ML20237A376

Insp Rept 50-219/87-32 on 871019-23.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Documentation for Mfg & Installation of New Fuel Racks & Licensee Response to NRC Info Notice 87-43, Gaps in Neutron Absorbing...Storage

ML20237A376
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	12/04/1987
From:	Kaplan H, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237A362	List: ML20237A360 ML20237A376
References
50-219-87-32, IEIN-87-043, IEIN-87-43, NUDOCS 8712140432
Download: ML20237A376 (4)

See also: IR 05000219/1987032

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-219/87-32

Docket No. 50-219

License No. DPR-16 Priority -

Category

Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation

P.O. Box 388

Forked River, New Jersey 08731 ,_

Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Forked River, New Jersey

Insp'ection Conducted: October 19-23, 1987

Inspector: Mj . /(h

H. J. Kaplan, Senior Reactor Engineer

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~date

Approved by: f ///f/87

J'. R. Strosnider, Chief date

Materials and Processes Section

-Inspection Summary: Routine Unannounced Inspection on October 19-23, 1987

Report No. 50-219/87-32

Areas Inspected: Documentation for manufacture and installation of new fuel

racks, and licensee's response to NRC information Notice No. 87-43 " Gaps in

Neutron Absorbing Material in High Density Spent Fuel Storage."

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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Details

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1.0 Persons Contacted

GPU-Nuclear Corporation

-P. Fiedler, Vice President and Director of Operations l

' B. DeMerchant, Licensing Engineer

J. Solakiewiez,. QA Engineering Manager

R. Thompson,. Core Engineering Manager

J. Barton, Deputy Director Plant Operations

~ J.F. Andrescavage, Plans and Programs Engineer

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

W. Bateman, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Wechselberger, Resident Inspector

2.0 Inspection Purpose

The purpose of this inspection was to review the documentation covering

the manufacture and installation of ten spent fuel modules (racks) as

described in Safety Esaluation Report 402-138-003. Also, information was

obtained regarding the licensee's response to NRC Information Notice No.

87-43 " Gaps in Neutron-Absorbing Material in High-Density Spent Fuel

Storage."

3.0 Manufacturing Information

The subject racks, identified as A through K were manufactured by Joseph

Oat Co, Camden New Jersey. Manufacture was initiated in 1984, and

completed in 1985. Technical Specification 1302-12-007, required the

racks to be designed and cor structed in accordance with ASME III, Section  !

NF. A review of the Joseph Oat document packages indicated that the rackr 1

were fabricated from annealed .048" .063" thick SA-240 type 316 L (low I'

carbon) stainless steel supplied by Allegheny Ludbm and Eastern Stain-

less Steel. The inspector verified that the mater'al certifications

(mechanical properties and thickness) conformed to SA-240 and Joseph Oat j

drawings 7470-77. The material test reports indicated that the material I

was furnished in the annealed condition and had successfully passed ASTM A j

262 Practice A and E corrosion testing. The filler material used was Type 1

308 L as verified by Sandvick material test report #45778. )

Records were reviewed verifying that Joseph Oat welding procedures WPS

4101, 4309, 4310, 4303 & 4307 had been reviewed by the licensee. The

document package also showed evidence that the racks had been subjected

to numerous dimensional checks, liquid penetrant inspection of all welds,

and " free path testing" of fuel cells to check for proper fuel bundles

movement. Traceability of materials was maintained with respect to

material certifications,

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Documented evidence was presented to indicate that the licensee's QA

representative had verified or witnessed these inspection activities. A

review of nonconformance reports did not disclose any material

deficiencies. Several dimensional deficiencies were recorded They

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l however, were accepted by the licensee's Engineering Group.

4.0 Visual inspection j

The inspector visually inspected a portion of the seam welds in module B,

~the only module which had not been installed in the fuel pool. The welds

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appeared to be in the as-welded condition. No apparent surface defects

such as cracks or lack of fusion were observed. These welds had been

liquid penetrant inspected as indicated in the document package.

5.0 Removal and Installation

The inspector reviewed work packages A15J-30138 and A15K-30138 covering

the removal of old racks and bases from the north end of the fuel pool

and replacing them with four new racks. This work was performed by

Quadrex Energy Services Co. Numerous QA hold points were documented

including cleanliness of equipment used, removal of rack connections,

rigging and torquing.

6.0 NRC Information Notice No. 87-43

The subject Information Notice, No. 87-43, dated September 8, 1987

recently alerted nuclear power facilities to a potentially significant

problem pertaining to gaps identified in the neutron absorber component

(Boraflex) of the high density spent fuel storage racks at Quad Cities

Unit 1. These racks also were manufactured by Joseph Oat. The safety

concern is that certain gaps might reduce the margin of nuclear sub-

criticality in the fuel pool. Boraflex, a Bisco Products trade name for

a boron carbide dispersion in an elastomeric silicone apparently undergoes

dimensional changes under radiation which results in gap formation.

The issue with regard to the gap problem may be confined to only racks

supplied by Joseph Oat, since Westinghouse racks used at Turkey Point have

not indicated the presence of gaps. In this regard the nuclear industry

in cooperation with EPRI and Bisco is currently studying the problem to

determine the effect of rack design and manufacturing methods on the

consequence of stress, temperature and chemical environment on irradiated

Boraflex. The method of attachment of the Boraflex to the stainless steel

wall of module may be very crucial. In discussing this problem with the

l licensee the inspector reviewed Bisco's QA document package indicating

that the Boraflex used in the new racks had been subjected to Quality

Assurance requirements specified in GPU Purchasing Specification PS-301,

Revision 0.

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The package included Elastomer / Boron carbide lot numbers, and reports

covering composition, physical properties and dimensional reports. In

addition the licensee presented the Oyster Creek Spent . Fuel Rack In-Service

Surveillance Program Procedure 1002.6 Revision 1 which provides instruc-

tions for verifying the integrity of the Boraflex using material test

samples. The samples are packets which house the Boraflex material

between stainless steel sheets in a configuration essentially the same as

in the fuel racks. These test samples will be withdrawn and characterized

in accordance with specified intervals after exposure to irradiation under

short term and long term conditions, and the irradiated properties

compared to non-irradiated. The inspector recommended that in addition to

evaluating the test samples the licensee should consider inspecting the

racks for gaps in the Boraflex using underwater neutron radiography or

" blackness" tests as mentioned in information Notice No. 87-43. The

licensee also repcrted that he had performed a criticality analysis of the

new. racks using the Quad City gap conditions ana concluded that no safety

problem would exist.

7.0 Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (closed) 87-13-02

Violation 12

The licensee failed to hydrostatically test following rework of a feed-

water isolation valve V-2-11. Although Plant Engineering specified a

requirement for hydrostatic test, the requirement was not included in the

Work Control Package (WCP) since the Weld Package Information Request

(WPIR) was not returned to the preparer of the WCP for its inclusion.

GPUN Welding Manual Procedure has been revised as Revision 3 to require

the completed WPIR to be returned to the preparer for inclusion of the

requirements in the WCP as 'a final step. The valve was subsequently

hydrostatically tested as required.

8.0 Exit Meeting

The inspector met with licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1,

on October 23, 1987. No violations were identified. At no time during

the inspection was written material provided to the licensee.