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{{#Wiki_filter:,,A~CELERY'J'ED
{{#Wiki_filter:,,A~ CELERY'J'ED         'DI&'I'RIBUTION       DEMONSTRATION             SYSTEM 0                             ~
'DI&'I'RIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM 0~REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8712090208 DOC.DATE: 87/12/07 NOTARIZED:'NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Power&Light Co.WATSON,R.A.
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
Carolina Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
ACCESSION NBR:8712090208         DOC.DATE: 87/12/07     NOTARIZED:'NO         DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina             05000400 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER       Carolina Power &   Light Co.
WATSON,R.A.         Carolina Power &   Light Co.
RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 87-063-00:on 871108,plant trip due to loss of main feedwater.
LER   87-063-00:on 871108,plant feedwater.
W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL W SIZE-TITLE: 50.73 Licensees Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 g RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 LA BUCKLEY,B INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DE ST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PS B NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPQ/QAB NRR/DREP/RAB PRR-S SIB G ILE 02 ORD,J RGN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH,M H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DE ST/CEB NRR/DEST/I CS B NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/RS B NRR/DLPQ/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/I LRB RES DEPY GI RES/DE/EIB FORD BLDG HOY i A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 A S j TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45 NRC Form 356 (94)3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.31604104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)DOCKET NUMBER l2)PACiE 31 050004001'OF 03 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 PLANT TRIP DUE TO THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER CAUSED BY A MISPOSITIONED CONDENSATE RECIRCULATION VALVE EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR 5PÃ3 EEQUEIITIAL NUMBER N.NIIMSSR MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCK ET NUMB E R(S)0 5 0 0 0 11 08 8 7 8 7 6 3 001 20 7 87 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO MODE (9)POWER LEVEL y 20.405(~l(1)(I)20.405 (~)(1)(8)20.406(e l(l lliii)20AOS le)(I)(Iv)20.405 (e)l I I (vl X 60 73(s)l2)(iv) 50.73(el(2)(vl 20A06(e)EOM(c)(I)EOM(c)(2)50.73(e)(2)(I)50.73(a)(2)(rg)60.73(e)(2)(riii)(Al 50.73(a l(21(8)50.73(el(2)(iii) 50.73(e)(2)I viiil(8)S0.73(el(2)(al LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): (Check onr or morr of the foilovfingf ill)73.71(h)73.71(cl OTHER fSueclfy In Abstract hrrow coif In Test, NRC Ferns 366AJ NAME R.SCHWABENBAUER
trip due to loss of main W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR             ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensees Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
-REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TECHNICIAN AREA CODE TELEPHONE NUMBER COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT l\3)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER 9'''v c mr EPORTABLE",: CAUSE SYSTEM r COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER EPORTABLE vtN'O NPRDS.r.5%&SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)EXPECTED SU 8 M I SS ION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR YES flf yer, complrte EXPECTED SVSMISSION OATH NO ABSTRACT fLImft to 1400 spaces, I 6, epproalmetrry fiftern alnrrerpecr typrwrfrten lined l16)The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 22 percent reactor power on November 8, 1987.The plant was in the start-up process following a scheduled outage and was preparing to increase power from 100 MWe to 150 MWe with only the'lA'eedwater train in service.1A Condensate Pump tripped on low discharge pressure which caused 1A Condensate Booster Pump and 1A Main Feedwater Pump to trip, which resulted in a total loss of Main Feedwater.
W  SIZE-NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.                                   05000400 g RECIPIENT         COPIES            RECIPIENT          COPIES ID  CODE/NAME      LTTR ENCL      ID CODE/NAME     LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA               1    1      PD2-1 PD              1    1              A BUCKLEY,B              1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON           1    1      ACRS MOELLER          2    2 AEOD/DOA               1    1      AEOD/DSP/NAS          1    1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB           2    2      AEOD/DSP/TPAB          1    1 ARM/DCTS/DAB           1    1      DEDRO                  1    1 NRR/DE ST/ADS           1    0      NRR/DE ST/CEB          1    1 NRR/DEST/ELB            1    1      NRR/DEST/I CS B       1    1 NRR/DEST/MEB            1    1      NRR/DEST/MTB          1    1 NRR/DEST/PS B          1    1      NRR/DEST/RS B          1    1 NRR/DEST/SGB            1     1     NRR/DLPQ/HFB          1   1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB            1     1     NRR/DOEA/EAB          1   1 NRR/DREP/RAB            1     1     NRR/DREP/RPB          2    2 PRR-    S  SIB        1     1     NRR/PMAS/I LRB        1   1 l G  ILE      02    1     1     RES DEPY GI            1   1 ORD,J        1     1     RES/DE/EIB            1   1 RGN2    FILE    01    1     1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH,M              5     5     FORD BLDG HOY i A      1    1 H ST LOBBY WARD        1     1     LPDR                  1   1 NRC PDR                1     1     NSIC HARRIS,J          1    1 NSIC MAYS,G            1    1 S
The reactor and turbine were then manually tripp'ed at 1625 hours.The Hain Steam Isolation Valves were shut in order to limit pl.ant cool, down and the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated to restore Steam Generator water levels.All plant systems responded as required.O OR OOR r'I o wO W(A COO co&OCJ C'2 O OR 0<<3: C'a mCZ Nu CO@CO NRC Form 366 ror.nv I The immediate cause of the event was the condensate recirculation valve was in the"OPEN" position rather than"MODULATE" position as required by normal plant operation.
j TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR          46  ENCL    45
This caused the Condensate Pump and Condensate Booster Pump to be operating at near run~out condition and eventually tripped the Condensate Pump on low discharge pressure.The root cause of the event was personnel error as plant operators were not fully aware of all plant conditions.(i.e., the recirculation valve being in the open position.)
 
Corrective actions are Operating Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, has been revised incorporating lessons of this event, and operating shifts were briefed on the causes and consequences of this event, and Post"Turnover briefings are being conducted to ensure understanding of plant conditions for the operating crew.This event is being reported in accordance with IOCFR50.73(ai(2)(ivl as an Engineered Sateguards System Feature and Reactor Protection System Actuation.
NRC Form 356                                                                                                                                          U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)
/(
APPROVED OMB NO. 31604104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                          EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1)                                                                                                                        DOCKET NUMBER l2)                                  PACiE 31 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 PLANT TRIP DUE TO THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER CAUSED BY A MISPOSITIONED CONDENSATE 050004001'OF                                            03 RECIRCULATION VALVE EVENT DATE (5)                        LER NUMBER (6)                          REPORT DATE (7)                        OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
NRC Form 348A (083 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3(50&(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME III DOCKET NUMSER lll LER NUMSER (Sl IIAOE (3)SHEARON HARRIS~NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 TEXT/I/more 4/reoe 14 err/'rrrrf, voe NIN/orNI A/RC%%drre 38$AS/(171 DESCRIPTION o s o o o4 00 yEAR 58r$4QUENTIAL oI rrevrercN NUM44rr..8 NvM err 87-06 3-0 0 02>>0 3 The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 22 percent reactor power on November 8, 1987.The plant was in the start-up process following a scheduled outage.The Turbine Generator (EIIS:TA)output was to be increased from 100 MWe to 150 MWe at a rate of 3MW/min.Due to the power range at this time, only the'1A'ain Feedwater (EIIS:SJ)train was in service.As the load increase was started, the operator noted that the lA Condensate Booster Pump (CBP)(EIIS:SD)'Controller was in the maximum demand posit'.on.
EEQUEIITIAL MONTH          OAY      YEAR    YEAR      5P&#xc3;3 NUMBER   N. NIIMSSR    MONTH        DAY      YEAR            FACILITYNAMES                            DOCK ET NUMB E R(S) 0  5    0    0        0 11 08                  8 7 8        7                    6 3       001 20                      7  87                                                        0  5    0    0          0 OPERATINO THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): (Check onr or morr                  of the foilovfingf ill)
1A Main Feedwater Pump (MFP)(EIIS:SJ) suction pressure and 1A CBP discharge pressure were approximately 430 psig'1A Condensate Pump (CP)(EIIS:SD) discharge pressure was approximately 200 psig.It was noted that the Condensate Recirculation Valve, 1CE-293, was in the"OPEN" position rather than the"MODULATE" (MODU)position as required by normal plant operation.
MODE (9) 20A06(e)                        X  60 73(s)l2)(iv)                                  73.71(h)
In effect, the 1A CBP and the 1A CP were operating at near pump"run out" condition.
POWER                             20.405( ~ l(1) (I)                        EOM(c) (I)                         50.73(el(2)(vl                                  73.71(cl LEVEL 20.405  ( ~ ) (1) (8)                      EOM(c)(2)                          50.73(a) (2) (rg)                               OTHER fSueclfy In Abstract hrrow coif In Test, NRC Ferns 20.406(e    l(llliii)                      50.73(e) (2)(I)                   60.73(e)(2)(riii) (Al                            366AJ y                      20AOS le) (I ) (Iv)                       50.73(a l(21(8)                    50.73(e) (2) I viiil(8) 20.405 (e) l I I (vl                      50.73(el(2)(iii)                   S0.73(el(2)(al LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
The Shift Foreman determined that the safest way to avoid a flow disturbance', which would cause a CP or CBP trip, would be to slowly close the manual recirculation path isolation valve, 1CE-294.An operator was dispatched to do this;however, there was no attempt to halt the turbine power increase process.As turbine power approached 10S MWe, before any possible operator action on the manual recirculation path isolation valve could be made, 1A CP discharge pressure fell below the trip setpoint of 195 psig.After the S second trip delay, the 1A CP tiipped and initiated the trip of the 1A CBP and 1A MFP resulting in a total loss of Main Feedwater.
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER R. SCHWABENBAUER  REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TECHNICIAN                                                                                AREA CODE CAUSE      SYSTEM      COMPONENT            MANUFAC.
Since feedwater flow could not be immediately restored, the reactor and the turbine were manually tripped at 1625 hours.The Main Steam Isolation Valves (EIIS:SB)were shut in order to limit plant cooldown and Steam Generator (EIIS:TB)water levels were restored with the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)(EIIS:BA).
TURER EPORTABLE
All plant systems responded as required and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3, Hot Standby.CAUSE: The immediate cause of the event was that Condensate Recirculation Valve 1CE-293, was in the open position rather than the moduLate position as required for normal plant operation.
                                                                                    '''v
This resulted in the lA CP and 1A CBP to be operating at near run out condition and eventually tripping 1A CP on Low discharge pressure.The root cause of the event was personnel error as plant operators were not fully aware of all pl.ant conditions (i.e., the recirculation vaLve being in the open position).
                                                                                          ",:
Shift turnover notes did indicate that valve 1CE-293 was N/IC FD/IM 344*(043(e U.S.OPO:108~824 538/455 NRC Potm 264A (94L)I LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.2150&104 EXPIRES: 8/21/88 PACILI'TY NAME ill SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 TEXT//I IINrp Spree/I Irovked, vrr 4/4/SAI/NRC Pr/m 6//$4'4/117)CAUSE: (continued)
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 9              c mr r
OOCKET NUMBER 12)o s o o o4 00 YEAR 8.7-0 3 LER NUMBER 16)SEOVSNTIAL R>5 NVMSSII II 4 V IS IO N NVM SA PAGE IS)0 0 3 oF0 3 in an abnormal condition.
CAUSE SYSTEM  COMPONENT l\3)
The position resulted from secondary plant chemistry operations conducted earlier in the week.The plant had been in a long path recirculation mode for the purpose of establishing secondary plant chemistry control prior to plant start-up.In this mode, Operation Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, permits placing valve 1CE-293, in the"OPEN" position in order to increase recirculation flow.The procedure did not specifically address returning the valve switch to the"MODULATE" position, which is the assumed position for normal pl.ant operation, when returning to the normal or short path recirculation moce.ANALYSIS: This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an Engineered Safeguards System Feature and Reactor Protection System Actuation.
MANUFAC.
There were no safety consequences as a result of this event;although operation of a safety system was challenged (AFW).The AFW system started as required upon loss of Main Feedwater to maintain vater levels in the Steam'enerators.
TURER EPORTABLE NPRDS vtN'O
                                                                                                                                                                                        .r .
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH 5%&      DAY    YEAR SU 8 M I SS ION YES  flfyer, complrte EXPECTED SVSMISSION OATH                                        NO DATE (15)
ABSTRACT fLImft to 1400 spaces,    I 6, epproalmetrry fiftern alnrrerpecr  typrwrfrten lined l16)
The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 22 percent reactor power on November 8, 1987. The plant was in the start-up process following a scheduled outage and was preparing to increase power from 100 MWe to 150 MWe with only the 'lA'eedwater train in service. 1A Condensate Pump tripped on low discharge pressure which caused 1A Condensate Booster Pump and 1A Main Feedwater Pump to                          trip,   which resulted in a total loss of Main Feedwater.                                                           The reactor and turbine were then manually tripp'ed at 1625 hours. The Hain Steam Isolation Valves were shut in order to limit pl.ant cool, down and the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated to restore Steam Generator water levels. All plant systems responded as required.
The immediate cause                          of the event was the condensate recirculation valve was in the       "OPEN"          position rather than "MODULATE" position as required by normal O          plant operation. This caused the Condensate Pump and Condensate Booster Pump OR          to be operating at near run out condition and eventually tripped the   ~
OOR              Condensate Pump on low discharge pressure.                                                   The root cause of the event was r'I o wO              personnel error as plant operators were not fully aware of all plant W(A COO              conditions.                      (i.e., the recirculation valve being in the open position.)
co&             Corrective actions are Operating Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, has OCJ             been revised incorporating lessons of this event, and operating shifts were C'2 O OR               briefed on the causes and consequences of this event, and Post"Turnover 0    <<3:
briefings are being conducted to ensure understanding of plant conditions for C'a mCZ the operating crew.
Nu CO@     CO This event is being reported                                      in accordance              with IOCFR50.73(ai(2)(ivl as an Engineered Sateguards                          System Feature                    and Reactor    Protection System Actuation.                                                   /(
NRC Form 366 ror.nv I
 
NRC Form 348A                                                                                                          U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (083 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION                                      APPROVED OMS NO. 3(50&(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME III                                                                  DOCKET NUMSER lll          LER NUMSER (Sl                      IIAOE (3) yEAR 58r $ 4QUENTIAL    oI rrevrercN NUM44rr    ..8 NvM err SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT  ~
UNIT      1 TEXT /I/more 4/reoe 14 err/'rrrrf, voe NIN/orNIA/RC %%drre 38$ AS/ (171 o  s  o  o  o4 00 87 06            3  0          0  02>>          0  3 DESCRIPTION The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 22 percent reactor power on November 8, 1987.                                       The plant was in the start-up process following a scheduled outage.                             The Turbine Generator (EIIS:TA) output was to be increased from 100 MWe to 150 MWe at a rate of 3MW/min. Due to the power range at this time, only the                      '1A'ain                  Feedwater (EIIS:SJ) train was in service.
As      the load increase was started, the operator noted that the lA Condensate Booster Pump (CBP)(EIIS:SD)'Controller was in the maximum demand posit'.on. 1A Main Feedwater Pump (MFP)(EIIS:SJ) suction pressure and 1A CBP discharge pressure were approximately 430 psig'1A Condensate                                                    Pump      (CP)(EIIS:SD) discharge pressure was approximately 200 psig. It was noted that the Condensate Recirculation Valve, 1CE-293, was in the "OPEN" position rather than the "MODULATE" (MODU) position as required by normal plant operation.                                                            In effect, the 1A CBP and the 1A CP were operating at near pump "run out" condition. The Shift Foreman determined that the safest way to avoid a flow disturbance', which would cause a CP or CBP trip, would be to slowly close the manual                recirculation path isolation valve, 1CE-294.                                      An operator                was dispatched to do this; however, there was no attempt to halt the turbine power increase process.
As      turbine power approached 10S MWe, before any possible operator action on the manual recirculation path isolation valve could be made, 1A CP discharge pressure fell below the trip setpoint of 195 psig. After the S second trip delay, the 1A CP tiipped and initiated the trip of the 1A CBP and 1A MFP resulting in a total loss of Main Feedwater. Since feedwater flow could not be immediately restored, the reactor and the turbine were manually tripped at 1625 hours.                       The Main Steam Isolation Valves (EIIS:SB) were shut in order to limit plant cooldown and Steam Generator (EIIS:TB) water levels were restored with the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
(EIIS:BA).                        All plant systems responded as required and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3, Hot Standby.
CAUSE:
The          immediate              cause            of the event          was that Condensate      Recirculation Valve 1CE-293,                   was      in the             open      position rather than the moduLate position as required for normal plant operation. This resulted in the lA CP and 1A CBP to be operating at near run out condition and eventually tripping 1A CP on Low discharge pressure.
The        root cause of the event was personnel error as plant operators were not fully            aware of all pl.ant conditions (i.e., the recirculation vaLve being in the open position). Shift turnover notes did indicate that valve 1CE-293 was N/IC FD/IM 344*
(043(                                                                                                                                 e U.S.OPO:108~824 538/455
 
NRC Potm 264A                                                                                                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94L) I LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                         APPROVEO OMB NO. 2150&104 EXPIRES: 8/21/88 PACILI'TY NAME     ill                                                     OOCKET NUMBER 12)                  LER NUMBER 16)                      PAGE IS)
YEAR      SEOVSNTIAL R>5 II4 V IS IO N SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT                                                                                 NVMSSII        NVM SA UNIT       1 o  s  o  o  o4 00      8. 70            3              0 0    3  oF0          3 TEXT //I IINrp Spree /I Irovked, vrr 4/4/SAI/NRC Pr/m 6//$ 4'4/ 117)
CAUSE:             (continued) in       an       abnormal           condition.             The   position resulted             from     secondary               plant chemistry operations conducted earlier in the week. The plant had been in a long path recirculation mode for the purpose of establishing secondary plant chemistry control prior to plant start-up. In this mode, Operation Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, permits placing valve 1CE-293, in the "OPEN" position in order to increase recirculation flow. The procedure did not specifically address returning the valve switch to the "MODULATE" position, which is the assumed position for normal pl.ant operation, when returning to the normal or short path recirculation moce.
ANALYSIS:
This event is being reported                                 in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an Engineered Safeguards                           System Feature and Reactor             Protection System Actuation.
There           were no safety consequences                           as a result of this event; although operation of a safety system was challenged (AFW). The AFW system started as required upon loss of Main Feedwater to maintain vater levels in the Steam
                                                                                                                                                        'enerators.
Other events reported where the loss of Main Feedwater resulted, in a plant trip vere reported in LERs.'7-005-00, 87-008-00, 87-013-00, 87-017-00, 87-018"00, 87-019-00, 87-024-00, 87-025-00, 87-028-00, 87"031-00, 87-037-00.
Other events reported where the loss of Main Feedwater resulted, in a plant trip vere reported in LERs.'7-005-00, 87-008-00, 87-013-00, 87-017-00, 87-018"00, 87-019-00, 87-024-00, 87-025-00, 87-028-00, 87"031-00, 87-037-00.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
1.The Shift Turnover process has been enhanced.Previously, the turnover process included a briefing by the off going Shift Foreman and a one-on-one turnover of each position.Plant direction has been issued through a Night Order to require a Post-Turnover briefing by the Balance of Plant (BOP), Reactor Operator (RO), Senior Control.Operator (SCO), each Auxiliary Operator (AO), and the Shift Foreman (SF)to ensure the operating crew has a ful.l understanding of plant conditions.
: 1.           The     Shift Turnover process has been enhanced. Previously, the turnover process included a briefing by the off going Shift Foreman and a one-on-one turnover of each position.                                 Plant direction has been issued through a Night Order to require a Post-Turnover briefing by the Balance of Plant (BOP), Reactor Operator (RO), Senior Control. Operator (SCO),
Operations Management Manual (OMM)-001, Operations-Conduct of Operations, is being revised to incorporate this action.2.Operating Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, has been revised incorporating the lessons of this event.3.Following the event operating shifts were briefed on the causes and consequences of this event.I NRC SORM SSSA 19421*U.S.GPO:1986.0 624 558/455 Carolina Power 8 Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O.Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 DEC 0 7~98'ile.Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'HO-870563 (0)U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-063-00 Gentlemen'.
each Auxiliary Operator (AO), and the Shift Foreman (SF) to ensure the operating             crew             has   a   ful.l understanding           of plant conditions.
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
Operations Management Manual (OMM)-001, Operations-Conduct of Operations, is being revised to incorporate this action.
This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30)days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.Very truly yours, RAW'lkd Enclosure SF/W~~>R.A.Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project cc.'Dr.J.Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)Mr.B.Buckley (NRR)Mr: G.Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)MEM/LER-87-063/1/OS1}}
: 2.           Operating             Procedure             (OP)-134,     Condensate       System,       has       been         revised incorporating the lessons of this event.
: 3.           Following the event                         operating     shifts     were   briefed     on   the causes               and consequences             of this Ievent.
NRC SORM SSSA 19421
                                                                                                                                      *U.S.GPO:1986.0 624 558/455
 
Carolina Power 8 Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New   Hill, NC         27562 DEC 0 7
                                            ~98'ile
      .Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'HO-870563       (0)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:   NRC   Document Control Desk Washington,   DC   20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT         UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-063-00 Gentlemen'.
In accordance     with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.                 This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.
Very truly yours, SF/W~~>
R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW'lkd Enclosure cc.'Dr. J. Nelson Grace   (NRC   RII)
Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)
Mr: G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP)
MEM/LER-87-063/1/OS1}}

Revision as of 06:59, 22 October 2019

LER 87-063-00:on 871108,plant Tripped Due to Loss of Main Feedwater.Caused by Mispositioned Condensate Recirculation Valve Due to Personnel Error.Operating Procedure Revised to Include Lessons from Event & Crews briefed.W/871207 Ltr
ML18005A229
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/07/1987
From: Schwabenbauer, Watson R
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870563-(O), LER-87-063, NUDOCS 8712090208
Download: ML18005A229 (5)
v • d • e


Text

,,A~ CELERY'J'ED 'DI&'I'RIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM 0 ~

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8712090208 DOC.DATE: 87/12/07 NOTARIZED:'NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Power & Light Co.

WATSON,R.A. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-063-00:on 871108,plant feedwater.

trip due to loss of main W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensees Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

W SIZE-NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 g RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 A BUCKLEY,B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DE ST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DE ST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/I CS B 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PS B 1 1 NRR/DEST/RS B 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 PRR- S SIB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/I LRB 1 1 l G ILE 02 1 1 RES DEPY GI 1 1 ORD,J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH,M 5 5 FORD BLDG HOY i A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 S

j TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

NRC Form 356 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)

APPROVED OMB NO. 31604104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER l2) PACiE 31 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 PLANT TRIP DUE TO THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER CAUSED BY A MISPOSITIONED CONDENSATE 050004001'OF 03 RECIRCULATION VALVE EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

EEQUEIITIAL MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR 5PÃ3 NUMBER N. NIIMSSR MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCK ET NUMB E R(S) 0 5 0 0 0 11 08 8 7 8 7 6 3 001 20 7 87 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): (Check onr or morr of the foilovfingf ill)

MODE (9) 20A06(e) X 60 73(s)l2)(iv) 73.71(h)

POWER 20.405( ~ l(1) (I) EOM(c) (I) 50.73(el(2)(vl 73.71(cl LEVEL 20.405 ( ~ ) (1) (8) EOM(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (rg) OTHER fSueclfy In Abstract hrrow coif In Test, NRC Ferns 20.406(e l(llliii) 50.73(e) (2)(I) 60.73(e)(2)(riii) (Al 366AJ y 20AOS le) (I ) (Iv) 50.73(a l(21(8) 50.73(e) (2) I viiil(8) 20.405 (e) l I I (vl 50.73(el(2)(iii) S0.73(el(2)(al LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER R. SCHWABENBAUER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TECHNICIAN AREA CODE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER EPORTABLE

v

",:

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 9 c mr r

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT l\3)

MANUFAC.

TURER EPORTABLE NPRDS vtN'O

.r .

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED MONTH 5%& DAY YEAR SU 8 M I SS ION YES flfyer, complrte EXPECTED SVSMISSION OATH NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT fLImft to 1400 spaces, I 6, epproalmetrry fiftern alnrrerpecr typrwrfrten lined l16)

The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 22 percent reactor power on November 8, 1987. The plant was in the start-up process following a scheduled outage and was preparing to increase power from 100 MWe to 150 MWe with only the 'lA'eedwater train in service. 1A Condensate Pump tripped on low discharge pressure which caused 1A Condensate Booster Pump and 1A Main Feedwater Pump to trip, which resulted in a total loss of Main Feedwater. The reactor and turbine were then manually tripp'ed at 1625 hours0.0188 days <br />0.451 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.183125e-4 months <br />. The Hain Steam Isolation Valves were shut in order to limit pl.ant cool, down and the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated to restore Steam Generator water levels. All plant systems responded as required.

The immediate cause of the event was the condensate recirculation valve was in the "OPEN" position rather than "MODULATE" position as required by normal O plant operation. This caused the Condensate Pump and Condensate Booster Pump OR to be operating at near run out condition and eventually tripped the ~

OOR Condensate Pump on low discharge pressure. The root cause of the event was r'I o wO personnel error as plant operators were not fully aware of all plant W(A COO conditions. (i.e., the recirculation valve being in the open position.)

co& Corrective actions are Operating Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, has OCJ been revised incorporating lessons of this event, and operating shifts were C'2 O OR briefed on the causes and consequences of this event, and Post"Turnover 0 <<3:

briefings are being conducted to ensure understanding of plant conditions for C'a mCZ the operating crew.

Nu CO@ CO This event is being reported in accordance with IOCFR50.73(ai(2)(ivl as an Engineered Sateguards System Feature and Reactor Protection System Actuation. /(

NRC Form 366 ror.nv I

NRC Form 348A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (083 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3(50&(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME III DOCKET NUMSER lll LER NUMSER (Sl IIAOE (3) yEAR 58r $ 4QUENTIAL oI rrevrercN NUM44rr ..8 NvM err SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ~

UNIT 1 TEXT /I/more 4/reoe 14 err/'rrrrf, voe NIN/orNIA/RC %%drre 38$ AS/ (171 o s o o o4 00 87 06 3 0 0 02>> 0 3 DESCRIPTION The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 22 percent reactor power on November 8, 1987. The plant was in the start-up process following a scheduled outage. The Turbine Generator (EIIS:TA) output was to be increased from 100 MWe to 150 MWe at a rate of 3MW/min. Due to the power range at this time, only the '1A'ain Feedwater (EIIS:SJ) train was in service.

As the load increase was started, the operator noted that the lA Condensate Booster Pump (CBP)(EIIS:SD)'Controller was in the maximum demand posit'.on. 1A Main Feedwater Pump (MFP)(EIIS:SJ) suction pressure and 1A CBP discharge pressure were approximately 430 psig'1A Condensate Pump (CP)(EIIS:SD) discharge pressure was approximately 200 psig. It was noted that the Condensate Recirculation Valve, 1CE-293, was in the "OPEN" position rather than the "MODULATE" (MODU) position as required by normal plant operation. In effect, the 1A CBP and the 1A CP were operating at near pump "run out" condition. The Shift Foreman determined that the safest way to avoid a flow disturbance', which would cause a CP or CBP trip, would be to slowly close the manual recirculation path isolation valve, 1CE-294. An operator was dispatched to do this; however, there was no attempt to halt the turbine power increase process.

As turbine power approached 10S MWe, before any possible operator action on the manual recirculation path isolation valve could be made, 1A CP discharge pressure fell below the trip setpoint of 195 psig. After the S second trip delay, the 1A CP tiipped and initiated the trip of the 1A CBP and 1A MFP resulting in a total loss of Main Feedwater. Since feedwater flow could not be immediately restored, the reactor and the turbine were manually tripped at 1625 hours0.0188 days <br />0.451 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.183125e-4 months <br />. The Main Steam Isolation Valves (EIIS:SB) were shut in order to limit plant cooldown and Steam Generator (EIIS:TB) water levels were restored with the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)

(EIIS:BA). All plant systems responded as required and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3, Hot Standby.

CAUSE:

The immediate cause of the event was that Condensate Recirculation Valve 1CE-293, was in the open position rather than the moduLate position as required for normal plant operation. This resulted in the lA CP and 1A CBP to be operating at near run out condition and eventually tripping 1A CP on Low discharge pressure.

The root cause of the event was personnel error as plant operators were not fully aware of all pl.ant conditions (i.e., the recirculation vaLve being in the open position). Shift turnover notes did indicate that valve 1CE-293 was N/IC FD/IM 344*

(043( e U.S.OPO:108~824 538/455

NRC Potm 264A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94L) I LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 2150&104 EXPIRES: 8/21/88 PACILI'TY NAME ill OOCKET NUMBER 12) LER NUMBER 16) PAGE IS)

YEAR SEOVSNTIAL R>5 II4 V IS IO N SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NVMSSII NVM SA UNIT 1 o s o o o4 00 8. 70 3 0 0 3 oF0 3 TEXT //I IINrp Spree /I Irovked, vrr 4/4/SAI/NRC Pr/m 6//$ 4'4/ 117)

CAUSE: (continued) in an abnormal condition. The position resulted from secondary plant chemistry operations conducted earlier in the week. The plant had been in a long path recirculation mode for the purpose of establishing secondary plant chemistry control prior to plant start-up. In this mode, Operation Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, permits placing valve 1CE-293, in the "OPEN" position in order to increase recirculation flow. The procedure did not specifically address returning the valve switch to the "MODULATE" position, which is the assumed position for normal pl.ant operation, when returning to the normal or short path recirculation moce.

ANALYSIS:

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an Engineered Safeguards System Feature and Reactor Protection System Actuation.

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event; although operation of a safety system was challenged (AFW). The AFW system started as required upon loss of Main Feedwater to maintain vater levels in the Steam

'enerators.

Other events reported where the loss of Main Feedwater resulted, in a plant trip vere reported in LERs.'7-005-00, 87-008-00, 87-013-00, 87-017-00,87-018"00, 87-019-00, 87-024-00, 87-025-00, 87-028-00, 87"031-00, 87-037-00.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

1. The Shift Turnover process has been enhanced. Previously, the turnover process included a briefing by the off going Shift Foreman and a one-on-one turnover of each position. Plant direction has been issued through a Night Order to require a Post-Turnover briefing by the Balance of Plant (BOP), Reactor Operator (RO), Senior Control. Operator (SCO),

each Auxiliary Operator (AO), and the Shift Foreman (SF) to ensure the operating crew has a ful.l understanding of plant conditions.

Operations Management Manual (OMM)-001, Operations-Conduct of Operations, is being revised to incorporate this action.

2. Operating Procedure (OP)-134, Condensate System, has been revised incorporating the lessons of this event.
3. Following the event operating shifts were briefed on the causes and consequences of this Ievent.

NRC SORM SSSA 19421

  • U.S.GPO:1986.0 624 558/455

Carolina Power 8 Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 DEC 0 7

~98'ile

.Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number.'HO-870563 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-063-00 Gentlemen'.

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours, SF/W~~>

R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW'lkd Enclosure cc.'Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr: G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP)

MEM/LER-87-063/1/OS1

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