ML20206C745
| ML20206C745 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1988 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206C743 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8811160390 | |
| Download: ML20206C745 (39) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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November 1988 Rev. 5 ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM SPECIFIC DESIGN FOR BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATIONS COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l
l 8911160390 001109 ADOCKObOg45,4 DP i
Project Nos.
7725-52/53 1775-07/08 e
November 1988 Rev. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 2.0 DESIGN B ASIS 2-1 3.0 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 3-1 4.0 PLANT SPECIFIC DESIGN DETAILS 4-1
5.0 REFERENCES
5-1 l
6.0 ATTACHMENTS 6-1 3
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November 1988 Rev. 5
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this document is to provide a description of the specific ATWS Mitigation System design proposed for implementation at the Byron and Braidwood Stations.
The description is i.itended for the use of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in evaluating the specif'c design for compliance to the ATWS rule of 10CFR 50.6?(c)(1).
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C November 1988 Rev. 5
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2.0 ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM DESIGN B ASIS The Byron /Braidwood Stations ATWS Mitigation System ( AMS) design is based on the following requirements:
a.
The ATWS Rule (Reference 1) b.
ATWS Quality Assurance Requirements (Reference 2)
I c.
Westinghouse AMSAC Generic Design Guidance (Reference 3)
The foregoing documents provide the basis for the specific AMS system design as described in Section 3.0.
In addition to the details provided in Section 3.0, plant specific information, as requested by the NRC in their letter (Reference 4) stating acceptance of the Westinghouse AMSAC Generic Design, is included in Section 4.0.
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November 1988 Rev. 5 3.0 ATWS HIT!GATION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL,0ES_CRIPTION This sectica w ll functionally describe the proposed ATWS Hitigation i
4 System ( AMS) design for the Byron and Braidwood Stations. The operation of the proposed AMS is defined in Figure 3-1 and by the following descriptions.
3.1 System Overview The required initiating actions of the AMS are as follows:
a.
initiate the auxiliar/ feedwater system, and b.
trip the main turbine i
The plant variable that is monitored to determine loss of heat sink and provide for the actions described above is Steam Generator (SG) level. Each steam generator is monitored by four existing sets of level instrumentation. Any of the four level measurements indiciting low level is an indicattor of loss of heat sin ( for that steam ganerator.
As shown in Figure 3-1, one AMS logic train is provided, Both the main turbine trip and auxiliary feedfater actuation signals are initiated by this logic train.
3-1
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November 1988 C
Rev. 5 The AMS logic monitors the RPS Cn.1 SG 1evel transmitter f rom each steam generator for a total of four level inputs.
A 3 out 1
of 4 coincident logic scheme is employed to interrogate these SG level signals, therefore requiring three of the steam generators to indicate a loss of heat sink in order to actuate the AMS. The I
AMS level setpoint will De 37, of narrow range span below this RPS Steam Generator level setpoint.
t The AMS logic will actuate the auxiliary feedwater sa tem (1.9..
s moter driven and diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and related equipment) and trip the main turbine (through the emergency trip). A time delay (approximately 25 seconds) is provided to ensure the reactor protection system will provide the i
first trip signal.
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Arming of the AMS is automatic and is accomplished when both the i
i C-20 power level ( 40% of nominal full power) permissives are achieved (see figure 3-1).
Upon a decrease in power below the C-i 20 power 1.
el the AMS will be automatically bypassed.
The C-20 power level permissive is developed in the AMS system based on i
j turbine impulse chamber pressure.
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j Af ter an AMS initiation of the auxiliary feedwater system and
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tripping of the main turbine, the AMS will self reset. That is, i
afi,er AMS initiation as power decreases and af ter a time delay
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l (approximately 360 seconds), the C-20 inte:* lect will inhioit the
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logic thus allowing shutdown of the auxiliary feedwater system f
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November 1988 Rev. 5 and reset of the main turbine trip.
i.ie time delay allows the l
AMS to rema n armed long enough to perform its function in the event of a turbine trip.
The logic provides for one inhibiting signal which is manually implemented under administrative control and prevents the logic from initiating its intended functions (i.e., start the auxiliary feedwater system and trip the main turbine).
This inhibiting signal results from the requirement that the AMS must have the capability for testing during power operation. When the operator selects the AMS test mode, the final AMS actuation output devices (relays) are inhibited f rom operating and inadvertently initiating the auxiliary feedwater system or
- ripping the main turbine during power opeastion.
Control of the auxiliary feedwater system and main turbire are provided for Ly existing controls and are not in the scope of the AMS design.
3-3
November 1988 Rev. 5 3.2 Main Control Room Interface The control room interface between the AMS and the operator includes the following alarms and indications located at the main control boards:
a.
Al arms AMS Initiated AMS Inoperable
- 24VOC P/S Failure D.
Indications - AMS Initiated - Red Lignt AMS.\\rmed - Green Light AMS In Test Mode - Red Light c.
Bypass Permissive Light Box - ATWS Permissive C-20
- Inoperable alarm includes 'uss of power, AMS in test, and automatic bypass (C-20 40t ).
3-4
e November 1988 Rev. 5 3.3 Termination of Steam Generator Blowdown Steam generator blowdown will not se automatically terminated by the AKS.
Since the innediate effect of st(im generator blowdown, in the event of an ATWS event, is to remove hest from the steam generator, automatic isolation is not necessary. Once AHS is initiated, steam generator inventory can be adequately satisfied with both trains of auxiliary feedwater operating. Auxiliary feedwater flow per steam generator will De approximately.'20 gen with maximun blowdown flow per steam generator of 90 gpm.
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i NovGmber 1988 Rev. 5 4.0 PLANT SPECIFIC OESIGN DETAILS ine following section provides the plant specific design details as requested by the NRC. Each topic is addressed in the order i 1 which they are listed in Reference 4 4.1 Diversity The ATWS Mitigation System ( AMS) design for the Byron and Braidwood Stations uses equipment which is largely diverse from that used in the Reactcr Protection System (RPS;. AMS inputs are derived from the existing CG level and C-20 instrumentation which is located in the RPS Westinghouse 7300 protection cabinets.
The AMS SG level and C-20 inputs are isolated from the existing instrumentation loop signals by Technology for Energy (TEC)
Analog Sig1al Isolators.
These isolators are classified as saf ety related.
Af ter isolation the signals are fed to Rosems _ t master *. rip units which generate the SG low level and C-20 logic inputs to the Rochester Solid State Logic System or approved equivalent.
The Solid State Logic System provides implementation of the coincidence logic, permissives, test inhibits, time delays a:id other AMS functions.
Outputs from the logic system are then j
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Nov0mber 1988 Rev. 5 used to trip the turbine and start a)4fliary feedwater via a number of interposing relays.
The interposing relays interlocking safety related circuits are classified as safety rel a ted.
These relays will oe Struthers Dunn relays or approved equi val ent.
Major components of the AMS are therefore provided by manufacture's who are diverse from those used in the Westinghouse 7300 protection cabinets and Westinghouse solid state logic cabinets.
4.2 Logic Power Supplies r
The AMS logic will De powered through a current-limiting voltage regulator fron a new non-saf ety related 24 VOC, battery with a dedictted battery charger purchased specifically to power the AMS csoinet.
The voltage regulator will have a current limit of 32 amps.
l The guidelines in 10CFR50.62 ( ATWS Rule) state that:
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The AMS power supply is not required to be safety-related.
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Tne AMS must ce capable of performing its safety-related i
function following i loss of off site power.
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The AMS lojic power must 3e independent fran the power supply f 0e the ReactJr Trip System.
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November 1988 Rev. 5 A new 24 VDC battery system, as the AMS power supply, complies with the guidelines in 10CFR50.62 as discussed below; a.
Safety Classification of AMS Power Supply The new battery shall 3e non-safety related.
b.
Operation Following loss of Of fsite Power Since the AMS cabinet is powered from a de source (i.e,. a 24 VOC battery and voltage regulator), the system is capable of performing its function following a loss of of f site power.
c.
Independence From Reactor Trip System Power Supply Since the AMS r binet will oe powered from a new battery, a
with its own ba tery chae ger, the AHS logic power supply is totally independ-. f rom ti e Reactor Trip System power supply.
4.3 Safety-Related Interface Two safety-related interfaces esist oetween the AMS and existing S3fety related circuits.
The first 's the interface Detween the AMS and the SG 1evel and C-20 i nst rument a ti oq circuits. As previously disc 1ssed in 4-3 4
November 1988
.Rev. 5 Subsection 4.1, isolation is provided by the use of Technolacy for Energy Corporation analog signal i sol ators. The second is the interface between the AMS and the auxillary fet dwater circuits.
Isolation is provided by the use of Struthers Dunn relays or approved equivalent.
The existing criteri3 for physical separation between reactor protection, ESF, and non-safety system wiring will also be utilized.
44 Quai _ity Assurance l
l Sa 'ety-related components which are part of t% AMS will De procured with the appropriate quality assurance required for safety-related equipment. All other comp 0nents in the l
AMS design will be orneurad using the qual'ity assurance requirements stated in Generic t. tter 85-06 (Reference 2).
4.5 Maintenance Bypasses Maintenance at power can be a, :omplished by taking the AMS out of service administrativ21y (test settch) and removing electrical power.
It is recomended that the main test switch located in the AMS c6 binet, be placed in the test mode to ensure that maintenance activities do not result in spacious actuation of the AMS output relays, t.oss of power to the AMS or placing the AMS in test mode will result in 4-4 1
November 1988 Rev. ',
an AMS inoperable main control alarm.
This alam along with other AMS alarms and indicating lights will De grouped and located on the main control board utilizing human factors engineering practices, t
4.6 Operating Bypasses The AMS shall De automatically armej coincident with power above C-20 (40; of nominal full power) as a permissive.
Bypass of the AMS shall se automatically initiated if the power is reduced below C-20.
The C-20 power level is measured by two transmitters.
The transmitters will measure first stage impulse chamber pressure at the high pressure turbine. The basis for the 40% of full power t
setpoint is provided in 0G-87-10 (Ref. 5).'
Tae automatic bypass of the AMS is alarmed as AMS inoperable. The C-20 power level permissive will be indicated at the Bypass Permissive 1.ight Box.
l 4.7 Means for Bypassing 1
Tne main test switch'as discussed ir. Sections 3.1 and 4.5 l
1s a pemanently installed selector switch with two positions:
normal and test.
The f. min test switch is located in tne AMS cabinet and is the only means provided f0r bypassing the cysten.
Other means for bypassing as l
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l November 1988 j
Rev. 5 specifically excluded by the guidance are not used. The I
main test switch will De included in the overall human factors engineering review of the system, 4.8 Manual Initiatjon Manual actuation of the AMS is not provided. Manual initiation of auxiliary feedwater and manual tripping of the turbine can De accomplished by the operator at existing controls provided on the main control boards.
4.9 Dectrical Indeper.dence_Fyrom Existing Reactor protection System And Other Safety Related Circuits The interface between the SG 1evel and C.20 instrumentation loops and the A% is made through Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC) Model 156 Nuclear Qualified Analog I sol a tors. These isolators, which are located in a mild environment, have been ful'y qualified by the vendor according to the guidelines set forth in the applicable IEEE Standards.
The maximam crediDie voltage / current transient which the non-safety-related (output) side of the 1-6
November 1988 Rev. 5 circuits would be exposed to is approximately 30 volts DC and 32 amps due te the current limiting voltage regulator installed on the output of the battery /cha ger circuit.
Appendix A of AMSAC Generic SER criteria has been satisfied by the TEC Model 156 isolato* as follows:
A) Attachment 1 of this document are diagrams which show how the maximum,redible transients were applied during the TEC testing. These diagrams also include short, grouno, and open testing.
B) The TEC Modc1 156 isolator has been tested to demon. strate that the isolator would provide isolativo during maximun crec; e transient of,120VAC at 20 amps and 2000V00 at 20 mA and daring othe-transients such as shorts, opens, and grounds. This testing is documented n TEC Reports 156-TR-02 and IS6-TR-03.
Additional test will De completed to verif,* that the system m3ximum credible transient defined above will be enveloped by vendor test dita.
4 C)
See Item B above.
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November 1988 Rev. 5 D) The pass / fail acceptance criteria for the TEC isolator will De that the isolation-capability of the assembly is not degraded dJring or af ter the transient.
E) The TEC isolators were tested to IEEE 323-1974 and 324-1975 a' documented in TEC Reports 156-TR-02 and 156-TR-
- 03. This environmental and seismic testing envelopes the Byron /Braidwood station requirements for the installed location.
F) The TEC isolator has Deen successfully tested to determine susceptibility, at 10Y/M from 20-50 MHZ and 15 V/M from 100-500 MHZ with a spot check frun 500 to 1000 HZ. The stainless steel case will also be grounded which generally eliminates el.ectromagnetic interferences.
The design of the isolators is cased on an inherently fail-safe principle which ensures isolation, even if all power is removed from the device.
It should be noted that the TEC isolators are protected by both in-line circuit fuses and internal fuses on the isolator outpats.
4-9
November 1988 Rev. 5 TP.e AMS output interface to the safety related auxiliary feedwater circuits is provided at the output relays via coil to contact separation. The proposed output relays are t
Struthers Dun auxiliary relay Type 219. These relays, which are located in a mild environment, will be qualified according to the guidelines set forth in the applicable IEEE Standards. The resul ts of the environmental qualification testing shall envelope the Byron /Braidwood Stations requirements.
In addition, the relays will be functionally tested. The maximum credible voltage transient which the non-safety-related side of the circuits would be exposed to is approximately 30 volts de (i.e., the AMS cabinets where the relays are located, are powered from 1
a 24 volt DC System). The maximum credible current I
transient which the non-safety-related side of the circuits l
would se exposed to is 32 amps.
These output relays will be tested to the criteria of Appendix A of AMSAC Generic SER.
f Tne relays are rated 10 amps non-inductive and 3 amps l
5 indactive it 120VAC. The relays are rated 3 amps non-L indactive and I amp inductive at 125VDC.
The relays are t
t 4-9 t
November 1988 Rev. 5 inherently fail-safe because power is not required for the relays to function as isolation devicer Typically electromagnetic interference is not a problem with rel ays. More-detailed documentation addressing qualification and testing will be available once the qualification test, reports are complete.
4.10 Physical _ Separation From Existing Reactor Protection System The AMS hardware is located in its own cabinet which is separate from the existing reactor protection system cabinets. Actual isolation of the SG level, C-20, and aux-feedwater circuits will be done in the AMS cabinet.
Isolators, tafety related relays and wiring within the AMS cabinet will be physically separated to meet all existing separation reqairements. Likewise all existing criteria for physical separation of reactor protection, ESF, and non-safety system wiring external to the AMS cabinet will I
also be followid.
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I 4.11 Environmental Qualification, i
The AMS cabinet is located in a mild environment.
The environmental parameters for the location, Zone A1, are listed in the Byron /Braidwood FSAR Table 3.11-2.
The four existing SG level transmitters are located in a harsh environment. The ervironmental parameters for the location, Zone C6, are listed in the Byron /Braidwood FSAR Table 3.11-2.
Tne two existing C-20 transmitters are located in a mild en vi ronment. The environmc7tal parameters for the locations, Zones T1 and T2, are listed in the Byron /3raidwood FSAR Table 3.11-2.
Both non-safety and safety-related components of the ATWS cab r.es $1d the SG level and C-20 transmitters will De tesigned t) meet the environmental conditions cristing in the zones they are located.
Seismic qualification will De provided for the AMS cabinet and internal safety-related components which provide the inpJt 39d output AMS interf ace to eAternal s3fety related circuits.
Isolation devices shall be provided with seismic qJalification in accordance witn the 01515 for plant 1
lice 9 sin 9 I
1-11
November 1988 Rev. 5 4.12 Testaoflity at power The AMS is designed to allow testing of the master trip units, solid state and relay logic system, and final ANS vutput relays during power operation as well as below t5e C-20 powea level permissive. AMS testing at power will be performed once every 6 months. AMS tu, ting at power is subdivided into three areas which are described individually below, a.
Testing of master trip units (MTV) - The logic train requires six MTVs (one per steam generator plus two C-20's) which are housed in a single MTU chassis. A calibretion unit with a dual readout assembly is provided to insert in the MTU chassis and caliorate each individual MTV.
The calioration unit when placed into the MTV chassis allows testing or calibration of each MTV (only one MTV can be tested at a time).
The calf oration unit generates a calibrate comand signal, calibration current, and a calioration status signal.
Calioration of any selected MTV in the chassis is initiated by the csliorate comand signal directed to that MTV, which causes the MTU under test to accept a calioration cirrelt in place of the input signal.
The input signal 4-13
November 1988 Rev. 5 is switched to a fixed resistor (located in the MTU),
while the MTV is under test, to prevent opening the input circuit. The calibrate command signal also Causes the MTV under test to generate a calibration / gross failure output signal which energizes the cal / gross f ailure relay. While the MTU is under test an AMS inoperable alarm is annunciated in the MCR via the cal / gross failure relay.
DJring testing, the MTU receives a calibration current e
(continually adjustable) from the calioration unit which is simultaneously displayed on the readout assembly as the calf oration status signal.
A second display on the readout assembly tracks the calibration status signal until the MTU changes st' ate (non-trip to trip state or vice versa). The calibration current reading at that point is latched on the trip current dispisy by the trip status signal from the MTU under test.
This allows an accurate determination of the MTU trip setpoint setting.
When the MTU is returned to nonnal operation, the input si gq ti is switched back to the MTV, and the cal / gross f silure relay is de-energized (provided the input signai is within its nornal range of 4-20 ma DC). Each MTU is provided with a process indicator which will 1-13 4
November 1988 Rev. 5 display the input process signal (S3 level or turbine impu1>J chamber pressure) or the calibration current.
Although each MTU car be tested on an individual basis, the AMS actuation signal should be blocked from inadvertently actuating the final AMS output relays.
This is accomplished by placing the AMS test mode selector switch in the test position. This action will illuminate an indicating light both at the MCR and AMS cabinet and also will activate the AMS inoperable annunciator alarm. To return the AMS to normal service, a two step process is required since otherwise 4
resetting the AMS test mode selector switch to no. mal dJring a test would inadvertently actuate the final AMS out?;t relays. Once testing is completed the operator would return the AMS test mode selector switch to nonnal and then press the test reset pushbutton.
D.
Testing of system logic (solid state and relay) - Since the MTUs are tested individJally, it is not possible to force more than one MTU into a trip status simultaneously from the caliDration unit.
To artifict311y initiate the system logic for testing, external MTV test switches are provided for each MTV.
4-l*
November 1988 Rev. 5 The MTU test switch is a three position 5, witch with each position accomplishing the following respective f unc tiori:
MTV Test Switch posi ti on Function Norm Allows the MTU to directly operate the MTU trip relay MTV Test Switch Posi tion _
Function Test-Trip Disconnects the MTV trip relay f rom the MTU and energizes the trip relay creating an artificial "trip situation."
Test-Norm Disconnects the MTU trip relay f rom the MTV and de-energizes the trip relay creating an
- artificial "non-trip or nomal situation."
This position allows logic testing daring maintenance outages when the input signal would nor-nally maintain the MTU in a tripped state.
piscing the MTU in either test mode from the MTU test switch causes the AMS inoperable alarm to be annunciated in the MCR. An indicating light for each MTU at the AMS caoinet alerts the operator when the MTU trip relaj is artificisily energized of the MTV test switch.
4-15
November 1938 Rev. 5 To test system logic, the AMS test mode selector switch would be placed in the test mode.
As described previously this action would prevent the actuation of the final AMS output relays during test.
The AMS test mode indicatin) light would illuminate in the MOR and at the AMS cabinet and the AMS inoperable annunciator 3
alam would be activated.
Successful generation of the AMS actuation signal by the system logic is verified when the AMS initiated indicating lights are illuminated in the MCR and at the AMS Cabinet and also by actuation of the AMS initiated annunciator alam.
Prior to returning under test to the normal mode by the
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AMS test mode selector switch and pushbutton, each MTU test switch should be placed in the normal mode.
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c.
Testing of final AMS output relays - The testing circuits used for the final AMS output relays and final i
actuated devices at power will be similar to the testing schemes used in the Byron /Braiowood Safeguards c
Test Cabinets.
However, for the purpose of the AMS,
[
t testing of the final AMS output relays and final actuated devices will oe limited to a continuity test j
only of the circuits and not full actuation of the
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final devices (control relay which opeettes the t
IJ Alli ary feedwater pump, for eAample).
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Nov6mber 1988 Pev. 5 Continuity testing of the circuits will be used
- because, the AMS is not safety-related, any additional periodic cycling of safety related system components in the auxiliary feedwater system as a result of AMS testing should be limited in order to maximize the qualified life of those components, and tripping of the turbine at power is obviously unacceptable.
A complete off-line end to end test will De perfonned once i
each refueling outage.
This test will simulate inputs to i
transmitters and monitor proper actuation of output rel ays.
A test procedure will be prepared once the system hardware is purchased.
4.13 Completion of Mitigative Action Once initiated the AMS actustion signal will go to
[
completici except as de'lyed by the 25 second time delay.
The C-20 permissive is delayed from de-energizing for 360
(
seconds to ensure thst the C 20 pnemissive is present so
)
tnat A'45 operites.
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November 1938 Rev. 5 Seal-in of the AMS actuition sign 31 is not ne vssary at the logic level, since the final actuated or tripped equipment control circuits (auxiliary feedwater and turbine trip) will remain in that condition until stopped or reset D/ the main control room operator.
4.14 Technical Specification No specific technical specification is proposed at this time.
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Novem"er 1988 Rev. 5 5.0 Reference _s_
1.
ATWS Final Rule - Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.62 and Supplementary Information Package, "RedJction of Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram ( ATWS) Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants".
2.
"Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety-Related", Generic
'tter 85-06; April 16,1985.
3.
"AMSAC Generic Design Package", WCAP-10858 Rev. 1.
4.
Rossi, C. E., "Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Report", NRC Letter to L. D. Butterfield, Chairman of ATWS Subcommittee, Westinghouse Owner's Group, July 7,1986.
5.
Westinghouse Owners Group Letter OG-87-10, dated February 26, 1937.
5-1
November 1988 Rev. 5 6.0 Attachments 1
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> 249 one -------
l l
ccM l --
1
< 1/4 W 1
1 I
l
) 15 1
1 l
l t-------o-----------------o-------------l j
l 1
[;
g l!
I I
[
?
I
---,,-,,----w,------
r ee
.xt.a n 1:::1 Tc
.t.
....t.+",'
2.2.2. Output (non.1E) open, circuit fault conditions N0kh&L. N0 FAULT isc 156 1...--......-........-.-....---....
l l
l t
i I +a4 Y I
a4P l--
I +/- 55 I
i INPor i 007 1..-.........-........
I 1
> att ens.......
1 C0Hl-1/4 W I
I I
>15 I
I I
1............
............o...........i l
WPPLY CouMECTION OMN.CIACUITED TEC 156 1.--....
I i
l i
i i +24 V i
scP l-.
t +/. 55 I
i input 1 00 7 1. - -..... --........ -..... -
l l
> att ohn -....
I coM l
< 1/4 W I
I I
>15 I
............. I i
I........................o.............i l
O*T.26 'i3 15:!1 TEC
- ! C 4 LL E+T!4 P.07 O.,
- ;p 2.2.2. Output (non.1E) open circuit fault conditions (continued) oUfrUT CCNNCCTION OPEN. CIRCUITED T8C 1M l -.................... -.........-....
l t
i I
l l +a4 y I
suP l-.
26 4 l +/. 55 p
y Isnr i our i
.-.... x i
i
> 249 eaa.......
I coH 1..
< 1/4 W I
I I
>15 I
l l
t l.. -..............................
l comou consterios cPsu.CtacuzTs0 TEC 1%
i
.....-..... -............- ~........
l l
l l
l l +24 V I
scP l-t./. $s l
INNT t our I I
I
> 249 a s - -.-..
1 CON l-I i
i OPEN y.u-T$ <> 1/4 V 1:
,y l
1........ x -............ e............
l e
X T.16
- s i !!: 51 !E ' 6 f i. L E it.
F.Os i
0 i
I i
i 2.2.2. output (non-1s) open.ci:cuit fault conditions (continued) f comor. no outeur couxscrzous orsw-cIncc2tto i
i tse tw 1------.--------------------.-----
l t
i I
I i +24 V I
set l-opeg 7.x F5
.f. 3, l
i y
u Pur i ou t I --.------ x -- --- --- --- --- -
i i
i
> 24 9 ohn ------
l CON 1-O M
.1*U <
I 7
1/4 W i
i i
l
>1s j
i
.f i
i 1------2---..---------o------------
1 1
I l
ct>&CN uD SuPP!.Y CONWRCr20NS OPEN-CI ACUlf t0
[
1 -----.- 2 --.--- g5 4tu' 7
,7 tsc 1H r
t 1
I i
i +24 V I
scP l-I +/- 55 l
l 1xtut i 001 l -- - -. - - - -- -.- - - - -- - - - - -- - - -. --
I i
> 249 one -----.-
i i
cull-ON.
15 <
7 t/4 W l
l l
>is t
1 4
f j
t--.----- 1 --------
o-..-
l q
(t I
l 1
I r
I
e ;.
c.;t.26 'S3 1!:53 TE';
6f0' L.' E m P.C4 r
e i
t 2.2.2. Output (non.tE) open.ctreuit fault conditions (continued) k t
settL ANO QUrtyT MNuSCTIONS OPtW. CIRCUITS 0 L
OttN 7 26' l
tsc 1M l......-.x/
1 I
)
l I
I 7
t +t4 V I
act I..
oftN i +/. ss i
i 7
In70t i out t
. x - -.......
I I
>24s me-....-
I con I..
< 1/4 v i
l I
i
>15 i
1 1._.............-........i l
l 4
I 4
i t
1 i
1 i
surett, cortor, two ccnesos countettoms oess czaevzfsn 0fCAI 7 4
Ytc 1%
l-......I--..-...
I i
1 I
i 7
6 1.at i I
sur I-OM'Al
!.i. ss I
-1 zuror I our 1 -......... x I
1
> 24 s en.......
I ccm l -
1 I
I OW ut v
>i I
l
./
I i
i
..... 2 l
Au
k.E, ;,
P.10 t
i:.;T. 26 'i3 15 : 5 3 Tre:, t. :'
2.2 3. Output (non.1C) applieg voltage / current fault conettions
.........n..............................................
NOAHAl.. NO TAULT tsc 1W I-.....
l l
l 1
1 I d4 V I
acP l-I +/- 55 I
l InPcf l 00f l................-.......
l l
) 249 ees.... ~
l con t-
< 1/4 v I
I l
)15 l
g l -...-..............l.-
.l l
C04410N TO 00 fry? APPLIED VOLfACE/ CURRENT FAULT ftc 1M l.-~.........
open l
t
.. I i 1 144 V l
ser I-t./. p i
i Inecr 1 our I......-...
.... eten I
i
> 249 ens.......
I coH 1-V roult
< 1/4 v I
I I
J
>15 1
t l
0;;.I6 a it s Tec ne vIttt.Tn P.11 2.2 3. Output (non-16) applied voltese/ current fault conditions (continued
....................................................................)
CCl+iOW TO $UPPLt APPLICO FAULT VOLTAct/CURAMT TEC IM l -.....o-
..- open 1
I 1
I I
V roult I +24 V I
sur I-I 7,g. (
l +/- 53 l
l 1
Inpg7 l 00 T l..-../D.-...............
I I
l
> 249 oca.. ~..
i i
coH I-1
< 1/4 w I
I i
1
>15 i
l l
l.......o..
I I
CIRCUIT 83 FOR ht&SURING 18. INPUT SIONAL DtCRADATIDW CAUS80 St WOW.18 (0UTFVT) l'AULTS IN TWC ftC 1M ISOLATOR t
.i cecillosoepe 1 Tsc 1H uor.or Teet lose notes 1,3) l l
gg A1... ~...-o... ~...- -....lI IWPVT I
l i
> a sitterescatl i
l l
< 1 k one, 15, 1/4W l l
I I
cm a l -~ ~-...- o. --.~.--....-- ll I
1xrVT coM I
I I
I I
oso I-..-
1 I
l l
I I
i i
l
....I casa
...~.
l l
i i
l i
j I
1 Osa111oooope 2 1
feee notes 2,3)
I l
l Cenotea eroana l
l l
t reference.
Saae I
CH Al--.---...---o scound used for l
l
) A common-soas output pound.
j l
l 1 k cr.a. 15, 1/4 W i
l 1
i I
C E D l -. -. o. ---. --
1 I
i l
1
,,-.,._____,_.___-._,_..,_____________.__n.._,-
_