IR 05000498/2015004

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000498/2015004 and 05000499/2015004

ML16042A550
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	02/11/2016
From:	Taylor N H NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To:	Koehl D South Texas
Taylor N H
References
IR 2015004
Download: ML16042A550 (75)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD.

ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 February 11, 2016 Mr. Dennis Koehl

, President and Chief Executive Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483

SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000 498/20 15 00 4 AND 05000499/2015004

Dear Mr. Koehl:

O n December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. O n January 7, 2015

, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Powell, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report

. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements

. If you contest the violation or significance of th is non-cited violation (NCV), you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington

, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 a nd 2, facility

. If you disagree with a cross

-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility

. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding,"

a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC

's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Document s Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Nicholas H. Taylor , Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos

.: NPF-76 and NPF-80

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000498/2015004 and 05000499/2015004

w/Attachment 1: Supplemental Information w/Attachment 2: Document Request for Inservice Inspection

ML16042A550 SUNSI Review By: NHT ADAMS Yes No Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE SRI:DRP/B RI:DRP/B TL:DRS/TSS C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB NAME ASanchez NHernandez THipschman TFarnholtz GWerner VGaddy SIGNATURE /RA/E- /RA/E- /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 2/10/16 2/10/16 2/4/16 2/4/16 2/4/16 2/3/16 OFFICE C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRS/PSB2 BC:DRP/B NAME MHaire HGepford NTaylor SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 2/4/16 2/3/16 2/11/16 Letter to Dennis Koehl from Nicholas Taylor dated February 11, 2016

SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000 498/20 15 00 4 AND 05000499/2015004 DISTRIBUTION

Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov

) DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Alfred.Sanchez@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (Nicholas.Hernandez@nrc.gov) Branch Chief, DRP/B (Nick.Taylor@nrc.gov) Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (David.Proulx@nrc.gov

) Project Engineer, DRP/B (Shawn.Money@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/B (Steven.Janicki@nrc.gov)

STP Administrative Assistant (Lynn

.Wright@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov

) Project Manager (Lisa.Regner@nrc.gov) Team Leader, DRS/TSS (Thomas.Hipschman@nrc.gov) RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov

) ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov

) Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV Congressional Affairs Officer (Angel.Moreno@nrc.gov)

OEWEB Resource (OEWEB.Resource@nrc.gov

) OEWEB Resource (Sue.Bogle@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Raj.Iyengar@nrc.gov)

ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000498, 05000499 License: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report: 05000 498/20 15 0 04 and 05000499/20 15 00 4 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 7748 3 Dates: October 4 through December 31, 20 15 Inspectors:

A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector M. Bloodgood, Operations Engineer J. Braisted, Reactor Inspector T. Farina, Senior Operations Engineer G. Guerra, CHP, Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector R. Kumana, Resident Inspector B. Larson, Senior Operations Engineer D. Proulx, Senior Project Engineer C. Smith, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Nicholas H. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

IR 05000498/2015004, 0500049 9/201500 4; 10/0 4/2015 - 12/31/2015; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Licensed Operator Requalification, and Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between October 4 and December 31, 2015

, by the resident inspectors at the South Texas Project and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office. Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements

. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process ," dated April 29, 2015.

Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas" dated December 4, 2014.

Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG

-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process

," Revision 5.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a finding, associated with simulator operability testing, for the failure of the licensee to track and incorporate actual plant data into their cyclic operability tests, as required by American National Standards Institute-3.5-2009, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training and Examination." With the exception of one transient, the licensee exclusively used engineering analysis from the RETRAN code as baseline data without reference to plant events that may have been related to the required transient tests. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 15

-21463.

The failure to track and incorporate plant events into baseline data for simulator operability testing is a performance deficiency. It is more than minor and, therefore, a finding because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and negatively affected the objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, if simulator performance is not being compared to the most relevant baseline data from the plant, the reliability of the simulator performance is reduced. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, "Licensed Operator Requalification SDP" (block 14), the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it is a "Simulator testing, maintenance, or modification deficiency." This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the procedure adherence component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to ensure that individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions in that the American National Standards Institute-3.5-2009 guidance for selecting baseline data for simulator testing was not followed [H.8]. (Section 1R11.

3)

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) for failure to maintain the emergency plan in accordance with the approved safety evaluation report. Specifically, the licensee failed to meet 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) requirements for timely augmentation of response capabilities, in accordance with the approved safety evaluation report. Following an update to the safety evaluation report in 1993, the licensee failed to update the emergency response organization staff augmentation time requirements to commence at the time of an emergency declaration vice from the time of an emergency notification. To restore compliance, the licensee updated the emergency plan in accordance with the current safety evaluation report. Failure to maintain the site emergency plan in accordance with the approved safety evaluation report, dated May 20, 1993, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to update the ERO staff augmentation time requirements to commence at the time of an emergency declaration, as required by the NRC safety evaluation report. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. This finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP)," dated September 22, 2015, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) per Table 5.2-1, "Significance Examples 50.47(b)(2)

," because the staffing processes do not meet the threshold of "routinely not capable of ensuring timely augmentation of the on shift emergency response staff to the extent that more than one required ERO functional area (in accordance with E

-plan commitments) would not be filled." No cross-cutting aspect is assigned because the performance deficiency is not indicative of present performance.

(Section 4OA2.3)

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power. On October 18, 2015, Unit 1 entered Mode 3 to begin Refueling Outage 1RE19. On November 13, 2015, Unit 1 entered Mode 3, but identified a reactor coolant pump 1C high seal leak off from the number 1 seal and returned to Mode 5 later that day to replace the seal. On November 17, 2015, following the repair of the reactor coolant pump 1C seal replacement, Unit 1 entered Mode 3.

On November 20, 2015, Unit 1 entered Mode 5 to evaluate issues regarding unreliable operation of control rod D

-6. Following an NRC emergency license amendment review and approval, the licensee removed control rod D

-6 from the reactor and entered Mode 3 on December 18, 2015. On December 20, 2015, Unit 1 closed main generator output breakers ending Refueling Outage 1RE19.

On December 21, 2015, while at 48 percent reactor power, main turbine governor valve number 2 began oscillating uncontrollably. Reactor operators trip ped the main turbine. Following the main turbine trip, group one steam dumps failed to operate

, which led to rising steam generator levels and resulted in a main feedwater isolation actuation.

Reactor operators initiated a manual reactor trip, and entered Mode 3, due to the inability to maintain and control steam generator levels. Following repairs to the main turbine number 2 governor valve and the group one steam dumps, Unit 1 entered Mode 1 on December 24, 2015

, and main generator breakers were closed on December 25, 2015. On December 30, 2015, Unit 1 reached 100 percent power and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 R 01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

On October 13, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's adverse weather procedures for extreme cold weather and evaluated the licensee's implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to the onset of cold weather , the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous cold weather season

. The inspectors selected two risk-significant systems that were required to be protected from cold weather

Unit s 1 and 2, essential cooling water intake structures Unit s 1 and 2, engineered safety features transformers The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and design information to ensure the systems would remain functional when challenged by adverse weather. The inspectors verified that operator actions described in the licensee's procedures were adequate t o maintain readiness of these systems. The inspectors walked down portions of these systems to verify the physical condition of the adverse weather protection features.

These activities constitute d one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

On October 14 and December 30, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's readiness to cope with external flooding. After reviewing the licensee's flooding analysis, the inspectors chose six plant areas that were susceptible to flooding:

Units 1 and 2 electrical auxiliary building Units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater storage tank areas Units 1 and 2 tendon access and auxiliary airlock areas The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether credited operator actions could be successfully accomplished.

These activities constitute d one sample of readiness to cope with external flooding , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Partial Walk

down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk

-downs of the following risk

-significant systems: October 14, 2015 , Unit 1, train A high head safety injection system while train B high head safety injection system was out of service for planned maintenance October 21, 2015, Unit 1

, technical support diesel generator when it was required for backup electrical power for closure of the containment equipment hatch Decem ber 14 through 15, 2015, Unit 2, train A auxiliary feedwater system while train D auxiliary feedwater pump was out of service for planned maintenance December 16 through 17, 2015, Unit 1, train B essential cooling water system while train C essential cooling water was out of service for planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration

. These activities constitute d four partial system walk

-down sample s , as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On October 6, 2015, the inspectors performed a complete system walk-down inspection of the Unit 2, train A component cooling water. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct component cooling water lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed open condition reports, temporary modifications, and other open items tracked by the licensee's operations and engineering departments

. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

On December 19, 2015, the inspectors performed a complete system walk

-down inspection of the Unit 1, train B high pressure safety injection system. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct high pressure safety injection system lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed open condition reports, temporary modifications, and other open items tracked by the licensee's operations and engineering departments

. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constitute d two complete system walk

-down sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on seven plant areas important to safety

October 7, 2015 , Unit 2, mechanical auxiliary building, Fire Area s 27, 29, and 02

Fire Zones Z128, Z139, and Z140 October 19, 2015 , Unit 1, reactor containment building, Fire Area 63, Fire Z ones Z222 and Z203 November 4, 2015, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building, Fire Area 04 , Fire Zone s Z052 and Z054 November 18, 2015, Unit 1, mechanical auxiliary building, Fire Area 50 , Fire Zone 401 November 18, 2015, Unit 1, mechanical auxiliary building, Fire Area 49, Fire Zone 402 November 19, 2015, Unit 1, mechanical auxiliary building, Fire Area 48

, Fire Zone 40 3 November 19, 2015, Unit 1, mechanical auxiliary building, Fire Area 51

, Fire Zone 405 For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constitute d seven quarterly inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed an inspection of the station's ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensee's flooding analysis, the inspectors chose two plant area s containing risk

-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that were susceptible to flooding:

On November 20, 2015, Unit 1, train A auxiliary feedwater pump room On December 30, 2015, Unit 1, fuel handling building The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.

These activities constitute completion of two flood protection measures sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee programs to verify heat exchanger performance and operability for the following heat exchangers:

Unit 1, train A standby diesel generator lube oil and jacket water heat exchangers Unit 1, train C essential chilled water chiller Unit 2, train A component cooling water heat exchanger Unit 2, train C essential chilled water chiller The inspector s verified whether testing, inspection, maintenance, and chemistry control programs are adequate to ensure proper heat transfer. The inspectors verified that the periodic testing and monitoring methods, as outlined in commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, utilized proper industry heat exchanger guidance. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee's chemistry program ensured that biological fouling was properly controlled between tests. The inspectors reviewed previous maintenance records of the heat exchangers to verify that the licensee's heat exchanger inspections adequately addressed structural integrity and cleanliness of their tubes. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of four triennial heat sink inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08)

The activities described in subsections 1 through 4 below constitute completion of one inservice inspection sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.08.

.1 Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Activities and Welding Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # Pipe Lugs/8

-AF-1010-GA2[C]/19PL1

-19PL8. Drawing # B AF 5. Record

1. MT-2015-062 Magnetic Particle Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI

-1206-HFW-0191 - FLEX tie-in to Safety Injection System. 3 inch Weld

-O-Let to 6 inch pipe. Record

1. PT-2015-218 Penetrant Examination Reactor Coolant System Component ID # Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve

FW-0015 (10 Pipe

-to-Valve HV3658A). Record

1. PT 2015 222 Penetrant Examination Reactor Coolant System Component ID # Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve

FW-0006 (13 Pipe

-to-Valve HV3658B). Record #

PT 2015 223 Penetrant Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1206. Weld ID # HFW-0177. Dated 10/27/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4542

-4063457 Radiograph Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1106. Weld ID # HFW-0156. Dated 10/22/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4542

-40163457 Radiograph Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 23B Pipe to Pipe. Record # UTCAL

-2015-84 (Ultrasonic Calibration)

Ultrasonic Examination SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Main Steam System Component ID # 30-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 23B Pipe to Pipe. Record # UTP 2015

-15 (Ultrasonic Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 23B Pipe to Pipe. Record # UT Exam 2015

-69 Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 25 Valve to Pipe. Record # UTCAL 2015

-82 (Ultrasonic Calibration)

Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 25 Valve to Pipe. Record # UTP 2015 1 (Ultrasonic Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 25 Valve to Pipe. Record # UT Exam 2015

-68 Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # Pipe to Elbow, 16 F 1018-GA2 weld 9.1. Transducer 45/60 degree. Drawing # B

-FW-8. Record # UT Exam-2015-076 Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # Pipe to Elbow, 16 FW 1018

-GA2, weld 9.1. Drawing # B

-FW-8. Record # UTP 2015-20 (UT Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # Elbow to Pipe, 16 F 1018-GA2 weld 8.1. Transducer 45/60 degree. Drawing # B

-FW-8. Record # UT Exam-2015-077 Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # Elbow to Pipe, 16-FW-1018-GA2, weld 8.1. Drawing # B

-FW-8. Record # UTP 2015-21 (UT Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI

-1106HFW-0190. FLEX tie

-in to Safety Injection System. 3 inch Weld

-O-Let to Spool SI

-1106-F. Record # VTW-2015-427 Visual Examination SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Safety Injection System Component ID #

SI-1206-HFW-0191. FLEX tie

-in to Safety Injection System. 3 inch Weld

-O-Let to 6 inch pipe. Record # VTW-2015-457 Visual Examination Component Cooling Water Component ID # GUIDE/CC

-1101-HL5001, Drawing # CC

-9101-HL5001. Pipe Support. Report # VTC

-2015-80 Visual Examination Component Cooling Water Component ID # GUIDE/CC

-1102-HL5002, Drawing # CC

-9102-HL5002. Pipe Support. Report # VTC

-2015-72 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component ID # Bottom Mounted Instrument Penetration/No. 1

-58. Drawing

1. A-RPB-BMI. Record #

VE 2015-005 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: #100718. RPV1 N1ASE/RPV Loop A Outlet Nozzle to Safe End @ 202 Degrees. Drw. # A

-RPV-2 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: #100858. RPV1 N1BSE/RPV Loop B Outlet Nozzle to Safe End @ 338 Degrees. Drw. # A

-RPV-2 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: #100998. RPV1 N1CSE/RPV Loop C Outlet Nozzle to Safe End @ 22 Degrees. Drw. # A

-RPV-2 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: #101138. RPV1 N1DSE/RPV Loop D Outlet Nozzle to Safe End @ 158 Degrees. Drw. # A

-RPV-2 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: # 760180. RPV1 N1ASE/RPV Loop A Outlet Nozzle to Safe End, (Hot Leg). Drw. # A-RPV-2 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: # 760200. RPV1 N1BSE/RPV Loop B Outlet Nozzle to Safe End, (Hot Leg). Drw. # A RPV

-2 Visual Examination SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: # 760220. RPV1-N1CSE/RPV Loop C Outlet Nozzle to Safe End, (Hot Leg). Drw. # A

-RPV-2 Visual Examination Reactor Coolant System Component Summary: # 760240. RPV1-N1DSE/RPV Loop D Outlet Nozzle to Safe End, (Hot Leg). Drw. # A

-RPV-2 Visual Examination Component Cooling Water System Record # VTC-2015-80. Component: Guide/CC

-1101-HL5001, pipe support. Drw. #

CC- 9101-HL5001 Visual Examination Component Cooling Water System Record # VTC

-2015-72. Component: Guide/CC

-1102-HL5002, pipe support. Drw. #

CC- 9102-HL5002 Visual Examination Reactor Pressure Vessel System Record # VTW

-2015-465. Component: Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve FW

-0015 (Pipe to Valve HV3658A)

Visual Examination Reactor Pressure Vessel System Record # VTW

-2015-466. Component: Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve FW

-0006 (Pipe to Valve HV3658B)

Visual Examination Chemical Volume Control System Record # VTC

-20105-82. Component: SH

-V/CV-1121-HS5004 (Spring Can Hanger). Drawing: CV

-9121-HS5004 Visual Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # Pipe Lugs/8

-AF-1010-GA2[C]/19PL1

-19PL8. Drawing # B AF 5. Record # MT

-2015-062 Magnetic Particle Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI

-1206-HFW-0191 - FLEX tie-in to Safety Injection System. 3 inch Weld

-O-Let to 6 inch pipe. Record # PT

-2015-218 Penetrant Examination Reactor Coolant System Component ID # Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve FW

-0015 (10 Pipe

-to-Valve HV3658A). Record # PT 2015 222 Penetrant Examination SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Reactor Coolant System Component ID # Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve FW

-0006 (13 Pipe

-to-Valve HV3658B). Record # PT 2015 223 Penetrant Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1206. Weld ID # HFW-0177. Dated 10/27/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4542

-4063457 Radiograph Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1106. Weld ID # HFW-0156. Dated 10/22/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4542

-40163457 Radiograph Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 23B Pipe to Pipe. Record # UTCAL

-2015-84 (Ultrasonic Calibration)

Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 23B Pipe to Pipe. Record # UTP 2015

-15 (Ultrasonic Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 23B Pipe to Pipe.

Record # UT Exam 2015

-69 Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 25 Valve to Pipe.

Record # UTCAL 2015

-82 (Ultrasonic Calibration)

Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 25 Valve to Pipe. Record # UTP 2015 1 (Ultrasonic Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Main Steam System Component ID # 30

-MS-1002 GA2. Weld 25 Valve to Pipe. Record # UT Exam 2015

-68 Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # Pipe to Elbow, 16 F 1018-GA2 weld 9.1. Transducer 45/60 degree. Drawing # B

-FW-8. Record # UT Exam-2015-076 Ultrasonic Examination The inspectors reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1106. Weld ID # HFW-0149. Dated 10/22/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4542

-40163457 Radiograph Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1106. Weld ID # HFW-0156. Dated 10/22/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4542

-40163457 Radiograph Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1106. Weld ID # HFW-0150. Dated 08/19/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4491

-40131645 Radiograph Examination Safety Injection System Component ID # SI 1206. Weld ID # HFW-0163. Dated 10/05/2015. 3 inch butt weld. Mistras Job # J 4542

-40163457 Radiograph Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # 4

-RC-1320-BB1 weld 4, pipe to elbow. Transducer 45 degrees. Drawing

1. A-RC-10. Record # UT Exam 2015-064 Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # 4

-RC-1320-BB1-4, elbow to pipe. Drawing #

A-RC-10. Record # UTP 2015

-16 (UT Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID #

4-RC-1320-BB1 weld 5, elbow to pipe. Transducer 45 degrees. Drawing

1. A-RC-10. Record # UT Exam-2015-065 Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # 4

-RC-1320-BB1-5, elbow to pipe. Drawing #

A-RC-10. Record # UTP 2015

-17 (UT Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # 102950 12

-RC-13 12-BB1 weld 10, elbow to pipe. Transducer 45 degrees. Drawing # A-RC-8. Record # UT Exam-2015-066 Ultrasonic Examination SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # 12

-RC-131 2-BB1 weld 10, elbow to pipe. Drawing # A RC-8. Record # UTP 2015-19 (UT Profile) Ultrasonic Examination Auxiliary Feedwater System Component ID # 8

-RC-1214-BB1 weld 3, elbow to pipe. Drawing #

A-RC-8. Record # UTP 2015

-18 (UT Profile)

Ultrasonic Examination During the review and observation of each examination, the inspectors verified that activities were performed in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements and applicable procedures. The qualifications of all nondestructive examination technicians performing the inspections were verified to be current.

The inspectors directly observed a portion of the following welding activities:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION WELD TYPE Safety Injection System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "A". Line # SI 1106, Weld # HFW0149 LA Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Safety Injection System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "A". Line # SI 1106, Weld # HFW0190 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Weldin g Safety Injection System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "B". Line # SI 1206, Weld # HFW0177 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Safety Injection System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "B". Line # SI 1206, Weld # HFW0191 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "B". Line # AF 1077, Weld # HFW0184 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "B". Line # AF 1077, Weld # HFW0185 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding The inspectors reviewed records of the following welding activities:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION WELD TYPE Safety Injection System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "A". Line # SI 1101, Weld # HFW0097 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Safety Injection System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "B". Line # SI 1201, Weld # HFW0097 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "B". Line # AF 1077, Weld # HFW0190 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "B". Line # AF 1014, Weld # HFW0198 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "B". Line # AF 1014, Weld # HFW0199 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "C". Line # AF 1079, Weld # HFW0191 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System

- Train "C". Line # AF 1079, Weld # HFW0192 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "C". Line # AF 1079, Weld # HFW0197 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "C". Line # AF 1047, Weld # HFW0204 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding Auxiliary Feedwater System FLEX Modification tie

-in to Safety Injection System - Train "B". Line # AF 1047, Weld # HFW0205 Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Weldi ng The inspectors verified, by review, that the welding procedure specifications and the welders had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section IX requirements. The inspectors also verified through record review that essential variables for the welding process were identified, recorded in the procedure qualification record, and formed the bases for qualification of the welding procedure specifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During South Texas Project Refueling Outage 1RE19, there was no visual examination of the reactor pressure vessel head performed. In compliance with A SME Code Case N-729-1, "Alternative Examination Requirements for PWR Reactor Vessel Upper Heads With Nozzles Having Pressure

-Retaining Partial

-Penetration WeldsSection XI, Division 1," Table 1 requires licensees that have new reactor heads with nozzles and partial-penetration welds of primary water stress corrosion cracking

-resistant materials to perform a 100 percent inspection every third refueling outage or 5 calendar years, whichever is less. The licensee last inspected the Unit 1 r eactor pressure vessel head in March 2014.

b. Findings

No findings were identified

. 3. Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensee's boric acid corrosion control program for monitoring degradation of those systems that could be adversely affected by boric acid corrosion. The inspectors reviewed the documentation associated with the licensee's boric acid corrosion control wal k-down as specified in Procedure 0PGP03-ZE-0133, "Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program," Revision 9, and Procedure 0PGP03

-ZE-0033, "RCS Pressure Boundary Inspection for Boric Acid Leaks

," Revision 13. The inspectors reviewed visual records of components and equipment containing boric acid leaks. The inspectors performed walk

-downs of portions of the following areas:

residual heat removal pump rooms, safety injection pump rooms, reactor pressure vessel hot and cold leg nozzles, and reactor vessel bottom mounted instrument penetrations. The inspectors verified that the visual inspections emphasized locations where boric acid leaks could cause degradation of safety

-significant components. The inspectors also verified that the engineering evaluations for those components where boric acid was identified gave assurance that the ASME Code wall thickness limits were properly maintained.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the steam generator tube eddy current (ECT) examination scope and expansion criteria to determine whether these criteria met technical specification requirements, EPRI guidelines, and commitments made to the NRC. The inspectors also reviewed whether the ECT inspection scope included areas of degradations that were known to represent potential ECT test challenges such as the top of tube sheet, tube support plates, and U

-bends. The inspectors confirmed that no repairs were required at the time of the inspection.

The scope of the licensee's ECT examinations included:

Full length bobbin inspection of the outer three peripheral tubes from tube end to tube end, including 10 tubes inwards into the no

-tube lane from the periphery Fifty percent full length bobbin inspection of all tubes. Scope shall include all remaining tubes not inspected full length during 1RE13 Twenty percent

+point probe inspection of the upper t ube sheet plate hot leg to upper t ube sheet plate cold leg on rows 1 and 2 (U-bends) Twenty percent

+point probe inspection of tube sheet hot leg +6 inches/

-3 inches +Point probe inspection of outer three tubes of periphery and divider lane top of t ube sheet +6 inches/

-3 inches to aid in loose parts detection (hot leg and cold l eg) >Twenty percent

+point probe sample inspection of tube sheet hot l eg +6 inches/-16 inches in tube with bulges and over expansions.

This includes 65 in SG A, 18 in SG B, 5 in SG C, and 7 in SG D The primary side inspection also includes the following special interest scope:

+Point probe inspection of all previously identified dents and dings >5 volts

+Point probe inspection of all prior and 1RE19 "I

-code" and/or non

-quantifiable indications as determined by bobbin inspection or any previously reported signal that has changed

+Point probe inspection of possible loose parts in the ECT database as identified by previous ECT inspections

+Point probe inspection of all observed loose parts as identified by previous secondary side video inspections and not removed +Point probe inspection of a minimum two tube locations surrounding any new possible loose parts or foreign object identified in 1RE16 Video inspection of all installed plugs Inspection scope of the secondary side of the SGs for 1RE19 includes the following:

Top of tube sheet foreign object search and retrieval in all four SGs including annulus and tube lane Top of tube sheet i n-bundle foreign object search and retrieval as follows

SG 1A inspect every fourth column both hot leg and cold l eg SG 1 B inspect every fourth column both hot leg and cold l eg SG 1 C inspect every fourth column both hot leg and cold l eg SG 1D inspect every second column both hot l eg and cold l eg Ultra sludge lancing on all four SGs Sludge collector inspection and cleaning (if required based on inspection) in SG 1A. The sludge collectors will only be cleaned if more than 0.5 inch of sludge is seen Steam drum inspection in SG 1A and 1B Upper steam drum inspection of SG 1A Foreign object search and retrieval of all possible

b. Findings

No findings were identified

.

.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed 54 condition reports which dealt with inservice inspection activities and found the corrective actions to be appropriate. The specific condition reports reviewed are listed in the documents reviewed section. From this review

, the inspectors concluded that the licensee has an appropriate threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program and has procedures that direct a root cause evaluation when necessary. The licensee also has an effective program for applying industry operating experience.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11)

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On October 12, 2015, the inspectors observed simulator just-in-time training for an operating crew in preparation for the Unit 1

, 1RE19 Refueling Outage. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the just-in-time training activities

.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

On October 17, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on

-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to shutting down the reactor for Refueling Outage 1RE19.

In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including 0POP03-ZG-0006, "Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby," Revision 61, and other operations department policies.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Biennial Review

a. Inspection Scope

The licensed operator requalification program involves two training cycles that are conducted over a 2-year period. In the first cycle, the annual cycle, the operators are administered an operating test consisting of job performance measures and simulator scenarios. In the second part of the training cycle, the biennial cycle, operators are administered an operating test and a comprehensive written examination.

To assess the performance effectiveness of the licensed operator requalification program, the inspectors reviewed both the written examination and operating test quality , and observed licensee administration of an annual requalification test while on site. The operating tests observed included five job performance measures and two scenarios that were used in the current biennial requalification cycle. These observations allowed the inspectors to assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the operating test to ensure operator mastery of the training program content and to determine if feedback of performance analyses into the requalification training program was being accomplished.

On December 23, 2015, the licensee informed the inspectors of the completed cycle results for Units 1 and 2

, for both the written examinations and the operating tests

Thirteen of fifteen crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test Eighty-three of eighty-five licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test Eighty-five of eighty-five licensed operators passed the job performance measure portion of the operating test Eighty-two of eighty-five licensed operators passed the written examination The individuals that failed any portion of the exam were remediated, retested, and passed their retake examinations. Two operators have not completed their examinations due to extended medical leave

, and their licenses have been placed in a suspended status pending completion of missed training and the requalification examinations

. The inspectors observed examination security measures in place during administration of the examinations (including controls and content overlap) and reviewed remedial training and re

-examinations, as available. The inspectors also reviewed medical records of 12 licensed operators for conformance to license conditions and the licensee's system for tracking qualifications and records of license reactivation for five operators.

The inspectors reviewed simulator performance for fidelity with the actual plant and the overall simulator program of maintenance, testing, and discrepancy correction.

The inspectors completed one inspection sample of the biennial licensed operator requalification program.

b. Findings

Failure to Track and Incorporate Actual Plant Data into Simulator Operability Testing

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with simulator operability testing for the failure of the licensee to track and incorporate actual plant data into their cyclic operability tests, as required by American National Standards Institute (ANSI)-3.5-2009, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training and Examination." With the exception of one transient, the licensee exclusively used engineering analysis from the RETRAN code as baseline data without reference to plant events that may have been related to the required transient tests.

Description.

During the week of September 14, 2015, while performing a biennial requalification inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," the inspectors reviewed the baseline data sources used to evaluate simulator operability testing. South Texas Project's Simulator Configuration Control Procedure (0PNT01

-ZA-0037), Section 4.5.5.2, requires that each fuel cycle, benchmark transient tests shall be conducted as delineated in ANSI

-3.5-2009. Section B.3.2 of ANSI

-3.5-2009 lists 11 transient performance tests that must be performed such as a manual reactor trip, reactor coolant pump trip, maximum design load rejection, and others. Section 5.1.1 of ANSI

-3.5-2009 requires that the baseline data against which the simulator is compared shall be used in the following order of preference: 1) actual plant data, 2) engineering analysis, 3) similar plant data, and

4) subject matter expert estimates. Contrary to this standard, South Texas Project cyclic simulator operability testing exclusively used engineering analysis from the RETRAN code without reference to plant events that may be related to the transients (with the exception of the manual reactor trip transient, for which South Texas Project had appropriately demonstrated equivalency with a 2002 plant event). The station does perform post

-event simulator testing as required following actual plant events, but this is one-time testing that is not repeated, in contrast with cyclic operability testing which is repeated after each fuel load. Because the station was not actively incorporating plant data into cyclic simulator operability testing at the time of the sample, the station was unable to provide a list of relevant plant events that might qualify as baseline data.

This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 15-21463. South Texas Project's Simulator Configuration Control Procedure (0PNT01

-ZA-0037), Section 4.5.5.2, requires that each fuel cycle, benchmark transient tests shall be conducted as delineated in ANSI

-3.5-2009. Section 5.1.1 of ANSI

-3.5-2009 requires that the baseline data against which the simulator is compared shall be used in the following order of preference: 1) actual plant data, 2) engineering analysis, 3) similar plant data, and 4) subject matter expert estimates. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to actively track and incorporate actual plant data into cyclic simulator operability testing, instead relying on engineering analysis exclusively. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 15

-21463.

Analysis.

The failure to track and incorporate plant events into baseline data for simulator operability testing is a performance deficiency. It is more than minor and

, therefore , a finding because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and negatively affected the objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, if simulator performance is not being compared to the most relevant baseline data from the plant, the reliability of the simulator performance is reduced. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, "Licensed Operator Requalification SDP" (block 14), the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it is a "Simulator testing, maintenance, or modification deficiency." This finding has a cross

-cutting aspect in the procedure adherence component of the human performance cross

-cutting area because the licensee failed to ensure that individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions in that the ANSI-3.5-2009 guidance for selecting baseline data for simulator testing was not followed [H.8].

Enforcement.

This finding does not involve enforcement action because no violation of a regulatory requirement was identified. Because this finding does not involve a violation and is of very low safety or security significance, it is identified as FIN 05000498/2015004-01; 05000499/2015004-01-01 , "Failure to Track and Incorporate Actual Plant Data into Simulator Operability Testing."

1 R 12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one instance of degraded performance or condition of safety-related SSCs: December 28, 2015, periodic assessment of the effectiveness of Maintenance Rule activities from February 2014 through March 2015

The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constitute d completion of one maintenance effectiveness sample , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:

October 7, 2015 , Unit 2, train C, 125

-Vdc battery breaker E2C

-11 replacement

, which required the licensee to enter the Configuration Risk Management Program October 8, 2015, installation of corona balls on the shunt reactor in the switchyard on the south bus

, which required isolating the Unit 2 standby transformer October 16, 2015, Unit 1, train B high head safety injection pump replacement , which required the licensee to enter the Configuration Risk Management Program The inspectors verified that these risk assessment s were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessment s and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessment s. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's actions for implementing the Configuration Risk Management Program for determining and implementing the ris k-informed allowed outage time for the planned activity listed above.

These activities constitute completion of three maintenance risk assessments inspection sample s, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five operability determination s that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:

October 13, 2015, operable but degraded determination of the Unit 1 qualified data processing system upon discovery of a drifting circuit board October 15, 2015, operability determination of Unit 1, train B containment spray following the discovery of a n air void during fill and vent activity for the system November 5, 2015, operable but degraded determination of Unit 1, train A emergency safeguards features sequencer following essential chiller 12A starting time outside surveillance acceptance criteria December 28, 2015 , operability determination of Unit 1 reactor vessel water level system , train A , following failure of a sensor December 31, 2015, the inspectors performed an in

-depth follow

-up of the Unit s 1 and 2 cumulative effects of operator workarounds, operator burdens, and control board items to determine the reliability, availability, and potential for incorrect operation of systems or components The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, t he inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC

. The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions.

The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operator s' ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

These activities constitute completion of five operabili ty review sample s, which included one operator work

-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

.1 Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

On November 2, 2015, the inspectors reviewed a temporary modification for Unit 1 temporary power to spent fuel pool cooling pump 1B during Refueling Outage 1RE19.

The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed and removed this temporary modification in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that this modification did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs. The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modification to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.

These activities constitute completion of one sample of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two permanent plant modifications that affected risk

-significant SSCs: December 23, 2015, Unit 1

, removal of electrical power, removal of position indication, and modification of plant computer point for the physical removal of control rod D6 from the reactor for operating cycle 20 December 23, 2015, Unit 1

, installation of a flow restrictor at the top of the guide tube in the upper internals

, and a partial length guide tube restrictor in the fuel bundle due to the physical removal of control rod D6 and its drive shaft for operating cycle 20 The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modifications. The inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modification s did not adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or other unplanned event. The inspectors verified that post

-modification testing was adequate to establish the operabilit y of the SSCs as modified.

These activities constitute completion of two sample s of permanent modifications , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:

October 15, 2015, Unit 1

, train B high head safety injection pump following pump replacement November 1, 2015, Unit 1, technical support diesel and load center 1W following supply breaker maintenance November 3, 2015, Unit 1, reactor coolant pump 1A seal injection containment isolation valve MOV

-33A following stem nut replacement November 3, 2015, Unit 1, reactor coolant pump 1C seal injection containment isolation valve MOV

-33C following stem nut replacement December 21, 2015, Unit 2, train A essential chiller 22a outlet line following flange replacement due to material de

-alloying The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design

-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures.

The inspectors observed the performance of the post

-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.

These activities constitute completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)

.1 Unit 1 Refueling Outage 1RE19

a. Inspection Scope

During the station's Refueling Outage 1RE19 that concluded on December 20, 2015, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:

Review of the licensee's outage plan prior to the outage Review and verification of the licensee's fatigue management activities Monitoring of shutdown and cooldown activities Verification that the licensee maintained defense

-in-depth during outage activities Observation and review of reduced

-inventory and mid

-loop activities Observation and review of fuel handling activities Monitoring of heatup and startup activities

These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Forced Outage

a. Inspection Scope

During the station's forced outage that began on December 21, 2015

, and concluded on December 25, 2015, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:

Review of the licensee's outage plan following the reactor trip Review and verification of the licensee's fatigue management activities Monitoring of sh utdown activities Verification that the licensee maintained defense

-in-depth during outage activities Monitoring of startup activities These activities constitute completion of one outage activities sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed five risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service tests:

October 22, 2015, Unit 1, train C low head safety injection comprehensive pump test October 22, 2015, Unit 1, train B high head safety injection comprehensive pump test and pump curve measurement

Containment isolation valve surveillance tests: October 23, 2015 , Unit 1, safety injection system, train A , local leak rate test of penetration M-18, check valve 1

-SI-0005A Reactor coolant system leak detection tests: November 12, 2015, Unit 1

, reactor coolant inventory leak rate Other surveillance tests:

October 21, 2015, Unit 1, train A emergency diesel generator load reject and safety injection auto

-start tests The inspectors verified that these test s met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constitute completion of five surveillance testing inspection sample s , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparedness 1 EP 2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation (71114.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the adequacy of the licensee's methods for testing the primary and backup alert and notification system (ANS). The inspector interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the maintenance of the primary ANS and reviewed a sample of corrective action system reports written for ANS problems. The inspector compared the licensee's alert and notification system testing program with criteria in NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Updated Prompt Notification System Design Report , September 30, 2010; and Updated Prompt Notification System Design Report, June 6, 2013. Other documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.

These activities constituted completion of one alert and notification system evaluation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 EP 3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System (71114.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified the licensee's emergency response organization (ERO) on-shift and augmentation staffing levels were in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan commitments. The inspector reviewed documentation and discussed with licensee staff the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting the on

-shift emergency response staff to verify the adequacy of the licensee's methods for staffing emergency response facilities, including the licensee's ability to staff pre

-planned alternate facilities. The inspector also reviewed records of ERO augmentation tests and events to determine whether the licensee had maintained a capability to staff emergency response facilities within emergency plan timeliness commitments.

These activities constitute completion of one emergency response organization staffing and augmentation testing sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 EP 4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed an on

-site review of the following emergency plan implementing procedures:

0ERP01-ZV-IN02, "Notifications to Offsite Agencies," Revision 31 0ERP01-ZV-IN02, "Notifications to Offsite Agencies," Revision 32 0ERP01-ZV-IN07, "Offsite Protective Action Recommendations," Revision 14 0ERP01-ZV-IN07, "Offsite Protective Action Recommendations," Revision 15 0ERP01-ZV-TP01, "Offsite Dose Calculations," Revision 24 0ERP01-ZV-TP01, "Offsite Dose Calculations," Revision These revisions implemented new administrative instructions because of program or software changes, form updates, and editorial corrections.

Additionally, the inspector reviewed emergency plan change:

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Emergency Plan, Revision ICN 20-17 This revision corrected Section C.4 of the plan to state that the augmentation start time for activation of the ERO is from the time of declaration of an event and not from the time of notification to the ERO.

Th e s e revision s were compared to previous revision s, to the criteria of NUREG

-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revision adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that the revisions did not reduce the effectiveness of the emergency plan. This review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee

-generated changes; therefore, the revisions are subject to future inspection.

These activities constitute completion of seven emergency action level and emergency plan changes samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 EP 5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness (71114.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed samples of the following documents for the period of June 201 3 to November 201 5: After-action evaluation reports for licensee drills and exercises Independent audits and surveillances of the licensee's emergency preparedness program Self-assessments of the emergency preparedness program conducted by the licensee Licensee evaluations of changes made to the emergency plan and emergency plan implementing procedures Drill and exercise performance issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program Emergency preparedness program issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program ERO and emergency planner training records The inspector reviewed summaries of corrective action program reports associated with emergency preparedness and selected 19 to review against program requirements to determine the licensee's ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F. The inspector verified that the licensee accurately and appropriately identified and corrected emergency preparedness weaknesses during critiques and assessments

. These activities constitute completion of one sample of the maintenance of the licensee's emergency preparedness program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security 4OA 1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index

Heat Removal System s (MS08)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of April 2014 through September 2015 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for heat removal systems for Unit 1 and Unit 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index

Residual Heat Removal System s (MS09)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of April 2014 through September 2015 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for residual heat removal systems for Unit 1 and Unit 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index

Cooling Water Support Systems (MS10)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of April 2014 through September 2015 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for cooling water support systems for Unit 1 and Unit 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Drill/Exercise Performance

(EP01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluated exercises and selected drill and training evolutions that occurred between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015, to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for classification, notification, and protective action recommendation opportunities. The inspector reviewed a sample of the licensee's completed classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations to verify their timeliness and accuracy. The inspector used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the drill/exercise performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's records for participation in drill and training evolutions between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015

, to verify the accuracy of the li censee's data for drill participation opportunities. The inspector verified that all members of the licensee's ERO in the identified key positions had been counted in the reported performance indicator data. The inspector reviewed the licensee's basis for reporting the percentage of ERO members who participated in a drill. The inspector reviewed drill attendance records and verified a sample of those reported as participating. The inspector used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator

, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Alert and Notification System Reliability (EP03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's records of ANS tests conducted between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015 , to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for siren system testing opportunities. The inspector reviewed procedural guidance on assessing ANS opportunities and the results of periodic ANS operability tests. The inspector used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7 , to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA 2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified

.

.2 Semi annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, list of essential cooling water leaks, condition reports associated with the main cooling reservoir, outage performance indications, hot work activities, outstanding work orders, and other documentation to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends.

These activities constitute completion of one semiannual trend review sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152. b. Observations and Assessments The inspectors' review of the possible trends noted above produced the following observations and assessments:

Hot work performance was a focus item for the licensee as well as the resident inspectors in the last half of the year. The licensee has developed a procedure that is specifically for hot work, has conducted training, and provided extra oversight in the field. The licensee has improved performance although, the resident inspectors continued to note deficiencies in this area.

The residents and the site have identified a number of maintenance issues associated with the main cooling reservoir. Some of the issues include vegetation control in and around the reservoir, relief well washout, outfall piping elevation drop, and piezometer protection piping damaged. The licensee is having an assessment from an outside consultant to help prioritize and correct the issues. The resident inspectors toured the main cooling reservoir and do not currently have a n operability concern.

The residents have noted several essential cooling water leaks (aluminum

-bronze) which were shared with the licensee. The number of noted leaks and condition reports have not identified any trends as the licensee normally identifies 2

-3 leaks per year and promptly corrects the issues by replacing the piping as necessary.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Annual Follow

-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected one issue for an in

-depth follow

-up: On December 7, 2015 , the inspectors reviewed a discrepancy between the emergency plan and th e safety evaluation report.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews

, and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to bring the emergency plan back into compliance with the safety evaluation report

.

These activities constitute completion of one annual follow

-up sample , as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

Failure to Maintain the Emergency Plan Introduction

The inspectors identified a Green non

-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) for failure to maintain the emergency plan. Specifically, the licensee failed to meet 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) requirements for timely augmentation of response capabilities, in accordance with the approved safety evaluation report.

Description:

During review of a license amendment request, dated October 6, 2015, regarding the site emergency plan's staff augmentation response times, NRC staff noted a discrepancy between the current site emergency plan and the approved safety evaluation report. The licensee submitted an earlier license amendment request dated November 3, 1992, the purpose of which was to increase the ERO staff augmentation times by 15 minutes. This changed staff augmentation times from 45 minutes (for radiation protection technicians and nuclear engineers) and 60 minutes (for other staff) to 60 minutes and 75 minutes respectively. The license amendment request stated that these times were "following an emergency declaration." Prior to this change, the licensee's emergency plan and the NRC's safety evaluation report required the licensee's staff augmentation time requirements to begin "following an emergency notification

," which the licensee was satisfied with.

On May 20, 1993

, the NRC approved the licensee's request for extending ERO staff augmentation response times "following emergency declaration," and issued an updated safety evaluation report containing this change on the same date. The licensee updated the emergency plan to reflect the new ERO staff augmentation response times

, but failed to update the emergency plan wi th the change for ERO staff augmentation time requirements from "notification" to "declaration."

Table C-1 of Section C of the emergency plan incorrectly stated that time requirements for ERO staff augmentation are from the time of an emergency notificati on vice the time of an emergency declaration.

Failing to implement this change could delay ERO staff augmentation times by as much as 15 minutes causing the licensee to exceed the time requirements set forth by the safety evaluation report. The licensee has demonstrated through unannounced off

-hours activation drills and announced staff drills that a loss of timely ERO staff augmentation would not have occurred as a result of the emergency plan change from time of notification to time of declaration.

This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 15

-23835. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee updated the emergency plan to accurately show that ERO staff augmentation times are to commence at the time of an emergency declaration.

Analysis:

Failure to maintain the site emergency plan in accordance with the approved safety evaluation report, dated May 20, 1993, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to update the ERO staff augmentation time requirements to commence at the time of an emergency declaration, as required by the NRC safety evaluation report. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. This finding was evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP)," dated September 22, 2015, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) per Table 5.2

-1, "Significance Examples 50.47(b)(2)

," because the staffing processes do not meet the threshold of "routinely not capable of ensuring timely augmentation of the on shift emergency response staff to the extent that more than one required ERO functional area (in accordance with E

-pla n commitments) would not be filled." No cross

-cutting aspect is assigned because the performance deficiency is not indicative of present performance.

Enforcement:

Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires, in part, that a holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the requirements in Appendix E, part 50, and for nuclear power reactor licensees, the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) requires, in part, that timely augmentation of response capabilities is available. Contrary to the above, from May 20, 1993

, until November 3, 2015, the licensee failed to ensure that timel y augmentation of response capabilities was available. Specifically, a change to the safety e valuation report affecting the emergency plan was not appropriately implemented in that Table C-1 of Section C of the emergency plan was not updated to reflect ERO staff augmentation times are from the time of an emergency declaration vice the time of an emergency notification. The licensee restored compliance by revising the site emergency plan to require timely staff augmentation following an emergency declaration. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 15-23835. Because the finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non

-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: (NCV 05000498/2015004

-0 2; 05000499/201500 4-0 2, "Failure to Maintain the Emergency Plan U p to Date With the Safety Evaluation Report

.")

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153

)

.1 Event Follow-up for Excessive

Leakage into a Waste Holding Tank

On November 13, 2015, while in Mode 3

, following Refueling Outage 1RE19, Unit 1 experienced increased leakage into the chemical volume control system waste h olding tank when a demineralizer was placed on service. Control room operators treated this excessive leakage as reactor coolant system leakage until the source of the leak could be identified and isolated.

The licensee declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) based on Unidentified Reactor Coolant Boundary Leakage. Shortly after entering the NOUE Control room operators identified the leakage was coming from a chemical volume control system drain valve and isolated that valve. The inspectors responded to the control room and observed the licensee's identification and resolution of the issue

, including walking down the affected portion of the chemical and volume control system , reviewing operator logs, and interviewing operators. The licensee retracted the NOUE on December 08, 2015 because the source of the leak was from the chemical volume control system and not the reactor coolant system. Inspectors determined that the retraction was appropriate.

No findings were identified.

.2 Event Follow-up for Unit 1 Manual Turbine and

Reactor Trip On December 21, 2015, while Unit 1 was at 48 percent power, turbine governor valve 2 began to oscillate open and closed

, resulting in large load swings and steam dump actuation. Operator s began to reduce turbine load in order to stabilize the governor valve, but the oscillations continued. The shift manager directed a manual trip of the main turbine. Main turbine governor valve 2 continued to oscillate and the group one steam dumps failed to operate

, as designed

, to manage the main steam to the condenser on the turbine load reject. Main feedwater continued to fill the steam generators to the main feedwater isolation setpoint of 87.5 percent. All four steam generator power operated relief valves lifted as designed. Steam generator levels lowered , and with no ability to feed the steam generators to maintain levels, the shift manager ordered a manual reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor core and all safe ty-related systems functioned as designed, with the exception of steam generator A blowdown containment isolation valve that failed to isolate on the main feedwater isolation.

The resident inspector respon ded to the control roo m upon hearing the load reduction plant announcement. The resident inspector observed all major evolutions and the operating crew's performance, reviewed the licensee's initial investigation and equipment repair prior to starting up the reactor. The inspectors also reviewed the initial licensee notification to verify it met the requirements specified in NUREG

-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines," Revision 3.

No findings were identified.

These activities constitute completion of two event follow

-up sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.

4OA 6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On November 5, 2015, the inspectors presented the in-service inspection results to Mr. G. Powell, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors acknowledged review of proprietary material during the inspection which had been or will be returned to the licensee

.

On November 19, 2015, the inspector presented the results of the on

-site inspection of the emergency preparedness program to Mr. D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President

, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

On December 10, 2015, the inspectors presented the final triennial heat sink inspection results to Mr. D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President, Operations, and Mr. G. Powell, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

The inspectors briefed Mr. G. Powell, Site Vice President

, and other members of the licensee's staff of the preliminary results of the licensed operator requalification program inspection on September 17, 2015. The inspectors conducted a telephonic exit meeting with Mr. G. Janak, Operations Training Manager, and other members of the licensee's staff on January 4, 2016. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On January 7, 201 6, the inspectors presented the resident inspection results to Mr. G. Powell, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Aguilera, Manager, Health Physics

P. Alier, Systems Engineering

J. Ashcraft, Quality Control

J. Atkins, Manager, Systems Engineering

M. Berg, Manager, Design Engineering/Testing and Programs

C. Bowman, Manager , Nuclear Oversight

W. Brost, Engineer III

A. Capristo, Executive Vice President

and Chief Administrative Officer

D. Caraballo, Systems Engineering

J. Connolly, General Manager, Engineering

M. Crain, Manager, Emergency Response

R. Dunn Jr., Manager, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis

J. Enoch, Supervisor, Emergency

R es pon s e

T. Frawley, Manager, Plant Protection/Emergency Response

C. Gann, Manager, Employee Concerns Program

M. Garner, Nondestructive Examination Examiner

R. Gibbs, Manager, Operations, Production

Support

R. Gonzales, Senior Licensing Engineer

J. Hartley, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance

J. Heil, TPE Engineer, Programs

G. Hildebran

d t, Manager, Operations

K. Hilscher, Manager, Training

S. Horak, Emergency Response Department

R. Hubenak, Supervisor, Licensed Operator Requalification

T. Hurley, Supervisor, Simulator Support

D. Janak, System

s Engineering

G. Janak, Operations Training Manager

D. Koehl, President and CEO

S. Korenek, Emergency Response Department

J. Lovejoy, Manager, I&C Maintenance

R. McNeil, Manager, Maintenance Engineering

B. Migl, Supervisor, Testing and Programs

J. Milliff, Manager, Security

M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

R. Nieman, Site Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANII)

C. Pence, Manager, Chemistry

L. Peter, General Manager, Projects

J. Pierce, Manager, Unit 1 Operations

G. Powell, Site Vice President

F. Puleo, Licensing Staff Specialist

K. Regis, Design Engineering

D. Rencurrel, Senior Vice President, Operations

R. Richardson, Welding Engineer

S. Rodgers, Emergency Response Department

M. Ruvalcaba, Manager, Strategic Projects

R. Savage, Engineer, Licensing Consult Specialist

R. Scarborough, Manager, Quality Assurance

M. Schaefer, Plant General Manager

S. Shojaei, Repair and Replacement Program Engineer, Testing Programs

L. Spiess, Supervisor, Testing Programs

R. Stastny, Maintenance Manager

L. Sterling, Supervisor, Licensing

S. Taylor, Emergency Response Department

J. Von Suskil, Owner Rep

- NRG South Texas LP

T. Wacker, Engineer, Quality Programs

G. Wendel, Emergency Response Department

J. Williams, Engineer, Testing Programs

P. Williams, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Manager

C. Younger, Testing Programs

D. Zink, Supervising Engineering Specialist

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

===Opened and

Closed===

05000498/2015004-01 0500049 9/2015004-01 FIN Failure to Track and Incorporate Actual Plant Data into Simulator Operability Testing

(1R11.4)

05000498/2015004

-0 2 0500049 9/2015004-0 2 NCV Failure to Maintain the Emergency Plan

U p to Date With the Safety Evaluation Report

(4OA2.3)

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0POP01-ZO-0004 Extreme Cold Weather Guidelines

0PGP03-ZV-0004 Freezing Weather Plan

0POP04-ZO-0002 Natural or destructive Phenomena Guidelines

0POP02-MC-0001 Cooling Water Reservoir Spillway Gates and Blowdown Operation 11 0PGP03-ZV-0006 Main Cooling Reservoir Notification Emergency Action Plan (Not a North Face Breech)

Drawings

Number Title Revision O-H-1155-8 Cooling Reservoir Earthwork Embankment & Interior Dikes

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-20464 09-20101 15-27001 15-26702 15-26999 15-26991 15-26992 15-26994 15-26996 15-26700 15-27003 15-26993 15-26997 15-26698 15-22814 09-20101 15-22834 15-22829

Work Orders

(WOs)

208596

34208283

Section 1R04

Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0POP02-CC-0001 Component Cooling Water

0POP02-SI-0002 Safety Injection System

0PGP03-ZO-0055 Protected Components

Miscellaneous

Title Date Performance Criteria, Goals, and Monitoring List August 2015

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-10345 15-10822 15-11367 15-12365 15-17166 15-17176 15-23370 15-23387 15-23373 15-21771 15-26644 15-26636 15-26634

Drawings

Number Title Revision 5N129F05014

Safety Injection System

5N129F05016

Safety Injection System

5N129F05016

Safety Injection System

5R149F05001

RCS Primary Coolant Loop

Section 1R05

Fire Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZF-0001 Fire Protection Program

0PGP03-ZF-0001A Hot Work Program Fire Preplans Number Title Revision 0EAB04-FP-0054 Electrical Auxiliary Building, Motor Generator Room

0EAB 04-FP-0052 Electrical Auxiliary Building ESF Switchgear Room, Train C 3

Calculation

s Number Title Revision

MC-5800 Combustible Loading of Safety Related Areas

MC-6023 Appendix R Evaluation Design Change Packages (DCP

)

08-4843-3

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-25711 13-11761

Section 1R06

Flood Protection Measures

Calculation

s Number Title Revision

MC-5365 Fuel Handling Building Flooding Calculation Section 1R07

Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PCP01-ZQ-0004 Cooling Water System Inspection Guidelines

0PEP07-EW-0001 Performance Test For Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZE-0080 Essential Cooling Water System Reliability Program

0POP01-ZA-0001 Plant Operations Department Administrative Guidelines

0POP02-EW-0001 Essential Cooling Water Operations

0PSP03-EX-0017 Essential Cooling Water System Train A Testing

0PSP15-DG-0003 Standby Diesel Generator #11

(#21) System Functional Pressure Test

0PSP15-EW-0001 Essential Cooling Water System Pressure Test

Condition Reports

(CRs)

14-10406 15-5202 15-26296 05-8601 13-3170 12-21573 15-13365 13-12970 13-11380 13-2530 15-26273 13-15904 12-21567 12-21568 15-24763 14-5321 12-21625

Calculations

Number Title Revision

MC-6476 Jacket Water and Lube Oil Cooler Performance

MC-6084 CCW HX Tube Plugging

MC-6255 SBDG Intercooler Performance

Drawings

Number Title Revision 5R209F05019#2

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System

5R209F05020#2

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Component Cooling Water System

5R289F05038#2

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Essential Cooling Water System Train 2C

Thermal Performance Analyses Title Date Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 2A

May 21, 2015

Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 1A

November 12, 2015

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

STPNOC SDG Performance Trending

-

SDG 11 Air Manifold vs. ECW Temperature Performance August 19, 2015

STPNOC SDG Performance Trending

-

SDG 11 Jacket Water Cooler Temperature Performance August 19, 2015

STPNOC SDG Performance Trending

-

SDG 11 Lube Oil Cooler Temperature Performance August 19, 2015

13-6716 Formal Self

-Assessment Report

- RC System July 3, 2013

4018-01001-SC To Provide "As

-Built" Information After Rodding and Plugging CCW Heat Exchanger 1A

C 5Q159MB1023

Standby Diesel Generator System

ET-2015-002 Report of Eddy Current Inspection on Train C Essential Chilled Water Chiller Unit 22C

May 18, 2015

ST-HL-AE-2400 Final Report Concerning Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers November 5, 1987

ST-HL-AE-3341 Response to NRC Generic Letter 89

-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety

-Related Equipment" January 29, 1990

Vendor Documents Number Title Revision/Date

Air Cooler Specification Sheet June 28, 1977

Jacket Water Cooler Specification Sheet March 7, 1977

Lube Oil Cooler Specification Sheet March 7, 1977

VTD-S445-0001 Installation, Operation, and Maintenance Instructions for Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

VTD-T950-0001-34035513 Installation of Orifices to Eliminate Cavitation Problems with Butterfly Valves March 12, 2015

System Health Reports Title Revision (CC) Component Cooling Water System rd Quarter 2015

(CH) Essential Chiller System rd Quarter 2015

(DG, JW, LU, DO, SD, DI, DX) Standby Diesel Generator Systems 3 rd Quarter 2015

(EW) Essential Cooling Water System rd Quarter 2015

System Health Reports Title Revision (HC) Containment HVAC System nd Quarter 2015

(HM) MAB HVAC System nd Quarter 2015

(RH) Residual Heat Removal rd Quarter 2015

Design Change Package Number Title Revision 98-622-15 Standby Diesel Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging Work Activity Numbers

485065

485064

495583

475776

475785

477067

477076 426476

Section 1R08:

In

-service Inspection Activitie

s

Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date 0PEP10-ZA-0001 Non Destructive Examination Written Practice.

0PEP10-ZA-0002 In-service Inspection Ultrasonic Non Destructive Examination Written Practice

0PEP10-ZA-0004 General Ultrasonic Examination

0PEP10-ZA-0009 Recording Data From Direct Visual, Liquid Penetrant, and Magnetic Particle Examinations

0PEP10-ZA-0010 Liquid Penetrant Examination (Color Contrast Solvent Removable

) 5 0PEP10-ZA-0017 Magnetic Particle Examination (Dry Powder Yoke Method) 5 0PEP10-ZA-0023 Visual Examination of Component Supports For ASME Section XI In

-service Inspection

0PEP10-ZA-0024 ASME XI Examination for VT

-1 and

VT-3 4 0PEP10-ZA-0025 ASME Section XI Visual Examination for Containment Metal Liner Inspections

0PEP10-ZA-0032 Visual

VT-2 Examinations

0PEP10-ZA-0054 ASME Section XI VE Visual Examinations

0PGP03-ZE-0027 ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Activities

Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date 0PGP03-ZE-0033 RCS Pressure Boundary Inspection for Boric Acid Leaks 13 0PGP03-ZE-0057 Installation, Field Fabrication and Modification of Piping 5 0PGP03-ZE-0133 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

0PGP04-ZA-0013 Reactor Coolant System Materials Management Program Quality

0PGP04-ZA-0108 Control of Vendor Technical Information

0PGP04-ZE-0304 In-service Inspection Program For Welds and Component Supports

0PMP02-ZW-0001 General Welding Requirements

0PMP02-ZW-0001A ASME Repair/Replacement Welding Requirements

0PMP02-ZW-004 Control of Filler Materials

0PSP11-RC-0015 ASME Section XI

In-service Inspection

0PSP15-SI-0001 Safety Injection System Functional Pressure Test

0PSP15-RC-0001 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Test

0PSP15-CS-0001 Containment Spray System Pressure Test

EPRI-DMW-PA-1 Nondestructive Evaluation: Procedure for Manual Phased Array Ultrasonic Testing (UT) of Dissimilar Metal Welds (DMW)

EPRI-PA-1 Procedure for Examination of Reactor Piping Using Phased Array Ultrasound

P1-A-Lh

QW 482 ASME Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) - Joints (WQ

-402), SMAW 8 P1-AT-Lh

QW 482 ASME Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) - Joints (WQ

-402), GTAW and SMAW

P1-T

QW 482 ASME Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) - Joints (WQ

-402), GTAW

P8,P1-T-Ag

QW 482 ASME Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) - Joints (WQ-402), GTAW

P8-T-Ag

QW 482 ASME Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS) - Joints (WQ

-402), GTAW

PCI-GQP-10.0 General Quality Procedure

- Inspection

PCI-GQP-12.0 General Quality Procedure

- Control of Measuring and Test Equipment

Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date

PCI-GQP-7.1 General Quality Procedure

- Procurement, Receipt, Storage and Issue of ASME III Subsection

NCA 3800 Weld Materials

PCI-GQP-9.6 General Quality Procedure

- Visual Examination of Welds 14

PCI-GQP-9.7 General Quality Procedure

- Solvent Removable Liquid Penetrant Examination and Acceptance Standards for Welds, Base Materials, and Cladding (50 o - 125 o F) 16

PCI-GWS-1 Second Edition

- General Welding Standard

-1, ASME Applications

PCI-PQR-063 PCI Energy Services, ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record (PQR)

PCI-PQR-600 PCI Energy Services, ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record (PQR), Machine Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW

) 6

PCI-WCP-1 Second Edition

- Welding Control Procedure

-1, Weld Procedure Preparation and Qualification 0

PCI-WCP-3 Second Edition

- Welding control Procedure

-3, Weld Material Control

PCI-WCP-4 Second Edition

- Welding Control Procedure

-4, Shielding/Purge Gas Procedure

PCI-WCP-5 Second Edition

- Welding Control Procedure

-5, Weld and Base Metal Repair 0

PCI-WCP-8 Second Edition

- Weld Control Procedure

- 8, Preheating and Post Weld Heat Treatment

PCI-WPS-8

MN-GTAW PCI Energy Services, ASME IX Welding Procedure Specifications

PDI-UT-1 Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds

E

PQR-003 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-T, GTWA, manual

PQR-006 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P8, P1

-AT-Ag, GTWA/SMAW, manual

PQR-016 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P8, P1

-T-Ag, GTWA, manual

PQR-035 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P8

-T-Ag, GTWA, manual

Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date

PQR-037 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P8

-T-Ag, P8-A, and P8-AT-Ag, GTWA, manual September 5,1989

PQR-040 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-A/P1-A-Lh, P1-AT-Lh, SMAW, manual November 17, 1989

PQR-046 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P8

-A-Ag, P8-AT-Ag, GTAW, manual January 24, 1990

PQR-058 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P43

-T-AG, GTWA, manual November 26, 1991

PQR-087A Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-AT-Lh(CVN), GTAW, SMAW, manual October 28, 1991

PQR-087B Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-AT-Lh(CVN), GTAW, SMAW, manual October 28, 1991

PQR-126 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-T (CVN), GTAW, manual March 16, 1995

PQR-127 Houston Power and Light, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-T (CVN), GTAW, manual March 16, 1995

PQR-197 STPNOC, Procedure Qualifications Record, P8

-T-Ag, GTAW, manual April 10, 2003

PQR-199 STPNOC, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-A-Lh, SMAW, manual October 14, 2003

PQR-205 STPNOC, Procedure Qualifications Record, P1

-a-Lh, SMAW, manual January 3, 2005

STP NDE DM

-001 Dissimilar Metal Weld Site Specific Training

UTI-004 ULTRASONIC TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

Manual Ultrasonic Examination Using Longitudinal Wave Straight

-Beam Technique

UTI-0 16 ULTRASONIC TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Nozzle Inner Radius Sections

UTI-024 ULTRASONIC TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Pressure Vessel Welds (Greater Than 2 to 12 Inches in Thickness) 6

Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date

UTI-065 ULTRASONIC TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION, Ultrasonic Examination of Small

-Diameter Piping Butt Welds and Components for Thermal Fatigue Damage 0

UTI-070 ULTRASONIC TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION, Conducting ultrasonic Examinations of Dissimilar Metal Welds 0

UTI-PDI-UT-01 ULTRASONIC TECHNICAL INSTRUCTON, PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds

UTI-PDI-UT-02 ULTRASONIC TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION, PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds 5

Condition Reports

(CRs)

13-00217 13-15539 14-27135 15-23185 15-23356 13-01267 14-08121 15-05854 15-23186 15-23379 13-02564 14-08611 15-10423 15-23187 15-23380 13-03645 14-08624 15-22824 15-23284 15-23381 13-03728 14-09112 15-23003 15-23287 15-23382 13-05011 14-12336 15-23091 15-23288 15-23383 13-08238 14-12474 15-23096 15-23286 15-23384 13-10032 14-12553 15-23099 15-23289 15-23386 13-11054 14-13315 15-23172 15-23290 15-23857 13-13209 14-22796 15-23177 15-23291 15-24009 13-14252 14-23083 15-23182 15-23293 15-24020 13-4439 14-27134 15-23184 15-23294 15-24406

Drawings

Number Title Revision

CC-9101-HL5001 Sht. 1 of 2 Train A, Component Cooling Water Pipe Support

CC-9102-HL5002 Sht. 1 of 2

Train A, Component Cooling Water Pipe Support 3

Drawings

Number Title Revision 5M369PCC207 Sht. 10 Component Cooling Water , "CC" 10 2F369PSI0572

Sht. 3 Safety Injection "SI"

2F361PSI0572

Sht. 5 Safety Injection "SI"

2F361PSI0572

Sht. 8 Safety Injection "SI"

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date ACTS;

TGX- 003 - 015 0 540"

Bobbin Coil Exam at 30IPS

October 20,2015

ACTS;

TGX - 004 - 015 Standard 0.560

"

3-Coil +PT:

NON-MAG October 20,2015

ACTS;

TGX - 005 - 015 0.560"

3-Coil +PT:

MAG-BIASED October 20,2015

ACTS;

TGX - 006 - 015 0.520"

1-Coil Ubend design +PT:

NON-MAG October 20,2015

ACTS;

TGX - 007 - 015 0.520"

1-Coil Ubend design +PT:

MAG-BIASED October 20,2015

ACTS;

TGX - 008 - 015 0.520"

G3-G4 Transmit Receive October 20,2015

ACTS;

TGX - 009 - 015 0.560"

Bobbin Coil Exam at 80IPS October 20,2015

ANTS; TGX

- A - 015 All bobbin coil probes October 20,2015

ANTS; TGX

- B - 015 3-coil +PT design probe

- standard & mag

-biased October 20,2015

ANTS; TGX

- C - 015 U-bend RPC design probe

- single coil +PT

October 20,2015

ANTS; TGX - D - 015 Ghent - G3-G4 Transmit

Receive October 20,2015

ANTS; TGX

- E - 015 Data quality & general instructions (all probe types)

October 20,2015

ASME Section III

- Division 1

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III

- Division 1, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Subsection ND, Class 3 Components July 1, 1974

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date ASME Section III

- Division 1

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III

- Division 1, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Subsection NC, Class 2 Components July 1, 1974

ASME Section III

- Division 1

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III

- Division 1, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Subsection NB, Class 1 Components July 1, 1974

ASME Section

IX 2013 ASME Boiler &Pressure Vessel Code,Section IX, Qualification Standard for Welding, Brazing, and Fusing Procedures; Welders; Brazers; and Welding, Brazing, and Fusing Operators July 1, 2013

Case N-729-1 Cases Of ASME Boiler And Pressure Vessel Code, Alternative Examination Requirements for PWR Reactor Vessel Upper Heads With Nozzles Having Pressure

-Retaining Partial

-Penetration WeldsSection XI, Division 1 March 28, 2006

CR-10-15719 STP Nuclear Operating Company, Formal Self-Assessment

- Secondary Chemistry Program September 2, 2010

SG-SGMP-15-9 South Texas 1RE19 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment South Texas Project Units 1 and 2

Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Guidelines October 2015

STP 8054 Snapshot Self-Assessment Report 2014 SGMP Self-Assessment (Overall)

CR

13-12088 0 Westinghouse Letter #

SGS-015-002 South Texas Unit 1, Site Validation of Eddy Current Inspection Techniques, Fall 2015 Refueling Outage

- 1RE19 October 23, 2015

Relief Requests Number Title Date

South Texas Project, Units 1 And 2

-Request For Relief

RR-ENG-3-03 From ASME Code April 7, 2011

Requirements For Pump Casing In

-service Inspection Examination (TAC Nos. ME4762 and ME4763)

Relief Requests Number Title Date

AE-NOC-12002347

STI:

33592900

ML12243A343

South Texas Project, Units 1 And 2

-Request For Relief

RR-ENG-3-04 To Apply Alternative To The American Society Of Mechanical Engineers Boiler And Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Requirements For Examination Of Class 1 And Class 2 Piping Welds (TAC Nos. ME7055 and ME7056)

September 10, 2012

South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2

-Request For Relief From The American Society Of Mechanical Engineers Boiler And Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Requirements For Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Flange O-Ring Leakoff Lines Non* Destructive Examination (TAC Nos. ME9863 and ME9864)

March 12, 2013

South Texas Project, Unit 1

- Request For Relief No.

RR-ENG-3-17 For Extension Of The Inspection Frequency Of The Reactor Vessel Cold

-Leg Nozzle To Safe-End Welds With Flaw Analysis

(TAC No. MF6174) August 21, 2015

Work Packages

25198

525199

525200

525201

554055 554113

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

and Licensed Operator Performance

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZT-0132 Licensed Operator Requalification

0PGP03-ZA-0119 Management Oversight of Training Programs

0PNT01-TQ-1000 Training System Development Process

0PNT01-TQ-1100 Analysis Phase

0PNT01-TQ-1200 Design Phase

0PNT01-TQ-1300 Developmental Phase

0PNT01-TQ-1400 Implementation Phase

0PNT01-TQ-1500 Evaluation Phase

0POP01-ZA-0014 Licensed Operator License Maintenance

LOR-GL-0001 LOR Training Program Guidelines

Procedures

Number Title Revision

LOR-GL-0002 LOR Annual and Biennial Evaluation Guidelines

19, 20

LOR-GL-0003 LOR Examination Bank Guidelines

LOR-GL-0004 Two Year Training Plan Guidelines

0PGP03-ZA-0128 Medical Examinations

0PNT01-ZA-0037 Simulator Configuration Control Lesson Plans Number Title Revision JIT154 Plant Shutdown from 100% AND Plant Cooldown to RHR 0 0PGP03-ZG-0006 Plant Shutdown from 100% to Hot Standby

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-23457 15-21462 11-17754 15-13338 15-13080 15-21463 14-7485 14-12096 14-10080 13-13390 15-15554 15-21515 15-21513 15-21461 15-21465 15-21485 13-13927 13-14866 13-15861 15-22833

Miscellaneous

Title Revision/Date

LOR 154 Sim Exam #8

LOR 154 Sim Exam #4

LOR 154 Sim Exam #1

LOR 154 Sim Exam #2

2015 LOR Sample Plan

JPM 9.01 6 JPM 9.01a 0

JPM 37.01 1

JPM 23.02 7

JPM 36.02 7

JPM 88.01 9

JPM 05.01 7

Miscellaneous

Title Revision/Date

JPM 72.02 0

JPM 56.02 9

JPM 45.02 7 JPM 136.01

STP4047E (03/12), Statement of Health Care Provider for Employee March 2012

STP3430 (03/12), Restricted Duty Review March 2012

STP997RO (10/13), Reactor Operator Physical Exam October 2013

Post-Event Simulator Testing

- U2 Transformer Lockout June 2, 2013

CALC-05-RC-002, Simulator Transient Analysis January 28, 2009

Simulator Transient Test 2

- Trip of all Feedwater Pumps February 17, 2015

Simulator Transient Test 6

- Main Turbine Trip without RX Trip February 17, 2015

Simulator Transient Test 7

- Max Power Ramp 100% to 75% to 100%

February 17, 2015

Cycle 19 BOL Steady State Tests

- 100%, 78%, 48%

December 1, 2014

Nursing Procedure and Protocol Manual, Licensed Operator Physical, pp. 27-36

Simulator Configuration Management Committee Meeting Minutes December 10, 2014

Simulator Configuration Management Committee Meeting Minutes August 14, 2014

LOR 155 RO / SRO Biennial Written Exam, Week 1 November 23, 2015

Deficiency Reports

DR-2911

DR-2916

DR-2845

DR-2836

DR-2806

DR-2755

DR-2866

Section 1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP04-ZE-0313 Maintenance Rule Program

SEG-0002 Maintenance Rule Equipment History Review 2

SEG-0009 Maintenance Rule Basis Document

Miscellaneous

Title Date STP Maintenance Rule Program Assessment March 5, 2015

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-516

Section 1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZO-0039 Operations Configuration Management

0PGP03-ZG-RMTS Risk-Managed Technical Specifications Program

0PGP02-ZA-0003 Comprehensive Risk Management Program

0POP02-AE-0002 Transformer Normal Breaker and Switch Lineup

0PGP04-ZA-0604 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program

0POP01-ZO-0006 Risk Management Actions

0PGP03-ZA-0091 Configuration Risk Management Program

0PGP03-ZE-0001 PRA Analyses/Assessments

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-18736

Work Activity Risk (WAR)

2596

RICTCal Sequence Number

2563

RAsCal Sequence Number

2356

Section 1R15

Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZO-9900 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Program 7 0POP11-SI-0001 Safety Injection/Containment Spray Pump Insolation and Restoration Calculation Number Title Revision

EC-5100 Standby Diesel Generator Transient Response Model Vendor Technical Document Number Title Revision

VDT-G927-0001 Units 1 & 2 Acceptable Gas Void Volumes in ECCS and RHR Suction Piping

Design Basis Document

Number Title Revision 5V369VB00120

DBD Chilled Water System

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-24673 15-15339 13-7733 15-16143 15-17109 15-23653 15-24262 07-14959 08-14968 10-9377

Section 1R18

Plant Modifications

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZO-003 Temporary Modifications

0PGP04-ZE-0311 Post Modification Acceptance tests

0PGP05-ZA-0002 10CFR50.59 Evaluations

0PGP04-ZE-0309 Design Change Package

DEG-0312 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FEMA)

0PSP03-RI-0001 Digital Rod Position Indication Operability Test

Design Change Package (DCP

)

15-25420-9 15-25420-8 15-25696 15-25766 15-25769 15-22820 15-23001

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision T1-15-2212-55 Temporary Power to Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Water Pump 1B

STI 34245464

Part Length Guide Tube Flow Restrictor Installation

STI 34246503 CRDM and CETNA Evaluation Due to Removal of CRDM Drive Rod and RCCA for South Texas Unit 1

A

Section 1R19

Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0POP11-SI-0001 Safety Injection/Containment Spray Pump Isolation and Restoration

0PSP03-SI-0011 High Head Safety Injection Pump 1B(2B) Reference Values Measurement

0POP07-DB-0005 TSC Diesel Generator Performance Test

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-23001 15-23376 15-23374 15-23019

Work Authorization Numbers (WAN

)

526899

526896 58731

523361

Section 1R20

Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0POP03-ZG-0007 Plant Cooldown

0PGP03-ZO-0042 Reactivity Management Program

0POP03-ZG-0010 Refueling Operations

0POP03-ZG-0006 Plant Shutdown from 100% to Hot Standby

0POP03-ZG-0009 Mid-Loop Operation

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZO-0035 Reduced RCS Inventory Operations

0POP02-SI-0003 Filling the Reactor Cavity Using the Safety Injection System

0PMP04-RX-0018A Non-Rapid Refueling Mechanical Support

0PGP03-ZA-0101 Shutdown Risk Assessment

0POP08-FH-0009 Core Refueling

0PGP03-ZO-ECO1A Equipment Clearance Order Instructions

0PGP03-ZA-0114 Fatigue Rule Program

0PAP01-ZA-0104 Plant Operations Review Committee 13 0PEP2-ZX-0002 Initial Criticality and Lower Power Physics Testing

0POP03-ZG-0005 Plant Startup to 100%

Miscellaneous

Title Date

Shutdown Risk Assessment September 23, 2015

Shutdown Risk Assessment (Amendment 2) November 5, 2015

Shutdown Risk Assessment (Amendment 6) December 14, 2015

1RE19 BECON Startup Prediction (Unit 1 Cycle 20)

December 17, 2015

Work Authorization Numbers (WAN)

505338

Equipment Clearance Order (ECO)

A 79211 A 80158

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-26691 15-26702 15-26719 15-26717 15-26734

Section 1R22

Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PSP11-SI-0013 LLRT: M-18 HHSI Pump 1A/2A Discharge

0PSP03-SI-0041 Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1C(2C) Comprehensive Pump Test

0PSP03-SI-0037 High Head Safety Injection Pump 1B(2B) Comprehensive Test Reference Values and Preservice testing Pump Curve Measurement

0PSP03-DG-0016 Standby Diesel 11(21) Twenty

-Four Hour Load Test

Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP05-ZV-0007 Prompt Notification System

0PGP05-ZV-00 16 Prompt Notification System Implementing Procedure

ERDGI

ZV-0013 Alert Radio Maintenance and Distribution

ERDGI

ZV-0016 ENRS Operation and Maintenance

0ERP01-ZV-IN03 Emergency Response Organization Notification

ERDGI

ZV-00 23 10CFR50.54(q) Screening Reference Document

0PGP03-ZV-0005 Equipment Important to Emergency Response

0PGP05-ZV-0014 Emergency Response Activities

0ERP01-ZV-IN01 Emergency Classification

0ERP01-ZV-IN0 2 Notifications to Offsite Agencies

ERDGI

ZV-0006 Letters of Agreement

Condition Reports

(CRs)

14-3686 14-21527 14-22056 14-22582 14-22644 14-22725 15-2022 15-2221 15-2352 15-3577 15-3937 15-4039 15-4333 15-4631 15-10376 15-13171 15-19620 15-20588 15-21862

Audits/Surveillanc

e Number Title Date 13-01 (EP) Emergency Preparedness Quality Audit Report March 11, 2013

14-01 (EP) Emergency Preparedness Quality Audit Report March 12, 2014

15-01 (EP) Emergency Preparedness Quality Audit Report Mar ch 12, 201 5

Drills/Exercises Title Date 2014 Environmental Sampling Mini Drill July 31, 2014

Red Team Combined Functional Drill August 13, 2014

Dress Rehearsal September 24, 2015

White Team Combined Functional Drill June 18, 2014

Blue Team Combined Functional Drill February 19, 2014

Health Physics Drill February 19, 2014 Owner Controlled Area Sweep Mini Drill June 5, 2015

Blue Team Combined Functional Drill February 1 1, 201 5 White Team Combined Functional Drill July 22, 2015

Red Team Combined Functional Drill September 16, 2015

201 5 Environmental Sampling Drill March 16, 2015

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Updated Prompt Notification System Design Report September 30, 2010

Updated Prompt Notification System Design Report June 6, 2013

On-shift Staffing Analysis December 18, 2012

On-shift Staffing Analysis Supplement 1

March 26, 2013

On-shift Staffing Analysis Supplement 2

September 25, 2014

NOC-AE-15003218 Changes to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures January 10, 2015

NOC-AE-1500321 1 Changes to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures January 14, 2015

NOC-AE-150032 42 Changes to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures April 2, 2015

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

NOC-AE-150032 44 Change to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure April 23, 2015

NOC-AE-150032 58 Change to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure May 13, 2015

NOC-AE-150032 64 Change to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure June 11, 2015

NOC-AE-150032 77 Changes to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures July 28, 2015

NOC-AE-15003289 Change to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure September 2, 2015

South Texas Project Electric Generating Stati on Emergency Plan

ICN 20-16

2013 Population Update Analysis October 11, 2013

201 4 Population Update Analysis October 11, 2014

201 5 Population Update Analysis October 10, 2015

Quality Monitoring Report

s

MN-13-0-101450

MN-14-0-103202

MN-14-0-103 341

MN-14-0-103 342

MN-14-0-103 39 7

MN-14-0-103705

MN-14-0-103708

MN-14-1-103 349

MN-14-9-103 355

MN-14-9-103 3 7 9

MN-14-9-103 384

MN-14-9-103 425

MN-1 5-0-103 866

MN-1 5-0-10 4344

MN-1 5-0-10 448 0

MN-1 5-0-10 4481

MN-1 5-0-10 4491

MN-1 5-0-10 4 5 97

MN-1 5-0-10 46 5 2

MN-1 5-1-10 4 5 90

MN-1 5-1-10 4 5 92

MN-1 5-2-103811

MN-1 5-9-1037 8 0

MN-1 5-9-103 93 0

MN-1 5-9-103 93 0

Quarterly ENRS Tests March 31, 2014 Jun e 13, 2014 September 9, 2014 December 16, 2014 March 3, 2015 June 24, 2015 September 14, 2015

Section 4OA1

Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PGP05-ZN-0007 Preparation and Submittal of NRC Performance Indicators

SEG-0007 Mitigating System Performance Indicator Collection, Processing and Maintenance of Data

Miscellaneous

Title Date MSPI Derivation Report July 2014 through September 2015

Unit 1 Consolidation Data Sheets for Residual Heat Removal, Heat Removal, Cooling Water April 2014 through September 2015

Unit 2 Consolidation Data Sheets for Residual Heat Removal, Heat Removal, Cooling Water April 2014 through September 2015

Section 4OA3

Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Procedures

Number Title Revision 0PAP01-ZA-0104 Plant Operations Review Committee

0PGP03-ZO-0022 Post-Trip Review

0POP04-TM-0003 Turbine Trip Below P

-9 21 0POP05-EO-ES01 Reactor Trip Response

0PMP08-ZI-0025 Pneumatic/Spring Control Valve or Damper Calibration

Miscellaneous

Title Date South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Emergency Plan December 03, 2009 License Amendment Request October 06, 2015

License Amendment Request May 20, 1993

Condition Reports

(CRs)

15-23835 15-26702 15-26719 15-26717 15-26734

Attachment 2

Request for Information for In

-service Inspection South Texas Project October 26, 2015, through November 6, 2015

NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2015004

Please provide the requested information.

Thank you for your support.

NOTE: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit the information using the same request designation.

For example, the names and phone numbers for the program leads should be in a file/folder titled A.5.b.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact the lead inspector Ron Kopriva at (817) 200-1104 (Ron.Kopriva@nrc.gov

)

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150

-0011.

IN-SERVICE INSPECTION DOCUMENT REQUEST

Inspection Dates:

October 26, 2015, through November 6, 2015

Inspection Procedures:

IP 71111.08 "In

-service Inspection (ISI) Activities" Inspectors:

Ron Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector

A. Information Requested for the In

-Office Preparation Week The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic format (ims.certrec.com preferred), in care of Ron Kopriva, by October 15, 2015, to facilitate the selection of specific items that will be reviewed during the onsite inspection week.

The inspectors will select specific items from the information requested below and then request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week (Section B of this enclosure).

We ask that the specific items selected from the lists be available and ready for review on the first day of inspection.

Please provide requested documentation electronically if possible.

If requested documents are large and only hard copy formats are available, please inform the inspector(s), and provide subject documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection.

If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the inspector as soon as possible.

A.1 ISI/Welding Programs and Schedule Information

a) A detailed schedule (including preliminary dates) of:

i)

Nondestructive examinations planned for Class 1 & 2 systems and containment, performed as part of your ASME Section XI, risk informed (if applicable), and augmented In

-service inspection programs during the upcoming outage.

Provide a status summary of the nondestructive examination inspection activities vs. the required inspection period percentages for this interval by category per ASME Section XI, IWX

-2400.

Do not provide separately if other documentation requested contains this information.

ii)

Reactor pressure vessel head examinations planned for the upcoming outage. iii) Examinations planned for Alloy 82/182/600 components that are not included in the Section XI scope (If applicable).

iv) Examinations planned as part of your boric acid corrosion control program (Mode 3 walkdowns, bolted connection walkdowns, etc.).

v) Welding activities that are scheduled to be completed during the upcoming outage (ASME Class 1, 2, or 3 structures, systems, or components)

. b) A copy of ASME Section XI Code Relief Requests and associated NRC safety evaluations applicable to the examinations identified above.

c) A list of nondestructive examination reports (ultrasonic, radiography, magnetic particle, dye penetrant, Visual V

T-1,

VT-2, and

VT-3), which have identified relevant conditions on Code Class 1 & 2 systems since the beginning of the last refueling outage.

This should include the previousSection XI pressure test(s) conducted during start up and any evaluations associated with the results of the pressure tests.

Also, include in the list the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions in the reactor pressure vessel head penetration nozzles that have been accepted for continued service.

The list of nondestructive examination reports should include a brief description of the structures, systems, or components where the relevant condition was identified.

d) A list with a brief description (e.g., system, material, pipe size, weld number, and nondestructive examinations performed) of the welds in Code Class 1 and 2 systems which have been fabricated due to component repair/replacement activities since the beginning of the last refueling outage, or are planned to be fabricated this refueling outage.

e) If reactor vessel weld examinations required by the ASME Code are scheduled to occur during the upcoming outage, provide a detailed description of the welds to be examined and the extent of the planned examination.

Please also provide reference numbers for applicable procedures that will be used to conduct these examinations.

f) Copy of any 10 CFR Part 21 reports applicable to your structures, systems, or components within the scope of Section XI of the ASME Code that have been identified since the beginning of the last refueling outage.

g)

A list of any temporary noncode repairs in service (e.g., pinhole leaks).

h) Copies of the most recent self

-assessments for the in

-service inspection, welding, and Alloy 600 programs.

i) Provide a copy of the nondestructive examination procedures that will be used to perform the examinations (including calibration and flaw characterization/sizing procedures).

For ultrasonic examination procedures qualified in accordance with ASME Section XI, Appendix VIII, provide documentation supporting the procedure qualification (e.g., the EPRI performance demonstration qualification summary sheets).

j) Provide a copy of the various Welding processes that are scheduled to be used during the outage.

A.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

(RPVH) a)

Provide the detailed scope of the planned nondestructive examinations of the reactor vessel head which identifies the types of nondestructive examination methods to be used on each specific part of the vessel head to fulfill commitments made in response to NRC Bulletin 2002

-02 and NRC Order

EA-03-009.

Also, include examination scope expansion criteria and planned expansion sample sizes if relevant conditions are identified. (If applicable)

b)

A list of the standards and/or requirements that will be used to evaluate indications identified during nondestructive examination of the reactor vessel head (e.g., the specific industry or procedural standards which will be used to evaluate potential leakage and/or flaw indications).

A.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

a)

Copy of the procedures that govern the scope, equipment and implementation of the inspections required to identify boric acid leakage and the procedures for boric acid leakage/corrosion evaluation.

b) Please provide a list of leaks (including Code class of the components) that have been identified since the last refueling outage and associated corrective action documentation.

If during the last cycle, the unit was shut down, please provide documentation of containment walkdown inspections performed as part of the boric acid corrosion control program.

c) Please provide a copy of the most recent self

-assessment performed for the boric acid corrosion control program.

A.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections

a) A detailed schedule of:

i)

Steam generator tube inspection, data analyses, and repair activities for the upcoming outage (If occurring).

ii)

Steam generator secondary side inspection activities for the upcoming outage. (If occurring).

b) Please provide a copy of your steam generator in-service inspection program and plan.

Please include a copy of the operational assessment from last outage and a copy of the following documents as they become available:

i) Degradation assessment ii) Condition monitoring assessment

c) If you are planning on modifying your Technical Specifications such that they are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force Traveler TSTF

-449, "Steam

Generator Tube Integrity," please provide copies of your correspondence with the NRC regarding deviations from the standard technical specifications.

d) Copy of steam generator history documentation given to vendors performing eddy current testing of the steam generators during the upcoming outage.

e) Copy of steam generator eddy current data analyst guidelines and site validated eddy current technique specification sheets.

Additionally, please provide a copy of EPRI Appendix H, "Examination Technique Specification Sheets," qualification records. f) Identify and quantify any steam generator tube leakage experienced during the previous operating cycle.

Also provide documentation identifying which steam generator was leaking and corrective actions completed or planned for this condition (If applicable).

g)

Provide past history of the condition and issues pertaining to the secondary side of the steam generators (including items such as loose parts, fouling, top of tube sheet condition, crud removal amounts, etc.)

h) Provide copies of your most recent self

-assessments of the steam generator monitoring, loose parts monitoring, and secondary side water chemistry control programs. i) Indicate where the primary, secondary, and resolution analyses are scheduled to take place.

j) Provide a summary of the scope of the steam generator tube examinations, including examination methods such as Bobbin, Rotating Pancake, or Plus Point, and the percentage of tubes to be examined.

Do not provide these documents separately if already included in other information requested

. A.5 Additional Information Related to all In

-service Inspection Activities

a)

A list with a brief description of in

-service inspection, boric acid corrosion control program, and steam generator tube inspection related issues (e.g., condition reports) entered into your corrective action program since the beginning of the last refueling outage (for Unit 1).

For example, a list based upon data base searches using key words related to piping or steam generator tube degradation such as: in

-service inspection, ASME Code,Section XI, NDE, cracks, wear, thinning, leakage, rust, corrosion, boric acid, or errors in piping/steam generator tube examinations.

b)

Please provide names and phone numbers for the following program leads:

In-service inspection (examination, planning)

Containment exams Reactor pressure vessel head exams Snubbers and supports

Repair and replacement program Licensing Site welding engineer Boric acid corrosion control program Steam generator inspection activities (site lead and vendor contact)

B. Information to be Provided Onsite to the Inspector(s) at the Entrance Meeting

(October 26, 2015):

B.1 In-service Inspection/Welding Programs and Schedule Information

a) Updated schedules for in

-service inspection/nondestructive examination activities, including steam generator tube inspections, planned welding activities, and schedule showing contingency repair plans, if available.

b) For ASME Code Class 1 and 2 welds selected by the inspector from the lists provided from section A of this enclosure, please provide copies of the following documentation for each subject weld:

i) Weld data sheet (traveler)

ii) Weld configuration and system location iii) Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for weldment iv) Applicable Code Edition and Addenda for welding procedures

v) Applicable weld procedures used to fabricate the welds vi) Copies of procedure qualification records supporting the weld procedures from B.1.b.v vii) Copies of mechanical test reports identified in the procedure qualification records above viii) Copies of the nonconformance reports for the selected welds (If applicable)

ix) Radiographs of the selected welds and access to equipment to allow viewing radiographs (If radiographic testing was performed)

x) Copies of the preservice examination records for the selected welds xi) Copies of welder performance qualifications records applicable to the selected welds, including documentation that welder maintained proficiency in the applicable welding processes specified in the weld procedures (at least 6 months prior to the date of subject work)

xii) Copies of nondestructive examination personnel qualifications (Visual inspection, penetrant testing, ultrasonic testing, radiographic testing), as applicable

c) For the in

-service inspection related corrective action issues selected by the inspectors from section A of this enclosure, provide a copy of the corrective actions and supporting documentation.

d) For the nondestructive examination reports with relevant conditions on Code Class 1 and 2 systems selected by the inspectors from Section A above, provide

a copy of the examination records, examiner qualification records, and associated corrective action documents.

e) A copy of (or ready access to) most current revision of the in

-service inspection program manual and plan for the current Interval.

f) For the nondestructive examinations selected by the inspectors from section A of this enclosure, provide qualification documentation of the specific equipment to be used (e.g., ultrasonic unit, cables, and transducers including serial numbers) and nondestructive examination personnel qualification records.

B.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head

a) Provide the nondestructive personnel qualification records for the examiners who will perform examinations of the reactor pressure vessel head.

b) Provide drawings showing the following: (If a visual examination is planned for the upcoming refueling outage)

i) Reactor pressure vessel head and control rod drive mechanism nozzle configurations ii) Reactor pressure vessel head insulation configuration Note: The drawings listed above should include fabrication drawings for the nozzle attachment welds as applicable.

c) Copy of nondestructive examination reports from the last reactor pressure vessel head examination.

d) Copy of evaluation or calculation demonstrating that the scope of the visual examination of the upper head will meet the 95 percent minimum coverage required by NRC Order EA

-03-009 (If a visual examination is planned for the upcoming refueling outage).

e) Provide a copy of the procedures that will be used to identify the source of any boric acid deposits identified on the reactor pressure vessel head.

If no explicit procedures exist which govern this activity, provide a description of the process to be followed including personnel responsibilities and expectations.

f)

Provide a copy of the updated calculation of effective degradation years for the reactor pressure vessel head susceptibility ranking.

g)

Provide copy of the vendor qualification report(s) that demonstrates the detection capability of the nondestructive examination equipment used for the reactor pressure vessel head examinations.

Also, identify any changes in equipment configurations used for the reactor pressure vessel head examinations which differ from that used in the vendor qualification report(s).

B.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

a) Please provide boric acid walkdown inspection results, an updated list of boric acid leaks identified so far this outage, associated corrective action documentation, and overall status of planned boric acid inspections.

b) Please provide any engineering evaluations completed for boric acid leaks identified since the end of the last refueling outage.

Please include a status of corrective actions to repair and/or clean these boric acid leaks.

Please identify specifically which known leaks, if any, have remained in service or will remain in service as active leaks.

B.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspections

a) Copies of the Examination Technique Specification Sheets and associated justification for any revisions.

b) Copy of the guidance to be followed if a loose part or foreign material is identified in the steam generators.

c) Please provide a copy of the eddy current testing procedures used to perform the steam generator tube inspections (specifically calibration and flaw characterization/sizing procedures, etc.).

Also include documentation for the specific equipment to be used.

d) Please provide copies of your responses to NRC and industry operating experience communications such as Generic Letters, Information Notices, etc. (as applicable to steam generator tube inspections) Do not provide these documents separately if already included in other information requested such as the degradation assessment.

e) List of corrective action documents generated by the vendor and/or site with respect to steam generator inspection activities.

B.5 Codes and Standards

a) Ready access to (i.e., copies provided to the inspector(s) for use during the inspection at the onsite inspection location, or room number and location where available): i)

Applicable Editions of the ASME Code (Sections V, IX, and XI) for the in-service inspection program and the repair/replacement program.

ii)

EPRI and industry standards referenced in the procedures used to perform the steam generator tube eddy current examination.

Inspector Contact Information:

Ron Kopriva Senior Reactor Inspector

817-200-1104

Ron.Kopriva@nrc.gov Mailing Address:

US NRC Region IV

Attn:

Ron Kopriva

1600 E. Lamar Blvd Arlington, TX

76011