ML20154J615

Insp Rept 70-1257/88-04 on 880418-22.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Organization,Criticality Safety, Operations Review,Maint & Surveillance Testing & Radwaste Mgt

ML20154J615
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	05/12/1988
From:	Brock B, Thomas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154J607	List: ML20154J604 ML20154J615
References
70-1257-88-04, 70-1257-88-4, NUDOCS 8805270077
Download: ML20154J615 (10)

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V ,

Report No. 70-1257/88-04  ;

Docket No. 70-1257 l

License No. SNM-1227 i

Priority: 0 Category: III Safeguards Group: I Licensee: Advanced Nuclear Fuels, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: Richland Facility

Inspection at

Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted: April 18 to 22, 1988 Inspector: . #b M B. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector Date Signed ,

Approved by: ,[ 8 R. D. Thomas, Chief D(te !Tigned Nuclear Materials Safety Section Summary: ,

l Inspection on April 18 to 22, 1988 (Report No. 70-1257/88-04)

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection was conducted of management organization, criticality safety, operations review, maintenance and surveillance testing, and radioactive waste management.

During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 88005, 88015, 88020, 83822, and 88035 were covered.

Results: No violations were identified in the five areas inspected.

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l DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted A. Advanced Nuclear Fuels 1

• R. G. Frain, Manager, Richland Operations-

• H. L. Caudill, Manager, Process and Equipment Engineering ,

• T. C. Probasco, Supervisor, Radiological and Industrial Safety l

• L. D. Gerrald, Criticality Safety Specialist

• J. E. Pieper, Specialist, Health Physics

• R. H. Purcell,-Manager, Safety and Security E. L. Foster, Radiological Safety Assistant M. K. Valentine, Manager, Plant Operations

• C. W. Malody, Manager, Corporate Licensing

• D. C. Lehfeldt', Manager, Operations Planning and Scheduling W. G. Keith, Plant Engineer ~, Chemical and Conversion

-M. Kirkman, Chemical Engineer L. A. Bispang, Senior Engineer C. L. Christiensen, Engineer .

l S. R. Lockhaven, Specialist, Industrial Hygiene '

C. J. Francis, Project Engineer N. S. Brown, Shift Supervisor, Ceramics L. Weaver, Shift Supervisor

, G. V. Mulligan, Supervisor Shipping R. A. Nunamaker, Lead Material Controller L. Klug, Senior Engineering Technician M. Moberg, Technician Specialist F. Raramo, Chemical Operator J. Morales, Chemical Operator

• Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Functional or Program Areas Inspected A. Management Organization and Controls (88005)

(1) Organizational Structure l

Independence of criticality safety and radiation saf6ty i components from production operations has been maintained, It ]

was noted however that the company president decided to retire  !

, effective May 1, 1988. The vice president of commercial operations will move up to become the new president and chief executive officer of the corporation on that date.

(2) Safety Committee- )

f The ALARA committee completed and issued its review of the 1987 radiological safety data. Airborne concentrations at~some work stations reached 6% of the regulatory limit.  !

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2 The licensee has not had an annual criticality safety program audit as recommended by the Criticality Safety Task Force.

Item (85-02-05) remains open.

The NRC inspector reviewed the minutes of the safety' committee.

The minutes indicated that the licensee's internal audits identified several problems which were promptly corrected (see Section 2.A.(3)). The inspector noted that the minutes addressed a problem to which the licensee had not adequately responded. The problem involved klaxon audibility in-the southwest corner of the site. The inspector suggested that the licensee provide a temporary ' correction even though a permanent solution is scheduled to be put into effect when the construction in the area is completed. The Supervisor, Radiological and Industrial Safety agreed to provide an adequate supplemental alarm for the area. The provision of an adequate supplemental alarm will be reviewed as open item (88-04-01) during the next inspection.

(3) Internal Review and Audit )

The licensee's internal audit program continues to be l effective. Problems identified during the audits included labeling, storage, posting, and the use of an unauthorized area for placing loaded sealed E boxes of low enrichment uranium i fuel pellets into shipping containers. The licensee corrected l the problems within the guidance provided in 10 CFR Part 2 l Appendix C.V.A.; therefore they were not cited. The licensee should assure that training reemphasizes the above subject areas.

Performance in this subject area warrants management attention.

No violations were identified.

B. Criticality Safety (88015) I (1) Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis The licensee's Criticality Safety Specialist completed three criticality safety analyses (CSAs) since the January NRC inspection. The review and approval of the CSAs were attested to by the signature of the qualified second party reviewer.

The subjects of the CSAs were: (1) bundle storage area modification to accommodate 5% enriched, 17X17 PWR fuel bundles; (2) solid waste uranium recovery (SWUR) drum storage; and (3) lagoon storage of uranium solutions. A CSA is currently in process in response to an Engineering Change Notice (ECN) requesting authorization for storage of additional fuel rods in the Contaminated Materials Warehouse. An additional ECN is being considered for proposed changes to the storage configuration in the Contaminated Materials Warehouse.

9 The Criticality Safety Specialist is developing a list'of the moisture equivalents for UO2 approved additives. This simplifies determining the specific quantity of each type of additive the Criticality Safety Specification permits to be mixed with the U02powder. The list currently includes the i moisture equivalents for five compounds.

(2) Audits The licensee's criticality safety audits are conducted as required and with sufficient scope and depth to be effective.

The items identified in the March audits mentioned in Section 2.A.(3) were expeditiously and appropriately corrected.

Performance in this program area appears to be adequate.

No violations were identified.

D. Operations Review (88020)

(1) Conduct of Operations (a) Vaporizat_ ion Room The inspector observed the swing shift operators connecting a UF6 cylinder to the vaporization system. The operators were wearing the required respiratory protection equipment. The NRC inspector observed that when the operators encountered a faulty valve while connecting the cylinder to the system they followed the procedure for valve replacement, tested the new valve, attached the cylinder to the system, and tested the integrity of the l connection. The Shift Supervisor, Conversion, was present in the vaporization room during the cylinder change operation.

(b) Conversion Area The inspector observed that the licensee had put into place modifications that improved the control of spills during powder sampling and slab tank and mixer servicing.

Additionally, improvements to powder transfer mechanisms were also noted. Of particular note were the i

modifications already in place as the result of the l recommendations of an independent contractor who evaluated I the stress on the licensee's hot oil systems.- Metal plates had been fashioned as shielding around the metal bellows to protect against the effect of a failure of the  !

metal bellows which contributed to the fire-reported in l the previous inspection report (70-1257/88-02).

Additionally, there was flame resistant padding (wrapped in wire mesh) that was used for insulation in various-locations around the equipment.

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(c) Bundle Assembly l l

The inspectors review of the bundle assembly area found that additional attention had been given to controlling the accumulation of zirconium hair-like turnings that contributed to a small fire in this area. -'This closes item (87-08-01).

(d) Dry Conversion The licen'see was not currently operating the dry conversion ~ process. The process will-be restarted to provide additional powder to complete powder l characterization studies.

(e) Gadolinium Scrap Recovery Plant (GSRP)

The plant was not in operation during this inspection.

Modifications were underway that would increase the throughput of the operation. Additionally, the storage room will be reduced to provide.for the addition of a  !

change room. Room 52, west of the GSRP, was being modified to accommodate the operation for evaluating the  :

recovery of uranium from the incinerator. ash. I (f) Solid Waste Uranium Recovery (SWUR) Facility The project engineer for the SWUR facility clarified that the incinerator was still undergoing test operations and therefore had not burned any urtnium contaminated waste.

It is expected to start burning contaminated waste by early June. There were no near term plans for burning liquid wastes nor wastes not generated by the licensee.

The project engineer also indicated that the change to once through cooling of the incinerator shroud has significantly improved system performance. The shroud effluent is sampled at its separate stack to verify the integrity of the system. l The combustion product gas stream is cooled from about i 2000 degrees to 160 degrees Fahrenheit before it is HEPA filtered, sampled, and exhausted through a separate stack.

The licensee's Incinerator Startup Review Council (ISRC) will review the startup test results before permitting I routine operation of the incinerator with contaminated l waste. l i

The senior engineer responsible for the ventilation system '

serving the building in which the incinerator is located clarified the independence of the incinerator's ventilation system. This independence permitted about 3000 cubic feet per minute additional cooling capacity to  !

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be redirected to other operations and offices in the i building.

(g) Neutron Absorber Facility (NAF)

The NAF also exhibited improvements in the radiation control program. Baffles had been put in place around the ,

mixer, which is above the mezzanine, to preclude spillage '

during servicing from falling to and contaminating lower levels.

During the tour of this facility the NRC inspector pointed out that the sliding door on the east panel of the plastic enclosure of the pellet oxidation operation did not have provision for controlling contamination. The Specialist, Health Physics immediately directed that pans would no longer be removed from the enclosure by that route. He suggested that the shift supervisor submit a request for a system modification that would permit the pans to be moved to the front of the operation while still within the enclosure.

(h) Ammonia Recovery Facility (ARF)

The ARF was in routine operation. It is recovering enoagh  !

ammonia to more than meet the licensee's conversion process needs. As a result the licensee sells surplus ammonia. The licensee indicated the radiation measurements show little if any alpha and beta plus gamna contamination. The licensee's measurements will be reviewed during the next inspection (88-04-01).

(i) Liquid Uranium Recovery (LUR) Process The LUR process was in full operation. The operators were following the procedures and understood the criticality safety controls. Product containers were restricted to one per pallet as required by the criticality safety specification. The radiation protection procedures were followed.

(j) Lagoons The leak reported in Lagoon I had slowed significantly.

The licensee indicated that the lagoon cover had been repaired where the plywood panel, blown by a wind storm, had penetrated the cover and the sidewall. The sidewall area, just below the damage to the cover and slightly beneath the surface of the liquid, had not been repaired.

However, no additions were being made to the lagoon while its contents were continually being fed to the ARF. This mode of operation had succeeded in lowering the liquid level below the area where the sidewall had apparently been penetrated. The licensee reported that measurement

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. 6 l of samples from the wells around the lagoon did not indicate that leakage into the groundwater had occurred. l The lagoon is scheduled to be emptied and repaired during the 1988 summer furiough.

Lagoon 2 is currently empty and ready for use. However, i current plans are to keep it on standby to permit it to be used as an alternate for Lagoon 1. l l

Lagoon 3 is the source of the feed for the LUR process. l Lagoon 4 receives the waste stream from the LUR process. .

It is the source of feed for the ARF because of its ammonia content.  !

Lagoon SA receives the waste stream from the ARF which is ,

released to the sewer after. measurements confirm releases j will not exceed regulatory limits. This lagoon may.also receive low uranium content liquids from which ammonia recovery is not warranted. It was noted during the tour, the. site liquid effluent flow measurement device was not t functioning normally. The Specialist, Health Physics indicated this had been identified as a follow up item in ,

1' his monthly audit report. The corrective action taken by l the licensee will be reviewed during the next ir.spection (88-04-02).

. Lagoon SB is now receiving the high uranium content l t

effluent streams from the plant because of the damage in )

Lagoon 1. '

(k) New Construction The licensee is constructing a new building, near the southwest corner of the site, to house the Irradiated Fuela, Services operation. This operation is licensed by the State of Washington. It is in this area that a' i temporary supplemental alarm is needed to assure that l workers hear the evacuation signal.

i The licensee is also constructing a new deionizing l facility for process water. It will replace the existing j facility.

The licensee had constructed a new pad for burning l zirconium turnings under controlled conditions. This process will convert the zirconium metal to zirconium l oxide for safe storage and transport. ,

4 The licensee is planning to move the dilute nitric acid 1 tank and the deionized water. tank inside the U02 Building.

Performance in this program area appears to be adequate.

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H Y. 7 R No violations were identified.

E. Radiation Protection (83822) i (1) Procedures The licensee recently revised the radiation protection i procedures. A copy of the revision was provided to the Region V office. The procedures, as attested to by signature, had been reviewed and approved as required.

(2) Instruments and Equipment (a) The radiation survey instruments checked for current calibration were found to be within the calibration period.

(b) The calibration stickers on air sample flow meters indicated.that the flow meters were within the calibration period.

(c) The airlock alarm in the basement of the Engineering '

Laboratory Operations (ELO) Building was not working a during the tour. The Specialist, Health Physics reported that the system was operating before the end of the inspection. The NRC inspector was unable, because of I other items, to verify that the system was in normal operation, therefore this item (88-02-02) will remain ,

open. l (d) The licensee's magnehelic gauges observed during visits to various parts of the plant indicated normal system l performance. No readings exceeded the 4 inch level at I which high efficiency particulate (HEPA) filter changes  !

are required.

(3) Posting and Labeling The licensee's internal audit program identified some posting and labeling problems (see Section 2.A.(3)). These findings warrant increased attention to this area.

(4) Decontamination l The previou= inspection report identified that the licensee had put a grey coat of-paint over yellow paint used to cover  :

residual contamination on a room floor in the ELO basement. l The licensee. explained during this inspection that the grey coat v'.s put down as a wear indicator. As the grey coat wears the yellow paint will begin to show through alerting the  !

license to the need for corrective action before the surface paint is worn through to the contamination. The sign indicating the contamination exists under the yellow paint remains in the room window. The extent to which this approach J

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is followed will be reviewed during the next inspection (88-04-03). The painting of contaminated surfaces is.not considered to be an acceptable health physics practice.

Performance in this program area reflects a need for improvement in training.

No violations were identified.

F. Radioactive Waste Management (88035) 1

-The licensee's effluent reports were issued as required by 10 CFR Part 70.59. .The reports indicated the licensee's effluents, liquid and gaseous, were less than regulatory limits. The reports were issued within the regulatory time requirement. -!

The licensee is considering the addition of another ion exchar.ge column in the process effluent stream to further reduce the uranium concentration in the liquid effluents in an effort to preclude reconcentration to significant levels durit.g processing through the local sewerage treatment plant.

e Performance in this program area appears adequate.

No violations were identified.

1 G. Exit Meeting (30703)

The results of the inspection were discussed with-the licensee's staff identified in Section 1. The topics included:

The areas inspected, d

i The ALARA report conclusion and the inspector's observation of improved radiation s3fety performance.

The status of the SWUR process and incinerator startup.

Improved alignment of hazardous materials storage area responsibility with principal users.

The implementation of improvements recommended by the consultant called in following the nonreportable incidents addressed in the previous inspection report (70-1257/88-02).

The parking of a trailer in close proximity to the valves and piping serving the concentrated nitric acid tank, The need for improving the performance of the site effluent

, flow measurement device.

The licensee's appropriate response to internal audit findings.

. 'he status of open items:

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. 1 Closed items 1 ]

Open items (old) 21 Open items (new) 3 The licensee stated that a temporary supplemental alarm would be added to the west side of the Fuel Storage Warehouse to 4 assure the workers in that area would be made aware of any need to evacuate.

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