ML20035B453
| ML20035B453 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Palo Verde, Sequoyah, Pilgrim, Diablo Canyon, Vogtle, Quad Cities, Fort Calhoun, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1993 |
| From: | Chaffee A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OREM-93-010, OREM-93-10, NUDOCS 9304020003 | |
| Download: ML20035B453 (18) | |
Text
MAR 18 833 e
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support FROM:
Alfred E.
Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support
SUBJECT:
OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING M7tRCH 17, 1993 - BRIEFING 93-10 On March 17, 1993, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events Briefing (93-10) to inform senior managers from offices of the Commission, EDO, SECY, RES, ACRS, AEOD, NRR, OE, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on March 10, 1993. lists the attendees.
presents the significant elements of the discussed events. contains reactor scram statistics for the week ending March 14, 1993.
No significant events were identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.
- original signed by Edward F. Goodwin for -
Alfred E.
Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support
Enclosures:
As stated DISTRIBUTION:
' Central. Files
- TKosliy cc w/ attachments:
PDR EBenner See next page EAB R/F EGoodwin KGray CBeardslee RDennig LKilgore, SECY l
310015 C
b Y[I DORS EAB/ DOR ORS EAB/ DORS c'
y/93
//
/3 J )8 / 3
}
l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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r-j DOCUMENT NAME:
ORTRANS.KAG (G:KAG)
I. NN - O ~ /
i RETURN TO REGul.AIDRY CBdRA. FILES CP'N /
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9304020003 930318 PDR ORG NRRB PDR
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j ec:
i T. Murley, NRR (12G18)
C. Trammell (PDV) l F. Miraglia, NRR (12G18)
T. Quay (PDV)
F. Gillespie, NRR (12G18)
D. LaBarge (PDII-4)
J. Partlow, NRR (12G18)
F. Hebdon (PDII-4)
S. Varga, NRR (14E4) l i
J. Calvo, NRR-(14A4)
G.
Lainas, NRR (14H3)
J. Roe, NRR (13E4)
J.
Zwolinski, NRR (13H24)
[
M. Virgilio,.NRR (13E4)
W. Russell, NRR (12G18)
J. Richardson, NRR (7D26) l A. Thadani, NRR (BE2)
S. Rosenberg, NRR (10E4) l 2
C.
Rossi, NRR (9A2)
I B. Boger, NRR (10H3)
F. Congel, NRR (10E2)
D. Crutchfield, NRR (11H21)
W. Travers, NRR (11B19) l D. Coe, ACRS (P-315)
)
E. Jordan, AEOD (MN-3701) l T. Novak, AEOD (MN-9112) l L. Spessard, AEOD (MN-3701)
K. Brockman, AEOD (MN-3206)
S. Rubin, AEOD (MN-5219)
M. Harper, AEOD (MN-9112)
J. Grant, EDO (17G21)
I R. Newlin, GPA (2G5) l E. Beckjord, RES (NLS-007)
A. Bates, SECY (16G15)
G. Rammling, OCM (16G15) l i
T. Martin, Region I W. Kane, Region I C. Hehl, Region I
{
S. Ebneter, Region II E. Merschoff, Region II B.' Davis, Region III j
E. Greenman, Region III J. Milhoan, Region IV i
B. Beach, Region IV J
J.B. Martin, Region V K. Perkins, Region V l
}
bec:
Mr. Sam Newton, Manager l
Events Analysis Department Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 i
. _,.. _. l
l i
I ENCLOSURE 1 l
LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS FULL BRIEFING (93-10)
I MARCH 17, 1993 I
NAME OFFICE NAME OFFICE B. GRIMES NRR T. KOSHY NRR E. BENNER NRR M. WOHL NRR j
C.
BEARDSLEE NRR E. TOMLINSON NRR l
K. GRAY NRR C. TRAMMELL NRR D.
SKEEN NRR G.
ZECH NRR E. GOODWIN NRR C. ROSSI NRR
)
J.
R. BENEDICT NRR F. MIRAGLIA NRR I
J. ROE NRR T. MURLEY NRR S. ROSENBERG NRR G. HOLAHAN NRR j
P. KANG NRR B. D. LIAW NRR M. CULLINGTORD NRR S. VARGA NRR D. CARTER NRR G.
LAINAS NRR i
R. ECKENRODE NRR J.
LUEHMAN OE l
P. ENG NRR D.
J.
ZIMMERMAN NRR G. BURDICK RES L. TRAN NRR E. BROWN AEOD J. TATUM NRR L. PLISCO OEDO i
J. LAZEVNICK NRR T. SHEDLOSKY OCM/IS J. WERMIEL NRR K. HART SECY TELEPHONE ATTENDANCE-
~
(AT ROLL CALL)
Reaions Resident Inspectors Region I Palo Verde Region II Region V IIT/AIT Team Leaders Misc.
Palo Verde (D. Kirsch)
Sequoyah (J. Blake) l l
l
{.
.. - -41 ENCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 93-10 LOCATION:
10 Bil, WHITE _ FLINT WEDNESDAY, MARCH.17, 1993, 11:00 A.M.
PALO VERDE, UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK-(AIT) l SEQUOYAH, UNIT 2 EXTRACTION STEAM HEADER RUPTURE-l (AIT - UPDATE) l!
a i
VARIOUS PLANTS PROPOSED-PWR ELECTRIC POWER i
REQUIREMENTS DURING SHUTDOWN-j
~
I l
i PRESENTED BY:
EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH l
~
DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR i
SUPPORT, NRR l
5 i
93-10 PALO VERDE, UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK MARCH 14, 1993 PROBLEM A TUBE LEAK 0F SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE EXISTED TO CAUSE A PLANT SHUTDOWN AND REQUIRE THE LICENSEE TO DECLARE AN ALERT.
CAUSE CAUSE OF THE TUBE LEAK IS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE TUBE LEAKS OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT OFFSITE RELEASES IF UNMITIGATED.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 3/14/93 (ALL TIMES ARE MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME) 04:25 OPERATORS NOTE DECREASING PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE.
ADDITIONAL CHARGING FLOW INITIATED.
04:48 REACTOR TRIPPED MANUALLY.
' UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED.
04:58 SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNALS INITIATED AUTOMATICALLY.
05:02 ALERT DECLARED BASED ON TUBE LEAK IN STEAM GENERATOR 2 GREATER THAN THE CAPABILITY OF ONE CHARGING PUMP.
i CONTACT:
E. BENNER, NRR/ DORS AIT: YES
REFERENCES:
10 CFR 50.72 #25255, SIGEVENT: TBD PN59309, AND PN59309A-C
1 l
PALO VERDE, 93-10 i
UNIT 2 05:35 PRESSURIZER LEVEL-AND PRESSURE STABILIZED AT 8% AND i
1900 PSIG, RESPECTIVELY, USING ALL THREE CHARGING l
PUMPS.
HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION INITIATED-
]
SHORTLY AFTER.
j i
06:05 LICENSEE INITIATED C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION USING STEAM BYPASS TO THE MAIN CONDENSER AND i
PRESSURIZER SPRAY.
07:28 STEAM GENERATOR 2 ISOLATED.
i 08:00 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE REDUCED TO 1160 PSIG AND 496*F, RESPECTIVELY, EFFECTIVELY STOPPING THE LEAK.
3/15/93 ALERT TERMINATED AT 01:15 DISCUSSION 0
LEAK ESTIMATED TO BE 150 GPM.
~
RELEASE PATHWAY, VIA STEAM JE ' AIR EJECTORS, IS o
FILTERED AND MONITORED.
o PRELIMINARY DOSE CALCULATIONS ARE LESS THAN 1% OF. EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE.
i o.
LONG TERM C00LDOWN OF STEAM GENERATOR 2 ACCOMPLISHED 3
WITH EMERGENCY PROCEDURE USING CONDENSATE PUMP TO FEED j
AND STEAM. GENERATOR BLOWDOWN TO REMOVE INVENTORY.
q l
PALO VERDE, 93-10
~
UNIT 2 FOLLOWUP e
LICENSEE ACTIVATED EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY AT 6:42 A.M., AND TECHNICAL RESPONSE CENTER AT 6:52 A.M.
o REGION V AND NRC HEADQUARTERS ENTERED STANDBY MODE AT 5:48 A.M.
REGION V INCIDENT RESPONSE CENTER ACTIVATED AT 6:12 A.M.
o AIT DISPATCHED TO SITE.
STATE OF ARIZONA SENDING A RADIATION MONITORING TEAM TO SITE.
1 i
4 I
r i
't
I 93-10 SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 EXTRACTION STEAM HEADER RUPTURE (AIT - UPDATE)
MARCH 1, 1993 PROBLEM EXTRACTION STEAM HEADER RUPTURE RESULTED IN APPR0X. 20%
VOLTAGE INCREASE AT THE SAFEGUARDS BUSES.
CAUSES o
INITIATING EVENT APPEARS TO BE CONTROL VALVE PARTIAL CLOSURE AND RE0PENING FOR STEAM GENERATOR NO. 3 RESULTING FROM AN ATTEMPT TO PULL THE WRONG FUSE.
o 0VERV0LTAGE WAS CAUSED BY THE VENTILATION FAN CIRCULATING STEAM FROM THE BREAK INTO THE MAIN GENERATOR V0LTAGE REGULATOR CABINET.
o THE RUPTURE OCCURRED IN DEGRADED PIPING UNDETECTED BY THE LICENSEE'S EROSION AND CORROSION MONITORING PROGRAM.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
~
PERSONNEL HAZARD.
e o
POTENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT CHALLENGE FROM 0VERV0LTAGE.
i CONTACT:
THOMAS K0 SHY, NRR/ DORS AIT:
YES
REFERENCES:
10 CFR 50.72 #25162 AND SIGEVENT:
TBD PN29308
.~
-SEQUOYAH, UNIT 2 93-10 j
i BACKGROUND l
o A 15CM (6) LONG AND 10CM (4") WIDE RUPTURE OCCURRED.ON j
A 25CM (10") DIAMETER EXTRACTION STEAM HEADER. -
i o
THE RUPTURED LINE SUPPLIED EXTRACTION STEAM TO FEED WATER HEATER B2.
l 4
o LEAK WAS NOT ISOLABLE FROM THE HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE l
I EXTRACTION STEAM LINE.
DURING THE. EVENT, THE OPERATORS NOTICED THE VOLTAGE o
6.9KV BUSES INCREASED TO 8.2KV.
i o
OPERATORS TRIPPED THE PLANT BECAUSE VOLTAGE COULD NOT BE REDUCED.
VOLTAGE RETURNED'TO NORMAL WITH' BUS
~
TRANSFER FOLLOWING THE TRIP.
. DISCUSSION AT 14:20 HRS., AN OPERATOR PLACED A FUSE PULLING TOOL e
ON THE WRONG. FUSE.
BEFORE THE MISTAKE COULD BE CORRECTED, NO. 3. STEAM GENERAT0_R-CONTROL VALVE RECEIVED l
A TRIP SIGNAL AND PARTIALLY CLOSED.
o WHILE CORRECTING STEAM FLOW / FEED FLOW MISMATCH, THE OVERV0LTAGE CONDITION WAS OBSERVED AT THE SHUTDOWN l
BOARDS.
o GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR OPERATED ERRATICALLY DUE.TO
)
EXCESSIVE M0ISTURE FROM THE ESCAPE STEAM CIRCULATED BY j
THE CABINET'S VENTILATING FAN.
P'
SEQUOYAH, UNIT 2 93-10
]
o FIRST INDICATION OF A MAJOR STEAM LEAK WAS AN ORAL i
REPORT FROM THE TURBINE BUILDING.
o SECOND INDICATION WAS AN EXCITOR TROUBLE. ALARM IN THE l
CONTROL ROOM.
o OPERATORS EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY IN REDUCING YOLTAGE j
AND TRIPPED THE PLANT AT 14:23.
o THE INCREASE IN V0LTAGE APPEARS TO BE APPROX. 20% AND i
i IT MAY HAVE LASTED FOR 3 TO 3 1/2 MIN.
NEITHER VOLTAGE CHART RECORDER WAS IN SERVICE.
o NO SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FAILURES WERE IDENTIFIED.
o THE LICENSEE INSPECTED BOTH UNITS AND FOUND ADDITIONAL i
INSTANCES OF DEGRADED PIPING THAT REQUIRED IMMEDIATE i
i ATTENTION.
l o
THREE ADDITIONAL DEFECTS WOULD_HAVE REACHED ASME MINIMUM THICKNESS LIMITS WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH; TEN WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR.
e THE EROSION AND CORROSION PROGRAM APPEARS TO LACK 1
MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IN PROVIDING RESOURCES AND SPECIFYING RESPONSIBILITY.
j o
THE CHEC-MATE PROGRAM MODELING FOR THE RUPTURED SECTION
)
FAILED TO CONSIDER 6 VENT LINES WHICH PROVIDED HIGHER-M0ISTURE CONTENT INTO THE EXTRACTION STEAM LINE.
THIS q
ACCELERATED FLOW ASSISTED CORROSION.
j
.l i
i
ng
'SEQUOYAH, UNIT 2-93-10 THERE WERE THREE EARLIER 0PPORTUNITIES TO DETECT THE-
- e FLOW ASSISTED CORROSION PRIOR TO THE PIPE BREAK.
1985-REPLACEMENT OF 25CM- (10") FEEDWATER HEATER ELBOWS (JUST DOWNSTREAM OF CURRENT FAILURE LOCATIONS) BECAUSE OF SEVERE--EROSION SEPTEMBER 1991. REPAIR OF A WEEP-HOLE AT THE l
JUNCTION OF 25CM (10") AND 50CM (20")- LINE AT HEATER 2C; WHEN WALL THICKNESS MEASUREMENTS WERE j
TAKEN BUT NOT PROPERLY EVALUATED.
THE MISSED VISUAL INSPECTION (FROM.INSIDE THE PIPE) l DURING THE WELD REPAIR IN 1992 OUTAGE AT THE' 1
JUNCTION OF 25CM (10") AND 50CM (20") PIPING
]
o REGION II IDENTIFIED PROGRAM DEFICIENCIES WHEN A i
REACTIVE INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED IN FEBRUARY IN RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER 7.5CM (3") DIA. PIPE BREAK.
THE LICENSEE'S PROGRAM MODELED ONLY DOWN TO 10CM (4) DIA.,
CONTRARY TO EPRI'S RECOMMENDATION TO INCLUDE PIPES DOWN-j TO SCM (2") DIA.
j l
1 FOLLOW UP l
AN AIT INSPECTION WAS COMPLET$D ON NARCH 11, 1993 WITH
~
e AN EXIT AND A PRESS CONFERENCE.
L e
A CAL WAS ISSUED.
I o
AN INFORMATION NOTICE IS PLANNED TO CONVEY LESSONS i
LEARNED.
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- - 10 PROPOSED PWR ELECTRIC POWER REQUIREMENTS DURING SHUTDOWN j
PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS i
TWO ONSITE AND ONE OFFSITE AC POWER SOURCES OPERABLE DURING COLD SHUTDOWN AND REFUELING WHEN REFUELING CAVITY a
NOT FILLED.-
1 IF AC SOURCES IN0PERABLE FOR >8 HOURS, EQUIPMENT SUPPORTED l
BY SOURCES DECLARED INOPERABLE.
i i
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS l
o HELPS ENSURE DECAY HEAT-REMOVAL (DHR) CAPABILITY NOT LOST DURING A LOSS-0F-OFFSITE POWER (LOOP) AND FAILURE.
OF ONE ONSITE SOURCE.
o DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO PWR CORE-DAMAGE FREQUENCY
]
EXIST WHEN REFUELING' CAVITY NOT FILLED AND DHR IS LOST.
. RISK SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS j
o MODE 5 AND 6, REDUCED INVENTORY CONDITIONS.
j o
MIDLOOP OPERATIONS.
j e
REFUELING, INITIAL SHUTDOWN.
j DISCUSSION i
o LOSS OF DHR LEADS TO BOILING, WHICH CAN LEAD TO INVENTORY LOSS AND CORE DAMAGE.
CONTACTS:
.CHERYL BEARDSLEE, NRR/ DORS l
WARREN LYON, NRR/SRXB MARK CARUS 0, NRR/SRXB l
l
l VARIOUS PLANTS 93-10 I
o' BOILING OCCURS IN AS LITTLE AS 10 MINUTES, DEPENDING ON:
1 4
DECAY HEAT LEVEL.
o PROPOSED CHANGES TO STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) POWER REQUIREMENTS BEING CONSIDERED AS BACKFIT.
i o
ADDITIONAL PROPOSED TS REQUIREMENTS WHILE SHUTDOWN:
CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS j
HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION, COMPONENT COOLING WATER-AND SERVICE WATER REDUNDANCY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND i
MAINTENANCE OF A PROGRAM FOR PLANNING AND CONTROL OF OUTAGES o
GENERIC LETTER UNDER CONSIDERATION.
o RESIDENT INSPECTORS BE SENSITIVE TO THE PLANT'S l
ELECTRICAL LINEUP WHEN ENTERING MIDLOOP.
SHUTDOWN EVENTS 1
e FORT'CALHOUN, FEBRUARY 26,:1990_
j LER 285/90-006 LOOP AND DIESEL FAILURE TO AUTOMATICALLY-LOAD RESULTED IN LOSS OF DHR ONE DIESEL OUT FOR MAINTENANCE, RCS PARTIALLY-FILLED DIABLO CANYON 2, APRIL 10, 1987 e
LER 323/87-005 R2, NUREG-1269 LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY CAUSED LOSS OF. DHR l
i
.VARIOUS: PLANTS 93-10 J
BOILING OCCURRED,-RCS TEMPERATURE HEATUP FROM 87*F T0:220*Ft MIDLOOP OPERATIONS REFERENCES i
o NUREG-1449, " SHUTDOWN AND. LOW-POWER OPERATION AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES."
o NUREG-1410, " LOSS.(H: VITAL AC POWER AND THE RHR SYSTEM DURING.MID-LOOP OPERATIONS AT V0GTLE UNIT 1 ON MARCH 20, 1990."
i o
NUREG-1269, " LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM,.
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2, APRIL 10,-1987."
i i
GL 88-17, " LOSS OF DECAY H' EAT REMOVAL."
o t
l j
l 1
g.
^~
ENCLOSURE 3 REACTOR SCRAM Reporting Period: 03/08/93 to 03/14/93 VfD YTD AtoVE.
BELOW YTD
.E.
PLANT 8 UWfT M
M LAR COMPLICATION $
M:
03/09/93 MCEJIRE 2 100 SM Equisment Felture NO 2
0 2
03/12/93 THREE MILE !$ LAND 1 100 SA Equipment felture NO 1
0 1
03/12/93-euAD CITIES 1 18 sM Equipment Felture NO.
1 0
.1 03/13/93 PILGRIM 1 100 SA Exteenet WO 1
0-1-
C3/14/93 PALD VERDE 2 98 SM Equipment taiture NO
.1' O-1
~
nota: Teer To Date (YTD) Totals Include Events Within The Calender Year Indicated By The End Date of The Specified Reporting Period :-
TS-10 Pape:1 03/17/93
~.
I
{
I COMPARISON OF WEEKLY SCRAM STAflSTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES l
PERICO ENDING l
C3/14/93 NWBER 1993 1992 1991*
1990*
1989*
j OF :
WEEKLY WEEKLY
. WEEKLY' WEEKLY WEEKLY j
SCRAM CAUSE SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERACE i
POWER GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%
i EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- 4 2.7 2.6 2.9 3.4 3.1 -
3 DESIGN / INSTALLATION ERROR
- 0 0.2 OPERATING ERROR
- 0 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.0
-l MAINTENANCE ERROR
- 0 0.8 0.4
'l EXTERNAL
- 1 0.3 0.1 OTHER*
O 0.0 0.2 Subtotal 5
4.4 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.2 l
i POWER LESS THAN 15%
E00lPMENT FA! LURE
- 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3'
-l
{
DESIGN / INSTALLATION ERROR
- O 0.0 OPERATING ERROR
- 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3.
i MAINTENANCE ERROR
- O 0.0 0.1 EXTERNAL
- 0 0.0 CTHER*
0 0.0 0.1 f
3
$ 4totat 0
0.5 0.7 -
0.5 0.5 0.6 l
TOTAL 5 ~
4.9 4.1 4.0 4.4 4.8 l
5 i
i 1
s I
1993 1W2 1991 1990 1989 NO. OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLV i
SCRAN TYPE SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERA2 AVERAGE.
(YTD)
TOTAL AUTouTIC SCRAMS 2
3.5 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.9 -
t TOTAL MANUAL SCRAMS 3
1.2 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.9 l
TOTALS MAY DIFFER BECAUSE OF AJUNDING OFF j
i
- Detailed breakdown not in database for 1991 and earlier
- EKTERNAL cause included in EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- MAINTENANCE ERROR and DESIGN / INSTALLATION ERROR causes included in OPERATING ERROR
- OTHER cause included in EQUIPMENT FAILURE 1991 and 1990
{
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. TS 14_
Page: 1 03/17/93'
]
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- =-
a
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NOTES 1.
PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW'OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD OF INTEREST.
SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.
2.
COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICAT E BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
3.
SA = Scram Automatic; SM = Scram Manual OEAB SCRAM DATA Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1987 ------------------ 435 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1988 ------------------ 291 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1989 ------------------ 252 M:nual and Automatic Scrams for 1990 ------------------ 226 Mnnual and Automatic Scrams for 1991 ------------------ 206 M nual and Automatic Scrams for 1992 ------------------ 212 M:nunl and Automatic Scrams for 1993 --(YTD 03/14/93)-- 50 l
,