ML20236C915

Insp Rept 70-1257/87-08 on 870928-1002.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Organization & Controls, Criticality Safety,Operations Review,Training,Radiation Protection & Emergency Preparedness & Environ Protection

ML20236C915
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	10/20/1987
From:	Brock B, Thomas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236C899	List: ML20236C897 ML20236C915
References
70-1257-87-08, 70-1257-87-8, NUDOCS 8710270398
Download: ML20236C915 (9)

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O. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ve ,

y REGION V ,

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(ReportNo.L70-1257/87-08'

- D$cket No.- 70-1257

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License'Nb.SNM-1227-Safeguards Group: lI Licensee: Advanced Nuclear Fuels, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids Road

> Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: Richland Facility Inspection at: Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted: September 28'to October'2, 1987

-Inspector: A M-- /8 8 7

. L. Brock, Fuel. Facilities Inspector- Date Signed <

Approved b : /d [8.

R. D. Thomas, Chief. .

Date' Sign'ed i Nuclear' Materials Safety Section '

' Summary:

Inspection on September 28 to October 2, 1987-(Report No.-70-1257/87-08)

. Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection was conducted of management organization and controls, criticality safety, operations review, training,

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transportation / radioactive waste' management, radiation protection,' emergency preparedness and environmental protection, ,

During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 88005, 88015, 88020, 88010, 86740/88035, 88050, and 84850 were covered.

Results: No violations were identified in the seven areas inspected.

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8710270398 071021 REGS LIC70 PDR SNM-1227 e-M__as-- ------.u-a_ . . - - . - - .--

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DETAILS =

1.- Persons Contacted '

A. Advanced Nuclear Fuels ~ 1

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• R. G.' Frain,' Manager,' Richland Operations j

• H. L. Caudill, Manager, Process and Equipment Department l

'*T. C. Probasco,. Supervisor, Radiological and Industrial Safety

• L. D. Gerrald,' Criticality Safety Specialist

• J. E. Pieper, Specialist, Health Physics 1

• R. H. Purcell, Manager, Safety and Security. 1 E. L. Foster,. Radiological Safety Assistant ;l

• M. K. Valentine, Manager, Plant Operations l

'M. Kirkman', Chemical Engineer' l

• C. W.. Malody, Manager, Corporate L'icensing i D. C. Lehfeldt, Manager, Operations Planning andLScheduling S. R. Lockhaven, Specialist, Industrial Hygiene

]j G._V. Mulligan,. Supervisor, Shipping I J.,Cudmore, Senior Health Physics Technicia'n .i D.'A. Marlin,l Health Physics Technician l E.'E. Garrett, Manager, Machine Shop and Component. Fabrication.

N. Brown, Shift Supervisor, Ceramics ,

L.:Bradley, Health Physics' Technician. l s N. O. Eliason.. Supervisor', Rod Bundles i

.-S. D. Haug,' Chemical Technician W.-G. Sakach, Chemical Technician W. G. Keith, Plant Engineer,-Chemical and Conversion D. J. Barkhurst,. Senior Engineer, Plant Engineering and Ceramics J.- Logsdon, General' Supervisor, Ceramic Operations C. Francis, Project' Engineer' L E. T. Johnson, . Supervisor, Analytical Laboratory W.-Stavig, Senior' Operations Analyst ]  !

Denotes those attending the exit interview. l

2. Management Organization and Controls Section 9 of License SNM-1227 incorporated Part I and the Appendices to Part I of the' licensee's application as license conditions.  !

A. Organizational Structure Section 2.4 of~the. license application requires certain l organizational divisions of responsibility to provide a check and j balance system in the important areas of plant safety. j (1) The licensee's management organization remains unchanged; i therefore, the checks and balances in plant safety remain in I

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l No violations were identified. ,

L 3. Criticality Safety Section 3.2 of the license application requires assurance of criticality safety through both administrative and technical practices.

. A. The licensee had made significant progress in two of the three remaining parts of the Criticality Safety Task Force i l

recommendations. This item (85-02-05) remains open until completion 1 of the implementation of the recommendations.

l B. The Criticality Safety Specialist prepared a modification to the

. Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) Safety Manual which addresses the action to be taken when the loss of a criticality safety contingency -

is suspected. The modified procedure wasloeing circulated for review and approval. Item (87-05-02) remains open until the approved procedure is in place. {

C. During the tour of the site the inspector noted that the slab control practices in the analytical laboratory and at the special hoods in the-production areas were consistent with the posted criticality safety specifications. This closes item (86-05-01).

- D. The inspector observed that criticality safety specification spacing limits were met in the handling of recovered uranium solutions.

. This closes item (86-05-02).

E. The inspector discussed operating practices with the operators of the liquid uranium recovery process and found they were fully aware of the significance of the criticality safety controls for the operation.

F. The steam lance cracking addressed in the previous inspection report (70-1257/87-05) was discussed separately with the Senior Operations Analyst and the Chemical Engineer. They identified actions the licensee had taken. The licensee scheduled more frequent inspections of the steam lance. They had also included a modification to the steam lance that would reduce the possibility that a leak would have access to the path that previously permitted moisture to reach the converted powder. Further, the licensee is circulating an Engineering Change Notice (ECN) for approval to install additional sampling ports on the slab hoppers. The additional sampling will improve the representativeness of the samples taken for powder moisture analysis.

No violations were identified.

4. Operations Review Section 2.1 of the license application requires the licensee to conduct business in a manner so as to assure that the licensee facilities are safe from radiation and other nuclear hazards, and the operations will not be detrimental to the environs and to assure that personnel radiation

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,( exposures, both in plant ~and offsite, are maintained as' low as is P reasonably achievable (ALARA). 1 L -i

'A. Conduct of Operations

-(1)? The. licensee currently plans.to use lagoon number. 2,-recently [

repaired 1 to' temporarily hold the liquid uranuim recovery (LUR) i

, process ' effluent currently flowing into the nearly full lagoon L number 4..

i (2).LTheNeutronAbsorber-Facility (NAF)rollercontamination problem had-been effectively reduced through more frequent cleaning of the boats.and rollers. The records of airborne levels in the area reflected a reduction since the increase in- l attention to this source of contamination. This closes item l, (86-03-04).

(3).'The inspector reviewed the result of the gadolinium scrap recovery (GSR) process ventilation syst.em modification. The i air sampling data indicated that the change had been effective in reducing the airborne contamination in the area. This closes item (86-08-05),

q (4) The pallet contamination control improvements in the powder

. preparation room had been implemented. The drums are now transported between the powder preparation room and the pellet pressing area without the use of the pallets. 'This closes item .,

(84-10-02). A-ventilation system modification'was also made in L) the powder room. The drum tumbler ventilation was improved by t relocating 1100 ft.3 of airflow from a. redesigned hood to the-  !

drum tumbler area. The air samples for this area reflected  !

.approximately a thirty percent decrease in airborne i contamination levels. This closes item (85-06-01).

v (5) The licensee's review of the feasibility of installing a pressure ' sensor.in the vaporization chests found the sensors  !

too fragile. The licensee previously installed an infrared temperature sensor'and now-depends on it as'a redundant safety. l control in the cylinder heating procedure. Further, the licensee found that the automatic mechanical placement of .l thermocouple on UF6 cylindero in the vaporization chests. f produced less reliable temperature indication than the manual j placement. Therefore, the licensee continues to place j thermocouple manually and has discontinued the effort to j develope automatic thermocouple emplacement. This closes item j (86-02-01).

, (6) The licensee had previously set up the drum filling station, j for storing rinse solutions from UF6 cylinder washing, near the ]

waste packaging area in the U02 Building. The rinse solutions, '

transferred from safe geometry storage tanks only after receipt )

of acceptable measurements, are apparently handled carefully .!

based on the low levels of contamination in the area where the transfer is made. This closes item (86-03-03).

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' (7) The\ inspector visited the Specialty Fuels (SF)_ Building to

" w 4 observe'the status of'the licensee's new incinerator

, i installation.. The incinerator, the core of'the. licensee's

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, Solid. Waste Uranium Recovery (SWUR) Program, was being thermally cured prior to the startup. 'No uranium.is:in,the . l system during-the curing phase. -The Project. Engineer described.

4o . the system operation during the tour. The' inspector focussed

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. onithe steps'taken to assure that. packages of combustible waste 'l

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' feed _t'o:the incinerator would not result in'an' accumulation of

' uranium. exceeding the' criticality safety limits. The 4 non' destructive assay (NDA) system was in place for measuring

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'the packages just before they moved into the incinerator. .The' y

" system' facilitated removal of packages which if added to the- i

, incinerator w'ould cause it to exceed the criticality safety

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q J(8) The licensee's review of the performance'of the UF6 scrubber i identified a low collection efficiency. .The. licensee plans further study. The need for further study of this recently  ;

identified problem precludes closing item (86-02-03). The  :

results may warrant a closer look by the licensee's Development. i Group. j No violations were identified. I

5. Transportation / Radioactive Waste Management i

The licensee's program for packaging and shipment of licensed material

- must be!in accordance with 10 CFR 20.311 and 10 CFR 71. All low-level radioactive waste prepared by the licensee for disposal must also be .i classified and labeled to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 61. .j J

A. -The licensee revised the shipping procedure to include follow-up on j missing shipments as required by 10.CFR 20.311. The procedure had 'j been reviewed as required, approved and issued. This closes item (87-05-03).

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i B. During the course of the inspection, the Region V office contacted the inspector at the site to request a follow-up on a shipment of empty UF6 cylinder overpacks (no UF6 cylinders were contained'in'  :

this shipment of overpacks). The inspector found the licensee had  !

documented the required survey of the transport vehicle. The inspector'also interviewed the Health Physics Technician (HPT) who  ;

had performed the surveys. The HPT stated that the release survey ]

was performed as usual and included the truck cargo. The log of

• these release survey forms, kept by the guards, was made available j to the inspector. The inspector found the procedures had been a reviewed and approved. The procedures required that packages and/or '

L containers will be surveyed on receipt. Therefore, the licensee F therefore may have overpacks on site that have been surveyed on I' -arrival and which are ready for return shipment unless  ;

decontamination or refurbishing is needed based on the licensee's

surveys and inspections. The inspector discussed these observations j L j J

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,, with the: Hazardous Materials Inspector of the Fire. Marshal's Office; q tof the: Seattle Port Authority on Tuesday,' October. 13, 1987. 1 r.

No violations ~were identified.

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' 6. Radiation Protection'  ;

Pursuant to 10 CFR Part.20, the licensee is-required to provide

. protection against radiation hazards associated with licensee activities.

. - A. The inspector reviewed the additional bioassay data on the-individual maintenance worker: contaminated during a spill. The lung j count data and the bioassay data were below action levels. This.

closes item-(86-05-03).

1 8. The licensee is holding quarterly Health Physics Technician training  ;

sessions. -The' subject matter for these meetings held principally.on '!

$aturday include's:a review of problems currently being encountered. 1 This closes the (b) part of item (86-03-02). Part (c) of item I (86-03-02) addresses preparation of job checklists which are still

=in. preparation. Item (86-03-02) therefore remains open. 1

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- C. The inspector reviewed the Corporate Licensing records tracking '

. discrepancies. . The records now track. discrepancies through their.  !

. resolution. This closes item (86-03-06).- i 1

No violations-were identified.

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7. Emergency Preparedness. l 3

Section 3.9 of the license application addressed the licensee's Emergency j

Plan (XN-NF-32) which includes a listing of. procedures that have been 1

-prepared to implement the' plan.

l A. The inspector visited the machine shop in which a zirconium turnings

. fire had occurred'in a Star screw machine (see inspection report -

70-1257/87-05). 'The licensee's corrective action included"the . 1 installation of a manually dumped Halon' fire extinguishing system j with several penetrations into the machine enclosure. The system is 1 readily activated by a button at the operators position.

Additionally, the licensee changed from use of an oil based cutting t fluid to a water based cutting fluid. The Manager, Machine Shop and i Component Fabrication indicated that the syste: modifications performed effectively in extinguishing a subsequent fire. The j lubricant change also reduced the oil disposal problem previously  !

solved by burning the oil along with the zirconium turnings. The l zirconium burning is for the purpose of converting the zirconium to  !

a stable form for storage or transport.

i B. The inspector also visited the fuel element assembly area whero a previous fire, also discussed in the above referenced report, involved ~ hairlike zirconium fines. The hardware aspects of the 1 licensee's corrective action (acquisition of a wet vacuum and j installation of an electrical contact cover) were apparent. 1

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. y-However, the inspector noted that the hairlike zirconium fines, prevalant on the' floor, indicated that the more frequent cleanup of the: fines was not fully implemented. _This aspect of the corrective action will'be reviewed in the next inspection (87-08-01).

C. The licensee completed the installation of curbing in the UF6 cylinder storage area to preclude the flow of gasoline or diesel fuel to the cylinders. The. licensee's evaluation was not' reviewed; however, the action taken adequately responds to the concerns for the protection of stored full UF6 cylinders addressed in the task force recommendation 3.B.(1).

D. The inspector noted during the tour of the Engineering Laboratory Operation Building that the licensee had replaced the temporary construction materials with standard building materials. This significantly reduced the fire loading in the basement area of that building and adequately responds to task force recommendation 3.8.(3)(a).

E. The licensee stated that the City.of Richland had completed the installation of the 800 feet of 10 inch pipe between the 16 inch city main and the ANF fire protection system's southern feed. This bypassing of the 6 inch line in the southern feed eliminates the water volume and the water pressure concerns with respect to fire suppression.' The change adequately addresses the task force recommendation identified as 3.B.(4)(a).

F. The licensee conducted an exercise on September 22, 1987 that involved the City.of Richland' Fire Department, Northwest Health Services, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPS), Westinghouse Hanford,~Benton County, and the Kadlec Hospital. The scenario involved sounding fire alarms because of a postulated explosioa that resulted in a range of injuries'to nine employees. The first alarm was followed a little later by a criticality alarm while the injured were receiving fn st aid treatment from the emergency personnel. The exercise included transporting two of the injured to the Emergency Decontamination Facility (EDF), and seven of the injured to the emergency room of Kadlec Hospital. The exercise was audited onsite by staff from the licensee's Quality Assurance Group. The offsite phase at the EDF and Kadlec Hospital was under the control of WPPS. This c'oses item (86-08-08). The exercise documentation included the use of three camcorders which proved helpful for reviewing the exercise. The critique apparently identified those areas needing attention and the licensee proceeded to make the necessary changes. This closes item (86-08-07). The exercise was also responsive to the task force recommendations 3.F.(1), 3.F.(3), 3.F.(8), and 3.F.(9). The inclusion of the EDF and Kadlec Hospital in the exercise, transporting the injured to these sites, and noting their state of readiness met the objective of item (86-05-04). This item is closed.

G. The. inspector's review of the licensee's emergency procedures indicated that the licensee had described the Shift Supervisor's l

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responsibility as one of assuring evacuation, reporting to the Plant

' Emergency Director (PED), and standing by. Therefore, it appears  !

that'the emergency procedures do not clearly indicate that the Shift {

Supervisor has the authority to act for the PE0 during swing, i holiday, and weekend shifts for emergencies other than a criticality j alarm. -The license indicates that except for criticality alarms the j Shift Supervisor has the authority to act for the PED. Item j (86-08-13). remains open pending resolution of the difference between l the. procedure.and the practices.  ;

H. The licensee is pursuing acquisition of an ammonia monitor with a )

short response time. The unit,'already ordered, will undergo q testing ~. If its performance is satisfactory it will be installed {

where'an evaluation indicates the greatest need. The licensee is j progressing significantly on this matter and the other areas covered j L

by the task force recommendations. The licensee's completion of 'l specific recommendations will be reviewed and addressed during a- i routine inspection. {

I. The licensee has implemented a computer based preventative i maintenance (PM) program that generates a listing of emergency equipment by location. This facilitates inventorying emergency 1 supplies stored at specific locations. The inspector noted that the j maps showing criticality detector and stack sampler locations, that j were missing from the Emergency Command Post (mobile van) during the i task force review, were not included on the item PM emergency.  ;

equipment listing. Therefore, this item (86-08-09) will' remain open. '

8. Environmental Protection j y

Section 3.5 of the license application addresses the licensee's ]

Environmental Surveillance Program wherein gaseous effluents, liquid  !

effluents and lagoon systems are monitored. Additionally, the licensee  ;

collects vegetation, soil and air samples at strategic locations for the )

analysis of pertinent chemicals and uranium, i The results of the analyses of samples taken at the new and old sewerage j treatment plants in the City of Richland, Washington indicated that i uranium is accumulating in the sludge from the plants. The NRC samples from the new plant measured up to 126 picocuries uranium per gram of l sludge (on a dry basis). The sample enrichments were a little more than '

2 percent. The licensee's uranium concentration measurements were about a factor of ten less because they were reported on a wet basis. The licensee's wet basis reporting represents the sludge composition as it is '

shipped to a landfill from the sewerage treatment plant. The NRC measurements for the fairly dry sample taken from the old sewerage treatment plant (currently being demolished) was 142 pCi U/gm. This sludge contained about 26% water indicating that natural drying over a two or three year period results in sludge dryer than that shipped from j the new sewerage treatment plant. The inspector visited the landfill. (

The inspector was informed by the workers that the sludge was dumped at y the site, and after the top layer dried the sludge was disked 1 periodically to facilitate drying of the other portions of the sludge.

The workers also indicated that the drier sludge from the old sewerage

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treatment' plant.was mixed'with water and sprayed on-a' cleared area.' /The

. sprayed sludge-was mixed by1 disking after:the 'upperLlayer. dried. .,

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1No' violations were identified. i

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'"( ' 9. - Exit Meeting q-The resultsJof the inspection were discussed with the licensee's staff:

vi identified in Section 1. :The topics-included:

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Sludge measurements'for samples taken at the.old and new sewage' i

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treatment plants,  :!

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• lStatusofopenitems, j d

Closed items 14 Open items-(old)-18 0 pen items (new) 1

'I'ncinerator status and' feed controls,

. Empty;overpack shipment review; f

- Cracked packing . nuts on UF6 cylinder valves,- U Some assessment team' recommendations discussed during the inspection e were not included.here because-the licensee's practices were not. l E iobserved of planned. actions were:not completed though significant  !

progress had beenimadc. J l

The licensee commented that ANF had to' acquire about twenty-five (25) )

valves to. continue operations when'the Superior Lot 16-22 valves were

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. removed from service.

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