ML20212M317

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Summary of 750207 Meeting W/Util,Earth Sciences Assoc,Univ of Washington,Usgs & San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace in Bethesda,Md to Discuss Site Geology & Seismology
ML20212M317
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Diablo Canyon
Issue date: 02/24/1975
From: Allison D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20150F500 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-86-391 NUDOCS 8608250441
Download: ML20212M317 (6)


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FEB. 2 41975

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DOCKET NOS:

50- 27S AND 50-323 APPLICAhT: PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CCHPNiY (ICSE)

FACIIIN: DIABLD CANYON NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 MlD 2 Sikt1ARY OF MEETING HELD ON FEBRUARY 7,1975 TO DISWSS GDOIDGY R4D SEISTOIIXsY OF 'HE DIABID CANYON SITE On February 7,1975, members of the Regulatory staff and its cormultant, the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) met with p=e==1 frun IGSE and their consultants in Bethesda, Maryland. An intervenor, the San Luis Obispo Mothers fx Peace, was also re1 resented at the meeting. A canplete list of attendees is attached as Enclosure No.1.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the geology and seismology of the D4ahin Canyon site.

Backgruand Following the Construction Pennit (CP) review, Diablo Canyon was des,tgned for a horizontal ground accelenstion of 0.4g.

Since that time additional peacu gaalng4n=1 investigations have taken place offshore of the Diablo Canyon site. In November,1974, PGSE subnitted additional geological infonnation based'en these inves*4=*4ans. In December, 1974, PGSE subnitted, at the Regulatry staff's request, the results of analyses indicating that Diablo Canyon could withstand accelerations of 0.5g.

On January 28, 1975, USGS ocupleted its zwview of the geological inferination and oopeludad that, with the limit of gresent infonnation, an accelsnation of 0.5g was not adequate. This conclusion was based on their opinion that the ma4=nic potential of the Hosgri Fault zone nust be cocaidared the same as that of other basin bounding faults in the region.

Diacnamion PGSE's geology consultant, D. Hamilton, graded the following views on the Hoegri Fault mone: at the northern and the Hosgri Fault zone tenninates a little north of Point Estere, giving way to folded structures and short faults. 'It is rot connected with the San Simeon fault, as evidanood by the apparent trend of the San Simeon fault and the fact that the San Simeon fault is rot seen on seisnic profiles in that area.

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. At its southern end the Ibsgri Fault zone is constrained by Transverse Range folding and faulting which ir=Wate that it runs no further south.

There is evidence of recent activity on the Hosgri Fault zone.

Source mechanisms do not preclude a strike slip mechanisn 1:ut total strike slip motion is not likely, at least rot over lorg sections of fault.

'Ihe Ibsgri Fault zone is considered to be a lesser order fault of the plate boundary tectonic zone and represents a lesser order of seismic potential than the Santa incia Bank Fault, basal in part upon the strong topographic expression of the Santa Lucia Bank. The zone consists of 50 - 60 miles of faults which are continuous or armrv,ed in close echelon. With an apprtrximately 30 additional miles of discontiraxxis faulting, the overall lergth is approximately 90 miles.

The URsS representatives stated that it is important to understand the liosgri Fault zone in relationship to regional tectonic mechanisms.

It would be useful to know whether or not there has been great lorizontal movement along the zone.

It is also iar a kuit to evaluate r

the Ibsgri Fault zone in comparison to the Santa Incia Bark Fault.

It is possible that the strurger topogmphic expre:sion of the Santa Lucia Bank is due to less exposure to erosion and deposition.

'D. Ilamilton also ' discussed his views on the fracwork of regional tectenic motions. The first order of faults are the San Andreas Fault IMMew and its pruninent loanches Giayward. Calvares, Elsinore and San Jacinto). The next order would be large onshore faults such as Sur-Macimiento. The Santa incia Bank Fault with a 65 mile outcrop,

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possibly a length of 85 or 90 miles and possibly a source of the l

1927 earthquake uvuld be ranked with these larrer onslere faults.

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'Ihe liosgri Fault zone would be ranked with a leeser order such as l

West liausna and Edna.

RISE's seisnelogy consultant, S. Snith, discussed the location and

ragnitude of the 1927 event. This event has been located by Byerly, banks and Gothrup at different places using different techniques.

Saith presented a location based on many obse:vations of S-P intervals frun aftershocks which locate the event on arcs around Santa Parbara ard Pasedena. Isoseismal data were then used to fix an appropriate latitude. Smith also stated that, in his opinion, 7.25 is a good value for the magnitude of this event.

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FEB.,2 41g75 3-Regartling the maximum fraction of a fault which is likely to move in a single event, Snith stated that large fractions have been observed to move, but not associated with a strike slip mechanism. The data am confused by variations in the manner of detennining fault length.

In nannal app 14mtions, fault lengths are not extended unless them is evidence to do so. However, for nuclear licensing applications i

conservatively long fault lengths am used. Smith believes that the probable caxinun fraction would be 20-25%, based on the fault lengths used in nuclear licensing, at least for strike slip mechanisms.

However, there are not many data on this since fault lengths are not nomally detemined in this manner.

D. hanilton aGain discussed the ordering of faults in the San Andreas system. He stated that the large onshore faults showing large movement in the geologic recorti should be considered capable of magnitude 7 plus. 'Ihe next lesser atter not showing large disp 1-nts ard with no geomorphic expmssion of large motion should be considered capable 6f less.

S. Snith expmssed his opinion that this lesser artier should be considemd capable of one artier of magnitude less energy release.

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'Ihe staff and USGS p=auel ex;ressed an intemst in the following question: if a higher order fault such as Haywarti were located offshore, would it show surface ex;ression?

D. Hamilton stated that there is i

one such fault which does show good surface expression.

Conclusion The Regulatory staff and USGS requested IGSE to provide the following Mditional infonnation:

(1)

Discussion and arguments for detemining the maximum earthquake 1

i that can be expected on faults of various ranks within the San Andreas systen, m1ated to hiLtric seismicity.

(2) h==ntation on the intersection of the Hoogri Fault zone with the Transverse Range Faults, includiJg seismic reflection profiles.

.(3)

>kre deti41M infomation on.the northern reaches of the Hosgri Fault zone, includire seisaic reflection profiles.

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A fuller developnent of views on the structural relationship of the hosgri Fault zone to the San Simeon Fault.

(5)

Data on the location of the 1927 event.

Original Signed by Thomas J. Hirons j

P. Allison

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Light Water Reactors Project Branch 1-3 Division of Reactor Licensing Erclosure:

Atterxiance List j

oc w/ encl:

Mr. John C. Mxcissey Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.

Andrei J. Skaff, Esq.

Mr. Frederick Eissler Ms. T'14=hath E. Apfelberg Ms. Sandra A. Silver Mr. John Forster Mr. Imnie Valentine n.._d Mr. W4114= P. Oormell Mr. W. J. Lirdbl=1 i

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DJCLOSURE hD.1 ATIENDANCE LIST PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC MEETING FEBRUARY 7, 1975 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY R. B. Bettinger V. J. Ghio W. J. Lindblad USGS J. F. Devine F. A. Houser CONSULTANTS TO FGSE D. H. Hamilton (Earth Science Associates)

S. W. Srnith (University of Washington)

INTERVENOR R. Augustine - Representing San Luis Ms Obispo Mothers for Peace (observing but not participating)

NRC - STAFF D. P. All hon R. Black R. C. DeYoung W. P. (u' m ill R. Hoffman R. B. McMullen

0. D. Parr W. Ross J. Tourte11otte e

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Distribution:

Docket File (2 R. Tedesco NRC PDR (2)

V. Stello local PDR R. Maccary NRR Raading (M. Groff)

H. Denton R. C. DeYoung V. Benaroya V. A. Moore C. Long D. Skovholt J. Kastner D. Muller G. Iainas R. Denise D. Ross K. Goller T. Ippolito G. Lear J. Knight W. Butler S. Pawlicki J. Stolz L. Shao R. Clark B. Grimes T. Spies W. * = ill D. Vasu11n R. M11ard K. Kniel P. Fine

0. Parr T. Novak.

A. Schwencer M. Spangler R. Schenel EP Project Manager - W. Ross D. Zisenn Attorney, ELD P. Collins IE (3)

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R. Purple V. H. Wilson G. Knighton ACRS (12)

G. Dicker Project Manager - T. J. Hirons g

B. J. Youngh1 W LWR 1-3 F eding W. H. Regan, Jr.

IRR 1-3 File R. Vollmer D. P. Allison W. Houston R. Black S. Varga R. Hoffman R. W. Klecker R. B. McMullen F. Schroeder J. Tourtellotte C. Stepp 4

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/ a E 031975 efL-J R. R. Maccary, Assistant Director for Engineering Division of Technical Review AREAS OF CONCERN IN SEISMIC ANALYSIS AND DESIGN ON DIABLO CANYON In a recent ACRS Subcomittee meeting (February 18, 1975) on Diablo Canyon plant, the subject of conservatism in the seismic design o'f the plant came up again.

It appears that the ACRS members attach a lot of importance to seismic analysis and design. At the meeting Dr. D. Okrent and Dr. S. H. ~ Bush of the ACRS Comittee wem present.

In addition they were accompanied by six seismic consultants - Dr. Page. Dr. Koffman, Dr. Steinbrugge, Dr. Thompson.

l Dr. Siegel and Dr. Triftnac. Considerable emphasis was placed by of the ACRS members on the types of detailed analyses and i

I its perfomed by the staff to verify the adequacy of the seismic sign.

I pointed out to the members of the Comittee that the staff reviews and evaluates procedures, methods of analysis, I

modelling and criteria, but we do not perform a detailed checking or audit of the applicant's analysis.

I also mentioned that in l

order to perform a detailed audit, the Structural Engineering Branch would require a staff of over a hundred people

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A large number of questions on seismic analysis and design wem asked by the ACRS Subconunittee members and their consultants.

All of these questions were answered by the staff to their satis-faction. However, after a caucus of the ACRS Subcommittee, they I

requested additional infomation on a few topics to be cddmssed i

by the applicant and the staff at the May ACRS meeting on the Diablo Canyon plant. These topics are as follows.

1 (1) The Conedttee members would like to know wh&t kind of errors could arise in seismic analysis. They would like to know, for example. if the finite element method nay have errors l

because of wrong input or the methodology itself may have i

errors which fail to cancel but which may accumulate in one direction. They would also like to know if we could estimate l

all possible sources of errors.

(2) The Committee members referred to Appendix X (on Design Adequecy) of Reactor Safety Study WASH 1400 and pointed out thaQr

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-2 p 03 m 19% of the items considered for seismic evaluation, design adequacy could not be ascertained because sufficient infor-mation was not available. They wanted to know whether the j

staff is performing similar type of audit and verification as was done in WASH 1400. They also wanted to know how the staff evaluates whether the seismic analysis and design is l

adequate and what type of audit the staff performs.

(3) They also wanted to know whether differential movement between adjacent structures was considered for the two earthquakes for which the seismic design was checked.

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addition they wanted to know why the two earthquakes are adequate to define the seismic risk at the site.

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Topic (1) will be addressed by the SEB, topic (2) should be addressed jointly by the MEB and SEB while topic (3) should be handled by the SEB and SAB.

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As regards topic (2), a phone call to Franklin Institute revealed that' the type of audit and verification documented in WASH 1400 i

l Appendix X. required approximately 10 man-years in addition to the manpower spent by the Architect Engineers and Vendors.

L. C. S a Chief Structural Engineering Branch

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