PLA-2618, Suppls 851115 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/85-28 & 50-388/85-23.Channel Functional Tests Not in Agreement W/Nrc Criteria Will Be Revised.Channel Functional Test Description & Other Related Info Encl

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Suppls 851115 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/85-28 & 50-388/85-23.Channel Functional Tests Not in Agreement W/Nrc Criteria Will Be Revised.Channel Functional Test Description & Other Related Info Encl
ML20206M897
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1986
From: Keiser H
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Kister H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20206M839 List:
References
PLA-2618, NUDOCS 8607010310
Download: ML20206M897 (28)
v • d • e


Text

'

Endosure iV sn 2 2W Pennsylvania Power & Light Company Two North Ninth Street

  • Allentown. PA 18101
  • 215 1 770-5151 Harold W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 215/770-7502 APR 2 21E Mr. Harry B. Kister, Chief Project Branch No. 1 Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTE 50-387/85-28 AND 50-388/85-23 FILE R41-2 DOCKET NOS. 50-387 PII i-2618 388

Dear Mr. Kister:

This letter is in response to a letter dated March 5, 1986 from Mr. Richard W.

Starostecki and supplements the information provided to you in our letter dated November 15, 1985 and at a meeting on March 14, 1986.

In response to your request at the March 14, 1986 meeting, this letter provides the following information for your review and comment:

. A statement of PP&L philosophy for Conduct of Instrument Channel Function Testing (Attachment I).

. Description of the Channel Functional Test's which do not conform to existing NRC criteria (Attachment II).

. Examples of the potential benefits of extending the scope of the monthly channel functional tests (Attachment III) .

. PP&L's experience with relay failures (Attachment IV).

Based upon the information presented during the March 14, 1986 meeting and this letter, it is PP&L's opinion that the Channel Functional Testing in accordance with PP&L policy assures high availability of components to provide an adequate level of safety. The reliability of the components is ensured by the 18-month Logic System Functional Tests along with the monthly channel functional tests.

8607010310 860625 PDR ADOCK 05000387 G PDR l

l i

Page 2 ssEs Pti-26is A R 2 2 886 Mr. H. B. Kister FILE R41-2 To further enhance the effectiveness of our channel functional tests, PP&L will:

1

1. Review those tests which are not in agreement with the NRC criteria for testing and revise as necessary to comply with our testing philosophy prior to the startup following the Unit 2 First Refueling Outage.
2. Review those tests which are in agreement with the NRC criteria and revise as necessary to comply with our testing philosophy during the normal 2 year review cycle for procedures.

In either of the above cases, the scope of testing will not be reduced from that which is currently employed.

Channels which may be installed in the future will be designed to facilitate testing in accordance with the NRC criteria for channel functional testing.

If you have any further questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, H. W. Keiser Vice President - Nuclear Operations cc: M. J. Campagnone NRC R. H. Jacobs NRC CTC:krp l

\

ATTACHMENT I PHILOSOPHY FOR INSTRUMENT CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTING Instrument channels are to be tested from the instrument (or as close as practicable to the instrument) to the point where the instrument channel signal enters logic, unless this causes undesirable actuation of non-channel devices.

If the instrument channel signal must be blocked to prevent undesirable actudtions (e.g., valve or damper movement, pump start or stop, etc.), the means to block the signal is chosen from the following in order:

a. Bypass, inhibit or test switch
b. States links
c. Jumpers
d. Lifted leads This order is intended to minimize disturbance of the normal configuration of the channel circuit.

If a jumper or lif ted lead must be used to block a signal, it should be located in the channel circuit as far downstream of the instrument as practical. This point will be determined by an evaluation of the risk associated with accessing the location of the jumper or lif ted lead.

Actuation of the last relay coil (s) prior to entering logic (or last relay coil upstream of blocking) will be confirmed by one of the following indications (in order), if available:

a. Installed indication, such as: annunciators, indicating lights, audible alarms, etc.
b. Visual observation of relay armature position.

If neither of the above indications is available, the risk associated with installing test equipment in the circuit to confirm last relay actuation will be evaluated. This evaluation will take into account physical accessibility in the panel, availability and location of terminal points, etc. If the use of test equipment to determine last relay actuation is determined to be unacceptable, confirmation of the channel signal at a practical point upstream of the last relay will be confirmed using the above criteria for indication.

At a minimum, instrument switch contact action will be confirmed.

ATTACHMENT II DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNCTIONAL TESTS WHICH DO NOT CONFORM TO THE NRC CRITERIA There are 28 monthly channel functional tests (13 tests for Unit 1, 13 tests for Unit 2 and 2 common tests) which are not accomplished to the NRC criteria.

These tests represent approximately 10% of the required tests.

The following are descriptions of each of the Unit 1 and common tests:

1. SI-151-201 MONTHLY CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST OF DRYWELL PRESSURE CHANNELS PS-E11-N011A,B,C AND D (CORE SPRAY, HPCI, LPCI PERMISSIVE) .

Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2, 3.3.3, 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.3.1

Description:

The surveillance verifies the operation of that portion of the channel that provides input to Core Spray and LPCI logic and a portion of the HPCI logic. It does not test repeater relays (E41-K5 and E41-K55) that supply the remaining Drywell Pressure input to HPCI logic. It also does not test the relays (K100AX1 and K100BX1, ref E184 Sh. 5) that provide the final input to the isolation logic for Drywell Cooling isolation valves. For system diagram see attached Figure 1.

2. SI-161-202. MONTHLY CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST OF RWCU HIGH DIFFERENTIAL FLOW CHANNELS FDSH-G33-14603A&B.

Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2, 4.3.2.1, and 4.3.2.1-1.4a

Description:

The surveillance tests the channel from the input of the first device I downstream of the flow transmitter, through the signal conditioning electronics, to the differential flow switches. These flow switches have two outputs. The first output controls RWCU SYS LEAK HIGH annunciators and is monitored by the surveillance. The second output actuates relays G33-R615A and B, which in turn input to the isolation logic, and is not monitor d.

The test starts from as close to the sensor as practicable and includes the applicable bistable devices. The bistables (FDSH-G33-N603A&B) are dual output devices that are verified by actuation of annunciators as described above. The relays that are not tested (G33-R616A and B) provide direct input into logic and upon actuation would, if not bypassed, result in isolation. See attached Figure 2 for system diagram.

3. SI-180-201 MONTHLY CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST OF REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CHANNELS PS-B21-N021A, C, E, G AND PIS-B21-N021B, D, (CORE SPRAY SYSTEM AND LPCI PERMISSIVE)

Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

l 3.3.3 and 4.3.3.1 i

4

Description:

Each pressure switch directly and/or indirectly drives parallel pairs of

relays that input to Core Spray, LPCI Injection Valve or Recirculation

! Discharge Valve isolation logic. In each pair one of the relays leads to

! an annunciator that is checked in the surveillance with pressure greater j than setpoint thereby satisfying the channel functional test requirement.

The other relay in the parallel pair leads only to isolation logic and is not checked as part of the surveillance. Those relays that are not checked are: E21-K32A&B, E21-K33A&B, E11-K35A&B, E11-K36A&B, E11-K47A&B and E11-K91A&B.

When pressure is less than the setpoint (i.e. the switch is closed) the annunciators discussed above, which are actuated by either of two pressure channels associated with that annunciator, cannot be used because the channel not in test will keep the annunciator continually actuated.

Therefore in this case testing is limited to checking proper actuation of a the switch itself. Therefore with reactor pressure less than the setpoint

! the following relays, in addition to those listed above, are not tested:

E21-K9A5B, E21-19A&B, E11-K31A&B, E11-K32A&B, E11-K90A&B and E11-K105A&B.

See Figure 3 for system diagram.

4. SI-152-203 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF HPCI SYSTEM STEAM LINE A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CRANNELS PDIS-E41-N004 AND PDIS-E41-N005 Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2 and 4.3.2.1

Description:

1 Both switches operate similarly. Two normally open contacts from a single l switch are connected in parallel. This parallel pair actuates a relay.

This relay has a contact hardwired into the isolation logic and will, on energization, cause an isolation. The surveillance is accomplished by opening a sliding link connecting the parallel switch contacts of the

{ isolation relays (E41-K33 for PDIS-E41-N005 and E41-K43 for PDIS-E41 N004)

to the electric power source, supplying a test source to the PDIS and
verifying closure on high differential pressure. The isolation relays, which if connected would cause an isolation, are not tested. For system

, diagram see attached Figure 4.

5. SI-150-203 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF RCIC SYSTEM STEAMLINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CHANNELS PDSH-E51-N017 and PDSH-E51-N018 Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2 and 4.3.2.1

Description:

Both switches operate similarly. Two normally open contacts from a single switch are connected in parallel. This parallel pair actuates a relay.

This relay has a contact hardwired into the isolation logic and will, on energization, cause an isolation. The surveillance is accomplished by 2

opening a sliding link connecting the parallel switch contacts of the

1 i

l isolation relays (E51-K12 for PDSH-E51-N017 and E51-K32 for PDSH-E51-N018)

to the electric power source, supplying a test source to the PDSH and i verifying closura on high differential pressure. The isolation relays, which if connected would cause an isolation, are not tested. For system i

diagram see attached Figure 4.

i 6. SI-152-201 MONTHL7 CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE CHANNELS

PSL-E41-N001A,B,C,D.

Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2 and 4.3.2.1

Description:

Each pressure switch directly actuates a relay dedicated to that switch, i The contacts of these relays go into the logic associated with valve isolation. The surveillance directly checks the actuation of the pressure switch; the associated relays are not tested. These relays are E41-K15 E41-K16, E41-K62 and E41-K63. See Figure 5 for system diagram.

l 7. SI-180-203 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL CHANNELS l LIS-B21-N031A,B,C,D i Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.5, 4.3.2.1, 4.3.3.1, 4.3.5.1 and 3.5.2

.i

Description:

The surveillance verifies the operation of those portions of the channels

that provide input to ADS, RCIC, RHR and Core Spray Logic. Each of the four Level Indicating Switches has an internal switch (one of four in each
LIS) that drives a relay that, in turn, inputs to the HPCI logic. The surveillance checks the LIS internal switch associated with HPCI but it does not check the associated relay (E21-K34A for B21-NO31A, E41-K41 for
B21-N021B, E21-K35A for B21-NO31C and E41-K42 for B21-N031D). In addition l B21-N031ALB provide, through a series of relays an input to the isolation
logic for Drywell Cooling isolation valves. The surveillance checks d

through this series to the final relay (K100AX1 and K100BX1, ref E184 Sh.

1 5), but does not check this final relay. See attached Figure 6 for system diagram.

! 8. SI-180-205 MONTHLY CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST OF REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL

! CHANNELS LIS-B21-N024A,B,C AND D

! Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.5, 4.3.1, 4.3.2.1, 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.5.1 i

Description:

Each of the LIS's contain a switch that closes on high reactor water level and a switch that closes on low reactor water level. Each low level switch actuates a relay (C72-K6A,B,C,D) that inputs to RPS logic and NSSSS. Within the NSSSS each C72-K6 contact actuates a relay (B21-N6A,B,C,D) that, in turn, inputs to NSSSS isolation logic. The portion of the low level switch channel that is completely within RPS is I l 1 i i I r e--

tested, but that portion of the channel within the NSSSS is not tested.

The high level switches of B21-N024A&C input to RCIC and the high level switch of B21-N024B&D input to HPCI. In each case the surveillance monitors the switch contact directly; however, in three of the four cases a repeater relay (E41-K45, E41-K56, and E51-K48), which is not monitored by the surveillance, is used to input to the logic circuits. In the fourth case (for B21-N021A) the switch contact is directly in the logic and therefore monitoring the switch contact satisfies channel functional test requirements. For system diagram, see attached Figure 7.

9. Sl-114-201 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL 1 CHANNELS LIS-14221C&D Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2, 4.3.2.1, and 4.3.2.1-1.la(3)

Description:

The LIS actuates a relay which, in turn, inputs to the isolation logic.

During testing the LIS is monitored directly and the input to the isolation logic is defeated by placing a jumper across the relay contact in the logic. This prevents a half isolation signal from being generated due to this test. As a result the coil of the relay (LISX14221C and LISX14221D, ref E-184 Sh 7) actuated by the PSH is not tested by the su rveillance. For system diagram, see attached Figure 8.

10. SI-114-202 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF DRYWELL PRESSURE CHANNELS PSH-15120C&D Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.2, 4.3.2.1, and 4.3.2.1-1.lb

Description:

The PSH actuates a relay which, in turn, inputs to the isolation logic.

During testing the PSH is monitored directly and the input to the isolation logic is defeated by placing a jumper across the relay contact in the logic. This prevents a half isolation signal from being generated due to the test. As a result the coil of the relay (PSHX15120C and PSHX15120D, ref E-184 Sh. 7) actuated by the LIS is not tested by the surveillance. See attached Figure 8 for system diagram.

11. SI-183-217 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM FSL-E32-N654 AND FSL-E32-N659 (INBOARD, OUTBOARD AIR FLOW)

Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.6.1.4 and 4.6.1.4

Description:

In both instances the surveillance inputs a test signal at the input of the first signal conditioning device downstream of the transmitter and monitors the actuation of the internal switches of each FSL. In the case of FSL-E32-N659, the only internal switch used inputs directly to logic and as such the testing encompasses the complete channel. In the case of '

FSL-E32-N654 the internal switches actuate two multiplying relays (E32-K27 l

l 1

and E32-K28) which, in turn, input to logic. The surveillance does not monitor these multiplying relays. See attached Figure 9 for system diagram.

12. SI-183-219 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM PSH-E32-N650 AND PSH-E32-N660 Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.6.1.4 and 4.6.1.4.c.2

Description:

In both instances the surveillance inputs a test signal at the input of the first signal conditioning device downstream of the transmitter simulating a reactor pressure signal. In both cases the surveillance monitors the actuation of the internal switch of the alarm unit used; however, this internal switch actuates a multiplier relay (E32-K26 for E32-N650 and E32-K30 for E32-N660). that inputs to systen initiation logic, that is not monitored. For system diagram, see attached Figure 10.

13. SI-145-201 MONTHLY CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST OF FEEDWATER SYSTEM / MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM, PDI-C32-N004A,B,C Applicable Technical Specification Paragraphs:

3.3.9 and 4.3.9.1

Description:

The surveillance inputs a signal at the input of the first device downstream of the transmitter to simulate a reactor high level signal.

this signal triggers on alarm unit (one per transmitter). An internal switch of the alarm unit energizes three relays coils connected in parallel. The output of one of these relays actuates an annunicator which is monitored by the surveillance; however, the other two relays (C32-K7A&D for C32-N004A, C32-K7B&E for C32-N004B, and C32-K7C&F for C32-N004C),

which input to trip logic, are not monitored. See attached Figure 11 for system diagram.

14. SI-079-217 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF THE SGTS EXHAUST VENT RADIATION MONITORS, RE-D12-N017A&B Applicable Technical specification Paragraph:

3.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.1

Description:

The SGTS Exhaust Vent sensor and converter supplies a signal to the Indicator and Trip Unit. This Unit provides signal conditioning and via a relay card output signals. The relay card contains two relays, one for upscale trip and one for downscale. The downscale relay triggers an j annunciator, which is checked by the procedure. Two contacts of the upscale relay are used. The first upscale contact triggers an annunciator which is checked by the procedure. The second upscale contacts triggers multiplying relays, which input to logic. These multiplying relays are not checked by the procedure. The relays not checked are (ref. E-201 Sh.

12): RISHHX1-0K617A, RISHHX2-0K617A, RISHHX1-0K617B, RISHHX2-0K617B,

RISHHX3-0K617B, and RISHHX4-0K617B. See attached Figure 12 for system diagram.

15. SI-079-216 MONTHLY FUNCTIONAL TEST OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE - PROCESS RADIATION CHANNELS (RR-D12-R610, RISHH-D12-K618A&B)

Applicable Technical Specification Paragraph: 3.3.7.1 and 4.3.7.1 The Emergency Outside Air Intake Sensor and Converter supplies a signal

to the Indicator and Trip Unit. This Unit provides signal conditioning and, vis a relay card, output signals. The relay card contains two relays, one for upscale trip and one for downscale. The downscale relay triggers an annunciator, which is checked by the procedure. Two contacts of the upscale relay are used. The first upscale contact triggers an annunciator which is checked by the procedure. The second upscale contact triggers a repeater relay, which inputs to logic. This second contact is jumpered out during the surveillance and therefore the repeater relay (RISHHX-0K618A&B, ref. E197, Sh. 3 & 7) is not tested.

The alternative to jumpering out the contact is lifting a lead in CRE0 ASS logic. Act'1ation of the repeater relay, without lifting a lead in CRE0 ASS logic, will result in initiation of CRE0 ASS equipment in a manner identical to that which occurs on an Emergency Outside Air high radiation signal. See Figure 12 for system diagram.

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ATTACHMENT III POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF THE MONTHLY CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS Pennsylvania Power & Light Company evaluated the safety effect of expanding the scope of the monthly channel functional tests for the HPCI system steam line differential pressure and low pressure isolation logic channels and the high reactor water level trip logic channels. In each case the expanded scope included the first relay energized by the various sensors in these channels.

In some cases these relays are cycled as a part of the current testing, however, relay actuation is not verified. All the relays that would be tested monthly by the proposed expansion are effectively tested every 18 months by the current procedures.

PP&L modeled the HPCI isolation function to determine the unavailability of isolation on demand. The model includes isolation valves F002 and F003 and all instruments and relays in the automatic isolation logic. This model was quantified to allow determination of the unavailability of the isolation function as currently tested and as proposed to be tested. No credit for manual isolation was considered. The unavailability of the logic upstream of relays E41-K44 and E41-K34 (See Figure 5 of Attachment II) is a function of the number of isolation conditions that are generated by an event. There are four conditions that cause isolation: high steam flow, low steam pressure, high temperature (around the steam lines or in the pump room), and high pressure between the rupture discs. Based on engineering judgment, PP&L has determined that all events with public risk potential will generate at least two of these conditions (high steam flow and high temperature). Therefore the effect of the proposed change was evaluated under the assumption that thase two conditions always exist when isolation is required.

PP&L reviewed the proposed test expansion to determine if they produced new sources of unavailability due to human errors. PP&L assumed revisions to the existing test procedures to cover the proposed test scope. Then the potential human errors that could be introduced through the expanded test were evaluated. Based on the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (NUREG/CR-1278-1983), no new errors are introduced and the likelihood of the existing potential crrors remains the same.

The results of the analysis show that the proposed test expansion produces a less than 1% decrease in the unavailability of the individual channels, and an even smaller decrease in the unavailability of the isolation function. The isolation function does play an important role in limiting source terms for a HPCI steam line break. However, the Susquehanna Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Rev. 0) shows that all LOCAs represent about 10% of the core melt frequency due to internal events and are small contributors to public health effects.

Therefore the proposed changes are estimated to produce no calculable decrease in the estimated dose rate to the public.

PP&L also modeled the HPCI high reactor water level trip function to determine the unavailability of trip on demand. The model includes the turbine stop j valve and all instruments and relays in the automatic trip logic. Because the  !

relays involved in the scope expansion are already cycled by the test, no new human errors need to be considered as a source of unavailability. (The

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expansion can be performed by monitoring the status lights indicating relay actuation.) The results of the analysis show that the proposed test expansion produces approximately a 40% decrease in the unavailability of the trip function. This trip function does play an important part in assuring that transient events do not evolve into LOCAs due to reactor overfill and overpressurization. However this particular failure mode was not modeled in the Susquehanna PRA. None the less, the analysis of the expanded testing included an estimate of the effect of overfill events on the core melt frequency. Including overfill events resulta in a 1-2% increase in the core melt frequency. The proposed test expansion would reduce this impact by about 40%. Therefore the proposed test expansion produces a small but calculable change in the core melt frequency. Based on the Susquehanna PRA (Rev 0) LOCAs are insignificant contributors to risk, therefore the proposed change does not significantly affect risk. The overall effect of adding overfill events produces a small increase to the core melt frequency in the Susquehanna PRA.

This increase is not expected to significantly change the importance of LOCAs on public health (but no calculations have been performed to verify this).

I t

ATTACHMENT IV j

RELAY FAILURE EXPERIENCE PP&L conducted a review of all Significant Operating Occurrence Reports to determine the extent of relay problems at Susquehanna SES. This review showed 10 events for Unit I which were associated with relays and 21 events for Unit l 2. In all but one of these events, the relays were not associated with any monthly channel functional test which are in question. In the one event, the relay failed in such a manner as to cause the required action to take place.

The relay would not reset.

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. _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ , _ . . _ _ . _ . . , _ _ . _ , . . . _ _ - . _ - - - _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ __ __ ., .. _.

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