ML20154J796
| ML20154J796 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1998 |
| From: | Alexion T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9810150334 | |
| Download: ML20154J796 (45) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES e
E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20655 4 001
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October 13, 1998 LICENSEE:
STP Nuclear Operating Company FACILITY:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (STP)
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF SEPTEMBER 15,1998, AFTERNOON MEETING ON RISK-INFORMED OPERATIONS AT STP On September 15,1998, the NRC staff met with the licensee in a seminar-type format on the above subject. The presentation was made by S. Rosen of STP Nuclear Operating Company.
The bulk of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was in attendance, as well as NRC representatives from other NRC offices. Attached is a copy of the slides that were presented.
The licensee presented an overview of their probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) program at STP. This inciuded discussion in the areas of the licensee's PRA development, configuration i
risk management program (CRMP), use of NRC-approved extended allowed outage times (for emergency AC power, essential cooling water and essential chilled water systems), and graded quality assurance. Regarding the CRMP, the licensee uses risk-profiles to ansess the cumulative effects of equipment out of service and to manage the risk to keep it below certain thresholds. Regarding the extended allowed outage times discussed above, this permits the licensee to schedule major emergency diesel generator, essential chiller and essential cooling water system maintenance while at power. This has resulted in numerous benefits for the licensee including managing risk levels to acceptably low levels at power with corresponding reductions to risk during refueling outages, reducing refueling outage scope and duration, and improving the time-averaged material condition of the plant.
The licensee uses graded quality assurance to combine risk-based, deterministic-based, and performance-based information analyses to establish appropriate levels of programmatic controls for systems, structures and components in order to provide necessary assurance that items will operate safely and activities are accomplished as prescribed (this program was approved by NRC on November 6,1997). The licensee indicated that implementation of graded quality assurance has shown that of the first 6 systems analyzed, only 5% of the components are highly risk significant and 71% are not risk significant. The licensee stated that in order to be able to fully focus on the risk significant components in these systems, they need to be able to change the classification of the components that are safety-related, but not risk significant, to X '\\
hq gfuECEISCMV 9810150334 981013 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P
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2 non-safety-related. The licensee's implementation of graded quality assurance and its
- challenges were discussed in detailin a separate meeting with the NRC staff earlier on the same day. A separate meeting summary will be issued for that meeting.
ww'l &
Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499
Attachment:
Slides Presented cc w/att: See next page 4
1 4
/
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A i i non-safety-related. The licensee's implementation of graded quality assurance and its challenges were discussed in detail in 3 separate meeting with the NRC staff earlier on the same day.~ A separate meeting summary will be issued for that meeting.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1
)
Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV j
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
' Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499
Attachment:
Slides Presented cc w/att: See next page DISTRIBUTION: See next page Document Name: 091598PM.MTG
)
hh4-1 OFC PM/PD43 LA/PD4-1 NAME
'CHaN JHannon DATE 0/1/F 0 9 /98 k/ k/98 bO h NO COPY YES/NO MFFICIAL RECORD CGFDV
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,.s-STP Nuclear Operating Company -
South Texas, Units 1 & 2
{
. cc:
Mr. Comelius F. O'Keefe.
Jack R. Newman, Esq.
Senior Resident inspector -
l' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1800 M Street, N.W.
P. O. Box 910 -
Washington, DC 20036-5869 i
i Bay City, TX 77414 i
Mr. Lawrence E. Martin
(
o
. A. Ramirez/C. M. Canady-Vice President, Nuc. Assurance & Licensing City of Austin STP Nuclear Operating Company'-
l L
Electric Utility Department P. O. Box 289 721 Barton Springs Road Wadsworth,TX 77483 l
Austin,TX 78704 i
Office of the Govemor I
Mr. M. T. Hardt ATTN: John Howard, Director i
E Mr. W. C. Gunst Environmental and Natural i
L City Public Service Board Resources Policy l
P. O. Box 1771 P. O. Box 12428 j
San Antonio, TX 78296 Austin,TX 78711 l
l Mr. G. E. Vaughn/C. A. Johnson Jon C. Wood l
[
' Central Power arid Light Company Matthews & Branscomb l
P. O. Box 289 One Alamo Center l
MailCode: N5012 106 S. St. Mary's Street, Suite 700 Wadsworth,TX 74483 San Antonio,TX 78205-3692 l
I INPO Arthur C. Tate, Director t
. Records Center Division of Compliance & Inspection i
700 Galleria Parkway Bureau of Radiation Control
- Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street i
(
- Regional Administrator, Region IV Austin, TX 78756 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Jim Calloway Arlington,TX 76011 Public Utility Commission of Texas j
j-Electric Industry Analysis
- D. G Tees /R. L. Balcom P. O. Box 13326 Houston Lighting & Power Co.
Austin, TX 78711-3326 P. O. Box 1700 L.
Houston,TX 77251 Mr. Will'am T. Cottle President and Chief Executive Officer
-Judge, Matagorda County STP Nuclear Operating Company.
Matagorda County Courthouse South Texas Project Electric 1700 Seventh Street Generating Station 3
Bay City, TX 77414 P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483 4
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Meeting Summary Memoranda dated October 13. 1998 b
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- PUBLIC l
PD4-1 Reading TAlexion OGC ACRS i
l E-MAIL J
S. Collins /F. Miraglia (SJC1/FJM)
B. Boger (BAB2) l E. Adensam (EGA1).
3 J. Hannon (JNH) _
C. Hawes (CMH2)
T. Martti(e-mail to SLM3)
D. Lange (DJL)
T. Gwynn (TPG) t i
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RISK-INFORMED OPERATIONS BY STEPHEN L. ROSEN l
MANAGER RISK MANAGEMENT & INDUSTRY RELATIONS STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY l
WADSWORTH, TEXAS 77483 Tel:512-972-7138 Fax: 512-972-7073 e-mail: slrosen@stpegs.com j
FOR NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF SEPTEMBER 15,1998
STP PRAPROGRARI COMPREHENSIVE RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM i
> PRA APPLICATIONS IMPLEMENTED
- Maintenance Rule
- Configuration Risk Management /On-line Maintenance
- Shutdown Risk Management
- Technical Specifications Optimization
- Severe Accident Management Program
- Generation / Engineering Support l
PRA APPLICATIONS UNDER DEVELOPMENT
- Graded Quality Assurance
- Motor Operated Valves
- Risk Based Inservice Testing
- NRC Safety Goal Pilot Project
> STP RISK MODEL CONFIGURATION CONTROL
- Configuration Control Program
- Configuration Control Program Self-assessment j
i i
1 pn.,,,,,..,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,;
1982 -Initiated work on PSA Model j
1989 - Full scope Level 1 PSA including External Events j
1990 - Risk-based evaluation of Technical Specifications f
i 1992 - NRC staffissues SER on the STP Level 1 PSA 1992 - STP IPE per Generic Letter 88-20 1992 - Level 2 PSA j
1993 - NRC staff approves revised Tech Spec AOTs and Surveillance Intervals based on PSA 1994 - PSA input to satisfy Maintenance Rule requirements j
1994 - On-line maintenance evaluations j
1995 - NRC staff approves STP Level 2 PSA / IPE for internal everas.
i 1995 - 21 day diesel generator special test exception technical specification submitted to NRC 1995 - Shutdown PSA (ORAM and RISKMAN models) 4 1996 - 14 Day DG/7 Day DG/EW AOT Tech Spec Change Approval by NRC j
1997 - Graded Quality Assurance Safety Evaluation Report Approval by NRC j
CURRENT WORK -IST, AOVs, MOVs, Appendix J, Graded QA Implementation, Improved Technical Specifications, Safety Goal Pilot l
c.
"In the end,I believe it will be this industry-hopefully with the assistance of a risk-informed regulatory fabric-that will raise safety-related performance up to the point that it will be cbove the margins of safety that we would like to have, and far above what is required. And the only way that we will be able to tell the difference is with the support of quantitative risk information. Let us also remember that ultimately what we create has to be usable and used by the men and women who work every day at this country's nuclear installations." (emphasis added)
Commissioner Nils J. Diaz U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Remarks before the 1998 NRC Regulatory Information Conference Washington, D.C.
April 14,1998
,m
.}
What are the Elements of
" Quantitative Risk Information"?
I The frequency of accident or transient initiators and the readiness of safety systems to respond if challenged are the elements of Quantitative Risk Information.
At STP, we use our Configuration Risk Management Program to control and monitor the readiness of our safety systems i
l I
l
e South Texas Project Configuration
~
Risk Management Program
- History:
- Late 1994 -First configurations generated
- Mid 1995 - Risk Assessment Calculator (Rascal) software developed and used to generate risk profiles
- January 1996 - Actual component out-of-service data based on " functional" collected I
- July 1996 - Rascal 1.0 approved under Station Software Quality Assurance Program
- January 1997 - On-Line Maintenance Risk becomes monthly Station Performance Indicator
- January 1998 - On-Line Maintenance Risk included in Station Incentive Compensation Plan
4 South Texas Project Configuration
~l Risk Management Program 1
Establishes potentially risk-significant threshold for weekly planned on-line maintenance activities
- 1E-06 weekly threshold based on EPRI PSA Applications Guide j
i
-If threshold is exceeded, increased management oversight and compensatory measures implemented, as appropriate
- Weekly threshold provides adequate barrier i
for implementation of corrective actions i
South Texas Project Configuration
~!
Risk Management Program i
l Risk Profiles:
l t
l
- Meets 50.65(a)(3) portion of the I
Maintenance Rule for assessing the cumulative effects of equipment out of service 4
- Communicated every Monday morning in Daily Communication & Teamwork (DC&T) meeting
- Control Room staff (Shift Technical
{
Advisor) enters Functional status on a train / system levelinto Rascal
- Previous week's risk communicated every l
Wednesday morning in DC&T meeting
South Texas Project Configuration JSlLh PRA Interface:
- Over 12,000 maintenance states in current database
- 5500+ Single Train Maintenance States j
- 6900+ Cross Train Maintenance States to support Extended AOT for Essential i
Cooling Water System (7 days;i and Standby Diesel Generators (14 days;i Results:
- Monthly, Three Month Average, Quarterly, and Annual risk are represented graphically
- Actual risk is adjusted b availability factor j
and normalized annuall to determine risk l
in " pure" units of event / year
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4 Frequency (1.21E-05)
Unit 1 ActualCore Damage Frequency 4.00E-06 0
L 2.00E-06 Unit 2 ActualCore Damage Frequency 0.00E+00
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Commissioner Diaz 1
suggested that the industry develop.
and use " quantitative risk information".
The STP Configuration Risk Management Program is fully responsive to this l
challenge.
l
STP Use of Extended Allowed Outage Times EAOTs) for Emergency AC P(ower$s
~
Essential i
Cooling Water and ChiIIed Water Systems i
A Technical Specification change was approved by NRC in late 1996 that extended allowed outage times from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 14 days for emergency AC l
power and 7 days for Essential Cooling Water and Essential Chilled water j
systems. Outage durations for maintenance on these systems have been less than 5 days l
[
The Technical Specification also adds a requirement for a Configuration Risk i
Management Program to the administrative section of the specifications.
Permits scheduling of major emergency diesel, essential chiller and essential l
cooling water system maintenance while at-power l
Scheduling these maintenance activities at-power allows them to be conducted j
when defense-in-depth is maximized Allows maintenance to be performed by experienced utility crews without requiring contractor staff augmentation
1 t
Allows maintenance to be performed with enhanced supervisory and management focus compared to availability of these resources during refueling l
outages 1
Risk levels are managed to acceptably low levels while at-power with l
corresponding reductions to risk while in refueling outages Refueling outage scope, complexity and duration are reduced by performing these significant maintenance tasks at-power l
Time-averaged material condition of the plant is improved with enhanced maintenance scheduling flexibility i
i Nine EAOTs have been conducted at STP since approval by NRC of this key operational flexibility in 1996 l
GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE e process by which a risk-based methodology, deterministic and performance-based information analyses are combined to establish appropriate levels of programmatic controls for systems, structures, j
and components in order to provide necessary assurance that items l
will operate safely and activities are accomplished as prescribed.
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GQA WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES D Purpose - Evaluate Station commitments and obligations against the relative risk significance of the function / activity.
@ Technical Approach - Blending of risk, performance, and deterministic analyses using working groups and Expert i
Panel D Results - Component-level Risk Significance Basis Documents are developed and issued for Station use.
DBenefits - Appropriately focus Station resources / processes based on risk significance
+.
GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS GQA WORKING GROUP PSA RISK RANKING Analyzes performance data e
e High Considers risk ranking
. Medium
_=
=
=
=
injects deterministic knowledge / insight e
. Low
.g Develops recommendabons regardng e
levels of programme 6c controland d L actmty oversight l
=
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STATION & INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE ii P
U d
Documented recommendations l
& rationale to Expert Panel j
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Program controls are iL established or modRed d
EXPERT PANEL Reviews W.G. performance data analyses DOCUMENTED EXPERT U
e e Considers risk ranlong
=
i ANEL M C N S injects deterministic knowledge / insight Levels of overvieware e
e established or modied y
f l ONGOING FEEDBACKj:
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ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF GQA r
f
/ Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) i t
/ Deterministicinsight i
i
/ GQA Working Group
/ CRM Expert Panel i
/ Continuous Performance Feedback i
i
/ Full QA Program I
/ Targeted QA Program i
f
/ Basic QA Program h
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DETERMINISTIC INSIGHTS
_+
4 11 the knowledge and experience gained / retained related to design bases, Technical Specifications, plant operations, safety analyses, accident analyses, etc. that have no quantification as to likelihood of occurrence.
i
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GQA WORKING GROUP MEMBERS
+ Systems Engineering s
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+ Design Engineering j
I
+ Risk & Reliability Analysis l
i
+ Maintenance / Work Control
+ Operations
~
+ Nuclear Licensing
+ Quality Assurance
+ Operating Experience 4
1
-_ -~ -
GQA WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES i
k ANALYZES PERFORMANCE DATA l
-Reviews plant / equipment performance history
-Reviews industry performance history k CONSIDERS RISK RANKING
- Formal documentation on risk role, as applicable
- Discussion of PSA assumptions, failure modes, etc.
k INJECTS DETERMINISTIC KNOWLEDGE / INSIGHT
- Design Basis multi-disciplinary involvement
- Document dissenting opinions k DEVELOPS RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING LEVELS OF PROGRAMMATIC CONTROL AND ACTIVITY OVERSIGHT
- Documented in Risk Significance Basis Documents i
4-P System or
-+
PSA High PSA Med PSA Low w -->
Not Modeled j
Component 4-Yes Yes Yes 4
D 1
V (f RAW between 10 & 100 J J
y m
FV<0.005, see Note 1 E
i R
V 4-M Mitigates Could fail risk Could directly j
i Assess risk significance based Mode Change or Used in on PSA rankings and/or
+-
shutdown safety &
4--
accidents or 4--
significant 6
cause initiating Is EOPs?
+y determinictic evalnatinn cienifiennt?
trnneientc?
svetem?
event?
V Not Risk R
N.
Med m
Low
-m
+
High Significan s
i 4K Yes Yes Yes j
i l
i Safety related
- Ne Safety related Safety related Quality relate l
I
- Yes No 4-Yes
{
y V
V Full l
d Basic Target l
No QA l
g l
v v
f 4E Nete 1: SR Components with a Risk Achievement Worth (RA W) between 10 and100 anda Fussell-Vesely (FV) value < 0.005 are to have Full QA applied to the critical attributes associated with that RA Wand /or FV f
i
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~
EXPERT PANEL REVIEW ACTIVITIES HE COMPREHENSIVE RISK MANAGEMENT EXPERT PANEL
- PANEL COMPRISED OF SENIOR-LEVEL MANAGERS I
4 1
- BLENDS DETERMINISTIC AND L
PROBABILISTIC INSIGHTS i
- INCORPORATES FACTORS OUTSIDE SCOPE I
OF PSA/ DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS 1
l
- CONSIDERS THE USE OF EXPERT SOLICITATION (DELPHI METHODS) l I
t
- ASSESSES AGGREGATE AFFECTS OF ALL RISK INFORMED, PERFORMANCE BASED PROGRAMS f
h t
O EXPERT PANEL FUNCTIONS STRUCTURES processes, MAKES decisions in accordance with its responsibilities I
under its charter, and MAINTAINS cognizance to ensure that its decisions are implemented COMPENSATES for the limitations of the PSA:
- Uncertainties caused by model assumptions
- Common cause or common mode failure rates
- Treatment of support systems l
- Level of definition of cut sets, cut set truncation
- Inclusion of repair and restoration of failed equipment j
- Human error rates
- Limitations in the meaning of the importance measures.
DIRECTS the activities of the Working Groups j
-Information gathering
- Recommendation development ADVOCATES / COMMUNICATES the Com rehensive Risk Man ement Pro ram Functions to advance STP Personnel, NR$ Staff and Public $nderstanhing of and Support for the Comprehensive Risk Management Program.
l
i b
HOW IT IS APPLIED SSCs and Full Program - applied to high risk / safety d
activities Fullprogram controls are AP.
f oversight, as prescribedin the OQ SSCs, for Target Program - applied to non-safety rela i kimportance. Specific which 10 CFR50 AppendixB is not app "high" or " medium" safety significant/r s li ble portions of the full program controls consistent with app cali d to th r criticalattributes that andbasic program controls are app em i
t t
l render the SSC significant or impor an.
t "high" l
Basic Program - applied to SSCs and activitl f
risk / safety significant or significant or o 1
?
I
MASTER EQUIPMENT DATABASE i
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E STP - ACQUISITION AND USE OF
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PERFORMANCE DATA l
PURPOSE IS TO MONITOR PERFORMANCE TO ENSURE THAT SYSTEM AND COMPONENT PERFORMANCE REMAINS ACCEPTABLE AFTER CHANGES MADE THROUGH GRADED QA P.ROGRAM ARE IMPLEMENTED Mcquire data from station and industry sources frade data for positive / negative performance hategorize and analyze data for specific areas and develop recommendations 8 upply recommendations to Expert Panel for final analysis and concurrence
-_..m
. ~.,.
communication j
Specific Data - operations Rafety Focus-Training / Qualifications Shift Operations - (logs.
Problem identification Management Oversight i
tumover, watch, etc.)
F Operations Problem Resolution Procedure / Work Instruction Major Evokstions Adewacy i
system wakdowns Quality of Work Contractor Control 8""*
OTULCO Compliance
_ Programs / Procedures work Practces Operator Aids (procedural adherence, Response to off-normal /
STAR. Al. ARA. etc.)
emergency condition Safety Focus Housekeeping Temp. Modarcations Staffing levels Reactivity management Problem identification coordination of Dairy Maintenance -
Problem Resolution Achvites overall Station Quality of Work uar gen
Configur* "
Specific Data - HP Performance
_._Prograras/ Procedures self-Assessments Radiological surveys Condition Reporting /
oosimetry Processing Access control /radiologeal Safety Focus Tesung l-posting Special Processes RWP preparation Problem identificat. ion CAP Data l
oecontamination activities Engineering -
Problem Resolution Specific Data - Maintenance i
Quality of Work Smific Dab Programs / Procedures Scheduling Adewacy l
Waste Management l
Radwaste collecbon.
storage, shipment Troubleshooting solidsrcation, & packaging
_. Safety Focus
- r Mod. Installation Problem Identification Planning l
Rad ca effluent hPgrt Problem Resolution YA" ' "*i""*"**
l Non-radwaste / Material
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Quality of Work
- j
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_ _ Programs / Procedures Specific Data - Security
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Specific Data - Engineering Engineenng oocumentation Matenal& vehicle access control System Engineer Walkdown Personnel / visitor access control
- _ Quality of Work Protected area / vital area Technical design adequacy Problem identification system hearth integnty
,,_ Suppliers _
Problem Resolution support of emergent issues secunty drills OCFR 50.59 process Offcer Patrol activities Programs / Procedures Temporary Modfacations Lock control i
_ Contract Compitance
SBDG AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS - GRADED QA EVALUATION
SUMMARY
BY SYSTEM l
- SAFETY RELATED l-QUAL CLASS 7 (LIMITED QA)-l l-NON4UALITY RELATED --- -I ALL y
GRADE
- l-FULIA BASIC TARGET l-TARGET-.I l----NO QA----I l-ASME LIMITED-lI-NON ASME LTD-I 1 SYS 1 MSK
DIESEL GENERATOP 129 12 42 6
80 178 130 557 6
0 0
802 000 0
0 6
19 25 1193 I
FUEL OfL 248 0
6 34 0
48 230 564 0
0 0
227 227 0
0 0
257 257 tose I
COeABUSTION AIRINTAKE O
O O
O O
O 36 38 0
0 0
88 86 0
0 0
0 0
124 DIESEL EXHAUST 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
294 284 0
0 0
0 0
254 t
JACKET WATER 0
18 47 6
6 87 142 306 0
0 7
121 120 0
0 0
9 9
443 i
i LUBECIL 0
12 121 18 18 250 233 552 0
0 0
158 156 0
0 0
38 36 844
[
STARTING AIR 12 0
24 12 80 66 389 563 0
0 0
883 683 0
0 0
18 18 1254 l
0 0
0 6
24 102 132 0
C 0
180 180 0
0 0
70 70 382 DG sUILDING 0
0 0
0 0
24 0
24 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 24
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ser 42 240 7e is0 s77 tasa 2es4 s
0 7
2341 2:54 0
0 e
40s 415 se0s
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%OFSR 117%
t.3% e.5%
2.7%
sn 23.s % 44 m 1010%
% OF TUTAL:
ass o7% da tm 17% 12.1 % 22.5%
sess at% Oss at%
41.8 %
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0.1%
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NOTES: 1. ASME IlMITI:D consists of those noMiigh risk components identified in MED as ASME class. except for valves <= I". ASME LIMITED totals are shown because these components would have to be procured as Code and thereforeemm.m..t cost savings would be limited even for low risk cr norwisk significant components.
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- 2. Condition Report 97-1271 initiated for the six Diesel Generator conponents (overspeed trip volves) having Quality Class 75 but ranked as high risk.
- 3. Quality Class 7 consists of 7B (Station Blackout),7P (Fire Protection),7P (PAMS Cat 2). 7R (Radwaste), or 7S (Seismic 2/I). All Class 7 SBDGS m.,-..L are 4.1he 246 SR high risk components in the Diesel Ibel Oil system include 240 separately tagged injection pumps (20 per DG) and injection nozzles (20 per DG).
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STP GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE RESULTS TO DATE i
t System Total Full QA Basic QA Target No QA Components QA i
Chemical and 3,072 2
1,709 1,112 249 Volume Control Essential 1,406 48 1,010 300 48 Cooling Water l
DG and 5,603 393 2,447 2,348 415
" supporting" DO, DI, DX, l
HG, XG l
Radiation 1,822 0
388 1,113 321 l
Monitoring l
Reactor Coolant 1,389 302 350 614 123 i
System l
Electrical 2,280 90 1,173 676 341 Auxiliary Building HVAC j
Totals 15,572 835 7,077 6,163 1,497
% of Totals 5%
45 %
40 %
10 %
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STP GRADED QUALITY ASSURANCE RESULTS TO DATE i
l These results indicate that almost half (45%) of the components in the first six analyzed systems can be
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treated as " Basic QA", the minimum QA that can be applied to components previously identified as " safety-
~
related".
Most of the remainder (50%) will have either no QA or only " targeted" elements of our Full QA program j
applied to some aspects of their design, procurement, maintenance, inspection or operation as determined by the risk analysis.
i
l STP GRADED RISK SIGNIFICANCE RESULTS TO DATE E
System Total Safety-Non-High Medium Low Not Risk
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Components Related Safety-Significant l
Related Chemical and 3,073 1711 1362 4
178 433 2457 Volume Control Essential 1,406 1058 348 48 127 199 1032 Cooling Water Diesel 5,603 2840 2763 393 341 493 4376 Generators Radiation 1,822 388 1434 0
0 189 1649 Monitoring Reactor Coolant 1,389 652 737 294 266 3%
433
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System i
Electrical 2,280 1263 1017 90 86 1036 1068 Auxiliary Building HVAC Totals 15573 7912 7661 829 998 2746 11000 i
% ofTotals 51 %
49 %
5%
6%
18 %
71 %
i
STP RISK SIGNIFICANCE
-l RESULTS TO DATE i
!l IN THE FIRST SIX SYSTEMS ANALYZED, ABOUT HALF OF f
a THE TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPONENTS ARE SAFETY-RELATED l
i ONLY 5% ARE HIGHLY RISK SIGNIFICANT 71% ARE NOT RISK SIGNIFICANT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO FULLY FOCUS ON THE RISK SIGNIFICANT COMPONENTS IN THESE SYSTEMS, STP NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE COMPONENTS THAT ARE SAFETY-RELATED, BUT NOT RISK SIGNIFICANT, TO NON-SAFETY-RELATED
STP RISK SIGNIFICANCE
-l RESULTS TO DATE-CONTINUED WE BELIEVE THAT TAKING THESE ACTIONS UNDER 10CFR50.59, AS PRESENTLY CODIFIED, COULD RESULT IN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS L
FOR MANY OF THESE COMPONENTS THE REVISIONS PROPOSED TO 10CFR50.59 IN SECY 98-171 WOULD, WN BELIEVE, MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS UNDESIRABLE RESULT WE SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF " MINIMAL", CONSISTENT WITH THE DISCUSSIONS IN SECY 98-171, SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE DEFINITIONS IN THE PROPOSED RULE i
, o;.
f SUGGESTED ADDITION TO DEFINITIONS IN THE STAFF'S PROPOSED REVISION TO 10CFR50.59 (a)
(7)Less than minimalincrease means that (a) a new failure mode as likely as existing modes has not been introduced and (b) a change in the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is so small or the uncertainties in determining j
whether a change in probability has occurred are such that it cannot be reasonably concluded that the probability has actually changed j
(i.e., there is no clear trend towards increasing the probability) l
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