ML20206B721

Package of Five Comments Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re State & Local Participation in Evacuation Planning

ML20206B721
Person / Time
Site:	Perry, Seabrook
Issue date:	02/24/1987
From:	Babbitt B, Chorman N, Comley S, Doughty J, Finaldi L, Sneider C, Snieder C AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:	Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#287-2600, CON-#287-2602, CON-#287-2606, CON-#287-2609, FRN-52FR6980, RULE-PR-50 OL, NUDOCS 8704100026
Download: ML20206B721 (26)

Text

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BECAUSE WE CARE ABOUT ROWLEY AND YOU .p C 280 Main Street Y' Rte, lA

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Rowley, MA 01969 (617) 948-2002 B7 FEB 24 P2 :33 P Ri s0 52FR5980 February 24, 1987 j,. ,q,

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. PART 50 52FR6980 Mr. Lando W. Zech Chairman Nuclear Regulatory. Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairman Zech:

I am deeply disappointed by the decision of the Commissioners denying my request to address this Commission today on a matter in which public participation goes to the very heart of the issue.

This commission is currently considering a proposal that will eliminate state and local participation in evacuation planning. I find it ironic that the Commission chooses to do so in a manner which precludes public participation. Under your leadership, it seems to be the attitude of this Commission that the less the public knows and the less the public participates, the better the public is. Such an attitude is foreign to our very concepts of government. Your decision, however, does not surprise me. On two occasions, I have written registered letters to you and on twelve other occasions I have called your office seeking a response to questions regarding nuclear power which I believe the American public has a right to know. Apparently, Commissioner Asselstine agrees because he met with me to provide the answers to these questions and later made his written responses a matter of public record.

I do not believe that the decision of the Commission to allow certain elected representatives from our state to appear before the Commission today excuses the actions of the Commission. I come here today on behalf of the town of Rowley, Massachusetts and as an American citizen. The fact that as citizens we elect certain persons to represent us does not mean that we forfeit our own right to have and express opinions on matters of vital concern to us. I applaud the efforts of our elected representatives from Massachusetts. However, I believe I offer this Commission a different perspective and one that the Commission should at least hear and consider prior to any decision on evacuation planning.

8704100026 870224 (over)

PDR PR SO 52FR6980 PDR

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I Chairman Lando W. Zech l February 24, 1987 l Page Two With this letter, I am submitting a written statement.

Since I am not allowed to address this meeting today, I am asking that this written statement be made a part of the record of this meeting. I also ask that the Commission consider a means by which the public will be afforded meaningful participation in this decision.

Sincerely, MN St phen B. Comley Director 4

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• s STATEMENT OF STEPHEN Bo COMLEY Conley. as a resident of Rowley, My name is Stephen B. I ,

Massachusetts, where I own and operate tne Seaview Nursing Home. I am also executive , director of Because we Care Aoout Rowley and You, a group formed in direct response to the failure of tne puolic Service Hampshire and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Company of New adequately protect tne nealtn and safety of the thousands of persons potentially effected oy an accident at the Seacrook Power Plant.

outside of tne original 10-mile Rowley is located two miles evacuation zone.

Many of tne residents of my nursing home will be for tnemselves in the event of an accident at unable to fend 12 miles from tne Seabrook. . But because tnat nursing home is located has never been includeu in any evacuation plan. But even if plant it my nursing home .vas included, I am not sure its residents would fare any better. Tne plan, as it now stands, calls for the eluerly, the l

disaoled, tne infirm and others Who are unaole to fend for themselves to stay indoors until tney can be safely evacuated. As has Deen too often the case in the past, tnese members of our society are dealt hew Hampshire witn by an old adage: "Out of sight, out of mind."

! Yanxee and the NRC apparently Delieve, as did Charles Darwin, tnat If any demonstration of

. survival is the privilege of the fittest.

this fact was needea, it comes with the proposal of tne utility to )

l reduce cne evacuation zone to one mile, and tne decision of this i

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j - Commissi,on to treat tne proposal in such a cavalier manner tnat it 1

would totally exclude the public from its deliberations.

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- in rocponco to qu30tieno thst .I cubnittsd to NRC Ch0ir.inan .IIndo ' W. -

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Zech, Jr., I received an answer that I concidar both clarming and f

callou's. ' Responding on behalf of Chairman sech, Victor Stello, Jr., few-stated that "for the Director for operations, Executive tauivicual y actants" .mo caa't eo a.o v 4 u in ene avea- sc a nute;r I dispute accident shelter would ca an appropriate safety measure.

nr. Stello's contention that only a rew indiviauals are involved.

But I asx you, Commissioners, if your mother, father, grandmotner or grandf atner was among tne few, would it be any consolation to you

' enat eney sere not part of a mass carnage createu cy a nucicar accident? Commissioner James Asselstine nas conceded tnat the NRC issue of discrimination against the elderly and has never faced the 4

hancicapped "nead-on". I uninx it's nign time tnat you uo so, and recucing ene evacuation zone to one mile is not ene answer.

Lixe otner parenta in Rowley,.n, en11aren attena I am also a parent.

In ene a regional senool enat is locatea witntn ene 10 mtle radius.

i event of a disaster, we will te separated f rom our enilaren at a time when tney need us most. 1ne proposea 1 mile evacuation zone is clearly preposterous, but even tne original 10-mile zone does not adequately account for those who will most need assistance in the l

event of an acciuent. -

4.e are toic by New hampanire tanxee and enis Commission enat seaoroox we nave notning to worry aoout, it is safe. eut is state-of-tne-art: Are we, as we now Anow enat caernocyl was ene result of numan error.

Americans, so state-of-tne-art that we will not fall victim to enat

! same numan error?

I suggest tnat with tne widespread reports of drug i

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couco Gt th3 S3cbrotk Oita cil our ocphisticatsd cod ciech31 tschnology cay'not cova un feca curtolv00.

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In his' operiing statement in October 1986 hearings, Representative Jonn Cingell, Chairman, of the Committee _ on Energy and Commerce,

.a na inve s c tga ttoas , racerrc9 cv t..a ..ic ' .s au.:co.a iittee or. versigat inacility to cope with an unprecedented regulatory "centinuing I tnat "tne NRC creakdown." Commissioner Asselstine has also indicated contains many able and dedicated people who are committed to tne proper policy regulatory mission of tne agency. If given tne direction from the top, I am confident tnat tne agency could pursue its regulatory responsiollities in a manner tnat would restore puolic confidence in the NRC as an oojective and fair regulator that puts tne interests of tne puolic foremost." rne Commission can atart retoring pablic confidence rivat now oy unanimously rejecting tne to proposeo 1 mile evacuation zone ana reafttraing tne puclic's rigat participate in tne for.aalation ot evacuation clans prior to licensin9 plants. Or it can continue cown ene road it is on oy once more caving into tne financial interests of the utilities and placing tnat aoove ene public interest.

tne sind Chairman Zecn, tne time nas come for you to begin proviaing If of leadership that can restore the puolic's conficence in ene NRC.

you cannot provide tnat leadersnip, enen it is time for you, ;2 r .

stello, and others like you to step aside, so the President can appoint someorie uno is capaole o' coe ing witu tais "un rececented e regulatory creaxdown."

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MEMORANDUM F0,R: The Files FROM: James K. Asselstine _A 7.

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SUBJECT:

DISCUSSION WITH S HEN B. COMLEY RE NUCLEAR SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING On Friday, August 15, 1986, I met with Mr. Stephen B. Comley to discuss his concerns regarding nuclear safety and emergency planning. Mr. Comley is a resident of Rowley, Massachusetts. Mr. Comley is interested in the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant but is not a party in the Seabrook licensing proceeding. We did not discuss any contested issues in the Seabrook licensing proceeding. The following is a written sumary of my responses to Mr. Comley's questions.

Question 1: Do you feel that the people of Rowley should have a voice in evacuation planning as it pertains to the Seabrook power plant?

Answer: As a general matter, I believe that the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) established by the Commission is a reasonable boundary for planning protective actions, including evacuation, in the event of a nuclear power plant accident. Mnwaver the enmmiecien'< r.enlations are flexible in that they allow excansion of the 10-mile FPI to taxe into account nearby fac11ities or features for which J ei.wi 3 cawy pionning woula De appropriate. An example would uc a a waivv i iusa6co JusT. outsace Ine trt. In DreviouS_ e supportea expancing the size of the EPL

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...f...y in a pas osuier area wnere tne tacts of the cast inuiwa6e a pos6isuier iesture. Tacility or prootem area which can affect overall emercency olannina for the olant, an exampie or tnts is the bric ge going to Cape Cod, which is located just beyond the 10-mile EPZ for the Pilgrim plant.

j Because the bridge could significantly affect emergency planning for the Pilgrim plant and because it is the principal artery leading to and from Cape Cod, I believe that it should be included in the Pilgrim EPZ, and I have 50 stated in the past. Whether the _ town of Rowley should be included in the EPZ for' 5eabrook would deDend upon the facts i _in ena c pa rtacu s s e case. Although this is not now a contested issue < n the 'Seabrook proceeding I understand that it may become one. If so, my decision would be based upon the record developed in the case. I have not reviewed 0 ~

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reductions the amounts and intypes the of radioactive source radioactive materials tenn which (the could be released during a serious nuclear accidertt). The  !

industry argues that these reduced source terms would l justify relaxations in several NRC regulations. Chief among l those is a reduction in the size of the emergency planning zone, perhaps to an area as small as two miles. The Anerican Physical Society and others have identified a number of areas where additional work.is needed to provide a sound scientific basis for any source. term reassessment.

They have advised that across-the-board reductions in the i, source term are not yet justified, and that specific

numerical reductions are unwarranted. The Coninission has

( no.t yet taken action to reduce the source terms, and our technical staff har advised that any across-the-board .

reductions in emergency planning zones are premature. The staff has rejected at least one site-specific proposal to reduce the EPZ for the Calvert Cliffs plant on the ground that the request is premature. Of course, any licensee is free to propose a site-specific reduction in the size of the:

EPZ for the plant and the individual proposal would be considered by the Comission on its merits.

Ouestion 5: I understand that the low level licensing requirements have been reduced as they pertain to issues of evacuation problems that may arise in a city or town. This change has enabled question not to be resolved before a license is issued. Given the Chernobyl. incident and the problems and questions that surround the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant in Plymouth (which has been branded "the worst-run plant in the US"), do you think we should reverse again and require that evaluation issues be resolved before a low level license is granted to any new plants?

Answer: The Comission's regulations require adequate emergency planning measures to be in place prior to the issuance of a full-power license, but not prior to the issuance of a low-power license (these are limited to no more than five percent of full power). This decision was based upon the technical judgment that a plant beginning operation and not going above five percent power fails to generate the quantity of fission products and decay heat which could pose a hazard to the public requiring evacuation or other ,

protective action. I agree with this technical judgment i that the risk to the public from low-power operation of a new plant is very low. Some have questioned whether the Chernobyl accident affects this judgment since that accident apparently occurred at low power levels. Hawner- nur staH advises that the sitt ation at Chernobyl was ou' te difderent because the o an" iac been coeratino a' hicher onwer evelt fnr enme time. w- t i the enr tenuent bt i 1-uo of f' 4sion eroducte and decav heat. b avino tait 111 . I thou' d note e

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'comitment to nuclear power which we alrea'dy have in the U.S. The challenge is to ensure that the approximately 125 plants we have in operation or under construction. are run safely. Hence, Chernobyl has underscored my belief that a severe nuclear accident in the U.S. is unacceptable, and .

that further regulatory initiatives are needed for the future if we are to reduce the long-tenn risk of nuclear power to an acceptable level. :n a recent lettor en .th.

President of the Atomic Industr' ai torum, I out' ined mv own assessment or our currens unour nanoing oT sne risxs o "

nuc ear power ana tne steps tnet i oeiieve are neecea a reauce ciat rism i.o acce nause icveu. 4 em picaseo to note Inat as part or its receic aarety uoals Policy Statement the Comission agreed to a statement that an objective of our regulatory process should be to prevent the occurrence 'of a severe nuclear accident -- that is, an accident causing damage to the. reactor core -- at any U.S. nuclear power plant. This statement, together with the Comission's recent increased attention on the operating performance of U.S. plants, particularly those with a history of poor performance, is an encouraging step in the right direction.

Question 8: - Do you feel _ttpt people are really informed about and know g - nf the dancers Of nuclear Dower?

. Answer: I 2m nn+ ennvinced that e se oublic is fu'1v inferned of the r m nf nue' ear oower. '1e issues are often comp 1ex, and the debate on tne issues is ' frequently polarized and somewhat' distorted. In my recent letter to the AIF, copy attached, I attempted to describe my view of the risk of a nuclear accident, including the uncertainties in estimating that risk. As I noted in my letter, I do not believe that i we fully understand that risk and we snou ac, not be af raid l m say s o, l

. Question 9: Cost verus other furids - obsolete? e Answer: -As I understand your question, do I believe that nuclear power is obsolete based upon cost considerations? The ,

yp Comission's regulations focus on health and safety considerations rather than on the overall cost of nuclear l

- power. It is true that the cost of nuclear power has increased substantially in recent years, particularly for the large new plants. The cost of operating and maintaining the older existing plants has also increased significantly over the past several years. Although there are many reasons for the cost increases, among the more significant are poor management of plant construction, the lack of standardization, a design-as-you-build approach to plant construction, and the need to address new and unanticipated i i

safety issues, including those arising from the Three Mile l Island accident. Whether nuclear power remains competitive ,

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Answer: I telieve that we should retain the nuclear power option for the future in this country. When I examine other energy arternatives, it appears at the present time that coal and nuclear are the principal means available for providing .

large central station generating facilities. Conservation and other options are having a significant impact; however, it is unclear whether they can eliminate the need for new large generating facilities at some point in the future.

But if nuclear power is to remain a viable option for the future, three conditions must be met. First, the existing plants must operate safely and there must not ce a severe accident at any of the existing plants for the foreseeable future -- at least the next 20 years. n , we must restructure the process for designing, cons ructing and operating future nuclear plants. This restructuring must include greater use of standardized designs; the development of essentially complete designs before the start of construction; better, more centralized management of the construction process; greater attention to construction quality assurance; improved designs which emphasize greater margins of safety, simplicity, ease of operation and ease of maintenance; better utility management; and improved operations and maintenance perfomance. g, we must make continued progress toward developing a sate and environmentally acceptable solution to the nuclear waste disposal problem. Each of these areas, in my view, is in need of attention if nuclear power is to remain a viable option for the future. .

Question 14: nn vno 5. 1 that the nublic wnula 8. <nct454.a in 8 14.u4na 1 1at the NRC is not actinQ in the oublic's best interest?

Answer: At I noted in mv resconse to o"at+4nn 5 Y haliava '"aca arp <nce (1cn1 "1 cant ommittinn docitinne in roepnt vo a rc in which the Enrm"< tion 1at acted mnre me the nen+petne nf t he industry than the Drotector of the oub' ic.

e ench czeae I a.i,.o. en2e enn noni3e wnn a no inct, "s.A in enneindinn

_that the NRr it not actino ' n the nuhl< e'e heet internets.

At:the same time, as I noted in my previous response, the NRC staff is composed of many hard-working and dedicated people. if nivan the oroner nnliev enidance and direction, the NPr enuld do much to restore noblic ennfidenen in the xcency as a fair and ob ective reculator. and in the safety

- af nuclear nnwar at war .

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j p SAPL <m n w Seacoast Anti-Pollution Leafgue DOLMETEP 5 Market St., Portsmouth, N.H. 03801 awac (603) 431-s089 PART 50

'87 FEB 24 P2 :35 086SU L 52FR6980 PRELIMIN48Y STATEMENT OF THE SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE

n. ON ME NRd PROPOSAL TO AMEND ITS RULES TO ALLd(; FULL POWER OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ABSENT STATE AND' LOCAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY PLANNING (SECY-87-35)

Throughout its history, both in its former incarnation as the Atomic Energy Commission and in its present form as the Nuclear

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Regulatory Commission, this Commission has asserted that public health and safety are its primary, final and enduring considerations.

The Commission has on various occasions and consistently in the past disclaimed any interest in or consideration of the weight of economic investment borne by potential, licensees. Further, the Commission, in promulgating the final rule on emergency planning in August 1980, did contemplate the eventuality that lack of participation by State and local governments could impede operation of some reactors.

Today, the Commission is seeking to backpedal on its commitment to public safety, inject utility economic considerations into licensing determinations, and pretend that it never envisioned that State and local governments would not go along with the planning process if they determined that adequate plan development was infeasible. In short, the Commission is seeking to stand history on its head to accomodate the needs of utilities that have run up against a reality that to them is most unpleasant, i.e. the fact that there are certain locations in this country where plans simply cannot be developed that provide " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" as required at 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1).

Founded 1969

A)' THE COMMISSION IS RETREATING FROM_ITS PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES The Commission, in considering.this proposed rule, acknowledges that the adequacy of plans is improved if there is the cooperation of state and local governments:

The governments or others may dispute whether planning is adequate, but it would seem fairly indisputable that the adequacy of a plan with cooperation will be enhanced relative to a utility sponsored plan without it.

j (SECY-87-35, Attachment A at 11)

Adoption of the proposed rule could, in a few cases where State or local governments do not cooperate in emergency planning, result in nuclear plant operation with less than optimum governmental coordination in emergency planning.

In this circumstance, the public in the vicinity of the few affected plants would be placed al somewhat greater risk relative to what would be the case if either the govern-ments cooperated or the NRC adhered to its current emergency planning rules.

Emphasis Added (SECY-87-35, Attachment C at 1)

In short, it is incontestable that adoption of the proposed rule would lead to a reduction in the margin of public safety and the 4

NRC Staff has conceded this point.

The purpose of emergency planning is to provide a means of achieving dose savings for the population in the event of a radiological emergency. The discussion of the proposed rule states

, that that proposed approach " focuses on what is prudent and achievable dose reduction taking into account lack of governmental cooperation."

The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League believes that the use of the word

" prudent" in this context is ridiculous in the extreme. There is nothing at all prudent about adopting a set of rules, particularly in light of the lessons that can be learned from the response to the accident at Chernobyl, which provide an avenue for circumventing State and local governmental assessments as to the feasibility of plan implementation .

In the first Supreme Court case arising out of a contested

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licensing proceeding, Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961),

the Atomic Energy Commission assured the Court that "public safety is the first, .last, and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility." If such were indeed still the case, the NRC would not now be entertaining a rulemaking proposal that represents an admitted reduction in the level of public protection. SECY-87-35 states that: "The rule change would have a minimal impact on safety."

This statement is simply gratuitous and unsubstantiated. As a sop to try to appear to retain a concern about public safety, the Commission tosses out the statement that:

Moreover, the Commission emphasizes that it would not be possible under this option to license a plant for full power operation unless the applicant demonstrates that adequate offsite emergency planning is achievable and all other aspects of foregoing criteria are satisfied. This rulemaking is. intended only to address non-cooperation by responsible State or local governments; it does not provide a remedy or excuse for other offsite emergency planning problems.

(SECY-87-35, Attachment A at 5-6)

Any party that has ever intervened in an NRC licensing proceeding knows how hollow this assurance is. In the Seabrook licensing proceeding, many meritorious contentions detailing serious planning deficiencies have been rejected by the Board. (See, for example, the contention appended as Attachment I.)

B) THE COMMISSION IS IMPROPERLY REVERSING ITS PAST POSITION THAT.

ECONOMIC INVESTMENT BY UTILITIES HAS NO BEARING ON LICENSING In 1979, in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League petitioned the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, for a hearing on suspension or revocation of the

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- construction permits for.Scabrook in light of that fact that the Commission was. promulgating emergency planning requirements. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a memorandum in support of

- SAPL's request. SAPL believed then, as it believes today, that it l 4

is impossible to develop a feasible evacuation plan for the area around Seabrook because of dense population and an inadequate roadway network.

1 On July 15, 1981, Harold Denton, then the NRC's Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, denied the request for a s'

hearing, stating f As a basis for instituting a show cause proceeding, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts suggests that permitting continued construction may result in "perhaps billions" of dollars of wasted investment if the Commission ultimately rejects the Seabrook operating licenses on the basis of inability to adequately cope with emergencies.

l That risk of lost investment is the risk that every holder l

of a construction permit carries. See Power Reactor Development Co. v International Union of Electrical, Radio

& Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961). The permittee's investment in constructing the facility is not,.however, a proper factor for consideration in determining at the operating license stage whether a nuclear power plant is safe to operate. Id at 415 (Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206, July 15,1981 at 11) 1 1

SAPL challenged the denial of a hearing in the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Though the Court upheld the NRC's decision, the. Court noted:

The Commission thus argues that because the EPZ evacuation

] issue will be addressed in the operating license review, it j was not arbitrary or capricious to refuse to address it sooner.

The Commission further denies that PSC's financial investment i

in the plant will influence its consideration of whether to grant'the operating license.

(Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 690 4

F. 2d 1025 (D.C. Cir.1982) i Today, the Commission has reversed its position. The proposed rule states:

Significant policy questions of equity and fairness are l presented where a utility has substantially completed l construction and committed substantial resources to a nuclear plant and then, after it is far too late en--m---vc.-, n,g. -.n- -gm, --,---e~,m----,.. . , - - - , - - . - - -,-.-.,_,m.- ,-,-.,-r_-,-mw4-- - . - - - - > , ,,-w-, - - . . . - --r,,wer+,w m,---,---,n , ,-

' realistically for ths utility to reverso courso, the Stato or local governmsnt oppoacs the plant by_non-coopsration in

offsite emergency planning.

1 (SECY-87-35, Attachment A at 4) l It is only "far too late" for the utility to reverse course because ,

l the utility and the NRC refused to deal with the infeasibility of evacuation at Seabrook back -in 1979 when SAPL requested that the matter be addressed. It is intervenors who have'not been ac' corded

" equity and fairness".

l C) THE COMMISSION, IN ADOPTING ITS CURRENT EMERGENCY PLANNING REGULATIONS, DID CONTEMPLATE THE EVENTUALITY THAT STATE AND

! LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MIGHT NOT PARTICIPATE IN EMERGENCY PLANNING

The Commission's present claim that it always expected that State

, and local governments would participate in the development or j implementation of offsite emergency plans is plainly erroneous.

In the discussion of the rationale for the adoption of the final emergency planning rule, the Commission stated:

• The Commission recognizes there is a possibility that the operation of some reactors may be affected by this rule

, through inaction of State and local governments or an

! inability to comply with these rules.

(45 feg. Reg. 55402 at 55404, August 19, 1980)

The Commission did state that it expected State and local officials s would " endeavor to provide fully for public protection." Id. at 55404.

SAPL believes that this is what responsible government officials have

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done in refusing to submit inadequate emergency plans for the areas surrounding Seabrook and Shoreham.

i D) CONCLUSION i

The NRC, in proposing this rule change in response to utility

, claims that politically ambitions public officials are taking advantage of a " flaw" in the licensing process in blocking nuclear plant operation, l has put forth a false characterization of the past regulatory history I .

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'.and' intent of cmsrgzncy planning regulations, Further, the Commission has executed an abrupt about face on the issue of consideration of utility investments in licensing decisions. Most importantly, the Commission has retreated from that which is supposed to be its highest commitment, the public health and safety.

Respectfully submitted, Jane Doughty Seacoast Anti-Pollution League February 2f+, 1987 l

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ATTACHMENT I - p. 1

• Cont'inti:n 4:

The New Hampshire, State, local and h'ost community plans fail to meet in adequate fashion the requirements that provisions be made for medical treatment of contaminated injured individuals as set forth at 10 C.F.R. 650.47 (bX12) and NUREG-0654 II.L.1. and L. 3.

Basis: Section 2.8 of the New ilampshire State plan describes the medical and public health support available to cope with a radiological emergency. Table 2.8-1 lists the .

local medical facilities capable of treating radiation accident patients. The total capacity of all these facilities, even assuming their maximum capacity, is inadequate for the task of treating those numbers of individuals who are likely to be both contaminated and injured in a serious nuclear accident at Seabrook, much less those in addition who are exposed to excessive amounts of radiation. Assuming maximum capacity, the hospitals listed can treat a total of 51 Type 2 patients (Type 2 patients being defined in the- Table as those requiring medical care as well a,s radiologically contaminated) and a total of 76 Type 1 patients (defined as those who have experienced excessive exposure to radiation). Only two of the hospitals listed can treat the numbers of patients specified for Type 2 treatment in addition to the numbers requiring Type 1 treatment. This means that the absolute maximum number of patients who could be treated at any one time is 91 patients.

Table 1, located in each of the 17 New flampshire local plans, provides 1985 peak population figures for each of the New flampshire municipalitics within the plume exposure EpZ. The combined total 1985 peak population of the 17 New Hampshire towns is 191,849. Even if dealing only with the Type 2 patients, lit is unreasonable to assume that only 51 persons out of 191,849 would be both injured and contaminated in a serious nucles' accident involving an evacuation of the plume exposure EPZ . 51 is only .027% l l

of 2.41,849. Realistically, in a serious accident scenario, thousands of people could require specialized medical care.

1. SAPL holds the position that " contaminated injured individuals" at 10 C.F.R. 650.47 (bX12) should properly be construed to include those exposed to excessive levels of radiation as well, the so-called Type 1 patients. Excesslve radiation exposure injures living thsue.

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ATTACHMENT I - p. 2 Furthermore, the capacitics listed for Exeter llospital and Pease Air Force Base hospitals should not be assumed since Exeter llospital lies within the plume exposure EPZ and might need to be evacuated. Pease is just a short distance beyond the EPZ boundary and might conceivably also be evacuated. If evacuated, neither facility would be available for the provision of medical treatment, thereby reducing the capacity for treatment of Type 2 patients to 47. Five of the hospitals listed, Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, Cheshire Medical Center, Cottage llospital, Newport llospital and Sceva Speare Memorial Hospital are more than 50 miles from Seabrook Station and would require significant travel time before arrival. If contaminated individuals were severely injured, they might not be able to survive the duration of the trip. Travel time would be lengthened by the congestion of the roadways in the EPZ in an evacuation scenario.

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r"FF6980 $fs Fr. Zech, I find it denlere ,e +h,t t h e N o.c v w : , a ch,nze + Sip 8 24 P6 :19 rules to +ake away state's rightm o r l o c'1 co- + chl . e e, 80Cu '. . > .' d. F in evacuatic" pirr.s in the areas surroundir.c nuclead * '

plants.

I live three miles fro- +b^ Ferry Mucler Pev er Plant,

,nd .ocne knows better than I which ronds and bridea9 are out.

I foel es though I a- livine in a Co runist country, havine things like th!- choved dov:n ny throat.

'take up, and put the control where it beloncs. With the peorle!!

'M " Chorman 92 Lyndile Read Plinecville, Ohio  !

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--omuPR4PR MB 2 a sg7/ PART 50

- ment 52FR6980 STATEMENT OF COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS' '87 FEB 24 P2 :35 ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON ON NRC STAFF'S DRAFT PROPOSED EMERGENCY PLANNING RULE CHANGE JF 00t Attorney General James M. Shannon regrets that the commission has denied him the opportunity to address the Commission personally at the Staff briefing on the proposed emergency planning rule to be held on February 23, 1987.

Because the Massachusetts Attorney General's office has for thirteen years represented the Commonwealth in the Seabrook construction permit and operating license proceedings, the Attorney General is in a unique position to comment on this draft rule that is directly aimed at assuring the licensure of the Seabrook plant. On February 18, 1987, the Commission denied the Attorney General's request to appear before the Commission. Attorney General Shannon is therefore submitting this written statement urging the Commission to reject the Staff's draft rule change that is based on considerations of

" equity" that simply do not apply for the Seabrook plant (one of only two plants -- Shoreham and Seabrook -- directly affected by the proposal), and that will, if adopted, most certainly result in an unacceptable lowering of safety.

For thirteen years, since the outset of the Seabrook licensing proceedings, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has argued that the Seabrook plant is sited too close to a massive, transient summer beach population for which adequate emergency i .

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planning is not feasible. Even before the accident at Three Mile Island and the current emergency planning requirements, the Commonwealth, along with the other intervenors in the proceeding, maintained that the utility should be required to demonstrate the feasibility of evacuating the summer beach population near Seabrook. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) LBP-76-26, 3 NRC Si7,922-26 (1976); ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733 (1977). After the accident at Three Mile Island, the Commonwealth _ joined the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League in its Petition to Show Cause why the Seabrook construction permit should not.be suspended or revoked unless it could be demonstrated that emergency planning was feasible for the Seabrook Station ten-mile emergency planning zone.

The Commonwealth argued in 1979, and again in 1981, that adequate planning was not feasible. Moreover, the Commonwealth pressed for a determination of the emergency planning issues before allowing the utility to proceed with construction so as to avoid the risk that billions of dollars would be wasted should the plant be denied an operating license due to its inability to comply with the emergency planning regulations.

The Commonwealth further argued that this emergency planning issue could not be decided fairly by the NRC if it waited until the operating license stage. See " Commonwealth of Massachusetts Memorandum in Support of Seacoast Anti-Pollution t

League's Request for an Order to Show Cause Dated May 2, 1979,"

dated November 16, 1979 (" Attachment A" hereto] at pp. 3-7;

" Memorandum of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Request for an Order to Show Cause Dated June 30, 1980," dated March 13, 1981 [" Attachment B" hereto] at pp. 3, 14, 17.

Nonetheless, the NRC refused to grant a hearing, stating unequivocally that a utility's investment in construction was not a proper factor for NRC consideration in determining whether to issue a license to operate. D.%-14, 14 NRC 279, 286 (1981). Indeed, when the intervenors appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, the Commission stressed that it "does not and cannot consider the utility's investment" and denied that such investment would in any way " influence its consideration of whether to grant an operating license."

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025, 1033, 1030 (1982) (emphasis added) citing NRC Brief at 36-37. It was this representation by the NRC that was the deciding factor in the court's refusal to order a hearing. Id. at 1033-34.

However, now that the NRC is faced with the very real possibility that the Seabrook plant, as well as Shoreham, may not receive a full-power operating license, the NRC Staff has shifted its position by 180 degrees and is endeavoring to lower the emergency planning licensing standard not out of any consideration for safety, but solely out of a concern for a l

utililty's investment in construction. See Draft Notice at

p. 4. The Staff now deems it unfair to the utility that it not be given an operating license after expending so much money constructing the plant. However, the commonwealth's refusal to submit emergency response plans is entirely consistent with the position it has taken for thirteen years. If equity were the real issue -- and not solely the economic interest of the utility -- the Staff, as well as the utility, would have agreed with Massachusetts years ago that the emergency planning issues should be decided before billions of dollars were expended in construction. Viewed in the light of this latest Staff proposal, the refusal to grant a hearing can only be seen as a reflection of the fear that if the emergency planning issues are decided properly, without consideration given to the utility's investment in construction, then this plant could not be licensed.

As the courts, as well as the NRC, have frequently made clear, it is the utility, and not the public, which must take the risk that a completed plant will not receive an operating license due to its inability to meet the NRC's ever-evolving safety standards. E.g., Power Reactor Development Co. v.

International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, 367 U.S. 396 (1961); Porter County Chapter of the Izack Walton League v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363, 1376 (D.C. Cir.

1979); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 690 F.2d at 1033. While the Staff couches its lowering of safety standards  ;

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in such euphimistic terms as "less coordinated planning," it is indeed the public who will bear the risk should a plant be licensed without the required assurance that adequate protective measures will be taken in the event of an emergency. The Staff is playing a game of " chicken," assuming that Governors deciding not to participate in planning will in fact participate once a plant is licensed. But it is the public that is endangered when plants are licensed to operate with less than adequate emergency planning.

Moreover, the Staff's proposed rule has far-reaching -

l consequences beyond the two or three states that now, for good cause, are failing to cooperate in emergency planning. Indeed, what the Staff's proposal amounts to is a return to the i

pre-Three Mile Island situation of voluntary emergency planning.

Indeed, the refusal of some states to participate in emergency planning is the direct result of the NRC's retreat from the standards set after Three Mile Island. Thus, the Staff in its briefing to the Commission states that all that is required for licensure is reasonable and feasible dose reduction. As the Staff (as well as the Seabrook utility) has previously articulated, this standard applied to the Seabrook case would mean that as long as it is feasible to evacuate some people from the Seabrook beaches, the plans will have accomplished the goal of dose reduction, and the plant may be l

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licensed. Consequently, it would not matter that thousands of other beachgoers may not be able to evacuate in time to avoid exposure to lethal doses of radiation. Thus, the Licensing Board in the Seabrook case has rejected out-of-hand Massachusetts' sole contention proffered in the proceeding on the New Hampshire's emergency plan, that set forth expert ,

testimony showing that adequate protective measures could not be taken for the summer beach population. Any determination of adequacy the Board might make for licensure, therefore, will be made without any look at evidence of whether the plan's

" protective" actions will even protect the public. Certainly, if the Commission expects states to cooperate in emergency planning, in a case where intervenors have argued for years that adequate emergency planning is not feasible, the Commission must demonstrate true concern for the public's safety and require more for licensure than merely the ability to achieve " feasible" dose reduction without any regard to the level of protection achieved.

Moreover, the Staff's major justification for the draft rule -- that the Commission never expected states not to cooperate in planning -- is simply not true. The Commission in its Statement of Consideration in support of its emergency planning regulations in fact expressly recognized that:

[T]here is a possibility that the operation of

' some reactors may be affected by this rule through inaction of State and local governments

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or an inability to comply with these rules. The Commission believes that the potential ~

restriction of plant operation by State and local officials is not significantly different in kind or effect from the means already available under existing law to prohibit reactor operation, such as zoning and land-use laws, certification of public convenience and necessity, State financial and rate considerations (10 CFR 50.33(f)), and Federal environmental laws. The Commission notes, however, that such considerations generally relate to a one-time decision on siting, whereas this rule requires a periodic renewal of State and local commitments to emergency planning."

45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55404 (August 19, 1980) (emphasis added).

It is clear from the Statement that the Commission did anticipate that some states might not participate in planning and that it recognized the consequent possibility that some reactors might never receive a license to operate.

Nevertheless the Commission deemed emergency planning by state and local governments to be such "an essential aspect in the protection of the public health and safety," 45 Fed. Reg. at 55404, that the Commission was willing to risk the fact that some reactors might not operate as a result of a state's-i failure to cooperate in planning.  !

There can simply be no basis for lowering the " essential" emergency planning standards set in 1980 for protecting the i

public health and safety. Certainly the economic interests of a utility cannot be an acceptable justification. Attorney General Shannon therefore urges the commission to reject the Staff's proposal.

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Respectfully submitted, JAMES M. SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL By: b-  !

Carol S. Sneider Donald S. Bronstein Assistant Attorneys General Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02109-1698 (617) 727-2265 Dated: February 23, 1987 1

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM'4ISSION TO: DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RE: CONSTRUCTION PERMITS CPPR-135 CPPR-136 .

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In the Matter of )

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) -

NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ). Docket Nos. 50-443

) 50-444 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE' S REQUEST FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DATED MAY 2,1979 The commonwealth of Massacnusetts, an intervenor in the construction permit licensing proceedings for the Seabrook Station, supports the request of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution -

League (SAPL) for an order to show cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked for the following reasons: 1) the failure of the NRC to evaluate and determine the feasibility of evacuation and emergency planning beyond the Seabrook low population zone (LPZ), and 2) the failure of the imC to evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 accident in its environmental reviews.

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SAPL has raised thos2 icau28 in ita R;qu2ct fcr En Ordor f to Show Cause, dated May 2, 1979. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts joins the arguments presented by SAPL in support of its Request for an Order to Show Cause, dated May 2,1979, and by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) .1/ As a contiguous state to New Hampshire, the Commonwealth joins in the concerns about adequate emergency planning articulated by the New Hampshire Attorney General in its Statement of Position.S! This memorandum comments on recent events and presents the Commonwealth's views on critical issues of public health and safety. .

I. THE NRC MUST CONSIDER THE FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PLANNING BEYOND THE SEABROOK LPZ There is no question that the Commission must consider the feasibility of evacuatons beyond the present 1.25 mile LPZ for the Seabrook site. Since the issuance of the construction permits for Seabrook Units 1 a 2, new NRC requirements have been promulgated; they call for extension of the emergency 1/ See "NECNP Memorandum in Support of Seacoast Anti Pollution League Requests for Orders to Show Cause" (July 30, 1979). SAPL also has requested an order to show cause, dated .

March 12, 1979, concerning the financial qualifications of Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSCO). The Commonwealth is on record as supporting this request. See

" Response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to SAPL's Request for an Order to Show Cause" (March 26, 1979).

' ' 2/ See " Statement of Position with Respect to the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Request for Show Cause Order Dated May 2,1979," N.H. Attorney General (October 12, 1979).

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plcnning zona frca th3 pracant LPZ to o rCdiu3 of ct 1Gost 10 miles around all reactor sites.1/

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The unique characteristics of the Seabrook area, including the heavily populated beaches, limited egress routes and lack of shelter f acilities, create major obstacles to the development of emergency plans that assure protection of the public in the event of a serious reactor accident. The licensee's own evacuation studies, on which the present emergency planc c.e based, indicate that nearby beaches could not be evacuated in the time now recommended by the Staff.d/

Because NRC policy requires a determination of emergency planning feasibility at the construction permit stage, this must issue be resolved before further constraction renders an

, impartial decision impossible.

SAPL has presented a thorough background of the evacuation issue in its memorandum in support of its request for 2/ NRC policy Statement on Emergency Planning Zones, 44 F.R.

61123, Oct. 23, 1979; Information Reoort, SECY-79-450, p. 2, July 23,1979; letter dated September 13, 1979, from Darrell G.

Eisenhut, Acting Director of the Division of Operating 4

Reac to r s , to all operating nuclear power plants, Enclosure 7; Proposed emergency planning regulations for expedited rulemaking.

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The staff is now requiring a commitment from licensees to provide prompt notification to offsite authorities and to assure that such authorities have the resources to provide

, early warning and clear instructions to the public in the plume exposure EPZ within 30 minutes following notification from the facility. See D.B. Vassallo, NRC-NRR, to R. M. Butler, Boston Edison Company, October 23, 1979 (NRC Docket No. 50-471) .

I

a chow cruco cedar. Briofly, frco tha initiatien of th3 Seabrook construction permit proceedings, the NRC S ta f f has

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maintained it has jurisdiction to require a demonstration of the feasibility of evacuating persons beyond the LPZ because of the proximity of the Seabrook units to the coastal beaches and because of the limited road networks serving those beaches.

This position was supported by NECNP, the Attorney General of New Hampshire and the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety.E!

Although the Licensing Board admitted that evacuation beyond the LPZ would become advisable in the event of a class 9 acc ident, the Board ruled and the Appeal Board agreed that existing NRC regulations did not require a consideration of emergency protection measures beyond the LPZ.5! The

! Commission subsequently rejected this narro'w interpretation of Appendix E by issuing a proposed amendment to the emergency planning regulations designed to overcome the limitations imposed by ALAB-390. The proposed rule provided immediate

" interim guidance" and required an applicant to consider i

emergency planning beyond the LPZ," . . . based on the design 5/ See Letter from ACRS reviewing Seabrook Application (December 10, 1974).

l l/ See Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Units 1 and 2),

i LBP 76-26, 3 NRC 857, 871-875, 922-9 26 (1976) ; ALAB-390, 5 NRC

. 733 (1971) ; Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

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features of the far:ility and the physical characteristics of the environs in the vicinity of the site. 2/

In 1976 a joint NRC/ EPA Task Force was organized to develop a basis for emergency response planning near nuclear

Power plants. The Task Force concluded that the consequences

!l of a spectrum of design-based and Class 9 accidents should form i

i the bases for emergency planning zones (EPZ's) with a 10 mile j

j radius for a radioactive plume inhalation exposure pathway, and with a 50 mile radius for an ingestion exposure pathway.I/ i i

As a , result of NRC investigations into the Three Mile Island 3

(TMI) accident and comments on the Task Force Report, the staff recommended that the Commission adoption of new emergency  ;

- planning requirements, including the 10 and 50 mile EPZ's.I/

l On September 13, 1979, the staff issued these proposals as l "Near Term Requirements for Improving Emergency Preparedness" Recently the Commission t

for all nuclear reactor sites.10/

2/ 43 F.R. 37473, 37 475 (August 23, 1978). ,

1 l I/ " Planning Basis for the Development of State . and Local  !

l Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of l Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396 (December , 1978 ) .

I/ Information Report, SECY 79-450 (July 23,1979) .

I 10/ Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director of NRC i Division of Operating Reactors, to all operating nuclear power

{ plants (September 13, 1979),

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officially enderssd tho EPZ pltnning guidtnco:

In endorsing - this guidance, the commission

. recognizes that1it is appropriace and prucet: for

emergency planning guidance to take into I consideration the principal characteristics . . . of.

a spectrum of design basis and core melt accidents.

j 44 F.R. 61123 (Oc tober 23, 1979)

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0 On September 19, 1979, the staff issued new "Draf t Emergency Action- Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0610), which replace the general classes of emergency

' action levels in NRC Regulatory Guide 'l.101.11/ These l guidelines, which are effective pending completion of the 1

! expedited rulemaking on emergency planning in January,1980, i

provide, inter alia, for specific actions to be taken by the j licensee and local emergency personnel during a reactor accident, including " actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integr ity," 1.e. , Class 9 accidents.

The NRC's recommended i

protective action for the public during such an accident is i

immediate sheltering, pending a determination that evacuation 1

1 is required and can be completed prior to the transport of

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j significant quantities of radioactivity to the affected area.

! The sheltering facilities along the coast near the 1

l Seabrook Station are grossly inadequate to accomodate the i

11/ The Commission has endorsed these " predetermined .

pr'otective action plans for the EPZ's." 44 F.R. 61123 l (October 23, 1979) .

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s number of people using the nearby coast'al beaches. The Commission has recognized and discussed this problem, and the i consequent need for feasible evacuation alternatives. In its August 1978 notice of the proposed' amendment to Appendix E, the Commission endorsed consideration of emergency planning beyond the LPZ, noting that:

The NRC staff has found that there may be '

circumstances for which the available strategies for taking protective actions outside the facility site boundaries are limited. As an example, this occurs ~

when large numbers of persons may be engaged in outdoor recreational activities in the vicinity of a plant, and it is clear that existing structures are insufficient to provide needed temporary shelter.

In such an instance, the sta ff [sici considered it approcriate to emchasize evacuation.- 43 F.R. 37475 (August 23, 1978) (emphasis added) .

The applicant or licensee, therefore, must demonstrate that the

] 5 beaches within the emergency planning zone ,can be promptly evacuated to assure the safety of these people in the event of a significant radiological release.

.. There are two principle reasons why an evaluation of emergency action capabilities at Seabrook should be initiated promptly. First, since the staff must ultimately determine the feasibility of evacuating the beaches before Seabrook Station can begin operating, it is important that the analysis te ,

completed before further investment and construction are wasted. More importantly, NRC decisions and regulations require that emergency planning feasibility be addressed at the construction permit stage.

i When reviewing an application for a construction permit, the Commission must at the very least determine whether i .

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d currounding populatien d2ncitios, tren2pertstien rcutoo,1cnd use and other unique site characteristics might combine to render any emergency plan ineff ective.12/ The issue, therefore, is emergency planning feasibility, which is a ,

site-specific matter that must be resolved by consideration of the demographic, meteorological and topological peculiaritics of the area surrounding the proposed reactor. This subject is i

a necessary component of the larger issues of site suitability (see 10 C.F.R. 5100.10)) , reactor safety (see 10 C.F.R.

- 5 50.34 (a] [10) and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50) and the NEPA alternative sites cost / benefit analysis (see Supplementary Information to the proposed amendment to Appendix E, 43 F.R.

l 37473, 37474 (August 23, 1978)), all of which must be resolved p

f ' prior to the issuance of a construction permit.11/

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/ In e ddition, an applicant for a construction permit is required under 10 C.F.R. 550.34 (a) to provide in its i Preliminary Safety Analysis Reoort (PSAR) a discussion of its

" preliminary plans for coping with emergencies.i While 12/ Southern California Edison Company, et al., (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3), ALAB-248, 8 AEC 957, i 962-63 (1974); Consumers Power Company, (Midland Plant Units 1

)

and 2) ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 342-43 (1973); 10 C.F.R. Part 50, -

Appendix E, Sections I-III . ,

! 12/ The proposed emergency planning regulations specifically I

require inclusion of a " preliminary evacuation feasibility i analysis" in the PSAR prior to issuance of a construction permit. See Proposed Amendments to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, SII(H); Staff Paper for Commissioner review from R.B.

Minogue, Director, Of fice of Standards Development. OSD's

, proposed amendments to Appendix E were draf ted pursuant to the I Commission's notice of expedited rulemaking on emergency l Planning, 44 F.R. 41483 (July 17, 1979) .

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': l l l consideration of the operative details of such plans may be l

. more appropriately deferred to the operating license stage,  !

there must be at least some consideration given to the scope of these plans, and a threshold determination made whether the

, plans effectively extend to that portion of the public.that can l

be said to be at risk in the event of a serious reactor  ;

acciden t. In short, if the feasibility issue is to be  ;

l considered 7t al.1, it must be at some time prior to construction of a facility. To deal with this critical safety l issue af ter a reactor is built illogical, and it runs the considerable risk that the applicant's ongoing investment *in

the project will impermissibly affect the decision-making process.1$/

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The urgency of an evacuation feasibility analysis might l not be so acute were it not for the heavily utilized beaches

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near Seabrook, the lack of adequate sheltering facilities and  !

the limited egress routes. When issuing the proposed rule

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i requiring consideration of emergency planning beyond the LPZ,  !

the Commission explained that one-of its major objectives was -

i . . . is to assure that emergency plans exist which i provide reasonable assueance that appropriate j measures can and will be taken in the event of an 1

accidental release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant.

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, The intent of the Commission is to assure that the decisionmaking process for licensing nuclear power plants will include an analysis by the

, applicant and a revie'w by the Commission of each nuclear power plant license or permit application to di/ See Seabrook , CLI-78-14, 7 NRC 952 (1978) .

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plan for taking suitable protective actions on a timely basis under accident conditions within and outside the proposed site. 43 F.R. 37474 (emphasis added).

The Commission has listed the physical characteristics in i

the vicinity of a site which it feels are relevant to the evaluation of proposed protective actions:

[t]he numbers and' proximity to the site boundary of resident and transient persons and the relative speed with which warnings can be communicated to ,

them, the availability and character of evacuation routes and means of transportation, the availability and locations of structures suitable for sheltering j people . . .. Id.

j More recently, the NRC Siting Policy Task Force Report ,

recommended:

J That Part 100 require thet the physical l -

characteristics of the EPZ, including the population 4

distribution in relation to transportation routes' and other topographic . features, be such as .to provide reasonable assurance that a relatively prompt evacuation of the EPZ, including transients would be feasible in the event of an accident.

NUREG-06 25, p. 48.  ;

The Seabrook environs prcsont =sjor obstacles to the 4

development of emergency plans providing " reasonable assurance ,

i that appropriate measures" can be taken on a " timely basis" in the event of a serious reactor accident. Within a 5 mile radius, there is an estimated summer peak population of over ,

100,000, the majority of whom are clustered in the beach areas.1E/ It is not disputed that even when the seasonal population is tim,e weighted, the population densities substantially exceed the population guidelines that normally 11/ Seabrook. LBP-76-26, 3 NRC at 871-875. ,

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triggsr cn svolunticn of the rick of Clocs 9 consequences.16/ In addition, there are only 3 two-lane roads providing egress from the entire beach region.

For an evacuation to be effective where little or no sheltering exists, people must be removed before the radioactive plume reaches the area. The NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, now endorsed by the Commission, estimates that a major release may begin within 30 minutes after an initiating event, -

and that a tasulting radioactive pluce may travel five miles 30 minutes to two hours, and ten miles in two to four hours.12/

In other words, the Task Force recommends for emergency planning guidance a plume speed of 2.5 to 10 mph.

utrrten 99r '. ic only tuo miles east-ncrtheaet of the Seabrook Station, and this coastal beach runs south to

, Salisbury Beach, Massachusetts, only five miles from the reactor site. A plume traveling at a speed of 10 mph to the east-northeast could reach Hampton Beach within 15 minutes of a relea.te; a plume traveling to the south-southeast at the same speed could reach Salisbury Beach in about 30 minutes. Under poor dispersion conditions associated with low windspeeds (2.5 mph), it would be necessary to evacuate the beach area within five miles in only two hours. The Applicant Public Service 16jf See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, p. A-60 (December 1978); Final Supplement to Final Environmental S ta temen.t (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 2), NUREG-0549,

p. 4-55 (May 1979) .

17/ NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, NUREG-0396 at 20, see also Appendix I. - .

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Company's own preliminary analysis of the road network and the beach population east of the Seabrook site concluded it would take eight hours to evacuate any of the three 22.5 beach sectors to a distance of five miles from the reactor.1E/

P.S.Co. 's Supplemental Testimony presented one year later reduced the 5 mile evacuation time estimates for 45 beach sectors to 3.75 to 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.1E/ Thus, the applicant's own testimony indicates that it is not likely that beach sectors could be evacuated before the arrival of a radioactive plume, under serious accident conditions. It can hardly be said that there is " reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an accidental release . . .

and that " suitable protective actions (can be taken) on a timely basis . . . . See 43 F.R. 37474.

SAPL and NECNP have requested the NRC to demonstrate that evacuation of persons within a 30 mile area surrounding the Seabrook site is feasible. While present Commission policy requires ev'acuation planning for about a 10 mile radius from the reactor site, the actual size and shape of this EPZ must be determined on a site-specific basis. See 44 F.R. 61123. The Commonwealth believes that t.he intervenors' request is reasonable in light of current Commission policy and the high 11/ Answer 13.9 to Staff Questions, Amendment 23 to the

. PSAR, p. S13-16, June, 1974.

19/ Applicant 's Direc tor Testimony No. 7, p.19, In the Matter of P.S.Co., Tr. p. 2495+, June 5, 1975.

permanent and seasonal populatienc gurrcunding thic coastc1 site. In order to evacuate a 10 mile sector, for example, it will be necessary to provide for prompt notification and traffic control in neighboring sectors within the 10 mile radius and in down-wind regions beyond the 10 mile radius. It therefore is necessary to analyze the major egress routes and population densities beyond ten miles in order to determine the feasibility of evacuating all persons within the EPZ. .

In this regard, the Commonwealth is critically concerned with the feasibility of evacuating Salisbury, which on a summer weekend has a population exceeding 50,000 persons. A ,

substantial portion of these people are day trippers on the beaches. In addition, the town of Newburyport, located just south of Salisbury, attracts many summer tourists to the Parker 1 River National Wildlife Refuge and Plum Isl'and, both recreation

' areas of which have limited access to the mainland. South and west of Salisbury are some of the Commonwealth's mo'st densely populated North Shore communities, many of which have historic and recreational tourist attractions, and limited road networks. The metropolitan Boston area is also within the 30-50 mile radius of the Seabrook site.ES/

Finally, an important f actor in determining the size of the evacuation zone is the probability of spontaneous or voluntary evacuation. This is especially true for the ,

l 2E/ Within a 30 mile radius of Seabrook, the staff has ,

estimated there will be over 1.4 million people in 1985 and over 3 million in 2020. See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, P. A-60 (June 1978) .

S;; brook environs whore tharo cro 1crgo numbsrs of sacsonal transients. A proper feasibility analysis must evaluate and include the likelihood of substantial voluntary evacuation outside recommended evacuation areas which could interfere with

. the prompt evacuation of sectors withom the EPZ.21/

II. CLASS 9 ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES MUST BE CONSIDERED AT SEABROOK

. Recent events underscore the importance' of a staff evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident at Seabrook Station in their NEPA cost / benefit analysis of -

alternatives. One faccor in this cost / benefit analysis is the risk imposed on surrounding populations in the event of serious reactor accidents. Since SAPL and NECNP presented their requests for show cause orders, the staff and a Licensing Board have officially identified the accident at TMI as a Class 9 acc ident. 22/ In addition, the Commission recently upheld the staff policy of considering the environmental consequences 21/ When pregnant women and pre-school children within 5 miles of TMI were advised to evacuate, there was a substantial number of additional evacuees within and beyond the 5 mile radius. A public opinion poll of residents living within 15 miles, of TMI by the Social Research Center at Elizabethtown College, PA, (April 9,1979) revealed that over half of all residents within 5 miles left the area and nearly one-third of the residents from 6 to 15 miles evacuated voluntarily.

22/ Pubic Service Electr ic and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1) (" Salem") NRC Docket No. 50-272, ASLB Order (September 10, 1979; "NRC Staff Response to Board l

Question No. 4 Regarding Occurrence of a Class 9 Accident at Three Mile Island," Docket No. 50-272 (August 24, 1979).  ;

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of Class 9 accidents under certain circumstances.22/

Fu r thermore, the Commission has just specifically endorsed the ,

consideration of Class 9 characteristics for emergency planning guidance (44 F.R. 61123, October 23, 1979). Because the staff must consider the environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident for emergency planning, the staff will not be unduly burdened by evaluating these risks in the NEPA cost / benefit analysis for alternative sites as well.

Initially the Staff was precluded from considering Class 9 accidents in its environmental reviews because the probability of their occurrence was said to be too remote. - The regulatory basis for ignoring Class 9 consequences was provided

,, by the proposed annex to Appendix D to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. The Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) provided some justification for this practice by quantifying the low probability of Class 9

' accidents.

Nevertheless, in practice the staff increasingly began to consider the potentially catastrophic consequences of such acc iden ts. As early as 1973, the Staff rejected a proposed site at Newbold Island, because an alternative site was significantly less populous and therefore less vulnerable to the consequences of a major nuclear accident. Shortly ~

thereafter, Regulatory Guide 4.7 was issued, containing specific guidelines on the population density surrounding 29J/ Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants)

Docket No. STN 50-437, CL1-79, (September 14, 1979). (" Offshore Power")

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t proposed nuclear reactor sites. Stating that "(alreas of low population density ara proforced for nuclect power station sites," Reg. Guide 4.7 specified that if projected population densities within a thirty-mile radius of the site exceeded 500 persons per square mile at the time of initial operation and 1,000 persons per square mile at its retirement, then "special attention should be given to the consideration of alternative sites with lower population densities. "

Then, in the early site review for the proposed Perryman j reactor in 1977, the staff initiated a Class 9 accident. -

analysis after demographic studies revealed population densities in excess of the " trip levels" of Reg. Guide 4.7.

The staff formalized this policy in Commission Action Paper, SBCY 78-137. Whenever the population trip levels of Reg.-

Guide .4.7 are exceeded, an " assessment of the relative differences in Class 9 accidenc risks should be included as one element of the site comparisons. " The staff 's concern "was not based on a uniquely high probability of accident but rather on unique circumstances which increase the potential consequences and thus the overall risk. "

In 1973 the NRC received the first application for a license to manuf acture a commercial floating nuclear power

{ Plant (ENP) . Because such plants involved so unique a departure from land based siting, the Staff undertook an extensive study of the consequences of a Class 9 accident ( the Liquid Pathway Generic Study, NUREG-0440 (LPGS]), and in the

FNP Final Environmental Statement found that

4 the unlikely but possible occurrence of a core melt i accident at estuarine and riverine areas could result in a direct release of radioactive material, I such that the consequences to the environment would l be u'nacceptable. FES III , p. XIV.

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The applicant then challenged the Staff's Class 9 analysis as l prohibited by the proposed Annex to Appendix D. The Staff argued before the Appeal Board that it was already established policy, as revealed in its Standard Review Plan, to reject proposed sites in highly populated areas due to the potential consequences of Class 9 accidents. See ALAB-489 at 223, 224.

The question was certified to the Commission which upheld

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the Staff 's consideration of Class 9 consequences. In its-Brief to the Commission, the Staff explained:

The premise for the Annex 's limitations on discussion of Class 9 accident risks must be that the risks for the reactor in question fall within the envelope of the risks for typical licensed power reac tor s. It just doesn't' make sense to presume

.that the Commission was fo'rever foreclosing any attempt to evaluate Class 9 consequences even if it

,could be shown that those consequences, and there fore the risks, for a particular application, were quantitatively and qualitatively different from practically all plants within the general. envelope previously-considered.

. . . Common sense dictates that there must be a point beyond which the consequences of a Class 9 accident become susceptible to candid evaluation in an environmental impact statement. And it should not matter whether the reactor in question is a -

land-based plant or an FNP. Brief of the Staff, page 36-47 (empnasis addeo).

Relying on its inherent policy-making authority, the Commission hcid it could not ignore what its own staff .

views as an environmental risk that requires specific mitigative actions. NEPA is based on the

! philosophy that the federal government should i

j consider all available information about the l

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l reasonably likely environmental consequences of its proposed actions and should take appropriate measures to mitigate or eliminate the adverse '

- impacts of those actions when practical. Offshore Powe r Systems , suo ra , Slip, Op. at 7.

The Commission announced its intention to leave the generic issue of consideration of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors for rulemaking proceedings and concluded by asking the staff to:

1. Provide us with its recommendations on how the interim guidance of the Annex migh* be modified, on an interim basis and until the rulemaking on this subject is completed, to reflect develooments since 1971 and to accord more fully with current staff policy in this area; and

2. In the interim, . . . bring to our attention any' individual cases in which (the Staff) believes the environmental consecuences of Class 9 accidents should be considered. Id., at 9-10 (emphasis added).

By inviting the staff 's recommendation for interim .

guidance based on developments since the issuance of the proposed annex and on current staff policy, the Commission implicitly accepted the staff's policy in f avor of considering Class 9 consequences at its discretion, and in particular where the population guidelines of Reg. Guide 4.7 are exceeded.

It is now clear that the sole justification for the original policy of the proposed annex is no longer valid. The probability of a Class 9 accident has now unmistakably entered the realm of " reasonable likelihood". First, the Risk Assessment Review Group concluded in NUREG-CR-0400 that the quantitative risk assessment methodology developed in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was scientifically e

indefensible, thereby undermining the quantitive basis for the

- low probability of class 9 accidents.

Now, by order of the Licensing Board in Salem, the ,

i accident at TMI has been officially recognized as a Class 9 l accident.21/ It is well established that the NRC must consider any events that are " reasonably probable."2E/ The I Appeal Board in Of fshore Power Systems, recognized that .

NEPA nanda*es assessment of those environmental consequences that are reasonably anticipatable . .

. Moreover, the decisions to tie the need to discuss reactor accidents . . . to a showing of a j

reasonable likelihood of occurrence (is) an approach

• that has gained judicial acceptance (cites

• omitted). ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 213 (1978) . .

4 The occurrence of a class 9 accident at Thtee Mile Island establishes that there is a " reasonable likelihood" that such severe accidents can occur. NSPA, therefore, requires an evaluation of Class 9 accident consequences.

Furthermore, the NRC Siting Policy Task Force has just issutd its report (NUREG-0625) for review by the Commission.

One of three primary goals was as follows:

"To take into consideration in siting the risk associated with accidents beyond the design basis (Class 9) by establishing population density and distribution criteria . . . Althnech (Class 9} risk cannot be completely reduced to zero, it can be significantly reduced by selective siting.

NUREG-0625, p. iii (1979).

52/ See footnote 22, supra at 14.

21/ Northern States Powe'r Co. (Prairie Island) Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. (Vermont Yankee), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 49 (1978). .

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'specifically, the Task Force recommends revision of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 to provide a fixed exclusion and protective action distance and population density and distribution criteria to be developed by generic rulemaking proceedings. The Task Force re-affirms the staff policy toward consideration of Class 9-events:

The Task Force concludes that the protection from Class 9 accidents originally intended to be provided by the populatica center distance should be restored

. . The rationale for recommending pcpulation density and distribution limits both within and

> beyond the EPZ is to provide some additional assurance that the societal risk from Class 9

- accidents for populations within about 20 miles of a nuclear plant is kept at reasonable . levels. ,

NUREG-0625, Supra at 48.

When the Commission recently endorsed the concept of EPZ's, it stated it is appropriate and prudent for emergency planning 9uidance to take into consideration the principal characteristics . . . of a spectrum of design basis

'and core melt accidents. 44 F.R. 61123 (October 23,

. 1979) (emphasis added) .

In the " Supplementary Information" section of the notice of the propos'ed amendment to Appendix E, the Commission stated the protection of the public beyond the exclusion zone was one matter which i may also be considered in identifying any potential ,

emergency planning advantages or disadvantages of particular sites as part of the NEPA cost / benefit i

analysis of alternate sites. 43 F.R. 37474.

In summary, the staff's class 9 policy and the .

Comm,ission's concurrence is now clear. In its most recent alternative site study, (NUREG-0501) , the staff 's demographic analysis of Seabrook disclosed population densities in excess

- of Reg. Guide 4.7 trip levels for plant start-up and

,_. , , , . - m.. , .-, , _ . - _. 4 _, __1-_, ._._ .

retirement. The Staff 's refusal to consider Class 9 consequences runs counter to its prior decisions made in Newbold Island, Perignan, and Offshore ' Power, and is directly l l

t contrary to the current staff policy elucidated in SECY 78-137 l l

and the Siting Policy Task Force Report. In view of the Commission's endorsement of this staff policy and the consideration of emergency planning disadvantages "as part of the NEPA cost / benefit analysis of alternate sites," it is the duty of the Staff to undertake a complete Class 9 analysis in conjunction with the evacuation feasibility evaluation.

III. ~ LEGAL AUTHORITY -

In consideration of the NRC's statutory duty to safeguard the public health and safety, it is the duty of the Staff, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.202, to issue a show cause order and -

institute proceedings to ' evaluate the feasibility of evacuation and emergency planning beyond the LPZ at Seabrook and the 4

environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident. It.is well-established that emergency planning is a significant i safety issue. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Unit 2), ALAB-474, 7 NRC 746 (1978). The Commission has a statutory duty to promote the development of atomic energy

" consistent . . . with the health and safety of the public."

42 U.S.C. 52013(d). The Commission itself has emphasized that i

'public safety is the first, last and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or license to operate a nuclear facility. Power Reactor Development Coro. v. l International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine

, Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402, 81 S. Ct. 1529, 1532 (1961).

l ,

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e.

i In this case, the Supreme Court stressed that even after licensing of a reactor, the Commission retains jurisdiction "to ,

ensure that the highest safety standards are maintained." Id,.

In discharging this duty to safeguard the public, the Commission has articulated the goal that emergency plans should I provide " reasonable assurance" that " suitable' protective i

actions" can be taken on a " timely basis."21/ There is no question that emergency plans that satisfy the Ccmmission,',s statutory duty or goal do not presently exist. The only

. " suitable protective action" for people on the beaches in the event of a serious atmospheric release is evacuation. It is i

therefore the duty of the staff to assure that an emergency plan can be developed which provides " reasonable assurance"

' that the beaches can be evacuated on a " timely basis."

Section 186(a) of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C.

s S2236(a)) authorizes the NRC to suspend or revoke "[a]ny license . . . because of conditions revealed . . . which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the .

District of Columbia Circuit recently held that this clause applies to all licensing matters, including health, safety, and environmental considerations . . . (and) reflects a deliberate policy choice on the part of Co.'gress when it enacted section 186(a) to render licenses for nuclear facilities subject to Postlicensing review under evolving licensing standards, rather than under those standards applicable at the time the license in question was issued. Ft. Pierce Utilities Authority of the City l

4 21/ See pp. 9-10, suora.

i. .

e of Ft. Pierce v. U.S.A. and the NRC, Nos. 77-1925 and 77-2101, slip op, at 19-20 (D.C. Cir., March 23, 1979).

Post-TMI investigations have resulted in significant new emergency planning licensing standards. The emergency plan for the Seabrook environs is now subject to postlicensing review under the new standards, and the staff should initiate this review promptly before further construction at Seabrook precludas an impartial resolution of this critical safety.,

issue. It is the statutory duty of the staff to suspend or revoke the Seabrook construction permits upon finding that the present emergency plans cannot provide. " reasonable assurance .

.. (that) suitable protective actions (can be implemented) on a timely basis under accident conditions." (See 43 F.R. 37474)

' In consideration of the grave safety issue at hand and the likelihood that a timely evacuation of the beaches near u

Seabrook may not be possible, it is the duty of the Staff to issue a show cause order and institute a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR S2.202 to resolve these major outstanding safety questions. .

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IV CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts supports the requests by the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League and the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,

isunediately issue an Order to Show Cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked.

Respectfully submitted, a,uA Y

• Laurie Burt Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place - 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 (6 17 ) 727-2265 DATED: aG mLc (9 77 30 t h, M.A

• e P

e e

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A Hachenent- B UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO: HAROLD R. DENTON '

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CONSTRUCTION PERMITS CPPR-135 RE:

CPPR-136 4

)

In the Matter of )

)

) Docket Nos.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-443 NEW RAMPSHIRE,*et al. )

) 50-444 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

)

MI!MORANDUM OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETFS IN SUPPORT OF SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE' S REQUEST EUR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DATED JUNE 30, 1980.

INTRODUCTION The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (* Commonwealth")

participated in the construction permit licensing proceedings for the Seabrook Station in an effort to protect the interests of its residents who either reside in communities or frequent beaches in the vicinity of that station. Because of these interests, the Commonwealth remains concerned about the issue of emergency evacuation at Seabrook.

On June 30, 1980, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League

(" SAPL" ) filed with the NRC a request that the Commissioners review a decision rendered by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (" Directer") on February 11, 1980.

In that decision the Director had denied a petition filed by n ma t, ,

~)WD h 5

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SAPL on May 2, 1979, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.206 seeking an order to Show cause why construction permits for the proposed nuclear power plant at Seabrook should not be suspended or revoked. As grounds for its petition SAPL cited, inter alia, the failure of the licensee, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, to demonstrate during the construction permit process the feasibility of evacuation beyond the low population zone. -

The Commission, in October,1980, decided not to review the Director's denial of SAPL's petition, but directed the staff to treat the June 30th SAPL request for Commission review as a new petition for a Show Cause Order under $2.206.

The Commonwealth supports the current SAPL request for an Order to Show Cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked 1/ for the following

. reasons:

1. The Director denied SAPL's May, 1979 petition on the basis that it was premature to reopen the Seabrook construction permit proceedings until certain events had transpired. Those events having transpired, the Director should now approve the request for an order to Show Cause.

2. There has been no determination of the

! feasibility of safely evacuating the population within the 10-mile plume exposure Emergency Planning i Zone of the Seabrook Station. Present evidence -

suggests that such evacuation may not be feasible.

i 3. It is in the interest of all parties that the feasibility of evacuation be assessed now, rather than at the operating license stage of review. If the present evidence suggesting that evacua: ion is

[/ The Commonwealth also filed a Memorandum in support of SAPL's May,1979 request.

not feasible is later confirmed, the appl.icant faces the loss of hundreds of millions, perhaps billions, of dollars of wasted invesdnent. At the same time, residents of and visitors to the EPZ face the possibility that the Licensing Board, moved by the expenditure of these sums, will permit operation despite the absence of truly adequate means of evacuation.

I. THE PRE-CONDITIONS TO ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER SET FORTH BY THE DIRECTOR HAVE BEEN MET In his February 11, 1980 denial of SAPL's petition for an Order to Show Cause, the Director concluded that it would be .

~

" premature" to reopen the Seabrook construction permit proceedings pending (1) the receipt and evaluation of evacuation time estimates prepared by the licensee; (2) 1 adoption of the then proposed rules amending 10 C'.F.R. Part 50 regarding emergency planning;2/ and (3) " guidance from the Commission" on reconsideration of construction permits.3/

In August of last year Public Service Company of New 1

Hampshire submitted its evacuation time estimates to the Commission. In December, 1980, the Commonwealth received notice that the Commission had completed an analysis of all evacuation tLme estimates which it had received. On August 19, 1980 the Commission published its final regulations on emergency planning, amending 10 C.F.R. Part 50, which regulations took eff ect on November 3,1980.A 2/ 44 Fed. Reg. 75167 (December '19, 1979).

3/ Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshine, et al., DD 80-6, 11 NRC 371, at 373 (February 11, L980).

4/ 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, 1980).

Thus, the first two events which, in the opinion of the Director, had to occur before consideration of the emergency planning issue would be timely have, in fact, occurred. Since the Commission has issued its final regulations on emergency planning , there is no reason to expect further formal

" guidance" from the Commission regarding the reconsideration of construction permits. The Commission has not, so far as we are aware, given notice of any intention to issue further formal guidelines in this area. The Director should, therefore, now grant SAPL's petition for an Order to Show Cause.

II. 'lEERE HAS BEEN NO DETERMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION WITHIN THE SEABROOK EPZ In its Final Regulations on Emergency Planning, amending 10 C.F.R. Part 50,E/ the Commission now requires appropriate emergency planning for the evacuation of persons beyond the low population zone of all light-water nuclear power plants, such as the Seabrook facility. A plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone having a radius of about ten miles must now be established around each such plant, with the exact size and shape of the EPZ to be decided on the basis of specific conditions at the site. Licensees must submit emergency plans providing for 5/ 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, .980).

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evacuation within the plume exposure EPZ's as part of their final safety analysis reports, and those plans must be approved prior to issuance of operating licenses.

While the Final Regulations on Emergency Planning do not require that operators already holding construction permits demonstrate compliance with the new requirements-before the operating license stage of review, the Commission expressly noted in a statement accompanying its publication of the proposed rules which preceded those final regulations 5/ ~that it was "considering whether construction permits which have already been issued should be reconsidered because of the emergency planning considerations of the (proposed rules]."

The Director quoted this Commission statement in his decision denying the May,1979 SAPL petition and further observed that in December, 1979 the NRC staff requested all licensees of plants under construction to submit evacuation time estimates so that the Commission would be in a position to identify those plants where " unusual evacuation constraints exist and special planning measures should be considered."1/-

Such " unusual evacuation constraints exist" in the case of

' the Seabrook plant. It is therefore one of the instances 44 Fed. Reg. 75167, (December 19, 1979).

1/

7/ 11 NRC 371, at 373 (1980).

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l anticipated by the Staff where construction permits should be reconsidered and, if necessary, special. planning measures ordered.

From the beginning of the Seabrook construction permit p roceedings , the NRC Staff has maintained that it has the authority to require a demonstration of the feasibility of evacuating persons beyond the LPZ because of the proximity of the Seabrook units to coastal beaches, the inadequacy of sheltering f acilities along the coast, and the limited road networks serving the beaches.8/ This position has been supported by NDCNP, the Attorney-General of New Hampshire, and the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety. ! There is thus a clear recognition of the unusual difficulties associated with evacuation of the beaches near the Seabrook facility.

Within about a five-mile radius of the Seabrook units there is an estimated summer peak population of approximately 100,000 persons, with the majority being clustered in the beach areas lying from northeast to south-southeast of the site.1E!

l It is undisputed that even when the seasonal population is 8/ See Public Service Company of New Hampshire ALAB - 390, 5 3RC 733, at 735-36 (1977).

9/ See Id.; Letter from the Chairman of the ACRS to the Chairman of the AEC reviewing Seabrook application (December 10, 1974) [ Relevant language quoted at 5 NRC 751] .

10/ Public Service Cox.canv of New Hamoshire, et al.,

E5P-76-26, 3IRC 857, at 871-72 (June 29, 1976). I E

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time-weighted, population densities at the Seabrook site exceed the " trip points" of Regulatory Guide 4.7 for both plant start-up and retirement.11/ And the Licensing Appeal Board has determined that the beach area located just over one and one-half miles f rom Seabrook is the nearest population center to the site, since it will "at times be the most densely populated area in the state."12/

SAPL has filed affidavits pr.epared by civil defense '

directors and other officials of New Hampshire towns in the vicinity of the Seabrook f acility. Attached hereto are similar affidavits prepared by municipal officials in Massachusetts.

Based on their past experiences with large beach crowds and their knowledge of the limited access roads and traffic " choke" points which exist in their areas, these local officials have serious concerns about the feasibility of evacuating their communities in a timely fashion.

In June of 1975, extensive evidentiary hearings were conducted, over the objection of the Applicant, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on the issue of the and f easibility of evacuating persons beyond the Seabrook LP3, There was conflicting particularly from Hampton Beach.

11/ See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, at A-60 TDecember, 1978).

12/ See Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire, ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, at 51 (1977).

testimony on the issue, which testimony was never resolved by the Licensing Board since it determined that emergency plans need not be developed for areas beyond the LPZ.12/ The conflicts in that testimony give further reason to question the feasibility of evacuation beyond the LPZ.

Mor eover , the licensee's own evacuation time estimates leave substantial doubt as to the feasibility of evacuation.

Public Service estimates that, on a summer weekend, it will take four hours and 20 minutes to evacuate a 180 degree sector to the north of the plant having only a two-mile radius.11!

That sector includes only one beach area, Hampton Beach, and accounts for only 5,247 of the 9,177 estimated vehicles associated with that beach population.15/ Public Service provides a similar estLmate -- 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 30 minutes--for evacuation of the ten-mile 90 degree northeast sector containing Hampton Beach.15/

Neither of these estimates includes the time required for competent author ities to make decisions about the need for evacuation or to notify officials and the public of that need.

13/ Public Service Company of New Hampshire, LBP-76-26, 3 NRC 657, 922-26 (1976).

14/ Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near Seabrook Station, August 4, 1980, Table 4.

15/ Id., Table 2.

16/ Id., Table 4.

_7 _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _

Nor do they include the time' required for individuals to -

prepare to evacuate or for officials to confirm that evacuation has been completed.11/ A recent NRC study , NUREG/CR-1745, attests to the significance of these omissions:

4 It is important to understand that estimates of the length of the time period f rom the decision to evacuate through clearances of the evacuation zone is (sic.] significantly aff ected by the time required for both notification and preparation. That is to say, the length of time that it_ takes to clear the area cannot be calculated with any degree of certainty without knowing how long it takes to nottfy the populace of an impending evacuation, and how long each person will consume in preparation.11/

Even without accounting f or decision, notification, preparation, or confirmation time, the licensee's estimates exceed the time period during which f atalities and injuries will result from exposure to radionuclides on the ground in the event of an " atmospheric" Class 9 accident, according to-NUREG-0396.1S! That document reveals that, assuming a unif orm population density of 100 persons per square mile and l

plume speed of 10 m.p.h. , an evacuation time of only three hours will result in approximately three deaths and twelve 17/ Id. at 11.

18/ Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones, NUREG/CR-1745, at 3-4 (November ,

1980).

19/ Planning Government Basis for the Development of State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans In Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants , NUREG-0396, EPA 52011-78-016, Dectmber, 1978, Figu res I-17 and I-18.

O

early injuries in the 0-5 mile range of the plant and approximately five early injuries in the 5-10 mile range.22,/

If evacuation time reaches five hours (w i t h , for example, the j addition of notification time) , the results are approximately l six deaths and twenty-eight early injuries in the 0-10 mile range. 1! Of cours'e, NUREG-0396 makes no attempt to estimate the long-term genetic or other health eff ects associated with such evacuation times.

Thus, even if evacuation can be accomplished within- the times estimated by Public Service, flere will be a significant number of early injuries and deaths in the event of an j

atmospheric Class 9 accident at Seabrook. And there is reason 3

to suspect that actual evacuation times would be much longer.

The licensee's most recent evacuation time estimates are defective in several ways. As we have already mentioned, Public Service has failed to include in its estimates the time required for decision, notification, preparation, and confirmation. Even more importantly, it has failed to provide i

20/ Id.

21/ Id. The population density in the beach area near the Seabrook site is much g reater than the 100 persons per square mile assumed in NUREG-0396. As the Licensing Appeal Board has noted, "there is no doubt that, at peak periods . . in excess .

of 25,000 people will be found in (that] densely populated area." Public Service Company of New Hamoshire, ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, at 51 (1977). Thus, all of the health and fatality figures contained in NUREG-0396 are understated so f ar as the seabrook site is concerned.

1

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l estimates based on simultaneous evacuation during the peak summer season of all of the beach areas lying from NE to SSE of the site or even simultaneous evacuation of Hampton Beach and either of the other two beach areas, Seabrook Beach and Salisbury State Beach. This def eats the purpose of licensee evacuation time estimates, as stated in RUREG/CR-1745--namely,

' "to present time estimates in a format that will aid a realistic assessment of the options."22/ The licensee has

~

also failed to provide a time estimate for evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ , as required by NUREG-0654.21/ And it has assumed that approximately one vehicle per household would be 2

used in the evacuation. This assumption, according to NUREG /CR-17 45 , results in a low estimate of the number of automobiles being evacuated.3d/

Other significant deficiencies in the licensee's estimates include the following:

(1) admitted failure to account in its off-season estimates f or evacuation of the f orty schools and in any of its estimates for evacuation of the three 1

22/ Analysis of Techniques for -Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones, NURBG/CR-1745, at 13 (November ,

1980). That document indicates that two evacuation times should be reported f or each evacuation zone--one reflecting evacuation of that zone alone and one reflecting simultaneous evacuation of all contiguous zones. Id. at 14.

23/ See Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-065 4, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (Novemb e r , 1980 ) , App. 4, at 4-4.

24/ Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for I

Emergency Planning Zones, NUREG/CR-1745, at 10 (November, 1980).

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I hospitals and other institutions 35/ located within i the ten-mile EPZ; 26/

(2) failure to account for the public transporation-dependent population; (3) failure to include major employers in its estimates of summer transient automobile demand; and (4) failure to consider the eff ect of voluntary evacuation beyond the ten-mile EPZ.

Given these deficiencies, it seems likely that the licensee 's current evacuation time estimates are too low. This ~

is especially so in view of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 's estimates that there are 7,180 people in the non-automobile owning population and 3,500 people in institutions, together constituting 10% of the total resident population within the Seabrook EPZ.S2!

It is also noteworthy that the evacuation time estimates provided by the licensee in its PSARS / are significantly a

25/ See Seabrook Preliminary Safety Analysis Report ("PSAR"),

at 2.1-8 and Tables 2.1-5 and 2.1-6.

26/ NUREG/CR-1745 concludes that evacuation times' for large l

.; special facilities, such as hospitals, may well be longer than See Analysis of >

the evacuation time for the general public.

Techniques f or Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones , NUREG/CR-1745, at 15 (November , 1980 ) .

27/ The Dynamic Evacuation Analyses: Independent Assessment of Evacuation Times from the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations, FEMA-REP-(number not yet ass igned) , at 46, 29/ Seabrook PSAR, knendment 23, July, 1974, at S13 S13-16.

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• higher than-its current estimates, even though the earlier estimates relate to 22.5 degree sectors (rather than 90 degree or 180 degree sectors) and cover only a five-mile radius.31/

In its PSAR, the licensee estimates that it will take eight 4

hours from the occurrence of the accident to clear three of the

six beach sectors to the five-mile radius and that the other three sectors will require five and one-half to six hours.SS/ ,

?

A FEMA study estimates that a minimum of six hours ,and 10 minutes will be needed to evacuate the entire EPZ on a summer Sunday, even if notification is completed within 15 minutes.21/ That study further concludes that The behavior of drivers who are caught in congestion within direct sight of the Seabrook Station can only be guessedEat this time. Any breakdown in orderly evacuation traffic flow will result in evacuation Total times greater than the ones estimated above.

evacuation times could range from 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes to 14 hcurs 40 minutes for an evacuation in which traffic control is generally ineffective.22/

FEMA estimates, then, are also considerably higher'than the licensee's current estimates. The early deaths and 29/ The earlier figures do purport to include notification-  ;

time.

30/ Seabrook PSAR, at 513 ,16.

Independent Assessment 31/ The Dynamic Evacuation Analyses:

of Evacuation Times from the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations, FEMA-REP-(number not yet assigned), at 46.

1 32/ Id. l s \

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injuries resulting f rom a Class 9 accident would, of course, be significantly higher than the figures recited above if the longer times estimated by FEMA or by the licensee in the 1974 amendment to its PSAR are actually required for evacuation.

III. THE FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED IMMEDIATELY The foregoing discussion demonstrates that there are e indeed " unusual constraints" associated with evacuation of the Seabrook EPZ and serious questions about the feasibility-of safe evacuation of the area. That being the case, Seabrook is an appropriate instance for immediate examination of the f easibility issue.

Both the "Moff ett Repor t" 1! and he Report of the .

President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island have roundly criticized the !TRC's past practice of postponing full consideration of emergency planning issues until the operating license stage. The Prstident's Commission wrote, The construction permit stage does not requi re complete design plans, and therefore the full safety review does not occur until the operating license stage. By then, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent or committed in the construction process.  :

Therefore, the ultimate safety review may be influenced by economic considerations that can lead 33/ Emergency Planning Around U.S. Nuclear Powerolants:

5uclear Regulatory Commission Oversight, Fourth Report by the  !

Committee on Government Operations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, I l

House Report No.96-413 (August 8, 1979) I"Mo f f e tt Report" 1. '

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to a reluctance to ceder ma the operating license stage.21/jor changes at Similarly, the Moffett Report observed that (ilt is not until the plant is nearly built and the utility applies for an operating license that it must come forward with a fullblown emergency plan. By then, of course, the Commission may find itself in the untenable position of having to choose between scrapping a multi-billion dollar investment or allowing the gelfare of area residents to be jeopardized.__

The Government Operations Committee concluded in the Moffett Report that there is " considerable doubt" about the feasibility of conducting evacuations in any densely populated areas 2k/ and that evacuation of a sufficient area around a number of U.S. plants is clearly not feasible.21/ In an exchange, recounted in the Moffett Report, between Congressman Moffett and then Chairman Hendrie, Congressman Moffett, speaking on behalf of the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee, called on the NRC to "take a hard look at the feasibility of evacuation in the case of plants located near major population areas and treat that examination as a " priority."18/ The Commission certainly does not fulfill this legislative mandate 34/ Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, at 52.

35/ Id. at 30.

36/ Id. at 8.

i 31/ Id. at 48.

38/ Id. at 46-47.

1 4 or meet the criticisms of the Committee on Government Operations and the President's Commission by postponing consideration of emergency planning at Seabrook.

Cases arising under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 4331 et seq. , provide a useful parallel to this situation. Confronted with the problem of " sunk costs",

courts insist on early review of significant environmental

, iss ues . Thus, in upholding the grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining further construction of a bridge, the 1

Second Circuit found in Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, at

" 497 (2nd Cir. 1975), that "[wl ithout preliminary injunctive relief construction might well reach the stage of completion

" where for economic and other reasons it would be impossible to turn back or alter the project in light of what an Environmental Impact Statement revealed, and thus the environment might thereby be irreparably damaged." 9 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit noted, in halting construction of an interstate highway pending a NEPA review by the Secretary of Transportation, that

[f]urther investment of time, effort, or money in the proposed route would make alteration or abandonment of the route increasingly less wise and, therefore, increasingly unlikely. If investment in the proposed route were to continue prior to and during the Secreta'ry's consideration of the environmental Andtis, 440 F.

30/ See also National ~4ildlif e Federation v.

Supp. 1245, at 1256 (D.D.C. 1977).

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report, the options open to the Secretary would d iminis h , and at some point his consideration would become a meaningless formality.40 The Commission clearly has the authority to require that Public. Service Company demonstrate the feasibility of evacuating the Seabrook EPZ now. At the time when emergency planning was limited to the low population zone, Commission.

decisions required a determination during construction permit proceedings that " timely evacuation (of the LPZ) is reasonably assured."$1! The Commission's Final Regulations on Emergency Planning, while extending emergency planning requirements to Emergency Planning Zones, maintain the requirement that a i

determination of f easibility be made at the construction permit stage for new plants. The Regulations state that:

The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans f or both .onsite - areas and i the EPZ's with facility design features, site layout,

-and site location with respect to such considerations j

as access routes, surrounding population d istr ibutions , land use, and local jur isdictional boundaries . . 4U 40/ Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe,458 F.2d l

1323, 1333 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,409 U.S. 1000 (1972).

l See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley 468 F.2d 1164, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1972)'. Latham v.

Author 45 Volpe, ity$ F.2d 1111, ll21 ' (9 th Cir . 1971) .

l 41/ Consumers Power Company, (Midland Plant Units 1 and 2) l i AEAB-123, 6 AEC 331, at 342. (1973). See also Southern Calif ornia Ed ison Company, et al., (San Onof re Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3), ALAB-2 48 , 8 AEC 9 57 , 961-6 3 (1974).

10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section II.

(('

Thus, the Commission cannot now issue construction permits without determining that timely evacuation of the EPZ for the particular plant is feasible.

Section 186(a) of the Atomic Energy Act $ / authorizes the NRC to suspend or revoke "(a]ny license . . . because of conditions revealed . . . which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has ,

held that this clause applies to all licensing matters, including health, safety, and environmental considerations . . . [andl reflects a deliberate policy choice on the part of Congress when it enacted section 185 (a) to render licenses for nuclear facilities subject to post-licensing review under evolving licensing standards, rather than under those standards applicable at the time the license in question was issued.d4/

It is clear, then, that the emergency plan for the Seabrook environs is now subject to post-licensing review under the new emergency planning standards.

In light of the gravity of the issue of safe evacuation, it is the responsibility of the Director to issue the show cause order requested by SAPL. Deferral of this major ouu-standing saf ety question to the operating license stage would be inconsistent with the primary obligation of the Commission and Staff to protect public health and safety.

43/ 42 U.S.C. S2236 (a) .

44/ Ft. Pierce Ut'lities Authocity of the City of Ft. Pierce

v. U.S.A. and the NRC, Nos. 77-1925 and 77-2101, slip opinion at 19-20 (D.C. Cir . , March 23, 1979).

Dated: March 13, 1981 Respectfully submitted, Paula Gold, Assistant Attorney General Chief, Public Protection Bureau Stephen M. Leonard, Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Environmental Protection Division 4f ~-w

• e -L . 3 _ N s.

Jo , Ann Shotwell Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Public Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 l

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AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE RIEL I, George Riel, Police Chief of Newbury, do hereby depose and say as follows:

' l. The Town of Newbury is a Massachusetts town within a

five air miles of the site of the nuclear reactor under construction in Seabrook, New Hampshire.

2. The population of Newbury is 4,800 but increases to well over 30,000 people on any given day in the summer on its 12 miles of beaches.

3. There is only one road making Plum Island accessible to the mainland. It consists of two and one-half miles of two l twelve-foot travel lanes. It then narrows into two ten-foot lanes as it feeds into the congested downtown area. *

4. At least eight times a year this sole access road to and from Plum Island is impassable due to flooding from high tides.

5. Any nuclear emergency evacuation' attempts would result in immediate congestion and bottlenecks throughout the entire town. All evacuation routes available (Routes lA, 1 and

95) would be congested with evacuating residents of Salisbury, Merrimac, Amesbury, Newburyport, and other small communities, making it that much more difficult for the residents of Newbury to evacuate the area.

6. There are four schools in Newbury, which would present special evacuatien problems.

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7. At the National. Wildlife Refuge which covers 4,650 l

acres of the Town, there are twenty miles of regularly used foot trails which are inaccessible to vehicles or communications . There are no telephone or power lines in the Refuge.

8. There is a state-controlled Wildlif e Management Area in the Town, 2,000 acres in size, which is aise used regularly at certain times of the year. It is also inaccessible to

- vehicles or communication.

9. The majority of the population of Newbury could be-evacuated within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> if all went well. 100% evacuation to safety of the Newbury population could be effected in 4 approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.-

10. As an official who would be involved in effectuating any actual evacuation, I feel that the issue of emergency evacuation planing should be addressed at the earliest possible t ime .

Signed under the pains and

' penalties of perjury this 6th day of March, 1981.

Qumm S- J/I G u. ./

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l Commonwealth of Massachusetts Suffolk, ss.

George Riel appeared before me and swore that he has read this affidavit and that the statements contained in it are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Before me, .

> n Notary Public My Commission expires on N%d Y /Y$$

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AFFID AVIT OF MAYNARD PEARSON I, Maynard Pearson, Civil Def ense Director for the Town of Amesbury, do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. The Town of Amesbury, Massachusetts is approximately 3-1/2 air miles from the nuclear reactor site at Seabrook, New Hampshire.

2. Its population of 16,000 increases by 500 to 700 people in the summer.

3. There are three highways leading out of town. .These are Interstates 95 and 495 and State Route 110.

4. In an evacuation, there may be bottlenecking and congestion since there are too many small roads f eeding into 1

the highways.

5. Concern about such congestion will increase if nearby New Hampshire towns develop plans to use the same evacuation routes we must use.

6. Amesbury has a hospital with 75-100 beds, six nursing homes and five schools.

7. A full evacuation of Amesbury residents would taka

$ six hours at best. It is possible that the time could be decreased by the use of adequate alarms which are not now v

available to us.

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8. As an official who would be involved in effectuating l

any actual evacuation, I feel that the issue of emergency i evacuation planning should be addressed at the earliest  :

possible time.

Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 6th day of March, 1981.

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i Commonwealth of Massachusetts ,

l Suffolk, ss.

Maynard Pearson appeared before me and swore that he has read this affidavit and that the statements contained in it are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. -

Before me,

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Notary Public My Commission expires on

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AFFIDAVIT OF EDWIN OLIVERA I, Edwin Olivera, Police Chief of the Town of Salisbury do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. Salisbury is a Massachusetts town within ten miles of the site of the nuclear reactor under construction in Seabrook, New Hampshire.

2. Its permanent population of approximately 5,600 1

residents increases by over 10,000 people between Memorial Day and Labor Day. It is additionally visited by 1,000 - 5,000 motorists daily during the above summer vacation period.

3. This large increase in population and daily influx of beachgoers creates severe congestion along the single access road to our beach. This one-lane access road is fed by Routes 1, 110 and Interstates 495 and 95.

i

4. At this " feeding" point, Salisbury Square, there is a bottlenecx which causes traffic congestion and back-up.

5. These same roads are also used by beachgoers on their way south f rom Hampton Beach.

In an evacuation situation, the congestion will be worsened by this southward evacuation.

6. In normal peak season, traffic emergency vehicles j suffer great delay and are caught up in the slow traffic.

7. In the Salisbury area, the state reservation camping 4

area and the three trailer parks are frequented by, among I I

I others, French Canadians who do not understand English.

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._ . _ . . _ - . _ . _ _ __ .__. ._ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _u

8. The Greenleaf Manor Nursing Home and other housing for the elderly are within ten miles of Seabrook. The two schools in Salisbury are between five and seven miles f rom Seabrook.

9. I estimate that 100% evacuation of Salisbury would take at least eight hours.

10. Our biggest evacuation problem is access to and from the beach.

11. As an official who would be involved in effectuating any actual evacuation, I feel that the issue of emergenc:/

evacuation planning should be addressed at the earliest possible time.

Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 6th day of March, 1981.

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Commonwealth of Massachusetts Suffolk, ss.

Edwin Olivera appeared before me and swore that he has read this affidavit and that the statements contained in it are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. .

Before me, ar '; b 2- - __

Notary Public My Commission expires on s - # f (U.,,5

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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l 1

I, JO ANN SHOTWELL, hereby certify that the foregoing

" Memorandum of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of l Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Request for an Order to Show  !

Cause Dated June 30, 1980" was served upon the following by depositing copies thereof in the United Staes Mail, postage prepaid, this 13th day of March,1981:

John Ahearne, Chairman Roy P. Lessy, Esquire Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner Office of the Executive Legal Richard T. Kennedy, Commissioner Direc tor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washing ton, D.C. 20555 washington, D.C. 20555 Samuel Chilk, Secretary E. Tupper Kinder, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Assistant Attorney General Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Environmental Protection Divisic Office of the Attorney General Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman 208 State House Annex Atomic Safety and Licensing Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Karen P. Sheldon, Esquire Sheldon, Harmon, Roisman, & Weit Dr. John H. Buck 1725 I Street. , N.W. Suite 50#

Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20006 l Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Atomic Safety and Licensing Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Michael C. Farrar, Esquire Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Dr. Ernest O. Salo U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Professor of Fisheries Research-Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Institute College of Fisheries Ivan W. Smith, Esquire University of Washington Atomic Safety and Licensing Seattle, Washington Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Thomas Dignan, Esquire Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Ropes and Gray 225 Franklin Street Dr. Marvin M. Mann Boston, Mass. 02110 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Leonard Bickwit, Esquire

! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Office of the General Counsel Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l

Docket and Service Section Robert A. Backus, Esq.

Office of the Secretary O'Neill, Backus, & Spielman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n 116 Lowell Street Washing ton, D.C. 20555 - Manchester, New Hampshire Joseph F. Tubridy, Esquire Dr. Kenneth A. McCollum 4100 Cathedral Avenue, N.W. 1107 West Knapp Street Washing ton, D.C. 20016 Stillwater, Okalhoma 74074 By: b-- # ed. . -C _h ;

JO . ANN SHOTWELL Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection-Divis.'.on Public Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General i

One Ashburton Place,19th Floor i Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 7"7-2265 I

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ma numann em (FEB3366tT PRJR LISA A. FINALDI 225 LINDEN AVENUE l {,['

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA 27601

'87 FEB 24 P6 :28 Secretary Samuel Chilk February 19, 1987 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission ofi . ,",.

Washington, DC 20555 PART 50 * ; .-

52FR6980

Dear Secretary Chilk:

I am writing to urge the NRC to scrap the proposal to allow the waiver of compliance with emergency planning standards for nuclear power plants where state and local governments refuse to panicipate in the emergency planning process.

By asking the utilities to demonstrate that they have taken

" reasonable and feasible" compensatory measures to make up for the lack of state of local plans, you are allowing a tremendous amount of subjective postulating. Requiring " adequate protective measures" during a nuclear accident is far more reaching and should not be changed.

Local and state government concerns are essential and vital in planning for a nuclear mactor accident. Your removal of their involvement in the process will not be tolerated.

I sincerely hope that on February 23 you decide against promulgating this proposal. I look forward to hearing from you on this matter in the future.

Sincarely,

[ /d /M b Lisa Finaldi

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,87 FEB 24 P5 :41

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acc-52FRS980 Canemer Brxe B2 tnt chr"* February 24, 1987 Admiral Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

Dear Chairman Zech:

Re: Consideration of Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Changes of Emergency Planning Rules The primary responsibility of government is to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. The proposed action by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to permit the granting of a full-power license without adequate, legally certain '

and fully tested state and local emergency plans, undermines that responsibility and places in jeopardy the lives and property of the people living near nuclear power plants at Seabrook, New Hampshire and Shoreham, Long Island.

In 1979, as a member of the Commission to Investigate the Accident at Three Mile Island (Kemeny Commission), I argued that it is essential that state and local governments develop emergency response plans before nuclear power plants are permitted to operate. My argument prevailed within that Commission.

In its October 1979 report the Kemeny Commission found that "the response to the emergency (at Three Mile Island) was dominated by an atmosphere of almost total confusion."

Many key decisions were made by individuals in state and local governments "who were not in possession of accurate information." They had relied in good faith on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the plant owners.

The Kemeny Commission stated forcefully: "Before a utility is granted an operating license for a new nuclear power plant, the state within which that plant is to be sited must have an emergency response plan." Moreover because different kinds of accidents yield different

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Bruce Babbitt Letter.to the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission page 2 s

radiological consequences, "all local communities should have funds and technical support adequate for preparing'the-kinds of plans necessary to meet a broad range of possible accidents."

Every other report on the accident at Three Mile Island, including the Rogovin Report; prepared for the NRC, reached the same conclusion. We learned something important from the accident at Three Mile Island and those lessons have been written into the laws of the United States and the regulations of the NRC.

But the accident at Three Mile Island does not stand alone. There is the disasterfat Chernobyl. There is your own recent staff projection, made public earlier this month, that there is a twelve percent to forty-five percent-likelihood of a core meltdown in the next twenty years.

When an accident occurs, and both science and history suggest it will, local policemen, sherriff's deputies, bus drivers, volunteer firemen and community _ leaders will direct

~

the evacuation. In other words the community will-lead itself, as it does in every other matter of' life and death.

The only possibility of safely responding _to a nuclear accident is.for the local community to have planned and practiced how it will react to protect ~itself.

If a community and a state government decide not to prepare evacuation plans, that is their choice to make. It is their lives, their community, their responsibility.- You can't evacuate a community from Washington.

At immediate risk are the people of New Hampsh' ire, Massachusetts and Long Island. In the long run, we are all at risk; those who reside around the 100 nuclear power plants that exist in this nation and those others who want to believe that an agency of the United States can act rationally and with care for our citizens. j

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t Bruce Babbitt-Letter to the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission page 3 The changes in emergency planning rules being considered are contrary to law and common sense. I cannot urge you strongly enough to set aside this proposed rule and provide the people of New Hampshire, New York and Massachusetts preci.sely what they have a right to expect:

that safety does not come second, but first.

Sincerel

, AN rv -

Bruce Babbitt i

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