ML20237J537

Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-271/83-26. Util Requests That 870615 Severity Level III Notice of Violation Be Reconsidered & Withdrawn.Violation Due to Interpretation of App R Requirements,Not W/Safety Concerns

ML20237J537
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	08/14/1987
From:	Murphy W VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
FVY-87-80, NUDOCS 8708180218
Download: ML20237J537 (7)

Text

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NERMONT YANKEE -

' NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION FVY 87-80

. RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301 y, g-p ENGINEERING OFFICE 1671 WORCESTER ROAD

• FR AMINGH AM. MASSACHUSET1 S 01701 August 14, 1987

.g U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5 Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Documvit Control Desk

References:

a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271) b) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 83-242, Inspection Report 50-271/83-26, dated 11/2/83 c) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 85-38, Request for Exemption 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, dated 4/24/85 d)- Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 86-240, Exemption from Appendix R to 10CFR50, dated 12/1/86 e) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 87-91, Notice of Violation, Inspection Report No. 50-271/83-26, dated 6/15/87 f) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 87-71, Inspection Report No. 50-271/83-26, Notice of Violation, dated 7/1/87

Attachment:

A) Responses to NRC Inspection Report No. 50-271/83-26

Subject:

Reply to a Notice of Violation, Inspection Report No. 83-26 By letter dated June 15, 1987 [ Reference e)], you transmitted the subject proposed Notice of Violation to Vermont. Yankee requesting a written statement or explanation pursuant to the provisions of 10CFR2.201 within 30 days. By letter dated July 1, 1987 [ Reference f)), Vermont Yankee requested and subsequently received approval to extend the response time associated with this matter an additional 30 days _in order to fully and comprehensively address the subject concerns identified by the NRC inspection team four years ago. Specific respon-ses to the individual examples cited in the NRC Inspecth.n Report No. 50-271/

83-26 and the subject Notice of Violation have been included in Attachment A of this letter.

' Vermont Yankee's responsiveness to NRC fire protection requirements in the early 1980's is clearly evidenced in the staff's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) reports, wherein reports covering the periods from July 1, 1980 through April 30, 1983, consistently ranked the fire protection /

housekeeping functional area as Category 1. For example, the 1983 SALP report for Vermont Yankee (dated November 23, 1983) stated in pertinent part, "The Fire Protection Program was found well established, maintained, and implemented based on an inspec lon at the start of the assessment period. The licensee performed an extensive survey of plant systems for fire protection requirements. Fire

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 14, 1987 Page 2 datection and suppression systems were well maintained and controlled. Fire equipment was in good working condition and adequate spares were available. NRC review of selected fire protection modifications per license Amendment 43 showed that commitments and requirements were met. Modifications to meet the Appendix R safe shutdown requirements were made during the 1983 refueling outage, one year ahead of scheduled commitments. Licensee exceptions to the requirements were properly identified to the NRC staff."

Accordingly, in 1983, Vermont Yankee, believing to be in full compliance with the requirements of 10CFR, Part 50, Appendix R volunteered for a plant inspection by an NRC special team. This nas an attempt to ensure ourselves that our interpretations of the regulation were accurate and would withstand regulatory scrutiny. The result of this audit, as stated in the inspection report conclusions, indicated a concern with Vermont Yankee's interpretation and implementation of certain specific Appendix R Rule requirements, not with any significant safety concerns associated with Vermont Yankee's fire protection capability or compliance efforts. The conclusion section to the subject 1983 Inspection Report stated the following:

"The team concluded that the licensee has made extensive modifications to provide an alternate shutdown capability for the Control Room and cable vault as allowed under Section III.G.3 of the Rule, and that as part of the alternate design, adequate fire protection has been provided for the Switchgear Room. The licensee has not satisfied the specific requirements of Section III.G.2 to provide fire protection to redundant safe shutdown equipment, primarily in the Reactor Building."

" Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that the licensee misinterpreted the Rule requirements. The alternate shutdown design was in part in response to the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER),

dated January 13, 1978, which identified the Control Room, cable vault and Switchgear Room as specific areas of concern. With regard to the remainder of the plant, the licensee apparently concluded that, as a result of the fire protection modifications made to satisfy NRC concerns as stated in the SER, and due to the inherent train separation in the Reactor Building, ade-quate protection existed to ensure safe shutdown could be achieved in the event of a fire. The Team concurred that the modifications made and the train separation tend to minimize the. safety significance of the licensee's failure to meet specific rule requirements; however, the team concluded that the licensee's failure to properly respond to the rule is a serious concern." (Emphasis added.'

In response to the 1983 Inspection Report, Vermont Yankee diligently pursued resolution of the identified concerns on a schedule fully consistent with the implementation program prescribed by the Appendix R Rule. A chronology of Vermont Yankee's efforts to ensure full compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R,

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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 14, 1987 Page 3 Section III.G. requirements from September 1983 through February 1985 is pro-vided in our March 1, 1985 response to NRC's 1984 SALP Report dated December 24, 1984, and not repeated here. Vermont Yankee's compliance efforts associated with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G between February 1985 and November 1986 are effectively summarized and described in NRC's December 1, 1986 letter exempting Vermont Yankee from the requirements of Section III.G.1, and Section III.G.2 of Appendix R in 11 areas of the plant (References c) and d)].

As acknowledged in your June 15, 1987 Notice of Violation, at the time of the subject inspection (four years ago), a lack of clarity within the NRC and the industry existed regarding fire protection requirements. As the NRC's fire protection requirements evolved, Vermont Yankee made a strong effort, working with the NRC, to identify and address concerns, engineer and implement modi-fications, and ensure the continued safe operation of the plant.

Vermont Yankee has spent considerable resources addressing the requirements of Appendix R and the subject Inspection Report examples. We have initiated numerous meetings with the staff in an effort to properly understand and dili-gently address their concerns. During this time, Vermont Yankee has committed to compensatory measures and instituted several design changes which we understood would, along with the submission of specific exemption requests, satisfy staff concerns. Through this entire period, Vermont Yankee has con-tinuously kept NRC staff fully informed of our efforts concerning fire protec-tion compliance. Changes in NRC staff personnel and their interpretation of requirements, as well as the continued evolution of fire protection philosophy, have impacted our ability to reach final closure on the broad range of fire pro-tection requirements.

Vermont Yankee continues to regard fire protection as an ongoing high priority. Vermont Yankee's continued commitment to fire protection compliance is borne out by the " Fire Protection" section of NRC SALP Report No. 50-271/

85-99, dated December 31, 1985, which states in pertinent part, " Based on sub-sequent licensee responses to issues and actions to complete a reanalysis of the Reactor Building in November 1984, the licensee demonstrated an increased sen-sitivity and responsiveness to Appendix R issues. The routine fire protection programs and plant housekeeping remained an element of strength during this assessment period." The fire protection program currently in place at Vermont Yankee ensures continued compliance with t'e requirements of Appendix R. The continued safe operaiton of the plant and the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire remains assured.

Based on the responses outlined in Attachment A and the discussion above, Vermont Yankee herein requests that the June 15, 1987 severity Level III Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-271/83-26) be reconsidered and withdrawn. Vermont Yankee believes this request is justified due to the fact that the 1983 Inspection Report conclusions indicated a concern regarding

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 14, 1987 Page 4 l

interpretation of certain specific Appendix R Rule requirements, not with any significant safety concerns associated with Vermont Yankee's fire protection capability or compliance efforts. Further reconsideration is warranted due to Vermont Yankee's responsiveness and extensive efforts preceding and following the subject inspection to ensure full compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R Rule requirements. Finally, the four year delay in the issuance of this Level III Notice of Violation associated with an interpretation of Appendix R Rule requirements, pending staff resolution of issues and interpretations pertaining to Appendix R requirements, implementation and enforcement, is unwarranted and unfair.

We trust that this letter is responsive to your request and that you will give full consideration to our determination and basis for withdrawing the sub-Ject Notice of Violation. Again, Vermont Yankee is prepared to meet with you to discuss this matter at any time.

Very truly yours, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION M w k Warren P Mur by Vice President a d Manager of Operations

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ATTACHMENT A l

RESPONSES TO NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-271/83-26 The following discussion addresses specific actions taken by Vermont Yankee to close out the examples cited in NRC In pection Report No. 50-271/83-26 and the subject Notice of Violation.

Example A "For redundant trains of systems necessary for hot shutdown and in the northwest of the RB, Elevation 252', although the redundant cable trays, containing control, instrumentation, and some power cables, were separated by more than 20' and there was fire detec-tion in the area, an adequate fire suppression system was not installed in that the fire suppression system was placed beneath the lowest level of cable trays which contained cable not qualified as fire resistant by IEEE-383. No alternative or dedi-cated shutdown capabilities were provided."

The sprinkler system which existed at the time of the inspection was installed as a result of the Vermont Yankee Fire Hazards Survey in order to comply with the NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1. These sprinkler locations were selected to address the concerns of the NRC review that the fire sprinklers be located below the cable trays in order to have an effective suppression system.

1 During the August 1983 inspection, Vermont Yankee, as described above, was cited for not having an adequate Fire Suppression System. Vermont Yankee corrected this concern by installing additional sprinklers above the the cable trays in 1984. This installation was inspected and determined to be " complete" by NRC Inspection Report No. 50-271/85-08, Section 11.2.2, dated April 15, 1985.

Vermont Yankee subsequently requested an exemption from Appendix R,Section III.G.2 for this area in Reference c) because our detailed reanalysis indicated f that minimum train separation in some places is only 18', not 20' as noted in the Inspection Report. Reference d) granted Vermont Yankee an exemption for the Reactor Building Elevation 252'.

Example B "For redundant control cables located in Cable Tray R330SII and ,

Conduit 11188JSIIX for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) inboard isolation J valves V13-15 and V23-15, there was less than 20' of separation j and there was no fire suppression or fire detection system at '

Elevation 252' of the RB. No alternative or dedicated shutdown capabilities were provided."

l Vermont Yankee reviewed the deficiency cited in this example, and in early 1984 initiated a design change to relocate the control cables for RCIC Valve V13-15 through a different elevation of the Reactor Building, thus providing greater than 20' of separation. This design change was installed during the summer of 1984. This installation was inspected and determined to be " complete" by NRC Inspection Report No. 50-271/85-08, Section 11.2.3, dated April 15, 1985.

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Attachment A Page 2 l

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-As a result of Vermont Yankee's Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, a design change was initiated to provide fire separation zones within the Reactor Building. In conjunction with this design change, Vermont Yankee submitted an exemption request for the northeast corner of Elevation 252' of the Reactor Building. This exemption request was discussed with members of the NRC staff at a meeting in July 1985. Subsequent to the meeting, Vermont Yankee revised the exemption request to address NRC staff concerns, and committed to install an additional design modification to further enhance separation of redundant equip-ment. In December 1986, Vermont Yankee received acceptance from the NRC of its exemption request for the northeast corner of Elevation 252' of the Reactor Building. Engineering for the final design modification necessary to meet full compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.2, was completed in February 1987, and it is scheduled for installation during the refueling outage which is presently in progress.

Example C " Motor Control Centers 898 and 90 which power RCIC and HPCI inboard isolation valves V13-15 and V23-15, respectively, were separated by greater than 20 feet; however, there were intervening combustibles in the form of open cable trays and there was no automatic fire suppression in the area. No alternative or dedi-cated shutdown capabilities were provided."

The resolution of this example closely follows that of Example B. In early 1984, Vermont Yankee initiated a design change which consisted of installing a thermal barrier between the two McC's. This barrier was installed after discussions with members of the NRC staff who suggested that this design modifi-  ;

cation may satisfy the NRC concerns. This installation was inspected and deter- l mined to be " complete" by NRC Inspection Report No. 50-271/85-08,Section II.2.4, dated April 15, 1985.

Vermont Yankee submitted an exemption request to the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2, based on implementation of this design change and the creation of fire zones within the Reactor Building, including fire stopping cable trays and adding fire detection. As discussed above, the NRC staff com-mented on the exemption request in July 1985. Vermont Yankee modified the request and in December 1986 received an SER which accepted the exemption. The cable tray fire stops were installed in 1986, and the addition of fire detection will be completed shortly.

Example D "For the reactor vessel level and pressure transmitters located at Elevation 280' of the RB, although there was more than 20' of separation, there was no automatic fire suppression or detection in the vicinity of the instrument racks. No alternative or dedi-cated shutdown capabilities were provided."

Vermont Yankee reviewed this example and re-reviewed the existing suppression and detection provided in the vicinity of this equipmeric and for- i mulated an exemption request to the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.2, which we felt would satisfy the NRC concerns regarding this area of the Reactor Building. During our meeting with the NRC staff in July 1985, in which we pre-sented our exemption requests, the staff stated that our exemption request could not be granted as written. Subsequent to the meeting, we modified the exemption

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Attachment A Page 3 request by committing to add addditional fire detection in this area. In addi-tion, our safe shutdown analysis identified some. additional circuit modifica-tions which we felt were necessary to enhance safe shutdown capability. In December 1986 the NRC granted the exemption request for Elevation 280' of the Reactor Building. Installation of the additional fire detectors in this elevation is in progress and will be completed shortly. Additional circuit modi-fication design changes are scheduled to be installed during the plant refueling outage.

Example E ~"The redundant power cables to Motor Control Centers 8B and 98, in the personnel corridor which lead to the northwest corner of the RB, were separated by less than 20' and did not have automa-tic fire suppression or detection in the area. No alternative or dedicated shutdown capabilities were provided."

Vermont Yankee reviewed this example of non-compliance, discussed possible resolutions, and committed in early 1984 to install a one-hour fire barrier on each of the redundant conduits, and to request an exemption from the need to pro-vide suppression in this area. Vermont Yankee submitted the exemption request, but in discussions with NRC staff was told the exemption could not be granted as written. Vermont Yankee. subsequently withdrew the request and committed to pro-vide a three-hour fire barrier on one of the cables, thus fully meeting Section III.G.2 requirements. Engineering for this modification was completed in May 1986, and installation of the change will be completed shortly.

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