ML20044G121

Insp Rept 70-1257/93-04 on 930226-0409.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Criticality Safety Controls Radiological Controls & Special Insp Topics

ML20044G121
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	05/19/1993
From:	Proulx L, Reese J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20044G105	List: ML20044G104 ML20044G113 ML20044G121
References
70-1257-93-04, 70-1257-93-4, NUDOCS 9306020050
Download: ML20044G121 (6)

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V Report No: 70-1257/93-04 License No. SNM-1227 Licensee:

Siemens Power Corporation 2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, Washington 99352-0130 Facility Name: Siemens Power Corporation Inspection Location: Ri land, Washington Inspection Conducted:

February ril 9, 1993 h

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O Inspectorn

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"Froulx,' Res' nt Inspector, WNP-2 Date signed i

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6!/9 O Approved by:

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(f. Reese,' Chie'f Ddte Gigned ameilities Radiological Protection Branch r

Summary:

Areas Inspected:

Routine inspection on a once a week basis by the inspector of control room operations, licensee action on previous inspection findings, criticality safety controls, radiological controls, special inspection topics, and procedural adherence. During this inspection, inspection procedures 88020, 83822 and 30703.

Results:

In the areas inspected, the licensee's performance appeared satisfactory. The following items were of particular note:

Summary of Violations and Deviations: One violation was identified involving the failure to follow criticality safety control in the U,0, facility.

i Open Items Summary:

No followup items were closed. One new enforcement item was opened.

t 9306020050 930519 i

PDR ADOCK 07001257 C

PDR

.s DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted i

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• B. N. Femreite, Plant Manager

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• R. L. Feuerbacher, Operations Manager

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• R. E. Vaughan, Manager, Safety, Security, and Licensing l

L. J. Maas, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

.l J. H. Phillips, Supervisor, Chemical Operations T. C. Probasco, Supervisor, Safety l

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• E. L. Foster, Supervisor, Radiological Safety

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• C, D. Manning, Criticality Safety Engineer

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• R. K. Burklir., Health Physics l

• J. B. Edgar, Staff Engineer, Licensing The inspector also interviewed various control room operators, shift a

supervisors, engineers, and management personnel.

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• Attended the Exit Meeting on April 9, 1993.

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Criticality Safety (88020)

The inspector observed the following items during tours to verify conformance with criticality safety requirements:

l a.

In-process Operations

'l Over the inspection period, the inspector observed licenseeThe

-l personnal conformance to criticality safety requirements.

sampl-

as such that the entire process from conversion from UF.

l to UD,, to fabrication of fuel rods was _ covered.

The criticality

-l safety limit cards found locally and in EMF-38 were used as a j

guideline..The inspector found during most observations, licensee j

personnel appeared to be closely following the posted criticality

-l requirements.

i (3) However, on March 5, 1993, the inspector observed a discrepancy

.l The j

with operations associated with the oxidation furnaces.

oxidation process consists of heating scrap U0, pellets in a j

furnace to produce 0,0, powder. This powder is added to'the j

dry conversion process directly to the blenders in the powder.

j preparation area. Trays of U0, pellets are stacked five high l

with 0.75 inch vertical separation by use of supports located j

in the corners of the trays. The inspector observed that most i

1 of the trays were badly warped such that the 0.75 inch i

separation w&s not maintained due to the physical configuration of the trays.

In addition, four of the trays were stacked directly on top of each other, and not on the supports which provided the minimum vertical separation.

The inspectar j

informed the. furnace operator and the criticality safety-

,l The-i specialist (CSS), who were both nearby.at the time.

furnace operator correctly stacked the trays and-removed trays

' j from furnace operations that had the worst warping.

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The CSS issued a criticality' safety corrective action report.

In addition, the CSS determined that this event was not l

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reportable to the NRC pursuant to NRC bulletin 91-01..The l

inspector retiewed the corrective action report. The description of the event or condition in the corrective action j

report did not appear to completely describe the event. The i

description stated "Several U,0, furnace oxidation trays have warped due to normal wear and heat during soak time in the furnaces." The inspector was concerned that the corrective action report did not also include the personnel performance issue of the furnace operator not stacking the trays on the supports that provide the vertical separation. The inspector discussed his concerns with licensee management.

Licensee i

management acknowledged the inspectors concerns, but stated that the most effective corrective actions would be a possible design change for the trays to preclude warping. Licensee l'

management stated that the present state of the warped trays sends a mixed message to operators with respect to following i

criticality safety requirements.

The CSS subsequently reanalyzed the array for the oxidation trays and found that the vertical separation requirement was unnecessary to keep the material subcritical under all i

postulated conditions.

License Condition No. 9 of License No. SNM-1227 authorizes the use of licensed materials in accordance with the statements, representations, and conditions contained in Part I of the licensee's application dated July 1987, and supplements dated November 12, 1987, through January 20, 1993.

Section 2.5 " Operating Procedures, Standards, and Guides," Part i

1 of the license application, states in part that the licensee j

conducts its business in a system of Standard Operating i

Procedures, Company Standards, and Policy Guides. Appendix 9 l

of this manual states in part: " Strictly follow procedures and limits provided by postings."

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Paragraph 1.3 of EMF-38 " Criticality Safety Specifications and

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Limit Cards" states in part:

" Criticality Safety Limit Cards are required at individual work stations or storage locations as designated by the criticality safety component. The postings shall provide the limits and controls under which fissile material can be handled safely." Criticality Safety l

Analysis (CSA) U-4.2 "U,0 Tray Loading, Furnaces, and Tray Unloading Hoods" Rev. 3, Part II " Limits and Controls to Assure j

Criticality Safety" and Criticality Safety Limit Card P90,052 i

i Revision 0 require-in part 6 that the furnace tray stack dimensions are as follows: " Tray Stack; Five trays high with

.75 " edge-to-edge vertical separation between trays." Because i

the licensee failed to meet the posted limit card requirements I

as stated above, this is a violation of URC requirements.

l (Violation 70-1257/93-04-01) q (2) On March 24, 1993, during a tour of the UD, building, the

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inspector noted three locations in which a sign identifying the j

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area as containing fissile material was missing.

Licensee procedures require these signs to be posted in any location in which fissile material is processed or stored.

However, the inspector interviewed the operators in the area and concluded that personnel were well aware that fissile material was stored The inspector notified the CSS of these in those areas.

discrepancies and the problems were corrected.

b.

Monitoring Instrumentation The inspector observed process instruments for correlation between The channels and for conformance with license requirements.

inspector also interviewed various operators on the recent design changes such as the temperature monitoring instrumentation for the Monitoring instrumentation appeared to be slab hoppers.

satisfactory for the processes and applications reviewed by the inspector.. The inspector also concluded that the operators were l

well trained for all of the recent design changes and the updated procedures that implemented these design changes.

c.

Ecuipment Lineups l

The inspector verified valves and electrical breakers to be in the position or condition required by administrative procedures for the This verification included routine control applicable process.

board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.

Equipment lineups appeared to be satisfactory for the conversion processes in progress.

d.

Eauipment Taqqing 1

Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment was in the condition specified.. Although tagging was generally-considered satisfactory, the inspector noted one instance in which an engineer removed'a danger tag from a component and left the tag under the component, rather than removing the tag from the area.

Although this instance did not appear to be an immediate safety hazard, repeat instances may result in personnel not returning tags j

to components, if tags fall ~off their component.

General Plant Eauipment Conditions

.I e.

Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the -

_i Although.no.

system fcom fulfilling its functional requirements.

conditions were noted in which equipment could not function j

properly, the inspector noted a number of UNH and ADU leaks throughout the inspection period. These were brought to the j

attention of licensee personnel and were promptly corrected.

1 The inspector noted that a rubber glove was used was used in lieu of a pipe cap to prevent liquid spillage from a pipe that had a component removid.

Licensee management stated that this condition j

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did not meet their expectations, and that it provides the appearance of an infcrmal maintenance work isolation.

f.

Fire Protection The inspector observed fire fighting equipment and controls for conformance with administrative procedures.

Fire protection provisions appeared to be satisfactory.

g.

Plant Chemical Analyses The inspector reviewed chemical analyses for conformance with administrative control procedures to ensure only dry powder was introduced into vessels with unfavorable geometries.

Chemical analyses and records appeared to be satisfactory during this inspection period.

h.

Plant Housekeepinq The inspector observed plant conditions and material / equipment storage to determine the general state of cleanliness and-housekeeping. Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and i

airborne contamination. Early in the inspection period, the U02 l

building had a large number of housekeeping problems, including rags, waste paper, empty containers, etc. in the work areas.

Towards the end of the inspection period, the inspector observed l

housekeeping to have improved.

~l One violation was identified, as discussed above.

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3.

Radiation Protection Controls (83822)

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i The inspector periodically ~ observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and 'in compliance with regulatory requirements. Tha inspector also observed compliance with postings, proper wearing of p otective equipment and personnel monitoring devices,..

and personnel friskag practices.

Radiation monitoring equipment was frequently monitorer to verify operability and adherence to calibration--

l frequency.

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Overall,_ licensee compliance with radiation protection procedures

-l appeared to be satisfactory. However, on April 2, 1993, the inspector noted a discrepancy with an Airborne Radioactivity Area posting.

The j

inspector entered the Vaporization Chest room for line 2, through one_

j door that was not' posted as an airborne area.

However, the inspector i

exited the room from another door that supports traffic into the line 2 l

vaporization chest room. This door was posted to indicate that the j

vaporization chest room was an airborne radioactivity area. The inspector contacted Health Physics, and the HP technician performed an airborne survey of the area. The air sample was less than the applicable l

limit.

Licensee investigation revealed that an operator removed the

'l posting from only one door in haste to support cleaning of the' area. The tj i

l posting from only.one door in haste to support cleaning of the area. The inspector discussed this incident with licensee management who stated that they would continue to emphasize good radiological practices with the crews, and will ensure personnel do not become lackadaisical in adherence to HP requirements.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Exit Meeting (30703) i The inspector met _ with licensee management representatives periodically during the report period to. discuss inspection status, and an exit meeting was conducted with the indicated personnel (refer to paragraph 1) on April 9,1993. The scope of the inspection and the inspectors' findings, as noted in this report, were discussed with and acknowledged

.l by the licensee representatives.

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