcement:=====
NUMARC/NESP-007 emphasizes the need for accurate assessment and classification of events. While primary emphasis is intended to be placed on plant conditions in classifying emergency events the inclusion of both categories of EALs in the overall emergency classification scheme more fully addresses the potential event spectrum and compensates for potential deficiencies in either category. This is important in characterizing the significance of this issue and identifying that the fission product barrier degradation EALs are not a substitute for the radiological effluent EALs and were never intended to perform that function. As such, credit for using a plant condition EAL to declare a General Emergency, in the absence of a radiological effluent EAL, cannot be given when making a significance determination for the violation. Only those EALs in the Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent category may be considered. In this case, the radiological effluent General Emergency EAL is considered degraded because EAL 1.4 (General Emergency - Gaseous Effluents) contained instrument classification threshold values that were beyond the specified effluent radiation monitors capability to accurately indicate. While the dose assessment and field monitoring in EAL 1.4 provide redundancy, evaluation using either of these two methods would delay the event declaration. As such, this finding is assessed as a White Finding because there was a degraded risk-significant planning standard function.
10 CFR Part 50.54(q), requires that a holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part, shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and the requirements in appendix E of this part. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), requires a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility and system effluent parameters is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response calls for reliance on information by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., Assessment Actions, requires that means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continuously assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. Contrary to the above, for several years prior to June 2011, the licensee failed to maintain in effect, a standard emergency classification scheme which included facility effluent parameters. Specifically, the General Emergency classification 1.4 specified effluent radiation monitors' (RM-A1 and RM-A2) values greater than that which the instruments could accurately measure. Those monitors were being relied upon to determine the magnitude and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials, as well as providing criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies. Pending final determination of safety significance, this finding was identified as an apparent violation (AV) 05000302/2011501-01, Failure to Maintain a Standard Emergency Action Level Scheme.


1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs determination of significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in the IMC 0609, Attachment 2. An appeal must be sent in writing to the Regional Administrator, Region II, 245 Peachtree Center Avenue, NE, Suite 1200, Atlanta, GA 30303-1257.


====a. Inspection Scope====
The NRC also determined that a violation occurred involving the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), in that for several years prior to June 2011, you failed to maintain in effect, a standard emergency classification scheme which included facility effluent parameters, as cited in the attached Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation were
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues and to determine if repeat problems were occurring. The facility's self-assessments and audits were reviewed to assess the licensee's ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. In addition, the inspector reviewed licensee self-assessments and audits to assess the completeness and effectiveness of all emergency preparedness related corrective actions.


The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 05, "Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses". The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria.
PROGRESS ENERGY  3 described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered an escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.


The inspector reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the correction of emergency preparedness weaknesses on a biennial basis.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRCs review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.


====b. Findings====
For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as NRC Inspection Report No.
No findings were identified.


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
05000302/2011501. Accordingly, AV 05000302/2011501-01 is updated consistent with the regulatory positions described in this letter. Therefore, AV 05000302/2011501-01, Failure to Maintain a Standard Emergency Action Level Scheme , is updated as VIO 05000302/2011501-01 with a safety significance of White, and a human performance cross-cutting element of Decision-making (H.1(a)) for ensuring that risk-significant decisions are made using a systematic process and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews.
{{a|4OA1}}
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification==


====a. Inspection Scope====
The NRC determined the performance at Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3 to be in the Regulatory Response Column of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix beginning the third quarter of 2011. Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to provide assurance that the root causes and contributing causes of risk-significant performance issues are understood, that the extent of cause is identified and that your corrective action for risk-significant performance issues are sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. The NRC requests that your staff provide notification of your readiness for the NRC to conduct a supplemental inspection to review the actions taken to address the White inspection finding.
The inspector sampled licensee submittals relative to the Performance Indicators (PIs) listed below for the period July 1, 2010, through March 31, 2011. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, was used to confirm the reporting basis for each data element.


Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected, and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/enforcement/actions.
* Emergency Response Organization Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
* Emergency Response Organization Readiness (ERO)
* Alert and Notification System Reliability (ANS)  The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC IP 71151, "Performance Indicator Verification."  For the specified review period, the inspector examined data reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspector verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records. The inspector reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The inspector verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability through review of a sample of the licensee's records of periodic system tests. The inspector also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting and evaluating the PI data. Licensee procedures, records, and other documents reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment to this report.


This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample each for the Drill/Exercise Performance, ERO Drill Participation, and Alert and Notification System as defined in IP 71151-05.
PROGRESS ENERGY  4 Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Brian Bonser at (404) 997-4653.


====b. Findings====
Sincerely,
No findings were identified.
/RA/
{{a|4OA6}}
Victor M. McCree Regional Administrator Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Enclosure:
==4OA6 Meetings, including Exit==
Notice of Violation cc w/encl.: (See page 5)
On July 1, 2011, the inspector presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. J. Franke and other members of licensee management who acknowledged the issue presented. Following completion of additional reviews in the Region II office, another exit meeting was held by teleconference on August 4, 2011, with Mr. B. Wunderly and again on September 14, 2011, with Mr. J. Franke and other members of licensee management. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.


ATTACHMENT:
ML113540744 X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE X FORM 665 ATTACHED RII: RII:
OFFICE DRS/PSB1 DRS/PSB1 RII: DRP/BR3 RII: DRS RII: EICS HQ: NSIR SIGNATURE RA/MS * RA/BB * RA/DR * RA/JM RA/CE - EMAIL RA VIA EMAIL NAME M. SPECK B. BONSER D. RICH J. MUNDAY C. EVANS S. COKER DATE 12/01/2011 12/01/2011 12/01/2011 12/08/2011 12/01/2011 12/14/2011 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICE HQ: OE RII: ORA SIGNATURE RA VIA EMAIL RA/LW*
NAME L. CASEY L. WERT DATE 12/09/2011 12/14/2011 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
PROGRESS ENERGY  5 cc w/encl:
Kelvin Henderson  Daniel R. Westcott General Manager  Supervisor Nuclear Fleet Operations Licensing & Regulatory Programs Progress Energy  Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution Brian C. McCabe  Joseph W. Donahue Manager, Nuclear Oversight Vice President Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Oversight Progress Energy  Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution Terry D. Hobbs  Jack E. Huegel (Acting) Plant General Manager Manager, Nuclear Oversight Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Crystal River Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution Stephen J. Cahill  David T. Conley Director - Engineering Nuclear Senior Counsel Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Legal Department Electronic Mail Distribution Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution R. Alexander Glenn General Counsel  Mark Rigsby Progress Energy  Manager, Support Services - Nuclear Electronic Mail Distribution Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)
Electronic Mail Distribution Jeffrey R. Swartz Director Site Operations Senior Resident Inspector Crystal River Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant U.S. NRC Donna B. Alexander  6745 N Tallahassee Rd Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Crystal River, FL 34428 (interim)
Progress Energy  Attorney General Electronic Mail Distribution Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL-01 Thomas Sapporito  Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Consulting Associate (Public Correspondence Only) Bryan Koon Post Office Box 8413  Director Jupiter, FL 33468  Florida Division of Emergency Management Electronic Mail Distribution William A. Passetti Chief  Chairman Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Board of County Commissioners Department of Health  Citrus County Electronic Mail Distribution 110 N. Apopka Avenue Inverness, FL 36250


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
PROGRESS ENERGY  6 Letter to Jon from Victor M. McCree dated December 20, 2011.


===Licensee personnel===
SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000302/2011504)
: [[contact::S. Cahill]], Manager, Engineering 
Distribution w/encl:
: [[contact::P. Dixon]], Manager, Training 
R. Borchardt, OEDO R. Zimmerman, OE E. Julian, SECY B. Keeling, OCA Enforcement Coordinators, RI, RIII, RIV E. Hayden, OPA C. McCrary, OI H. Bell, OIG J. Wiggins, NSIR E. Leeds, NRR M. Ashley, NRR F. Saba, NRR B. Westreich, NSIR R. Kahler, NSIR C. Scott, OGC D. Decker, OCA V. McCree, RII L. Wert, RII R. Croteau, RII J. Munday, RII B. Bonser, RII D. Rich, RII T. Morrissey, RII S. Ninh, RII S. Sparks, RII C. Evans, RII L. Douglas, RII M. Speck, RII L. Casey, OE S. Coker, NSIR OEMAIL RIDSNRRDIRS RidsNrrPMCrystal River Resource PUBLIC
: [[contact::J. Franke]], Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant
: [[contact::D. Herrin]], Lead Licensing Engineer 
: [[contact::J. Huegel]], Manager, Nuclear Oversight
: [[contact::C. Poliseno]], Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
: [[contact::M. Rigsby]], Manager, Site Support Services
: [[contact::J. Stephenson]], Manager, Fleet Emergency Preparedness
: [[contact::B. Wunderly]], Manager, Operations   
==ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==


===Opened===
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Progress Energy    Docket Nos.: 50-302 Crystal River Nuclear Plant  License Nos.: DPR-72 Unit 3    EA-11-208 During an inspection completed by the NRC on August 4, 2011, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is set forth below:
: 05000302/2011501-01 AV Failure to Maintain a Standard EAL Scheme
10 CFR 50.54(q) requires licensees to maintain in effect emergency plans which meet standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and requirements in 10 CFR 50 App. E 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), requires a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility and system effluent parameters is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response calls for reliance on information by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.
Closed and  
===Discussed===
None 


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., Assessment Actions, requires the means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continuously assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies and the Commission. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring.
==Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Testing==


===Procedures===
Contrary to the above, for several years prior to June 2011, the licensee failed to maintain in effect a standard emergency classification scheme which included facility effluent parameters. Specifically, the General Emergency classification 1.4 contained effluent radiation monitors (RM-A1 and RM-A2) threshold values greater than that which the instruments could accurately measure. These monitors were being relied upon to determine the magnitude and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials as well as providing criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies.
and Manual
: Citrus County Radiological Emergency Response Procedure REP
: SOP-11, Operation of the
: Emergency Sirens, Rev. June 2011  
: Whelen Siren Control System Operating Guide, February 8, 2007 Emergency Preparedness Staff Guidance (EPSG)-020, Alert and Notification System, Rev. 2
: Records and Data Crystal River Unit 3 Siren log 6/14/10-6/24/11 Documentation of weekly silent and full-volume ANS tests Selected ANS repair and annual preventive maintenance records, 2010-2011
: Attachment


==Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation==
This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.


===Procedures===
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Progress Energy is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-11-208" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the Enclosure
: EM-206, Emergency Plan Roster Notification, Rev. 107
: TPP-219, Emergency Response Organization Training Program, Rev. 5
: AI-4000, Conduct of Emergency Preparedness and Schedule for Radiological Emergency
: Response Plan Maintenance, Rev. 12
: AI-400H, Severe Accident Management Program and Guidelines, Rev.0
: AI-4001, Conduct of Drills and Exercises Supporting the Radiological Emergency Response
: Plan, Rev. 3
: Records and Data Radiological Emergency Response Plan 8/14/2010 Unannounced Staffing Drill Report Radiological Emergency Response Plan 5/3/2011 Training Drill Report
: Radiological Emergency Response Plan 3/1/2011 Training Drill Report Dose Assessment Team Tabletop 3/23/2011 Training Drill Report Radiologic Emergency Response Plan Exercise Critique 10/6/2010
: Emergency Preparedness Staff Augmentation Training drill report January 12, 2011 2010/2011 ERO Pager tests 2010, and 2011, Augmentation Drill packages Review of ERO position qualifications for selected individuals Emergency Preparedness logbooks for 2010, 2011


==Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes==
NOV  2 time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.


===Procedures===
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
: REG-NGGC-0010, 10
: CFR 50.59 and Selected Regulatory Reviews, Rev. 15
: Personnel Qualification Data - CR3 50.59 Qualified Evaluator listing
: Change Packages for Plans and Procedures
: Radiological Emergency Plan, Rev. 29 and 30
: EAL Bases Manual, Rev. 9 and 10
: EM-225, Duties of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 23
: EM-913A, Large Area Fire Resulting in Loss of Control Room Command and Control Functions,
: Rev. 2
: EM-102, Operation of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 51
: EM-104, Operation of the Operational Support Center, Rev. 13
: EM-402, Emergency Operations Facility Technical Support Team, Rev. 4
: AI-4000, Conduct of Emergency Preparedness and Schedule for Radiological Emergency
: Response Plan Maintenance, Rev. 12
: EM-400, Operation of the EOF, Rev. 12
: EM-206, Emergency Response Organization Notification, Rev 107
: EM-202, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator, Rev. 89, 90, 91, 92, and 93
: Attachment


==Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies==
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.


===Procedures===
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days of receipt.
: CAP-NGGC-0201, Self-Assessment/Benchmark Programs, Rev. 16
: Audits and Self-Assessments C-EP-11-01, Emergency Preparedness Assessment, February 22, 2011
: C-EP-FR-10-01, Emergency Preparedness Program Mid-Cycle Review, February 8, 2010
: 431502, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 08/30-09/17/2010
: 442313, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 01/10-14/2011
: 457573, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 04/13-20/2011
: 470156, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/23/2011
: 470159, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/13-20/2011
: 470161, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/09-12/2011
: 470167, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/23/2011
: 434294, Bench Mark Report, Drill and Exercise Critiques, 10/1/2010, and 11/17/2010
: NCR Action Request Documents
: 384495, Inaccurate Notification
: 428726, Inaccurate Notification
: 441995, Ineffective Corrective Actions in Drill/Exercise Performance
: 447238, PA not functioning
: 449241, Comm equipment replaced without prior warning
: 451364, Inaccurate info provided to dose assessment team
: 454187,
: RM-A2G(H) cannot receive high alarm
: 456477, Tornado Watch notification not timely
: 456658, Plant configuration may affect
: RM-A2 accuracy
: 463117, PA speaker has low volume
: 470640, Annual EPIP review late
: 472419,
: EM-202 mode definition misleading
: 444203, PA announcements not heard
: 438833,
: EM-220 does not support FSAR statement
: 439708, ERO on-call telephone list discrepancies


==Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) Verification==
Dated this 20th, day of December, 2011.


===Procedures===
Enclosure
: REG-NGGC-0009, NRC Performance Indicators and Monthly Operating Report Data, Rev. 10
: Records and Data DEP opportunities documentation from 3rd Quarter 2010, through 1st Quarter 2011 Drill and exercise participation records of ERO personnel from 3rd Quarter 2010, through 1st
: Quarter 2011 Siren test data from 2nd Quarter 2010, through 1st Quarter 2011 Various ERO Personnel Qualification and Participation records Attachment Corrective Actions Resulting From Inspection
: 474103: Revise
: REG-NGGC-0010 474428: E-Plan definition incomplete
: 474475: Rollup of NRC comments
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
: [[ANS]] [[Alert and Notification System]]
: [[AV]] [[Apparent Violation]]
: [[CAP]] [[Corrective Action Program]]
: [[DEP]] [[Drill/Exercise Performance]]
: [[EAL]] [[Emergency Action Level]]
: [[ERO]] [[Emergency Response Organization]]
: [[IMC]] [[Inspection Manual Chapter]]
: [[NEI]] [[Nuclear Energy Institute]]
: [[NRC]] [[Nuclear Regulatory Commission]]
: [[PI]] [[Performance Indicator]]
: [[PS]] [[Planning Standard]]
RSPS  Risk Significant Planning Standard
: [[SDP]] [[Significance Determination Process]]
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 10:39, 12 November 2019

Final Significance Determination of a White Finding, Notice of Violation, and Assessment Follow-up Letter (NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302-11-501)
ML113540744
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/20/2011
From: Mccree V
Region 2 Administrator
To: Franke J
Progress Energy Florida
References
EA-11-208 IR-11-501
Download: ML113540744 (9)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES ecember 20, 2011

SUBJECT:

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000302/2011501)

Dear Mr. Franke:

This letter provides you the final significance determination of the preliminary White finding discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2011501, dated September 23, 2011. The finding involved a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Specifically on June 27, 2011, you identified that Crystal River Unit 3 emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) 1.4 (General Emergency - Gaseous Effluents) contained instrument classification threshold values that were beyond the specified effluent radiation monitors capability to accurately indicate.

At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on November 7, 2011, to discuss your views on this issue. During the meeting your staff described your assessment of the significance of the finding, and the corrective actions taken to resolve it, including the root cause evaluation of the finding. Your root cause analysis found that establishment of the inappropriate radiation monitor threshold value was due to insufficient procedural guidance for the EAL change process. Contributing causes were found to be failures to validate assumptions and to conduct adequate reviews. Finally, you presented your assessment of the risk associated with this finding and determined it to be Green based on the availability of other means to evaluate gaseous effluent releases and fission-product barrier EALs to declare a timely and accurate General Emergency. You stated that the Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process result should be Green since even with the improper radiation monitor threshold value, the risk-significant planning standard function was not degraded.

You presented corrective actions related to the effluent radiation monitor threshold value for declaring a General Emergency and the emergency plan change process. The improper EAL threshold value was corrected promptly and you reviewed emergency plan related instruments and equipment to verify they were capable of performing their intended functions, and implemented changes to the emergency plan change review and implementation processes.

PROGRESS ENERGY 2 A summary of the Regulatory Conference (Accession no. ML11314A255) is available electronically for public inspection from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS), and is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

After considering the information developed during the inspection, the information you provided at the regulatory conference, and the additional information you provided following the regulatory conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding is appropriately characterized as White.

The NRC acknowledges your evaluation of root and contributing causes and agrees that it is likely the fission product barrier degradation EALs would be used to declare a General Emergency prior to meeting the entry conditions for the Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent EALs. The radiological effluent EALs provide classification thresholds for unplanned and/or uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the environment. The basis for the radiological effluent EALs, as described in NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, and endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning And Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors, identifies that they were included to provide diversity and to provide a basis for classifying events that cannot be readily classified on plant conditions alone.

NUMARC/NESP-007 emphasizes the need for accurate assessment and classification of events. While primary emphasis is intended to be placed on plant conditions in classifying emergency events the inclusion of both categories of EALs in the overall emergency classification scheme more fully addresses the potential event spectrum and compensates for potential deficiencies in either category. This is important in characterizing the significance of this issue and identifying that the fission product barrier degradation EALs are not a substitute for the radiological effluent EALs and were never intended to perform that function. As such, credit for using a plant condition EAL to declare a General Emergency, in the absence of a radiological effluent EAL, cannot be given when making a significance determination for the violation. Only those EALs in the Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent category may be considered. In this case, the radiological effluent General Emergency EAL is considered degraded because EAL 1.4 (General Emergency - Gaseous Effluents) contained instrument classification threshold values that were beyond the specified effluent radiation monitors capability to accurately indicate. While the dose assessment and field monitoring in EAL 1.4 provide redundancy, evaluation using either of these two methods would delay the event declaration. As such, this finding is assessed as a White Finding because there was a degraded risk-significant planning standard function.

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs determination of significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in the IMC 0609, Attachment 2. An appeal must be sent in writing to the Regional Administrator, Region II, 245 Peachtree Center Avenue, NE, Suite 1200, Atlanta, GA 30303-1257.

The NRC also determined that a violation occurred involving the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), in that for several years prior to June 2011, you failed to maintain in effect, a standard emergency classification scheme which included facility effluent parameters, as cited in the attached Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation were

PROGRESS ENERGY 3 described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered an escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRCs review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as NRC Inspection Report No.

05000302/2011501. Accordingly, AV 05000302/2011501-01 is updated consistent with the regulatory positions described in this letter. Therefore, AV 05000302/2011501-01, Failure to Maintain a Standard Emergency Action Level Scheme , is updated as VIO 05000302/2011501-01 with a safety significance of White, and a human performance cross-cutting element of Decision-making (H.1(a)) for ensuring that risk-significant decisions are made using a systematic process and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews.

The NRC determined the performance at Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3 to be in the Regulatory Response Column of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix beginning the third quarter of 2011. Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to provide assurance that the root causes and contributing causes of risk-significant performance issues are understood, that the extent of cause is identified and that your corrective action for risk-significant performance issues are sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. The NRC requests that your staff provide notification of your readiness for the NRC to conduct a supplemental inspection to review the actions taken to address the White inspection finding.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected, and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/enforcement/actions.

PROGRESS ENERGY 4 Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Brian Bonser at (404) 997-4653.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Victor M. McCree Regional Administrator Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Enclosure:

Notice of Violation cc w/encl.: (See page 5)

ML113540744 X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE X FORM 665 ATTACHED RII: RII:

OFFICE DRS/PSB1 DRS/PSB1 RII: DRP/BR3 RII: DRS RII: EICS HQ: NSIR SIGNATURE RA/MS * RA/BB * RA/DR * RA/JM RA/CE - EMAIL RA VIA EMAIL NAME M. SPECK B. BONSER D. RICH J. MUNDAY C. EVANS S. COKER DATE 12/01/2011 12/01/2011 12/01/2011 12/08/2011 12/01/2011 12/14/2011 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICE HQ: OE RII: ORA SIGNATURE RA VIA EMAIL RA/LW*

NAME L. CASEY L. WERT DATE 12/09/2011 12/14/2011 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO

PROGRESS ENERGY 5 cc w/encl:

Kelvin Henderson Daniel R. Westcott General Manager Supervisor Nuclear Fleet Operations Licensing & Regulatory Programs Progress Energy Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution Brian C. McCabe Joseph W. Donahue Manager, Nuclear Oversight Vice President Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Oversight Progress Energy Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution Terry D. Hobbs Jack E. Huegel (Acting) Plant General Manager Manager, Nuclear Oversight Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Crystal River Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution Stephen J. Cahill David T. Conley Director - Engineering Nuclear Senior Counsel Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Legal Department Electronic Mail Distribution Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution R. Alexander Glenn General Counsel Mark Rigsby Progress Energy Manager, Support Services - Nuclear Electronic Mail Distribution Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)

Electronic Mail Distribution Jeffrey R. Swartz Director Site Operations Senior Resident Inspector Crystal River Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant U.S. NRC Donna B. Alexander 6745 N Tallahassee Rd Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Crystal River, FL 34428 (interim)

Progress Energy Attorney General Electronic Mail Distribution Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL-01 Thomas Sapporito Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Consulting Associate (Public Correspondence Only) Bryan Koon Post Office Box 8413 Director Jupiter, FL 33468 Florida Division of Emergency Management Electronic Mail Distribution William A. Passetti Chief Chairman Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Board of County Commissioners Department of Health Citrus County Electronic Mail Distribution 110 N. Apopka Avenue Inverness, FL 36250

PROGRESS ENERGY 6 Letter to Jon from Victor M. McCree dated December 20, 2011.

SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000302/2011504)

Distribution w/encl:

R. Borchardt, OEDO R. Zimmerman, OE E. Julian, SECY B. Keeling, OCA Enforcement Coordinators, RI, RIII, RIV E. Hayden, OPA C. McCrary, OI H. Bell, OIG J. Wiggins, NSIR E. Leeds, NRR M. Ashley, NRR F. Saba, NRR B. Westreich, NSIR R. Kahler, NSIR C. Scott, OGC D. Decker, OCA V. McCree, RII L. Wert, RII R. Croteau, RII J. Munday, RII B. Bonser, RII D. Rich, RII T. Morrissey, RII S. Ninh, RII S. Sparks, RII C. Evans, RII L. Douglas, RII M. Speck, RII L. Casey, OE S. Coker, NSIR OEMAIL RIDSNRRDIRS RidsNrrPMCrystal River Resource PUBLIC

NOTICE OF VIOLATION Progress Energy Docket Nos.: 50-302 Crystal River Nuclear Plant License Nos.: DPR-72 Unit 3 EA-11-208 During an inspection completed by the NRC on August 4, 2011, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is set forth below:

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires licensees to maintain in effect emergency plans which meet standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and requirements in 10 CFR 50 App. E 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), requires a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility and system effluent parameters is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response calls for reliance on information by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., Assessment Actions, requires the means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continuously assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies and the Commission. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring.

Contrary to the above, for several years prior to June 2011, the licensee failed to maintain in effect a standard emergency classification scheme which included facility effluent parameters. Specifically, the General Emergency classification 1.4 contained effluent radiation monitors (RM-A1 and RM-A2) threshold values greater than that which the instruments could accurately measure. These monitors were being relied upon to determine the magnitude and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials as well as providing criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies.

This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Progress Energy is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-11-208" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the Enclosure

NOV 2 time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days of receipt.

Dated this 20th, day of December, 2011.

Enclosure

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