ML20203P888
| ML20203P888 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1985 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-I-FEMA-E-004, OL-I-FEMA-E-4, NUDOCS 8605080302 | |
| Download: ML20203P888 (202) | |
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' REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE REGION III EfERCISE EVALUATION REPORT FACILITY: LIMERICK CENERATING STATION OrERATOR: Philadelphia Electric Company LOCATION: Limerick Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania REPORT DATE: September 19, 1984 EXERCISE DATE: July 25, 1984 l PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Risk Counties of Montgomery, Chester and Berks Support County of Iehigh
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AND RECIONAL ASSISTANCE CODMITTEE REGION III EfERCISE EVALUATION REPORT FACILIT,: LIMERICK CENERATING STATION OPERATOR: Philadelphia Electric Company LOCATION: Limerick Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania REPORT DATE: September 19, 1984 EXERCISE DATE: July 25, 1984 PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Risk Counties of Montgomery, Chester and Berka Support County of Lehigh Municipalities as Noted in Exercise Susanary l i ! NON-PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS: Risk Municipalities as Noted in Exercise Summary Support County of Bucka l ., 1 l -
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EXERCISE
SUMMARY
State Activities ....................................i-111 Montgomery County Activities.........................iii-vii
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Chester County Activities............................vii-xii Berks County Activities..............................xii-xiii B ACKG ROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x iv PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv N0l+-PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vi-xvii OBSERVER ASSIGNMENTS...................................xviii-xx EVALUATION CRITERIA USED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi EXERCISE 010 ECIIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii-xxiii SCENARIO TIME LINE..................................... xxiv DEMONSTRATION OF RES0URCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv OBJECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED. . . . . . . . . . . . xxvi EXERCISE REP 0RTS...................................... 1 State Activities.................................... 1-15 Montgomery County Activities........................ 16-61 Ches te r Count y Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62-109 Berks County Activities..............................I10-132 . ADDENDUM TO EXERCISE REPORTS....'..... .. 6............ 133
SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES....................... 134 !_ t i O , I
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SUMMARY
OF REPORTS Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (State EOC) Overall operations at the State EOC proceeded in a well organized, efficient manner. During the exercise problems were noted in the area of cosununications systems. The PEMARS operator never got through to the Montgomery County EOC. It was discovered later that the repeater in Montgomery County was out. Verbal messages f rom PEMA to the risk counties were received promptly and efficiently. Dedicated conferencing telephones were used to inform the , counties and the Eastern Area Office of all major events and decisions. Each risk county and the Eastern Area Office was assigned Liaison Officers who had a dedicated phone line to their assigned county. However, equipment problems arose with the teletype system and hard copy messages were not received, in some cases, in a timely manner. The State EOC coordinated the sounding of the sirens, EBS activation and route alert team activatio( with the risk counties and Easter Area Office for 2045. v After recommendations were rece'ived from the Utility and discussion between BRP and PEMA, a decision was hade to evacuate the entire 10-mile EPZ with priority to population within two miles. Since the wording " priority to populaton within two miles" is a deviation f rom the State plan, some ( \' f") confusion'resulted. The State queried each county to see if the evacuation orders were clear. All of the risk counties stated that the order was understood. However, it was reported that one municipality in Montgomery County did not simulate evacuation. As addressed in more detail in the body of the report, BRP recommended that livestock int he 10-mile EPZ be placed under shelter and put on stored feed. However, the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture gave the recommendations only to the State EOC and Montgomery County. BRP recommended that the Department of Health instruct emergency workers to take KI when evacuation was ordered. For some reason, these instructions, authorizing emergency workers to take KI, were not received at the risk counties. As noted in the report no joint media center was established. Coordination of public information between the State spokesperson and the utility spokesperson presented some problems. The PEMA Media Center can operate adequately to inform citizens of potential danger and provide protective measures for their safety. The recurring problem of transmitting hard copy by telefax or teletype is a communications system problem. If system overload problems can be resolved, it will enhance information coordination and verification procedures. The Public Affairs Officer overcame this obstacle by coordinating the information with the jurisdictions by telephone. Bureau of Radiation Protection The Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) staff were highly professional, acted quickly, and were qualified for the emergency scenario. The people (" O i
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worked well together, communicated efficiently and made decisions af ter (( ) discussion and concurrence. The NRC and PEMA liaisons were effective in their roles of communicating information and helping the BRP staff think out a solution to a problem. Communication between field teams and the BRP needs to be improved so that there is a direct link backup rather than relying on slow, and inadequate, transfer through the EOF. The dose assessment techniques are adequate. The management of people was very good. Emergency Operations Facility The representatives in the EOF for the Bureau of Radiation Protection, have the primary function of making an independent evaluation of the plant status and radioactive release potential using information available at the EOF. They transmit this information to the BRP assessment center for further evaluation. At times the BRP representative was dif ficult to reach by phone due to long licensee conferences, data gathering and noise level in the EOF. The City of Philadelphia officials (water quality engineer and meteorologist) were not directly involved in the exercise. The scenario lacked water quality data and the wind direction and release duration had no consequence on the City. No monitoring was performed for radiation contamination at the EOF. ' Medical Support The following hospitals were reviewed during the Limerick exercise: Chester County Hospital - Support Facility Pottstown Medical Centet - Risk Facility Phoenirville Hospital - Risk Facility i All facilities had adequate communication capabilities: telephone, radio, and RACES. Those which were demonstrated during the exercise were appropriately handled, both in terms of external and internal capability. The hospitals had well developed plans which assigned specific respcnsibilities to specific persons on the hospital staff. The aspects directly observed during the exercise followed the plan and appeared to be meeting the needed response level for the level of the emergency dituation. Unfortunately, the observer was not in a position to observe the handling of an injured, contaminated person by the hospital staff. The personnel interviewed at the three facilities were well trained in their basic discipline and for a radiological emergency. They were aware of their roles and responalbilities as designated in the plan developed by the C hospital. The activities which were observed were appropriate to the stage of the exercise. Arrangements were made for acquiring the services of a health physicist since they were not on staff. The hospitals had the proper equipment to monitor levels of contamination, I( provide decontamination, and protective devices for their teams. The
- s. Chester County Hospital has a sufficient number of dosimeters but the other 11
Q two, since they are risk hospitals, need more dosisters than they have in QJ order to support an evacuation of the facility, or properly shelter. Field Monitoring Air Monitoring Teams Two air monitoring teams from the Reading Office of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources were evaluated. Their technical knowledge, equipment familiarity and how they conducted themselves could not be faulted. However, the teams had problems communicating with BRP in ( Harrisburg. They tried to correct this problem by manning an information ' relay at the EOF parking lot. In this manner information was passed to and from Harrisburg by dedicated telephone in the EOF. However, in doing this they lost the use of one monitoring team. Water Monitoring Team The water monitoring team played out of sequence. They left Norristown at 0945, had collected sampler by 1100 and delivered the samples to the laboratory by 1300. They knew their equipment and procedures well and demonstrated adequate knowledge of dosimetry and exposure control. In spite of the fact that BRP could not be contacted by radio, alternate procedures were explained and demonstrated. No deficiencies were noted. Agricultural Sampling Team (OV The agricultural sampling team demosntrated excellent procedures and performed in a professional manner. Montgomery County EOC Overall, personnel at the Montgomery County EOC performed their jobs in a most capable manner. Activation occurred in a premature manner and 24-hour staffing is still not complete at all positions. Energency operations ' management was effectively demonstrated, although it may be beneficial to formalize internal briefing procedures. In certain instances, the timeliness of responses to municipalities needs to be laproved. The county commissioners should take a more direct interest in future exercises. Facilities and the communications systems are excellent. Siren and EBS activation occurred smoothly at the county level, but the " evacuation" message caused confusion at Lower Frederick Township, resulting in the fact that they took no action. The exercise concluded before this situation could be resolved. Montgomery County coordinated the implementation of
- protective actions adequately. Radiological exposure control remains a problem due to lack of equipment. The performance of the public information officer was not directly observed, but it was noted that there was good <
coordination between the county media center and the EOC. Reception / Mass Care Centers ( s Individuals at the reception / mass care center displayed their capabilities in an adequate manner. Decontamination procedures were demonstrated and O
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t () facilities were available to house 850 people. Distribution of needed food supplies was discussed. Consideration should be given to streamline the registration process. The Red Cross District Headquarters in Philadelphia was also visited and was prepared to implement their plan. Pottstown School District School officials were well versed on their plans, their primary concern at this point obtaining the necessary buses to evacuate all their students in one lift. Collegeville Borough EOC Generally, the EOC staff did a good job. They knew their duties and carried them out in a timely and efective manner. The Emergency Management Coordinator is particulary knowledgeable about the plan and required response actions. However, she lacks a trained back-up for 24-hour o perations. EOC facilities are generally adequate, i ,
- Limerick Township EOC '
l Emergency response at Limerick Township occurred in a most efficient manner, especially in light of the fact that the EHC and his alternate were not present in the EOC for significant portions of the exercise. The Township building served as an adequate facility to coordinate their actions. Radio eg communications functioned well, but telephone contacts produced mixed
,) results. Route alerting was performed and Township officials were aware of their responsibilities for traffic control and arranging transportation for the mobility-impaired. Actual dosimetry was not distributed, but the Fire Chief was knowledgeable concerning its use.
Lower Frederick Township EOC The emergency operating center located in the Lower Fredrick Township municipal bulding provides a facility that will support emergency response o perations. The communication systems available at the EOC functioned well. Some confusion did occur when messages received from Montgomery County over the RACES net were garbled and misinterpreted by the staf f. This appeared to be a problem with both the County RACES officer and the Township EOC staff. Activation of the EOC and all appropriate emergency personnel occurred promptly. Although there was some limited prepositioning of personnel this time element is accurate, due to the close proximity of the EOC to the homes of the staff. Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated by double-staffing and a roster. Public alerting and instruction was demonstrated at the EOC. A misinterpretation by the emergency coordinator of the evacuation order is one problem noted in Lower Fredrick. The message to evacuate all sectors to 10 miles with 2 mile priority was thought to have meant evacuation of only the 2-mile sectors. Therefore the township did not simulate evacuation. Although there was no evacuation, the necessary steps had been taken to implement such a protective measure. Overall the operation at the Lower Fredrick Township {" EOC was good. Additional training of staf f personnel would be beneficial. All participants learned a great deal during the exercise and were serious 4 and sincere in their duties. iv
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Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC For the most part, the operations of the Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC were conducted smoothly and efficiently. Deficiencies in the operation were already known by the Emergency Management Coordinator. In particular, round-the-clock staffing has not been achieved. Furthermore, according to ' the EOC staff, the Township needs to devise a plan to accomplish route ' alerting for the entire area in a more timely manner. New Hanover Township EOC New Hanover Township has on order, but has not yet received, much of the equipment to set up their EOC. Once the equipment is received, they have adequate space for its installation and a good layout. For this exercise, they substituted adequately for the lack of permanent installations. The personnel performed in a professional manner to carry out their responsibilities.
, Perkiomen Township EOC
- Operations went smoothly at the Perkiomen Township EOC. The EOC officials appeared to be knowledgeable and well-trained. Copies of the plan were readily available. However,,over half of the actual operating EOC staff were PE employees, or in one case, the spouse a PE employee, whose services were arranged for by a PE Consultant. These people live in the area, but not necessarily in Perkiomen Township. They represented such EOC positions and areas as EMC Deputy, Traffic, Communications and clerical support. The PE employees were extremely well-trained and very obviously knew what to do during the exercise. If these individuals are expected to respond in an actual emergency, the township plan should be updated to reflect their staff positions. The listing of mobility-impaired needs to be revised.
Pottstown Borough EOC Particularly in light of the fact that this was the Borough's first exercise, Pottstown performed quite satisfactorily. Through careful reference to the REP plan and related SOPS the Borough Emergency Management Coordinator was able to overcome staff confusion concerning several aspects of the exerciss. In general, the exercise was an excellent training tool for the Borough. Royersford Borough EOC The EMC, his volunteer staff and the communication system were excellent. The EMC knew the borough plan and he provided the correct direction; his well-trained staff carried out his orders. The EOC provided an adequate base of operations. Contact was made with various institutions / individuals to inform them of the status of the emergency, route alerting was conducted and transportation was arranged (simulated) for those who needed it. The Borough demonstrated its familiarity with the various aspects of radiological exposure control. < v 9 0
_ 7-Skippack Township EOC (~C Skippack Township's participation in the Limerick exercise was minimal. According to the Emergency Management Coordinator, the township's participation in the exercise was to test only the communications link between the County and the municipality. The EOC was never fully staffed nor was their any demonstration by the township in public alerting, < protective action or radiological exposure control. Therefore, Skippack Township did not demonstrate adequate implementation of their radiological ) emergency response plan. Trappe Borough EOC The EMC was knowledgeable of operation procedures and was effective in directing the staff to take the necessary actions. The EOC was adequate for an emergency response operation and communications were sufficient. Route alerting vehicles were dispatched, traffic control points were activated and residents having special needs were contacted. EOC personnel were present who were aware of procedgres concerning the use of dosimetry. Twenty-four hour staffing has not been 4ssured. Upper Frederick Township EOC The overall response capabilities of Upper Frederick Township are considered adequate. The Emergency Management Coordinator and Fire Chief were very effective and knowledgeable. In order to enhance the coordination of (O EOC.information, the RACES operator and equipment should be located inside the Upper Pottsgrove Township EOC The Upper Pottsgrove EOC staff was knowledgeable of their particular area of responsibilitity, as well as the collective responsibility of the township. This was the first exercise for the participants and they functioned efficiently as a team. There was good interplay among the members, as well an an expressed dedication to ensure they would be able to mitigate, to the extent possible, the impact of a disaster on the community. All team members were well prepared for the exercise. Their familiarity with the township plan indicated each member had given it careful review prior to the start of play. Upper Providence Township EOC The township enthusiastically and effectively participated in the exercise. The EOC was fully staffed and benefited from the participation of many volunteers. The EMC was an effective leader and regularly consulted with and assisted the etaff. The EMC had requested a status board from the a county, but did not have one for the exercise. A status board would have improved the centers' operations. The EHC's philosophy was to exercise all possible aspects of the plan. Accordingly, the EOC was very active throughout the exercise. Hearing-impaired were personally visited by ( volunteers. Those registered as needing transportation and the mobility-impaired were telephoned and transportation arrangement s made. Fire crews vi
confirmed siren operations. Three route alerting crews were dispatched. k.r] js/ Telephone calls to more than 40 factories, private schools, parks, etc. , were made at the Alert, Site and General Emergency phases of the exercise. Upper Salford Township EOC The Limerick Exercise went well in Upper Salford Township. Key staff were ' well-trained and knowledgeable about their tasks. The EMC was clearly and effectively in charge. Messages were posted and staff briefed in an orderly and timely fashion. RACES proved efficient and effective. The township was not asked to participate in publi: alerting but they had teams stading by. ' A well-organized and complete listing of all known persons in the township with mobility / hearing difficulties was available and used. yhester County EOC Activation and staffing of the E0C occurred promptly and in accordance with the plans. The County Director of Emergency Services demonstrated excellent leadership capability, and internal information exchange and message handling at the EOC were wdll demonstrated. The staff members responsible for notifying the municipalities were not sufficiently familiar with their duty, resulting in some notification delays and miscommunication, particularly at the early stages of the exercise. Many communities experienced unsatisfactory re'sponse to their requests for unset needs. A more efficient request procedure, including an acknowledgement that municipal, requests are being processed, is recommended.
\' The EOC facility, although adequate in terms of space, lighting, and furnishings, could be improved. Emergency operations would be enhanced in a more modern facility.
The various communications systems available worked well, but a secondary means for contacting the EBS station should be established. Activation of the primary alert and notification system (sirens and EBS) occurred on schedule, but problems were experienced at both the county and municipal levels in activating route alerting. More specific procedures should be developed concerning activation of the route alert teams, and coordination among the municipal and county EOCs and the fire departments should be ensured. A radio station other than that designated in the plans was used as the primary EBS station during the exercise. If this is to be a permanent change, the plans and public information material should be amended accordingly. Although an appropriate EBS test message was broadcast, the county did not demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate public instructions regarding protective actions. The county demonstrated good capability for coordinating the activation of access and traffic control posts; the capability for allocating available transportation resources and obtaining unmet needs reported by the municipalities was also generally adequate, despite some delays. Activation C of the reception and mass care centers, however, was late. O vii
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The county deviated f rom the plan by pre-distributing dosimetry /KI kits to municipalities prior to the exercise. If this is to be a permanent procedure, the plans should be modified to reflect the change. The county failed to demonstrate the capability for certifying farmers as emergency workers and providing them with dosimetry and KI. The appropriate staff members were not familiar with this responsibility and should receive further training. The capability for establishing and maintaining contact with local media representatives, including conducting press briefings, was very good. The availability of a hard-copy device for receiving copies of news items released from the utility's media center would enhance the county's capability for coordinating news releases. The county's rumor control capability was excellent. Chester County Reception and Mass Care Centers Due to insufficient training of the staff members, the capability for registering and decontaminating evacuees was not adequately demonstrated at the three reception centers. There was also a lack of capability for 24-hour staffing. The staff at the esas care center were adequate in number and capability. The facility was gecarally ad' equate, but it may not have the capacity to house the assigned namber of evacuees. ((J ) Chester C'o unty Emergency Worker Decontamination Center The capability to perform decontamina' ion was not adequately demonstrated. The facility did not have showers, and had not been set up to demonstrate proper procedures. Decontamination monitoring of personnel was performed and correct procedures were demonstrated, but many of the staff were not adequately familiar with the use of dosimetry and other aspects of radiological exposure control. Charlestown Township EOC Notification and activation of the EOC occurred without problem, and the staff demonstrated a thorough knowledge of their responsibilities. The EMC and his staff demonstrated effective coordination of emergency activities,
**d appropriate actions were initiated to alert the public and obtain the l t;ansportation resources needed for evacuation. The EOC facility and communications capability were adequate.
East Coventry Township EOC The L"G staff was activated promptly, the EOC was fully staffed for one shift, and round-the-clock staffing capability was demosntrated by presentation of a roster. The EOC's amenities were adequate, as was the communications capability. The EMC managed operations effectively. Activation of traffic and access control posts was prompt and route alerting (" was implemented because of a siren failure. Preparations for notifying and transporting mobility-impaired individuals and others needing special O , assistance were demonstrated. The staff was sufficiently familiar with the use of dosimetry. viii
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East Nantaeal Township Call lists to notify the staff were incomplete, but mobilization of the full first shift occurred in a reasonable time. Capability for a full second shift was not demonstrated. EOC operations were handled effectively, and the EOC itself, including the communications system, was adequate. Township officials activated route alerting and determined the transportation requirements for those with special needs. Adequate procedures regarding radiological exposure control were demonstrated. The Township EMC delivered news briefings which were not coordinated with the PIO at the County, which resulted in a potentially misleading statement regarding release rates. East Pikeland Township EOC The emergency staff was notified and~ mobilized according to plan. Capability for 24-hour staffing was demonstrated by double staffing during the exercise. The EMC managed operations capably. The township has one of the few municipal EOCs that can support extended operations. The communications capability was , adequate. Public alerting was accomplished by thr'ee route alert teams, but ( notification of the hearing-impaired residents took one hour and fif teen I minutes, which should-be shortened. Mobility-impaired residents were notified by telephone, and ar'rangements were planned for their transportation needs. The traffic control posts were promptly manned. Insuffici.ent dosimetry was pre-distributed to the township, prompting a request to the county for more. East Vincent Township EOC Activation of the EOC staf f occurred promptly, but capability for 24-hour staffing was not demonstrated. The EOC and communications systems available were adequate. Emergency operations were well directed by the EMC. , Residents with special needs have been identified, and calls were placed to , notify individuals and institutions, as appropriate. Traffic control posts were promptly manned. North Coventry Township EOC Activation and staffing of a full shift was adequately demonstrated, but there was no formal demonstration of a shift change or 24-hour staffing designation. The EOC facilities and communications system were adequate. The township EMC demonstrated good capability for directing emergency operations, but directed questions to the PEMA representative, rather than to the County EOC. Four route alert teams were dispatched, and capability for notifying residents with special needs was simulated. Township officials made su'itable arrangements for transportation, and access control points were manned. The EOC personnel did not demonstrate a thorough understanding of the principals of radiological exposure control. Phoenixville Borough EOC ( The Phoenixville Borough EOC was delayed in activating due to misinformation y of the Borough EMC by the county staff. Once that problem was clarified.
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i l notification and activation of the staff occurred promptly, despite some ()(ss] incorrect phone numbers contained in the plans. Round-the-clock staf fing was demonstrated by double-staffing, The EOC was adequate, although noise control measures should be implemented. The available communications functioned adequately for the exercise, but additional telephones are recommended. The EMC was competent and provided ef fective leadership. A route alert team was dispatched to provide secondary notification. Transpor:ation needs were ' determined and reported to the county. Capability for implementing effective radiological exposure control was well demonstrated. Schuylkill Township EOC Activating and staffing of the EOC occurred as planned, except that the fire cepartment representative remained at the fire station, rather than relocating to the EOC. Capability for at least two full shif ts was not demonstrated. . - 7 A township officer was in charge of the EOC at all times, and emergency operations were well managed. The EOC facilities and communications system were generally adequate, except for the lack of radio communication with the fi's station. lue township's public alerting responsibilities were properly performed. Institutions were notified by telephone, and route alert teams were ((v] activated due to a sire failure, and to alert the hearing-impaired. Transportation requirements were identified and passed on to the county. Activation of traffic control points was prompt. Although the EMC is knowledgeable concerning the use of dosimetry, actual distribution to staff was not demonstrated. Spring City Borough EOC Activation of the EOC occurred according to plan. A full first shift were present, with capability for a second shift demonstrated by the presentation of a roster. The EMC was in charge of the Borough's emergency operations, which were marred by the mishandling of the evacuation message. Although the deputy EMC received the message at the proper time, the information was not recognized and acted upon by the EMC and staff. This internal coordination problem resulted in a 45 minute delay in implementing the evacuation. The Borough EOC was adequate, and no problems were experienced with the available ccumunications system. Public alerting measures were performed appropriately, with calls placed to institutions and route alert teams deployed. Arrangements for transporting ( those with special needs, if performed, were not observed. The municipal EOC staff was not sufficiently trained regarding radiological exposure () control. x
( Upper Uwchlan Township EOC
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Activation of the EOC occurred smoothly, with prompt mobilization of the full first shift. Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated by double staffing, with the second shift arriving later in the exercise. The EMC was ef fectively in charge of operations at the EOC. Internal coordination was well demonstrated, but miscommunication of the protective action message resulted in township officials believing, initially, that the evacuation was for the two-mile zone only, even though the plans contain no t such provision. It was not until 30 minutes after the evacuation was to have been implemented that the EMC obtained verification of the correct message. Creater familiarity with the plans could have prevented this delay. , The EOC lacks some basic amenities such as running water, toilets, and backup power. These should be provided where feasible. The communication system is to include amateur radio backup, but an ARES operator did not participate. This did not cause a probles during the exercise, as the primary system functioned adequately. The township has compile 3 kists of mobility-impaired residents and others requiring special assistance, and has identified residents who are transit- i dependent. One hearing-impaired individual has been identified, but route alerting to notify this individual was not implemented. Capability for implementing effective radiological exposure control was well demonstrated. ' Uwchlan Township EOC Activation and stffing of the E0c was promptly accomplished, with the ' exception of the police department representative. The township does not have sufficient staf f for round-the-clock operations. The management of the EOC was not strong and decisive and additional training of the staff is recommended. The facilities were generally adequate except that lighting should be improved and all available maps should be posted. Communications equipment and procedures were satisfactorily demonstrated. The capability for public alerting was demonstrated; however, the EMC was not certain when route alertin; was to be ordered. Special transportation was not needed or demonstrated since there are no needs for such within that portion of Uvchlan TJenship within the 10-mile EPZ. No dosimeters were available although their use and distribution was simulated by the EOC staff. Warwick Township EOC , The Warwick Township emergency staff, upon notification, mobilized promptly. The township did not have capability for staffing the EOC on a round-the-clock basis. The designated EMC chose not to participate, and an acting EMC was appointed for the exercise. This individual was untrained ( and inexperienced, but directed operations relatively well under the circumstances. The township EOC was marginally adequate for the exercise, but needs (G improvements to support an actual emergency. Communications problems were experienced with the telephones. V xi
p-f% Route alerting was performed due to a siren failure. Notification of others i (fV) with special needs was not demonstrated, as the list of such residents was not available. West Pikeland Township EOC i Activation and staffing of the EOC was accomplished in a timely manner. The ' l existence of sufficient personnel for 24-hour staffing was indicated by i presentation of a roster. The EOC was observed to be well organized and l well prepared, with the EMC in full control of emergency operations. The ( l facilities at the EOC were adequate, although space was limited. I l Communications were demonstrated to be good both in terms of equipment and
- procedures. The fire department was on standby for route alerting; however,
! it was not activated since the sirens were clearly heard at the designated time. ! The EOC demonstrated some capabilities for protective actions. The traffic l control point was manned by township police and lists of mobility-impaired ! people and those with special needs were available. Transportation for j those people was not available locally. This has been identified as an l unset need, but during the exercise the township did not request the county to provide unset transporation resources. Dosimetry equipment is also l needed, although its use was , simulated properly by the EOC staf f. l West Vincent Township EOC Activatio'n of the EOC, and mobilization of the staf f occurred promptly and in accordance with the plan. The township did not have the capability for two full shifts. The EMC performed effectively in directing the township's < response, and the various aspects of emergency operations management were
- well demonstrated. The EOC facilities and communications capability were l
adequate. Public alerting was performed by route alerting and calls made to institutions, and residents with hearing and mobility impairments. All such residents, including those who are transit-dependent, have been identified, and appropriate arrangements were made for their transportation. Traffte and access control posts were activated at the appropriate time. Capability for establishing effective radiological exposure contt91 for emergency personnel was adequately demonstrated. Berks County EOC The Berks Coucty emergency operations were overall well managed and supported by a knowlegeable, trained staff. The facilities at the EOC are excellent. Items which should be addressed by the County to enhance ( emergency response activities include 1) taking the necessary mesures to l ensure the timely,,and coordinated activitiation of the alert and notification system, 2) coordinating actions to ensure notification of ' significant activities to all appropriate response locations, 3) reviewing and ensuring adequate EBS reception at all required locations, and 4) updating and revising the County RERP. [ Berks County Reception and Mass Care Centers Although adequately equipped the Oley Reception Center was only partially
. activated due to a miscommunication at the County level. Emergency workers
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(~~) i > assigned monitoring and decontamination tasks at the Reception Center should m-be briefed as to whom will be monitored at that location - emergency workers or the general public. Mass care center operations were effectively demonstrated. Boyertown Area School District The Boyertown Area School District did not actively participate in this exercise due to the timing of the scenario. A primary concern raised by the district, however, was the potential traffic congestion at area schools as a result of the spontaneous, unsolicited pickup of school children by parents. Boyertown Borough EOC The EOC staf f at Boyertown were, in general, knowledgeable of emergency response activities, but may benefit from more detailed training with regard to the provisions of the Borough RERP. A systemmatic internal communications system should be developed and utilized by EOC staf f. Twenty-four hour staffing capability should be established. Colebrookdale Township EOC The Colebrookdale Township EOC was effectively managed and EOC staff displayed overall adequate tr'aining and knowledge. Round-the-clock staffing capability needs to be established. Heightened utilization of the amateur radio network should be considered by the Township as a message verification ((^3 resource. c) Douglass Township EOC The EOC staff demonstrated adequate knowledge with regard to emergency response procedures, but should be provided more detailed training with regard to the recently acquired copies of the RERP. Twenty-four staffing capability should be established. Earl Township EOC EOC staff at Earl Township were familiar with general emergency response procedures and local resources but should be provided additional RERP training. Twenty-four hour staffing capability should be established. Clarification is needed with regard to traffic control point manning responsibilities. Washington Township EOC Adequate knowledge was demonstrated by EOC staff concerning local needs and resources; however, additional training with regard to the provisions of the Township RERP should be provided. Designation of the responsible agency for manning traffic control points and the locations of access control points as identified by the Township and County RERPs should be comparatively reviewed and revised as necessary. Twenty-four hour staffing capability should be ( established. xiii
BACKGROUND Federal requirements dictate that periodic Radiological Eme gency Response Preparedness exercises be conducted in support of nuclear power plants to evaluate major portions of energency response capabilities. The exercises test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elemente existing within energency preparedness plans and organizations. The exercises simulate a coordinated response by State and local authorities, along with the utility, to include mobilization of personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to deal with an accident scenario requiring responses up to, and including, evacuation. This was the initial full participation exercise for the Limerick Generating Station and the various offsite organisations. The purpose of this report is to record the capabilities of State and local governments to respond to an accident at the Limerick Cenerating Station based upon the actual demonstration or simulation of their abilities during the July 25, 1984 joint, idll participation exercise . Deficiencies will be identified from this exercise and corrective actions will be recommended which would help to improve preparedness and response capabilities. The exercise was observed by 'a team made up of individuals f rom FEMA Region III, with support from FEMA Regions I and II, the American Red Cross and o Argonne Nstional Laboratory, along with members of the Regional Assistance h Committee. t xiv O
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O b PARTICIPATING STATE / COUNTY / MUNICIPAL COVERNMENTS State Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and 16 Other State Departments or Agencies ' Plume EPZ Jurisdictions Montgomery County Collegeville Borough Limerick Township Lower Frederick Township Lower Pottsgrove Township New Hanover Township Perkiomen Township Pottstown Borough , ' Royersford Borough ' Skippack Township Trappe Borough Upper Frederick Township . Upper Pottsgrove Township ' Upper Providence Township Upper Salford Township (O Chester County Charlestown Township East Coventry Township East Nantaeal Township East Pikeland Township East Vincent Township North Coventry Township Phoenixville Borough Schuylkill Township Spring City Borough Upper Uwchlan Township Uwchlan Township Warwick Township West Pikeland Township West Vincent Township Berks County Boyertown Borough Colebrookdale Township Douglass Township Earl Township Washington Township Support Counties Montgomery County Chester County (O. Berks County
. Lehigh County XV
r- 1 I \ NON-PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS v Plume EPZ Municipalities Montgomery County Douglass Township Green Lane Borough Lower Providence Township Lower Salford Township Marlborough Township Schwenksville Borough, West Pottsgrove Township Chester County South Coventry Township Berks County Amity Township . Union Township Support County Bucks County Based upon information supplied by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management ((,_ ; Agency, the following is an explanation as to the reasons for the lack of
'~'
participation by the above-referenced plume EPZ municipalities and Bucks County.
- 1. Montgomery County:
- a. Douglass Township, Lower Providence Township, and West Pottsgrove Township did not participate because of strong feelings against nuclear power that resulted in a political decision not to participate in the exercise. The county coordinator feels that much of this anti-nuclear feeling has been erased due to the fact that the exercise appeared to go well and he believes that these municipalities will participate in future exercise.
- b. Green Lane Borough, Lower Salford Township, Marlborough Township, and Schwenksv111e Borough did participate in the exercise but did not want FEMA to observe them. They took this action because they felt they were unprepared. PEMA did observe them. The county coordinator believes that these four municipalities will permit FEMA to observe them in future exercises because they performed better during the exercise than they had anticipated.
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<_j xvi O
- 2. Chester County; South Coventry Township did not participate due to strong anti-nuclear feelings. The county coordinator reported that they have no local coordinator of record and are taking some sort of legal action in the county courts.
- 3. Berks County:
Both Amity Township and Union Township did not participate because of strong anti-nuclear feelings. However, the county coordinator expressed his belief thst they'will participate in future exercises due to the rather good exercise that was conducted on July 25.
- 4. Bucks County:
The county consissioners elected not to participate in the exercise due to some misunderstanding with Philadelphia Electric Company that is unrelated to the nuclear power plant. O ( xvii 5
-- __ . - ___-i.-. ._. . _ . _ . , , _ _ . - _ , -- _ _ _ , , . . _ - _ , _ , _ , _ , , _ - , - - . - - , - _ _ - - - - - , - - _ . _ - - . - - - , - - - ,
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION REP EXERCISE July 25, 1984 Observer Assignments i RAC Chairman Jim Asher (FEMA) Regional Director Paul Giordano (FEMA) State EOC Janet Lamb (FEMA) - Team Leader Hugh taine (FEMA) Montgomery County Rick Kinard (FEMA) - Team Leader Bob Conley (USDA) Collegeville Borough Don Newson (Argonne) Limerick Township ,' Bob Archila (FEMA R-I) Lower Frederick Township Bill Casper (Argonne)
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{r Lower Pottsgrove Township Penny Wallingford (Argonne) New Hanover Township Neva Elliott (FEMA) Perkiemen Township Patti Crawford (FEMA) Potte*own Borough Joe Cavin (FEMA) Royereford Borough Marty Frengs (FEMA) Skippack Township Robin Danforth (FEMA) Trappe Borough Roman Siletsky (FEMA) Upper Frederick Township Al Weise (FEMA) Upper Pottsgrove Township Darrell Haemons (FEMA) , Upper Providence Township John Porco (DOT) Walt Adams (DOT) Upper Salford Township Dennis Figg (FEMA) ( O xviii O w-w.me,w====e** a- ee
i Chester County Steve Hopkins (FEMA) - Team Leader ky^ k Walter Fierson (FEMA) Charlestown Township Rocco Tocci (FEMA) East Coventry Township h becca Thomson (FEMA R-1) East Nantmeal Township Tony Foltaan (Argonne) East Fikeland Township Fatty McCallion (FEMA) East Vincent Township, Jack Dolan (FEMA R-1) North Coventry Township Bruce Swiren (FEMA R-I) Phoenixville Borough Steve Adukaitis (FEMA) Schuylkill Township Jim Opelka (Argonne) Spring City Borough ' Bob Linck (FEMA) Upper Uwchlan Township , Ken Fujishiro (FEMA) Uwchlan Township Bob Raspenda (Argonne) West Pikeland Township
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West Vincent Township Barbara Cray (FEMA) Berks County Karen Larson (FEMA) - Team Leader Karen Oakley (FEMA) Boyertown Borough Fat Arcuri (FEMA) Colebrookdale Township K. C. Chun ( Argonne) ' Douglass Township Francesca DiCosmo (FEMA) Earl Township Yehuda Klein (Argonne) Washington Township BRF EOC Ed Lessard (Brookhaven-DOE) EOF Jim Hawxhurst (NRC) Communications Fred Donnelly (FEMA) 4 Mike St. Angelo (FEMA) TCFs/ACFs Walt Adams (DOT) John Forco (DOT) \ xix e
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-e BRP Air Monitoring Teams \
Chris Weilandies (Brookhaven-DOE) Fran Dougherty (EPA) Agriculture Milk Sampling Team Bob Conley (USDA) Water Sampling Team / Bill Belanger (EPA) Chester Co. Decon Center Berks Co. Reception / Mass Care / Dale Petranech (FEMA / ARC) Decon Center /Berks & Montgo Co. Risk School Districts ( Montgomery Co. Reception / Mary Cinnan (ARC) Mass Care Centers Chester Co. Reception / Roberto Rodriguez (FEMA R-11) Mass Care Centers Hospitals / Nursing Homes , John Wells (HMS) E ( O - O O
1 A EVALUATION CRITERIA USED 1 i The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and local governments' response during this esercise was evaluated in relationship to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
- Disaster Operations Plan, Annex E - Pixed Nuclear Facilities, dated i November 1981 and the draf t Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Incidents at the Limerick Generating Station for Montgomery, Chester and l Berks Counties, along with the various draf t municipal Radiological Emergency Response Plans. These plans were prepared under the authority of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Services Act of 1978, P.L. 1332, and were developed in accordance with NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Energency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE EXERCISE 1. Test and evaluate the capabilities of state, counties and municipalities to interface and coordinate with each other in the following areas:
- a. Notification of Officials and Staff The adequacy of the nuclear incident notification and alert procedures from the fixed nuclear facility to PEMA, BRP, risk counties and municipalities and support counties.
- b. Public Alert / Notification and Information The ability of state, county and municipal authorities to alert, notify and update the public of incidents within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone, to include actual use of sirens.
EBS announcements, ' route alerting and other communications means available.
- c. Communications The adequacy of and/'or the need for all planned internal and external communications systems among and between the participants
,to include backup communications systems, EBS and RACES.
I
- d. Emergency Operations Center (State / County / Municipal)
The adequacy of the energency operations centers with respect to security, space, comfort, staffing and function for managing responses to nuclear facility incidents.
- e. Direction and Control The ability of key state, county and municipal energency response personnel and elected officials' support for the initiation and coordination of timely and effective decisions and their ability to provide resource requirements for incidents.
- f. Energency Plans The adequacy and capahtitty of implementation of state, risk and support counties and municipal emergency response plans.
- g. Public Information The adequacy of the intteface of state, county and nuclest facility public information systaas with the news media, to include news
, media briefing rooms, rumor control measures, etc.
xxii W
l k h. Accident Assessment (Bureau of Radiation Protection) The effectiveness of State BRP nuclear facility accident assessment system, to include adequacy of equipment, personnel staffing and competency skills with respect to reporting, dose projection, field measurement, coordination and communications.
- 1. Protective Measures The capability of the state, county and municipal emergency response systems to implement sheltering or evacuation and to take actions to activate such support functions as reception centers, mass care / decontamination centers, decontamination stations, risk school district procedures, ambulance services, bus operations, and pickup points.
J. Radiological Exposure Control The capability of state, county and municipal emergency response personnel to implement access control points and traffic control points, the issuance of dosimetry and KI and the record keeping and decontamination proc,edures. ( 4 C r {} xxiii
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SCENMIO The on-site scenario called for Unit 1 to be operating at full power with eight full power months of operation since the previous refueling. All power generation equipment is operating, and all safety system equipment is operable. Because of a fire at an instrument air compressor an Unusual Event is declared with is extinguished in about 40 minutes. An unplanned reactor scram led to a second Unusual Event being declared. Containment radiation monitor readings that exceeded 100 R/hr caused the declaration of g an Alert which was escalated to Site Emergency when the readings reached 1000 R/hr and a General Emergency at an excess of 10,000 F/hr. Because of Pennsylvania's policy of instituing protective actions, when necessary, within the entire plume EPZ, based upon a recommendation by the utility, and after an assessment by the Bureau of Radiation Protection and a consultation with the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Governot directed an evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ. The evacuation involved all participating state, cd'unty, municipal and prf.'vate organizations in the area. . s Scena,rio Chronology of Events Projected, Actual e (. Time
' Time 1105 :st Unusual Event Declared 1120 1315 2nd Unusual Event Declared +
1330
? 3rd Unusual Evert Declared 1505 1600 Alert Declared , 1600 1730 Site Emergency Declared 1730 1930 General Emergency Declared 1935 1930-2030 Evacuation Decision 2020 1930-2030 Evacuation Implemented 2045 2230 Exercise Terminated 2130-2230
( O xxiv
. I i
DEMONSTRATION OF RESOURCES State, county, and participating municipal and support County EOCs Communications systems and equipment Staffing of facilities Prompt notification system, including siren system and EBS Route alerting by various fire departments State and county Media Centers, including rumor control Field sampling teams (air, water, agriculture) and equipment Designated risk school districts and host schools Designated reception an( mass care centers Designated emergency worker decontamination stations Designated hospitals (risk'and host)
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Desginated access control and traffic control points ( (V) - Designated risk nursing homes
- Self-reading dosimeters (both actual and simulated), dose records, and simulated TLDs and KI for emergency workers
( xxv O O
( OBJECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED Objectives, which have been listed earlier in this report, have been met except as noted below:
- 1. Non-participating communities did not meet any of the objectives.
- 2. The communities referenced as not demonstrating twenty-four hour capability did not fully meet objective d.
- 3. Lack of dosimetry an'd K1 - objective J. was not fully addressed.
- 4. Lack of complete planning for dealing with mobility-lapaired/ transit dependent individuals or lack of demonstration of the means to deal with these individuals - objective 1. was not fully addressed.
- 5. Lack of demonstration of the ability to alert and notify the public within 15 minutes of tlfe decision to implement protective actions and EBS reception dif ficultites in Berks County - objective b. was not fully addressed.
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l Pennsylvania State EOC/ Bureau of Radiation Protection
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I. Activation and Staffing The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency received a call from the utility informing them of an Unusual Event at the plant at 1129. The call was received over the main ring-down phone; this instrument is a dedicated line which links the utility BRP, State EOC, Eastern Area EOC and the ri.sk County EOCs. Two additional Unusual Events were reported to the State EOC by BRP at 1344 and 1505. Staff members in the EOC were notified and the operations room partially activated at 1145. The Risk Counties, Eastern Area office, States of New Jersey, ' Delaware and Maryland were all notified by 1134. According to EOC Staff acabers, 24-hour notification is accomplished by use of duty officers. Calls are forwarded to the duty officer who has 2 phones installed in his/her residence, along with a recording capability. The call initiating ad'tivation of the EOC was received at 1604 from BRP informing the State of an escalation to Alert stage at 1600. At , that time the Eastern Area Office, risk counties, support countie6, and the City of Philadelphia EOC were notified. State agencies were notified; six agencies w'ere instructed to report immediately and the rest placed on standby to await further instructions. (() By l'645 the State EOC was adequately staffed and the following State agencies were present in the EOC: Pennsylvania State Police PennDot Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Protection Department of Military Affairs Department of Agriculture RACES operator (GSA) PEMARS operator Additional State agency personnel were present in the EOC by 1830, to include: , Bureau of Corrections Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Department of Aging Department of Commerce Department of Community Affairs Ddpartment of Education . . Department of Environmental Resources - Governors Energy Council Department of General Services
. Department of Public Welfare g
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r' The staff uembers were all briefed upon arrival at the EOC and ([ displayed excellent knowledge, ability and training to perform their assigned functions. Twenty-four operations were demonstrated by presentation of a roster and double manning in some positions. Many of the second shif t staff members were acting as Observer / Instructors for this exercise. The operations officer had a list of locations and phone numbers where each staff member could be reached. II. Emergency Operations Management The operations officer was effectively in charge throughout the exercise. He was assisted by a shift leader and four liaison officers who were assigned to inform the risk counties and Eastern Area offices of significant information and were actively involved in coordinating response actions and information between the risk counties and State EOC. The public address system was used to brief EOC staff whenever additional information became available. Response agency representatives were 6riefed in the conference room several times throughout the duration of the exercise, and reported to the shift leader whenever tasks assigned were completed. Plans and checklists were available and utilized whenever necessr.ry. All incoming and outgoing messages were fogged, photocopied and routed through the shift leader before being distributed to the appropriate action o f f i,ce . . Badges were issued to all personnel present in the EOC and a { {~T security guard was posted at the ent rance. The ECC was notified of Unusual Event at 1129, Alert at 1604, Site Area Emergency at 1734 and General Emergency at 1945. The Governor declared a State of Emergency at 1845. At 2045 the siren system was activated; evacuation ordered by the Governor. The Governor's office was actively involved in decisionmaking during the exercise and the Lt. Governor toured the EOC and was given a briefing on the status of response actions. III. Facilities The State EOC in Harrisburg is an excellent facility with adequate space furniture, lighting, equipment and telephones to aupport all response personnel. Status boards were visible and were continually updated. All appropriate maps were available and posted in the operations room. IV. Communications Primary communications with the licensee, BRP, Eastern Area office ( and the risk counties, (Montgomery, Berks, and Chester) were demonstrated through the use of dedicated commercial telephone lines; 3 both commercial phones and amateur radio nets were used as backup. The commercial phone line was used to contact FEMA and contiguous b 2 ($) 4 _m__ -
T states with FNARS as back-up. The PEMARs system was tested but could (. not be brought on-line. The Communications officer was not available for the exercise. A person from CSA was brought in to operate the PEMARs network but was not sure of procedures for using the PEMARs system. Problems were experienced with the new teletype system for - transsitting hard copy messages to the appropriate jurisdictions. . Some messages were received as such as 6 hours after they were typed into the system. When these system problems are corrected the hard copy capabilities should be excellent. t V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations (Bureau of Radiation Protection Activation and staffing of the Bureau of Radiation Protection was quick and in accordance with written procedures. The dedicated line , from the utility to BRP was the line over which the initial call for Alert status care is and thus verification was not necessary. The written call down lis(s were in evidence and utilized throughout the : exercise. The BRP staff was present at 1600 and included the incident Manager (Bureau Director), the Logistician (Chief of Environmental Radiation Division, Dose Projector (Chief Energy , Planning Section and a n'uclear engineer. The communications between ' PEMA and BRP was initially performed by BRP staff until the PEMA liaison arrived. Staff members were highly qualified and trained in [ T the field of radiological emergency response. They were aware of the fundamental requirements of an emergency staff. Two staff nuclear engineers were dispatched to the area of concern (EOF and TSC). Normally a BRP nuclear engineer would be dispatched to the EOF only; however, since the facilities were so close and it gave the cpportunity to become familiar with utility and NRC responsibilities, an engineer was sent to the TSC as well. The nuclear engineer provides BRP with an independent engineering assessment. He and his counterpart plus NRC liaison, who are both at BRP, would suggest ways to mitigate the accident. The nuclear engineer at the EOF would be responsibie for representing BRP's views of protective actions. This is a technically sound approach to appropriately staff an emergency assessment team at this level of government. Emergency operations management was smooth and efficient. Staff members communicated effectively and were involved in all aspects of decision making. They were familiar with written procedures and were comfortable with frank discussions between themselves, the NRC liaison and PEMA liaison. Their verbal approach to distributing new technical information was effective and alerted everyone to a change in a situation. It caused people to repeat messages out loud and mentally register the information. O e
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hp A blackboard sign at the entrance was a clever device used to direct unauthorized people out of the area. Identification was required for entry. The facilities were adequate and in some cases axcellent. Monitoring locations were plotted on large display maps as were plume path and EPZ. Overlays were used correctly. It was noticed that the scale marking the hash lines for degrees, which is correctly used to overlay the template, was opague. It blocks the view of the map, sampling locations and field team locations out to about one mile from the plant. A clear plastic scale is recommended. Communications between the utility, NRC, the State EOC, TSC; EOF, and county EOCs were adequate. The radio communications with field monitoring teams did not work and back-up communications through the EOF were inadequate. It is recommend that a second radio, on an independent system, be placed in the field team vehicles. Although State Police radios were recommended as backup communications for the field teams, it was clear that this would not work unless the PSP were involved at the time the teams were dispatched and remained as part of the BRP respo6se plan. Delay in arrival of police radios may lead to teams not being notified in time of plant status changes, protective actions and personal exposure control guidance which is the responsibility of BRP. Dose projection was performed by utility, and EPA-recommended, methods by persons at BRP headquarters. These methods are adequate. They are performed by hand calculation and displayed on a template
/ overlaying a map. There were delays as units for physical quantities were not verified when the technical information was obtained. A standard agreement between the EOF and BRP should be reached regarding release rate units. The logistician acted very quickly to correct differences and compensated for errors made by dose proj ector. BRP staff required 50 minutes to coordinate evacuation recommendations with NRC and the utility. This delay was caused in part because BRP had difficulty contacting the nuclear engineer, who was busy in conferences and discussions with the utility. Some method of assuring adequate communications between the nuclear engineer and BRP should be established in order to speed up the coordination efforts. Overall the close communications between BRP staff provided a good system of checks and balances.
BRP queried the Department of Health as to the availability of potassium iodide and were informed that it was available. The Department of Health arranged with Pennsylvania State Police to deliver KI to Allentown for use by Lehigh County. BRP recoesended the use of K.I at 2015 as noted below: (
"When evacuation is ordered, Health Department should notify emergency workers to take Potassium Iodide".
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e- However, none of the risk counties received instructions from the (()g Department of Health to inform emergency workers to take KI. BRP was reported as instructing monitoring team emergency workers to take KI at 1915 through the BRP liaison at the EOF. The Department of Health did not formally issue the authorization of the use of KI. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction After receiving notification of General Emergency at 1935, and after discussions with BRP, a conference call was established with the three risk counties and the Eastern Area Office in order to coordinate public alerting and instruction. The risk county EMCs were asked to provide the state with the amount of time needed to inform municipalities and initiate response actions involved at the time of siren activation. It was decided that 20 minutes would be required and that sirens would be sounded at 2045, with EBS announcements and route alerting to be initiated immediately following siren activation. News releases containfng public instructions were drafted at the State media center. Sample releases were used as guidelines, which is considered appropriate. The media center played a role in distributing instruction to the public by issuing hard copies of releases to media repres'entatives and through press briefings. The State media center also provides EBS announcements, although they are not ,responsbile for activation of the EBS system. , VII. Protective Actions At 2008 BRP informed the operations officer via dedicated phone line that the utility was recommending evacuation 360 degrees out to two miles and 10 miles down wind. The operations officer, at that point, reiterated Pennsylvania's policy (as noted in Annex E of the State plan) to evacuate the entire 10-alle EPZ (300o). As noted above at 1958 PEMA queried the risk counties as to the amount of time they would need to notify all municipalities of the time the sirens would be sounded. Berks County replied that they could notify municipalities in five minutes. Chester and Montgomery Counties informed PEMA that they would need 20 minutes. After further discussion BRP and PEMA decided to evacuate the 10 mile EPZ with priority for evacuation of the population within 2 miles of the plant. PEMA notified the Eastern Area office and the risk counties at 2020, that the sirens would be sounded at 2045 and that 360 degree evacuation of the 10 mile EPZ with a priority to evacuate the population within 2 miles should begin as soon as possible after the sounding of the sirens. The time lapse from the time the decision to evacuate was made until the activation of the alert and notification system was 25 minutes. FEMA-43 states that once the decision has been made to activate the alert and notification system, the capability will be available for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an f
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c (Q area wide basis throughout the 10-mile EPZ, within 15 minutes. The wording " priority to evacuation of population within 2 miles" caused some confusion at the risk county and municipal EOCs and was a deviation from procedures contained in the State plan. The Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) procedures that provide for participating officers to report to staging areas prior to being dispatched to TCP's and ACP's worked effectively and efficiently. For this exercise, only one (Limerick) of the three planned staging areas was activated. However, officers who are detailed to be in charge of the other two staging areas participated and demonstrated the ability to dispatch officers to respresentative sites in the other two counties from the activated staging area. A briefing was presented at 1030 that addressed the PSP responsibilities, specific duties of the officers assigned to TCP's and ACP's and radiological procedures and precautions. The briefing complemented earlier training provided to the officers. At 1130 the officers were directed to report to their assigned posts. All officers were observed at their assigned locations. Each officer was aware of what.his/her specific responsibility at the - respective TCP/ACP was and also had a general understanding of the overall evacuation plan. Current information was available on locations of dairy farms, food [(s processing plants, and water supply intake points. At 1815 BRP recommended that milk samples be collected at the evening's milking. At 1820 Department of Agriculture Milk Sanitation officers were dispatched to dairy farms in the vicinity of the Limerick Generating Station, to collect samples of milk, feed, forage and water. At 1835 based on information received from the utility and BRP f recommendations, the Department of Agriculture advised farmers in the 10 mile EPZ to place all livestock under shelter and start feeding of stored feed. Farmers were further advised to report their status to the County Agent. However these instructions were sent only to Montgomery County. A State news release was sent out regarding the protection of livestock which was coordinated with all risk counties. When Berks County received the news release, (which was the only indication of protective action recommendations for livestock) they called the State EOC to confirm and then took appropriate actions. Chester County took no action. A possible cause for this problem may have been the wording of the message from the Department of Agriculture to PEMA and M:ntgomery County at 1904. This message infers that Montgomery County should remove all livestock from pasture. In actuality, Montgomery County ~ refers to the location of the Limerick Generating Statier. and farmers within the entire EPZ should have removed their livestock f rom pasture and placed them on stored feed. Care must be taken that
e messages are easily understood so that proper instructions are given _((). .to all parties concerned. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Not applicable at the State EOC. IX. Media Relations It should be noted that for this exercise no joint media center was established. The utility set up its own media center at the . Philadelphia Electric Corporate Headquarters. PEMA set up the State media center in the State EOC. Attempts were made to coordinate information by: (1) telefaxing copies of state news releases to the Utility Media Center and utility news releases to the state Media Center. However problems arose immediately when the telefax equipment at the utility did not work. The equipment was replaced and telefaxing capabilities restored: (2) a joint two way conferencing capability was set up between each media center. The State PIO gave his brfefings over the conferencing telephone to a utility spokesperson who then relayed the information to the media representatives. There was limited two-way dialogue between media representatives and the State spokesperson. It is recommended that a joint media center, at s' location in closer proximity to the affected area and agreeable to both the State and the Utility, be established in o,rder to facilitate the coordination of information being { presented to the public. The State Media Center was well staffed by a full compliment of professional public information persons f rom a dozen State agencies. ' They were all knowledgeable of their jobs and what was expected of them. The clerical support was very capable and qualified. Public information releases were prepared in a timely manner and released promptly. They were also coordinated by phone with the local jurisdictions. Hard copy was held up in the communications room due to some malfunction of the equipment. Information in the releases was adequate to inform the public of the situation and protective actions. There were very few media representatives present. Nevertheless regularly scheduled news briefings were held. The room for briefings and facilities to accommodate the media was adequate and could provide for about fifty media persons. The system of conferencing, or joint two-way briefings with the Utility Media Center did not operate as well as expected. This was the first attempt at operating separately and the exercise provided an opportunity to test the equipment. 7 (O 4 g, , . , < - . - -.---.--r.m-.- ------eewe-- + * + "
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I. Recovery and Reentry b ' Recovery and reentry procedures were not addressed during this ' exercise. XI. . Scenario The scenario for the exercise was adequate to test the State response t i capabilities. During scenario planning prior to the exercise, PEMA f informed FEMA Region 3 that CDV-742 pocket dosimeters and CDV-750 chargers had been distributed to each County EOC and would be distributed to emergency workers in accordance with county and municipal plans. However only Berks County distributed CDV-742 4 dosimeters and CDV-750 chargers to the emergency workers. From an n exercise standpoint, the distribution of this equipment would have provided an opportunity to observe the emergency workers proficiency in the use of self-reading dosimetry and charging equipment. t Although the issuing of Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDS), CDV-730 pocket dosimeters and y tassium iodide was not to be demonstrated during the exercise, emergency workers did simulate having this ! + equipment. State EOC Deficiencies / i 1. Twenty-five minutes lapsed from the time the decision was made to , evacuate until the activation of the alert and notification system.
,( FEMA-43 stat'es thrt once the decision has been made to activate the '
alert and notificatica system, the capability will be available for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an area wide basis throughout the 10- i sile EPZ, within 15 minutes, j l
- 2. A back-up Consunications Officer should be trained on all the i Consunications systems available in the State EOC in the event that the regular communications officer is not available, and for ?
- continuity if extended operations become necessary.
- 3. The new teletype systes, if operating efficiently, would provide an outstanding capability to the State EOC. Every attempt should be :
4 made to resolve the systems problems experienced during the exercise.
- 4. Care should be taken by the Department of Agriculture in the wording ;
of messages to insure they are easily understood and that proper ; instructions are given to all parties concerned. i S. BRP made recommendations to the Department of Health that Emergency Uorkers take KI when evacuation was ordered. The risk counties never j , received instructions from the Department of Health to have emergency : a workers take KI.
- 6. According to information supplied by PEMA prior to the exercise, CDV-742 dosimeters and CDV-750 chargers were to be issued to
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l-emergency workers in accordance with county and municipal plans. (O Montgomery and Chester Counties did not distribute CDV-742 dosimeters or CDV-750 chargers to emergency workers. From an exercise standpoint, the distribution of this equipment would have provided an opportunity to observe the emergency workers' proficiency in its use.
- 7. It is recommended that a joint media center, at a location in closer i proximity to the affected area and agreeable to both the State and 4
Utility, be established in order to facilitate the coordination of information to the public and to anticipate some of the possible ; i equipment failures,that can arise. i 8. In order to avoid any possible misunderstandings in regard to evacuation orders, the State messages should follow those procedures outlined in Annex E of the State plan.
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Bureau of Radiation Protection Deficiencies
- 1. Some system for veriffing units for physical quantities needs to be established between the EOF and BRP.
- 2. The primary means of communication between field monitoring teams did not function during the ' exercise, the back-up system proved 1 inadequate. '
- 3. During the exercise BRP had difficulty talking with the nuclear
[(s engineer who was busy in conferences and discussions with utility staff. Some method of assuring adequate communications between the i engineer and BRP should be established. '
- 4. Annex E, Appendix 16, page 6 of the State plan states that KI should be taken only on the advise of the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health. It was unclear if the Department of Health was involved in the decisionmaking process of " issuing" KI to the BRP monitoring teams.
Emergency Operations Facility < I. Activation and Staffing [ The City of Philadelphia and State of Pennsylvania were represented
- at the emergency operations facility (EOF). The response teams were notified through their regular mobilization procedure, used for an emergency. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP),
Department of Environmental Resources, has specified a principal and back-up Nuclear Engineer for each nuclear power plant site within . t Pennsylvania. Full coverage is provided by two persons, who relieve one'another. The City of Philadelphia provided an engineer and > meteorologist to act as representatives of the city. Space was provided for a Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency representative and also representatives from the three risk counties. O ' 4
As described in the state's energency plan, a full complement of (JT
)*- staff was present. The representative was familiar with the states emergency plan.
II. Facilities The EOF provided adequate space and equipment for the city and state representative. The EOF is located outside the 10-mile energency planning zone; therefore, no special ventilation system is required. Security was established at the facility. No radiation monitoring was done at the facility prior to access. i , The city and state personnel had unhindered access to all meetings and plant status boards. III. Consunications l The EOF site was impressive. Relevant and informative charts were everywhere. The size was equipped with three telephone systems: The first switchboard sys(en was located at the Limerick Generating Station and extensions were tielined to all appropriate locations. The tielines between the Limerick Generating Station and the EOF where over the PECO Microwave system and through the public telephone j system for redundancy; the second switchboard system was located at the PECO Headquarters on 23rd and Market in Philadelphia and switchboard to the EOF; The third switchboard system was located at ( the ' Plymouth EOF site. The public telephone numbers / trunks came from two Central Offices for redundancy. The switchboards had power failure telephones so if they failed direct phone-to-trunk connections would be automatically established. A Radio system was inplace between Montgomery County EOC and the EOF as a backup. A Radio system was inplace between the LCS-TSC and the EOF. The TSC had direct contact with the LCS Control e Room and the Control Room had Radio to Montgomery County. There was a PECO computer system between all PECO locations for additional consunications. The radiological monitoring section had Radio between the EOF and the teams. There was a computer system for radiological computations. Message center procedures that were explained to the observer were excellent but there was no time to determine if they were being followed. IV. Informational Functions , This function was not performed at the EOF. - J V. Rumor Control The rumor control number (s) were activated and manned by utility (' personnel; six persons, three per shift located in the corporate O
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office, handled the calls. The observer did not verify the capability ((] or awareness of these individuals. An adminstrative emergency number was available in the licensee phone directory. VII. Scenario The scenario was adequate to provide for offsite response activity and test the capability of the state representative. The city officials were not tested; no information on water contamination was available. Emergency Operations Facility Deficiency
- 1. Consideration should be given to monitoring of individuals entering the EOF for radioactive contamination.
Medical Support Communications
- The communications capability was directly observed and the activity went very well. The EOC messages about the status of the emergency were received in a timely manner. The tasks which are identified in both the county plan and each individual facility plan were conducted and communicated back to the EOC. (Census, transportation requirements,, monitoring equipment inventories, etc.).
I The communication system appeared, throughout the exercise, to be functioning quite well. The host hospitals were contacted for bed availability and notice of the number / types of patients which would need to be transported in case of an evacuation. This communication was effective and timely. In summary, there was adequate equipment, properly trained operators, and effective utilization of the plan. Hospital Unfortunately, there was no opportunity to observe the processing of a patient as this activity was not conducted according to the scenario. No patient was transported to the Chester County Hospital. A patient was transported to Phoenixville and Pottstown Hospitals; unfortunately this was not played according to the exercise schedule. Therefore, the observer arrived af ter the patient had been treated and released. However; there was an opportunity to review, on-site, the hospitals" I plans by which they were operating. Adherence to the plan was progressing well: Key staff were present, alert procedures were accomplished in a timely fashion, current patient census and status were made, appropriate monitoring equipment was inventoried and in { 11
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s place, and the record cards were appropriately completed. There (((_sI seemed to be sufficient supplies of monitoring equipment but Pottstown Medical Center and Phoenixville Hospital will need supplemental supplies to have enough for all the staff who would be involved in an evacuation of the facilities. The hospitals have radiology departments who are a ready resource for the monitoring tasks. Chester County Hospital has its own contract for the monitoring tasks and has its own contract for a health physicist and laboratory; Pottstown Medical Center and Phoenixville Hospital have agreements with a lab and health physics staff; and, as [ risk hospitals, have agreements with the PECO health physics staff. ~ Ambulance From observations made at the Montgomery County EOC, the ambulance squads were active throughout the exercise. Dispatches were made from the medical and transportation desks. No direct observation of ambulance activity was made.as the scenario was not followed. From reports from the hospftals that received patients, the ambulances and crew were handled according to procedures, to determine level of contamination and decontamination if necessary. Patients were the responsibility of the emergency team, vehicles and crew the responsibility of radiol'ogical officer. Once again, no direct observation was made. ( Scenario' The scenario was a well-planned set of activities. Most of the areas observed reinforced this assessment. The medical system plans and their implementation were tested in an adequate manner as they progressed through the emergency classification levels. The lack of observation of the receipt of a contaminated, injured person was unfortunate. No patient was ever received by Chester County Hospital even though the Chester EOC kept expecting one; the hospital kept its staff at the ready until 2300. The two hospitals who received patients were not so designated in the scenario; since they did not have a scenario; they responded to this aspect as they should, having been notified that their services were needed. It was not a problem for the two hospitals but it did prevent the state and federal observers presence during this important phase; no direct assessment was possible. It also made an assessment of the ambulance equads impossible. Medical Support Deficiencies
- 1. Inadequate number of dosimeters at the Pottstown Hospital and the 4 Phoenirville Hospitals to support an evacuation or a shelter action.
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- 2. State and federal observers were not able to observer the management i
- , of an injured, contaminated person since they were delivered to hospitals other than those on the scenario.
Field Monitoring Teams
! Air Monitoring Team 1 , The mobilization phase of the exercise was excellent. The team was well drilled and very competent. There were two teams of two people !
(total 4). All members have had several years experience in 4 radiological monitoring. Mobilization worked very well with calls ! from the controller as appropriate. No suggestions can be offered to , I
- improve this phase.
Field Team equipment was neatly stored in a cabinet with each teaa member assigned a shelf. An equipment check list was on the door. This phace was excellent except for one suggestion. Some of the , equipment did not have any calibration date or what was there was two
- or three years old. fo improve this situation another column could be added to the state emergency equipment inventory to keep the calibration up-to-date. .
Technical Operations for' the Norristown 107. Team were not observed , since the team, due to malfunction of radio equipment, had to perform i a communications only function. ~ [ (~O On arriving in the field, radio contact could not be established with the controller in Harrisburg. The base in Harrisburg was operational 1 but the link to the antenna had a malfunction which could not be
! remedied during the exercise. ,
Both mobile teams tried various " tricks" to establish some sort of i communication. In order to participate in any part of the exercise, i one van parked at the EOF. The other van was then sent out (Reading 105) to respond to the exercise as best as possible. Telephone calls were taken in the EOF from the controller and relayed via the } nonitoring van in the parking lot to the " roving" van. Van-to-van communications, were adequate using the repeater as needed. i j' This phase of the operation was essentially a question and answer i-period with the team since the monitoring van had to park. However, there are no problems with this phase. As stated before the team of , was very competent. 4 The scenario was well planned and adequate pertaining to this phase of the operation. However, the communication problems previously ; , mentioned, prevented the monitoring teams from fully displaying the ' i expertise that they 'nad obviously acquired. 1 l 13 [ ,
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~ Air Monitoring Team 2 The drill was initiated, as far as this air monitoring team was concerned, with a call from the Harrisburg BRP office at 1600 hours at which point the team was placed in a condition of standby, and the two vehicles were loaded. A second call was received informing the 'e team of the meteorological conditions. In addition, a problem with [
the radio communication system was made known. In an attempt to resolve this probles, only one sampling team was dispatched for field data. The other team stayed in touch with Harrisburg via a direct phone line connection. The information to and from Harrisburg was relayed by one of the mobile radio units in one of the snapling vehicles stationed at the EOF, where phone communications with Harrisburg were established. If indeed an actual emergency did exist, mobile communication could be established via the State Police radio communication system. Once communication was established with Harrisburg through the EOF, tne ~ nonitoring team left the EOF to commence sampling. The single sampling team was dispatched from the EOF at about 1930. Shortly af ter 2000, the field sampling operations were terminated.
- The drill seemed'very short as far as actual field procedures were conce rned. Those tasks which the team performed (obtaining an air sample), were done well; however the field exercise was called of shortly after one sample was obtained. There was a lack of the
({ ) lastest calibration date on two of the instruments checked, however we were informed that all the instruments are checked on a quarterly basis. ! t The teams showed very good familiarity with the sampling area. Considering the problems the team had with the radio network they j functioned well. Air Monitoring Teams Deficiencies '
- 1. The communication failure in Harrisburg should have been overcome ,
since this could happen in a real emergency. Possibly the state police net or other temporary measures should have been used. I
- 2. . Calibration dates should be noted on all equipment.
Water Sampling Team A two-person team was dispatched from the DER office in Norristcwn to collect water samples and carry then to Harrisburg. The team operated out of the scenario time-frame to avoid overtime. Departure t
- from Norristown was at 0945. Samples were taken from Linfield Bridge '
and carried to Harrisburg. The samples were in the laboratory by 1300. During the sample collection, radio contact was attempted in order to get directions from BRP. Since the exercise had not yet [. 14
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I (f started, BRP did not respond. The sampling team then demonstrated that they were aware of alternate communications links to contact BRP. Af ter reaching the laboratory, the person to whom the samples were to be delivered was not available. The team was able to locate this person's alternate and to deliver the samples to him. It was explained to the observer that in the event of a real accident, two water monitoring teams would be dispatched from . Norristown, one for finished water and one for raw water. Only one team was used for this exercise. The team know their sampling points - and procedures well. They were issued proper simulated dosimetry I which they read at .the appropriate intervals. They were also aware of the exposure limits for emergency workers. The team was well-trained and was adequately briefed on what they were supposed to do. Overall, the team's performance was very good with no deficiencies. Agricultural Sampling Team This team performed in timely and efficient manner during the exercise. Team members were experienced and knowledgeable in sample calibration procedures. They had, in their vehicle a CB radio for communications, all nece,asary sampling equipment, and protective clothing, including boots, rubber glovers and disposable coveralls. They were equipped with CDV 730 and CDV 742 personal dosimeters, knew how .to read them and, every half hour entered readings on a Dosimetry (() and KI Report Form. They were also familiar with KI usage. The teau collected samples of water, milk, hay, feed, pasture and , folage on two farms in the 10- mile EPZ. They were knowledgeable of decontamination procedures and the location of decontamination stations in the area. Overall the team demonstrated excellent procedures and performed in a professional manner. 15 t ( O . O O g 6 - , - - , . * = - . . _ . -e=~-
_- ~- . .- .-. . . - -- - .- t Montgomery County EOC I. Activation and Staffing i Upon arrival at the EOC at the Unusual Event stage it was noted that ' most of the staff were already on hand. This was in contradiction to the county RERP which calls for limited activation at the Alert - stage. Although it is understood that there is a natural tendancy to want to "get things rolling," future exercises should follow the EOC 0 activation procedures established in the plan in order to get a more . realistic determination as to the time it wculd take to fully staff , the EOC. A written call list was available and appeared to be up- - to-date. Staffing was considered complete at 1630. The Montgomery ' County Consunications Center is operatic.nal on a 24-hour basi's; thus if an activation call is received during off-duty hours, the , 1 communications center will notify the applicable staff utilizing a ! l call-down list. ' Calls from the utility were verified by using the PEMA Notification Checklist. It is recommended that the checklist i also be used for the confirmation calls from PEMA rather than using a l
- standard message foraf in order to assure that the information in !
I both messages is consistent. ' i . i Organizations / individuals at the EOC included the EMC, Operations i Officer, Industrial Liaison, Mass Care, Medical Group, RADEF Officer, Police Services, Pennsylvania State Police, Fire Services and , Consunications/ Dispatchers, all of whom displayed adequate training
- and knowledge and whom were most enthusiastic and professional in carrying out their responsibilities. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated through the presentation of a roster and through
, double-staffing at many positions. However, the county has ] l acknowledged that there are still certain positions which have not l' been adequately staffed in order to assure complete 24-hour coverage. II. Emergency Operations Management I The EMC was effectively in charge of operations at the Montgomery County EOC, ably assisted by the operations staff and other staff members. Although all critical information was broadcast over the ;
- EOC's public address system and the EMC did periodies11y discuss the ;
, status of the response with individual staff seabers, (the staff members also discussed matters among themselves) it is recommended that full briefings be held, involving all the staff. This will give the EMC the benefit of hearing a complete report on the status of the - energency response at any given point in time and will also serve to inform the individual staff seabers of what is being done in other areas that might have an impact on them. The staff, especially the l operations officers, were involved in decisionmaking, where ; appropriate. i i l Plans were'available for reference, along with written checklists for { l each of the specific response areas, which proved to be very ; I - effective in providing specific directions at each emergency ; _k 16 i O ! l . 1 [
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classification level. Message logs were kept, and messages were ( reproduced and distributed to the applicable individual for action or information. Access to the EOC was effectively controlled by the County Sheriff's Department; all individuals were required to sign in (or out) and display identification. Montgomery County received notification at 1610 concerning the Alert, and were notified of the Site Emergency at 1730 and the General Emergency at 1940. At 2020, after consultation between the risk counties and PEMA, it was determined that evacuation should commence at 2045. 1 The county was responsible for coordinating activities with other jurisdictions throughout the exercise including: the risk municipalities, police, fire, ambulance, bus companies, industries, hospitals, etc. Some municipalities felt that the county did not respond promptly to their request for filling unset needs. The county should attempt to respond to municipal requests in a timely manner. If a prqbles cannot be resolved quickly, it is suggested that the county infera the municipality that the situation is being addressed and they will be informed of the outcome as soon as possible. The EMC informed the Federal observer that all important information was being relayed to the county commissioners in Norristown and that in an actual emergency, that is where the commissioners would be ( located. This would have been an ideal opportunity for the commissioners personally to view the county's capabilities in the event there is an accident at the Limerick Generating Station. III. Facilities Overall facilities were outstanding. The Montgomery County EOC is a modern, underground facility with everything needed for continuous 24-hour operation. It has two back-up diesel power generators, 30-day fuel supply, a 14-day food supply, stored water and sleeping accommodations, along with complete communications equipment. Maps and charts were adequate. All necessary information was displayed on wall charts or was included in the county plan and directory. However, a suggestion was made to display more comprehensive and refined maps and charts. This is being done but was just not accomplished in time for the exercise. The E0C had the following charts / status boards and maps clearly visible: major problem board, LGS incident status board, police / fire /eas resources board, siren coverage map, siren locations; evacuaction routes; 10-mile EPZ;'- EPZ facilities including nursing homes, hospitals, fire departments, police departments, and ambulance companies, and a large Montgomery County map. 17 i O i , _
A IV. Communications (U The Montgomery County EOC communications layout was impressive in appea rance. The most outstanding item was the dispatch system for fire and police; it was easy to use and all messages were authenticated. Although both the county and municipal plans refer to the telephone as the primary means of communication, with RACES as a backup, the heavy reliance on the RACES system throughout the exercise caused some confusion at the municipal level as to where the communication ! priority lay. , Although the various communications systems were quite sophisticated when taken as a whole, the appearance of systems integration was not there. As an example, important messages would be broadcast to municipal police or fire departments over the county radio net before the message was " officially" relayed by the county to the municipal EOCs through the use of telephones or RACES. Two "Hotlines" link Montgomery County to the State, one of which also allows conferencing with the other risk counties and the utility, and the other which is tied ,into a liaison officer at PEMA Headquarters. Other forms of communications with PEMA include various radio nets and the PEMA teletype system, the latter of which did not function in a timely manner at various points throughout the exercise. As an example, hard copy verification of an Unusual Event declared at 1415 ({) was not received by the county until 2005. Telephone and RACES serve as the means of communication between the county and municipalities and school districts, while the county radio net is utilized for police, fire and emergency medical services. At the present time commercial telephone is the only link to the designated EBS station. A dedicated telephone line and a remote pickup unit had not been established between the county EOC and the EBS station at the time of the exercise. A telephone /telefax linkup was in existence between the EOC and the county's media center at the Courthouse in Norristown. , V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations This is a state responsibility. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Public alerting during this exercise included siren and EBS activation. Management and leadership during siren and EBS activation was efficient and effective. The Alert and Notification system initiating event occurred at approximately 2005 when a conference call took place between PEMA and the three risk counties. The discussion concerned the lead time it would take the risk counties to inform all interested parties of the g 18 O
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proposed siren sounding and the need to evacuate the plume EPZ. (_("-}
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Af ter a discussion among the EOC staff it was decided that Montgomery County would need 20 minutes from the time the decision had been made. At approximately 2020 the county received word from PEMA that the sirens would sound at 2045, followed by EBS activation and, as soon as possible thereafter, evacuation. Sirens were activated at 2045, with EBS activated shortly thereafter, at 2048. The EBS message over radio station KYW was timely and clear. However,' the .l__ ' message from PEMA regarding evacuation was confusing. An evacuation was called for to be implemented within the entire 10-mile EPZ, with , priority to 2 miles. This is in contradiction to Annex E which does not stipulate thst . priority be given to any area within the plume _, -- EPZ. Personnel at the Montgomery County EOC noticed this discrepancy but went ahead and transmitted the message to the risk municipalities verbatua. This resulted in some confusion as evidenced by the fact that Lower Frederick Township never simulated evacuation. Because the exercise concluded somewhat prematurely in Montgomery County (prior to the " completion" of evacuation) it could not be determined whether the situation with Lower Frederick Township could have been rectified in a timely' manner. VII. Protective Actions , Traffic and access contr'ol responsibilities were a cooperative effort between the Police Services Group and the Pennsylvania State Police. The Police Services Group contacted municipal police departments (( ) outside the plume EPZ in order to obtain the necessary manpower / equipment to address the unset needs of risk municipalities. Traffic control points were promptly activated at the time of General Emergency. According to county officials, there are adequate resources available to deal with such evacuation concerns as bad weather and stalled or wrecked vehicles. However, planning has not been finalized in this area. Although the handling of mobility-impaired individuals is a municipal responsibility, Montgomery County did assist in obtaining transportation resources to fulfill the municipalities unset needs. The evacuation of school children will need to be addressed at a later time, as school was not in session during the exercise. The County Agriculture Agent was responsible for transmitting information to farmers f rom the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture such as the fact that farmers should shelter animals and place them on stored feed. In addition, he coordinated with other county organizations (police services, PIO) in the establishing of locations for farmers to register as emergency workers and collect dosimetry in the event that they would need to reenter the plume exposure EPZ to tend to their livestock. ,. 19 O O m _ _ -
] VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Except for necessary equipment that is lacking at present, overall demonstrated exposure control was adequate. Actual on-hand inventory for Montgomery County included: 120 CDV-777-2 Dosimeter Chargers, 232 Dosimeter Chargers, 76 CDV-700 Geiger Counters, 4400 CDV-742 Dosimeters,126 CDV-777s, 2400 Dosimetry-KI report forms,100 Acknowledge receipts, 384 "D" cell batteries.
The county had no TLDs, KI or CDV-730s available. They are being procured through PECO and the Pennsylvania Department of Health and f should be available in the future. It was planned to distribute, during the exercise, CDV-742s to both county and municipal emergency workers. However, since TLDs, CDV-730s and KI were not available, actual equipment was not distributed, as plans call for predistribution of all necessary dosimetry at one time, when purchasing is completed, to facilitate accounting and supply procedures. . Kits containing simulated KI, TLDs and self-reading dosimeters were distributed in the Montgomery County EOC during the exercise, along with dosimetry report forms and instructions. The County RADEF Officer is faalliar with the proper use of radiological exposure control equipment, including K1, the maximum dose allowed to emer.gency workers without authorization, and decontamination (( )
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procedures. Although this EOC is beyond the 10-alle limit, it should be noted it also has a protection factor of 1000. IX. Media Relations Media relations were not directly observed, as the Montgomery County media center is not co-located at the EOC but is, instead, in the County Courthouse in Norristown. It was noted that all information of interest to the public was telefaxed over to the PIO in a timely manner and that rumor control, consisting of 10 telephone lines on suspended service, was operational during the exercise. K. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated during this exercise. XI. Scenario The scenario was adequate to allow the county to demonstrate its capabilities to respond to an accident at the Limerick Generating Station. Montgomery Ccunty EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Staffing at the EOC occurred in a premature manner. Future exercies j should follow EOC activation procedures as called for in the RERP.
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,x 2. Round-the-clock staffing was not evident at certain positions. The 1
(,((_) county should continue to attempt to achieve 24-hour coverage for all response areas.
- 3. Briefings should be held with the entire staff, thus providing for an up-to-date flow of information in all directions.
- 4. The county commissioners should take a more direct interest in future exercises.
- 5. When tran.saitting messages, timing should be stressed between the various communications networks.
- 6. Exercises should not be concluded prematurely. " Simulated evacuations" should be carried to their logical conclusion to permit interaction between the various jurisdictions.
- 7. The County should respond in a timely manner to requests, from the municipalities, for. unmet needs, even if it is only to update the municipality as to th( status of fulfilling the need.
Montgomery County Reception / Mass Care Centers 4 The reception center, which was located in the Free Lance Company parking lot, was staffed by police, RACES and volunteers who distributed maps directing evacuees to mass care centers where they woul'd be monitored for contamination. The system provides for a map ( f-~) (_ per car but does not appear to account for the number of individuals per car. The mass care center was staffed by government officials, monitoring teams, volunteers to assist with decontamination, Red Cross personnel, an auxiliary fire department group called "Second Alarmers" who provided ambulance service and were available for whatever might be needed, and police. Activation procedures were not observed, but personnel arrived in a timely manner, e.g., Red Cross personnel following the General Emergency. Staff present, or available, was adequate for 24-hour staffing capability. Neither registration of evacuees nor checking for radiation contamination was accomplished at the reception center. A total of 23 people (13 in Fire Department and 10 from sewer authority) were trained recently. Teams were present at the mass care center, had the necessary equipment and followed adequate procedures. There were provisions for disposing of contaminated clothing and safekeeping of personal possessions. The mass care center is located well beyond the limit of the plume EPZ. The community has two shelters - the high school for 500 i. people and the middle school for 350 people. When shelter capacity I~h is reached, evacuees would be sent to another center. Food supplies G are available immediately by the Red Cross system for distribution of USDA food from the school and/or warehouses and commercial sources. 21 w- g -e ,
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l l 5 The Red Cross District Headquarters in Philadelphia, which would direct Red Cross activities in the affected areas, was visited. It was ready to put its overall plan into action. > l RACES did ar. outstanding job and was active at both locations and assisted in the total Red Cross network. Montgomery County Reception / Mass Care Center Deficiencies
- 1. It is recommended that a facility for a reception center be considered where monitoring for contamination can be done and only those families needing to go to ease care centers for long tern housing be directed to those locations.
- 2. If decontamination responsibilities are to remain at mass care centers more definite procedures should be developed to differentiate ,
' between those people who would be going to a mass care center for monitoring and decontamination and those who require housing. Currently, the system provides that when the maps at the reception
- center (one per car 7 run out, it is assumed that the mass care center '
is filled. This systes does not take into account those people who ! any only require monitoring or the number of people per car. ) 3. In future exercises red Cross District Headquarters should be included in scenario planning. ] Pottstown School District The schools were closed before the Alert phase. The school officials advised that they anticipated problems in the following areas: More school busses are needed. There are only 15 contract busses available to evacuate the districts 3100 plus students as well as private school students. An estimated 40 busses are needed. The i communications problems reported in Berks County also apply to Montgomery County, i.e., the lack of an alternative means of l communication to the telephone system. Pottstown School District Deficiencies i
- 1. The school district should continue to work with other political f
jurisdictions to obtain the necessary busses to evacuate their students.
- 2. A back-up communications systes should be established.
Collegeville Borough EOC I I. Activation and Staffing According to the plan, activation of the EOC was to be initiated by a phone call from the County to the Collegeville EMC. This phone call f !O l
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was received at 1644 on a specially installed EOC phone. At that k' time, the EOC was formally activated. However, prior to that time, EOC staff had already arrived, without having been notified per the plan. Thus, mobilization procedures were not actually demonstrated. The staf f called for by the plan were present, covering emergency management, police services, fire and radiological services, and transportation / health services. The staff were quite knowledgeable of their duties. Most positions were double-staffed, providing ,, evidence of 24-hour staffing capability. However, the Borough lacks a trained backup person for the Emergency Management Coordinator; hence, 24-hour staffing is thin at that position. II. Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations were effectively managed by the designated emergency management coordinator. The EMC was very knowledgeable about response actions to be taken at each stage of the emergency, and effectively coordi,nated'the actions of the other staff. The EMC was supported by the Mayor, who was present and involved throughout the exercise. Initial notification of ,tihe Alert and Site Emergency was monitored over the fire services radio, at 1612 and 1736, respectively. Official notification from the County followed, at 1644 by phone for the Alert, and at 1744 by RACES for the Site Emergency. Notification ( ) of General Emergency came only by RACES at 1957. Handling of both telephone and radio messages was efficient. Appropriate actions were taken at each stage, implementing EOC security at the Alert, and activating fire service volunteers to standby at Site Emergency. III. Facilities The EOC occupied the meeting hall of the Borough firehouse. Furnishings, space, and lighting were ample. However, only two EOC telephones were installed. At times, this was a critical shortage, as the Transportation Services Staff needed one phone nearly full time to verify and arrange special transportation needs. Needed information was readily available. A status board was kept posted with significant events. Maps of the borough and evacuation ; routes were posted. Other information including route alert sector maps and information concerning mobility impaired individuals was ( available on maps or in the plan. ( IV. Communications Comrsunications systems consisted of commercial telephone, fire / police services radio, and RACES. All three systems were used effectively g 23 O
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for communication to the county. Communication with local businesses ([t - and schools used commercial phone. Comunication with local response teams was by word of south at the firehouse staging area, or by fire / police services radio in the field. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation ' Not applicable to municipalities. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The Borough mobilized four route alerting teams to provide backup alerting should the siren fail. The teams were activated to standby at the Site Emergency declaration, about 1745. The actual process of public alerting was initiated by a RACES message at 2029 that sirens would be sounded at 2045, to be followed by EBS. The Borough monitored both of these actions, heariug the siren at 2045, and EBS test messages at 2049 and again at 2102. Per the plan, route alerting was not required, given the successful siren sounding. However, for exercise' play, one route alerting vehicle was dispatched at 2101 per a message from County fire services. The content of public instructions to be, issued by the route alerting teams is contained in the Borough plan. VII. Protective Actions j((} Whil'e activation of traffic control points was only simulated, the Police representative at the EOC clearly was aware of what was to be done and when. Locations and numbers of points, and their function, were known. Local resources were reportedly adequate to cover the designated points. Other evacuation and access control functions (roadway clearing, manning of access control points, activation of reception centers) are county or state responsibilities. The EOC Transportation Services staf f began verifying, at the Alert stage, the special transportation needs of mobility-impaired persons, placing calls to those listed to update the information, which included their locations and needs. A particular need was also identified for buses to evacuate attendees at a local sports camp. . The unset transportation needs were reported to the County, with followup queries to the County about the needed buses. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control A small supply of simulated dosimetry and KI were pre-distributed to the Borough by the County. Dose record and instruction sheets were included, but no actual dosimeters or chargers. The Fire / Radiological Services staff at the EOC initially had some confusion over the issuance of the KI, but pursued the clarification of that question with the State observer. Once clarified, he
- properly issued the simulated materials and instructions to all 24 l
([) l ~ i l . - _
g~ emergency workers, including EOC staff. However, due to the lack of (}\s_)) actual dosimetry, procedures concerning its use could not be demonstrated. IX. Media Relations Media relations are not generally a municipal function. However, for the exercise, one media representative was granted access for interviews. His presence was carefully controlled by Borough officials so as not to interfere with exercise play. I. Recovery and Reentry Not played in this exercise. XI. Scenario The Scenario was adequate to test the response capabilities of the Borough. , . r Collegeville Borough EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The Borough lacks adequate trained backup 9taff for 24-hour staffing of the Emergency Management Coordinator position.
- 2. Staff mobilization procedures were not demonstrated.
.s -
x-) 3. The two existing EOC telephone lines are insufficient to handle the expected volume of telephone traffic.
- 4. Procedures for the use of actual dosimetry were not demonstrated.
- 5. The plan (Attachment B) should be updated to reflect the staffing of i
the Transportation / Medical Officer, as that position was filled during the exercise. Limerick Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing Although some staff (4 people) were on hand prior to the Alert, the EOC at Limerick Township was not fully activated and staffed until after the Alert status. Additional staff were called by telephone using a call list and arrived in a reasonable time. The latect copy of the Township Plan supplied to FEMA needs updating to include the names and telephone numbers of all emergency response staff. FEMA should also get a copy of the SOPS utilized by the various jucisdictions, as these SOPS are used extensively by the local department chiefs and were ef fec:ive in keeping activities on track. 25 O
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II. Emergency Operations Management
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As the local emergency management director was out of town, the Police Chief became, by virtue of being second in command, the person in charge. The chief relied heavily on the use of SOP checklists to perform his duties. However, it was noted by the observer that the PEMA controller's methods of asking questions and volunteering information may have both partially interfered with the Chief's activities and prompted him into actions he otherwise may not have taken. This made the FEMA observer's evaluation more difficult. The PEMA controller did not know if PEMA staff are planning to assist in a real event at Limerick. The Chief, however, answered most questions posed to him by the PEMA observer with a complete answer and offered some discussion which revealed both his knowledge and common sense. The Chief, at one point, was forced to leave the exercise due to an actual emergency. This required the two township supervisors to take over. By using the SOfs they were able to carry on during a critical (General Emergency) time. As they had been there throughout the exercise observing the Chief, this transition went smoothly. Checklist SOPS ensured that all pertinent organizations in the township such as school,s, major employers, and nursing homes were contacted. However, the EMC should get help in making calls or delegate'this task to others. { III. Facilities The recently built municipal building which normally houses the township police and other township government officials was used as the EOC. Adequate space, lighting, sanitary facilities and furniture were observed. More table top space would enhance operations and make it easier to perform in a more orderly manner. Generally,allnecessarymapsandwritteninfu.mationwereavai(able to accommodate any conceiveable use. IV. Communications Contrary to the description in the Limerick Township Plan (stating primary means of communication as being the telephone) the majority of messages containing important information and instruction'rame ' . over the radios. This gave the Chief some concern. He stated that , he intends to question higher authorities regarding this problem. '( Radios worked well and all information was received in a timely manner. 26 i O . W 6 g
) Several attempts to obtain information by calling the county by telephone resulted in mixed success. On one occassion county personnel told the Chief that he had called the wrong number in spite of the fact the number has been given to him by the County.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction As county and State, officials activated the alert and notification system the township was taken care of by others' initiatives. Nonetheless, township fire personnel took to the streets in a vehicle equipped with siren and public address systems and performed route alerting in one of their seven " sectors" within the Township to demonstrate back-up alerting which would be done in the event of siren failure (s). Unfortunately, termination of the exercise occurred before route alerting was complete, thus the observer could not determine the pre (ise amount of time it would take to run the route. VII. Protective Actions , Protective actions were considered and implemented after a
, recommendation came in from the County. Although the police and road
(( ) maintenance staff were aware of their duties in traffic control they were not observed to go through the motions of performing these functions. The township is aware of the location of mobility-impaired individuals and has this information in written form. It was not observed whether arrangements were made for transportation for these individuals. VIII. Radiological Exposure' Control Because actual dosimetry was not distributed, a major emphasis was not placed on this particular area. From discussions with the various staff, it was apparent that the Fire Chief was well-versed on radiological issues, but other's knowledge in this area was less apparent. II. Media Relations The only person from the media who showed up at the EOC was from a weekly paper who stayed all day as an observet. When questioned about how the media would be handled, the Chief said that the media would be received upstairs away from the EOC's activities. If things got too busy to allow him to deal with reporters the Chief would ask them to leave. 6 27 5 y .._~n--~._. - - - . . . .
X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated. XI. Scenario , The scenario provided th'e Township oFI.imerick with~ sufficient activity with which to test their capabilities. However, PEMA's prompting made it difficult to evaluate the capabilities of the Township. 4 Limerick Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The towr. ship plan needs to be updated to reflect the staffing that was evident at the exercise.
- 2. If PEMA is going to have people directly assisting the municipalities during an.actus1 emergency, this should be formally reflected from a planning process; otherwise'their role must be considered prompting, which is more approprfate for training and drills.
Lower Frederick Township E . I. Activation and Staffing # The call. initiating activation of the EOC came from the Montgomery ([D County EOC at 1611. As per the plan the call was received by the Emergency Coordinator at his place of busineas, which is directly across from the EOC. He then verified'the call via commercial phone , and started activ:Atton procedures for the EOC. A call down list was utilized to alert the emergency personnel. Twenty-four hour notification would occur through a . call to ths _EOC (Township building), to the EMC's home, or to his place of business. The EOC was staffed with the following personnel: The EMC, his deputy, two RACES operators and a secretary. This does not reflect full staffing as called for in the current plan, including a Fire / Radiological coordinator and a Transportation Medicel/ Ambulance coordinator. There was double staffing of the RACES operator and the presentation of a different roster-this roster while not included in the plan will be added shortly. The deputy director was left in charge of the operation from time to time, however there was never any formal announcement of this nor any briefing of incoming staff. In fact
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the
- director was away from the desk when the General Emergency was declared and was not made aware of it until sometime later (30 minutes).
II. Emergency Operations Management The Emergency Coordinator (as iridicated in the plan) was effectively in charge of the operation add demonstrated that'he is well versed in the requirements and duties for the EOC. The EOC staff was ( 28 O e e 9 , _ . , - --- .A.- - _w -.w - .e. --- -
-*=f
{ ) generally kept aware of the status by oral briefings by the coordinator. These were informal, consisting of reading the lastest message and discussing appropriate actions. Incoming message logs were kept, as well as multiple copies of each message received. Incoming message handling was handled well-the RACES officer copied the transmission down and handed them directly to the coordinator. There was no log of outgoing messages kept by the coordinator, i.e. when he would call the firehouse to notify the route alerting teams, etc. This could cause sc_e problems if the second shift were to assume command. The security at the EOC was basically non-existent. l Notification of the emergency classification occurred as follows: Alert was received at 1621 by the emergency coordinator; Site Area Energency was declared at 1730 and received at the EOC via RACES at 1742. At 1916 a message was received that the Govenor was considering declaring a state of emergency, official notification of the General Emergency was received at 1941 after being declared at 1935. The only protective ac' tion message received was misinterpretated by the EOC staff. This was the message to evacuate the 10 mile EPZ, with a 2 mile priority. The staff thought that the evacuation was for only the 2 mile radi,us. This message was logged in at 2027 and alterted the staff to the activation of the siress at 2045. A call to activate the fire department and ambulance service was made at 1647. Two township supervisors were present at the EOC, who were -( there mainly to observe. III. Facilities The EOC facility was sufficient to maintain emergency operations. There was ample space, furniture, lighting and telephones. There were no provisions for showers, cooking, etc. This is not a problem because the staff lives within walking distance of the EOC and could go home. Back-up power was not available. A status board was displayed; however, it was not properly updated with significant events. Messages that were written on the board were and difficult to read. There were three maps available and posted: (1) Routing-alerting sector and routes, (2) Evacuation routes and (3) A map published for the exercise showing the coverage, and lack of coverage, of the siren system. IV. Communications . Two communications systems were available to the Montgomery County EOC. The primary system is the RACES net (once established) with telephone (commercial) as backup. Three phone lines were available ( at the EOC, two of which were unlisted numbers and one a commercial line. The Township plan specifies that the phone is the primary system and the RACES the back-up, this is in conflict with the actual system. (, O 2' O O
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(~T Telephones were used to communicate with the Fire Department, the k2~/ ambulance service and the only school within the jurisdiction of the EOC. A radio system has been ordered which will provide 2-way capabilities between the EOC and fire / ambulance services. The RACES messages were of ten dif ficult to understand because they were garbled. There was never any interference or static, it appeared that the operator at the county wasn't ennunciating properly or was reading too fast, he also made numerous mistakes in reading the time (military clock). The RACES operator at the Township EOC could have used some training in terminology and EOC operations. V. Dose Assessment and' Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction A call came over RACES at 2027 to the EOC, notifying the staff of the evacuation message and the sounding of sirens at 2045. The staff misinterpreteted the message as meaning evacuation of only a 2-mile radius of the EPZ, therefore there was no simulated evacuation in Lower Frederick because they are approximately 7 miles from the plant. The sirens sounded at 2045 for 3 minutes, with a route alerting team dispatched at 2050 to the area that is not currently
,, covered by the siren system-this took about 20 minutes to complete.
Instructions to the public that the route alerting teams would use, were prescripted and available at the EOC. The only affected school was called, as a formality, as school was not in session. A local camping / day care facility was also notified. VII. Protective Actions Traffic control points were activated promptly following the evacuation message. Due to the misinterpretation of the evacuation order the Emergency Coordinator felt that it was not a requirement to man the TCP's, but he dispatched the teams as a training exercise. The traffic volume estimates were discussed by the staff with no problem surfacing. Impediments to evacuation could be handled by the staff. Tow trucks are available accross the street from the EOC. Because there is still a question regarding the availability of the volunteer emergency staff there may be some problems in obtaining sufficient numbers of personnel to carry out all required functions. In this event a call to the county specifying the unset needs would be initiated. t Mobility impaired persons were addressed by the staff. The list of those persons needing special assistance was used, as the emergency coordinator notified the ambulance service to standby with 2 (' vehicles, they discussed the needs of each individual. 30 g .i
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} VIII. Radiological Exposure Control All dosimetry equipment was simulated for the exercise. The staff was briefed on the use of dosimetry, (how to read, charge, record, etc.) and KI. The decontamination center was discussed to the extent of where its located and when to go there.
IX. Media Relations Not Applicable. X. Recovery and Reentr,y J Not demonstrated. XI. Scenario The sequence of events in the scenario was such that the EOC was able to activate and demonstrate their emergency response capabilities. All members of the staYf gained valuable experience from the a exercise. Earlier deficiencies were tested. Lower Frederick Township EOC Deficiencies:
- 1. Lack of security at the EOC.
(j ) 2.
~
More effective message logging system for outgoing messages needed.
- 3. Status board was not well maintained.
- 4. The message to evacuate was misunderstood by the EMC. Further training is necessary in the understanding of the implementation of protective actions.
- 5. The Township should continue to attempt to resolve the problem of round-the-clock staffing.
Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC ' I. Activation and Staffing According to the EMC, he was notified of an Alert by the Montgomery County EOC at 1616, at his home. He then notified the staff and proceeded to contact the public officials designated in the plan. A call was received at the Township office at 1615 from the Lower Pottsgrove Township police department who had been notified of the Alert status Ly the County and instructed to call the Township offices. This notice was verified by a clerk contacting the county EOC at 1621. The EMC arrived at the Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC at 1643 and staffing was fully complete at 1710; although enough people to man the facility had arrived prior to that time. The RACES f operator dispatched through the county did not arrive until 1740. 31 O
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--s- , --4 ---m, - - -. - - - -ce, ---mm - * -r _ -__-- - -
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/~ \} Organizations represented at the Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC w~' included elected officials and their representatives, as well as the police department, fire services, and the visiting nurses j association. Staff members displayed adequate training and knowledge.
Although double staffing was observed for three of the positions at the EOC, round-the-clock staffing capability was not demonstrated as no "back-ups" have been selected for the EMC or the public works representative. Some of the phone numbers listed in the plan were ' incorrect and had to be updated. II. Energency Operations Management The Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC was effectively directed by the Emergency Management Coordinator. He was concientious about conducting periodic briefings, and also urging staff members to think about, and review, steps that should be taken if the status of the emergency were to deteriorate. Message handling was effective but could be improved by better descriptions of the messages on the logs used for telephone cafis. This is particularly applicable due to the number of EOC staf f members making outgoing calls. Access to the EOC was co,ntrolled by having all visitors pass through the police department. One gentleman was denied access because he did not have identification to prove he was an emergency worker. ( ( "') The Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC was notified of Alert status at 1616, of Site Area Emergency status at 1743 and Ceneral Emergency status at 1952. At 2030 the Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC received notice to evacuate and that the warning system would sound at 2045. At 2045 The EMC directed the police department to verify that TCPs were manned and directed the fire services to verify that guides were available for buses and an ambulance that were being supplied by the County to aid in evacuation. He also called Occidental Chemical and the Beuhlah Land Park to notify them of the evacuation orders. The fire service directors were instructed to notify the hearing impaired. Most actions were initiated by the EMC who is also an elected official. The Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC was particularly good at using their plan as a resource tool during the exercise. III. Facilities The Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC was located in the Township office adjacent to the police department and has adequate space and office facilities. Communications were sometimes difficult to observe as the staff would leave the central area to use other telephones if the telephone in'the main operations area was already in use, or they wanted complete silence. There were two telephones, the RACES equipment, a radio and walkie/ talkies in the central area. No back-up power is currently available but a stand-by generator has been ordered, according to a clerk in the Township office. l (] 32 I l ( , , +.v.- ~. r.~ . - ,..~#- - ... - ---
1 l 1
~S l The status board was clearly visible and displayed the significant
(,('-- events. Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, and access control points were displayed. A map showing the plume EPZ l was included in the office copy of the plan and later was copied to be posted. The two men responsible for fire services (route l alerting) divided a Township map into the four sectors they had l designated for route alerting based on population and area. - According to the directors of fire services, maps displaying the sectors were located at the two fire stations. IV; Communications The primary means of communication used at the Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC was the telephone system. RACES and walkie/ talkies could only be used to receive messages due to interference caused by a nearby hill. Most communication was received, via telephone, from the Montgomery County EOC, although the order to evacuate was issued via RACES. Because the Township has no ambulance service of its own, communications would have to be conducted via the Montgomery County EOC, which arranged fd'r the necessary ambulance during the exercise. A photocopying machine was available to copy and distribute messages within the Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC. There was some difficulty in communicating with fire service vehicles because the walkie-talkies could not " send" and could only receive
- from inside the EOC. Communication was achieved by telephoning the
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fire station'and relaying messages. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation . Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Based on conversation with the EMC, the Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC had initially decided not to conduct actual route alerting as part of this exercise because they had done so earlier that week and the process had taken 1 1/2-2 hours to cover the entire township. The EOC staff recognized this as being unacceptable. However, when urged by the County at 2104 to conduct silent route alerting in one sector, the EMC did so. The fire service director called the fire station to dispatch two vehicles to one of the four sectors at 2105. The exercise was concluded at 2120 before the route alerting had been completed. ( Instructions that would have been broadcast are included in the Lower ! Pottsgrove Township plan. The EMC and fire services director were , familiar with the clear, concise prescripted message. The EMC also placed calls to a factory and an institution to relay information concerning evacuation. ( 33 m V 9 g -w- ~- o
VII. . Protective Actions Lower Pottsgrove Township has insufficient manpower to staff all of the traffic control points, and as specified in the plan contacted the Mongtomery County EOC to request assistance for this unset need at 1020. Verification of presence at TCPs was to be made via police radio.
- The EOC had a list of the names and addresses of mobility-impaired individuals which noted any special needs. Transportation for these individuals was arranged through the Montgomery County EOC. A RACES contact was made by the medical services representative to request 2 buses and l' ambulance at 1935. A second follow-up contact was placed, again via RACES at 2045. Calls were also made to ensure that the buses and ambulance would have a local guide available.
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Simulated dosimetry. equipment was brought to the EOC by the EMC. The supply of simulated d(simeters was not adequate. The EMC explained the use of dosimeters and KI pills and the importance of the record cards at the time of distribution. Dosimeters are to be kept at each fire station as well as at the EOC. Thorough instructions on radiological exposure co'ntrol are also included in the Lower Pottsgrove Township Plan. The EMC was aware of maximum does allowable and decontamination procedures.
<O IX. Media Relations Media relations was not applicable to Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC.
K. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated during this exercise. II. Scenario
~ Scenario was realistic from the perspective of time. Staff members did not know what to expect in terms of when an energency would occur or the duration. The exercise was somewhat hampered because the exercise was concluded before route alerting had been completed.
Siren testing was somewhat confusing because not all sirens were operable and siren testing is scheduled to occur again in the future. Lower Pottsgrove Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Work should continue on obtaining round-the-clock staffing, especially for such a critical position as the EMC.
- 2. The Township should revise their plan to reflect the fact that current routes are too long.
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New Hanover Township EOC , I. Activation and Staffing The Emergency Management Coordinator arrived at the EOC at 1627, followed within 10 minutes by a RACES operator and the Communications Officer. The Montgomery County EOC was notified at 1653 that New Hanover Township EOC was operational. Full staffing was completed by 1746. EMC indicated that his staff is all volunteer. It has been difficult for him to get people to accept emergency response responsbility. Therefore, should around-the-clock staffing be necessary, the present staff would bunk at the EOC and alternate sleeping and duty hours. Alerting procedures were followed for response personnel and through the notification of public and private organizations in the community. Although there was a typed list of telephone numbers, it was observed for numbers to that contac they(. frequently neededtotothem It was suggested refer after to other sources the exercise, that a more complete, updated list be compiled and maintained. II. Emergency Operations Management All staff was located in one room. Messages were logged and immediately read aloud to everyone. Therefore, it was not necessary (OV to reproduce and distribute copies. Instructions were immediately given to the responsible section head to take whatever action the message or implementing procedures required. III. Facilities Space, furniture, lighting and telephones were adequate. A locking cabinet to be installed in the safe will eventually house dosimeter /KI kits. Radios are on order. When received, the base station will be installed in a side area of the main room. Maps were available for all pertinent information however, display boards have not yet arrived. IV. Communications For this drill, two RACES units, located in automobiles in the parking lot were used. Telephones were used for backup. RACES operators will be in the EOC Coimmunications Room as soon as equipment is received and installed. A HAM radio operator was also present but experienced reception problems after sundown. There was a police-fire scanner operating in the EOC. It was noted - that reports were heard over the scanner well in advance of receiving the official notification through RACES. In the beginning several messages were sent to the police to have New Hanover E0C telephone ( 35 O O
b] f the Montgomery County EOC because the County was having difficulty contacting the township EOC directly. It was later advised that the County would transmit all messages through RACES because it was faster than telephoning each municipality, and would not require verification of the messages by telephone. It was noted that the County dispatcher read the messages to the RACES operators much faster than they could write them down. This could be a problem. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Telephone calls were made to Swann Oil, Fellowship House Farm, and a Girl Scout camp at each phase of the operation. It was actually the County's responsibility to notify Swann and the Township's responsibility to verify. The first telephone contact indicated the County had not calledy so the municipality took the initiative to keep them advised throughout the drill. Fellowship House Farm, a home for immigrants, hung up on the EOC. A team was dispatched imme,diately to correct this situation. All Township sirens have not been received and installed. A silent route alert.was made by Cossmansv111e Fire Company on Kulp Road south (h '~' of Hoffmansville in the area of Siren 10 and by New Hanover Fire Company on Swamp Picnic east of Luthern in the area of Siren 20. All actions taken were in accordance with their Plan, not initiated by the County. VII. Protective Actions The Township's only TCP at Route 663 and Swamp Pike was manned at 1952 upon notification of a General Emergency. Although not demonstrated, resources are available and plans in place for traffic control. The Township has a list of handicapped and people needing assistance for evacuation. They are currently in the process of refining this list. They will request help from Montgomery County EOC for transportation of mobility-impaired individuals. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Dosimeter /KI kits have not been issued to New Hanover. According to 4 their Plan, they did, however, simulate distribution of kits (with instructions and forms) to police and fire service officers at 1835. At 1927 officers were instructed to issue kits to emergency personnel. ( 36 O
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IX. Media Relations (}S There were no representatives of the press present in the New Hanover EOC. X. Recovery and Reentry Not applicable.
- XI. Scenario ,
The scenario provided an adequate test of the Township's capabilities > to respond to an accident at Limerick. New Hanover Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The Township should, where possible, continue to attempt to recruit individuals to serve in an emergency management capacity to help insure round-the-clock staffing.
, r a
- 2. Call down lists should be updated to reflect current contacts.
Perkiomen Township EOC , I. Activation and Staffing A ndtice of Alert was called to the Township by the County at 1613. ( (s'>) The EMC seemed concerned they were not notified by the County of an Unusual Event, but the plan does not call for it. Activation of the EOC was initiated with staffing completed by about 1645, except for a Medical Officer who did not show up. The plan only designates one person in writing by name (EMC). The rest of the positions say "To Be Determined". On hand were the EMC, Deputy, Communications person, traffic person, Fire Chief, clerical assistance, three elected officials, and a RACES operator. Over half the EOC staff are employees or spouses of employees of the utility, including back-up staff, who were also utility connected individuals who live in the area, but not necessarily in Perkiomen Township. All staff present were obviously well-trained and appeared to be very knowledgeable. II. Emergency Operations Management The EMC was effectively in charge of the Township's emergency - operations. He received a great deal of input from the EOC staff such as the Deputy and Communications person. The EMC kept staff informed, consulted with them and gave them instructions to take certain actions. Copies of the plan were readily available and frequently consulted. Message handling was efficient, with messages promptly logged and distributed. Access to the EOC was not tightly controlled. There was a sign-in sheet to be completed by everyone other than the staff. At one point the EMC asked several residents 37 { O g .we. . . ~ ~ . .-%-- #w--. --.%<- .
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to leave the EOC to ensure better control. Tighter security is -h recommended with some type of state police or fire police assistance. The EOC was notified of the Site Area Emergency at 1730, and the General Energency at 1953, via RACES messages from the County. The order to evacuate came over RACES at 2023. The Township took action to activate fire officials, and asked for assistance from the County for ambulance and bus service. Several members of the , Board of Supervisors were on hand for assistance and were consulted with by the EMC and the staff. III. Facilities l a The EOC was fully adequate for the job. The EMC's office was small, 3 but the Township building had plenty of space in the same area, along j with several separate telephone lines that could be used for 4 operational purposes. The EMC's office had two separate telephone lines recently installed at the utility's expense. There were plenty of desks and tables, along with a photocopy machine, water cooler and refrigerator. The EOC did not maintain a status board. Wall maps and table top maps of'the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers and access control points were visible. The Township Fire Department is next door to the EOC for easy access. IV. Consunications ' The Township has adequate commercial telephone equipment, consisting i of tko dedicated phone lines in the EMC's office, and at least three ( (A other " Call Director " type telephor.es in the Township Building with different extensions. There is a RACES entenna on the roof. For the exercise there was one RACES operator who brought in his own equipment and hooked in. There was also a Police / Fire band scanner evident. Some staff had portable units. The Fire House is next door with access to the fire radio. The primary communications with the County EOC was via RACES. At one point during the exercise the Township EOC could not reach the County EOC by telephone because the lines were overloaded. Commercial telephone would be the primary means of communication with the one high school in the Township, when in session. j V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The Township supplemented the siren sytea with route alerting by fire vehicles with PA systems. There are 3 Sectors identified. Fire j officials advised that 6-8 staff went to all three Sectors < ! immediately following the sounding of the sirens. The public was instructed to tune to EBS. The staff at the Township EOC were tuned j into KYW Radio and listened for a message right af ter sirens, i ;. 38 O O
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j. 4 however, KYW cut off and came back on for the sign-off of the 4
.. emergency broadcast. At that point, the Township should have contacted the County to infore them of the probles and to inquire l
' whether there had been a system-wide failure of the EBS station or i
- whether the problem was only associated with their particular location.
The EMC had staff call local businesses periodically to keep thes
- informed of the status of the emergency.
VII. Protective Actions i Activation of traffic control points was not observed. However, the plan calls for only one TCP to be manned by the Township. This is to l
- be done by the fire staff. The Fire Chief advised that fire
- department personnel would act as fire police. There is no Police i
- i. Department in the Township. EOC staff advise they could also call upon State Police at Limerick for assistance.
Separate lists provid(d by the County were on hand listing mobility-impaired individuals, hearing-impaired and persons needing transportation. However..these lists were incomplete and unclear.
- They lacked full addresses, phone numbers and specific assistance 1
- required in some cases. ' The lists also grouped together different Townships. The EMC, who is extremely familiar with the area and its resi, dents, could pick out those in Perkiomen Township. However, '
(' , anyone else ~trying to contact people and review the list would not be able to do so. New lists need to be compiled and continuously updated. ' l The Township determined a need for an ambulance and bus , i transportation for 12 persons and sent a RACES message to the County asking for assistance at 1847 hours. The County did not respond to this request. The Township should have followed up on this request,
- but did not.
j VIII. Radiological Exposure Control ! A simulated distribution of high-range dosimeters and TLDS was performed. Only five simulated dosimetry /KI kits were received. . There also was one simulated charger for the dosimeters. The
. . Township sent a RACES message to the County advising of the small ;
i quantity. A telephone call came back advising that if this was an '
- actual energency 53 of each would be issued, thus, an adequate supply '
of dosimetry /KI does not currently exist. There were record keeping cards maintained for each emergency worker. There was no dosimetry 1 equipment actually on hand at the Township EOC. , There were handwritten instructions attached to the slaulated i , equipment. Someone acting in the capacity of Medical Officer who was ' i supposedly familiar with the proper procedures concerning the use of j (~ 39
- ()
k e i _,_,-_,3*-.,,_,___,_.Ch.._,, Um, h.______,_.__--_,_.-,_.,_._.._,_____.__,.,,._._____,...
r~S KI and dosimetry and who is a trained Emergency Medical Technician _(hus) (and an employee of the utility) "couldn't make it" to the exercise. At 1924 a message was received from the County instructing the Township to distribute dosimetry equipment and KI to emergency workers. This was done, with the message that KI was not to be taken unless advised by the Secretary of Health. The Deputy EMC, continually took simulated dosimetry readings from staff at EOC. At 2100 hours the EMC gave instructions to simulate the evacuation of EOC to a decontamination station outside the back-up EOC at the Norristown Library. II. Media Relations No activity in this area at the Township EOC. I. Recovery and Reentry No activity. . - r XI. Scenario The scenario was adequat,e to fully exercise Township resources. Perkiomen Township EOC Deficiencies '
~
( /~N 1. County did not respond to request to fill unset ambulance and transportation needs. Township should have followed up.
- 2. No status board maintained.
- 3. Lists of mobility-impaired individuals, hearing impaired and those needding transportation need to be clarified and updated.
- 4. Staffing of the EOC demonstrated during the exercise needs to be more specifically defined. The plan does not list names, except for the EMC, thus it should be updated to reflect those individuals who participated in the exercise
- 5. Improved security at Township EOC.
- 6. The EBS message was not heard at the EOC. The Township should have contacted the County EOC to ascertain the magnitude of the problem.
Pottstown Borough EOC I. Activation and Staffing A call frca the Montgomery County EOC at 1618 notifying the Borough that an Alert had been declared at Limerick at 1600 initiated activation of the EOC. The Borough emergency coordinator and the [ assistant coordinator are full-time employees of the Borough and were 40 0 O O
h on duty in their offices which are part of the Borough EOC. The call ( f~'# was verified by a return call to the County. Notification of Borough elected officials and mobilziation of e0C staff was demosntrated. Written call lists were used and were accurate. Staffing was complete shortly after 1700. Activation of the staff can be accomplished at any time through the Borough police department which operates a 24-hour per day telephone / radio system that is tied into a - County-wide net. The EOC was staffed by the following: Borough . coordinator, Chief of Police, Fire Cheif, Transportation Officer, , Communications Officer, Public Works Officer and Radiological Officer plus assorted support staff. The staff displayed adequate training and knowledge. Various instances of uncertainty gave evidence that this was the staff's first REP exercise. However, the staff and particularly the Coordinator, dealt very well with its uncertainties by reference to the Borough's plan and operating procedures and by requesting information from the County. Round-the-clock staffing would be accomplished by utilization of deputy department representatives, all of whom are permanent Borough employees. Several of these second shif t personnel were present at various times during the exercise. II. Emergency Operations Management The Assistant Borough Manager is the emergency management coordinator. EMC was effectively in charge of emergency operations. k() Periodic staff briefings were held, predominantly following escalation of emergency classifications. Staff were appropriately involved in decision making, plans and SOP's were used often. Message logs were kept and messages distributed as appropriate. There were several problems encountered in the handling of RACES massages. The RACES operators were set up in a room adjacent to the police radio room. Outgoing police radio traffic interfered with reception of the RACES messages resulting in ti.e need for the RACES operators to request repeat of large parts of messages. This, combined with the operators care, for the sake of accuracy, in writing and then re-writing messages directed to the Borough coordinator, resulted in delays in them getting to the coordinator. For example RACES began receiving the public .11erting and evacuation message at 2020, but it did not arrive at the coordinator's desk until 2037 which was only 8 minutes prior ta siren sounding. Also, there was some question about what the various times noted on RACES message forms referred to e.g. the time of a site emergency operation or the time of transmission of the message notifying the Borough of , the declaration. Access to the EOC was controlled by Borough police officers. e The EOC was notified of Alert status at 1618, of Site Emergency at 1755 and of General Energency at 2010. The order to evacuate was received at 2037. (p 41 b 4
Ilected officials were not present during the exercise. The Governor's Disaster Emergency Proclamation caused confusion among the EOC staff. Word of this proclamation was interpreted as notice of General Emergency and posted as such. The Borough coordinator, however, was alert for follow-up communications from the County, and as a result, did not make any substantive mistakes because of a " belief that a general emergency had been declared. j III. Facilities ' The Borough EOC is . loc.ated in the Borough Hall, specifically in the ' offices of the Borough manager and assistant manager; the police radio room is twenty feet down the hall from these offices. While operations were somewhat cramped for lack of space, the minimum necessary space was available. Furniture and lighting were sufficient. The number of telephones was adequate for this exercise. A status board was maintained in the room adjacent to the main operations room.' Because it was not in the main room it was of limited usefulness to the staff. Energency classification levels were posted on the board along with other significant information. Maps showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers and traffic control points were all posted. Populations by evacuation , areas were not posted but are well known by the Borough staf f. IV. Consunications The Borough communicated with the County EOC by telephone and by RACES. Incidental, parallel information was also exchanged via police radio with the County. Notification calls were made to local hospitals, nursing homes and notels at the Alert stage; subsequently calls were made to these organizations to verify that they had been notified of escalated emergency levels. The Borough is well equipped for intra-Borough communications by means of phone and radio. The only equipment problem encountered was that referred to above involving police radio interference with the RACES message reception. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Not applicable at the county level. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction - After notification of the evacuation order the Borough dispatched (approximately 2100) a route alerting team to the homes of pre-identified hearing lapaired citizens in one section of the Borough. For the exercise the team drove past those residences without ( 42 O 4 0 g - . w - , ,
actually communicating with their inhabitants. Copies of an appropriate prescripted message for hearing-impaired persons were available. The Borough was poised at the approrriste time for additional route alerting should it receive word of siren failure but no such failures were discovered. A prescripted message was ready for use; it instructed residents to turn to the EBS station. VII. Protective Actions The location and manning of TCP's was discussed by the coordinator and key staff members. Police personnel throughout the borough were kept up-to-date throughout the exercise. TCP's were not activated, however, because it was the coordinator's understanding that the activation would not be required for this exercise. No specific instructions concerning activation of traffic control points were received from the County. According to the staff and according to the Borough Plan, Ipcal resources are available to cover all traffic and access control fud'ctions. The Borough had written lists of various types of mobility-impaired residents, of hearing-impaired, those not having automobiles, disebied persons not in hospital or nursing homas. The Borough calculated available buses and ambulances and made known its deficiencies in this regard to the County. (, According to the County and Borough plans, the Borough is not primarily responsible for the evacuation of the hospital or nursing home in the Borough, or for the schools or motels in town. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Neither dosimetry nor potassium iodide was available at the Borough EOC. Their distribution was simulated along with appropriate instruction. When it became apparent that the number of pieces of chalk used to simulate low range dosimetery was inadequate for Borough use, additional pieces were requested from the County. The Borough fire chief who serves as radiological officer was aware of maximum doses, decontamination procedures, etc. The Borough was prepared to simulate relocation of the EOC to Daniel Boone High School. However, relocation was not ordered by the County. IX. Media Relations A reporter from a local daily newspaper was present at the EOC throughout the exercise. Briefings were given by various members of the EOC staff and particularly by the coordinator. By his questions the reporter gave evidence of having made some effort to understand [ 43 0 O g, ..m.-w,-. , , . . ~ .-
the exercise concept and purpose. Relations between EOC staff and hq the reporter were cooperative and cordial. A rumor control operation was set up in the Borough building in the form of several volunteers answering phone calls from residents. X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated during this exercise.
- 11. Scenario The scenario provided sufficient stimuli for this local organization to test its capabilities in this, its first, REP exercise.
Pottstown Borough EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The Borough should take steps to improve the quality of its RACES reception capabilities and should establish clear procedures for recording times on itr message forms.
- 2. Pottstown EOC mistook the, Governor's Disaster Proclamation to be the General Emergency Notification.
a
- 3. The Borough should position its status board in a place where it can be easily consulted by EOC staf f members.
Royersford Borough EOC I. The Borough received the Alert notification from the Montgsmery County EOC at 1614 The message was received by both the Borough Fire Company and the Police radio via the County-wide fire department monitor tones. The Police Chief, Fire Chief, Radiological Officer, Ambulance representative, Public Works Director and the Mayor were contacted by the EMC. All arrived at the EOC by 1625 except the Public Works Director who continued his street work and was in contact with the EOC via Borough band radio. Twenty-four hour
, staffing appeared evident by a roster presentation and the large numbers of Borough volunteers present at the exercise. However, this is not reflected in the municipal plan, where several backup positions are listed as vacant.
II, Emergency Operations Management The EMC, his staff, and the elected officials were excellent. Periodic briefings were held, message recording and handling was good, decisionmaking involving the elected officials was continuous, f i and EOC security was maintained. The Borough's plan was followed at each of the status levels. Notification of Alert was received at 1614, Site Emergency at 1735, General Emergency at 2000 and evacuation at 2045. I 44 i O I
, _ - . ~- >~-
/~5 III. Facilities The physical plant (the Humane Fire Company) was adequate as an EOC.
A message display board was visible and kept up-to-date and all the required mapa and charts were posted or available in the plan. IV. Communications l Not only was the EOC communications systen excellent, it was used properly. It consisted of three telephones, the RACES operator, the County-wide fire department tone activated radio, a Borough C.B. . radio and an independent Borough band radio which provided radio contact between the EOC, the police department and vehicles, all public works vehicles, and five other mobile units. These mobile units were exchanged between elected officials or other EOC staff as needed. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction At each change in emerge'ncy status, the EMC inititated telephone calls to six schools, a senior citizens home, a juvenile home and two large businesses, informing them of the change. After the sirens (() they telephoned the hearing-impaired and immobile citizens, informing them of the status, and initiated transportation for those needing it. When directed by the County EOC they sent one fire truck on route alerting to demonstrate their capability. It appeared that their plan was up-to-date with lists of names and phone numbers and that actions were undertaken at the proper times as called for by the plan. VII. Protective Actions The EMC was told by the County EOC the previous day that the five TCP's in the Borough would be manned by state police. When the state police did not physically show up for this exercise, the Borough simulated manning them with Borough Fire Police and regular Police. This was accomplithed without depleting staff from other important functions. Evacuation for the mobility-impaired was properly simulated by , following the plan. The EMC simply notified the schools of the emergency status; the school board has their own plan of action given a specific level of emergency. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control On the day prior to this exercise Energy Consultants, Inc. { distributed eight packets containing a simulated dosimeter, simulated 45 0 e . g w4 >,.=.-a- ee- e.w,+ s u sw. w. +
(} KI, simulated TLJ's a simulated charger, instructions, and a check-list showing the numbers of pieces of equipment they would have if they were available to distribute, (e.g., the Borough requested 121 Dosimeters and received only eight). Instead of using the simulated equipment, the Borough utilized their own (0-200R) dosimeters and chargers. They demonstrated the proper use of these dosimeters and knew the proper dosages of KI. Proper decontamination procedures were demonstrated by the Borough simulating that three crew members on one fire truck were contaminated. They called the County EOC who directed the three men and the truck to go to Upper Perkiomen High School in Red Hill Borough for total decontamination. II. Media Relations There was a reporter from a local newspaper present in the EOC during the excerise. Briefings were provided to her by the EMC after significant actions.we,re taken by the EOC staf f. On two occasions, the EMC contacted the County EMC with sessages that citizens wanted more information and rumors were running rampants. X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated. XI. Scenario The scenario provided a good chance for the borough to display their abilities to respond to an emergency at Limerick. Royersford Borough EOC Deficiency
- 1. If round-the-clock staffing is indeed a reality, the borough plan needs to be updated to reflect that fact.
Skippack Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing At 1633, a call was received in the Skippack Township EOC from the Montgomery County EOC, notifying the township of an Alert at the Limeri Station. At this time, the EMC was already at the EOC because he had heard the Alert notification over the 2-way hand radio that he carries with him for fire emergencies. The EMC verified the Alert status by calling the County EOC. Upon verification of the Alert, the EMC, using a call down list, began phoning the township supervisors, key emergency personnel and major industries and special facilities. Although the calls were g 46 () O q -
l 4 g '(~)' actually made, no staffing of the EOC was demonstrated. The EMC was A s- the only key personnel who played a role during the entire exercise. II. Emergency Operations Management e For the extent of Skippack Township's participation in the drill, the Emergency Management Coordinator was ef fectively in charge. Because staffing was not demonstrated, no briefings were held. All incoming and outgoing messages were recorded on log sheets but no distribution of messages other than the call down list was demonstrated. No security measures to control access to the EOC were demonstrated. I The EOC was notified of the events of the drill as follows: Alert was received at 1633, Site Emergency at 1741 and General Emergency at 1957. At 2028, the order to evacuate the 10 mile EPZ was received over RACES. No actions were demonstrated to coordinate emergency activities. The elected officials made an appearance in the EOC prior to the start of their regular township meeting but were not involved in the exercise.
- III. Facilities The EOC is located in the Skippack Township Municipal Building and consists of one large room which is used for township meetings.
There appeared to be sufficient fu rni ture , spacing and lighting. However, there were only two phones available. Full staffing ( (~N requires four key personnel to be located within the EOC, thus it did k# not appear that adequate telephones are available for a full-fledged emergency response. For the exercise, a status board was clearly visible and was used to post emergency classification levels. This board was kept up to date on significant events. No maps, other than a county road map were posted in the EOC. When questioned by the FEMA observer if the evacuation and plume EPZ maps were available, the EMC responded that he had the maps, but would not use them for this drill because the township was not fully participating in the emergency responses. IV. Communications Communications between the County EOC and the township EOC was through RACES with phone service as a back-up. Comisunications with key personnel is by phone with the exception of the fire chief who can be contacted over a 2-way radio. Because the drill was held in the summer, no notification to schools was made. V. Dose Assesshent and Protection Recommendations i Not Applicable. 47 (n f h
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e 4 g , -__u_ - --.u - -
VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Skippack Township did not play a role in public alerting. No effort was made to determine the number of people requiring transportation or special assistance, nor was there any attempt to notify the hearing impaired. VII. Protective Actions Skippack Township did not participate in responding to protective action instructions. No traffic control points were activated nor were there any assessments made regarding the need for assistance from the County. According to the EMC, the township keeps a list of those , requiring special assistance but this information is confidential and was not observed. No arrangements were demonstrated to provide transportation to local citizens. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control During the Alert, the'EMC located the predistributed radiological exposure control devices. This consisted of pieces of paper for KI and TLDS, and wooden sticks for dosimeters. No actual devices were available at the EOC. The use of these devices were not demonstrated nor was there any distribution to emergency workers. IX. Media Relatio.ns There was no noticeable media activity during the exercise. X. Recovery and Reentry Not Applicable. XI. Scenario Although the scenario provided an adequate opportunity, the township did not exercise to an extent to show their ability to protect their citizens in the event of an accident at the Limerick Generating Station. Skippack Township EOC Deficiency
- 1. The township did not participate to the extent to demonstrate their capability to protect their citizens in the event of an accident at the Limerick Generating Station.
48 i O g , , . , , , . . - - . . - . , . , -
Trappe Borough EOC I. Activation and Staffing At 1613 the EE was observed as verifying an alert notice f rom the Montgosery County IOC over a hand-held, two-way portable radio as he was entering the Borough EOC operations room. The Borough EOC was declared as being activated with the same transmission. At 1630 the county called the EOC on the county fire radio requesting acknowledgement of the alert notice. It appeared that the EMC's portable radio verification transmission was not received at the county. , Two staffing positions were not filled as per the Borough plan. The plan es11s for a public works /public services officer and a transporation medical /asbulance officer. The EMC stated that the latter position is still in a "TBD" status and the former was deemed as not being applicable to the Borough's requirements. The functions of these two positions seemed to be satisfactorily handled by the EE having designated otheft personnel to fill their assignments. Key staffing was accomplished by 1650. The organisations represented at the ROC were: Fire / police. Ambulance, EMC, Mayor, RACES and Borough Council President. The staff displayed an adequate knowledge of their responsibilities. [ Capability for 24-hour staffing was not demonstrated. According to the EMC there is no provision for a second shift at present. II. Emergency Operations Management The EMC, as designated by the plan, was effectively in charge of the Borough's emergency operations. The EMC was very knowledgeable of operational procedures and was effective in directing his staff to address various actions. The staff frequently referred to checklists, and messages were promptly distributed and logged on a status board. The EOC was notified of the Alert status at 1613, the Site Area Emergency at 1736, and the General Emergency 1952, by the county. All three events were received over the two-way radio and were confirmed by the EMC via a telephone call to the county. The Governor's disaster proclamation was received by the RACES radio at 1957 and was verified by the EMC by calling the County via commercial telephone. At 2030 the EOC received the radio message from the county informing all concerned that the strens would sound 49 (, O 9
--*-.ee
at 2045 and that evacuation procedures were to be implemented h following the sirens. At this time the staff ensured that route alerting vehicles were on standby and TCP points were in readiness. Preparations were made to call residents who required transportation assistance and for notification of the hearing-impaired. A radio message from the County was received at 2101 instructing all concerned to implement route alerting at the EMC's disgression. This i message was sent for exercise purposes only in order to demonstrated the route alerting procesa, as the sirens had activated in an adequate manner. No actual evacuation procedures were observed other than TCP's reporting at their designated places and reception centers ' being verified as being activated. III. Facilities The EOC facility was fully adequate for an emergency response operation. Two commercial emergency telephones were on hand along with five portable j;wo-way radios and one portable RACES radio with a mobile (dash mounted)' auto unit. Ample tabular and graphic information was available, and a status board showing significant events was kept updated. IV. Communications ' The Borough had sufficient communications capabilities to insure
~
messages could be received and transmitted. The Alert and Site Area ( Emergency messages from the county were both received over the two-way police and emergency service radio net. Once the messages were received they were confirmed over the telephone before any action was taken. If an authentication means was developed for the radio net, telephone verification would not be necessary. The RACES operator could not take his equipment into the EOC due to the non-availability of an antenna at the EOC. Thus, from 1735 to 1815 RACES messages were relayed from the operator's car into the EOC. At 1815 the EOC received a portable RACES radio, allowing the RACES operator to function in the EOC from that point on. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Not Applicable VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The Morough relies primarily on the siren warning system followed by EBS monitoring. The Borough did not therefore play a major role in t public alerting and instruction. After the sirens were sounded both actual and simulated telephone calls were made to utilizing a list, known residents who require special assistance and to hearing-50 ( A V e
impaired. At 2101 the fire chief dispe",ched two route alerting vehicles which returned by 2133 having covered the entire borough limita. VII. Protective Actions Traffic control points were activated at the required time and manned by fire / police volunteers. - The point at the junction of routes 422 and 113 is the responsibility of the state police. The EMC did not attempt to involve the state police in the exercise but was aware of their responsibility. A confirmation call was placed to the county to confira that reception areas were activated. There are no known residents requiring ambulance support, however the borough maintains a list of residents, with addresses, phone numbers, and identification of special needs. Among these residents are 11 hearing-impaired. Several were actually called by phone and instructions were received by these individuals. Transportation assistance is required for approximately 30 residents and it is noted in the plan as an u*nnet need. During the course of the exercise when the county requested information from participants as to unment needs the EMC did not confirm this transportation requirement. When questioned later by this observer his answer was that he assumed that the county was aware of this as it has a copy of the borough plan on file. Based upon the fact that there are no known deaf residents (as opposed to hearing-impaired), and that hearing-impaired individuals contacted by phone understood the message given to them by the ( borough, route alert trucks were not dispatched to those individuals homes. However,the borough has printed message slips with written instructions for the hearing-impaired which, according to the plan, are to be distributed by route alert personnel. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control The borough did not have any dosimeters on hand and thus simulated preparation and distribution of dosimeters and KI to their emergency workers. Several EOC personnel were present who were aware of proper procedures concerning the uses and maximum doses. As a result of simulation the EOC did not respond to the county's request for dosimeter status as an unment need. II. Media Relations There was no involvement by the media at the EOC. X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstr ted during this exercise. I 51 ( O 4 #
(~N XI. Scenario The scenario gave the borough an opportunity to exercise its procedures and requirements contained within their plan and was an excellent test of borough manpower and resources. Trappe Borough EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The Borough should carry all response procedures to their logical conclusion, i.e. if they need transportation for 30 people they should not assume automatically that the county will provide those resources. They should confirm that the county will provide them.
- 2. The Borough should continue to attempt to provide 24-hour staffing and should revise their plan to reflect the staffing set-up they feel is appropriate to their needs.
Upper Frederick Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing The call initiating activation of this EOC was received from Montgomery County over t,he Fire net. The Fire Chief was notified over his beeper. He in turn notified the EMC. The call was verified. Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated by use of written call down lists. Staffing was complete at 1720. Staffing in ( the EOC consisted of the Emergency Management Coordinator, 3 township supervisors, Fire / Rescue Officer, Transportation Of ficer, RACES operator and a secretary. The first person to arrive at the EOC was an employee of Philadelphia Electric, who proceeded to set up the Operations Room. Initally some confusion was observed as to what should be done. However, once the Emergency Management Coordinator arrived this problem straightened out. In addition, the Philadelphia Electric employee turned the EOC over to the EMC and was only an observer for the rest of the exercise. II. Emergency Operations Management The Emergency Management Coordinator was very effective and knowledgeable. Once he arrived at the EOC, all response actions fell together in accordance with the plan. In addition, the Fire Chief proved to be an asset to the response capabilities. Periodic briefings were held to update staff membera. All members of the staff were involved in decision making. Copies of the plan and written procedures were used throughout the exercise. The status boards were continually updated and messages handled in the proper manner. The EOC was notified of the Alert at 1640, the Site Area Emergency at 1736 and the General Emergency at 1935. Elected officials were present and actively involved throughout r.he exercise. 52 ( O 9
/G III. Facilities j
The EOC is located in a modern building which provided sufficient furniture, space and lighting. However there are no kitchen or facilities for extended operations. Backup power was not available. All appropriate maps were available and posted. IV. Communications 4 The plan calls for commercial telephone as the primary means of communications with the County EOC and RACES as backup. However, during the exercise most information was received over the RACES. The RACES operator was located outside. The township should move the radio equipment into the Operations area in order to alleviate the necessity of the operator running in and out with messages. Additional radio equipment had been delivered to the EOC but was not installed. There were three phones available in the EOC. These three phones were in constant use by staff members throughout the exercise. . - r V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction (()
\/
The ' county informed the township that the sirens would be sounded at 2045 with EBS announcement to follow. The fire chief sent out one route alert team, in accordance with instructions, when the sirens , sounded. One route took 35 minutes to complete. Calls were placed to schools but they were not in session. The EOC monitored the EBS station (KYW) and the announcement was heard. VII. Protective Actions The municipal plan calls for the township to man one traffic control point. The actual manning of the traffic control point was not observed. The EOC was aware of hearing impaired individuals, residents requiring ambulance support and those needing other special assistance. This information is in written form on file in the EOC. Actual contact with these individuals was not observed. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control The Fire Chief was aware of the proper procedures involved in Radiological Exposure Control and briefed the emergency workers in its use. However no actual dosimetry or KI was available. 53 1 LJ O
XI. Media Relations There was no media contact at this EOC. X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated during this exercise. XI. Scenario , The scenario was adequate to test this community's response c capabilities. , Upper Frederick Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. A telephone line should be kept open in the EOC to receive incoming calls.
- 2. The RACES radio equipment and operator should he set up in a more convenient location 1( order to facilitate the coordination of information and the message handling process. j Upper Pottsgrove Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing
(}'() The iownship was notified on an Alert by the County EOC at 1625. Township EOC staff were on-site prior to the start of the exercise. The staf f notified township of ficials and RACES operators af ter receiving notice of the Alert. All staffing was completed at 1655. The EOC staff displayed adequate knowledge of their responsibilities. Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by preparing a roster for two 12 hour shifts. This should be formalized in their plan. II. Emergency Operations Management The ENC was effectively in charge of the Township's emergency o perations. He frequently briefed staff on the changing situation, consulted with them, and directed them to take various actions. Copies of the plan and procedural checklists were referred to frequently throughout the exercise to ensure completion of all necessary activities. Internal communications were well-managed, ~ with messages promptly logged and distributed. Security was well- r maintained by police. 4 s i The EOC received notification via radio of Site Area Emergency at : ( 1730 and General Emergency at 1941. These notifications were confirmed with the county after receipt. Instructions were received at 2020 to initiate evacuation when the sirens sounded at 2045. The EOC then coordinated with police, fire and county personnel to initiate evacuation plans. 54 4
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III. Facilities The EOC facility was fully adequate. Space and furnishings were sufficient to conduct emergency operations. A status board was prominently displayed and kept up-to-date as significant events occurred. Maps of the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, pickup points, relocation centers, traffic control points, and route alerting zones were available but had not been posted for the exercise. IV. Communicationa j Primary communication is accomplished via telephone, with police / fire radio and RACES as a backup. EOC personnel stated radio equipment was on order, but it had not yet been received. Messages are logged when received. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. , VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The township has the capability to supplement the siren alerting with route alerting by fire v'ehicles, although vehicles were not mobilized for this exercise. The routes are predetermined, and the Township plan. provides for a primary and backup driver for each route. The ( persons who will run the routes are not pre-determined, instead fire personnel would be assigned if route alerting is necessitated. VIII. Protective Actions Traffic control points are predesignated. PA State Police will supplement Township police to control these points. The township maintains a listing of mobility-impaired residents and initiated procedures to insure transportation would be available. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Dosimeters and KI were not available for the exercise. This shortage was reported to the county by the township EOC. Simulated distribution was made to emergency workers, and necessary control records and instructions were prepared. Emergency workers not under the township's jurisdiction, such as bus / ambulance drivers, would report to the township EOC to receive protective equipment prior to performing duties in the township. IX. Media Relations < There was no media activity at the EOC during the exercise. ( O
. 55 4
X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated. ,, II. Scenario The scenario was adequate to exercise township resources. Upper Pottsgrove Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The Township plan should be updated to reflect twenty-four hour ,
staffing capability.
- 2. Future exercises should demonstrate activation of the EOC as called for in the plan. Pre-positioning should not taka place.
Upper Providence Township EOC f. I. Activation and Stsffing - e . The Township JMC received notice of the Alert from the county by , telephone at his Some at 1623. He initiated activation of the EOC immediately, arriving there himself by iM5. Written call lists were used. Except for the udnsportation officer, whose arrival ws delayed until about 1815, all other EOC staff were in place by about 1720. In addition to the EMC, the EOC was staffed with comm'unications, police, fire / medical /transportatian, radiological, ({ - and public works representatives, along wich an impressive number of volunteers. Although the, regular transportation officer arrived later in the dxercise, the transportation function was quite adequately co'vered by h volunteer until he arrived. All staff member;s appesied to be very familiar with their duties. All key functional personnel have assistants who could take over for double , shifts, although no roster was actually prepared. Twenty-four hour staffing will not be considered completely resolved until the plan , reflects primary and backup coverage of all key positions. _ II. Emergen'y c Operations Management The EMC Uffectively managed the emergency operations. He did announce the changes in plant donditions, but did not conduct any substantive briefings for the EOC staff as'a whole. However, he did provide almost constant instruction to and consultation with individual staff members. Copies o'fethe township and county plans were available and referred to frequantly. In addition to their plan, the township has a set of color-coded implementing instructions for each functional area and these were used extensively. Message logs were maintained. A multicopy mecsage form was'used, allowing adeque.te message distribution. Access to the EOC was controlled by a fire policeman. . :The EOC received radio messages announcing the Site Emergency at 1736 and the General Energency at 1955. The message'
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announcing the Governor's emergency declaration, received before the (,) 7- ~ General Emergency message, was mistakenly interpreted by the EMC as the General Emergency declaration. This has happened elsewhere in previous exercises revealing widespread confusion with the " state of emergency" terminology. Two township supervisors and the Township Manager were present at the EOC throughout the exercise and actively participated. III. Facilities The EOC is fully adequate to handle emergency operations. Furnishing, lighting and six telephones were sufficient. All required maps were posted. However, there was no status board. The EMC indicated that he had requested one from the county. But, having not received it, he made no attempt to improvise one, which could have been easily done. IV. Communications Primary communication ( between the township EOC and the county was the RACES radio. Backup was provided by telephone and the fire radio net. V. Dose Assessment and Prot'ective Action Recommendations Not ,a township responsibility.
) VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Immediately upon activation of the EOC, at the Alert phase, the EMC directed a secretary to initiate an actual call down of some 40 special facilities in the Township (industries, private schools, parks, swimming pools, etc.). This initial alert by one person took some 90 minutes. The procedure was repeated at both the Site Emergency and General Emergency levels. Additional volunteer personnel were assigned to this duty at the higher levels, so the alert took less time. This was a very impressive display.
Route alerting crews (some 20 people-enough to do all 9 alert sectors) reported to their fire stations at the Alert level about 1630. This is earlier than called for in the plan. At 2100, each township was ordered to do route alerting in at least one sector. The EMC decided to dispatch two teams, choosing the two sectors in the township with incomplete siren coverage, an excellent decision. The route alert crews had adequate route descriptions and a pre-scripted message. The crews departed at 2210, but the actual alert was not observed and the time required is unknown. The township has conducted a survey to determine the location of hearing-impaired residents. Nineteen were identified. At 2015, two volunteers were dispatched to actually visit each of their homes and g 57 t' V) 9 O g4yy -g -%.o.m e-- , .-.#, .
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personally deliver a written emergency instruction sheet prepared by the EMC. This was an excellent demonstration. VII. Protective Actions The township received the evacuation order at about 2025. Activation of traffic control was simulated at 2100, just a bit late. No posts were actually manned, but the township has adequate police and fire police forces to staff their designated TCP's. The township has conducted surveys of mobility-impaired residents who require special transportation assistance as well as residents without access to private vehicles. Lists of both have been prepared. The list of mobility-impaired includes a complete description of special needs. Upon activation of the EOC, volunteers actually called all the individuals on both lists to deterafne their specific needs at the moment of the exercise. The medical coordinator used the response of the mobility-impaired as a basis to request four ambulances from the county. The transportation coordinator, assisted 4y several volunteers, plotted the locations of residents who needed bue transportation on sector maps. Based on this, buses were requested from the county and bus routes and pickup points determined. The tremendous effort put into this demonstration by the coordinators and volunteer assistants was very impressive and clearly indicated the adequate capabilities of the township. ( VIII. Radiological Expcsure Control The township received a sample kit of simulated direct reading dosimeters, TLD's, and KI from the county. The supply was apparently not intended to represent the actual number of dosimeters needed by the township. Therefore, only the fire personnel assigned to route alerting were given individual dosimetry-KI kits. One set was kept in the EOC to represent dosimetry for the EOC staff. Those personnel who received the simulated kits were instructed in their use. The radiological officer was well aware of the procedures for using KI, maximum dosages, etc. The EMC simulated the " buttoning up" of the EOC at the appropriate time, since it is in the EPZ. IX. Media Relations No representatives of the media came to the township EOC. X. Recovery and Reentry Not exercised. , XI. Scenario i The scenario was adequate to fully exercise township resources. 58 I O .
~ , _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _
Upper Providence Township EOC Deficiencies A status board should be maintained in the EOC. 1.
- 2. Some action should be taken to insure that the Governor's declaration of a disaster emergency is not interpreted as the General Emergency -
announcement. t Upper Salford Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing The Upper Salford Township EMC was notified by the Montgomery County . EOC of an Alert status at 1630. The EMC telephoned the secretary at the EOC at 1635 and she proceeded to secure the premises. The EMC arrived at 1707 and verified the Alert with the county EOC. The remainder of the staff were telephoned and asked to report to the EOC. Staffing was completed at 1843 with the arrival of the second township supervisor. , The EMC, Deputy EMC, two elected township supervisors, a transportation officer and two secretaries compose the main ECC staff. TheEMCalsoserjesastheRadiologicalofficer. EOC staffing is of concern. The EMC has several important roles to fill, outside of coordinator-police services, public works and (k communication. In addition, the EMC has also had to assume the fire services / radiological originally indicated was the concern of other individuals. The primary staff members on hand were well-trained and knowledgeable about their tasks. The secondary staff members appeared to have less training and looked to the primary staf f members for guidance. A shift change did not occur so the capabd ities of the secondary staff could not be observed. II. Emergetcy Operations Management The EM: was effectively in charge throughout the entire exercise. When a message would come in the EMC would review it and then announce it to the entire staff. Each staff member was well-informed as to the status of the emergency, the occurring events and the emergency actions needed in response. Access to the EOC was controlled by locking the entrance door at 1635. A security guard was posted at 2111 for increased protection. The original Alert notification was received at 1630 as noted earlier. The other status notifications were received via the RACES g i network at 1750 and 2005. l The Telford Diving Unit was placed in a stand-by mode during the j Alert so they would be ready if needed for evacuation and route 'g alerting. O 5. l
Two elected township supervisors (in addition to the EMC) were (,( ) present for the majority of the exercise. Their involvement in decision-making was on a limited, as needed basis. III. Facilities The room size, desk space and seating were just adequate. For extended operations, the larger area adjacent to the room utilized would probably be advisable. The EOC room could then be used for a radio room. The status board was posted in plain review of all the staff. It was kept up-to-date by the primary secretary on all significant events. The plume EPZ, Evacuation Route and Relocation Centers maps were all posted. There are no ACP's in the Upper Salford Township. IV. Communications The primary communicafions to and from the Montgomery County EOC was accomplished through RACES, after the initial activation phone mescages. Secondary communications, the telephone system, was used
.on several occasions for, convenience. Schools and Radiological Monitoring teams were contacted via RACES in an efficient and effective manner. Unfortunately, the RACES operated from a truck downstairs and outside the EOC structure. This did not impair the I() effective transmission of messages in any way, but did prove to be an inconvenience.
V. Public Alerting and Instruction The Telford Diving Unit was placed in a standby mode during the Alert stage so they would be ready if needed for route alerting. However the county EOC did not instruct the Township EOC to activate them. VI. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VII. Protective Actions A list of all known residents of the township with hearing impairments or mobility difficulties were contacted during the Site Area Emergency state. They were again contacted later in the exercise (simulated) and arrangements were made for their evacuation. 'This list was up-to-date and well organized. I l VIII. Radiological Exposure Control An adequate supply of simulated dosimeters, chargers, TLD's and KI, along with record keeping forms, were available. The distribution of 60 O 9 s g - w~
A these instruments was well handled. The EMC, who serves as the (O- Radiological officer and the transportation officer is knowledgeable on the use and calibration of the dosimetry equipment. The EMC was familiar with decontamination procedures. IX. Media Relations There was no media involvement at this EOC and no expectation or preparation for media. X. Recovery and Reentry ; Exercise terminated before any recovery or reentry. XI. Scenario The scenario did test the response capabilities of Upper Salford Township. Upper Salford EOC Deficiencifs
- 1. Supporting staf f appeared to be less f amiliar with the plans as what they might need to be, additional training is recommended. Also, the Township needs to reexamine the issue of twenty-four hour capability.
- 2. RACES was located downstairs and outside of the EOC structure. The relocation of the RACES' might be considered next to the Emergency
([ } - Operations room for a slightly more efficient operation. 61 h O O e+- r --me-mm--,w - -mane, -m-- -..w-m, ,---e: ~
] Chester County EOC I. Activation and Staffing Notification of county officials and activation of the EOC staff occurred promptly and in accordance with the plans. Activation of the EOC was initiated by the utility's Alert notification call, i received at 1614 via the hotline. This information was verifed by -
receipt of a follow-up call from the State EOC. Appropriate stsff were mobilized through the use of written call lists. Full staffing was achieved by about 1725, during the Alert stage. Almost all of the positions were, double-or triple-staffed. This not only coonfirmed round-the-clock staffing capability, but afforded everyone - the benefits derived from exercise participation. II Emergency Operations Management The County Director of Emergency Services, as specified in the plan, was firmly in charge of operations at the EOC. He demonstrated excellent capability f'r o strong leadership. He gave periodic briefings in a loud, clear voice. His directions were explict while still being concise. He reminded staff, as conditions changed, to review their check lists'and plans and to perform the specified actions. l An effective message handling system was established. Pressure sens'itive form packets were used, consisting of an orginal and four (( ) copies. Routing instructions were displayed on a prominent wall chart. A message center kept a log of messages and distributed them by the use of runners. Access to the EOC was effectively controlled by staff at the two entrances. The security personnel had lists of staff members and expected visitors, which made for an efficient operation. The EOC was notified by PEMA at the various event stages as follows: Alert at 1614, Site Area Emergency at 1738, General Emergency at 1949, and evacuation order at 2021. The county established a unique method for keeping the municipalities aprised of major developments. Each of the fourteen participating communities was assigned to a different EOC staff member, who was responsible, in addition to his or her regular duties, for notifying the municpal EOC of changes in emergency classification status, 2 protective action decisions, and other significant events. Theoretically, this should have allowed rapid disemination of information, as the county staff could contact all of the communities simultaneously, and within moments of the Director's announcement. In practice, however, there were numerous problems in the early stages of the exercise. Schuylkill Township never received the Site Area Emergency notification; the Alert was reported to Phoenixville
, 62 l
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Borough as an Unusual Event, thus delaying activation of the EOC; and k East Nantmeal and Warwick Township experienced delays ranging between one to two hours in receiving the Alert and/or Site Area Emergency notifications. As the exercise progressed, however, the notification times improved markedly. At the Alert stage, only four municipalitieswere notified within fifteen minutes of the county's receipt of the declaration; at the Site Area Emergency stage, nine EOCs were notified within fifteen minutes; at the General Emergency, . I all municipalities were notified within five minutes. This trend toward improved performance supports the finding of the observers that the staff members who were assigned this responsibility were not sufficiently familiar with this duty at first. If this notification ( procedure is to be continued, the appropriate staff should receive additional training in this responsibility, and the duty should be included in the check-lists and procedures for the respective positions. A related problem, which undonbtedly contributed to the early notification delaysg was that the county's notification call lists initially contained numerous incorrect telephone numebra for , municipal EOCs and key municipal officials. The correct numbers were gradually identified during the course of the exercise, and the corrections were posted.f Coordination calls were placed to fire, police, and ambulance groups via . county radio. Bus companies were contacted by commercial (l], telephone. Coordination with the Berks and Montgonery County EOCs was demonstrated, and the Chester County risk municipalities were contacted by the municipal liaison group fo? response action status reports. Such coordination at the municipal level, however, tended to be one-way, and some municipalities complained that they were not routinely provided status reports regarding meteorological conditions, release rates, plume location, etc. A more frequent complaint of the municipalities was that the County EOC failed to respond in a timely manner, if at all, to their requests for unmet needs. Almost every community reported some type of unset resource, > including ambulances and busses, dosimetry, and personnel for manning access and traffic control posts. Direct observation and a review of message forms indicate that, although there were some delays in taking action to fulfill these requests, the county staff did act upon most requests, and succeeded in simulating their fulfillment by the end of the exercise. The problem, was not do much one of failing to fulfill the requests, but of failing to notify the municipalities of action being taken until the final arrangements had been made (or simulated). If such arrangements took several hours to complete, as they probably will in an actual emergency, the municipal EMA's were not provided'with status reports in the interim, and perceived that nothing was being done. As noted, there were delays in acting upon some of these requests, which may have resulted from a lack of a specific procedure for municipalities to request unmet needs. Some 63 1 O O
l requests were made to the County Director, some to Operations and (() others to various county staff members. The county should examine this procedure, especially the way in which requests are routed, to determine if efficiency can be improved. Receipt of requests should be confirmed to the municipalities, and they should be provided with status reports indicating actions taken and resource ETAs. The county's reception and mass care centers were late in activating, i but the exact cause is not discernable to the federal observers. The plan specifies that the centers (and/or the center managers) are to benotified by the Mass Care Chief during the Alert phase, and nobilized during the Site Area Emergency phase. Notification and mobilization of the staff for each center is the responsibility of the respective center managers, and was not observed. The Mass Care Chief initiated actions to notify the reception and Mass Care Centers at about 1745, shortly after the county was notified of the Site Area Emergency declaration. Although this was later than specified, it , should have been timely enough to permit activation of the centers prior to the General Emergency declaration, but this did not occur. Reports from the field observer concerning the reception centers indicate that the Stetson Middle School was notified at 1735 and activated at 1800, Downingtown High School was notified at 2015 and activated at 2045 and Exton Mall was notified at 1955 and activated at 2000. The mass care c' enter at the Unionville High School was activated at 2200. The county should further investigate the cause of this late activation, and implenent appropriate measures to a ( ,) resolve the problem. Elected officials were present and participated in the decisionmaking process throughout the exercise. One County Commissioner attended the entire exercise, another commissioner was in the EOC for part of the time and a third was reportedly in the field. The Commissioners announced a county disaster declaration at approximately the sane time as the Governor made his disaster declaration. III. Facilities The EOC is located in the basement of a county office building which
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is outside the ten-mile EPZ. The facility provides the basic amenities, including adequate space, furniture, lighting and telephones, but lacks air conditioning. Several large fans used to circulate air during the exercise resulted in excessive noise. The capability of the facility to support extended operation cannot be confirmed, as such items as bunks, showers, and a kitchen, if available, were not observed. Lavatories are located on an upper floor, and their use required the staff to exit and reenter through l EOC security. The county emergency communication center, which , i contains most of the emergency communications equipment, is not within or adjacent to the EOC, but is located in another wing of the building, and several flights up. This requires that all 64 i O
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l communications traffic be relayed between the communication center h,] and the EOC, with the attendant possibility for delay and error. Although the condition of the EOC is not considered deficient, emergency operations would be enhanced in a more modern facility, which included or was adjacent to the communications center, and contained the amenities to permit continuous operations. IV. Communications , Capability for communicating with the appropriate organizations and locations was demonstrated throughout the exercise. The primary l
- means of communicating with the state and municipal EOCs wascommercial telephone'. A temporary dedicated telephone line linking the county and state was also used. Although this line can reportedly be established within six hours, the county director would not depend upon its being available during an actual event. The backup system to the State EOC was the utility's " Hotline," a
' dedicated telephone net, which also serves as the primary ?. ink between the county and the plant. A teletype system is also available to the State EOC. The secondary system to the municipal EOCs was provided by ARES, an amateur radio organization. Secondary cotamunications to Limerick were via commercial telephone or via radio to Moctgomery County, whfch has a separate, dedicated phone line to the plant.
The.only means presently available for the County to communicate with the EBS station it commerciel telephone. Plans to install a radio (- backup to the EBS station should be completed, to provide a secondary means of communication. The only available mesns of communication with the utility media center was commercial telephone; a hard copy device directly linking the County and media center was not available. However, the State EOC could use the teletype syster.to provide the County with hard j copy of news releases, although this would result in some delay. Commercial telephone provided the primary means of communication to support hospitals, schools and other institutions. A secondary means of contacting hospitals was one- and two-way radio. The primary means for contacting ambulances is via the county emergency radio net, with commercial telephone as backup. No problems with the communications systems were experienced during the exercise. Although there is a heavy reliance upon using ; commercial telephones as the primary means for contacting many organizations and locations, most of these can be contacted by existing secondary means. A notable exception is the EBS station, which presently has no backup. The county is in the process of installing a computerized automatic dialing system which is being programmed to perform notification 65 ( O e e- e -w-we--=*-,+#-weeemtr--e'eerreew-we-w-w-se weer-"Te w vf-ngw-iie ryw,-w--- y'wer e
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) calls. The system will have the capacity for storing primary and alternate phone numbers for 1600 individuals, and will send messages out simultaneously over ten telephone lines. According to the Director, the system will be used to notify and mobilize the EOC t staffs of the fifteen risk municipalities, as well as the county.
There is also an acknowledgement feature for key individuals, by which they can confirm their receipt of the message. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommenstion ! The County EOC had no role in performing dose assessment or formulating protective action recommendations. , VI. Public Alerting and Instruction - The procedure for alerting the public was initiated at 2021 when the county EOC received a call from the State EOC advising that the sirens were to be sounded at 2045, with EBS activation to follow shortly afterward. .The director instructed the staff to notify their respective municipalif'ies, and a call was placed to the EBS station at 2035 to arrange for EBS activation at 2050 (the station had been ;
- alerted and placed on standby at 1628, shortly af ter the county had 4
received the Alert notification). Observer reports f rom the risk ' municipalities confirm t' hat the siren and EBS activations occurred on ' schedule. l ( ) The ' primary EBS station used by Chester County during the exercise l was WCAU, not WC0J as specified in the plans. The reasons are that WC0J does not broadcast round-the-clock, as does WCAU, and it has a l weaker signal in some areas of the County. WCAU is also affiliated with the CBS Radio Network, and is probably more familiar to most , County residents than the local station. The designation of WCAU as the primary EBS station is clearly warranted, but the State, county and municipal plans, as well as the public information material, I should be amended to reflect this change. i The County did not demonstrate the capability to privide appropriate public instructions regarding protective actions. The EBS message l which was broadcast was a test message, which advised listeners that in the event of an actual emergency, instructions would be provided. Although it was an exercise objective, and reiterested by PEMA's 2021 siren /EBS coordination message, the County did not prepare evacuation instructions for the public. When questioned, the PIO stated that, in a real emergency, the prescripted EBS messages contained in the < plan would be used. However, no messages were actually prepared as a demonstration. Future exercises should include preparation of evacuation messages which instruct the public where to go, when to leave, what to take, how to get there, how to request special assistance or transportation, what to do with pets, etc. Such j messages should be prepared for both EBS and general news release.
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Activation of the County's siren system is computer controlled. ( Following activation of the system, a printout is available which L indicates whether or not each siren sounded. This report identified ten sirens which had failed. Problems were experienced at both the county and municipal levels in implementing route alerting. Although the exact.cause of these , problems is difficult to identify, it appears to be the result of planning deficiencies. The plans are not absolutely clear, but I indicate that the county is responsible for activating route alerting in the event of siren failures, while the municipalities are g responsible for activating route alerting to notify hearing-impaired g residents. As the same municipal fire departments may be called upon i by two different jurisdictions to perform both types of alerting, coordination between the county EOC, the municipal EOCs, and the fire departments is essential. The plans, however, do not include sufficient procedures to assure such coordination. During the exercise, several of the municipal EMCs who did attempt to initiate coordination with the county did not receive satisfactory responses. Many of the municipal,EMCs, however, indicated that they did not share the above interpretation of the plans, as they activated their s l' route alerting teams independently. The actions of the county officials indicate that they belive authority to implement route , 8 alerting resides at the county level, as they directly contacted the appropriate fire departments and instructed them to perform route alerting within the areas covered by the ten failed sirens. There is no indication, however, that the county coordinated with, or even (J ) notified the corresponding municipal EOCs. Furthe rmore , this action was not accomplished in a timely manner. At 2050 the Director received the computer printout which identifid the siren failures, but it was not until 2130 that the fire / rescue group chief initiated notification of the ten fire departments. The reason for the 40 minute delay is not apparent to the observers, but it may be related to the general lack of procedures noted above. t In the end, some form of route alerting (either actual or simulated) was implemented in most municipalities. However, the circumstances of activation were not consistent, and the activity wa not coordinated. The County should investigate this matter further and, as appropriate, clarify the responsibilities, establish more specific procedures, and assure that there will be coordination among the county and municipal EOCs and the fire departments. The County and municipal plans should be amended to reflect any resulting changes or clarification of procedures. t VII. Protective Actions According to the plan, the county has no direct responsibility for a manning the 90 traffic and 25 access control posts which have been pre-identified. The plan assigns responsibility to the Pennsylvania 67 ( ([) 6
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) x State Police (PSP) for establishing 42 of the posts, located along
{ major evacuation routes, and the municipalities are responsible for the remainder. During the exercise, the PSP liaison at the county EOC coordinated the simulated establishment of the posts at the appropriate time. The liaison reported that there would be no problem obtaining the necessary troopers and vehicles, as there were three barrecks to draw from, and appropriate resources are available < to keep the county's evacuation routes clear. As note previously, the reception centers were not activated in a timely manner. This is discussed in the Operations Management section. The evacuation of mobility-impaired, transit-dependent, and others needing special assistance is the primary responsibility of the municipalities in which such individuals are located. According to the EDC staff, the county does have duplicate copies of the municipalities' list of these residents, but these were not observed. The county's responsibility is to coordinate the allocation of the available transportation resources, and to obtain unset needs reurted by the municipalities. As described in the Emergency Operations Management section of this report, capability for this function was generally adequately demosntrated, although there were some delays.< It should be noted that the transportation resources arranged for during the exercise were largely simulated; the exercise did not afford the observers the opportunity to determine whether the necessary vehicles were actually available. The county played a more direct role in coordinating the evacuation of a hospital and three nursing homes located within the plume EPZ (a fif th institution, the Pennhurst Center, is a State facility and, according to the county staff, evacuation is a State responsibility). As specified in the plan, notification of these ' facilities was performed by the medical /ENE group at the Alert stage and subsequent changes in emergency status. The county staff demonstrated good capability for coordinating the evaucation of the special facilities. Based on census data which they Legan collecting during the Alert phase, the medical / EMS group determined the transportation needs and coordinated with the Transportation Group to assign the county's available resources. PEMA was requested to provide 19 additional ambulances from out-of-county sources. These arrangements were performed in accordance with the plans, and the resource assignments were completed prior to the implementation of evacuation. A demonstration of school evacuation was precluded by both the time ; of year and the time of day that the general evacuation occurred. i However, the school services representative at the EOC reportedly < contacted all schools to confirm that none were in session. 68 O
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VIII. Radiological Exposure Control The county EOC is not located within the 10-mile EPZ, so distribution of dosimetry /KI hits to EOC staff was neither required nor demonstrated. The county is responsible for distributing dosimetry /KI kits to the municipalities. According to the plan, this is to occur during the Alert stage. For the exercise, the dosimetry /KI kits were pre-distributed to the municipalities the day prior. This reflects the county's reported intention of predistributing the dosimetry and KI on a permanent basis (discussions are ongoing with the utility to provide each msnicipal recipient with a secure storage cabinet for the kits). This predistribution plan should be more efficient than arranging for distribution at the time of an event, and is endorsed. However, the plans should be revised to reflect this change. The quantity of simulated dosimetry /KI kits predistributed to most municipalities was not sufficient to meet their needs, as identified in the plans. Most, municipalities requested additional sets. One aspect of dosimetry /KI distribution was net demonstrated during the exercise. The county,is responsible for certifyir.g farzecs as emergency workers, and establishing procedures to allow them to reenter evacuated areas'to tend livestock. The plan spectfles ths; 200 sets of dosimetry /KI, plus record forms and special ids, are to , be available for this purpose, and that a distribution point is to be j' '- established at the Lionville Fire Department. The appropriate county EOC staff were not aware of this responsibility, and no provisions i were made to implement it. This issue was also not addressed in EBS messages or general news releases, as the plan stipulates. I The Radiological Officers at the county EOC were familiar with the procedures for distributing KI, as well as the precedure for authorizing its use. They were also aware of the maximum radiation dose permitted, as specified by the EPA Protective Action Guides. l Timely instructions were issued to the municipal EOCs which addressed these subjects; the municipalities were also advised to obtain dosimeter readings at regular intervals and maintain records.
' IX . Media Relations i The EOC building includes an appropriately equipped press room on the third floor, which was staffed for the exercise. A press briefing I was held at 1645, but the observer was unable to attend, due to other duties. Several media representatives did attend the briefing, and a tour of the EOC which followed.
The PIO was active during the c.xercise. It is the policy of the !- county to keep the media fully informed. The PIO or his assistant maintained verbal contact, via telephone, with local radio stations I on an hourly basis. Local newspapers were also contacted at least ( once during the exercise. However, written news releases were not l prepared, and as noted in the Public Alerting and Instruction section i E O
- 69 ------ pn a eewwwwupe =1se-p+we e>=-e em m.-+w w e e e aw w ee <w e h -- +--*-*nmur-,s --e---*-r---
i O of this report, the capability to prepare public instructions h appropriate to the scenario events was not demonstrated. Capability for rumor control was excellent. In a room adjacent to the operations room, six rumor control operators manned eleven phone lines. The rumor control number had been widely publicized, and some actual inquiries were received. A weakness in the county's media relations activity was the apparent lack of direct coordination with the utility media center - if such ; i coordination occurred, it was not observed. The PIO was providing information based on data received via telephone from the State EOC, ' and on activities at the county EOC, without the benefit of knowledge regarding utility press releases. Capability for such coordination would be greatly enhanced by the availability in the county of a device for receiving hard copy of news releases from the utility media center. K. Recovery and Reentry
- Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective.
II. Scenario ' The scenario was adequate for all political jurisdictions within . ' Ches.ter County to test their capability to respond to an emergency at the Limerick'Geneating Station. , Chester County EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Notification of municipal EOCs and/or officials by the county staff i 4 was not timely during the early stages of the exercise. The EOC
- staff seabers who are responsible for performing this function should receive additional training, and the duty should be included in the check-lists and procedures for the respective positions.
j 2. The county's notification call lists initially contained numerous incorrect telephone numbers for municipal EOCs and key municipal officials. Correct lists including all necessary numbers should be compiled, and a procedure for periodically checking the lists for accuracy should be implemented.
- 3. Actions to fulfill some municipal requests for unset needs were delayed, and in most cases, municipalities were not provided with updated status reports regarding such requests. The county should ,
investigate the possibility of establishing a more efficient procedure for receiving, routing and overseeing requests for unset .! j needs, and, especially, of providing status reports to the municipalities regarding actions being taken and estimated time of arrival of the requested resources. l ( 4. The county's reception and mass care centers were not activated in a timely manner, as specified by the plan. The county should further j O 1 ti <* c a f t* o 1 r a cei ti . a 1 at t appropriate measures to resolve the problem. G 70
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- 5. The county did not have a device for receiving hard copies of news
([(]' releases from the utility media center. The availability of such a device would greatly enhance the county's capability for coordinating with the State and utility regarding news releases.
- 6. The only means available for communications between the county EOC and the primary EBS station was commercial telephone. An alternate means of communication should be available to serve as backup in the event of phone system overload or failure. f
- 7. The primary EBS station used by Chester County during the exercise was WCAU, rather than WC0J as the plan specifies. If WCAU is permanently designated as the primary EBS station, the State, county and municipal plans, as well as the public information material, should be amended to reflect this change.
- 8. The county did not demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate public instructions regarding protective actions. Future exercises should include preppraticn of evacuation messages which instruct the public where to go, hdk to get there, how to request special assistance or transportation, what to do with pets, etc. Such messages should be prepared for both EBS and general news release.
- 9. Problems were experienced at both the county and municipal levels in implementing route alerting. The circumstances of activating the route alerting teams were not consistent among the municipalities,
( the ' activity was not coordinated, and the county delayed the implementing instuctions for forty minutes. The county should investigate this satter further and, as appropriate, clarify the responsibilities at the county and municipal levels, establish more 1 specific procedures, and assure that there will be coordination among the county and municipal EOCs and fire departments. The county and municipal plans should be amended to reflect any resulting changes or clarification of procedures.
- 10. Distribution of dosimetry /KI kits to the municipalities was performed prior to the exercise, rather than during the alert stage, as specified in the plans. If predistribution of dosimetry /KI kits is to be implemented on a permanent basis, the plans should be modified i accordingly.
- 11. The quantity of simulated dosimetry /KI kits predistributed to the municipalities was not sufficient to meet their needs, as identified in the plans. Future exercises should include a demonstration of the county's capability to provide sufficient dosimetry and KI.
! 12. The county failed to demonstrate the capability for certifying ; ! farmers as emergency workers and providing them with dosimetry, KI, l record keeping forms and ids. The appropriate staff members [ responsible for implementing these actions should receive further i training, and this capability should be demonstrated in future
, exercises.
O 71 L
(' Chester County Reception / Mass Care Centers Pre-exercise planning identified three locations where reception centers were to be established-the Exton Square Mall, Downingtown High School, and Stetson Middle School. The following observations apply to all three locations unless otherwise noted. The participating groups involved in the relocation effort were the Fire Department, Police Department, and ARES volunteers. The activation procedure was via telephone, beeper pager system and radio. Most staff members received their calls at home. Staffing , was adequate in numbers but they lacked training in the use of forms and some radiological monitoring equipment. There was no evidence of printed rosters, but Fire and Police indicated they would utilize their existing personnel roster to arrange for 24-hour coverage. No replacement staff capability was demonstrated. Procedures for Registration of evacuees were not demonstrated at any of the reception centers. However, the participants at Exten Mall and Stetson satisfactorfly explained the procedures. Those at Downingtown were not familiar with the procedures for registration. Evacuees were monitored for contamination, but no one knew the procedures for dealing with contaminated individuals. Participants r^N stated that they would have to contact the County EOC for [ k-) decontamination instructions. Decontamination equipment and procedure s were not demonstrated or explained. The Fire Chief at the Exton Mall felt that the site was inconvenient to evacuees, due to access difficulties. As an alternate, he recommended the Township building, located about I mile from the . Mall. In addition to providing easier access, this site reportedly provides sufficient shelter, ample parking, and a large area that could be used for vehicle decontamination. It is recommended that Chester County officials investigate this situation, and consider designating the Township building as a reception center location, if it proves to be a better site than the Mall. Pre-exercise planning identified two locations where mass care centers were to be established-Unionville High School and Kennett High School. Due to late activation of reception centers, the latter was not observed. , The Unionville High School Mass Care Center is located more than 5 miles beyond,the Plume EPZ. , The Shelter Manager indicated that the high school could accommodate about 800 individuals. If sheleter capacity were exceeded the neighboring middle school, also with a capacity of 800, would be used. The high school provided generally adequate facilities, O 72 py--_, . - .. ~ y . - , - - - , - - - - - . - - - - - - -
g() including wheel chair accessability, a nursing station, and quick access to a hospital. However, toilet and eating facilities did not appear adequate to support 800 people. Immediate food sources would be supplied by the Red Cross and the school cafeteria supply. Additional food could be obtained from USDA resources and local food retailers. J There was good communication ~ established with the Chester County EOC - by telephone and radio, with indirect contact with the state via the county. There was direct communication via ARES and Fire Department , radios to ambulance services and some area hospitals.
- The staff was adequate in number and capability. An established call-up procedure for additional staff to provide 24-hour coverage was demonstrated. '
Shelter personnel had been told that they would not receive evacuees. However, during the observer's visit the shelter received and processed (registered and monitored) over 30 evacuees. A procedure for isolating contaminated individuals was established. Chester County Reception / Mass Care Center Deficiencies 1. Capability for registering and decontaminating evacuees at reception centers were not adequately demonstrated. Personnel should receive
- f. furt.her training, and registration and decontamination of evacuees (1 ) should be demonstrated at future exercises.
- 2. Capability for 24-hour staffing at reception centers was not -
demonstrated. Additional staff should be appointed and trained, as necessary, and capability for 24-hour staffing at reception centers should be demonstrated at future exercises. 4 3. The Unionville High School did not appear to have adequate toilet and - eating facilities to support the number of assigned evacuees. The i county should re-examine the capability of the Unionville High School to handle 800 evacuees. Chester County Emergency Workers Decontamination Center The Chester County emergency workers decontamination center is located at Elverson fire hall (just east of Morgantown, Pennsylvania). The center was manned by fire personnel who are also responsible for route alerting. Decontamination monitoring was performed by County emergency services personnel who brought CDV-700 survey meters to the fire hall, along with the emergency worker exposure control kits. 4 A decontamination center was not demonstrated at this location. There was no working shower (although the utility has agreed to
- install one) and the area was not set up to segregate contaminated N
([) 73
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O people from those who were not contaminated. Center personnel had been briefed on decontamination procedures and knew of a facility where showers were available, but were unaware they were expected to set up a decontamination center for the exercise. The observer was satisfied that in a real emergency the decontamination center would have been set up and operated properly, as the fire company personnel were aware of how to accomplish this and knew where to get the equipment needed. The decontamination monitoring was performed by county emergency services personnel. They demonstrated the proper procedure to - monitor a person suspected of being contaminated. They also were aware of the allowable meter readings above which decontamination is required. Only one of the two survey meterr available was operational. The one survey meter would be adequate for this center unless a large number of persons arrived at once. Vehicle and equipment monitoring were not demonstrated. Those firemen who were interviewed by the observer were not familiar , with the use of dosin(ters, and were not aware of the authorized < exposure limits. It was learned later that only about half of the 4 I a personnel had been briefed on dosimetry, and that the briefing had occurred only a day or so before the exercise. Some of those briefed believed they had not be'en adequately trained. ' In summary a decontamination center was not set up. There were no (( } show'er facilities and the fire company workers were not adequately trained on use of dosimetry and protective equipment. Chester County Emergency Worker Decontaination Center Deficiencies
- 1. A working decontamination center was not set up and demonstrated.
Future exercises should include demonstration of an operational decontamination center, including all attendant equipment.
- 2. Fire company personnel were not familiar with the proper procedures ',
- for radiological exposure control. Those responsible for operating the decontamination center should be provided further training on the use of dosimetry and protective equipment, and the allowable radiation exposure limits.
- Charlestown Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing An initial telephone notification was received by the Deputy Assistant Emergency Management Coordinator (initiated by the Chester a County EOC) at 1619 hours. Verification was not observed. The first staff seaber (Deputy EMC) arrived to activate the EOC at 1650.
Township emergency staff continued to arrive and staffing was complete at 1815. Staffing was mobilized according to written I (:) 74
i I i procedures. Total staff numbered eleven persons, representing: (( )
~ Township emergency services, ARES, East Whiteland fire / ambulance, township townwatch (aux. police), public works, radiation, Board of Supervisors, standby transportation, and volunteer victia-players (mostly utility employees). The staff displayed a thorough knowledge of their responsbilities. Capability for 24-hour staffing was ;
demonstrated by presentation of a roster for two 12 hour shifts.
- II. Emergency Operations Management ,
Until the EMC arrived, the Deputy EMC demonstrated capable leadership of the Township emergency functions. She acted in a back-up role , ' after the EMC took' charge. He consulted frequently with his staff ' and infrequently with the PEMA instructor / observer. Copies of the plan procedural checklist were available and referenced. Internal communications were well managed, with messages promptly logged and posted on status boards. EOC security, provided by a townwatch officer,'was very effective. The EOC was notified of Site Area Emergency at 1758 and General Emergency at 1953 by the county. A , notification from the' county concerning siren activation was received i
- and confirmed at 2033, and the evacuation recommendation was received at 2038. ,
- . . i Capability for effectively coordinating emergency activities was well demonstrated by Charlestown officials. The township initiated coordination with the county EOC of activities such as the manning of
' (( ) traf'fic control points, activation of route alerting, and obtaining unset transporation needs. In general, however, the county's response was inadequate, occurring either late or not at all. + III. Facilities . The EOC, established in a multi-purpose school auditorium, was fully adequate for the purpose. There was sufficient space, furnishings, , lighting, and telephones, and the facility can support extended operations. . There were numerous status boards and graphic displays, including all appropriate maps. The EOC is located beyond the 10 mile EPZ. IV. Communications Communications were very good. Commercial telephones were the primary means of communication, with ARES providing backup. Also ' available were 10 pagers for notifying staff. Portable AM/FM radios were used to monitor EBS stations. V. Dose Assesselnt and Protective Action Recommendation Not applicable at the municipal level. j
; O 75 1
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VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The township has identified four residents with hearing impairments. The plan specifies that individual notification of these people is to be performed by route alerting teams. At 2048, following the sounding of the sirens, the township initiated coordination with the ' county to activate route alerting for the hearing impaired. It was not until 2144, almost an hour later, that route alerting vehicles with PA systems arrived at the township EOC. They were dispatched ,# within several minutes. Procedures should be established between the s , , township and county to assure the timely activation of route alerting. j VII. Protective Action , In anticipation of an evacuation, arrangements for township residents requiring special assistance were begun early, during the Site Emergency phase. Twenty-two people without their own means transportation, one person requiring er. abulance and one wheel chair-bound individpal were. identified. At about 1845, the Deputy EMC forwarded the tow 6 ship's transportation needs to the county. No , response was received. The request was repeated at 1950, 2020 and 2030, again with no response. With the evacuation pending, township officials wisely decided to make their own, alertnate arrangements for transportation, and ' contacted the county at 2107 to cancel their previous requests. [ Acti'vation m'nd manning of seven of the eight access and traffic
} control points identified in the plan is a State responsibility, to be performed by the State Police. The township adequately demonstrated the capability for manning the traffic control point for which it is responsible, and requested confirmation from the county regarding activation of the other posts.
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control j Ten simulated dosimeters and TLDs were pre-distributed by the county prior to the exercise. As the EOC is not located within the 10-mile EPZ, distribution to the staff is not required. Capability for distribution of dosimetry to an ambulance crew from a neighboring, non-risk municipality was adequately demonstrated. II. Media Relations Not Applicable. I X. Recovery and Reentry C Demonstration of Recovery and Reentry was not an exercise objective. r 76 ga w 9 w -. +$+ . - - , ,4 9 c -p+ .-- 4+ mes g -,e_~*e_ - - - - -e; -
+- - <--a --- - - - -
l Charlestown Township EOC Deficiency
- 1. The township should update its plan to reflect the staffing that was present during the exercise.
East Coventry Township EOC t I. Activation and Staffing ~ l The EOC was promptly activated by the Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC), who received a call at 1638 from the Chester County EOC. Staff, included numerous message receivers and recorders, a transportation coordination team, the police chief, the fire chief, , and an ARES operator. Security was very good. Staffing was completed by 1700. EOC staff were well-trained, and worked very well as a team under the direction of the coordinator. Round-the-clock :
) staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. l l II. Emergency Operations Management i
The EMC directed the st.aff well, briefing them as a group and on an ,
' individual basis, as needed. Message handling was rapid, efficient,
- and thorough. Access to,the EOC was controlled at all times. The ,
EOC was notified of the developing incident as follows: Alert at 1638 hours, Site Area Emergency at 1743 hours, and General Emergency-at 1952 hours. Police and fire companies were on hand to respond; ' i ('[" notification of ambulance and bus companies are a county responsibility. All three elected officials were present and participated. . .; III. Facilities The facilities were adequate. The EOC, part of the fire station, is large and comfortable with plenty of furniture, and a large kitchen. Sleeping and showering are not available, thus precluding extended operations. Backup power is available. Another telephone would be l beneficial to communications capability. Status boards were posted ! and kept up-to-date. Maps were posted showing the EPZ, evacuation l routes, relocation centers, location of sirens, route alerting l routes, and the location and type of infirmity of the. mobility impaired. No population map was posted, but information regarding the EPZ population is available in the RERP. IV. Communications Communications were adequate, in spite of the fact that the CD radio ' had not been received. Police and Fire radios were in use, 1 commercial phones were used for receiving, verifying and sending messages. ARES back-up was on site and operating. Messages from the county did not seem to transmit enough information or be very well-prepared to respond to East Coventry's queries. The means of (- communication to the schools and nursing home will remain commercial telephone. 77
/'T V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable.
VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The county is responsible for sounding the sirens, and did so at 2045 hours. However, one in East Coventry did not sound; this was reported to the county and an order for route alerting back-up was expected. When it did not come through within 15 minutes, the township, on its own initiative, commenced with route alerting which took one hour (2100-2200 hours). The EOC coordinator also notified. the nursing home by telephone. VII. Protective Actions Activation (simulated) of traffic and access control points was prcmpt. An outstanding aspect of this EOC's operations were its preparations for notifying and transporting the mobility-impaired. A list of those needing assistance, including their exact location and type of assistance required, is maintained and was checked and updated by the transporation coordination team tl ,ghout the exercise. An evacuation,of the schools was not 4emonstrated, as schools were not in session. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control 10 Direct read and permanent record dosimeters were simulated. Three CDV-700's were available. Although this equipment had been delivered to the EOC with no instructions, or explanation, the EOC staff did an adequate job of simulating distribution and use of the equipment. The quantity of dosimetery was not adequate, however. Repeated queries to the county on the subject (more dosimeters, supply and use of KI, etc.) were not responded to promptly. II. Media Relations The East Coventry EOC is not intended to be a location for media contact. However, when a news reporter arrived, he was permitted to observe the EOC for a short time. He was not formally briefed and was dismissed (by the EOC Coordinator) when the General Emergency was declared. Rumor control was demonstrated. I. Recovery and Reentry Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective. East Coventry Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The township plan needs to be updated to reflect the staffing in the roster presented to the Federal observer.
(2) 78
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f'T 2. Completion of route alerting took one hour. The towns' hip should kJ\- reassess the length of their routes in order to shorten the one hour notification time. East Nantaeal Township EOC_ I. Activation and Staffing i The Township Emergency Management Coordinatior (EMC) received the initiating call from the Chester County EOC at 1706. He did not verify the call as no procedure is provided in either the county or township RERP. The township call list, which did not list home and office numbers for all on the list, and in some canes did not provide any numbers for some individuals, was used to mobilize the staff. The staff as listed in the plan were in place at the EOC by 1750. This included the EMC and his deputy, two township supervisors, the radiological officer, the township secretary, communications officer and security. The staff (first shift) were competent and knowledgeable. Three volunteers who were present as part of their training represented (he 24-hour capability. The second shift staff does not at this time have adequate traiiing. . II. , Emergency Operations Man,agement The Township EMC, as designated in the RERP, was effectively in charge of operations. However, he was often unable to obtain (() information from the Chester County EOC when necessary. No immediately available contact was provided at the County. The communications officer handled all incoming calls and used the message forms provided effectively. A Township constable arrived to provide security at 1734. He controlled acess and sign in/out lists. 4 The Township received notification of the Alert at 1706, the Site Area Emergency at 1931, and the General Emergency at 1935. The Fire Company that performed route alerting was placed on standby at 1813. Two of three Township supervisors were present throughout the exercise. They were not observed to be actively involved in decisionmaking. III. Facilities The East Nantmeal Township Building was used as the EOC. The facility is adequate for this purpose with sufficient furniture, space, lighting and telephones. However, no back-up power is provided. The status board was clearly visible in the EMC's office and kept up-to-date with effective use of color for emphasis. The maps available were adequate. ( () 79
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IV. Communications One commercial phone line with a published number was provided as was one commercial phone line with an unlisted number. An additional phone line with unlisted number is to be added. A radio scanner unit was also used. The fire company radio frequency was available,as was a backup from the Amateur Radio Energency Services (ARES). These , communications facilities provided communications to the County EOC and other Township EOC's as well as local schools, hospitals, and ambulances. The county EOC did not initially have the correct listing for the unlisted telephone line, which delayed notifications. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not applicable at the municipal EOC level. VI. Public Alerting and, Instruction r The Township Plan specifies that route alerting is to be performed in the event of notification of siren failures by the County. No notification was received, but the Township did dispatch a route alerting team sometime after the General Emergency was declared. The alertin,; was not observed but was reported to involve only hearing-impaired persons previously identified. D VII. Protective Actions The Township role, according to their plan, is to verify that the Pennsylvania State Police has manned the TCP's in the Township. According to the operations log this was done after the General Energency was declared. The Township has no role in activation of reception centers. The Township does maintain lists of names and locations of hearing and mobility impaired individuals in the county. These people were all actually called during the exercise to determine their transportation needs at that time. This information was noted on a map to effectively plan transportation needs. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control While an actual dosimeter charger was provided to the Township, dosimeters and TLDs were simulated by wooden dowels and pieces of cardboard. Energency worker instruction and record forms were ' appropriate and thorough. The quantity of dosimetry and KI provided was less than the Township's needs as identified in the plan. l ( (~T 80 (_) ' l
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t 1
- j
No potassium iodide was provided although forms outlining its proper
- (_'(i-)- use were. The Township radiological officer generally did an adequate job in assuring that workers monitored their simulated dosimeters, but was not aware that a second, closer decontamination center was available in the event it was needed.
IX. Media Relations . The Township did provide space for media briefings. The Township Deputy EMC prepared briefings which were read to individuals in the / media space. The briefings were'not coordinated or checked with any other public information officers at the county or state level. The first briefing issued at 1800 contained a potentially misleading statement that "100 REM /hr are being released" with the implication that the release ' to the public. The briefing consisJed only of reading the press release. , I. Recovery and Reentry Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective. East Nantmeal Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. TVen'ty-four hour response capability over an extended period of time
({ } is not assured. A full second-shift staff should be identified and trained, and the Township plan should be amended to include the additional staffing.
- 2. The Township call-up list contains some inaccuracies and omissions for staff and alternates. The call list should be completed, and checked for accuracy on a regular basis.
- 3. The Township issued a news item which included potentially misleading information. The Township role in issuing press releases and media briefings should be clarified and/or coordinated with the county and state.
East Pikeland Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing At 1635, the declaration of an Alert was received over police radio. Based on this radio announcement, the Police Services Officer arrived at the East Pikeland Township EOC. The Acting EOC Coordinator was notified by the EMC by phone to report to tn= EOC. He arrived at 1710 and immediately began the call down. He also directed that (D d 81 G
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o l 1 l l security measures be set up at this time. The EMC arrived at 1750. , By 1850 the EOC van fully mobilized. Although no shift change - l actually took place, double staffing did occur for training , purposes. During an actual event, the Township has sufficient staff- l to man the EOC on a 24-hour basis. , II. Emergency Operations Management The EMC was effectively in charge of the Township's emergency , i operations. He Feld frequent briefings to keep the staff apprised of - l the situation. Copies of the plan and checklists were utilized to ensure that all necessary actions were performed. Internal communications vers well managed, with messages promptly logged and ; i distributed for appropriate response / action. Guards were deployed early in the exercise to secure access to the EOC. The EOC was notified of the declaration of the various emergency stages as follows:' Alert status was received at 1630, Site Area Emergency at 1746; pad General Emergency at 1953. Members of the Board of Supervisors were present at the EOC intermittently during' ' the exercise. III. Facilities The EOC was adequate in terms of space, lighting and phones. Extended operations are possible in that bunking, showers and a {~ kitchen are available within the facility. Back-up power is available and is tested periodically although it was not demonstrated during the exercise. A status board was clearly visible, and appropriate information was immediately posted as received. Maps displaying the plume EPZ, route alerting sectors and evacuation routes were displayed. Maps depicting the location of relocation centers and access control points were reportedly available, although not posted or observed. , IV. Communications i The Township EOC utilized telephones as their primary means of i communication and police radio as back-up. Also present and operating from the EOC was an ARES operator. The communications as
- demonstrated were adequate.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation are not i municipal responsibilities.
/
VI. Public Alerting and Instruction East Pikeland Township supplemented the siren activation with route alerting. Route alerting is accomplished by the Fire Services by 82
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siren sector, which does not follow township boundaries. Route alerting was actually accomplished for three sectors. The teams were , mobilized at 2104, about 15 minutes following completion of siren activation. Route alerting was reportedly completed at 2200. Route alerting to notify the 17 identified hearing-impaired residents i was begun immediately following receipt of the evacuation order. . Pre-printed messages, contained in the plan, were hand delivered to them. Notification of these individuals took one hour and 15 minutes to complete. Handicapped individuals were contacted by phone to alert them they would be picked up. VI. Protective Action Traffic control points were canned promptly by the Township. The EMC indicated that although local personnel and resources to cover all traffic control functions was adequate for the exercise, additional help would need to be requested from the County EOC during an actual event. . - r EOC staff had lists of all those within the Township known to be mobility-impaired, and arrangements were provided for their transportion. The bus with wheel chair lift requested from the i County EOC at 1830 finally arrived at 2115 and was immediately dispatched. One wheel chair bound individual and aide were evacuated. ( VIII .- Rad [ological Exposure Control Actual dosimetry was not utilized during the exercise. Instead, dosimeters and TLD's were simulated. The Township did not have an adequate supply of dosimetry and a call to the County EOC was placed at 1920 to request more. The Township was not advised as to the resolution of this request. KI was not distributed. No special measures were taken to protect EOC personnel; however, an alternate EOC is designated in Exton should an actual event occur. IX. Media Relations Not Applicable. I. Recovery and Reentry Demonstration of Recovery and Reentry were not exercise objectives. East Pikeland Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Route alerting of the hearing-impaired took one hour and fifteen minutes to complete. The Township should consider ways to reduce this notification time, such as by applying more resources to the task.
i 83 4 e
_r-- a i East Vincent Township EOC , I Activation and Staffing ' I. The East Vincent EOC was.,setivated af ter receipt of in Alert notification from Chestert County, as prescribed in the township plan. The required personnel reported promptly. The capability for - around-the-cicek staffing was'not demonstrated. Assistants to key personnel have been or are being trained to enable shift changes in the future. 1 /-
?
! II. Emergency Operationa' Management The Emergency Management Coordinator was effectively in charge of emergency operations. He was supported by the Police Chief, Transportation Ccordinator and Ascistant Emergency Management Coordinator. A member of the Board of Supervisors also acted as the Radiological Equipment Coordinator. There is no fire or ambulance service physically located in.this community. If such services are required they- st'e disp'atched from nearby adjacent townships. One Emergency Amateur Radio Operator provided radio ' communication services. Emergency management was carried out efficiently and professione.lly. No' formal briefings were required because of tlw small number of emergenc'y management personnel present. EmergencymanageSentinEastVincentTownshipwasadequate. The (3j community can focus on assisting its citizens because it has no direct responsibility for fire / ambulance emergency services. The small size enables radiologial emergency response personnel to be intimately-familiar with individual citizen's requirements for ' assistance. III. Facilities The facility provided adequate space', furnishing, lighting, and telephones, but was not equipped for extended operations. The appropriate maps were generally available. IV. Communications , 4 Adequate communications were' available to enable necessary coordination and direction to be completed. Commercial telephones served as the primary system, with ARES radio used for backup. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation This community hed no role in dose projection or protective action , decisionmaking. 84 e v
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VI. Public Alerting and Instruction , -East Vincent Township's role in public alerting and public instruction was limited to energency management staff personnel making some calls to verify that individuals and institutions were aware of current situation. EBS broadcasts were a-anitored at the EOC. ; VII. Protective Actions t Traffic control points were promptly manned by police when required. i The EOC staff was exceptionally knowledgeable of the location and specific problems of mobility impaired individuals. Written lists are maintained with this information. t VIII. Radiological Exposure Control No actual dosimeters were available for energency workers, although they were simulated. The quantity of dosimeters predistributed to
- the township was not fufficient to meet the identified need.
II. Media Relations , Not Applicable. i
- X. Reentry and Recovery k Demonstration of reentry and recovery was not an exerise objective.
East Vincent Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The capability for round-the-clock staffing was not demonstrated.
Additional staff should be appointed and trained, and the stafing lists contained in the Township plan should be revised accordingly. North Coventry Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing i _ Activation and Staffing were adequately demonstrated at the North . Coventry EOC. Chester County called the EOC at 1630 to report that
- an Alert had been declared at the plant at 1600. All key staff were notified by telephone, via a call list, and the North Coventry EOC was activated by 1655. Auxiliary firefighters were notified by radio pagers (through the Chester County EOC at the request of the North CoventryEOC}andreportedtothefirestationby1730.
The EOC was staffed by a township supervisor, an EMC, the fire chief, - the deputy police chief (substituting for the police chief), a RADEF officer and an assistant, a RAM operator, a constable (for security), and two administrative assistants. No shift change or 24 hour (.. O
. 85
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g staffing capability was demonstrated. There appeared to be (d L sufficient township personnel and volunteers for 24-hour staffing, but there was no formal designation as such. II. Energency Operaticus Management Emergency operations management was adequately demonstrated during this exercise. The EMC was in charge of the township"a operations, and demonstrated good capability for directing the actions and activities of the EOC. He made good use of his staff, and they also carried out their required actions capably. Copies of the plan and checklists were available, and referenced frequently. All messages were promptly logged in by the EMC's assistant; the constable provided security; the fire chief coordinated the implementation of route alerting; the EMC and his assistant handled notification of staff and special facilities; and the police chief handled the arrangements for access control. The EMC controlled the pace of all theses activities, and kept the township supervisor who was present informer of all actions. Coordination and information sharing between the township and county EOCs, should be improved. The township EMC occasionally relied upon the advice of the PEMA observer concerning correct procedures. These questions should properly have been directed to the county EOC, as it is unlikely that a PEMA respresentative will be present during an actual event. The County EOC provided little information to the ( community concerning plant conditions, release data, plume direction and radiation levels. Only once, at the Alert stage, was wind direction given. III. Facilities The EOC was located in the Township Municipal Building. The E0C was functional, although it had no back-up power or facilities for extended operations. Battery powered lighting and portable radios in automobiles would have to be relied upon in the event of a power failure. A status board was available, and was used. There was no large plume EPZ map; a small map depicting the EPZ with evacuation routes was available, but not posted. IV. Communications Communications equipment functioned adequately and was suitable for the needs of this EOC. The primary means of communications with , Chester County was via telephone, with amateur band radio as a back-up. The township's police / fire band radio provided communications with the fire and police emergency workers, and neighboring communities. Schools are contacted via telephone, and out of town ambulance services are contacted via telephone, either directly or i through Chester County. O 86
f V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations
)
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation is not a municipal responsibility. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction At 2045, the 7 sirens in North Coventry sounded. The township was notified by Chester County of the siren sounding and EBS broadcast in conjunction with the order for a general evacuation at 2031. At 2050, 4 route alerting teams were dispatched (in 4 fire trucks with I mounted loudspeakers) to cover the entire township. The township was divided into 4 sectors for route alerting purposes. It took approximately 50 minutes for each team to complete its run. The local EMC had lists of hearing-impaired, mobility-impaired, and those needing transportation. He simulated calling some, and having the route alerting teams contact others. VII. Protective Actions Seven traffic control points were manned by police and auxiliary police. The township has access to one tow truck within its boundaries. Others are'available from Pottstown. There are no ambulance within the tevnship. They must be called from surrounding communities, or through the Chester County EOC. The township has ( some road maintenance vehicles for use in clearing roads during bad weather. As stated in the previous section, the EMC has written information concerning those citizens within the township having special needs. Arrangements for transporting these people were made, and the township requested three busses from the County EOC. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Although the township's plan identifies the need for 41 sets of dosimeters, the county predistributed only ten sets, consisting of simulated direct-read dosimeters and TLD's. The township's request to the county for additional dosimetry was granted. Although dosimeters were issued and initial readings properly recorded, township personnel did not demonstrate a thorough i understanding of the principles of dosimetry, and the significance of protection action levels. Information concerning the proper procedures for the use of KI were also lacking. There is a need for more training in this area. i ( 87 l ([) e
,.y .- w+-- =e- . =w..=- - . - +.--.-. --*mw ---e wm . -. -.
II. Media Relations Although conducting media relations is not a municipal responsibility, a reporter for a local newspaper who visited the EOC was provided information concerning the exercise. , I. Recovery and Reentry Demonstration of Recovery and Reentry was not an exercise objective. , North Coventry Township EOC Deficiencies
] 1. Capability for 24-hour staffing was not demonstrated. The township . should identify its need for additional staff members, and make the j appointments, as necessary. New staff members should be trained, and the staffing lists within the plan modified accordingly. Future exercises should include a demonstration of 24-hour staffing capability.
- 2. The EOC did not have adequate maps posted. Maps depicting the ten-mile EPZ, the township's evacuation routes, and traffic control points should be obtained and posted.
- 3. Procedures for coordination and information sharing between the county and township EOCs should be improved. The township EMC should direct questions regarding procedures to the county EOC for resolution, rather than rely upon the advice of a PEMA representative
( ( ]) who say not be available during an actual incident.
- 4. Township personnel did not demonstrate a thorough understanding of the principals of radioogical exposure control for emergency workers. Personnel should receive additional training concerning the proper procedures in the use of dosimetry and KI.
Phoenirville Borough EOC " l I. Activation and Staffing i Activation of the Emergency Operation Center was initiated by a call from the County EOC to the EMC at home at 1629. The EMC arrived at the EOC at 1638 and stated that he had received a message that an Unusual Event had been declared at the facility. After the Phoenixville Hospital called at 1652 to inform the EMC that they had
- received notification of an Alert and the EMC insisted that there only had been an Unusual Event, the PEMA Controller informed the EMC at 1700 that an Alert had been the proper message. The EMC i immediately called the County for clarification and, after receiving confirmation, quickly notified all of his staff using the implementing procedures attached to the plan. Notification started at 1706 and was completed by 1735. The EMC stated that the latest plan changes received that morning from the contractor contained many
( incorrect phone numbers and that he was required to use his own
! (:)
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list. The EMC, his Deputy or any other responsible Borough official ( can be contacted 24 hours a day through business or work phones or through the Police Department. The EMC used the last resource to inform the Borough Manager.
)
The EOC was fully staffed at 1743 with representatives from each of the organizations / services prescribed by the EMA organization chart. ~ Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated through the use c of double staffing. All staff members demonstrated a good knowledge i. of their plans and procedures and appeared well-trained.
; II. Emergency Operations Management -
The individual in charge of the EOC was the EMC, as designated in the plan. The EMC demonstrated a thorough knowledge of all aspects of the operations and assisted all staff members with questions and problems as they arose. He was supported by a Deputy and a staff who l were involved in all decisionmaking and who used their plans and implementing procedures in an effective manner. It is recommended, however, that the EMC' hold periodic staff briefings to update everyone on the status of operations and to allow each department to brief and coordinate with other departments. Message forms and logs were properly utilized, even though the supply ran short towards the end of the exercise, and the message handling syst,em was efficient. i (O Access to the EOC was adequately controlled. i The Mayor, Council President and other Council members were present. The Mayor was active in decision-making and issued a declaration of an Emergency in the Borough at 2002. III. Facilities j - , The EOC is located in the basement of the East Wing of the
- Phoenixville Hospital, which is within the EPZ. The EOC consists of one room with an off-room for comunications. Additional space would
- be helpful. There was adequate furniture and lighting, but an insufficient supply of telephones. Noise also was a problem and
! measures should be taken to reduce the level. Although there are 30 l cots for sleeping purposes, there are no kitchen or shower facilities l in the East Wing. Energency classification levels and other significant events were maintained on two separate status boards and both boards were kept ' current. - i Posted on the walls of the EOC were the following maps: the ten mile EPZ map showing general evacuation routes; access control points and traffic control points; pick-up points for those requiring transportation assistance; route alerting maps. { O 89 l l i .
The EMC stated he had received that morning, a new ten mile EPZ map ( which changed one of the Borough's reception centers (Stetson Middle School instead of the West Goshen Shopping Center). The EMC stated he had not been informed of the change; this change also caused confusion during the exercise when the officials were discussing where to send the two buses of " evacuees." IV. Communications EOC communications to the Couaty EOC was by telephone with radio backup. These two systems functioned adequately during the exercise, although more telephones are needed. ( The EOC also had radio communications with its police, fire and ambulance services. Communications with the staging area for the two buses for evacuation was provided by the local Town Watch group with their CB radios. V. Dose Assessment and Pr,otective Action Recommendation Dose Assessment and Protective Action recommendations are not municipal responsibilities. VI.Public Alerting and Insdruction In accordance with the exercise scenario, public alerting was -(' accomplished through the sounding of the sirens at 2045 followed by an EBS transmission. The sirens were heard in the EOC and by municipal workers in the field. Significantly, the EMC stated that since the signal from WCDJ (the EBS station in Coatesville) is received weakly in Phoenixville, they use WCAU to monitor EBS transmissions in the EOC. This should be reflected in the plan. A radio in the EOC did receive the EBS message broadcast on WCAU. Supplemental alerting of the public is accomplished by route alerting by municipal teams. For this exercise, one fire truck was scheduled to run its route. The EMC stated that the County Fire Board is responsible for dispatching the crews; when he contacted the County at 2100 to confirm that the route aletting team had been sent, he was informed that it had not. The team was then dispatched and alerting was completed at 2130. It is unclear in the Borough's plan whether the Boroughor County has this responsibility. This matter should be addressed and clarified in the plan. VII. Protective Actions Af ter the evacuation order, the police representative informed the observer that one officer had been at a TCP during the entire exercise. No other TCP's were activated. The Borough plan identifies an inadequate supply of local resources to effectuate complete traffic control; it was not observed whether this shortfall ( was communicated to the County. O 90 g s.. - m w,s. - - . . - ~ ~ -
During the exercise, the Transporation and Medical Services staff k, were observed working with their lists of individuals requiring evacuation assistance. Both groups indicated they would. file these names by geographic area instead of by name to facilitate easier routing of transportation resources. The Medical Services group alerted and coordinated the dispatch of its local ambulance resources (three) and forwarded repeated requests to the County for an unset need of ten ambulances (this differed from the stated plan requirement of seven). Although this request was initially made at about 1845, the Borough was not advised by the County in time for the
- evacuation order. *
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'The Transportation Group forwarded a request to the County for one bus with which to evacuate a group of Boy Scouts who acted as j volunteer evacuees. The plan states eight buses would be needed to assist in a complete Borough evacuation. Again, this group was required t st+ait repeated requests to the County'for the one bus. ,
Two buses arrived at 2110. Confusion existed over which was the proper reception area,due t6 the problem noted in Section III of this report. i The EOC staff both relayed and received updates to the lista of persons with special transportation needs. For example, the Deputy EMC sent to East Pikeland Township the names and addresses of township residents who had sent a newspaper notice form to the i Borough. (O ' VIII. Radiological Exposure Control '
- The RADEF group at the EOC performed its responsibilities in an l excellent fashion, calibrating all dosimetry, making proper distribution with appropriate forms and instructions and even responding to a request for six sets from the Phoenixville Hospital.
All unset needs were forwarded to the County; follow-up requests were i necessary. The observer could not determine whether the County's
. simulated delivery was timely.
The Borough posesses 22 CDV-742 dosimeters and no CDV-730's or TLD's. The RADEF Officer stated that 50 sets of dosimetry would be the maximus Borough requirement. 1 IX. Media Relations ! The EOC staff had two individuals assigned to this function. Although they did not perform any traditional media relations activities (briefing, etc.), they did perform a useful support role , by notifiyinit area industries and institutions, thereby freeing up t other EOC staff. Rumor control capability was not demonstrated. ' j ( O 91 e o
. . . - - - - _ . _ . , . . ~ . - . - _ . . - . . . , . . , . . . - .
Phoenixville EOC Deficiencies l 1. The call-lists for the EOC staff, as contained in the most recent version of the plans, contained many incorrect phone numbers. The lists should be corrected, and checked periodically to maintain accuracy.
- 2. The EOC did not have sufficient tele 1 phones to support emergency operation. Additional telephone lines and telephones should be
, installed.
- 3. Noise level in the,EOC was high enough to be a probles. Measures should be taken to reduce the noise level.
Schuykill Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing The telephone call . initiating activation of the EOC (the Alert notification) was recfived from the County EOC at 1630. A written call list was used to mobilize the staff, but contained some inaccurate listings. Staffing was not completed until 2020, during
,, the General Emergency phase. Full staffing was not achieved, as the i
, fire department represen'tative remained at the fire station (designated as the alternate EOC) rather than reporting to the EOC.
. Those present included the EOC director, a transportation
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staffing for the EOC director was demonstrated, but capability for a shift change for the other positions was not demonstrated. 1 II. Emergency Operations Management 2 As per the plan, there was a township officer effectively in charge of the EOC at all times. Periodic briefings were held. Access the , EOC was not controlled. Message handling was effectively performed. However, there was no formal mechanism for getting written asterial from the EOC to the fire ~ department. Bus companies were , appropriately called in to assist in the evacuation. t , The township received notification of Alert status at 1630 and General Emergency at 1954; according to the staff, the township was never notified by the county of the Site Area Emergency declaration. j III. Facilities There was sufficient furniture, space, lighting and telephones at this facility. The status board was clearly visible and kept up-to- ! date on significant events. Maps of evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, and population were available. Capability for continuous operations, such as bunks, showers, j kitchen, and back-up power source, were not available. (O 92 9 0
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IV. Communications Communications were available with the other municipalities and the Chester County EOC via two telephone lines (primary) and ARES radio (secondary). However, no communication was available to the fire department via radio. Many calls to the township came in on the township phone rather than the two EOC phone lines. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation a Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Notification of schools and other institutions by telephone was performed at the Alert stage. No schools were in session. Route Alert teams were places on standby following receipt from the county of the evacuation notification, at 2027. After receiving word that a siren had fail (d the township implemented route alerting. Teams were also dispatched to alert hearing-impaired residents following siren activation. VII. Protective Action Activation of traffic control points was promptly organized at the general emergency. According to township officials, adequate (- resources are available to man all access and traffic control points. The EOC staff were aware of the location and special needs of mobility-impaired people, and had this information in written form. .However they were not notified at the alert, as required by the plan. Arrangement was made for the pickup of residents with special evacuation needs. Unnet transportation requirements were identified, and passed on to the county. l VIII. Radiological Exposure Control i An adequate number of simulated dostmeters were predistributed by the
- county before the exercise. KI, if available, was not observed. The
! director of the EOC was well acquainted with the procedures for using i and maintaining proper records, but dosimetry was not distributed to the staff during the exercise. In particular, there was no mechanisa l for distributing dosimetry to those emergency workers stationed at ' the firehouse. The EOC staff was familiar with decontamination procedures. II. Media Relations e
. Not applicable.
l l X. Recovery and Reentry
- I Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective.
- 'O .
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4
- Schuykill Township EOC Deficiencies t e' 1. The call list used to notify the EOC staff contained some incorrect e listings. The list should be corrected and checked periodically to
- maintain accuracy.
- j- 2. ' Capability for a full second shif t was not demonst. rated. Additional
- staff should be appointed, trained, and recorded in the RERP. ,
- 3. The Fire / Rescue officer did not locate at the Township EOC, as specified in the plan. Township officials should assure that, during future events, staff members perform their duties at the specified ,
4 locations.
- 4. Procedures for distributing dosimetry to emergency workers were not demonstrated. Future exercises should include such demonstrations.
Spring City Borough EOC I. Activation and Staffitig Activation of the Borough,EOC was initiated at 1627 by a call from , the County EOC. -This call was verified by the municipality via a call to the County EOC.' Staffing was completed at 1820. Staffing consisted of the EE, the Deputy EE, police service officers, ambulance service officers, fire service officers, and the Mayor. (O
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se r< a a6 er =* ir 1 a ee isitici - Round-the-clock staffing capability was demonstrated by the presentation of a call-up roster. e i II. Emergency Operations Management , As designated in the plan, the EE was in charge of the borough's operations. Management of emergency operations was marred by an 4 internal coordination problem which resulted in delayed implementation of protective actions. The evacuation recommendation was issued by the County EOC at 2028 and received at the Borough by , 'the Deputy EE. This.information was not directly relayed to the EMC by the Deputy and, consequently, was not officially recorded by the Municipality. The Deputy reiterated several times to the staff that evacuation orders were issued but since it was not officially recorded, his comments were not acted upon. This was resolved at 2130, resulting in a 45 minute delay in implementing evacuation. - Aside from this problem, other aspects of emergency operations management were well demonstrated. The EMC held periodic briefings to update the staff; messages were reproduced and distributed on ' prescribed forms, as appropriate; a police officer, stationed at the / EOC entrance, established effective security. The EOC received notification of significant events as follows: Alert status, 1627; Site Area Emergency status, 1745; General , j Emergency status, 1951. Confirmation calls were placed to the county l 0 - 94 l i
___ 7 _._ . _ _
-{O EOC following receipt of all of these status changes. Notification and/or coordination calls were placed to other organizations, as stipulated in the plan. Council members not in attendance were kept apprised of the situation via telephone.
4' The Borough Mayor, in attendance throughout the exercise, was involved in decisionmaking and provided the contact between the EMC and Council. l III. Facilities The Municipal EOC was located in the Borough Building as per the Plan. The EOC's amenities were adequate. A status board was posted in view of all in attendance and was concise and up-to-date. Maps showing the evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control
; points, and radiological monitoring points, although not posted, were available et the EOC. The EMC indicated that these maps would be posted at future events.
e IV. Communications , i The only demonstrated communications were between the Municipal EOC
..and County EOC and between the Municipal EOC and ambulances. The '
former was handled via commercial phone with ARES and police radio backup; the latter via commercial phone to the County which in turn ( call,s.the ambulances. The municipality hopes to have direct access
\ to ambulances in the future.
V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation - ] Dose assessment and formulation of protective action recommendations are not municipal responsibilities. T q VI. Public Alerting and Instruction , i The Municipal EOC utilized route alerting to notify those individuals
'who are hearing impaired. In an actual emergency, these people will be presented with a preprinted card advising them that an emergency exists, and providing them with appropriate instructions. Route alerting was performed by Fire Department personnel, and teams consisted of at least two members. Vehicles were dispatched at 2030
- upon receipt of a call from the County EOC. Completion of the routes
- was accomplished in 45 minutes. Calls were also placed to factories i following each change in status, beginning with the Alert notification. These calls took about 12 minutes at each phase.
s l VII. Protective Action A record is maintained at the EOC of those people (names and addresses) who are without private transportation or require j ,- transportation assistance due to impaired mobility. Arrangements for
. the transporation of these people, if they were made (or simulated),
were not observed. 4 9 95
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._ - - _ _ - ~ _. - - .. .. - . ~ ~ . . _ . . - . . - - - - - . -- . ._
The plan specifies that Spring City is responsbile and has the necessary resouces for manning the three identified traffic control points. However, during the exercise, the borough determined that they were not capable of meeting this function, and requested personnel from the county. This request was made shortly after the Alert notification, at about 1645, which should have allowed the county sufficient time to provide the personnel prior to the
~
- evacuation.
i VIII. Radiological Exposure Control ! The Borough EOC has some 0-200 MR dosimeters, a charger and 4 recordkeeping cards. The supply of dosimeters was not adequate. KI supply was simulated. Familiarity of borough personnel with the use of the dosimeters and KI was inconsistent. The municipal EOC staff has not received sufficient training regarding radiological exposure , control. 1 Since the EOC was La the evacuation zone, relocation to an alternate I ' site was simulated. F II. Media Relations No activities regarding' media relations were demonstrated. I.. Recovery.and Reentry Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective. Spring City EOC Deficiencies ,
- 1. An internal coordination problem resulted in delayed implementation
) of protective actions. Although the evacuation recommendation was received at the proper time by the Deputy ENC, the message was ! mishandled, and was not immediately recognized and acted upon by the EMC and staff. The borough should determine the cause of this coordination failure, and implement procedures to assure that such an incident will not be repeated. i
- 2. The EOC staff was not sufficiently trained in Radiological Exposure Control. The staff should be provided additional training in the l procedures for the proper use of dosimetry and KI.
i Upper Uwchlan Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing
'~
A call was received by the Township EMC at his home to activate the
- EOC. The EMC notified the Board of Supervisors, and Team A members.
The EMC was the first to arrive at the Township Building at 1645. At
- 1650, all Team A members were present in the EOC with the Board of Supervisors arriving at 1710. The call from the County w1s reported
! t j . I 96
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. to have been made at 1630 to the EE.
-{ The five member Team A (first shift) consists of the EE, Assistant EE, and coordinators for Fire,
- Transportation, and Medical /Aabulance. Round-the-clock staffing i capability was demonstrated through double staffing, with Team B members arriving on-site by 1920. The staff displayed a good basic knowledge of their responsibilities. The Assistant EE is on the construction engineering staff of the Limerick Generating Station, and is a valuable resource due to his intimate knowledge of the
- facility. The second shift staff were briefed on a one-on one basis by their Team A counterparts.
1 Emergency Operations Management II. The EMC was effectively in charge of operations at the EOC. The EMC
.and/or the Assistant EMC frequently briefed the staff on the changing situation, consulted with them, and directed them to take various actions. Copies of the plan and procedural checklists were frequently referenced throughout the exercise to ensure completion of all necessary accians. Incoming messages were recorded on message formaandinitialedbftheEMC. Internal communications were well managed, but the message forms were found to be cumbersome to handle at the municipal level. Ihree copies were not required and
- ,, considerable effort could be saved if completed in single sheets.
t Routine messages could be preprinted with their call list so that the , individual only need initial, date and time the calls for actions I taken. .. EOC security was good with the EE acting as the " sergeant-I at-aras". He required positive identification of all staff. l observers and visitors. The EMC received advance notification of the Site Area Emergency by monitoring the several emergency management frequencies with a scanning monitor at 1745, but did not receive confirmation from the County until 1810. Telephone communication i from the County at 1955 advised of the change in status to General l 'Esergency that had been declared at 1935. The EOC staff either i misunderstood or was misinformed about the evacuation order, ! ! believing initially that the evacuation was for a 2-mile zone only. l However, in seeking verification from the County at 2115, they were i notified that'the evacuation was for the entire 10-mile EPZ with 2- , alle priority. In either case, the Township officials should have recognized that their plans contain no evacuation provisions other l than for a full, 10-mile EPZ evacuation, and should have sought clarification sooner. This would have prevented the resultant 30 j minute delay in implementing the evacuation. The three members of the Board of Supervisors were actively participating in the exercise and were supportive of the program and ['; their staff. : l III. Facilities The EOC was adequate for the exercise, but lacks the amenities needed for continuous operations. It is a former one room school house with I adequate space, and furnishings, but lacks restroom facilities, (O == i E d *t==8 1 citici - r r i *i E di at r a ! 97 [.
telephones were adequate. The EOC lacks emergency power and two-way radio communications capability. Tabular and graphic information was displayed and kept current throughout the exercise. Additional map-related information that is supposed to be contained in copies of the plan were not yet completed. The Status Board was clearly visible and kept current on significant events. Maps displaying the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, and access control points ' were posted. IV. Communications This Township relied primarily upon commercial telephone for communications, as radio communications equipment had not yet been obtained and installed. The County emergency management net is in the process of being installed, but was not operational at the time of the exercise. Although the plan specifies that back-up communications is to be provided by ARES, an ARES operator did not participate at the township. The exercise was conducted using a 20 channel scanning monitor, too AM/PM portable receivers, and the two telephones. One telepfone is the regular published Township number, ' and the second is reserved for incoming calls from the County EOC and is unlisted. The township does not have a Police Department and contracts out for police' services to Uwchlan Township. The EBS ' station to be monitored by the Township is identified as WC0J-AM (1420), but the station reduces their evening power output at 2030 and goes off the air at 2200. At reduced power, adjacent stations (O cause substantial interference, resulting in poor reception. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations This is not a municipal responsibility. , VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The EOC plays a relatively minor role in public alerting. Upon , receiving notification from Chester County, they will in turn notify the two schools, factories and institutions in accordance with the plan. Public instruction is not a Township responsibility. However, they do play a role in distributing instructions to the public through telephone contact to schools, factories and other institutions including the State Park ranger. Route alerting was not implemented at the direction of Township officials, although there is one identified hearing-impaired
- resident. The plan specifies that route alerting should be implemented to notify hearing-impaired individuals.
8 i VII. Protective Actions According to officails, the Township's role is to assist the County by verifying that TCPs are manned; when verification was attempted during the exercise it was determined that the State Police had O . e 98
- s .,
e l 0
4 i ( exercised their segment earlier during the day, out of synchronisation with the rest of the players. The Township maintains a list of mobility-impaired residents and others requiring special assistance, with addresses and phone numbers and their special needs. There are no residents requiring ambulance support, but 3 residents may require special assistance. Fourteen residents have been identified as requiring transportation assistance. School was ,l not in session during the exercise. However, the EMC is also the County School Bus contractor and indicated that should he be contacted during school hours, he would be able to respond promptly. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control . Emergency workers in the Township number 44. Thus a total of 88 dosimeters were identified as being needed. Only 10 simulated
- dosimeters had been predistributed by the County. The shortfall was made known to the County EOC, which simulated delivery of the additional dosimetry. The Township did demonstrate their capability to issue the dosimetery with' appropriate instructions, and were aware of the maximum allowable dose. They were also aware of the procedures for issuance of KI and its use. The staff was aware of when and where to go for decontamination.
6 IX. Media Relations
-g Media Relations were not a major activity at the Township. Two N reporters, who came to the EOC during the course of the exercise, were admitted into the EOC and were briefed by the EMC. Incoming telephone inquiries were referred to the rumor control number at the County.
X. Recovery and Reentry Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective. Upper-Uwchlan Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The planned radio consunications equipment was not yet installed.
Installation should be completed as soon as possible.
- 2. The EOC lacks capability for continuous operation. In order to assure long-term uninterrupted operations, the EOC should be provided with; where feasible, running water, toilets, and backup power generator.
- 3. An ARES radio operator did not participate at the township EOC. '
Steps should be taken to arrange for ARES participation at the township during future exercises.
- 4. A separate plan developed for Upper Uwchlan Township, reflecting such information as round-the-clock staffing, etc, needs to be forwarded I to the Regional office.
B O 99
- 5. Township officials, initially believing that the evacuation was for the two-mile zone only, failed to recognize that their plans contain no evacuation provision other than for a full 10-mile evacuation, resulting in a 30 minute delay in implementing the protective action. Township officials should become more familiar with the plans, and should immediately seek clarification of any instructions or messages which are questionable.
- 6. Route alerting was not implemented by Twonship officials to notify t'ne one identified hearing-impaired resident. Notification procedures should be implemented, as specified in the plans.
Uwchlan Township E C ' I. Activation and Staffing i At 1624 a call was reportedly received from the Chester County EOC informing Uwchlan Township of the Alert Status. This call was not witnessed by the federal observer, nor were the subsequent calls to
.. notify the EOC staff.' The EOC was not fully staffed since no police representative was present. (According to the EMC, the township is in the process of appointing a new Police Department representative).. Those present consisted of the EMC, a Township Supervisor, a Medical Coordinator, a Transportation and Public Works Representative, and a secretary. The staff displayed adequate capability, but demonstrated a lack of complete familiarity with checklists and procedures; occassionally the EMC was not able to
(~ ,) locate materials quickly. Additional training and familiarization with the plans is recommended. According to the EMC, there is presently not sufficient staff available for round-the-clock operations and shif t change. II. Energency Operations Management . The EMC directed operations at the EOC. Due to the small staff size formal staff briefings were unnecessary, however the EMC net individually with staff members to discuss status and procedures. Although the EMC was generally knowledgeable of operations required, he was observed to be not totally familiar with all procedures, or checklists, and had some difficulty finding materials when needed. The need for additional training is recommended. Message handling was generally efficient and written forms were used. Access to the EOC was controlled. The EOC was notified of Alert status at 1624 and Site Area Emergency at 1746. An elected official (Township Supervisor) was present and was involved in , decisionmaking. III. Facilities The EOC is located on the second floor of the Uwchlan Township ( Building. In general, the facilities of the EOC were adequate; O
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100
{ however, lighting was poor and needs improvement. A status board L was clearly visible and was kept up-to-date. The only maps posted were rosed maps for Chester County and Uwchlan Township, and a map 1 showing airen coverage within the 10-mile EPZ, other maps which were available but, not posted included evacuation routes, relocation c, enter locations, and access control points. . IV. Communications . Communications at the EOC consisted of telephone and CB radio. The ARES operator arrived at 1800 to supplement those. The EMC placed several calls to Chester County EOC for clarification of some items ! and there were long delays in getting responses from the County. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public' Alerting and. Instruction The plan called for route alerting by the Lyonville Fire Department only if the sirens failed. The fire department was available and j , ready to perform this route alerting if needci. The federal observer
- was not present at the t'ine sirens were sounded, so this activity was not obsevered. There are no identified hearing-impaired individuals _
with,in the EPZ portion of the Township. i (O VII. Protective Actions According to the EMC, there are no schools, nursing homes, mobility impaired people or people with special needs within that area of Uwchlan Township located within the IO-alle EPZ, and therefore no r transportation assistance was needed or demonstrated. A. No observations were made regarding the activation of the two traffic / access control posts which the Township is responsible for. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control , i No actual dosimetry was available. Simulated dosimeters and TLD's had been provided by Chester County prior to the exercise, but quantities were not sufficient to meet identified needs. No KI was ! provided. Township officials requested additional dosimetry and KI from the county. Simulated dosimeters were distributed to field
- emergency workers along with instructions.
IX. Media Relations Not applicable. X. Recovery and Reentry
- (
i Demonstration of Recovery and Reentry was not an exercise objective. i 101 ', ,4,- ,
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/ Uwchlan Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The Police Chief did not participate in the exercise. The township should assure that the police department will be appropriately represented at the EOC in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick. .
- 2. The township does not have sufficient staff for two shifts, precluding round-the-clock operational capability. Additional staff should be obtained and trained, and staffing lists in the Township plan should be modified accordingly.
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- 3. The staff demonstrated a lack of familiarity with certain plans and procedures. Futher training and familiarization with plans and procedures should be provided.
Warwick Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing . 4 A township supervisor received the initial call from the county at 1652. The regular Township EMC chose not to participate in the exercise and the supervisor requested a township resident to volunteer to serve as acting EMC. According to the log the EOC activation was complete at 1725. ( . The" initial notification call was not verified as no verification procedure is in place in either the Township or County plan. Besides the acting EMC, two of three Township supervisors, the fire company, transportation and Amateur Radio Emergency Services were represented at the EOC. The acting EMC had very limited training and knowledge due to the limited time he had available to prepare. The Township does not have at this time the capability to staff the EOC for 24 hours for an extended time. II. Emergency Operations Management The acting EMC was not the individual designated in the plan. He acted effectively within the constraints of his training and knowledge. He briefed the staff and referred to implementing procedures as appropriate. Message handling was adequate. The notifications, according to the EOC message log, came at 1725 for Alert, and 1908 for Site Area Emergency. The General Emergency was received at 1950. I III. Facilities The Township EOC, located in a garage, was marginally adequate for the exercise; it would probably be inadequate in a real event. It cannot support extended operations, and backup power was not { O 102 -r ee --m .e ~- --en- ---.w.---s--m ~e -
I () available. The maps were generally adequate. The status board, although visible, was not generally legible and useful, however, it was kept up-to-date. IV. Consunications Three commercial phones, two with unlisted numbers, were available. The fire company frequency was available as was a backup from ARES. These facilities provided communications to the county 20C and other township EOC's as well as local schools, hospitals and acaulances. There were difficulties with the unlisted phones and one was unuseable for auch.of the exercise. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Warwick Township did provide route alerting upon notification by the county of a siren failure. The township dispatched a route alert team at 2117; approximately 40 minutes were required to run the route. The team reported actually used their sirens and public address system. VII. Protective Action According to officials, the Township does not order that TCP's be manned; but are responsible only for verifying that they are manned. Activation of reception centers is not a Township responsibility. The lists of names and addresses of hearing and mobility-impaired individuals in the county were not available. They were reportedly in the home of the designated EMC who eleced not to participate. Therefore no attempts were made to confira notification and/or needs of these residents. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control While an actual dosimeter charger was provided to the Township, actual dosimetry was not available. The delivery of TLD's was simulated by using pieces of cardboard. Instructions were adequate. No potassium iodide was provided although forms explaining its use . were available. - II. Media Relations Not applicable. X. Recovery and Reentry f Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective.
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- 1. Twenty-four hour response capability over an extended period of time is not assured. Additional staff, sufficient to provide two full shifto, should be' assigned and trained.
- 2. The Township does not have a designated emergency management coordinator who will act in the event of a radiological emergency at
- Limerick Generating Station. An EMC who will serve during such an emergency must be assigned and trained.
- 3. The unlisted phones did not consistently provide reliable service.
The emergency phone system should be repaired, and maintained in working order.
- 4. Lists of hearing and mobility-impaired were not made available to the acting EMC. Appropriate arrangements should be made to assure that these lists are available to township officials at all times.
- 5. The EOC needs substanfial improvement in facilities and comfort. The facility should, where feasible, be provided with emergency backup j power, and other amenities needed for continuous operation.
West Pikeland Township EOC f I. Acti.vation and Staffing { tO At 1621 the EMC received a call from the Chester County EOC notifying 4 his of Alert status. Verification was r:ot observed. At that time a call up of EOC staff was initiated by the EMC. Coupletion of EOC staffing was not observed. The EMC and his staff displayed adequate i training and knowledge throughout the time the federal observer was present at the EOC. Round-the-clock staffing was not demonstrated; however, a roster was presented indicating sufficient personnel for a
- second shift.
II Emergency Operations Management The EMC was in charge of the operations at the EOC. He was well organized and prepared for the exercise, and demonstrated capable ! leadership. In full <;ntrol at all times, he also briefed other i staff members and conferred with them when needed. Message forms were used and message handling was well organized and efficient. Access to the EOC was tightly controlled. An elected official (Township Supervisor) was present and was involved in the decisionsaking. [ III. Facilities The EOC was located in the basement of the home of the EMC. Although space and furniture were somewhat limited, it was adequate. A status -(
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S (N) board was clearly visible and was maintained up-to-date. Maps L showing sectors within the EPZ, Evacuation Routes, and Access Control Points were posted on walls and in a specially built map case. IV. Communications Communications available at the EOC consisted of two phone lines and r CB radios. During the exercise an ARES radio operator also arrived to supplement these. Communications were maintained with the Chester County EOC, the township police and the ambulance service. Primary n contact with the county EOC was by telephone with backup provided by the ARES radio. The reverse was the case for the ambulance service. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction i , . The plan called for r(ute alerting in the event of siren failure. At 2032 a call was received from the Chester County EOC indicating sirens would be sounded at 2045. At 2045 the sirens were clearly heard in the EOC and no route alerting took place. Route alerting would have been perforne'd by Lyonville Fire Department and they were available to do this if necessary. ( The ' plan also specifies that route alerting is to be implemented to notify hearing-impaired individuals, of which six have been identified. Route alerting for hearing-impaired residents, if activated, was not observed. VII. Protective Actions The traffic control point was manned at the proper time during the - exercise according to the EMC, although this was not observed. Manning of the TCP was performed by township police. The EOC staff was aware of the names and locations of mobility impaired residents and people with special needs (including hearing impaired). An up-to-date listing of these people was shown to the federal observer. Transportation for these people is not available. This has been identified as an "unnet need", and Chester County has been informed of this. During the exercise, however, the township did not request the county to provide any unset transportation-related needs. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Actual dosimetry equipment was not available. However, it was ' simulated by the use of wood dowels for dosimeters and paper tags for TLD's which were provided by Chester County. These were distributed to emergency workers and proper records were maintained. No KI tablets were provided by the county. No special measures were taken O 105
g to protect personnel in the EOC against exposure except that the EOC L was located in the basement. The EMC said he does not plan to relocate the EOC. II. Media Relations Not Applicable. I. Recovery and Reentry Not Applicable. [ West Pikeland Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. The township failed to reiterate its need to the county for unset transportation resources, necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired and transit-dependent residents. All unset resources needs should be forwarded to the county EOC.
2- Until such time as th( Township RERP reilects complete staffing, the issue of 24-hour coverage has not been resolved. The Township should update its plan to officially record those individuals who comprise the second shift. , West Vincent Township EOC , ( I. Activation and Staffing At 1628 the Alert notification call was received at the EOC from the , Chester County EOC. The EMC verified it by callback. Activation of the Township EOC was then initiated, with staff mobilized according to written procedures. Except for three volunteer workers, whose arrival was delayed until 1745, the EOC staff was present by 1640. The staff displayed an adequate knowledge of their responsibilities. In addition to the EMC, representatives from the Board of Supervisors, Communications, Fire Ambulance, Police, Transportation and Public Works were present. Round-the-clock staffing capability was not demonstrated. EOC personnel advised that they do not have backup staff. II. Emergency Operations Management ! The EMC, assisted by his Deputy, was clearly in charge and performed - his duties effectively. He periodically left the EOC Room to go to i the Planning Committee Room to brief the staff on the status of i events. Message logs were maintained throughout the exercise and telephone messages received from local citizens were delivered from the Township Secretary Room to the EMC in the EOC. The operation was very efficiently handled. { O
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r 1 The ROC staff was involved to some degree in decisionmaking, such as the order in which the three fire companies would be contacted. - A copy of the operating plan was available and referred to from time-to-time as the different levels progressed. Members of the various organizations represented had color-coded annexes containing written procedures to be followt ' in the performance of their - assignments. i
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Access to the EOC was controlled by the Constable, who required l proper identification for admittance, and maintained a Sign-In and j Sign-Out sheet. . l The IOC was notified of Alert status at 1628; of Site Area Energency at 1745 and of General Energency status at 1950. An order to evacuate was received at 2045. All of this information was recorded j_ on a status board. III. Facilities , - e The EOC was relatively small-four rooms of the upstairs of a ; converted schoolhouse-but was adequate for the size of the municipality. There was adequate furniture, lighting, telephones,
- toilet facilities and pa,rking. The EOC also has a meeting room and a i kitchen downstairs. If necessary bunks could be placed in the ,
meeting room. A status board was continuously updated upon the k occurrence of significant events, and wall maps of the plume EPZ,
- evacuation routes and siren coverage in the township were posted.
t Maps designating Relocation Centers were not posted. However, the i EMC stated that the Downingtown High School has been designated as i their shelter area. i i IV. Consunications
! t The consunications capabilities demonstrated at this township were j very good. Primary communications with Chester County is by telephone. A scanner with a roof antenna, which serves as the backup system, was also used for receiving incoming calls from the County.
Local communications employ the telephone as primary and 2-way radios j and pagers as back-up.
- There are two EBS stations designated as serving the township-WC0J l and WCAU. i V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations i
Not Applicable at the municipal level.
- j VI. Public Alerting and Instruction
- Only three of the township's nine sirens were operational.at the time
- ( of the exercise. The remaining six were inoperable because of a l 0
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(s court injunction prohibiting their sounding (the result of an alleged ( zoning violation). This matter has been resolved. The township supplemented the siren activation with route alerting, performed by fire vehicles equipped with PA systems in the areas (approximately 50%) which did not have siren coverage. Telephone calls were made to residents with hearing and mobility impairments, and to those requiring transportation. Calls were also made to Layman's Nassionary Home and the Black Angus Inn. In attempting to call , Campbell Village, a home for retarded hildren, officials dicovered that they had the wrong number listed, and dispatched a messenger to provide notification. - VII. Protective Actions' Traffic and access control points were promptly activated by the Township. At 2040 The police were instructed to block all roads providing access to the affected area. According to the EOC staff, their local resources are adequate to cover all traffic and access control functions simultaneously. The EOC staff effectively demonstrated that they were fully aware of the location of mobility-impaired township residents within the EPZ. The staff had written lists of individuals who required special assistance due to hearin'g and/or mobility impairments. They also had lists of those who did not have transportation of their own. Arrangements were made for the transportation of the above individuals. At 2135 the township requested that the county provide ((_r')s two busses. There are no schools located in the municipality's EPZ. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control The distribution of simulated dosimeters to emergency workers from the EOC was demonstrated. At 1820 the EOC Director proceeded to distribute dosimeters and discovered the amount which had been pre-distributed was inadequate (ten were available, twelve were needed). The county was contacted for an additional 12. Dosimeter readings were teSen and recorded evety half-hour. The Director advised that all ew?t , ency service dcpat" r.ents, such as the Fire Companies, had received a supply of dosimeters and KI for their use. The Director noted that the radiological equipment kits did not contain sufficient KI for all of the field workers expected. However, action to obtain additional supplies was not observed. The Director had written procedures concerning the use of the KI and the maximum exposure allowed without authorization. The written document also contained adequate information on decontamination procedures. The Director was familiar with all of the above procedures. He also stated that the windows of the EOC, since it was . located in the plume zone, would have been closed in an effort to protect the EOC personnel from radiological exposure had this been an actual event. O V 108 p -- --
( IX. Media Relations Not Applicable.
; X. Recovery and Reentry Demonstration of recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective.
r West Vincent Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Capability for round-the-clock staffing was not demonstrated, due to insufficient staff. Additional staff members should be appointed and trained. The township plan should be amended to reflect such changes, and capability for 24-hour staffing should be demonstrated in future exercises.
- 2. The list of institutions requiring notification contained wrong telephone numbers. Such lists should be corrected and checked for accuracy on a regular basis.-
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- Berks County EOC I. Activation and Staffing
/.
A phone call was received from the facility at 1605 notifying the
'Berks County EMC of an Alert at the Limerick Generating Station. The call was followed-up with a verification phone call from PEMA at ,
1608. Written call lists for EOC staff appeared to be accurate, although the timing of the Alert and subsequent calls resulted in many persons being unavailable initially, as they had been released
- from their place of employment and were in transit to their homes, e Initial notifications were performed by the EMC; this procedure could have been streamlined by detailing additional personnel to this function. However, a computerized, automated call-down system,
" RECALL", is in the process of being installed, and once in use, should result in a more rapid notification to response individuals.
In addition to Emergency Management Agency Staff positions at the EOC included representatives from State Police, Sheriff's Department, Public Works, Civil Af'r Patrol, USDA, Fire, RADEF Officer, Mass Care, ' Medical, Transportation, School Services Municipal Liaison, National Guard, RACES, and REACT. . Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated via double or multiple staffing, in addition to roster presentation; however, sIost. positions have only one person designated to that function (PIO, Hazard Analysis, School Services Ministry, Operations Officer, and Central Resource Receiving Point Manager) in ( the county RERP. All staff persons were knowledgable with regard to resources available to them, and in general, their respot.sibilities under the County RERP. Written implementation activity lists were available for each of the EOC functions, and resulted'in rapid completion of required activities following each notification of changa af classification. II. Emerg e.y Operations Ma'agement c The Berks County EMA Director was effectively in control of response operations at the County EOC, as designated in the County RERP. Briefings with regard to changes in plant statu and/or significant activities were provided to the staff in a timely manner although occasionally on a person-to-person versus a full staff basis. The EOC was notified of plant Alert status at 1605, of Site Area Energency at 1732, and of General Emergency at 1946. Initial notification to the municipalities was incomplete for sometime due to wrongly listed contact information for Colebrookdale Township. Contact was not established with Colebrookdale until 1744, C twelve minutes after the County EOC was notified of a Site Area Energency. Calls were placed to activate police response operations at 1630, for ( fire police at 1735, for ambulances at 1941, and for buses at 1950. O
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Communication was on-going with the State and, periodically, with the kJlll Berks County municipalities, once established. r The three County Commissioners were present at the EOC during the majority of the exercise, demonstrated interest and involvement in the operations, and were actively engaged in decisionsaking regarding protective actions.
?
Internal communications were well-coordinated and rapid, with the r exception of messages sent over RACES. The Operations Officer walked RACES messages from the Operations Room, requiring that he leave the operations room for a period of time, occasionally during high-levels ' of activity. The use of a messenger to transmit these messages internally would relieve the Operations Officer from this function, and enable him to focus his activities on the overall operation. III. Facilities The Berks County EQC has excellent facilities, with ample furniture, telephones, and lighting, and is, overall, well-organized to support exercise activities. Also, showers, beds, and kitchen facilities to support extended operations are available. A status board was clearly visible, and was used to log changes in emergency classification levels. 'Esps were available and were visibly posted which identified the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control and monitoring points, and population by
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(7S evacuation area. V IV. Communications Two "Hotlines" were available to the Berks County EOC; one provided a direct line to the State EOC in Harrisburg, and the other provided a ring down capability to PEMA, the risk Counties, BRP, and the i Utility. Commercial telephone lines provided the primary consunications link between the County and Municipal EOC's, EBS 4 Station, schools, and hospitals. Telephone listings for some locations, (hospital, ambulance, Blue Mountain Academy) were not accurate as listed. In accordance with the County Plan, the back-up communications resource of RACES was utilfred during the exercise, tying in the Municipal EOCs, Mass Care, Decontamination and Reception Centers. A teletype located in the EOC received hard-copy confirmation of major status changes from the State EOC, but these i messages were, on several occasions, very belated. Information regarding the Unusual Event occuring at 1120 was received over the teletype in the County at 1754; information regarding and Alert, declared at 1600, was received at 1828. Only two hard copy news releases were received from the State PIO due to technical ' difficulties experienced at the State. Other public information releases were relayed to the County PIO via commercial telephones Itnes. l b 111 I e
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i V. 'l i Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation
}
Dose level. Assessment activities, by plan, are not completed at the County At or around 1942, a ca,11 was received f rom the State EOC, which was interpreted as requesting from the County any recommendations for' Protective Actions. The EMC conferred with the County Commissioners t who recommended sheltering until the extent of the reported airborne releases could be determined. Ac 1956, the ENC returned the phone , call to the State EOC , Commissioners' recomme,ndation. informing the State of the County ' No information regarding projected off-site dose was available to the County at this time. This activity was in conflict with the RERP which indicates that recommendations the County by PEMA.for protective actions should have been forwarded to VI. Public Alerting and Instruction A call from the State <EOC at 2001 initiated coordination of sirens activation and EBS messages for the three risk counties. conference call between the risk counties at 2004 was held toA follow-up coordinate the times needed to effect the sirens /EBS system. A 2021 , call from the State EOC informed the ENC that sirens in the three counties should be activated at 2045, with activation of the EBS following "thereafter or as soon as practical". The EMC immediately [ began to inform, on a one-to-one basis, the Agency Representatives (Municipal Liaisons Fire P10, etc) who proceeded to alert their respective municipal counterparts. The Municipal Liaisons reported that all Municipal EOC's were notified as of 2034; however, a break ; in communications occurred which resulted in Colebrookdale, Washington, and Earl Townships to reportedly not receive official notification of the evacuation. Also, the Public Works Officer had begun notification to industries and utilities to take shelter at 1950, following the General Energency. No notification of recommendation to evacuate was made to these locations. The PIO notified the EBS Statfun (WKUM) at 2046 to proceed with the EBS ' message. A prescripte'd generically instructive message was aired over the EBS at 2048. However, complications developed in the siren activation systes, which restricted the sounding of the sirens until 2054, six minutes af ter' the airing of the EBS system was demonstrated. Thenot computer print-out indicated that one siren, Douglass 008, was activated. According to the Fire , Representative, all. routes in the Municipalities were to be run in ' order to gain experience and to determine time requirements for *
- completing each route.
Normally, however, route alerting would only be activated in the event that sirens did not sound in a specific location. t VII. Protective Action
- f
\ Notification to activate eleven traffic and access control points was sent to the Municipal EOC's at 2045. Representatives from the O
112
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q. ( Pennsylvania State Police, the Sheriff's Department and the National Guard acted together to coordinate these activities. The National Guard Representatives utilized the exercise to provide insight as to the possible requirements for this type of response to be used as a basis in the development of their plan. Although not activated, resources are reportedly available to support municipal unset needs. Lists of wreckers and fuel resources are available at the County EOC to maintain Berks evacuation route clearance outside of the EPZ but within County. I Although the Reception Center at the Oley Valley High School was intended to be activated during the exercise, the responsiblity for making the activating phone call was unclear, subsequently was not made and the Center was never activated. Schools were not included in the demonstration of evacuation activities due to school closings at the time of the exercise. However, simulated arrangements were made for gaining the use of 20 additional buses to, support municipal needs. Initial information regarding ingestion pathway protective measures was received by the County P10, indicating that as of 1900, the
.. Department of Agriculture recommended the precautionary measures of sheltering livestock and use of stored foods be performed out to 10-miles in Montgomery County. The USDA Representative contacted the _
PEMA PIO to verify this information, was transferred to the (O n P re e 1 ^=ric 1t r t th st e =oc. 4 milk sampling was being completed, and sheltering / stored food was i fera a t* e recommended for the 10-mile radius.. The County USDA Offices are located in the EOC building; information regarding farms, food processing locations and water supplies was reportedly available but E, , not brought to the EOC Operations Room. The USDA Representative had a good working knowledge of his responsibilities and procedures in 4 accordance with the County Plan. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control In accordance with the County RERP, prepared packages of high-range ! dosimeters, chargers, and record-keeping cards were dispatched by Sheriff Department Personnel from the County to the Municipal EOC's following the Alert classification. However, according to the EMC, no TLDs or KI were available at the County for distribution. Instructions in the use of this equipment was not observed at the time of dispatch from the County. However, the RADEF officer provided several briefings to the EOC w ' Staff, informing them of requirements for reading the dosimetry, - activities to be undertaken at 20R, 25R, and to gain authority to exceed 25R, and the location of the Decontamination Station; these briefings included the reminder that Emergency Workers were not to 1 take KI until directed to do so. These briefings were very effective
"( in initiating the call down of this information to the municipalities and Agency Representatives.
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II. Media Relations An auditorium is available for press briefings at this EOC, but it was not activated during this exercise. According to the PIO, the press representatives would be provided with typewriters and access to several office telephones. One newspaper representative was in attendance during the course of the exercise and several briefings were provided to this individual at the rear of the Operations Room. Information for these briefings was gathered by the PIO from the e Agency Representatives. This material was not coordinated with the PEMA PIO prior to being released, although the PIO did maintain fairly consistent telephone contact with the state, in part as a result of problems encountered by the state in transmitting hard copies of state news releases. The PIO acted as spokesperson during these briefings, although the County plan designates the Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners, or his designee, to act as spokesperson following a briefing by the PIO. These briefings were accurate, complete, and provided up-to-the-moment information regarding the response exercise. The PIO actively forwarded the rumor control number (o municipal locations through the Municipal Liaisons and Agency Representatives. The Rumor Control Telephone was i manned outside of the Operations Room; no briefings were observed as being provided to the individual tasked with answering the Rumor Control line.
- X. Recovery and Reentry
(' Not demonstrated in this exercise. XI. Scenario - The scenario provided the opportunity for all players to become more experienced with county operations, the RERP, and their respective responsibilities. - Berks County EOC Deficiencies
- 1. A more effective internal system should be developed for the prompt transmittal of RACES messages to and from the EOC Operations Room.
- 2. Telephone listings for contact locations should be reviewed, and the plan revised to reflect any revisions. Principal locations should be instructed to advise the county EOC of any future changes in telephone listings.
- 3. Clarification is needed with regard to procedures for determining the source of recommendations for protective actions. If recommendations l
are to be requested of the county by the state, additional information and expertise is required at the County level, and the plan revised to reflect this change in responsibility. I 114 9
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4. i EOC briefings should be held throughout the exercise to provide all the agency representatives with the same information at the same time, especially with regard to protective actions. This will provide an opportunity to share information regarding agency and which may develop, and to provide the dissemination of c information to all agency respresentatives. 5. The county should take measures to ensure that EBS messages are timed to follow the activation of the sirens. should be analyzed to determine and overcome the experiencedThe computerize difficulties in siren activation. occurring two minutes following the request by the county The PIO.The EBS r county may consider withholding the request to the EBS station until activation of the siren is assured. If sirens do not sound prior to activation.of the EBS, the county should take the necessary actions to ensure that the EBS message is retransmitted. 6.
.. The County centers'has the reception should clarify beentogiven.
whom the responsibility for activating Although the county RERP . designated during the exercise.this function to the Mass Care Officer, this was unclear Future exercises should demonstrate the activities to be complet,ed at the reception centers.
' 7.
Information concerning farms, food processing locations and water _ ( supp. lies was not available in the EOC Operations Room. Future exercises should demonstrate the status and availablity of this information to suport ingestion pathway protective actions. 8. the County release. level should be coordinated with the PEMA PIO Also, either the RERP should be revised to reflect the PIO's activity as the county spokesperson to the press, or this activity should be assumed by the Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners in future exercises. 9. The county should ensure that periodic updates of response activities are telephone provided line.to the individual assigned to the Rumor Control 10. Traffic control points and access control points, as design =*.ed in the revised and Countyasand Municipal Plans, should be reviewed for consistency needed. .
- 11. ~
Several Muncipalities (Earl, Washington, and Colebrookdale), as well . as the Berk's County Reception Center, reportedly did not receive notification to evacuate. The county should coordinate with these a
- localities to determine the cause of this failure, and implement .
corrective actions accordingly. The County may wish to consider using the RACES backup communications net to verify and to ensure { that all locations receive notification of changes in classification status and recommended protective actions. 115 e
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12. 4 k The County Radiological Emergencyshould Response continuePlan. to take steps to update the Berks County
- informational . itema such as resource requirementsBesides , letters of completing the various 4
agreement, etc., particular emphasis should be placed on obtaining round-the-clock staffing where it does not yet exist. 13. The County should ensure that the designated EBS station,,WHUM is ' adequately received at all locations within the 10-sile EPZ in Berks County. Also, Annex 0-2, " Agriculture", of the county RERP, instructsprotective pathway Farmersadvisories. to monitor WHUN for information regarding ingestion EBS coverage purpose. in those areas of Berks County to be used for thisThe co t Berks County Reception and Mass Care Centers The reception center was located in the oley High School with elements department. of the Reading Radio Club (RACES) and the local fire Although there were sufficient radio equipment and staff the County.to complete Reception, activities, there were no representatives from , Without the Reception Center operation, the mass care functio ! eliminated as the general population would not know where to go. I Radio ortraffic ordered sirens did not inform the center that an evacuation sounded. had been needed at the Reception Center.This is essential information that is k' The perform monitoring their mission and adequately. decontamination unit demonstrated the ability to needed to cover all aspects of their operation.More Thepersonnel personnel and equipment are assignedpopulation general had no knowledge(or both).as to who they would serve-workers or the The Fleetwood High School is well be can accommodate up to 600 evacuees. yond the boundary of the EPZ and ' The Evacuation Reception Center would control operational. the number of victims arriving, if that facility was personnel demonstrated sufficient knowledge to assure a well r facility. back up radios on several frequencies. Communication was adequate with p Health and Registration activities were adequate. Monitoring and demontamination was of procedures and equipment. demonstrated adequately with all personnel Berks County Reception Center Deficiencies '
- 1. h Clarification is needed for the decontamination staff to whom would be theattended to at this general public, or decontamination both. center ; emergency workers or
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- 2. A resource inventory should be conducted with regard to the 1 decontamination station, to ensure adequate personnel and equipment are assigned and available for use at this location.
- 3. In the future, care must be taken to properly activate and staff the designated reception center (s), in order to demonstrate an overall mass care / decontamination capability. '
Boyertown Area School District ' The Boyertown Area School District did not demonstrate any facet of 'I their plan as all schools were closed prior to the Alert of this exercise. The school uses commercial telephone lines as their primary means of communication. During peak use periods, there are delays in obtaining a dial tone. However, all school buses are radio equipped. School officials advise that they have sufficient buses and drivers to evacuate all their' students without the necessity of making a ~ second run. However, they anticipate a potential traffic problem should parents elect to pick-up students prior to a formal evacuation. They emphas,ized the need to be advised as early as possible of any plans to evacuate.
.. ' Boyertown Area School District Deficiencies
( (\)~ 1. The Boyertown Area School District, in conjunction with the Berks i County EMA, should review potential areas of traffic congestion as a result of school evacuations, and provide for access / traffic control as warranted.
- 2. Consideration should be given to providing back-up communications to the school district to offset the potential problems with relying totally on commercial telephones.
l, Boyertown Borough EOC I. Activation and Staffing At 1620 the Borough heard radio traffic referring to an Alert at the Limerick Generating Station. At 1627 the Borough was officially notified by the County Sheriff's Department, via commercial telephone of the Alert. The Borough verified the Alert at 1630. At 1652 the County EMC called, providing secondary notification of the Alert phase. Some confusion at the EOC existed following the initial , notification as to whom should be contacted. The state observer advised alerting of key staff only. At 1630 EOC staff notification commenced according to written procedures. The call down list c ({]) 117
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ca t i ea e er t 1 correct 6er wich c e4 e aet F - rae (O EOC was fully activated by 1658 and included the EMC and representatives from police, fire, public works, ambulance, communications and four council members, the Mayor and the Deputy EMC. Some confusion resulted when RACES arrived at 1530 to address temporary preparations needed since the antenna provided by PECO was I not yet installed. Their arrival pre-dated any official notification j to report to the EOC. The staff displayed a general knowledge of 6 their responsibilities, however they lacked direction and experience with specific details of the RERP. Capability for 24-hour staffing was demonstrated through presentation of a roster; no notification to the second staff shift was demonstrated. It is recommended that future exercises demonstrate actual call-down of second shift telephone numbers. The EMC as identified in the plan was on vacation. The Fire Marshall, who is also the Code Enforcement Officer, along with the Mayor, shared the direction of EOC activities in the EMC's absence. II. Emergency Operations Management A copy of the plan was a,vailable and utilized throughout the exercise. Internal commiunications were somewhat uncoordinated in that initially, there was no central point for receiving messages. Recommendations to coordinate message control were provided by the (O tate es erver. "e se were tessea set ai tridetie Precea re-were inconsistent. A status board was visible but was not promptly updated. Access to the EOC was controlled by limiting access to the - EOC via the side door. The EOC was notified of Alert at 1627, of Site Emergency at 1738 and of Ceneral Emergency at 1953. Ceneral evacuation notice was received from the County at 2030. 4 III. Facilities The EOC Facility was adequately furnished and arranged to support response activities. Furnishings and telephones were sufficient. There were no maps posted showing the plume EPZ or traffic control points, although the information was available through a copy of the County plan. A small map showing route alert sectors and evacuation routes was distributed to EOC staff. IV. Communications The Borough's primary communications with the Berks County EOC is via telephone with the RACES as backup. The Borough's police-fire radio , communications serves five (5) additional municipalities. { V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not applicable. (0 - 118
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l
} VI. Public Alerting and Instruction !
The Borough supplemented the sirens with route alerting by fire department personnel; pre-scripted messages were available for their use. Four sectors were pre-identified on maps and given to teams. Vehicles were mobilized to run 2 routes. Routes were begun at 2053 and ended at 2116. A total of 3.6 miles were driven. There were no news releases prepared at the EOC. The designated EBS station, WHUM, , was received very poorly and according to EOC staff, poor reception ; was normal due to interference caused by a nearby mountain. KYW was ; later tuned in and received well, although information disseminated
- by KYW would not be intended for Berks County residents. The EOC i staff will suggest that KYW be considered as the EBS Station. If !
not, an alternate EBS Station should be considered. VI. Protective Actions Traffic control points were activated at 2045. Sirens were expected ' to sound at 2045 but d,id not until 2057. 4 i .. The borough has a list of the handicapped and homebound with addresses, phone numbers and special needs required. Contacting ; these individuals was simulated. The borough was unaware of how the listing was compiled; ac' cording to EOC staff, some of those ! individuals listed are deceased. The Borough stated that they had i ' rece.ived the listing the day before the exercise. The listing also ('( _ ) contains the names of the hearing-impaired, who were to be notified ' by the route altering teams with a pre-printed card with i instructions. Arrangements for the required number of ambulances was I simulated. The Borough identified 3 buses as an unset need and requested the same from the County at 1740, although the borough plan identifies a total of only 2 buses as an unset need. , Although the evacuation of school children was not demonstrated during this exercise, some discussion regarding this subject ensued. Some uncertainty was raised as to where evacuated school children t would be sent. A school board member was in attendance and advised j that Kutztown would be the relocation site. i VIII. Radiological Exposure Control Appropriate numbers of high-range dosimeters were delivered from the County EOC; distribution to Emergency Workers was simulated. - Chargers and record keeping forms were available and properly used. The distribution of KI was simulated. 1 II. Media Relations
- Media relations were not a major activity at the Borough.
X. Recovery and Reentry ( Not applicable. i O e 119
II. Scenario
~i The scenario acted to identify several areas in which additional training and/or preparation is needed. The EOC staff was enthusiastic, energetic, and acted capably in overcoming difficulties as they became evident in the course of the exercise.
Boyertown Borough EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Training should be provided to all ECC staff in order to better familiarise them with the procedures and responsibilities as contained in the RERP, especially with regard to activation of staff and protective action for school children.
2. Call down lists for the activation of EOC staff should be reviewed for accuracy and revised accordingly.
- 3. The borough should provide for the permanent installation of the radio antenna to be.us,ed by amateur radio in the case of an emergency.
- 4. A standard internal message control system should be developed and distributed to EOC staff.. Future exercises should demonstrate prompt updates to the status bo,ard of significant activities.
- 5. The Borough should coordinate with the County EOC in reviewing and ensuring EBS reception capability within the Borough.
((b
- 6. Borough listings of handicapped and homebound individuals should be reviewed for accuracy and revised as needed.
- 7. Potential transporation requirements which cannot be met at the local level should be reviewed, and revisions to the Borough RERP completed as needed.
- 8. Twenty-four hour staffing will not be considered completely resolved '
until such time as the borough plan is updated to reflect double staffing at all positions. Colebrookdale Township EOC i I. Activation & Staffing A call from the Berks County EOC of escalation to a Site Area Emergency, resulting in activation of the Colebrookdale Township EOC, was received at 1742 through a commercial telephone line. Because many participants were prepositioned, only a few needed to be contacted, and the EOC was fully staffed in just 12 minutes. ; Representatives of police, fire, township transportation were l ' present, along with the EMC and several commissioners. The staff was very eager and serious throughout the exercise and displayed good training and knowledge, in general. ( O 120 l s .
A Round-the-clock staffing capability was not demonstrated; the roster hd for a second shift has not been prepared. II. Emergency Operations Management The Colebrookdale EMC was effectively in charge and managed the EOC in a very efficient manner. The EOC was provided with copies of the county and municipal RERP, and the staff with written procedures. ; Message logs were kept faithfully. Access to the FOC was controlled as soon as the EOC was officially activated. According to the township, notification of Alert status was never i received from the county, but Site Area Emergency and General Emergency messages were received at 1742 and 1951, respectively. The calls from the county were not verified. Orders for sheltering or evacuation were reportedly not received by the municipal EOC. Elected officials actively participated in response operations, providing positive contribution to EOC activities. The township EMC and Commissioners cheeked available resources (or lack thereof) with regard to current EOC operations and in anticipation of the next step. Problems were addressed as they arose. However, in the S absence of county initiated contact, the municipal EOC could have initiated contact with the county in order to gain situation and j response updates to the exercise. III. FacilitNs The Colebrookdale EOC facilities were adequate for the number of participating people and the level of activities at the municipal EOC. A status board was available and kept up-to-date but was not mounted on the wall for clear and easy visibility. Other information, including maps which identified the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, etc., were available and posted. The EOC is scheduled to have an emergency generator installed in the 4 near future for back-up power.
- IV. Communications i
The communication linkages between the Colebrookdale municipal EOC and Berks County EOC consisted of two commercial telephone lines (primary) and amateur radio provided by the acabers of Reading Radio Club (back-up). Other communication channels at the municipal EOC 3 included a police radio scanner, and two-way portable radios to the local police and fire departments. - l Calls to local schools over commercial telephone lines were not ' demonstrated because the municipal EOC activation occurred after school hours. Although amateur radio linkage between the county and ! 7 municipal EOCs was tested, the equipment was left outside the EOC ~ O . 121
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(' building and was not utilized to any great extent. The radio could (\ be used for verification of emergency information received from the county over the commercial telephone lines. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The Colebrookdale municipal EOC dispatched a route alerting team upon receiving an order through the Boyertown Area Communication Center at 2050. The route al'ert vehicle was dispatched quickly to sectors of the township, and completed its round in 34 minutes. The sirens activated by the county were heard at the municipal EOC at 2055, but the EBS message from WHUM-AM was not heard at the municipal EOC due to poor reception at the EOC location. VII. Protective Actions ' L'ithin 50 minutes of receiving the message to activate the Township EOC, 3 traffic control points were established; estimates of expected - traffic volume were not ' discussed. According to EOC staff appropriate equipment and manpower are available to keep evacuation rout,es clear and to cover all traffic control points. k No message to evacuate was reportedly received by the municipal EOC. The EOC staff had a list of the mobility-impaired individuals, their locations and needs, and had made arrangements for their transportation to designated reception centers.
+
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control An adequate supply of dosimeters (high-range) was delivered to the township EOC by the county. Low and mid-range dosimeters, permanent
' record dosimeters, and KI were not available.
When the dosimeters were distributed among emergency workers, no instructions were provided; however, instructions were given later upon receiving instructions from the county EOC. The EOC staff were aware of decontamination procedures; the plan was - referenced to determine the maximum exposure allowed without , authorization. XI. Media Relations A Reading newspaper reporter visited the Colebrookdale EOC early in the exercise. The Chairman of the Board of Commissioners was 4 responsible for providing press briefings. He provided accurate and complete answers to the questions raised. O 122
X. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated in this exercise. ' l II. Scenario The scenario gave the township an opportunity to display their abilities to deal with an emergency at the Limerick Generating Station. Colebrookdale Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Twenty-four hour st'affing capability to support extended EOC operations should be developed and incorporated into the Township RERP.
I
- 2. In order to. fully demonstrate the activation of the EOC, staff participants should not be pre-positioned in future exercises.
- 3. The EOC status board should be wall-mounted to improve visibility of the applied information.
- 4. The EOC should fully establish the amateur radio system and maintain active use of this syste's throughout the course of an exercise.
- 5. The , township, in coordination with the county EOC, should review the
((]) adequacy of reception of the EBS Station. Use of the designated EBS Station should be reconsidered, as it cannot be received at the Colebrookdale Township EOC. <
- 6. The township plan should provide for the delivery of instructions in the use of dosimetry and KI at the time of distribution to emergency workers.
- 7. The Berks County EOC maintains that all messages were relayed to the risk muncipalites in a timely manner while Colebrookdale officials informed the observer that neither the Alert or the evacuation 4
messages were ever received. The county and township should discuss where the problem lies and then develop a solution to prevent its reoccurrence. In any event, the township should always be encouraged to initiate contact with the county in order to receive situation updates. Douglass Township EOC I. Activation and Staffing A call initiating activation of the EOC was received from the Chief of Police to the Emergency Coordinator at 1630 hours. This message was received at the Alert stage. The call was verified by call back. Mobilization procedures were demonstrated using an up-to-date { call list. Full staffing of the EOC was completed by 1700. According to the participants, emergency staff can be called at any i e f ,- , 123
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( hour of any day, as demonstrated by lists of personnel with home and work telephone numbers. Organizations represented at the EOC included volunteers, municipal employees, police, fire and township officials. The E0C staff demonstrated adequate training and knowledge even though some of the procedures were received from the planning consultant only the day before. A roster was presented to demonstrate round-the-clock staffing. However, this is not reflected in the current township plan. II. Emergency Operations Management The Emergency Coordinator was in charge of the township's response for the duration of the exercise, as designated in the Douglass Township Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Briefings were kept to a minimum, and little group involvement with the staff relative to decision making wcs demonstrated. Several copies of the plan were available for staff use and reference. There were written procedures for fire, police, EOC staff end transportation. These specialized procedures were used extensively by most of the EOC staff. Message logs were kept for bofh landline and radio treasmissions. Messages were read aloud by the Emergency Coordinator and promptly posted. Access to the EOC was controlled by an EOC staff person. The EOC had a log which ' enumerated all who entered, but the log was started after many individuals had already arrived. The access log should be started promptly at the initial activation of the EOC. O The EOC was notified via land line of Alert status at 1659 hours, Site Emergency status at 1739 hours and General Emergency at 1946 hours. The Douglass Township EOC received notification of the Berks County Commissioners' recommendation to the State to take shelter at 2020 hours. The Township EOC received an order to evacuate at 2038. Evacuation was to take place after the sounding of the sirene. Although elected officials (Township Supervisors) were present, they were not actively involved in decisionmaking. III. Facilities The EOC facilfty could be improved in order to more easily facilitate accomplishment of assigned duties and tasks. The space was small and did not have adequate furniture; lighting and telephones were sufficient. Noise was adequately controlled. The facility cannot i support extended operations and backup power is not available. ( Emergency classification levels were posted and clearly visible. The status board was kept up-to-date on significant events that were i transmitted over RACES or landline. The status board, or a separate board, could have been more actively used to reflect other important milestones such as activation of the EOC, when traffic control points were etc. established, when public alerting was initiated and terminated, 124
A map showing the 10 mile EPZ, evacuation routes and relocation
.( centers was posted. Information regarding access control points and population by evacuation areas was available but not posted.
IV. Conaunications The EOC comunications network consisted of commercial landlines as the primary and RACES and police radio as the backup. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not applicable. , VI. Public Alerting and Instruction Public alerting crews were alerted at the Alert stage and kept on standby until needed. The volunteer fire companies were used for public alerting. Public alerting was initiated at 2050 hours when the volunteer fire companies' vehicles were dispatched. Prescripted messages were availabfe to inform the handicapped or hearing impaired residents to evacuate. However, for this exercise, a drill message was used. Calls were placed to all congregate care facilities and schools. - 1 EOC staff attempted to tune-in the designated EBS station, WHUM, but could not succeed in establishing reception of that station. KYW was { subsequently _ tuned-in and monitored. VII. Protective Actions The activation of traffic control points was promptly ordered at the General Emergency stage. According to EOC staff, appropriate and sufficient resources are available to keep evacuation routes clear during bad weather and if vehicles become stalled or wrecked, but they were not activated for the exercise. The EOC staff was aware of the potential need to evacuate the EOC to ' an alternate EOC location. An individual was intended to be dispatched to the alternate EOC location (Fleetwood Area High School) in order to simulate preparations for the move; however, a miscommunication as to the location of the alternate location resulted in this individual being sent to the mass care center at j Oley High School. The EOC staff was aware of the location of mobility and hearing impaired individuals. This information is in i written form and on file at the EOC. Arrangements were made and ' completed for informing the hearing impaired via the fire department public alerting activities. Arrangements were made to obtain a bus C from the county EOC (simulated) to transport elderly individuals ' t residing at a care center. I The Tovnship EOC would depend on the County EOC for guidance and assistance in the area of ingestion pathway protective actions. 4 [ O 125 1 _ ~ -..--_ -
VIII. Radiological Exposure Control
~
High range' (0-200R) direct-read dosimeters were available, complete with a charger and record keeping cards. The supply of dosimetry equipment was not adequate, and a call was placed to the County EOC to obtain 4 additional dosimeters. The County EOC replied that the . dosimeters were available and simulated sending them to the Township " l EOC. Other equipment (low-range dosimeters, TLDs, and KI) are not currently available in sufficient numbers. The staff was aware of the proper procedures concerning the distribution and use of KI and dosimetry, however, no instructions were provided to Emergency { Workers when this e.quipment was distributed. II. Media Relations There was no space available for press briefings and no press briefings were held. The Township EOC would direct all media to the County EOC. I. Recovery and Rentry ^ Not demonstrated in this exercise. II. Scenario # The . scenario was adequate to exercise all appropriate aspects of the { capabilities at the Douglass Township EOC. Douglass Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Future exercises should demonstrate active participation by elected officials in exercise play.
- 2. The Township should consider augmentation to the space and furniture assigned for use by the EOC.
4
- 3. Consideration should be given to formalizing briefing arrangements in the use of dosimetry and KI at the time of issuance to emergency workers. ,
- 4. Douglass Township should coordinate with the County EOC in reviewing and ensuring EBS reception capability within the Township. ,
[ 5. Twenty-four hour staffing can only be officially recognized through the planning process. The Township should update its plan to reflect the roster presented during the exercise. 7 Earl Township EOC ~ l I. Activation and Staffing l I ( In the early phase of the exercise the Earl Township Emergency
\ Operations Center was staffed by two RACES operators. The initial
<~~'- 126
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(,( ) call from the County EOC was received via amateur radio at 1620; this call was not verified. Staffing of the EOC began shortly af ter 1700 hours with the arrival of the fire chief and the EMC. The facility was fully staffed by 1800, within 20 minutes of notification to the Earl Township EOC of the Site Area Emergency. The staff included the EMC and his deputy, fire and fire police, highway department and amateur radio personnel. The staff was familiar with local needs and resources, and with general emergency response procedures (i.e. , fire, fire police, rescue, impediments to i evacuation). The EMC reported that the RERP plan, maps, dosimetry, forms and related supplies had been received as recently as the day of the exercise. The capability for 24-hour emergency operations had not been established as of the date of the exercise. The EMC, who had assumed his post three weeks prior to the exercise, indicated that a 24-hour rotation roster would be developed following the exercise. II. Emergency Operations Ianagement The EMC was in charge of the EOC operations and periodically consulted with his staff,. Information received from the County was limited, which tended to limit activity at the municipal level. In the absence of more detailed information on the progess of the simulated accident, the newly appointed EMC, performed adequately. ((:) Earl Township was notified of Alert status at 1621, of Site Emergency at 1740, and to " standby for evacuation" and Ceneral Emergency at - 1902. It was reported that no direct notification to evacuate was received by the EOC. III. Facilities The Earl Township EOC is located at the township fire department. The facilities provide sufficient space, furniture and lighting to handle the local emergency response activities. Kitchen and dining facilities are available, and space is adequate to install cots, if necesary, to support operations. Emergency classification levels were not posted during the exercise. A message board was not available, although toward the end of the exercise, messages were posted on a 8 1/2" X 11" sheet of paper. One map was posted of the EPZ which included evacuation routes and relocation centers. Preliminary information regarding access control points and the plume EPZ population was available in the township's plan. IV. Communications i l ' The Earl Township EOC established primary communication with the County EOC via two available commercial telephone lines. RACES was l l 127 __-----h--,4"
j used as a back-up. These systems can also be used to communicate ,km(} with neighboring township EOC's. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Not Applicable. VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The Township EOC plays a supporting role in public alerting and notification. It dispatches route alerting teams in coordination with the activation of the siren system by the County. The Township EOC received a telephone call from the County at 1750 to standby for dispatch of route-alerting teams; at 1912 the EMC was awaiting instructions from the County. The actual call initiating the dispatch of the route-alerting team was not observed. VII. Protective Actions , *
,. e The EMC demonstrated a familiarity with local needs and with local, County and State resources available to deal with traffic control, the needs of the mobility-impaired, and obstacles to evacuation.
The EMC stated that Earl Township did not have the resources to cover
. traf,fic control, and that the Pennsylvania State Police were
( [~' responsible for this function. He indicated that a request to the State Police was made at 1810 to provide personnel for traffic control. However the Township plan indicated the one traffic control 1 point assigned to Earl, E-1, is to be manned by Township police. The Township ENC had lists of mobility-impaired and hearing-impaired individuals and persons with special needs. The EMC reported that at 1824 Earl Township requested the County EOC to supply one ambulance to transport persons with special needs., At 1945 the Township requested that the County EOC provide one bus for the transportation of 9 mobility-impaired individuals. The EMC discussed procedures for keeping evacuation routes clear. The Township has snowplows to keep routes clear of snow; the State Police or, in an emergency, Township Fire Police would call local tow-truck operators to remove stalled or wrecked cars from evacuation routes. . VIII. Radiological Exposure Control
- The Earl Township EOC received 43 high range (0-200R) direct-read '
dosimeters, 7 chargers, and dose record-keeping forms. Neither ' permanent-record dosimeters, nor KI, were available. , The Township Fire Coordinator was responsible for radiological '{ exposure control. He demonstrated procedures for charging direct-read dosimeters and was familiar with dose limits, dose reporting ) 128
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T~T requirements, and the location of the decontamination center. kh J Dosimeters were assigned to the route-alerting crew. IX. Media Relations No activity was demonstrated. X. Recovery and Reentry 1 Not demonstrated in this exercise. II. Scenario , The scenario could be expanded to include free play activites during slack periods. These could include simulated obstacles on evacuation routes, establishment of access control points in coordination with the Pennsylvania State Police, and simulated evacuation of mobility-impaired persons. Earl Township EOC Deficien(ies
- 1. Twenty-four capability to man and support the emergency operations center should be-established, and the plan revised to reflect this capability.
- 2. Clar,1fication is needed with regard to assigned responsibility for
('\(~ ' manning Traffic Control Post Number E-1. Although the Township and County Plans indicate that this post is to be manned by Earl, the Earl Township EMC indicated that this staffing resource was not , available at the Township level, and that the Pennsylvania State Police were responsible for manning this post. Washington Township EOC ' I. Activation and Staffing The Washington Township EOC was staffed initially (from 1525) by three amateur radio (REACT) operators. The EOC was partially staffed (Deputy EMC, Fire Chief, Deputy Fire Chief) by 1640, within 20 minutes of notification of the Alert. The EOC was fully staffed by 1806, within 25 minutes of the Site Area Emergency notification. The organizations represented at the EOC, in addition to the EMC and Deputy EMC, were the fire department (Chief and Deputy), amateur radio, highway department, fire police and transportation department. First shift staff were familiar with local needs and resources. The RERP and related procedures, maps and e equipment were received just prior to the exercise. The EMC stated that a second shift EOC staff could be mobilized by telephone, but that no roster was available. Round-the-clock ( staffing capability was not demonstrated. O 8 *4
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129
'f f II. Emergency Operations Management O. The EMC was nominally in charge of the EOC. The PEMA
" observer / instructor" played an active role in EOC management, instructing EOC staff in the use of the message-recording form, finding telephone numbers, and consulting with PEMA staff at the County EOC on the progress of the exercise, and then directing the exercise at the township level. Evaluation of local initiative and EOC management was difficult in light of this active involvement by the PEMA observer.
A copy of the township plan was available for reference. Message logs were kept. Access to the EOC was controlled by Township fire police. f The EOC received notification of Alert status at 1620; Site Area Emergency at 1739, and General Emergency at 1946. A message that the sirens were scheduled to be activated at 2045 and that the municipalities should " prepare" to evacuate was received at 2033. The township reportedTy did not interpret this message as to actually proceed with evacuation. A follow-up call to the County at 2131 clarified that the intent.of the 2033 message was to recommend j evacuation for the entir,e 10-mile EPZ. III. Facilities (. The Washington Township EOC is located in a fire station; space, () furniture, and lighting are sufficient for local emergency response activities. Dining and cooking facilities and adequate space for cots are available for extended operations. All maps, plans, telephones and a scanner had been delivered just prior to the exercise. The classification levels were not posted; a status board was available but was not kept up-to-date. A map depicting evacuation routes and relocation centers was posted, while information concerning access control points is contained in the township RERP. IV. Consunications The Township had sufficient telephones available and a RACES radio net established. The ENC did not post any messages received on a 4 i status board for viewing. There was good use made of the RACES message form for recording messages. The means of communications used to pass traffic from the County EOC vacillated between the commercial lines and the RACES net. V. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation ^ Not applicable. 1 { O . 130 8 gD' * - - - -*'wmu.e==wwwi- -
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VI. Public Alerting and Instruction The Washington Township EOC plays a suporting role in public alerting and isntruction. Upon instruction from the County EOC, it will dispatch route alerting teams in conjunction with (and absence of) the activation of the siren system. The EMC expressed confusion as to when to dispatch the route-alerting crew and the route and message to use. The EMC indicated (at 2016) that he was waiting to receive maps from the County EOC and then would dispatch a route-alerting crew. The route-alerting, team was dispatched at 2050 using the route map and message found in the plan. (The message / map expected from the County did not arrive.) The PEMA instructor directed the team to use a standard " tune to EBS station" message. The designated EBS Station for Berks County, WHUM (1240), is not received well in this section of the county. e ' VII. Protective Actions The EMC was familiar with local needs and with local and state resources that would be,available for response. The EMC reported that the Pennsylvania State Police were responsible for manning traffic control points, although the Township plan indicates that two posts will be manned by the Township. Traffic and access control [V points listed in the Township and County plans are inconsistently described. The EMC reported that the Township highway department had resources to clear snow; the State Police would initiate a call to local tow truck operators to remove stalled or wrecked cars from evacuation routes. The County EMC had lists of mobility-impaired persons, hearing-impaired persons, and persons with special needs. A mutual aid pact with a neighboring township was invoked to put an ambulance on standby for possible evacuation of persons with special needs. VIII. Radiological Exposure Control The Township EOC received the adequate amount (72) of 0-200R direct-i read dosimeters, record keeping cards and 7 chargers at approximately 1730. No permanent record dosimeters or KI were available. The Fire Chief was uncertain as to dose reporting l procedures. The issuance of dosimeters to the route-alerting crew was not observed and was not logged on the sign out sheet. The Fire Chief was aware of where, but not when, to go for decontamination. II. Media Relations { Not Applicable O - 131
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- I. Recovery and Reentry Not demonstrated in this exercise.
II. Scenario The scenario was adequate to test Municipal capabilities. Washington Township EOC Deficiencies
- 1. Twenty-four hour EOC staffing capability should be developed and incorporated into t,he Township Plan.
- 2. Training in the area of Radiological Emergency operations, to include procedures in the use of dosimetery and KI, route-alerting, decontamination and general provisions of the township plan should be provided to the EOC staff.
- 3. Clarification is needed with regard to the designated responsible agency for manning th4' Traffic Control Points. Access Control Point locations and the responsible manning agency are incongruous with the county plan; either the township or county plan should be reviewed and revised as required.,
- 4. The issuance of dosimetry and KI to Emergency Workers was not observed during this exercise. Future exercises should demonstrate
( this aspect of the plan.
- 5. The PEMA observer / instructor was very active in EOC operations at <
this site. The township plan does not reflect inclusion of this position in its organization; the Municipal RERP should be revised to include the designated PEMA observer / instructor within the , organizational chart. Otherwise, future exercises should demonstrate more independent initiative and management at the local level. -
-6. Future exercises should demonstrate active participation by Local Officials.
- 7. Twenty-four hour reception of the designated EBS station (WHUM) l should be verified for the entire township, and especially that area within the 10-mile EPZ.
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1 l ([) ADDENDUM TO EXERCISE REPORTS The following additions should be made to the exercise reports: Page 25, Collegeville Borough EOC Deficiencies. Add a deficiency 6 to read as follows:
- 6. Staffing at the EOC occurred in a premature manner. Future exercises should follow EOC activation procedures as called for in the RERP.
Page 28, Limerick Township EOC Deficiencies. Add a deficiency 3 to read as follows:
- 3. Staffing at the EOC occurred in a premature manner. Future exercises should follow EOC activation procedures as called for in the RERP.
h ($) ; 133 m n m y e--,-m. -- m, - - -, - -
SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES This report has referenced two types of deficiencies: Category "A" and Category "B". It is important to differentiate between the two. A Category "A" deficiency is of the type that would cause a finding that ; offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the g health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Limerick - Generating Station in the event of a radiological emergency. Category "B" deficiencies include those where demonstrated (and observed) performance during the exercise was considered faulty, corrective actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that, in the event of an actual radiological emergency, appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and
,. safety of the public. Also included as a Category "B" deficiency are those areas where perf ormance was considered adequate but where a correctable weakness was noted. Correction of the weakness would enhance the ability of the organization to perform their adequately demonstrated response capability. These are classified as Category "B" recommendations.
(O 4 (~ O , 134
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SUMMARY
OF CATECORY "A" DEFICIENCIES s Th2 Interim Findings on the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Limerick Generating Station d:tGrained certain Category "A" Deficiencies existed f rom either a planning or resources standpoint. The July 25, 1984 radiological emergncy response exercise, held in conjunction with Limerick, gave FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee no assurance that these problem areas have been resolved. Three of the Category "A" Deficiencies listed belco reflect a joint planning / preparedness deficiency. The latter two deficiencies are a result of problems revealed during the exercise only. Reference , NUREC-0654 Proj 'd Actual .I Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date l
- 1. Lack of twenty-four emergency response. A.4.
This was confirmed at the following jurisdictions: c lj N lI
- c. PEMA (Communications Officer) ,
- b. Montgomery County EOC
- c. Collegeville Borough EOC j.
Lower Frederick Township EOC ! d.
- o. Lower Pottsgrove Township E0C l-
- f. New Hanover Township EOC ;
- g. Trappe Borough EOC
- h. Chester County Reception Centers
- 1. East Nantmeal Township EOC
- j. East Vincent Township EOC
- k. North Coventry Township EOC
- 1. Schuylkill Township EOC ,
- c. Uwchlan Township EOC i
- n. Warwick Township EOC
- o. West Pikeland Township EOC ;
- p. West Vincent Township EOC )
- q. Colebrookdale Township EOC +
- r. Earl Township EOC
- o. Washington Township EOC 9 '
O O' J Q . N,
- CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 2. The means for dealing with mobility- J.10.d.
impaired /t ransit-dependent individuals remains unresolved. The State Institu-tion, Graterford and the various risk school districts did not fully partici-pate in the exercise. PEMA has acknow-ledged that a tabletop exercise to test ' the Graterford plan is a possiblility and the issue of school evacuation can best be addressed while school is in session. Planning for the number of e school buses and ambulances necessary for evacuation and those available for O evacuation purposes needs to be finalized.
- 3. The exercise confirmed that potassium J.10.e.
t iodide, low-range, self-reading K.3.a. ; dosimeters and thermoluminescent i dosimeters are not available in adequate ! numbers for emergency workers. ' t 9 Sw S. .
~ _
CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES
' I i , Reference NUREG-0654 l
Proj"d Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date I
- 4. Twenty-five minutes lapsed from the time E.6.
the decision was made to evacuate until the activation of the alert and notifi-cation system. FEMA-43 states that once the decision has been made to activate the alert and notification system, the capability will be available for providing both an alert signal and an informational [ or instructional message to the population { on an area-wide basis throughout the 10-mile i EPZ, within 15 minutes. In addition, Berks : County's designated EBS station, WHUM, was e- ! either received very poorly or not at all in N the vast majority of municipal EOCs, thus calling into question the ability of the public to receive instructions in the event of an emergency.
- 5. Non participating communities (defined as J.9.
totally non participating, participating but not allowing a FEMA observer, or participating but not displaying an ade-quate capability to protect the public) I make up approximately twenty-five (25) . percent of the population (about 44,500 l people) living within the plume exposure EPZ. ! These jurisdictions, listed earlier in ! this report, did not display their capability to protect their citizens in , the event of an accident at Limerick. , i e e 9s - 6 w
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual i Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date i Stete of Pennsylvania j s
- 1. Care should be taken by the Department J.11.
of Agriculture in the wording of messages l to insure they are easily understood and that proper instructions are given to all parties concerned.
- 2. BRP made recommendations to the J.10.f.
Department of Health that emergency workers take KI when evacuation was ordered. The risk counties never received instructions f rom the Depart-
- j ment of Health to have emergency workers M j
take KI. '
- 3. According to information supplied by K.3.a.
PEMA prior to the exercise, CDV-742 dosimeters and CDV-750 chargers were to be issued to emergency workers in accordance with county and municipal plans. l Montgomery and Chester Counties did " not distribute CDV-742 dosimeters or CDV-750 chargers to emergency workers. From an exercise standpoint, the dis-tribution of this equipment would have provided an opportunity to observe the , emergency workers' proficiency in its use. . I 1 ! l 9a - 9 u 9' -
y v
SUMMARY
OF CATECORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference > NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual De ficiency/ Recommendation Part II Correction Date 'Date i i
- 4. In order to avoid any possible mis- A.I.b. '
understanding in regard to evacuation orders, the State messages should follow those procedures outlined in Annex E of ' the State plan. BRP i
- 5. Some system for verifying units for I.10.
physical quantities needs to be i established between the EOF and BRP. !
- 6. The primary means of communication H.12, I.8, !
between field monitoring teams did not F.1.d. function during the exercise, the backup ( system proved inadequate.
- 7. During the exercise BRP had difficulty F.1.d.
talking with the nuclear engineer who was h f busy in conferences and discussions with utility staff. Some method of assuring adequate comaunications between the engineer and BRP should be established.
- 8. Annex E, Appendix 16, page 6 of the State J.10.f.
plan states that KI should be taken only on the advice of the Secretary of the Pennsyl-vania Department of Health. It was unclear if the Department of Health was involved in the decisionmaking process of " issuing" KI to the BRP monitoring teams. l l l l l e G G G s . w
-~- m- , , m . .. n
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Medical Support {
- 9. State and federal observers were not able L.1.
f to observe the management of an injured, contaminated person since they were de- . livered to hospitals other than those listed ! in the scenario. : Air Monitoring Teams
- 10. The communication failure ir. Harrisburg H.12, I.8 should have been ovet ost sirce this H.10 could happen in a real +<,ergency. ,
Possibly the state po'- tce Wet or other j temporary measures sh, l's have been used. ' Montgomery County 4
- 11. Staffing at the EOC occurred in a pre- E.2. j mature manner. Future exercises should I follow EOC activation procedures as called i for in the RERP. i
- 12. When transmitting messages, timing should F.1.b.
be stressed between the various communi-cations networks.
- 13. Exercises should not be concluded pre- J.9. ;
maturely. " Simulated evacuations" should l be carried to their logical conclusion to permit interaction between the various jurisdictions. i A 9 e
~
O s s O G
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 14. The County should respond in a timely J.9.
manner to requests, from the municipal-ities, for unset needs, even if it is only to update the municipality as to the status of fulfilling the need. P ttstown School District ,
- 15. Staff mobilize:1on procedures were not E.2. :
demonstrated. l
- 16. Procedures for the use of actual dosimetry K.3.b. i were not demonstrated.
Collegeville Borough
- 1
- 17. Staffing at the EOC occurred in a pre- E.2. $;
"1 mature manner. Future exercises should i follow EOC activation procedures as j called for in the RERP.
Limerick Township
- 18. If PEMA is going to have people directly N.4.
assisting the municipalities during an actual emergency, this should be formally reflected from a planning process; other-wise their role must be considered prompt-ing, which is more appropriate for training and drills.
. ~
4 9s O O' - s
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd J's Actual ! ~ Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 19. Staffing at the EOC occurred in a pre- E.2. f' mature manner. Future exercises should follow EOC activation procedures as ;
called for in the RERP. l-Lower Frederick Township j
- 20. The message to evacuate was misunder- J.9.
stood by the EHC. Further training is necessary in the understanding of the ! implementation of protective actions. , f 0,
- 1 I
0
~
9a , O .. 9
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Referetnce NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Lower Pottsgrove Township
- 21. The Township should revise their plan E.6.
to reflect the fact that current routes are too long. New Hanover Township
- 22. Call down lists should be updated to re- E.2.
flect current contacts. Parkiomen Township
- 23. Montgomery County did not respond to re- J.9.
quest to fill unset ambulance and trans-portation needs. The Township should have O followed up.
- 3
- 24. The EBS message was not heard at the EOC. E.6.
The Township should have contacted the County EOC to ascertain the magnitude of the problem. l Pottstown Borough ,
- 25. The Borough should take steps to improve F.1.b. '
the quality of its RACES reception capabil- g ities and should establish clear procedures for recording times on its message forms. ! t 0
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9a O O
n
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj 'd ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 26. Pottstown EOC mistook the Governor's A.I.b. i Disaster Proclamation to be the General A.2.a. ;
Emergency notification. i Trrppe Borough
- 27. The Borough should carry all response pro- J.10.d.
cedures to their logical conclusion, i.e. i I if they need transportation for 30 people they should not assume automatically that the ; County will provide those resources. They ; should confirm that the County will provide l them. , Upper Pottsgrove Township l
- 28. Future exercises should demonstrate E.2.
$ i "l
activation of the EOC as called for in ! the plan. Pre-positioning should not l take place. ! Upper Providence Township
- 29. Some action should be taken to insure that A.I.b.
the Governor's Declaration of a Disaster A.2.a. Emergency is not interpretated as the General Emergency announcement. i a e Ga G G a u -
%, s
SUMMARY
OF CATECORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date I Upper Salford Township j
- 30. Supporting staff appeared to be less 0.1. I familiar with the plans as what they A.4.
might need to be; additional training is recommended. Also, the Township needs to I reexamine the issue of 24-hour capability. ! I, Chister County
- 31. Notification of municipal EOCs and/or E.1.
officials by the County staff was not timely during the early stages of the [ exercise. the EOC staff members who are j responsible for performing this function j should receive additional training, and the g duty should be included in the check-lists ) r4 ! and procedures for the respective positions.
- 32. The County's notification call lists init- E.1. I ially contained numerous incorrect tele-phone numbers for municipal EOCs and key municipal officials. Correct lists includ-ing all necessary numbers should be compiled, and a procedure for periedically checking the lists for accuracy should be implemented.
l 1 I 1 9 ev . G v G
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd ' Actual
. Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 33. Actions to fulfill some municipal re- J.9.
quests for unmet needs were delayed, and in most cases, municipalities were not provided with updated status reports re-garding such requests. The County should investigate the possibility of establishing , a more efficient procedure for receiving, routing and over seeing requests for unset needs, and, especially, of providing status reports to the municipalities regarding i actions being taken and estimated time of arrival of the requested resources.
- 34. The County's reception and mass care J.9. ,
centers were not activated in a timely manner, as specified by the plan. The i County should further investigate the e : cause of the delayed activation, and imple- 3 l I ment appropriate measures to resolve the problem.
- 35. The County did not demonstrate the E.7. l
{' capability to provide appropriate public instructions regarding protective actions. Future exercises should include preparation of evacuation messages which instruct the public where to go, how to get there, how { to request special assistance or transpor- I tation, what to do with pets, etc. Such ! messages should be prepared for both EBS i and general news release. l l 1 l es e
. w e '
_- _ . - m .
SUMMARY
OF CATECORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj"d ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 36. Problems were experienced at both the E.6.
County and municipal levels in implementing route alerting. The circumstances of activating the route alerting teams were not consistent among the municipalities, the activity was not coordinated, and the County delayed the implementing instruc-tions for forty minutes. The County should investigate this matter further, and, as - appropriate, clarify the responsibilities at the County and municipal levels, es-tablish more specific procedures, and assure that there will be coordination among the County and municipal EOCs and fire departments. The County and muni-cipal plans should be amended to reflect any resulting'changea or clarifications v. of procedures. $ , t
- 37. The County. failed to demonstrate the J.ll.
capability for certifying farmers as emergency workers and providing then with dosimetry, KI, record keeping forms l and ids. The appropriate staff members j responsible for implementing these actions i should receive further training, and this - ! capabDity sheen 14 be demoaatrated in , future exercises.
.a-M .
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Om - O o O:x. ens ~'1 ~
~ . -
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj 'd " Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Chester County Reception / Mass Care Center
- 38. Capability for registering and de- J.12.
contaminating evacuees at reception centers were not adequately demonstrated. Personnel should receive further train-ing, and registration and decontamination of evacuees should be demonstrated at future exercises i Chester County Emergency Worker Decontamination Center ,
- 39. A working decontamination center was not K.5.b.
set up and demonstrated. Future exercises should include demonstration of an operational decontamination center, includ-ing all attendant equipment, m
- 40. Fire company personnel were not familiar
?
K.5.b. ! with the proper procedures for radiological exposure control. Those responsible for operating the decontamination center abould l j be provided further training on the use of l dosimetry and protective equipment, and the allowable radiation exposure limits. i l L i l Os G G
. u
. - -~ --
4
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj"d 'Actua1 Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Eant Coventry Township
- 41. Completion of route alerting took one E.6.
hour. The Township should reassess the length of their routes in order to shorten the one hour notification time. ES:t Nantmeal Township
- 42. The Township call-up list contains some E.2. !
inaccuracies and omissions for staff and , alternates. The call list should be com- ; pleted, and checked for accuracy on a . regular basis.
- 43. The Township issued a news item which G.4.b. , :
included potentially misleading infor- g l nation. The Township role in issuing ! press releases and media briefings should l be clarified and/or coordinated with the l county and State. 1 l E st Pikeland Township f i
- 44. Route alerting of the hearing-impaired E.6.
took one hour and fifteen minutes to com-f' plete. The Township should consider ways i to reduce this notification time, such as l-by applying more resources to the task. ! 9 Oa O O
- w
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Refe rence NUREG-0654 Proj'd ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date North Coventry Township
- 45. The EOC did not have adequate maps J.10.a.
posted. Maps depicting the IO-mile EPZ, the Township's evacuation routes, and traffic control points should be obtained and posted.
- 46. Procedures for coordination and infor- J.9.
mation sharing between the County and Township should be improved. The Township EMC should direct questions regarding procedure to the County EOC for resolution, rather than rely upon the advice of a PEMA representative who may not be available during an actual incident.
- 47. The Township personnel did not demon- K.3.b.
E.< strate a thorough understanding of the J.10.e. principals of radiological exposure control for emergency workers. Per-sonnel should receive additional training concerning the proper procedures in the use of dosimetry and KI. 1 ea e .n 6 .u e I
.s%..g. a u.
1 .... .
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj 'd ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Phoenixville Borough
- 48. The call lists for the EOC staff, as con- E.2.
tained in the most recent version of the plans, contained many incorrect phone numbers. The lists should be corrected, and checked periodically to maintain accuracy. Schuylkill Township
- 49. The call list used to notify the EOC staff E.2.
contained some incorrect listings. The list should be corrected and checked periodically to maintain accuracy. 5
- 50. The fire / rescue officer did not locate at A.4. "'
the Township EOC, as specified in the plan. Township officials should assure that, during future events, staff members perform their duties at the specified locations.
- 51. Procedures for distributing dosimetry to K.3.a.
emergency workers were not demonstrated. Future exercises should include such demonstration. ea 9 - 9
- .. n n
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd " Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Spring City Borough
- 52. An internal coordination problem resulted A.I.b.
in delayed implementation of protective A.2.a. actions. Although the evacuation recom-mendation was received at the proper time by the Deputy EMC, the message was mis-handled, and was not immediately recognized and acted upon by the EHC and staff. The Borough should determine the cause of this coordination failure, and implement pro-cedures to assure that such an incident will not be repeated.
- 53. The EOC staff was not sufficiently trained K.3.b. p in radiological exposure control. The J.10.e. -4 staff should be provided additional train-ing in the procedures for the proper use of dosimetry and KI.
Upper Uwchlan Township
- 54. The planned radio communications equipment F.1.b.
was not yet installed. Installation should be completed as soon as possible. 9 9a , O O
W e v v c
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 55. An ARES radio operar r did not partici- F.1.b.
pate at the Township EOC. The Township should assure that ARES will be available in the event of a radiological accident at Limerick.
- 56. A separate plan developed for Upper A.I.b.
i Uwchlan Township, reflecting such infor- l A.2.a. ; mation as round-the-clock staffing, etc. needs to be forwarded to the Regional ; Office.
- 57. Township officials, initially believing J.9.
that the evacuation was for the 2-mile zone only, failed to recognize that their plans p , contain no evacuation provision other than -' for a full 10-mile evacuation, resulting in a 30 minute delay in implementing the pro-tective action. Township officials should become more familiar with the plans, and should immediately seek clarification of i any instructions or messages which are ! questionable.
- 58. Route alerting was not implemented by E.6.
Township officials to notify the one identified hearing-impaired resident. Notification procedures should be imple-mented, as specified in the plans. 9 9 9 :
, a w -
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part 11 Correction Date Date Uwchlan Township
- 59. The police chief did not participate in A.4.
the exercise. The Township should assure that the police department will be appro-priately represented at the EOC in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick.
- 60. The staff demonstrated a lack of famili- A.1.b.
arity with plans and procedures. Further A.2.a. training and familiarization with plans and procedures should be provided. W rwick Township
- 61. The unlisted phones did not consistently F.1.b.
provide reliable service. The emergency phone system should be repaired, and maintained in working order.
- 62. Lists of hearing- and mobility-impaired J.10.d.
individuals were not made available to the acting EMC. Appropriate arrangements should be made to assure that these lists are available to Township officials at all times. O . O
- v e
St9tMARY OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd " Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date West Pikeland Township
- 63. The Township failed to reiterate its J.9.
need to the County for unset transport-ation resources, necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired and transit-dependent residents. All unset resource needs should be forwarded to the County EOC. West Vincent Township
- 64. The list of instructions requiring E.2.
notification contained wrong telephone numbers. Such lists should be corrected o and checked for accuracy on a regular basis. 0 Berks County
- 65. Telephone listings for contact locations E.2.
should be reviewed, and the plan revised to reflect any revisions. Principal lo-cations should be instructed to advise the County of any future changes in telephone listings. B Gs G G
-~ .
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 66. Clarification is needed with regard to J.10.m.
procedures for determining the source of recommendations for protective actions. If recommendations are to be requested of the County by the State, additional in- l formation and expertise is required at the l County level, and the plan revised to re- ! flect this change in responsibility.
- 67. The County should take measures to ensure E.6.
that EBS messages are timed to follow the ' activation of the sirens. The computer- , ized system should be analyzed to determine and overcome the experienced difficulties in siren activation. The EBS response was , very rapid, occurring two minutes following p the request by the County PIO. The County may consider withholding the request to the EBS station until activation of the siren is assured. If sirens do not sound prior to l activation of the EBS, the County should ; take the necessary actions to ensure that the ESS message is retransmitted. } 4
)
- 68. The County should clarify to whom the re- J.9. l sponsibility for activating the reception !
centers has been given. Although the County RERP designated this function to the mass , care officer, this was unclear during the exercise. Future exercises should demon-strate the activities to be completed at the reception centers. 9a e G
,
- r
t
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 69. In accordance with the RERP, public infor- G.4.b.
nation releases developed at the County level should be coordinated with the PEMA PIO prior to release. Also, either the RERP should be revised to reflect the PIO's activity as the County spokesperson to the press, or thia activity should be assumed by the Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners in future exercises.
- 70. The County should ensure that periodic G.4.a.
updates of response activities are provided to the individual assigned to the Rumor Control telephone line.
- 71. Traffic control points and access control J.10.k. ,
points, as designated in the County and J.10.g. O municipal plans, should be reviewed for consistency and revised as needed.
- 72. Several municipalities (Earl, Washington, E.1.
and Colebrookdale), as well as the Berks County Reception Center, reportedly did not receive notification to evacuate. The County should coordinate with these local-ities to determine the cause of this failure, and implement corrective actions accordingly. The County may wish to consider using the RACES backup communications net to verify and to ensure that all locations receive notification of changes in classification status and recommended protective actions. Ss , O G
~n .>
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Deficiency / Recommendation Proj"d ' Actual Part II Correction Date Date
- 73. The County should continue to take steps A.1.b.
to update the Berks County Radiological A.2.a. Emergency Response Plan. Besides complet-ing the various informational items such as resource requirements, letters of agreement, etc., particular emphasis should be placed on obtaining round-the-clock staffing where it does not yet exist. Berks County Reception Center
- 74. Clarification is needed for the decon- K.5.b.
tamination staff as to who would be monitored at this decontamination center
- emergency workers or the general public, or both, m
N
- 75. A resource inventory should be conducted K.5.b.
with regard to the decontamination station, to ensure adequate personnel and equipment are assigned and available for use at this location.
- 76. In the future, care must be taken to J.9.
properly activate and staff the designated reception center (s), in order to demonstrate ' an overall mass care / decontamination capability. 9 l O O O s . - u
~.
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREC-0654 Proj'd ' Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Boyertown Borough
- 77. Training should be provided to all EOC 0.1.
staf f in order to better familiarize them with the procedures and responsibilities as contained in the RERP, especially with regard to activation of staff and protective actions for school children.
- 78. Call down lists for the activation of EOC E.2.
staf f should be revised for accuracy and revised accordingly.
- 79. Borough listings of handicapped and home- J.10.d.
bound individuals should be reviewed for accuracy and revised as needed.
- 80. Potential transportation requirements J.10.g.
which cannot be met at the local level J.10.k. should be reviewed, and revisions to the Borough RERP completed as needed. Colebrookdale Township
- 81. In order to fully demonstrate the acti- E.2.
vation of the EOC, staff participants should not be pre-positioned in future exercises. Ou 9 9 s,
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd " Actual ; Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date j
- 82. The Township plan should provide for the K.3.b.
delivery of instructions in the use of J.10.e. i dosimetry and KI at the time of distri-bution to emergency workers. 1
- 83. The Berks County EOC maintains that all J.9.
messages were relayed to the risk munici-palities in a timely manner while Cole-brookdale Township officials informed the observer that neither the Alert nor the evacuation messages were ever received. The County and Township should discuss where the problem lies and then develop a solu-tion to prevent its reoccurrence. In any event, the Township should always be en-couraged to initiate contact with the County in order to receive situation e updates. Earl Township l
- 84. Clarification is needed with regard to J.10.k.
assigned responsibility for manning J.10.g. traffic control post number E-1. Although , the Township and County plans indicate that i this post is to be manned by Earl Township, l the Earl Township EMC indicated that this staffing resource was not available at the j Township level, and that the Pennsylvania State Police were responsible for manning this post. 9 9.s O O
, ~ v -
,w SUMMAR*t OF CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd ' Actual De ficiency/ Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Washington Township
- 85. Training in the area of radiologcial emer- 0.1.
gency operations, to include procedures in the use of dosimetry and KI, route alerting, decontamination and general provisions of the Township plan should be provided to the EOC staff.
- 86. Clarification is needed with regard to the J.10.k.
designated responsible agency for manning J.10.g. the traffic control points. Access control point locations and the responsible manning agency are incongruous with the County plan; either the Township or County plan should be reviewed and revised as required.
- 87. The issuance of dosimetry and KI to emer- K.3.a.
gency workers was not observed during K.3.b. this exercise. Future exercises should demonstrate this aspect of the plan.
- 88. The PEHA observer / instructor was very N.4.
active in EOC operations at this site. The Township plan does not reflect in-clusion of this position in its organi-zation; the municipal RERP should be revised to include the designated PEMA observer / instructor within the organiza-tional chart. Otherwise, future exercises should demonstrate more independent initiative and management at the local level. 9 9 _- 9_. __
n .
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Pennsylvania State EOC
- 1. The new teletype system, if operating F.1.b.
efficiently, would provide an outstand-ing capability to the State EOC. Every attempt should be made to resolve the system's problems experienced during the exercise.
- 2. It is recommended that a joint media C.4.b.
center, at a location in close proximity to the affected area and agreeable to both the State and Utility, be established in g order to facilitate the coordination of information to the public and to anticipate some of the possible equipment failures that can arise. EOF
- 3. Consideration should be given to monitor- K.5.a.
ing of individuals entering the EOF for radioactire contamination. Air Monitoring Teams
- 4. Calibration dates should be noted on all H.10.
equipment. l 6 e . 9 O L
SUMMARY
CF CATEGORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference t NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Montgomery County
- 5. Briefings should be held with the entire A.I.b.
staff, thus providing for an up-to-date A.2.a. flow of information in all directions.
- 6. The County Commissioners should take a A.4.
more direct interest in future exercises. Montgomery County Reception / Mass Care Center
- 7. It is recommended that a facility for a J.12.
reception center be considered where g monitoring for contamination can be done H and only those families needing to go to mass care centers be directed to a shelter. 1
- 8. If decontamination responsibilities are to J.12.
i remain at mass care centers more definite procedures should be developed to differ-entiate between those people who would be l going to a shelter for monitoring and de-contamiration and those who require housing. Currently, the system provides that when the l maps at the reception center (one per car) run out, it is assumed that the mass care center is filled. This sytem does not take into account those people who may only re- l quire monitoring or the number of people per car.
'I O O O -
x
SUMMARY
OF CATECORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference 's NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date
- 9. In future exercises Red Cross District N.3.b.
Headquarters should be included in scenario planning. Pottstown School District
- 10. A backup communications system should F.1.b.
be established. Collegeville Borough
- 11. The two existing EOC telephona lines H.3.
appear to be insuf ficient to handle the expected volume of telephone traffic. , A
- 12. The plan (Attachment B) should be updated E.2.
to reflect the staffing of the Transportation / Medical Officer, as that position was filled during the exercise. Limerick Township
- 13. The Township plan needs to be updated to E.2.
reflect the staffing that was evident at the exercise. O .- O- m O
u- - -_ - . _ .
SUMMARY
OF CATECORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date i Lower Frederick Township
- 14. There was a lack of security at the EOC. D.3.
- 15. More effective message logging system for A.1.b. !
outgong messages is needed. A.2.a.
- 16. The status board was not well maintained. D.3.
Perkiomen Township
- 17. No status board was maintained. D.3.
- 18. Improved security at the Township EOC is D.3. ;
needed. !
- 19. Staffing of the EOC demonstrated during A.4. t the exercise needs to be more spe- ,
cifically defined.The plan does not > list names, except for the EMC, thus it i should be updated to reflect those in-dividuals who participated in the exercise. Pottstown Borough
- 20. The Borough should position its status D.3.
board in a place where it can be easily consulted by EOC staff members. ,
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i SUltiARY OF CATEGORY "B" RECODGIENDATIONS Reference s NUR'G-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Patc II Correction Date Date Royersford Borough
- 21. If round-the-clock staffing is indeed a A.4.
reality, the Borough plan needs to be up-dated to reflect that fact. Upper Frederick Township
- 22. The RACES radio equipment and operator F.1.b.
should be set up in a more convenient
! .:stion in order to facilitate the co-ordination of information and the message handling process.
Upper Pottsgrove Township -
- 23. The Township plan should be updated to A.4.
reflect 24-hour staffing capability. l 1 I Upper Providence Township
- 24. A status board should be maintained in D.3.
the EOC. a.
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S1201ARY OF CATECORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference ' > NUREC-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date i Upper Salford Township !
- 25. RACES was located downstairs and outside F.1.b. r of the EOC structure. The relocation of RACES might be considered next to the Emer-gency Operations room for a slightly more j efficient operation. !
Chester County
- 26. The County did not have a device for re- C.4.a.
ceiving hard copies of news releases from the utility media center. The availability [ of such a device would greatly enhance the County's capability for coordinating with g ; the State and utility regarding news ; releases. !
- 27. The only means available for communica- E.5.
tions between the County EOC and the pri-mary EBS station was commercial telephone. An alternate means of communication should be available to serve as backup in the ! event of phone system overload or failure. f ea . G w G
SUMMARY
CF CATECORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference ' NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date i
- 28. The primary EBS station used by Chester E.5. ;
County during the exercise was WCAU, rather that WC0J as the plan specifies. If WCAU is permanently designated as the primary EBS station, the State, County and munici- ' pal plans, as well as the public infor-nation material, should be amended to reflect this change. -
- 29. Distribution of dosimetry /KI kits to the K.3.a.
municipalities was performed prior to the exercise, rather than during the Alert stage, as specified in the plans. If pre-distribution of dosimetry /K1 kits is to be implemented on a permanent basis, the plans $
'd should be modified accordingly. j
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Ch ster County Reception / Mass Care Center
- 30. The Unionville High School did not appear J.10.h. !
to have adequate toilet and eating facil-ities to support the number of assigned l i evacuees. The county should re-examine the i capability of the Unionville High School to handle 800 evacuees. t
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS , Re ference ' NUREG-0654 Proj"d Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date i Charlestown Township
- 31. The Township should update its plan to A.4. !
reflect the staffing that was present ; during the exercise. j East Coventry Township
- 32. The Township plan needs to be updated to A.4.
reflect the staffing in the roster pre-sented to the Federal observer. Phoenixville Borough
- 33. The EOC did not apear to have sufficient F.1.b.
telephones to support emergency operation. Additional telephone lines and telephones '. should be installed. i
- 34. Noise level in the EOC was high enough to H.3. 4 be a problem. Measures should be taken to reduce the noise level.
Upper Uwchlan Township
- 35. The EOC lacks capability for continuous H.3.
operation. In order to assure long-term uninterrupted operations, the EOC should be provided with, where feasible, running , water, toilets, and backup power generator.
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date Warwick Township
- 36. The EOC needs improvement in H.3.
facilities and comfort. The facility should, where feasible, be provided with emergency backup power, and other amen-ities needed for continuous operation. Berks County
- 37. A more effective internal system should A.1.b.
be developed for the prompt transmittal A.2.a. of RACES messages to and from the EOC Operations Room, o e
- 38. EOC briefings should be held throughout A.1.b.
the exercise to provide all the agency A.2.a. representatives with the same information at the same time, especially with regard to protective actions. This will provide an opportunity to share information re-garding agency and municipal activities, to dispel any questions or misinterpre-tations which may develop, and to provide
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SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference j
, NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date j
- 39. Information concerning farms, food J.ll. f processing locations and water supplies ,
was not available in the E0C Operations Room. Future exercies should demonstrate the status and availability of this infor-mation to support ingestion pathway pro- - tective actions. B@yertown Area School Districts
- 40. The Boyertown Area School District, in J.10.k.
conjunction with the Berks County EMC, should review potential areas of traffic congestion as a result of school evacu-ations, and provide for access / traffic N control as warranted.
- 41. Consideration should be given to providing F.1.b.
backup communications to the school dis-trict to offset the potential problems with relying totally on commercial telephone. f Boyertown Borough
- 42. The Borough should provide for the pera- F.1.b.
anent installation of the radio antenna to be used by amateur radio in the case of an emergency. l 43. Twenty-four hour staffing will not be con- A.4. j sidered completely resolved until such l time as the Borough plan is updated to j reflect double staffing at all positions. 9a 9 9
SUMMARY
OF CATEGORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS Reference ' NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation Part II Correction Date Date ; t
- 44. A standard internal message control A.1.b.
system should be developed and distri- A.2.a. . buted to EOC staff. Future exercises I should demonstrate prompt updates to the } status board of significant activities. l l i Colebrookdale Township i
- 45. The EOC status board should be wall- D.3.
mounted to improve visibility of the applied information. 4
- 46. The EOC should fully establish the F.1.b.
amateur radio system and maintain n , active use of this system throughout [; i-the course of an exercise. { i t-Douglass Township l
- 47. Future exercises should demonstrate A.4. l active participation by elected officials .
I in exercise play.
- 48. The Township should consider augment- H.3.
ation to the space and furniture assigned for use by the EOC.
- 49. Consideration should be given to formal K.3.b.
izing briefing arrangements in the use of J.10.e. dosimetry and KI at the time of issuance to emergency workers. F 8 *
- N,
SUMMARY
OF CATECORY "B" RECOMMENDATIONS i Reference l NUREG-0654 Proj'd Actual Deficiency / Recommendation l Part II Correction Date Date h
- 50. Twenty-four hour staf fing can only be A.4.
officially recognized through the planning ; i process. The Township should update its ! plan to reflect the roster presented during the exercise. Wnshington Township i l
- 51. Future exercises should demonstrate A2a active participation by local officials. i
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