ML20059A686

Discusses 931006 Operating Reactors Events Briefing 93-38 Which Informed Senior Managers from Listed Ofcs of Selected Events That Occurred Since Last Briefing on 930929.Attendees Listed in Encl 1

ML20059A686
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Waterford, South Texas
Issue date:	10/08/1993
From:	Chaffee A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-93-038, OREM-93-38, NUDOCS 9310270061
Download: ML20059A686 (21)

Text

__

/

October 8,1993 MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support FROM: Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support

SUBJECT:

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING OCTOBER 6, 1993 - BRIEFING 93-38 On October 6, 1993, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events Briefing (93-38) to inform senior managers from offices of the j Chairman, ACRS, NRR, AEOD, RES, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on September 29, 1993. Enclosure 1 lists the attendees. Enclosure 2 presents the l significant elements of the discussed events.

l Enclosure 3 contains reactor scram statistics for the week ending October 3, 1993. No significant events were identified for input into the NRC Performance Indicator Program.

[ original signed by]

Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating l Reactor Support j

Enclosures:

As stated DISTRIBUTION:

LCentral Files: l cc w/ enclosures: PDR i See next page LKilgore, SECY EAB R/F KGray  ;

RDennig l EGoodwin i DSkeen l TKoshy l JCarter NFields

.B/DO S EAB/ DORS EAS bR - EA S KGray EGoodwin RDs.hnig A , ffee p 10/h/93 10/)/93 10/(g/93 10/g/93 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY '.

DOCUMENT NAME: ORTRANS.KAG l (G:\KAG) g s , ,.i. u

, n ' fj },

y , c' 7X u %Qf~ff J cf i e: .w.

I( q , 0,, d Y- J' 9310270061 931008 k _h van m ber. .SY3 -

., j PDR ORG NRRB PDR 3

cc: ,

T. Murley, NRR (12G18) D. Wigginton (PDIV-1)

• F. Miraglia, NRR (12G18) W. Beckner (PDIV-1)

F. Gillespie, NRR (12G18) J. Stang (PDIII-2) ,

J. Partlow, NRR (12G18) J. Dyer (PDIII-2)

S. Varga, NRR (14E4) L. Kokajko (PDIV-2)

J. Calvo, NRR (14A4) S. Black (PDIV-2)

G. Lainas, NRR (14H3) ,

J. Roe, NRR (13E4)

J. Zwolinski, NRR (13H24)

E. Adensam, NRR (13E4) '

W. Russell, NRR (12G18)

J. Wiggins, NRR (7D26)

A. Thadani, NRR (8E2)  :

S. Rosenberg, NRR (10E4)

C. Rossi, NRR (9A2)

B. Boger, NRR (10H3)

F. Congel, NRR (10E2) i D. Crutchfield, NRR (11H21)

W. Travers, NRR (11B19)

D. Coe, ACRS (P-315)

E. Jordan, AEOD (MN-3701)

G. Holahan, AEOD (MN-9112)

L. Spessard, AEOD (MN-3701)

K. Brockman, AEOD (MN-3206)  ;

S. Rubin, AEOD (MN-5219)

M. Harper, AEOD (MN-9112)

G. Grant, EDO (17G21) '

R. Newlin, GPA (2GS)

E. Beckjord, RES (NLS-007)  ;

A. Bates, SECY (16G15)

T. Martin, Region I l W. Kane, Region I R. Cooper, Region I S. Ebneter, Region II 1 E. Merschoff, Region II S. Vias, Region II J. Martin, Region III E. Greenman, Region III f J. Milhoan, Region IV B. Beach, Region IV  !

B. Paulkenberry, Region V K.-Perkins, Region V ,

bec: Mr. Sam Newton, Manager l Events Analysis Department .i Institute of Nuclear Power Operations j 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-5957

)

i

. i

~

p t** "' C%

. . y 3 y, o UNITED STATES 5  : E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

• h.ey v [s!

• • • • • October 8, 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support ,

FROM: Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch -

Division of Operating Reactor Support

SUBJECT:

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING OCTOBER 6, 1993 - BRIEFING 93-38 4 On October 6, 1993, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events .

Briefing (93-38) to inform senior managers from offices of the Chairman, ACRS, NRR, AEOD, RES, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on September 29, 1993. Enclosure 1 lists the attendees. Enclosure 2 presents the significant elements of the discussed events.

Enclosure 3 contains reactor scram statistics for the week ending '

October 3, 1993. No significant events were identified for input into the NRC Performance Indicator Program.

(wM CU' Alfred E. Cha fee, Chi-Events Assessment Brk_..ch i Division of Operating Reactor Support

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ enclosures:

See next page  ;

t

[

L

1 1

• l i

ENCLOSURE 1 i i

LIST OF ATTENDEES i

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS FULL BRIEFING (93-38) .)

OCTOBER 6, 1993 NAME OFFICE NAME OFFICE A. CHAFFEE NRR W. BECKNER NRR  !

T. KOSHY NRR D. WIGGINTON NRR J. CARTER NRR T. YAMADA NRR N. FIELDS NRR J. DYER NRR K. GRAY NRR G. ZECH NRR  :

R. DENNIG NRR B. BOGER NRR ,

E. GOODWIN NRR C. ROSSI NRR j M. VIRGILIO NRR J.. ROE NRR ,

L. KOKAJKO NRR A. VIETTI-COOK OCM/IS G. MARCUS NRR D. COE ACRS i D. LANGE NRR W. MINNERS RES J. STANG NRR J. ROSENTHAL AEOD I E. ADENSAM NRR  !

4 E

TELEPHONE ATTENDANCE (AT ROLL CALL)

Recions Resident Inspectors -

Region I Linda Smith (Arkansas) f Region III i Region IV Region V i

IIT/AIT Team Leaders Misc.

f 1

s i

?

Y i

e m - - ~, - ., w.

ENCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 93-38 LOCATION: 10 B11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1993, 11:00 A.M.

WATERFORD, UNIT 3 INOPERABLE CONTAINMENT 3 SPRAY VALVE DRESDEN, UNITS 2 AND 3 FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS i

I SOUTH TEXAS, UNITS 1 AND 2 PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE AND l PROCEDURAL' PROBLEMS j I

i PRESENTED BY: EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH  :

DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT, NRR 4

93-38 WATERFORD, UNIT 3 IN0PERABLE CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE AUGUST 20, 1993 PROBLEM ,

CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CANNOT OPEN AGAINST HIGHER THAN l EXPECTED SYSTEM PRESSURE. l CAUSE o UNANTICIPATED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS THE "A" TRAIN CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE.

o POTENTIAL VALVE DEGRADATION.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ABSENCE OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM COULD CHALLENGE CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN BASIS EVENTS. l DISCUSSION o CONTAINMENT SPRAY VALVE CS 125A FAILED TO OPEN WHEN  ;

FILLING THE RISER AFTER A SURVEILLANCE TEST. THIS IS AN AIR OPERATED GATE VALVE MADE BY WKM.

o THIS VALVE IS DESIGNED TO FAIL OPEN. SPRING FORCE OPENS THE VALVE WHEN AIR IS VENTED THROUGH A SOLEN 0ID.

l o THE FILL OPERATION WAS ATTEMPTED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A TEST OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP IN THE SAME TRAIN.

CONTACT: THOMAS K0 SHY, NRR/ DORS /0EAB AIT: NO

REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50.72 #26081 SIGEVENT: TBD

' WATERFORD, 93-38 UNIT 3 e SUBSEQUENT DIAGNOSTIC TESTING INDICATED APPR0X.

468 PSIG UPSTREAM 0F THE VALVE WITH A RISER OF 190 FT.

THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS THE VALVE WAS I APPR0XIMATELY 386 PSI.

l o THE PUMP SHUT 0FF HEAD IS 620 FT. OR APPR0XIMATELY  !

270 PSIG. THE VALVE WAS RATED FOR A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE OF 300 PSI. I i

o THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THE INCREASE IN PRESSURE IS THE RESULT OF TRAPPED AIR IN THE PIPING. TRAIN "A" WAS DRAINED IN THE LAST REFUELING OUTAGE FOR MAINTENANCE.

l o ON SEPTEMBER 27, REGION GRANTED ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION )

FOR 72 HOURS WHILE TRAIN "A" CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM WAS IN0PERABLE FROM TROUBLESHOOTING.

o THE LICENSEE INSTALLED ADDITIONAL VENTS IN TRAIN "A" AND COMPLETED SEVERAL SWEEP AND VENT OPERATIONS. THE PEAK PRESSURE UPSTREAM 0F THE VALVE DECREASED TO  !

300-340 PSI RANGE WITH THE PRESSURE DECAY OF A FEW SECONDS.

o IN REPEATED TESTING, CS125A COMPLETED FULL STR0KE AT APPR0XIMATELY 220 PSI DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE. HOWEVER, IT FAILED TO OPEN SUCCESSFULLY DURING THE SECOND OF TWO CONSECUTIVE TESTS.

o THE VALVE STR0KED FULLY WHEN TESTED AFTER A 15 MIN.

INTERVAL. THE LICENSEE THE0RIZED VALVE HEATING FROM MULTIPLE OPERATIONS TO BE A CAUSATIVE FACTOR.

. WATERFORD, 93-38 UNIT 3 o AN EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE / LICENSE AMENDMENT WAS APPROVED TO ALLOW THE LICENSEE TO OPERATE WITH TRAIN "A AND B" SPRAY VALVES OPEN UNTIL NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE.

e THE LICENSEE'S ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO LEAVE THE "A" TRAIN VALVE OPEN. THEY WERE RESERVING THE OPTION TO LEAVE THE TRAIN "B" VALVE OPEN IF NECESSARY.  :

o THE LICENSEE INITIALLY CONSIDERED TRAIN "B" TO BE OPERABLE DUE TO SHORTER PIPE RUN AND FROM THE CONFIGURATION LESS SUSCEPTIBLE FOR TRAPPED AIR.

o "B" TRAIN WAS TESTED SUCCESSFULLY ON OCTOBER 2, 1993. l THE "B" TRAIN VALVE OPENED WITH 365.6 PSIG UPSTREAM 0F  !

THE VALVE AND A RISER LEVEL 0F 170 FT D0WNSTREAM. i LICENSEE RECORDED A MAXIMUM PRESSURE OF 409 PSIG UPSTREAM 0F THE VALVE BEFORE OPENING.

o SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEST, THE LICENSEE LEFT THE "B" TRAIN SPRAY VALVE OPEN ALSO.

o LICENSEE IS CONSIDERING REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVE IN THE  !

NEXT OUTAGE DUE TO DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING REFURBISHMENT PARTS.

o ANOTHER SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM BEING CONSIDERED TO PROVIDE A ONE MIN. TIME DELAY IN THE PUMP START CIRCUIT  !

TO ALLOW VALVE OPENING BEFORE PRESSURIZING THE SPRAY HEADER.  ;

WATERFORD, 93-38 UNIT 3 FOLLOWUP o EAB ASSESSING THE NEED FOR AN INFORMATION NOTICE. -

o REGION IS MONITORING LICENSEE'S SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM ACTIONS.

t a

l l

l l

BRIEFING 93-38 , .-

WATERFORD, UNIT 3 -

A E

H vent FIG. 02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM INJECTION MODE 4 _

(REF. LOU-1564 -G-163)

, RW5P VACUUM BREAKERS '600K GAL ..

CAPACITY Y S

. . S u u9 S 1218 121A 1068 -

106A g

g -

g 200 20A 1078 -

107A g

)( )[ e' <' <'

g -

1100 110A g ,

128B

]

_ CS 129B CCW CS 117B ~

B3-S CS T110 4=

i g P -CS CS 1 CS M#d 6 128A MCONTSPRAY l 1 P CS 117A 'Qg 3 129A PUMP D CS CS CS j k

1250] SDCHX g CONT. SPRAY 1 r 1 RISER PtNP D J L ROM SDC r [CS 101B LPS PtMP B l J L CCW A3--S CS IIIA S ' '

j ( N #I28 midr.CONT SPRAY 1 P s M WS PUMP A 602A TO SDC NC HC 602B j L g CS CS

• 105A 106A 107A S S 3 y

q U4 125A3 g SOCHX W 60 4 -

- 60M A CCW n CS CONT. SPRAY N RISER PUMP A m0M SDC ;

yg 101A LPS PUMP A '

412A

?q TO SDC 8A c 1R A FCVs TT '

I 23

93-38

~

DRESDEN, UNITS 2 AND 3 FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS PROBLEM FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY EVALUATE A LOWER THAN EXPECTED FLOW RATE FROM TWO CONTAINMENT COOLING SERVICE WATER (CCSW)

PUMPS.

CAUSE WEAKNESSES IN THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES; APPROACH TAKEN WAS TO SUPPORT ACCEPTABILITY OF MEASURED FLOWS VERSUS UNDERSTANDING WHY THE FLOWS WERE LOWER THAN EXPECTED.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY DOCUMENT AND REVIEW CHANGES TO THE FACILITY COULD RESULT IN INADEQUATE REMOVAL OF POST ACCIDENT HEAT FROM THE SUPPRESSION P00L AND IN INADEQUATE EMERGENCY CORE C0OLING SYSTEM (ECCS) PUMP NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD (NPSH) .

DISCUSSION o THE CCSW SYSTEM CONSISTS OF TWO LOOPS, EACH WITH TWO  ;

CCSW PUMPS AND ONE CONTAINMENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER, l THAT CIRCULATE WATER FROM THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TO REMOVE HEAT FROM WATER BEING CIRCULATED FROM THE SUPPRESSION P00L BY LPCI PUMP (S). I q

l CONTACT: J. CARTER, NRR/ DORS /0EAB AIT: H0

REFERENCE:

INSPECTION REPORT SIGEVENT: YES 50-237/92034 (DRP)

' DRESDEN, 93-38 UNITS 2 AND 3 o THE CCSW SYSTEM HAD BEEN TESTED IN THE PAST. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE TESTING EACH PUMP SEPARATELY AND EACH PUMP ACHIEVING A FLOW RATE OF AT ,

LEAST 3,500 GPM WITH A DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF 180 PSIG. !

THIS TEST HAS BEEN PASSED.

o ON APRIL 2, 1992, AN OPERATOR NOTICED FOLLOWING l MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, THAT SINGLE LOOP CCSW SYSTEM l FLOW WITH TWO PUMPS OPERATING WAS 5,600 GPM.  !

o NRC ALERTED THE LICENSEE THAT THE ORIGINAL CCSW HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY USED IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS WAS BASED ON A 7,000 GPM FLOW (2 PUMPS) . l o THE LICENSEE'S ENGINEERING STAFF STATED THE REDUCTION .

IN THE CCSW HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY WAS ACCEPTABLE AND l THE DESIGN BASIS CONFIGURATION SHOULD BE ONE PUMP IN A i LOOP.

• LICENSEE ACTIONS APPEARED TO BE FOCUSED UPON SUPPORTING l DECISION THAT A FLOW 0F 3,500 GPM IS ACCEPTABLE; THEREFORE, A 2 PUMP FLOW RATE OF ONLY 5,600 GPM IS OK.

o THE NRC STAFF HAD SEVERAL CONCERNS WITH LICENSEE'S ANALYSIS:

HEAT TRANSFER C0 EFFICIENT WAS INCORRECT; COMPUTER CODES AND THE DECAY HEAT MODEL USED FOR THE CONTAINMENT RESPONSE WERE NOT ADEQUATELY VALIDATED FOR THE PLANT;

)

' DRESDEN, 93-38 UNITS 2 AND 3 CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE MUST BE UTILIZED TO  :

CALCULATE THAT ADEQUATE ECCS PUMP NPSH IS AVAILABLE (CONTRARY TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)

BASES WHICH STATES OVERPRESSURE NOT REQUIRED);

LONG-TERM CONTAINMENT PRESSURE WOULD BE INCREASED AB0VE 8 PSIG (REDUCES THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TS BASES) o THE " LOW" FLOW RATE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO HIGH BACK PRESSURE FROM A COMMON DISCHARGE HEADER AND A PARTLY CLOSED DISCHARGE VALVE DOWNSTREAM FROM THE HEAT EXCHANGER.

SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION DISCOVERED THAT THE VALVE WAS NOT FULLY OPEN WHEN STR0KED "0 PEN"; BACK PRESSURE IS DESIGN REQUIREMENT TO ASSURE LEAKAGE DIRECTION IS INT 0 SUPPRESSION POOL WATER o IN 1980s, MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE THAT IMPACTED THE HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY. THE LICENSEE'S SAFETY l EVALUATION DID NOT EVALUATE THE EFFECT OF THE MODIFICATIONS ON THE LOSS-0F-COOLANT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.

E0LLOWUP o THE NRC IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES WITH THE LICENSEE <

ENGINEERING DESIGN FUNCTION, INADEQUACIES IN SAFETY EVALUATIONS PERFORMED FOR DESIGN MODIFICATIONS, AND UNDERSTANDING 0F NRC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

o ON JULY 15, 1993, THE REGION III REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR ISSUED A PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY OF $75,000 AND A LEVEL III VIOLATION BASED ON FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY EVALUATE DESIGN MODIFICATIONS.

DRESDEN, 93-38 UNITS 2 AND 3 o ON AUGUST 10, 1993, THE NRR/AE0D EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL CLASSIFIED THE EVENT AS A "SIGNIFICANT EVENT" BASED ON THE EXTENT OF PROGRAMMATIC WEAKNESSES.

o GENERAL ELECTRIC IDENTIFIED OTHER PLANTS USING HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH A NON-CONSERVATIVE CAPABILITY. THIS CONDITION WAS REPORTED, PROCESSED AS A PART 21, REVIEWED AND CLOSED OUT BY THE PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH.

NRC VEND 0R BRANCH PLANS A FOLLOWUP INSPECTION OF THE HEAT EXCHANGER CALCULATIONS USED AT OTHER FACILITIES.

BRIEFING 93-38 DRESDEN, UNITS 2'AND 3'

' "E" j[,. DPvvEtt SPRAY

, M M ---

v2 LPCI INXCillk4 . J A

p)

T L *. t / TOkt t'. *ItittNG L "-

M - M- _

l TDkui SVkr.s M-M d -

r,-

t.l.

\, = _

h M

[lm W h til filet M

~

/

D) ,

l LPC f HX

<Pt t 2 i r;ttM J N

' i

/

) I -

i

'y - -]

, t r w

')

j FLOV DRIr!CE

{! 'CNTDDL 7 b t 04 HVAC l

w W

A, L PCI g e I'l-A Dt't MARGE 10 ), ,

/ 4 i' >< ADE R N p .t.

I \ ,

,,Q - 'x- ;I - rr'vpmo s-f.

i e !!Ott 6 p.t' M/

r PU M S -

1 y \

% /

I ,

I 3 x .

,, l .m . m .

- . , - - _ _ . - _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - - - - _ - - _ _ - - ~ - . ~ - - . . - _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _-__ - - _ _ _ . - _ - _ - _ - _ a . _ - _ - - _ _ . - -

93-38 SOUTH TEXAS, UNITS 1 AND 2 PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS -

VARIOUS DATES ,

PROBLEM CERTAIN PERSONNEL, MAINTENANCE, AND PROCEDURAL ERRORS WERE SUBJECT TO ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT AND WERE COLLECTIVELY CLASSIFIED BY THE NRR/AE0D SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SCREENING PANEL AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR PROGRAM.

CAUSE MANAGEMENT AND PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE i THE LICENSEE COMMITTED A NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS OF i PROCEDURES WHICH INDIVIDUALLY MIGHT NOT PRESENT IMMEDIATE SAFETY CONCERNS. HOWEVER, COLLECTIVELY THEY INDICATE ,

SERIOUS PROGRAMMATIC WEAKNESSES IN THE LICENSEE'S MANAGEMENT OF THE PLANT. ,

i DISCUSSION e ON MAY 19, 1992, WITH BOTH SOUTH TEXAS UNITS OPERATING AT 100 PERCENT POWER, PLANT OFFICIALS CONCLUDED THAT A DEFICIENCY EXISTED IN THE SURVEILLANCE TEST OF THE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM BUT CONTROL 309M OPERATORS WERE NOT NOTIFIED THAT THE SYSTEM WAS IN0PERABLE UNTIL 2 AND 1/2 HOURS LATER. '

CONTACT: N. FIELDS, NRR/D0RS/0EAB AIT: NO

REFERENCES:

INSPECTION REPORTS 92-17, SIGEVENT: YES 92-29, 92-32, 93-03, 93-08 AND EN93-034 l

~ SOUTH TEXAS, 93-38 UNITS 1 AND 2 o ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1992, WHILE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS WERE IMPLEMENTING T/S 3.0.3 SHUTDOWN IN RESPONSE TO A COMPONENT OPERABILITY PROBLEM, MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED REVISED GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING T/S 3.0.3, CONFUSING CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL.

o BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 28, 1992, AND JANUARY 9, 1993, THERE WERE EIGHT INSTANCES OF PERSONNEL ERRORS THAT RESULTED IN WORK BEING PERFORMED ON EQUIPMENT IN THE WRONG TRAIN OR WRONG UNIT.

o BECAUSE OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS, THE LICENSEE DID NOT TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO REPLACE A MOTOR ON A MOTOR OPERATED VALVE (MOV) IN THE UNIT 2 "A" TRAIN LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM FOR 18 MONTHS.

o THE AB0VE EVENTS RESULTED IN THE ISSUANCE OF A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

o THERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL AT SOUTH TEXAS.

1 FOLLOWUP  :

e THE REGION IS F0LLOWING LICENSEE'S SHORT TERM l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND LONG TERM EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PROGRAMMATIC AND MANAGERIAL WEAKNESSES. j

SOUTH TEXAS, 93-38 UNITS 1 AND 2 o AN OPERATIONAL READINESS ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION IS PLANNED FOR THE NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1993 TIME FRAME.

e A RESTART PLAN IS CURRENTLY UNDER PREPARATION. (MANUAL CHAPTER 0350 IS BEING USED FOR GUIDANCE.)

l

e' '

ENCLOSURE 3 REACTOR SCRAM i Seporting Period: 09/27/93 to 10/03/93 YTD YTD ABOVE BELOW YTD PAIL PLANT & UWIT POWE R TLPg ggg CPPLICATIows ILM ji) E ,

D9/30/93 TUR GY POINT 3 0 SA Ecpipment Fallure NO O 1 1 10/03/93 BRAIDWOOD 2 100 SA Equipment Failure k0 1 0 1 i

t

?

i i

i

.i i

. J l

l J

Wote: Tear To Cate (TTD) Totals Incitde twents Within The Caterdar Tear Irdicated By The End Cate of The Specified Reporting Period

!TS 10 page:1 i 10/06/93 1

1

I O

COMPARISON OF WEEKLY SCRAM STATISTICS WITN INDUSTRY AVERAGES 1 PERIOD ENDING 10/03/93 i l

l l

WiMBER 1993 1992 1991* 1990* 1989* i 0F WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY ]

JCRAM CAUSE SORAMS A VE R AGE AVE R AGE AVERAGE AVERACE AVERAGE (YTD)

POWER GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15% ~l EQUIPMENT FAILURE

• 1 1.8 2.6 2.9 3.4 3.1  !

DESIGN /INSTALLATIDW ERR 0k* 0 0.1 - - - -

OPERATING ERROR

• 0 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.0 MAINTEEAkCE ERROR

• 0 0.6 0.4 - - -

l EXTERhAL* O 0.2 - - - -

l CTHER* 0 0.0 0.2 - -

0.1  !

i S Wtetet 1 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.2 POWER LESS THAN 1$%

EQUIPMENT FAILURE

• 1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 DESIGN /lkSTALLATION ERROR

• 0 0.0 - - - -

j OPERATlWG ERROR

• 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 '

MAthTEhANCE ERROR

• O 0.0 0.1 - - -

EXTEthAL* O 0.1 - - - -

l CTHER* O 0.0 0.1 - - -

Subtotal 1 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 I

TOTAL 2 3.6 4.1 4.0 4.4 4.8 I 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 WO. OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SC8AW TYPE SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE (YTC)

TOTAL AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 2 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.9 i i

TOTAL MANUAL SCRAMS 0 0.9 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.9 '

TOTALS MAY DIFFER BECAUSE OF ROUWDlWG OFF

• Detailed breakdown not in database for 1991 ard earlier I EXTERNAL cause included in EQUlPMENT FAILURE

- MAlkTEhAhCE ERROR and DESIGN / INSTALLATION [RROR causes inclu3ed in OPERATikG ERROR OTMER cause incluoed in EQUIPMENT FAILURE 1991 and 1990 l

ETS 14 Page: 1 10/06/93

HOTES PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE 1.

WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH HIDNIGHT SUNDAY. i SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN l OPERATING LICENSE. ,

- 2. PERSONELL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, i AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.

3. COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL 4

ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM. ,

4. "OTHER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES *

(LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE. i OEAB SCRAM DATA  :

Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1987 ------------------ 435 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1988 ------------------ 291 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1989 ------------------ 252 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1990 ------------------ 226 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1991 ------------------ 206 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1992 ------------------ 212 Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1993 --(YTD 10/03/93)-- 138 i

>