IR 05000302/2005011
| ML052650156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/2005 |
| From: | Travers W Region 2 Administrator |
| To: | Young D Florida Power Corp, Progress Energy Florida |
| References | |
| EA-05-114, IR-05-007, IR-05-011 | |
| Download: ML052650156 (85) | |
Text
I, Ii UNITED STATES NUCL:::AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Sf -'II NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
SUBJECT:
FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3, NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000302/2005011)
Dear Mr. Young:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
final significance determination for a finding involving unprotected post-fire safe shutdown cables and related non-feasible local manual operator actions. The finding was documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2005007, issued on June 16, 2005, and was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary "greater than Green" issue (Le., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance which may require additional NRC inspection). The cover letter to the inspection report informed Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
of the NRC's preliminary conclusion, provided FPC an opportunity to request a regulatory conference on this matter, and forwarded the details of the NRC's preliminary estimate of the change in core damage frequency (CDF) for this finding.
At FPC's request, an open regulatory conference was conducted on July 22, 2005, to discuss FPC's position on this issue. The enclosures to this letter include the list of attendees at the regulatory conference and material presented by FPC and NRC.
During the conference, FPC presented the results of its estimate of the increase in CDF due to the performance deficiency including influential assumptions and risk analysis methodology.
FPC concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance. The critical aspects of FPC's analysis and inputs that differed from the NRC's preliminary estimate included the following: (1) fully developed fires would produce enough smoke to require extensive removal efforts with a gas-powered ejector (NOTE: FPC estimated that a sufficient amount of smoke would be removed within 20 minutes to allow an operator to reset the emergency diesel generator (EDG) lockout breaker in the 3B 4160-VAC switchgear compartment and recover the 4160-VAC electrical bus.); (2) FWP-7, the non-safety-related feedwater pump, and its associated power and control circuits would remain free from fire damage and could be started from the main control room to provide and maintain secondary side heat removal; (3) the EDGs could operate unloaded without incurring damage for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> given the potential lack of room ventilation; (4) the emergency feedwater initiation control system (EFIC) would be available for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> instead of 30 minutes as assumed in the NRC's preliminary
I"i'
FPC 2 estimate; and (5) FPC would use the Technical Support Center (TSC) to provide guidance to the operating and response staff for diverse emergency and auxiliary feedwater lineups and for electrical distribution alignment. FPC did not contest that the finding represented a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
After considering the information developed during the inspection and the information FPC provided at the conference, the NRC has concluded that the final inspection finding is appropriately characterized as White in the mitigating systems cornerstone. In summary, the most critical differences between the NRC's assessment of the change in CDF and that of FPC's involved the likelihood of success of an operator action to reset the EDG lockout breaker to recover the 4160-VAC electrical bus and credit for use of FWP-7. The NRC ultimately concluded that the probability of failure to reset the EDG lockout was much greater than that assumed by FPC due to the extreme environmental conditions produced by the fire coupled with the very poor ergonomics associated with accomplishing a task in this situation. Therefore, possible accomplishment of this task could not be considered until smoke removal efforts were successfully employed. In considering the use of FWP-7, the NRC agreed with FPC that some credit was warranted which would result in a reduction in the NRC's preliminary estimate.
Regarding other aspects of FPC's analysis, the NRC agrees with FPC that the EDG could operate unloaded for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> without incurring damage and that EFIC would be available for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Regarding the use of the TSC, the NRC concluded that the combination of time constraints, the complexity of the emergency situation, power/communications availability, and the variability in the actual TSC response precluded TSC credit.
You have 10 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of significance for the identified finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.
The NRC also concluded that a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, occurred in that the protection and metering circuits were not physically separated or protected from fire damage as required. The violation is set forth in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2005007 dated June 16, 2005. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, the Notice of Violation is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2004009 dated March 14, 2005; NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2005007 dated June 16, 2005; and the information provided by FPC at the July 22, 2005, regulatory conference (Enclosure 3). Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.
For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report, No. 05000302/200500011, and the above violation is identified as VIO 0500302/200500011-01,
FPC 3 Unprotected Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Cables and Related Non-feasible Local Manual Operator Action. Accordingly, Apparent Violation 05000302/2005007-01 is closed.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (should you choose to provide one) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), which is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, classified, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.
Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. D. Charles Payne, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, at (404)562-4669.
Sincerely,
~~~--::::::~::::..-.--'
~~--::::::::::::..-
William D. Travers Regional Administrator Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation 2. List of Attendees 3. Material presented by FPC 4. Material presented by NRC
I.*;;
FPC 4
REGION II==
Sf -'II NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
SUBJECT:
FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3, NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000302/2005011)
Dear Mr. Young:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
final significance determination for a finding involving unprotected post-fire safe shutdown cables and related non-feasible local manual operator actions. The finding was documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2005007, issued on June 16, 2005, and was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary "greater than Green" issue (Le., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance which may require additional NRC inspection). The cover letter to the inspection report informed Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
of the NRC's preliminary conclusion, provided FPC an opportunity to request a regulatory conference on this matter, and forwarded the details of the NRC's preliminary estimate of the change in core damage frequency (CDF) for this finding.
At FPC's request, an open regulatory conference was conducted on July 22, 2005, to discuss FPC's position on this issue. The enclosures to this letter include the list of attendees at the regulatory conference and material presented by FPC and NRC.
During the conference, FPC presented the results of its estimate of the increase in CDF due to the performance deficiency including influential assumptions and risk analysis methodology.
FPC concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance. The critical aspects of FPC's analysis and inputs that differed from the NRC's preliminary estimate included the following: (1) fully developed fires would produce enough smoke to require extensive removal efforts with a gas-powered ejector (NOTE: FPC estimated that a sufficient amount of smoke would be removed within 20 minutes to allow an operator to reset the emergency diesel generator (EDG) lockout breaker in the 3B 4160-VAC switchgear compartment and recover the 4160-VAC electrical bus.); (2) FWP-7, the non-safety-related feedwater pump, and its associated power and control circuits would remain free from fire damage and could be started from the main control room to provide and maintain secondary side heat removal; (3) the EDGs could operate unloaded without incurring damage for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> given the potential lack of room ventilation; (4) the emergency feedwater initiation control system (EFIC) would be available for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> instead of 30 minutes as assumed in the NRC's preliminary
I, Ii UNITED STATES NUCL:::AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Sf -'II NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
SUBJECT:
FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3, NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000302/2005011)
Dear Mr. Young:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
final significance determination for a finding involving unprotected post-fire safe shutdown cables and related non-feasible local manual operator actions. The finding was documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2005007, issued on June 16, 2005, and was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary "greater than Green" issue (Le., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance which may require additional NRC inspection). The cover letter to the inspection report informed Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
of the NRC's preliminary conclusion, provided FPC an opportunity to request a regulatory conference on this matter, and forwarded the details of the NRC's preliminary estimate of the change in core damage frequency (CDF) for this finding.
At FPC's request, an open regulatory conference was conducted on July 22, 2005, to discuss FPC's position on this issue. The enclosures to this letter include the list of attendees at the regulatory conference and material presented by FPC and NRC.
During the conference, FPC presented the results of its estimate of the increase in CDF due to the performance deficiency including influential assumptions and risk analysis methodology.
FPC concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance. The critical aspects of FPC's analysis and inputs that differed from the NRC's preliminary estimate included the following: (1) fully developed fires would produce enough smoke to require extensive removal efforts with a gas-powered ejector (NOTE: FPC estimated that a sufficient amount of smoke would be removed within 20 minutes to allow an operator to reset the emergency diesel generator (EDG) lockout breaker in the 3B 4160-VAC switchgear compartment and recover the 4160-VAC electrical bus.); (2) FWP-7, the non-safety-related feedwater pump, and its associated power and control circuits would remain free from fire damage and could be started from the main control room to provide and maintain secondary side heat removal; (3) the EDGs could operate unloaded without incurring damage for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> given the potential lack of room ventilation; (4) the emergency feedwater initiation control system (EFIC) would be available for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> instead of 30 minutes as assumed in the NRC's preliminary
I"i'
FPC 2 estimate; and (5) FPC would use the Technical Support Center (TSC) to provide guidance to the operating and response staff for diverse emergency and auxiliary feedwater lineups and for electrical distribution alignment. FPC did not contest that the finding represented a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
After considering the information developed during the inspection and the information FPC provided at the conference, the NRC has concluded that the final inspection finding is appropriately characterized as White in the mitigating systems cornerstone. In summary, the most critical differences between the NRC's assessment of the change in CDF and that of FPC's involved the likelihood of success of an operator action to reset the EDG lockout breaker to recover the 4160-VAC electrical bus and credit for use of FWP-7. The NRC ultimately concluded that the probability of failure to reset the EDG lockout was much greater than that assumed by FPC due to the extreme environmental conditions produced by the fire coupled with the very poor ergonomics associated with accomplishing a task in this situation. Therefore, possible accomplishment of this task could not be considered until smoke removal efforts were successfully employed. In considering the use of FWP-7, the NRC agreed with FPC that some credit was warranted which would result in a reduction in the NRC's preliminary estimate.
Regarding other aspects of FPC's analysis, the NRC agrees with FPC that the EDG could operate unloaded for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> without incurring damage and that EFIC would be available for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Regarding the use of the TSC, the NRC concluded that the combination of time constraints, the complexity of the emergency situation, power/communications availability, and the variability in the actual TSC response precluded TSC credit.
You have 10 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of significance for the identified finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.
The NRC also concluded that a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, occurred in that the protection and metering circuits were not physically separated or protected from fire damage as required. The violation is set forth in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2005007 dated June 16, 2005. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, the Notice of Violation is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2004009 dated March 14, 2005; NRC Inspection Report No. 05000302/2005007 dated June 16, 2005; and the information provided by FPC at the July 22, 2005, regulatory conference (Enclosure 3). Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.
For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report, No. 05000302/200500011, and the above violation is identified as VIO 0500302/200500011-01,
FPC 3 Unprotected Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Cables and Related Non-feasible Local Manual Operator Action. Accordingly, Apparent Violation 05000302/2005007-01 is closed.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (should you choose to provide one) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), which is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, classified, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.
Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. D. Charles Payne, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, at (404)562-4669.
Sincerely,
~~~--::::::~::::..-.--'
~~--::::::::::::..-
William D. Travers Regional Administrator Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation 2. List of Attendees 3. Material presented by FPC 4. Material presented by NRC
I.*;;
FPC 4
REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GA.
I. OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETING INTENT Mr. V. McCree, Director, Division of Reactor Safety II. NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE POLICY Mr. V. McCree, Director, Division of Reactor Safety III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE WITH RISK PERSPECTIVES Mr. V. McCree, Director, Division of Reactor Safety IV. SUMMARY OF APPARENT VIOLATIONS Mr. V. McCree, Director, Division of Reactor Safety V. LICENSEE RISK PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION VI. LICENSEE RESPONSE TO APPARENT VIOLATIONS VII. BREAK / NRC CAUCUS Mr. V. McCree, Director, Division of Reactor Safety VIII. CLOSING REMARKS Mr. V. McCree, Director, Division of Reactor Safety