ML20246F012
| ML20246F012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1989 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#389-9091 CLI-89-17, OL-2, NUDOCS 8908300107 | |
| Download: ML20246F012 (24) | |
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oocuET NUMf3EH g][2 gj-d-d PROD. & UTIL FAc.,._. ,mmmo, an d' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA n 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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COMMISSIONERS: Kenneth M.~Carr, Chairman ?L e. Thomas M. Roberts Kenneth C. Rogers
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James R. Curtiss 4EWED AUG 2 5 1989 In the Matter of PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY Docket No. 50-353-OL-2 (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2) l MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CLI-89-17 INTRODUCTION For the reasons set forth below, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission ("NRC" or "Comission") has determined that the current record in this proceeding provides the necessary basis for authorizing the issuance of a license to the I Philadelphia Electric Company ("PECo") to operate the Limerick Generating } I Station, Unit 2 (" Limerick") at full power. The Commission finds that the balance of factors set forth in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.764(f)(2)(i) as well as consideration of environmental matters under the National Environmental Policy. Act ("NEPA") favor commencement of operation now rather than waiting for the outcome of the proceeding currently pending before the Atomic Safety and [ Licensing Board (" Licensing Board") concerning severe accident mitigation
- design alternatives ("SAMDAs"). This decision is without prejudice to the Licensing Board decision, and the license is subject to amendment as a result p of.the outcome of that proceeding. Since we expect that there will be a C - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
N Licensing Board decision on the merits of the SAMDA issue before the first refueling outage, we need not consider at this time whether the matter of full power operation beyond the first refueling outage should be subject to further conditions based on the outcome of the Licensing Board proceeding. We note, however, based on material to be discussed in this order, that any further requirements on the licensee that might be reasonably foreseen to arise out of the Board's consideration of SAMDAs will not be foreclosed by the present authorization. BACKGROUND On July 22, 1985, the Licensing Board issued its Fourth Partial Initial Decision ("PID") which resolved all remaining contested issues in favor of PECo and authorized the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue PEco a full power operating license for the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, LBP-85-25, 22 NRC 101. The Commission issued a full power operating license for Unit 1 on August 8,1985. On February 28, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued its decision in Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, FM F.2d 719, which held that the agency had erred in dismissing a contention by
.intervenor Limerick Ecology Action (" LEA") that sought to obtain consideration of SAMDAs for Limerick. The Court declared that, as part of its l responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Commission had to give consideration to SAMDAs, and remanded the matter to the Comission _for further proceedings.I On May 5,1989, che Comission entered an I-I The Court did not enjoin, set at'Je, suspend or determine the validity of the grant of an operating license to Limerick Units I and 2. Id. at 741 n.27.
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order directing the Chainnan of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel to i convene a Licensing Board to conduct further proceedings on the issue of SAMDA consideration, consistent with the Court's directive. On June 5,1989, PECo filed with the Comission a motion for clarification of the licensing status of Unit 2 pending completion of the ongoing adjudicatory proceeding. On July 7,1989, the Comission issued CLI-89-10, a Memorandum and Order responding in part to PECo's motion. In CLI-89-10, the Comission found that the Court's decision did not preclude low power authorization for Unit 2. A low power license was issued on July 10, 1989. However, the Commission deferred its consideration of full power operation until its imediate effectiveness review under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.764(f)(2). On July 26, the Comission issued an order considering the impact of the Third Circuit's decision, the parties' filings and the requirements of NEPA on the full power license. The Comission noted that:
. . . the Third Circuit did not take issue with any of the agency's findings on NEPA issues save one: its failure to analyze under NEPA s the additional matter of the alternative of further mitigation of the j consequences of severe accidents through certain facility design {
changes. Left standing by the court are the NRC staff's assessments i in the final FES that the risks of a severe accident itself are { small, NUREG-0974, at 6-3; that operation of the Limerick generating ! station would have a minimal environmental impact for full power { operation, id. at 6-4; and that for full power operation, there was ! an overall Tavorable balance of the benefits of the plant versus the l id. Thus, the basic NEPA environmental costs Limerick that could result, liiieration, including low power framework supporting facility testing, remains in place. Additionally, PECo estimates that delay in operation will increase the cost of Limerick Unit 2 by $35.7 million dollars per month, and will increase the fuel costs of PECo's 1 2 The Court also ordered the Comission to consider on remand a contention raised by the inmates of the Graterford Correctional Institute concerning the adequacy of the Limerick radiological emergency response plans. Pursuant to a , stipulation by the parties to that proceeding, the Licensing Board dismissed i the contention and terminated the proceeding on August 11, 1989. Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-22. 3
customers by $11.9 million for each month of delay. PEco motion at 18. Given these factors, the public interest does not dictate that a safe facility which is ready to operate should stand idle while litigation on SAMDAs proceeds if compliance with NEPA can otherwise be achieved. Order at 4-5 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the order asked specific questions intended to elicit from the parties sufficient information to enable the Commission to determine whether full power operation for a period up to the first refueling outage may take place during the pendency of the Licensing Board proceeding without compromising the aims of NEPA.3 On August I and 2, the parties responded to the specific questions asked by the Comission.4 On August 9, PECo and the NRC staff filed replies. LEA filed its reply on August 14.
,THE 00ESTION OF FURTHER HEARINGS LEA in its reply claims that the Licensing Board hearing must be completed before the Comission can authorize a license, and that the Comission must allow discovery and full adjudicatory hearings before it can make the NEPA determination posed in its July 26 order. In accordance with 10 C.F.R.
5 2.764(f)(2), the Comission reviews all Licensing Board decisions authorizing issuance of full power operating licenses before the NRC staff can issue the 3 This time period was selected based on the hypothesis that any SAMDAs that might be installed following the Licensing Board proceeding could be installed during the first refueling outage. One of the questions presented to the parties attempted to ascertain whether this hypothesis was correct. 4 LEA's August I response did not attempt to answer the questions, but alleged that the Comission's questions and the time given for response were J' inadequate, and that the Comission could not license Unit 2 until completion of the Licensing Board proceeding. On August 7, the Comission granted LEA , additional time to file its reply. I 4
t license. Such a review does not give rise to hearing rights. Oystershell Alliance v. NRC, 800 F.2d 1201,1206 (D.C. Cir.1986); accord, Eddleman v. NRC, 825 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir.1987). Nor does the Atomic Energy Act prevent a licensing decision from becoming effective prior to a review on the merits. Oystershell Alliance, 800 F.2d at 1206. Instead, the Commission's regulations provide only that the Comission will l
. . . review the matter on its own motion to determine whether to stay the effectiveness of the decision. An operating license decision will be stayed by the Comission, insofar as it authorizes other than fuel loading and low powar testing, if it determines that i it is in the public interest to do so, based on a consideration of '
the gravity of the substantive issue, the likelihood that it has been resolved incorrectly below, the degree to which correct resolution of the issue would be prejudiced by operation pending review, and other relevant public interest factors. 10C.F.R.62.764(f)(2)(i). This determination, which is without prejudice to further decisions on the : merits on issues raised in the licensing proceeding, allows the Licensing Board's authorization of full power operation to become effective while the resolution of contested issues continues through the administrative appeals pre:ess. Oystershell Alliance, 800 F.2d at 1206. Ordinarily, in a Comission imediate effectiveness review under 10 CFR 5 2.764(f) the Comission decides whether a Licensing Board decision issued after full hearing and favorable to the applicant may be made effective so as to authorize full power licensing pending further administrative appeals. The underlying principle is that the Comission itself, as opposed to its subordinate adjudicatory boards, must take direct responsibility for the important decision to Fruit a nuclear power plant to begin full power operation. The instant case is unusual in that, while all contested safety issues have been fully heard and resolved, NEPA issues remain pending for hearing before the Licensing Boar'd as a result of the Court's remand. However, 5
e L NEPA itself does not always require resolution of all contested environmental
'i ssues 'and completion of the entire NEPA review process before the license can o
issue. See 40 C.F.R. i 1506.1. Thus, the presumption in the immediate
" effectiveness review rule that there has been a full Licensing Board decision on all contested issues-is not necessarily applicable here. Nevertheless, the underlying principle of the immediate-effectiveness review rule -- that the Commission itself must take direct responsibility for the decision to allow commencement of full power operations -- still applies. Since the underlying principle is~~ fully applicable, we believe we are justified in conducting this immediate effectiveness review.
In conducting this review we have followed the usual review procedures except that LEA was given two opportunities, rather than one, to file written connents with the Commission. The Commission does not hold formal hearings as a part of its effectiveness reviews, see Eddleman v. NRC, 825 F.2d at 50, and there is nothing in this case that warrants a departure from the usual practice. All of the facts relied upon for this decision are on the record of the pleadings filed with the Connission. Even assuming arguendo that the Comnission was required to offer LEA a femal hearing on the findings which fonn the basis for our decision to permit full power operation of Unit 2 without waiting for the outcome of the SAMDA proceeding before the Licensing Board, for such a hearing to go forward LEA would have to have raised issues for hearing with . adequate tesis and specificity. See 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b). In our order of August 7,1989 granting LE/. an extension of time for further connents, we specifically asked LEA to "... state with specificity the portions of the NRC staff and applicant's response with which it disagrees, and outline insofar as possible the specific factual basis for th$ disagreement." Order of August 7 at 2. LEA's response 6
of- August 14.did not offer any such material. Rather than identify with basis and specificity any significant flaws or shortcomings in the factual case for concluding that a delay.in full power operation will result in greater environmental impacts and financial burdens than allowing full power operation now, LEA simply asked for another extension of time.and admitted that it does not have the information to litigate these matters except "after adequate discovery and in the course of. the required hearings." LEA response of August 14 at 10. i The ir. adequacy of LEA's response makes clear that an additional hearing would serve no purpose. Even if LEA were granted the right to a hearing, that grant would not convey a right to conduct a random fishing expedition. A party to a hearing is not entitled to discovery unless and until that party succeeds in putting forward litigable contentions with basis and specificity. LEA's filings demonstrate LEA's inability to meet this threshold test. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to offer LEA a formal hearing on the issues that bear on our present decision. LEA remains, of course, a party to the hearing before the Licensing Board where LEA has the opportunity to litigate its views and concerns about SAMDAs. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS The Commission's July 26 order requested an evaluation of the potential environmental impacts of permitting full power operation before, rather than after, conclusion of the Licensing Board proceeding on SAMDAs. In this regard, the Commission requested an evaluation of the incremental increase in l occupational exposure resulting from the installation of SAMDAs after one fuel cycle is completed; the difference in risk level associated with operating the plant without SAMDAs for one fuel cycle; and the environmental effect of using 7
alternative replacement power. The NRC staff was directed, and the other parties.were invited, to: 1. Provide an evaluation of the incremental increase in occupational radiation exposure associated with postponing the installation of SAMDAs to the first refueling outage; 2. Provide an evaluation of the incremental environmental effects from the risk of severe accidents of operation of Limerick Unit 2 with no SAMDAs in place for one fuel cycle. [ Note that NUREG-1068 and the references cited therein provide numerical estimates of the public risk (e.g., eerly and latent fatalities per year, person-rem per year) associated with full power operation of the Limerick facilities.]; 3. Provide an evaluation of the incremental environmental effect of generating non-nuclear replacement energy equivalent to one fuel cycle's energy production by Limerick Unit 2; 4. Provide an evaluation of whether operation of Unit 2 for one fuel cycle would foreclose later installation of SAMDAs; 5. Provide an evaluation of the dollar cost resulting from a delay in starting up Limerick Unit 2 for a period of time equivalent to one fuel cycle. The Commission has, after receipt of the parties' responses, analyzed the potential environmental impacts of permitting full power operation before conclusion of the Licensing Board proceeding on SAMDAs . Our analysis follows.
- 1. Incremental Increase in Occupational Radiation Exposure.
The possibility of increased occupational radiation exposure is the most obvious possible consequence of letting Limerick Unit 2 begin full power operation now if the Commission later determines as a result of the ongoing hearing before the Licensing Board that installation,of SAMDAs is desirable. Postponing SAMDA installation to the first refueling outage will require work 8
. ,f to be performed in radiation fields caused by full power operation, while installation could be done in a nearly radiation-frec environment if full power operation were delayed.
The potential increase in occupational exposure from installation of SAMDAs after full power operation has begun turns out to be relatively small. PEco has estimated the increase in occupational radiation exposure for the spectrum of SAMDAs. , PEco Response of August 2 at Appendix A. The NRC staff did not form its own estimate, but instead evaluated and agreed with PEco's estimate. NRC Staff Response of August 2 at 2-5. The largest estimate of occupational radiation exposure for any SAMDA contemplated, 416 person-rem, is . less than half the average annual collective occupational dose which has been experienced for boiling water reactors such as Limerick, see NUREG/CR-4160 at ix, and corresponds to a
.ak af .04 premature cancer deaths in the work force involved. See CLI-89-10 at 10.5 The insignificance of the increased risk can be better understood when compared to the general risks of nuclear energy generation discussed infra.
The health effects of the occupational radiation exposure associated with implementation of SAMDAs in a plant which has experienced full power operation for one fuel cycle are small compared to the general mortality and morbidity risks for nuclear energy generation, which have already been found by the NRC to be small and acceptable. In any event, this is a worst-case estimate based S Even if the Mtimate of occupational radiation exposure for each SAMDA L were totalled to arrive at a dose estimate for installation of all SAMDAs under consideration, the estimated exposure would total only 751 person-rem. This is l still considerably less than the average annual collective occupational dose. Further, it is extremely unlikely that more than one or two SAMDAs would be installed, and it is not certain that the exposure in installing multiple SAMDAs would be additive. l 9 L .- - __ l
i on the assumption that installation of SAMDAs is warranted -- at this point, the need for installation of SAMDAs has not been established. 2. Incremental environmental effects from the risk of severe accidents one fuel cycle. Any installation of SAMDAs which might ultimately be required would arguably reduce the severe accident risk associated with operation of the facility. How much reduction could be achieved is not yet known but, obviously, SAMDAs cannot do more than reduce the severe accident risk to zero. Thus, the severe a.eident risk figures presented by the NRC Staff can be regarded as upper bounds to the reduction in risk which could result from the implementation of any SAMDA. This assumption that a SAMDA might reduce the severe accident risk to zero is conservative in the context of the present NEPA analysis and tends to compensate for uncertainties in risk estimates and the possibility that the reduction in risk from the installation of SAMDAs is greater than we have assumed 0 6 The inclusion environmental of severe impact involves accident risk a comparability as an additive element in question. the tota Most environmental impacts are realistic expectation values in the sense that they are indeed expected to occur, whereas the severe accident risks are actuarial numbers, calculated by multiplying a very low estimated frequency of occurrence by a large consequence should an accident occur. Thus, the severe accident risk figures are not true expectation values. In actual fact, either a severe
-accident will _not occur during the course of a fuel cycle, in which case there are no consequences, or a severe accident will occur, in which case the consequences will be much larger than the actuarial risk figures. An actuarial estimate such as thisaspects and high consequence is a mathematical device which includes the low frequency in one number.
Although the comparability question reasons: following exists, the actuarial figures will nevertheless be used here, for the (a) The actuarial consequences figures of severe attempt to include both the low frequencies and high accidents. No better method hes presented itself. (b) Similar comparability questions abound in environmental impact studies. (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED GN NEXT PAGE) 10
The NRC staff and PECo have independently estimated the risk of severe accidents. NRC Staff Response of August 5 at 5-8; PECo Response of August 2 at Appendix A. Both report estimates of early fatalities, latent cancer fatalities and person-rem. In addition, the staff estimated the land area for long term interdiction. The estimates are expressed in terms of consequences multiplied by the probabilities. The staff's largest risk estimate, based on the entire region rather than limiting calculations to a 50 mile radius, is 0.008 early fatalities, 0.06 latent cancer fatalities, and 1000 square meters of land requiring long term interdiction. Staff Response at 7. The staff's and PECo's estimates of severe accident risk are in some disagreement. The staff's estimates range from (approximately) a factor of 2 to a factor of 10 greater than PEco's, but are still low. Regarding this difference, it should be noted that both estimates are based upon the Limerick Probabilistic Risk Assessment and the Severe Accident Risk Assessment (" SARA"), the latter of which dates back to 1983.7 Both the staff and PEco have attempted to update the 1983 SARA to reflect modifications to the plant which (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) (c) A separate decision on the safety of the plant has already been made and was not challenged by LEA in the proceedings before the Third Circuit. This decision in effect states that the severe accident frequency associated with full power operation of the facility is sufficiently low as to be considered acceptable under the Atomic Energy Act. 7 LEA purports to challenge the staff's analysis. LEA Response of August 14 at 9-10. However, LEA provides no quantitative information to indicate that other figures would be appropriate. Further, as we have indicated, the staff's figures are not new information. LEA had ample opportunity to challenge the staff's figure, in the course of the previous litigation. Further, LEA attempts to 2xpand the inquiry beyond severe accident issues. See LEA Response of August In at 10-12 (discussing Crud Induced Localized Corrosion). Such generic challenges go beyond the narrow question at hand. LEA may not use this immeo' ate effectiveness proceeding to litigate or relitigate every Commission 'indirg with which it disagrees. 11
have occurred since that date. Years of experience with Limerick Unit I have provided some plant-specific data which PECo has used in this update, but which the staff has not reviewed. Given this, and in view of the wide uncertainty bands of all P'lAs, the difference is understandable.8 The severe accident risk is only one of the environmental impacts of nuclear power plant operation. Although the implementation of on2. or more SAMDAs might arguably reduce the severe accident risk, we agree with 8.EA that, in comparing the impacts of operation of the facility with the impact of delay (e.g., generation of electricity from alternative non-nuclear facilities), all the other components (i.e., the environmental impacts of nonnal or routine operation) should be included for an accurate comparative assessment of the incremental environmental impact of generating non-nuclear replacement energy equivalent to one fuel cycle's production. LEA Response of August 1 at 7. Moreover, these environmental effects of operation include all activities, from mining to waste disposal, needed to support the plant for the period in question. The environmental effects of using nuclear energy for electric power generation include, in addition to the severe accident risk, contributions from the mining, transportation and refining of uranium ore, the fabrication of fuel elements, the normal effluents from the reactor facility, waste disposal, and 8 These estimates are "best" estimates as expressed by the parties presenting them. All of these numbers are subject to some uncertainty, i.e. each parameter has associated with it not only a "best" estimate but also a mathematical distribution about this estimate. Thus, it is recognized that true <alues may deviate somewhat from the estimates. Nevertheless, these estimates are the best estimates currently available, even though the possibility cannot be excluded that an incorrect conclusion could be reached. 4 This would only happen, however, if the estimates associated with nuclear operation deviated considerably in one direction and the estimates associated with fossil fueled generation deviated considerably in the other direction. While LEA challenges these estimates, it offers no alternative information. 12
the routine occupational radiation exposure of plant workers. Many of these-effects are not directly related to radioactivity, but instead are analogous to the mortality, morbidity and ecological effects of any industrial operation. All must be included in the evaluation of the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle.9
- 3. Incremental Environmental Impact of Generating Non-nuclear Replacement Energy Ecu1 valent to One Fuel Cycle's Energy Production.
We have discussed at some length the environmental impacts of nuclear generation to emphasize the Commission's acute awareness of the environmental consequences of the action it is authorizing. However, the fact that operating Limerick Unit 2 will have environmental impacts cannot be said to act against coeration of the plant before one also looks at the impacts of the alternatives to that operation. The only realistic alternative to letting Unit 2 begin to generate electricity is continued fossil fuel generation that Limerick would replace. Electrical generation using fossil fuels is not environmentally inconsequential. The use of coal as a fuel for generation of electrical energy involves the mining and transportation of very large quantities of material. Coal mining involves significant occupational hazards as well as effects on the ecosystem, while transportation of large quantities of coal has significance as a hazard to the public. Finally, the effects of stack emissions must be considered. 011 is generally less hazardous to produce at the we11 head than mining an equivalent quantity of coal. Also, stack emissions are generally much ,less.
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These fuel cycle impacts are set out quantitatively in great detail in the Comission's fuel cycle rule. See 10 C.F.R. 6 51.51, " Table S-3n." 13
- Of course, the use of oil to generate electricity also raises questions about-additional cost and foreign policy and foreign trade considerations.10 It is possible, as LEA has done, to contemplate still other, more exotic sources of electrical energy, or still other alternatives such as conservation.
LEA Response of August 14 at 13-17. However, none of these are practical alternatives in the short term, and LEA has produced no infonnation to show that these alternatives are likely to be pursued to replace the power Limerick Unit'2 would generate if the plant were allowed to go to full power in the near future. Thus, the realistic alternative to full power operation of Limerick 4 Unit 2 is continued electrical generation based on coal and oil.
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All of these effects must be evaluated quantitatively for both nuclear and non-nuclear generation, and the results balanced against each other, to arrive at an estimate of the incremental environmental impact of generating non-nuclear replacement energy. 1 The NRC staff and.PECo have independently evaluated the environmental j effects of the generation of electrical energy equivalent to one fuel cycle's i full' power operation of Unit 2, in terms of mortality and morbidity for both { plant workers and the. general public, for both nuclear generation and non-nuclear generation. Staff Response of August 2 at 9-16 PECo Response of
. August 2 at Appendix A.
In addition, both evaluated at least qualitatively the ecological impacts of the two means of generation. Although the staff's and PECo's estimates differ, which is not unexpected in areas such as this where there is no unanimity among the technical comunity, both estimates greatly 4 10 Unlike coal, oil-fired generation carries with it a possibility of accidents with severe environmental impacts, particularly if tanker transportation is necessary. Currently, quantitative estimates of the severe 1 t accident risk associated with oil are lacking. 14 . i
favor nuclear generation as having the lesser environmental impact. The ' staff's estimate, which is the less favorable to nuclear generation, nevertheless calculates a favorable balance in terms of mortality (6.2 fatalities for the fossil fuel option vs.1.0 to 1.4 for nuclear) and morbidity (98 for fossil vs.14 to 27 for nuclear). These figures imply one life lost for every 13 weeks that Limerick Unit 2 remains shut down and replacement power must be found. LEA claims that the delay in operation until the SAMDA issue is litigated need not be as long as 15 months, and would be "probably only a few months at most." Id. at 19. While we agree that the delay may not be as long as 15 months, we do not share LEA's optimism. LEA states that "much progress could be made in the litigation before the Commission need address the full power question at all, that is, while low power testing is underway." Id. Low power testing began on August 12; the parties have not yet even agreed to a discovery schedule in the Licensing Board proceeding. See unpublished Licensing Board Order of August 15, 1989. It is difficult to see how the proceeding will be completed any time soon.II
- 4. Foreclosure of Later Installation.
Both the NRC staff and PEco have stated that operation of Unit 2 would not
-make the installation of the SAMDAs under consideration physically impossible, and that the only difficulties expected concern matters of increased cost and increased occupational radiation exposure. NRC Staff Response of August 2 at 11 This is particularly true if LEA's actions in this immediate effectiveness proceeding are taken as an indication of its future actions in the Licensing Board proceeding. LEA has made late requests for two extensions of time and generally has produced little factual support for its positions despite a specific request from the Commission that it timely state the bases for its arguments. See unpublished Commission Order of August 7,1989 at 2.
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19; PECo Response of August 2 at Appendix A. LEA did not address the issue of foreclosure. Regarding increased cost of installation of SAMDAs after a fuel cycle's operation at full power, PECo has agreed that for purposes of evaluation of SAMDAs in the remand proceeding, the cost / benefit balance should be viewed as of.the time of initial licensing without regard to any additional costs that might be associated with the implementation of a SAMDA after operation has begun. CLI-89-10 at 12; Juni 5,1989 affidavit of Corbin A. McNeill. Even if the added costs were considered, the only costs envisioned would be the increase in occupational exposure, since the reactor is already built. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, Sec. II.D., the Commission uses the value of $1000 per whole body person-rem for purposes of cost / benefit analysis. When that number is multiplied by the 416 person-rem dose which has been estimated for the SAMDA having the largest occupational dose, see discussion of question 1, supra, the increased cost of installing SAMDAs after the first fuel cycle may be estimated to be approximately $416,000. Given the cost of keeping the facility shut down, see discussion of question 5, infra, such a cost is small and would not foreclose installation of SAMDAs. Although the NRC staff concedes that the occupational radiation exposures
. incurred during SAMDA installation after one fuel cycle would be greater than exposures incurred during installation prior to achieving reactor criticality, both the staff and PECo have stated in their pleadings that the occupational dose associated with installing any of the SAMDAS under consideration is the same or less than that associated with typical outage maintenance activities.
1 NRC Staff Response of August 2 at 19; PECo Response at Appendix A. Thus, the matter of increased occupational exposure will not foreclose the installation 1 of SAMDAs. I 16
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- 5. Dollar Cost of Delay.
In order to calculate the financial cost of delay if the issuance of the full pcwer license is deferred until the completion of SAMDA litigation, the parties have identified the costs likely to be incurred. PEco has identified three categories of costs: (1) the additional carrying costs allowed under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") accounting rules, which are capitalized as part of the project costs; (2) the additional cost of fuel to operate alternative generating sources; and (3) the operation, maintenance and security costs ("O&M") at the plant during the delay period. PECo Response of August 2, 1989 at Appendix A. The NRC staff argues that the only cost which should be included is the additional fuel cost of operating other generating units for replacement power. LEA agrees with the staff that carrying charges and 0&M should not be included. LEA Response of August 14, 1989 at 18. The Commission believes that the staff is correct in asserting that only costs that increase due to the delay in the operating license should be counted. The fact that, as PEco asserts, FERC allows additional carrying costs to be capitalized as part of the project cost and therefore eventually recovered by ratepayers does not mean that carrying costs have in fact increased. That approach mixes capital costs and methods of capital recovery. If alternatively, PECo immediately reduces stockholder distributions in order to begin retiring capital costs, there may be no additional indebtedness. As the staff points out, recovery of the capital costs can be paid either by the stockholder or the ratepayers.12 12 The above is consistent both with the NRC's past methodology in perfonning NEPA cost-benefit evaluations and with the staff's methods of cost analysis for the regulatory impact analysis performed for agency ralemakings. i (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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We find, however, that one cost not included by the staff should be included in light of the clarification provided by PECo'in its August 9,1989 reply. This clarification states that approximately 40% of the operation and maintenance expenses relate to activities that would not be continued following emnmerciel operation. Accordingly, these expenses will be solely attributable to the delay. We turn now to the dollar amounts of these costs. There are some differences between the PEco and NRC staff estimates. This is to be expected given the nature of economic forecasting. Regarding 0&M, the only estimate available, that provided by PECo, is $43 million, or 40 percent of the total O&M during the delay period. -This figure is reasonable based on current industry experience. In its August 2 response, PECo estimates replacement power fuel costs of
$11.9 million per month, or $178.5 million for 15 months. The NRC staff derived an estimate of $228 million ($500,000 per day) for the same period.
'This is based on information contained in NUREG/CR-4012, which is used to obtain replacement power cost estimates for the agency's regulatory impact analyses. LEA's figure is $12 million per month, an estimate virtually identical to the licensee's estimate.13 Each of these figures is acceptable
-within the errors of economic forecasting. Adding each of these figures to the (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) See, and 2e., ., LI-77-8, Public. Service Company of New Ham) shire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 5 NRC 503, 534 (1977); 47 ed. Reg. 12940, 12942 (March 26, 1982). (" Sunk costs" are not appropriately considered in an operating license cost-benefitbalance.) 13 LEA claims that these numbers are uncertain. Of course, economic ' forecasting is not and cannot be a precise science. Nevertheless, the numbers are the best available and are consistent with principles of economic forecasting and industry experience.
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estimated $43 million in O&M, it is reasonable to estimate the total cost of a 15 month delay as between $221.5 million and $271 million. LEA argues that the dollar cost of delay need not be as great as assumed by either PECo or the NRC staff. LEA response of August 14 at 19-25. LEA's arguments are based on faulty economic principles and unsupported forecasts. The crux of the argument seems to be that both future costs of operation and capital costs should be included in deciding if and when the various generating plants should be operated. It is a long-established economic principle that the most efficient economic choice is to operate the system with the lowest future costs. As intiicated above, sunk costs, i.e., in this case, capital costs, should not be used when deciding which plants to operate. This is why utilities practice " economy dispatching" i.e., the available plant with the lowest operating costs is connected to the grid when an increase in electrical demand occurs. Therefore, it does not necessarily make economic sense to stretch out the usefulness of those units that enjoy long depreciated capital costs. LEA is inconsistent in arguing that carrying charges on capital should not be included in the cos.t of delay of Limerick operation, id. at 18, but that capital costs should be included in deciding which plant to operate. Id. at
-19. In addition, LEA makes the unsupported claim that Limerick has some fixed lifetime which can simply be extended later if operation is delayed now. Id.
Decisions on whether.to continue to operate a plant are made on the basis of costs of continued operation, subject to appropriate regulat'ory requirements, l rather than some fixed operating life. t Even if, as LEA asserts, see discussion supra, the delay were half of what is envisioned, 7-1/2 months, and even taking into account seasonal differences in power use, the dollar cost of delay would be in excess of $100 million. 19 *
.c CONCLUSIONS NEPA is a procedural statute designed to assure that the decisionmaker has considered the environmental effect of the available options before a decision is made which might foreclose any of those options. It is uncontested that -
full power operation of Limerick Unit 2 for a period not to exceed the first fuel cycle will not foreclose implementation of any SAMDA under consideration -should the Commission's decision at the conclusion of the litigation find SAMDA installation -necessary. Thus, the only implication of full power operation which need be considered in this immediate effectiveness review is the environmental effect of operating without SAMDAs for one fuel cycle as compared i to keeping Limerick Unit 2 shut down until the conclusion of the Licensing Board proceeding. As indicated above, those effects have been found to be as follows: (1) A maximum risk of occupational radiation exposure of 416 person-rem or .04 premature cancer deaths in the work force involved if SAMDAs need to be installed after the plant has been irradiated for one fuel cycle. (2) A possible maximum increased risk from severe accidents of .008 early fatalities . 06 latent cancer fatalities and long tenn interdiction of 1000 square meters of land area, assuming an as yet unproven hypothesis that SAMDAs i can lower the risks of severe accidents. (3) A favorable balance of overall environmental impacts compared to generation of replacement energy. 'The overall comperison of mortality and morbidity contemplates a difference of one life icst for every 13 weeks that { Limerick Unit 2 remains shut down. 1 (4) A cost saving to PECo, its shareholders and ratepayers of between { $100 million and $271 million. J j 3 20 -
}
l Given these impacts, both the public interest and the relative environmental impacts favor the issuance of a full power license for Limerick Unit 2. Accordingly, the NRC staff is authoriied to issue a full power license to PECo to operate Limerick Unit 2 once it has made the requisite safety findings under 10 C.F.R. 6 50.57.14 This decision is without prejudice to the cutcome of the adjudicatory proceeding currently pending before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. It is so ORDERED. For the Commi.;sio g D, Ta-
< om
/ % .
) SAMUEL J! ItttLK g'? g Secretary of ttp Commission Dated at Rockville, Maryland thisD-4day of August, 1989.
14 Earlier today, we received a "Second Supplemental Response of Intervenor Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. to Memorandum and Order of Commission, dated July 26,1989 and Memorandum and Order of August 7,1989." This response is dated August 24, 1989. This supplemental pleading does not provide any basis which would cause us to revise our conclusion in this matter as set forth in the text of this Memorandum and Order. denied. In addition, LEA's request for an administrative housekeeping stay is 21
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of I I
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY l Docket No.(s) 50-352/353-OL-2 ' I (Linerick Generating Station, i Units 1 and 2) l l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing COMMISSION Mk0 (CLI-89-17) have been served upon the fo110 wing persons by U.S. sail, first class, except as otherwise noted and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 2.712. Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Gary J. Edles Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Howard A. Wilber Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Morton B. Margulies, Chatraan Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Frederick J. Shen Jerry Harbour Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Joseph Rutberg, Esquire Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire Office of the General Counsel Conner & Wetterhahn, P.C. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission 1747 Pennsylvania Avenus, N.W. Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20006 C' .les W. Elliot, Esquire Edward S. Bauer, Jr., Esquire Poswistilo, Elliott & Elliott Vice President and Seneral Counsel 1101 Northampton Street, Suite 201 Philadelphia Electric Company Easton, PA 18042 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 a e
L "D;cket No.is)50-352/353-OL-2
' COMMISSION M&O (CL!-89-17) i Vincent S. Boyer Frank R. Romano Vice President-Engr. & Res. Chairman Philadelphia Electric Company Air and Water Pollution Patrol 2301 Market Street 61 Forest Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19101 Aabler, PA 19002 David Stone Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. Robert J. Sugarsan, Esquire P.O. Box 761 101 North Broad Street, 16th Floor Pottstown, PA 19464 Philadelphia, PA 19107 Charles E. Rainey, Jr., Esq. Michael B. Hirsch, Esquire Chief Deputy City Solicitor Federal Energency Management Agency-City of Philadelphia 500 C Street, S.W.
1 Reading Center, Fifth Floor Washington, DC 20472 Philadelphia, PA 19107 David Wersan, Esquire Theodore 6. Otto, III. Esquire Assistant Consumer Advocate Chief Counsel Office of Consumer Advocate Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 1425 Strawberry Square P.O. Box 598 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Caso Hill, PA 17011 Bregory E. Dunlap Deputy General Counsel Robert L. Anthony The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Box 186 Office of General Counsel Moylan, PA 19065 333 Market Street, 17th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 596 Pottstown, PA 19464 Dated at Rockville, Md. this 25 day of August 1989 s Office of the Secretary of the Commission
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