ML20207F196

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Draft Agenda for Site Visit & Drawing Review.Related Agendas Encl
ML20207F196
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/05/1987
From:
NRC
To:
NRC
References
NUDOCS 8701050483
Download: ML20207F196 (13)
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g i S0llTH TEXAS AGENDA FOR SITE VISIT AND DRAWING REVIEW t

1. Control Room
a. Diesel control board, D/G inoperable status alarm
b. Annunciator panel
c. D. C. system monitoring and alarm
2. Cable Runs and Cable Spreading
a. Degree of separation
b. Penetrations and cable terminations
c. Identification of cables and raceways
3. Switchgear Rooms
a. General layout i b. Physical and electrical separation of redundant units
4. Rattery and Charger installations
a. General layout
b. Physical and electrical separation
c. Ventilation independence
d. Monitoring instrumentation and alarms l S. Diesel Generator
a. Physical and electrical separation of redundant units
b. D/G local control panels, instruments and controls l

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6. Switchyard Q
a. General layout
b. Physical and electrical separation of transmission lines, buses, breakers
c. Relay house
d. Control power supplies (AC and DC)
7. Reactor Building
a. General layout
b. Separation of piping and cabling to redundant equipment
8. Shutdown Outside Control Room
a. Remote shutdown panel arrangement, separation and layout
b. Identification of control and monitoring equipment
9. ESF Systems and Pump Rooms  !
a. General layout
b. Physical and electrical separation of redundant equipment
c. Identification of cables, raceways and equipment 10 Vital instrumentation Power Supply installation
a. General layout '
b. Physical and electrical separation
c. Monitoring instrumentation
d. Identification of cables, raceways and equipment f

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11. System Orawings
a. As built D/G control drawings showing (11 bypassing of protective trips on SIAS and (2) SIAS overrides test mode to pemit response to SIAS signal
b. Sample as built schematics showing thermal overload bypass
c. Sample as built schematics showing power lockout to active and passive valves - redundant valve indication
d. Sample as built schematics showing automatic disconnection of non-safety loads from the safety buses on a safety injection signal
e. Sample as built schematics showing electrical penetration overload protection

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N TENTA11YE AGENDA SOUTil TEXAS PROJECT NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

  • SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM AUDIT InY I, .I ANtJ ARY 27 8: :ll \.M. NRC Entrance Briefing and Introductions M:15 .\.M. Overview of SPDS design program and current status by HLP, including:

. Boundaries of the SPDS with respect to the EOF, TSC and/or plant computer

. Basis for parameters displayed

. Iluman factors analysis, standards, and criteria used in the design process with emphasis on plant specific considerations

. Displays layouts and basis for displays selected

. System reliability and availability:

Design characteristics te ensure high availability Methods used to estimate system svailability Methods planned to monitor operational availability System security provisions

. Data validation methodology used in the SPDS, including data validation perforrned by any necessary support systems that provide validated data to the SPI)S. Possible examples are RVLIS and radiation monitoring.

. Operator training in the use of the SPDS p

. System maintenance philosophy and staffing ] s n

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I :'3 G[ l'.il . Description of Verifier. tion cnd Vclidation (V&V) Program, including: *

. Description of the V&V team and discussion of the degree of independence from the design team

  • l . Scope and depth of the V&V Program

. Test cases for validation of SPDS parameters and how they demonstrate the representativeness and usability of the selected parameters for evaluating transient conditions that do not fall within the plant design basis.

. Discussion of SPDS Validation testing

. Verification of human factors aspects of system i

. Coordination with other NUREG-0737 initiatives, with' emphasis on control room design review (including a short discussion of SPDS-related findings).

. Overview of SPDS V&V documentation D Ah 2, .I ANUARY 28 x:.to \.11 NRC questions and review of V&V documentation. As part of the V&V documentation review, the audit team will want to select sample SPDS requirements and trace their implementation through hardware and software specifications, source code, verification testing, integrated system testing, and field installation testing. 'the audit team will review documentation of V&V netivities for each step. To support this review, all existing system documentation in the following categories should be available for the SPDS and any necessary supporting systems that provide validated data to the SPDS.

System functional requirements documents liardware and sof tware specifications g/

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Algorithm descriptions, cnd source code

  • Emergency operating procedures
  • Data validity criteria Software and hardware verification test procedures and results System validation test procedures and results System availability study Documentation of independent verification reviews of functional requirements documents, hardware and software specifications, algorithms, test procedures, and results.

Drawings that document the make and type of SPDS electrical isolators and the interconnection of the isolators with safety-related inputs and the SPDS.

I:00 l'.M. Identification of outstanding questions resulting from the V&V documentation review 2:u0 l'.M. NRC human factors audit of displays, display formats, control devices, access anel response times.

The audit team will wish to operate or witness operation of the system to acccu and ex: imine all SPDS display formats. This activity may be conducted in the Control Room, 'ISC, EOF, Control Room Simulator, or SPDS engineering simulator.

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  • 7 D AV 3, J AN U AOY 29 M:.itl A.11. Short tour of the Control Room l u:t10 \. \1. Run through of a plant-specific scenario that involves confirmation of containment isolation, moni-toring or reactor building radiation levels and hy& ogen concentration, transition from injection to recirculation cooling, and trends and monitoring of gaseous releases. The run through simuld be performed by a plant operator who is familiar with SPDS operation and should make use of plant emergency operating procedures. The run through will be most effective if it is performed using the control room simulator. However, use of any SPDS display that can be driven by simulated plant transient data is acceptable.

I:ottl'.\1. Discussion of outstanding questions l

2:00 P.11. NRC audit team caucus l

t:Olil'.11. Exit Briefing y -

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T ENCLOSilRE 1 ELECTRICAL, I&C BRANCH SITE VISIT AGENDA FOR SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, llNIT 1

1. Preliminary Discussion / Plant Walkthrough
a. Plan for touring plant including a general discussion or the plant layout,
b. Preliminary plant walkthrough.
2. Control Room
a. Review general layout of the control room.
  • b. Examine manual reactor trip controls to verify that separation and isolation requirements are met.
  • c. Examine overall display instrumentation important to sa fety.
  • d. Review bypassed and inoperable status indication as it relates to R.G. 1.47,
e. Review Protection system initiation and status panels,
f. Review ESF systems initiation and status panels.
g. Review Rod Position indication and Incore instrumentation.
h. Review inadequate core cooling instrumentation displays.
f. Review procedure for power lockout valves and their position indications.

J. Review console and panels cable routing and separation.

  • k. Verify certain NilREG-0737 items (NRC to identify).
  • l. Review of the use of 00PS for the following functions:

(1) qualified display for post accident monitoring. ,

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(?) safety-grade control and position indication of auxiliary feedwater control valves, steam generator power-operated relief valves, reactor vessel head vent valves, and essential cooling water flow control to safety-related heating, ventilation, and air conditioning chillers (3) alternate shutdown capability (4) reactor protection on steam generator water level compensation system (SGWLCS) and hot-leg averaging for overpower temperature trip.

(5) review RFI protection for digital processors, separation, cable routing, physical location of cabinets

3. Relay Room
  • a. Inspect instrument cabinets, engineered safoguard cabinets RPS cabinets, isolation cabinets larrangement, layout, separation).
  • b. Testing features, discussion of typical test sequence for channel calibration, channel operation test, logic test, master relay test, slave relay test.
  • c. Examine the routing off the non-safety rel.sted and safety related cables within the NSSS CABINETS.
  • d. Walkthrough ESF load sequencer operating procedures and testing.

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4. Shutdown from Outside the Control Room c.

a Location of remote shutdown panel.

b. General layout of panel.
c. Identification of controls.

ed. Verify that physical separation and electrical isolation requirements for redundant instrumentation and controls are met.

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a Examine the manual transfer switches.

  • f. Verify control room annunciation for operation of transfer switches.
  • g. Physical walkthrough using emergency procedures required in case of control room evacuation (should include discussion on the number of people that would be required to achieve shutdown from outside the control room, the accessibility / security of the remote shutdown station (s), etc.)

5 Cable Spreading Area

  • a. General layout.
  • b. Implementation of separation criteria (i.e., verify identification of Class IE raceways and check cable identification)
  • c. Verify that electrical penetrations meet physical separation and electrical isolation requirements.

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  • b. Trace the turbine trip upon reactor trip circuitry.) Verify i that the maximum credible faults were considered in routing of \

these circuits within the turbine building. I Ch eck isolationi ' ,

l devices used to prevent degradation of RPS due to credible faults within the turbine building. (SER7.k.2.4)

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9. Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Supply I'nstallation
a. General layout. ,
b. Physical and electrical separation. j
c. Batteries and inverters. s

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d. Potential for damage from missiles, high energy line break, etc. I

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10. Reactor Containment Building, Turbine Building j ,
a. Potential for instrument damage due to missiles, flooding, pipe whip, etc. ,
b. Component separation and isolation.
  • c. Separation and independence of pipind,and wiring to redundant s I j

or diverse instruments.

  • d. Turbine stop valve, cable routing and separation. '
e. Low auto stop oil pressure transducers,' cable rouding and separation. ,
f. Turbine electro-hydraulic control system.

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11. Diesel Generator Building
a. General layout.
b. Physical and electrical separation.

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  • These items should receive priority .

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